



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.


GIFT OF
Mrs. SARAH P. WALSWORTH.


Received October, 1894.

Accessions No. 58202 Class No.

E. P. Walsworth
Marysville

2,0
C. 511











A

COMMENTARY

ON THE

EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

BY

MOSES STUART,

Late Prof. of Sacred Literature in the Theol. Sem. at Andover.

THIRD EDITION, CORRECTED AND ENLARGED.

ANDOVER:

PUBLISHED BY WARREN F. DRAPER.

1854.

BS2665
S8
1854

58202

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1832, by
MOSES STUART,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

I PUBLISH to the world the result of my labours upon the Epistle to the Romans with unfeigned diffidence, and with a trembling sense of the responsibility which I incur by so doing. This epistle has been the grand arena, if I may so express myself, on which theological combatants have been contending ever since the third century, and perhaps still earlier. The turn which the apostle James has given to his discussion respecting justification, makes it probable that even in his time there were some who abused the words of Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, concerning the doctrine of 'justification by faith without the deeds of law.' If so, then it would seem that there has been no period since this epistle was written, in which its meaning has not been more or less a subject of contest.

How could this be otherwise, since it discusses the highest and most difficult of all the doctrines which pertain to the Christian system? Men must be more alike in their early education, their illumination, their habits of reasoning, and their theological convictions, than they have hitherto been, and they must love God and each other better than they have ever yet done, not to differ in their interpretation of the Epistle to the Romans. It strikes at the root of all human pride and vain-glory; it aims even a deadly blow. And where a passionate attachment to these is rankling in the breast, how is it possible that this epistle should meet with a welcome reception, and the authority of its simple and obvious meaning be admitted? Even where the remains of such an attachment are still lurking within, and only now and then developing themselves, because the heart is in some measure unsanctified, there we cannot expect to find an unprejudiced interpretation of the writing in question. An epistle which is, as it were, the very *Confession of Faith* that a true Christian is to make, must needs receive an interpretation more or less forced, on the part of all who are influenced by pride, by passion, by prejudice, by ill-directed early instruction, or by ignorance.

For these reasons, an interpreter of this epistle must expect opposition at the present day, let his views be what they may. Be he Calvinist, Arminian, Pelagian, Antinomian, Socinian, or of any other sect, it is in vain for him to think of escape. Paul is a writer too formidable to be acknowledged as an opponent. Hence, when he is interpreted so that the views of one party in any particular point seem to be favoured, other parties are very apt to unite in condemning the interpretation. Nothing will satisfy them but to have such a writer explained as siding with them. Alas, then, for the interpreter! While he meets, perhaps, with the approbation of a few, he must of course expect the vehement dissent of many. He must make up his mind, therefore, before he publishes, to bear with all this, and to bear with it patiently and firmly; or else he had better abstain from publishing. It may appear to him as a very undesirable remuneration for painful and long-protracted labours; but it is one which others have been obliged to receive, and which he also must expect. The only offset for all the pains which this may occasion him, must be the hope, that his labours after all may do some good; and that, if they do not themselves on the whole directly advance the cause of truth, they may at

least be the means of exciting others to make inquiries, which will result in the accomplishment of such an end.

For myself, I do not profess to be free from all prejudices of education and all attachment to system, in such a degree as to make it certain that my views may not sometimes be affected by them. Nor do I profess to be so illuminated in respect to divine things, and so skilled in the original language and criticism of the New Testament, as to be certain that all my conclusions respecting the meaning of the epistle before us are correct. *Homo sum, et nihil humani a me alienum puto*. When, therefore, I speak in the *indicative* mood, and say that this means thus and so, the reader will not understand that any thing more is intended, than that this is true in my opinion. To be always dealing in the *conditional* mood, and filling one's pages with *if, perhaps, probably, possibly, may it not, can it not, &c., &c.*, would be intolerable in such a writing as a commentary. Besides, it would represent the author himself as in a perpetual state of doubt or uncertainty. This I cannot truly say of myself. My convictions, for the most part, have become definite and full in respect to far the greater portion of the Epistle to the Romans. To represent them otherwise, would be to misrepresent them.

But this does not imply that I am insensible to the weakness of human nature, or to my exposedness to err. If I have any knowledge of my own heart, it is very far from such insensibility. After all, however, a man who is liable to err, may form opinions, and may be satisfied that they are correct. This all men do, and must do; and all which can be properly demanded of them is, that they should hold themselves open to conviction, whenever adequate reasons are offered to convince them of their errors.

In this position, I trust and believe, do I hold myself, as to the opinions advanced in the interpretations that follow. I can say truly, that there are no opinions advanced here, which have been hastily taken up. I have been long engaged in the exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, and have studied it much more than any other part of the Bible. I have taken an extensive range in consulting commentators ancient and modern, as well as exegesis contained in theological essays and systems. This, however, I mention for one purpose, and one only, viz., to show that I have not come lightly to the responsible task of writing and publishing a commentary on the epistle under consideration; and that the opinions, therefore, which are advanced in it, are not the offspring of mere education or hasty conjecture.

Dissent, and probably contradiction, are almost of course to be expected. I may be permitted, however, respectfully to solicit those who may see fit to publish any thing of this nature, that they would investigate thoroughly, before they condemn, what I have said. When they have so done, I shall value their opinion, however it may differ from my own. Aiming, as I trust I do, at the development of truth, I shall rejoice to find any of my errors corrected (for errors, no doubt, there are in my work); and, if the correction be made in the spirit of love and Christian friendship, so much the more acceptable will it be. If it be made in a different spirit, and is still a real correction, I would fain hope for magnanimity enough to say: *Fas est ab hoste doceri*.

From some of those who have never deeply studied the Epistle to the Romans, and who have a traditional and systematic exegesis which answers their purposes in an *a priori* way, I may probably expect, in regard to some things, vehement and unqualified dissent. Such, however, can hardly assert the right of demanding that my views should be accommodated to theirs; since we proceed in our respective interpretations, on grounds so exceedingly diverse. I hope, therefore, that such will excuse me from any obligation to contend with their exegesis.

To those who may differ from me, after thorough research, I can only say: 'The field is open; as open for you as for me. You have the same right to publish your thoughts to the world, as I have to publish mine; and as good a

right to defend your views, as I have to proffer mine. The result of doing this, if done with deep, attentive, protracted consideration, and in the spirit of kindness, cannot be otherwise than favourable to the interests of truth. I may not live to vindicate my own views where just, or to abandon the errors of which you might convince me; but others will live, who will do the one or the other for me, should it become necessary. The truth, at last, must and will prevail.'

I confess, frankly, that I do not expect for this book the favour of such as are truly *sectarians*. I have written it, so far as in my power, without any regard to sect or name. Doubtless my efforts have been imperfect; but so far as in me lay, the one only and simple inquiry with me has been: What did Paul mean to teach? What Calvin, or Augustine, or Edwards, or Arminius, or Grotius, or any other theologian or commentator has taught or said, has been with me only secondary and subordinate. No one is farther from disrespect to the great and good than myself; but when explaining the Bible, to call no man *master*, and to bow to no system as such, are sacred principles with me. If I have not always adhered to them, it results from my imperfection; not from any conscious and allowed design. Of course, all *partymen* in theology will probably find some things in the following pages with which they will not agree. How can it be otherwise? I have, to the utmost of my power, left their systems out of sight, and made it my constant and only effort, to follow simply the way in which the apostle seems to lead me. Such a course will be estimated differently from what it now is, when less attachment to system and party in theology, and more of simple-hearted love of truth, just as it stands in the Scripture, shall prevail in the churches.

My views of Rom. v. 12—19, of vii. 5—25, and of viii. 28, seq., will no doubt be controverted. I have anticipated this; for who can help knowing that these passages have for time immemorial been the great *πρόσκομμα καὶ σκάνδαλον* of theology? To hazard an interpretation here, and not to accompany it with reasons, would be justly deemed presumptuous. To give reasons, demands at least the appearance of *theologizing*. Whatever of this exists in the Commentary or the Excursus, is, I may say, involuntary on my part. It is inserted only to guard against being misunderstood, or else to support the interpretation which I have given. In order to do this, it is now and then necessary to show that a different interpretation is replete with difficulties, some of which are insurmountable.

Those who are disposed to find fault with what they may call my *theological* discussions,—brief and seldom as they are,—would probably not make any objections to such discussions, had the result of them been accordant with their own views, or with those of the authors whom they highly esteem. But how can I be under obligation, to make wishes of this nature a rule to guide my interpretations, or my explanation and defence of them? I know of no precept in Theory, nor any obligation from usage, which hinders an interpreter from reasoning upon the doctrines which the Scriptures appear to teach, or which they have been represented as teaching. How can it be one's duty not to guard against the misrepresentation of his own views in respect to the meaning of Scripture, and not to defend those views by producing the arguments which appear to justify them?

Whatever the following pages contain, either of truth or error, they have been written under no ordinary sense of responsibility. The epistle itself must needs create such a feeling in the breast of every reflecting man, who undertakes to comment upon it; and, in addition to this, I have been repeatedly interrupted in my labours by my state of health; and this under circumstances which rendered it not improbable, that I should not live to see the completion of my work. The day of my account cannot be far distant; and in view of it, can I publish to the world what I do not seriously regard as being true? Can party purposes have any strong attractions for a man in such a condition? I hope and trust I can say, that the tribunal before which this and all other

works are to be finally judged, appears to me a matter of immeasurably higher interest than all the praise or blame which men can bestow.

May that omniscient and merciful Being, the God of love and truth, forgive whatever of error may be in this book; and accept and bless to the good of his church, whatever of truth is explained or defended!

I should be ungrateful if I should omit to mention my special obligations to some of the interpreters, who have laboured to explain the Epistle to the Romans. Calvin, Grotius, J. A. Turretin, Flatt, and Tholuck have been my favourite authors; although I have by no means confined my reading to these. Most of all am I indebted to the excellent book of Tholuck on this epistle. In particular, I have often relied on him in my statements with respect to the opinions of other commentators, whom I had not at hand, or whom I did not think it important to consult myself, because I confided in his account of their views. But in all cases, where any considerable importance was attached to the opinion of this or that individual, and where it was in my power to consult, I have consulted for myself. Prof. Tholuck will easily perceive, also, if the following sheets should pass under his eye, that I am indebted to him for various classical quotations and allusions, and also for not a few valuable philological remarks, as well as views of the reasoning and argumentation of the apostle. He has my most unfeigned thanks for all the aid which his excellent work has afforded me.

He will also perceive that in some places I differ from him; I do this, as I trust, in the spirit of kindness and brotherly love. When I do differ, I always give my reasons for it. As I fully believe that his only aim is to come to the knowledge and development of truth, so I trust he will put a candid estimate on the full and frank expression of my own views, where they differ from his. May our respective labours and inquiries help to promote the great object which we both have in view!

Throughout, I have adopted and expressed no views or opinions without study; and none upon the *authority* of others. Those who read the following pages will perceive, I apprehend, that while I have not neglected the study of other writers, I have not omitted to study and think for myself. In this way only can any advance be hoped for, in the all-important work of interpreting the Bible.

I have only to add, that the present work is designed, in a special manner, for *beginners* in the study of interpretation; and this fact will account for the occasional repetitions and particularity of illustration, which the reader will not unfrequently meet with, in his perusal of this volume. If all the young men in our country, who repair to theological Seminaries, or who devote themselves in any way to the study of sacred criticism, had been trained in early life to the study of the classics, on such grounds as are adopted in the Gymnasias of Europe, many a minute remark might be spared which is now made. The reader who finds some things which are superfluous for himself, when he calls this to mind, will grant me pardon for being minute and particular. Commentary written in a *general* way, leaves only a general and indistinct impression. It is not my aim to accomplish merely such an end.

The more practised interpreter will not, for the most part, be displeased with being frequently reminded of principles in grammar and criticism, which are in themselves important, and which need, in our biblical studies, to be kept constantly before the mind.*

M. STUART.

THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, ANDOVER. }
Sept., 1832.

* I have omitted a short paragraph here, which is not apposite to the present edition.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

SINCE the publication of the first edition of this Commentary, several works have appeared, some of which are adapted to afford aid of no inconsiderable importance. New editions of Usteri's *Creed of Paul* (Lehrbegriff Pauli), with the commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans by Beneke, Glöckler, Ruckert, and Reiche, have been published in Germany; and, in our own country, the Rev. A. Barnes of Philadelphia has also published a brief but very comprehensive and valuable work on the same epistle. All of these, with the exception of Ruckert, which has not come to hand, have been consulted by me in preparing the present edition. The work of Reiche (in two octavos) is exceedingly copious. I have been aided in some respects by his *philology*; for his *theology* is any thing but consistent and evangelical. His book in various respects is an able one; but his method is confused, and his manner often tedious. Yet no commentator on this epistle should now choose to dispense with the use of him. I thank him sincerely for the valuable hints that he has given me, of which I have omitted no opportunity to avail myself.

The works of Beneke and Glöckler are short. The first holds to the pre-existence of human souls, and accounts for the present degradation of men, on the ground of sin in a previous state; the second appears to be a moderate Pantheist of the recent school, and not unfrequently exhibits a portion of their mysticism. Yet both of these writers are in the main sensible men, and appear to possess serious and evangelical feelings. I have obtained some hints from each, which I consider as of value.

From Usteri's new edition I have also taken some hints. From Mr. Barnes' work I have also derived aid; and especially have I been often cheered on my way, by finding the result of his investigations to tally so well with my own.

I have altered, and I hope amended, so many passages in this edition, that to specify them all is out of question. I have bestowed on it scarcely less labour than the first writing cost me. On many places, indeed I may say on all, which I have not materially altered, I have bestowed much study in order to satisfy myself that they should remain unchanged. Many *additions* have been made to the work. If the reader wishes to know the nature of them, he may compare notes on Chap. IV., V., and the Excursus appended, with those of the first edition. I have spared no effort that I could bestow, to make my work more deserving than before of public approbation; and in particular I have laboured to do this, as it respects the *grammatical* part of the commentary and the explanation of the particles.

I hesitated for a time whether I should not *abridge* the Excursus on Rom. v. 12—19, instead of enlarging them as I have now done. My reason for this hesitation was, that I had written in part an examination of the subject of Original Sin, and hoped to be able to illustrate and fortify some of the views which I had before advanced, to more advantage in a separate Essay, than could be done in Excursus where one is hedged in on every side through want of room. But as the plan of my Essay requires, in order to complete it, so wide an extent of reading as to both ancient and modern writings, I cannot well predict when I may be able to complete it, under such numerous and pressing duties as lie

upon me. I have therefore retained so much of my former *Excursus* on chap. v. as my plan of corrections would permit, and made many additions to them; some of which will at least serve to make the views I really entertain more explicit, and, as I would hope, better understood. That there is some want of unity of plan, and some repetition in the *Excursus*, is certainly apparent: but this is owing to causes that were beyond my control, and which it would be useless for me to particularize in this place.

I offer no apology for the changes and corrections that I have made in this edition of my commentary; being fully satisfied, that in a work of such an extent as the present, and embracing such a great variety of topics, if its author does not find reason in a republication to change and correct some of his first views, it is merely because he has not continued to study and investigate. For myself, I am so far from being satisfied with my first efforts, that they only serve to stimulate me to new labours of investigation, in order more fully to ascertain whether they will abide a thorough scrutiny. Experience has taught me, that first views on subjects so difficult as some of those which the *Epistle to the Romans* discusses, are not always the safest. If there be any whose first impressions are always and only right, and who find no reason to alter and amend, they will not sympathize with these remarks; but others who, like myself, are obliged to investigate a second time, and review and amend, will enter fully into the meaning of what I say.

I have scarcely referred in any part of my book, even in my own mind, to any of the criticisms that have been made upon it in periodicals. I do not wish to appear as a polemic, in such a work as this. Those who have kindly given their approbation to the first edition of the work, will not complain of my course; and those who have attacked it with earnestness, ought not to complain. By this latter class I have been *theologically* and not *philologically* reviewed; and that, at times, evidently without the writers having read any thing more than some of the *Excursus* with which they disagreed. In a few instances, the style and manner of attack has been such as manifestly to preclude all attempt at reply; in some others, the matter contained in the criticisms has not seemed to me to present any thing but the most common suggestions, of every day's polemic theology; and to repeat and confute this, would be *agere actum*. But, even if matter and manner might seem to demand or admit a reply, it would be unwise to make a *commentary* the scene of battleground between contending parties. I have spoken without restraint my own sentiments; but I have not intended to speak them as a polemic.

The first edition of this work was disposed of within so short a time, that my other engagements did not permit me sooner to accomplish my preparations for a second edition. I could not prepare, moreover, in a way consistent with the plan which I had adopted, until I had obtained the recent commentaries on the *Epistle to the Romans*, which have appeared since my first edition was published. Even now, several writers on this epistle are lingering in the press, whose works I should be glad to possess, but for which I could not think it my duty any longer to wait. Should I live to hear a call for another edition, I shall have my eye upon them, and shall not fail to draw from them all that I can which is appropriate to my object. In the mean time, I would hope that the present edition may be useful to such as are desirous of critically studying the *Epistle to the Romans*.

M. STUART.

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

§ 1. *Of the first planting of the church at Rome.*

HISTORY affords no certain evidence respecting the individual who first preached the gospel at Rome. The Romish church indeed maintain, that Peter was the founder of the first Christian community in that city. Irenæus (adv. Hæreses III. 1), and Eusebius (Chron. ad. ann. 2 Claudii), are the witnesses to whom the appeal is particularly made, in order to confirm this opinion. But although these Fathers had undoubtedly heard such a tradition, and (as it appears by the passages above cited) gave credit to it, yet there is substantial reason for doubting the correctness of it. The statement of Eusebius implies, that Peter came to Rome in the second year of Claudius' reign, *i. e.*, A.D. 43*. Jerome states, that Peter came to Rome in the second year of Claudius' reign, in order to counteract the influence of Simon Magus there; and that he resided in that city, and held the office of a bishop in it, for twenty-five years, *i. e.*, until the last year of Nero's reign, in which he suffered martyrdom; De Viris illustr. c. I. But neither Eusebius, nor any of the most ancient ecclesiastical writers, make mention of such a period. Whence Jerome obtained information respecting it, he does not tell us; and some leading critics among the Roman Catholics, *e. g.*, Valesius, Pagi, Baluzius, and others, give no credit to this part of his narration.

That Peter visited Rome at some period of his life, before the close of Nero's reign, cannot well be doubted. Origen (in Euseb. Hist Ecc. III. 1), and Dionysius of Corinth (flor. c. ann. 117), as related by Eusebius (II. 25), testify to this in such a manner that it cannot well be rejected, without giving up the credibility of all ancient historical testimony of the like nature. Caius, a presbyter, at

* 'Ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς Κλαυδίου βασιλείας, sc. anno secundo; Euseb. Ecc. Hist. II. 14.

the commencement of the third century, mentions that he saw at Rome the graves of Paul and Peter; Euseb. Hist. Ecc. II. 25. The doubts of many Protestants relative to the fact that Peter visited Rome, and the assertions of Salmasius, Spanheim, and others, that this could not have been the case, appear to be without any solid foundation.

But that Peter did not go to Rome as bishop in the second year of Claudius' reign, nor indeed before the Epistle of Paul to the Romans was written, seems to be nearly or quite certain. (1) In Acts xii. 3, 4, we find an account of Peter's being imprisoned by Herod Agrippa, in the last year of this king's reign (comp. v. 23); and this year synchronizes with the *fourth* year of Claudius. Of course Peter was at Jerusalem, not at Rome, *after* the period when Jerome and Eusebius affirm that he went to Rome and resided there. (2) We find Peter at Jerusalem in the *ninth* (some say eleventh) year of Claudius; he being present at the council there, Acts xv. 6, seq. (3) Nothing is said in the book of Acts, or in the New Testament, respecting Peter's visiting Rome; and if he had done so, before the time at which the history in the book of Acts terminates, we can hardly suppose so important an occurrence would have escaped the notice of Luke. (4) Paul came as a prisoner to Rome, in the 7th year of Nero's reign, *i. e.*, A.D. 60 (but some say in 62 or 63); on which occasion there is no mention, and there seems to have been among the Jews of that city no knowledge, of Peter, Acts xxviii. 17, seq. (5) Could Paul have addressed the Romans as he did in his epistle, if he had recognised them as disciples of Peter? Could he have written his whole epistle without once adverting to this fact? (6) If Peter was at Rome when Paul wrote this epistle, how could the latter fail to send a salutation to him as well as to others?

So late, then, as A.D. 57 or 58, when the Epistle to the Romans was probably written, it seems to be nearly certain that Peter had not been at Rome. The flourishing and apparently numerous church there, must therefore have been gathered by some other person than Peter.

But who was this person? A question that cannot be answered with any certainty; although we may arrive at some probabilities respecting it. In the salutations which Paul sends to the church at Rome, he mentions (xvi. 7) Andronicus and Junias, as having been his *fellow-prisoners*, and as *ἐπίσημοι ἐν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις*, they having become Christians earlier than himself. What hinders the supposition, that one or both of these men, perhaps converts on the notable day of Pentecost (Acts ii. 10), and of high repute among the apostles themselves, may have first spread the knowledge of the gospel in the metropolis of the Roman Empire, of which they were inhabitants, or in which they were at least residents? Rufus, also, a distinguished Christian, whose mother had shown much kindness to Paul (Rom.

xvi. 13), may have been one of the founders, or at least fosterers, of the Roman church; possibly the same Rufus, whose father (a native of Cyrene) was compelled to bear the cross of Jesus, when on his way to Calvary, Mark xv. 21. Others, moreover, who are mentioned in Rom. xvi., may have been, and probably were, contributors to the work of establishing or building up the church at Rome. At all events, there was opportunity for a very early establishment of it; inasmuch as we find persons from this city present at Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost, Acts ii. 10. We know, also, that Christians were scattered abroad, when the persecution of Stephen occurred; at first in Judea and Samaria, Acts viii. 1; afterwards to more distant regions, Acts xi. 19; and what hinders us from supposing that some of them may have come to Rome itself, preaching the gospel?

That the church at Rome was *early* planted, seems probable from the fame which it had acquired throughout the Christian world (Rom. i. 8; xvi. 19), when Paul wrote his epistle. That the persons concerned in the establishment of it were Paul's particular friends and acquaintances, with whom he had met and conferred, while preaching in Asia or in Greece, appears very plain from the manner of the salutations in chap. xvi. 3—16. In respect to Aquila and Priscilla, we have a definite knowledge, from Acts xviii. 1—3, 18, 26, and from what is said in Rom. xvi. 3, 4. Others are called the *kinsmen* (*συγγενεῖς*) of Paul, viz. Andronicus and Junias, ver. 7; Herodion, ver. 11. Others again are called ἀγαπητοί, συνεργοί, ἐκλεκτοί κοπιῶντες ἐν τῷ κυρίῳ, &c. Moreover, the manner in which Paul addresses the church of Rome, *i. e.*, the plain, familiar, authoritative tone of the letter, shows that he considered himself as addressing those who were in effect his own disciples, or, in other words, such as had probably been converted to Christianity under the preaching of his own particular friends and spiritual children. Hence, too, the frequent expressions of strong affection for the church at Rome, and of strong sympathy with them.

On the whole, although we have no definite history of the planting of the church at Rome (excepting the one given by Jerome, which is not entitled to credit), yet we may consider it as quite probable, that some of the persons named in the salutation (xvi. 3—16) were entitled to the honour of having founded a church in the metropolis of the Roman empire.

§ 2. *Of the constituent parts of the church at Rome.*

Nothing can be clearer, than that a considerable portion of the church at Rome consisted of Jewish converts; ii. 17—iii. 19; iv. 1, 12, vii. 1—4, and chapters ix.—xi. Nor is there any serious difficulty of a historical nature, in making out the probability of this. When Pompey overran Judæa with a conquering army, about 63 years

before the Christian era, he caused many captive Jews to be sent to Rome. There they were sold into slavery, as was usual in respect to captives taken in war. But their persevering and unconquerable determination to observe the Sabbath, and to practise many of the Levitical rites and customs, gave their Roman masters so much trouble, that they chose to liberate them rather than to keep them. As there was a large body of persons so liberated, the government assigned them a place opposite Rome, across the Tiber, where they built a town which was principally inhabited by Jews. Here Philo found them, just before Paul's time; Legat. ad Caium. p. 1014, ed. Frankf. The reader who wishes for historical vouchers in respect to the number of Jews at Rome, during the apostolic age, may consult Joseph. Antiq. XVII. 14, XVIII. 5, ed. Cologn. Dio Cassius, XXXVI. p. 37. Suetonii vita Tiberii, cap. 36.

When the first impressions arising from the degradation of captivity and slavery began to wear away, the Roman citizens seem to have looked at the Jewish community with some degree of respect, or at least with not a little of curiosity. Whether it arose from the disgust which delicate females among the Romans felt for the obscene rites of heathenism which they were called to practise or to witness, or whether it sprung from a curiosity which is characteristic of the female sex, the fact was, that in Ovid's time (ob. A.D. 17) some of the most elegant and polished females thronged the Jewish assemblies. The poet therefore advises the young men of the city, if they wished to see a splendid collection of its beauty, to go to the *sabbath-day solemnities of the Syrian Jew*, "*Cultaque Judæo septima sacra Syro.*"

It is not strange, moreover, that some of these should become *σβόμεναι* or proselytes; as Josephus relates of Fulvia, *μία τῶν ἐν ἀξιώματι γυναικῶν*, i. e., a noble woman. By degrees the men also, as was natural, began to frequent the assemblies of those once despised foreigners. Juvenal, at the close of the first century, pours out his contempt and indignation at this in the following bitter words :

"Quidam sortiti metuentem Sabbata patrem,
Nil præter nubes, et coeli Numen adorant;
Nec distare putant humanâ carne sullam,
Quâ pater abstinuit; mox et præputia ponunt;
Romanas autem soliti contemnere leges,
Judaicum ediscunt, et servant, ac metuunt Jus,
Tradidit arcano quodcumque volumine Moses."

I suppose the poet must here refer, however, to those who had a Roman mother and a Jewish father. In regard to 'Nil præter nubes, et coeli Numen adorant,' I take it to refer to the fact, that the Jews had no temple at Rome, and that they addressed and worshipped God as dwelling in heaven, i. e., above the clouds; in both which respects they differed from the heathen.

Seneca also (fl. A.D. 64), about the time when Paul wrote the

Epistle to the Romans, says, in a fragment preserved by Augustine (De Civit. Dei, VII. 11), that "so many Romans had received the Jewish [he means by this the *Christian*] religion, that *per omnes jam terras recepta sit, victi victoribus leges dederunt.*" Tacitus, in his Annals, likewise represents the "*exitiabilis superstitio*" (Christian religion) as breaking out again after being repressed, and spreading *non modo per Judeam, sed per urbem* [Roman] *etiam.*

When to these testimonies respecting the *Jews* at Rome, we add that of the Epistle before us respecting *Gentile* converts, no doubt can be left that the church at Rome was made up of Gentiles as well as Jews. Let the reader compare Rom. i. 16—32, ii. 6—11; iii. 9—19, 29, ix. 24, 30; xi. 13—25, xiv. 1—xv. 13, and no doubt can possibly remain in his mind relative to this point. The general strain of the whole epistle is such, as that it can be best accounted for by the supposition that the church at Rome consisted of both Jews and Gentiles, and that each party were endeavouring to propagate or to defend the peculiar views respecting certain points, which they respectively entertained. But of this, more in the sequel.

§ 3. *Of the time and place, when and where the epistle was written.*

We have a kind of stand-point here, with which the epistle itself furnishes us. It could not have been written before the decree of the emperor Claudius was published, by which the Jews were banished from the city of Rome. In Acts xviii. 2, we have an account of Paul's *first* acquaintance with Aquila and Priscilla, who had *recently* quitted Rome, and come to Corinth, because of the decree of Claudius banishing the Jews from the imperial city. Now as Paul salutes these same persons, in Rom. xvi. 3, 4, and speaks of them as having risked great dangers in his behalf, it follows, of course, that his epistle must have been written subsequently to the decree of Claudius; which was probably in A.D. 52, or as some say (improbably however) in A.D. 54.

It would seem also to have been written after the time when the First Epistle to the Corinthians was written, which was during the last visit which Paul made to Ephesus, and near the close of that visit *i. e.*, about A.D. 56. In Acts xviii. 19, we are told that Paul left Aquila and Priscilla at Ephesus. After this he made another circuit through the churches of Palestine, Syria, and Asia Minor (Acts xviii. 20—23), and returned again to Ephesus, xix. 1. There he spent two years or more (xix. 8—10); and near the close of this period, in writing to the Corinthians, he sends the salutation of Aquila and Priscilla, who were still at Ephesus, 1 Cor. xvi. 19. Now as Paul sends a salutation, in his Epistle to the Romans, to Aquila and Priscilla at Rome, it would seem probable that it must have been written after he left Ephesus, and after they had removed from this city to the metropolis of the Roman empire.

Other circumstances concur, to render the matter still more definite. When Paul wrote his epistle, he was on the eve of departure to Jerusalem, whither he was going to carry the contributions of the churches in Macedonia and Achaia, Rom. xv. 25, 26. When he should have accomplished this, he intended to make them a visit at Rome, Rom. xv. 28, 29. In what part of his life, now, do we find the occurrence of these circumstances? Acts xix. 21, compared with xx. 1—4, gives us a narration of exactly the same thing. Paul, at the close of his last abode at Ephesus, purposing to make a charitable collection in Macedonia and Achaia, first sent on Timothy and Erastus to Macedonia in order to forward it there (Acts xix. 22); afterwards he himself went into Achaia, passing through Macedonia, Acts xx. 1, 2. That he came, on this occasion, to the capital of Achaia, *i. e.*, Corinth, there can be no reasonable doubt. Here most probably he abode three months (Acts xx. 3); and then set out on his contemplated journey to Jerusalem, where he was made prisoner, and sent (A.D. 59 or 60) to Rome, in order to prosecute his appeal to Cæsar. From a comparison of this account in the Acts, with Rom. xv. 25—29, it follows of course that the Epistle to the Romans must have been written about A.D. 57; although some chronologists put it later. Counting the time which Paul's journey to Jerusalem must have occupied, and adding the two years of his detention as a prisoner at Cesarea (Acts xxiv. 27), and the time necessarily taken up in going to Rome, we must assign to the Epistle to the Romans the date above given, on the supposition that Paul came to Rome (as is most probable) about the beginning of the year 60.

As to the PLACE where it was written, there can be no doubt. In xvi. 1, Phebe, a deaconess of the church at Cenchrea, is commended to the Romish church, who probably either had charge of the epistle, or accompanied those who did carry it; and Cenchrea was the port of the city of Corinth, some seven or eight miles from that place. In xvi. 23, Gaius is spoken of as *the host* of Paul; and this Gaius was baptized by Paul at Corinth, 1 Cor. i. 14. Paul speaks also of Erastus, *the chamberlain of the city*, Rom. xvi. 23. The city, then, was a well-known one, *i. e.*, the capital of Achaia; and moreover, we find this Erastus spoken of in 2 Tim. iv. 20, as abiding at Corinth.

From all these circumstances, we must conclude that the *place* of writing the Epistle to the Romans was Corinth; and that the *time* was that in which Paul made his last visit there, and near the close of it, *i. e.*, about the latter part of A.D. 57.

§ 4. *Of the genuineness of the epistle.*

This has been so generally acknowledged at all times and in all ages since it was written (excepting the last chapters, which have recently been disputed), that it seems to be unnecessary to

make any quotations here from the early writers for the sake of proving it. It is true, indeed, that some early sects, viz., the Ebionites, Encratites, and Cerinthians, rejected it; as appears from Irenæus ad Hæres. I. 26; Epiphan. Hæres. XXX. Hieronym. in Matt. xii. 2. But as this seems to have been purely on *doctrinal* grounds, i. e., because they could not make the sentiments of Paul in this epistle to harmonize with their own views, it follows of course that no weight can be attached to their opinions. The question whether Paul wrote the Epistle to the Romans, is of an *historical*, not of a doctrinal nature.

The reader who is curious to see an exhibition of early testimony respecting this epistle, may find it amply detailed in Lardner's *Credibility*, and in Schmidii *Historia et Vindiciæ Canonis Sac.*, &c. The circumstantial evidence which evinces its genuineness, he will find admirably exhibited in Paley's *Horæ Paulinæ*.

Those who do not possess the first two of these works, may consult Polycarp, *Epist.* and Philipp. cap. 6; Clemens Rom. *Ep.* and Cor. cap. 35; both in Cotelerii *Patres Apostolici*. See also Theoph. ad Autolyc. I. 20; III. 14. *Epist. Ecc. Vienn. et Lugd.* in Euseb. *Hist. Ecc.* V. 1. Irenæus cont. Hæres. III. 16. § 3. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* III., p. 457, and I., p. 117, edit. Sylburg. Tertull. *adv. Praxeam*, cap. 13; de Corona, cap. 6. Cypr. *Ep.* LXIX. It is needless to cite later testimonies.

§ *Of the genuineness of chapters xv. xvi.*

The genuineness of these chapters, at least as a part of the proper Epistle to the Romans, has been called in question, and is still doubted by some. Heumann has advanced a peculiar hypothesis respecting chap. xvi. He thinks that the proper original epistle of Paul ends with chap. xi., and excludes from it all the hortatory part, i. e., chapters xii.—xv. Chapter xvi., he supposes, was originally attached to the end of chap. xi.; and that the sequel of the epistle is a kind of postscript or second letter, added by Paul after some delay in transmitting the first letter. This hypothesis, indeed, does not really deny the genuineness of any part of the epistle; but it advances what seems to be very improbable. What could be more natural than for Paul, after he had completed his doctrinal discussions, to caution the church at Rome against various evils to which he knew them to be particularly exposed? Is not this his manner elsewhere? And does not the *οὖν* (chap. xii. 1) necessarily import a connection between the sequel and the preceding context? In a word, the whole theory is so gratuitous, that it does not seem to be entitled to any serious contradiction.

Semler, however, has advanced much farther than Heumann. In his *Dissert. de dupl. Appendice Ep. Pauli ad Rom.*, he advances the

supposition, "that chap. xv. was not addressed to the Romans, but to those who had charge of Paul's epistle to them, which consisted of chapters i.—xv., with the doxology in xvi. 25—27."

But let any one, now, without any reference to such a hypothesis, sit down and carefully read chap. xv., and I will venture to predict that he will never once even think of its being addressed to any other persons, than those to whom the preceding part of the epistle is addressed. In particular; how can he help feeling that verses 1—13 do very closely cohere with chap. xiv., as the *ὀφειλομεν δὲ* at the beginning indicates? And in the remaining part of the chapter, what is there which is incongruous with the condition and relation of Paul in respect to his readers? Compare verses 15, 23 with i. 13, and also xv. 28 with Acts xix. 21, the latter of which passages shows the actual condition of Paul when he wrote the epistle. I am entirely unable to see why Paul should have given personally to the bearers of his letter to the Romans, such hints as chap. xv. contains; nor can I imagine what inducement Semler had to suppose this. But,

Chap. xvi. is more exposed to attack; because it consists of matter in general which is easily dissociated from the rest of the epistle. If the whole of it be omitted, the epistle is still, in all important respects, the same; if it be retained, the matter added consists chiefly in the expression of personal civilities. Moreover, the concluding part of chap. xv. would make a very probable and analogical close of the epistle; in particular if the *ἀμήν* at the close of ver. 33 be retained.

Probably grounds such as these first occasioned doubts concerning the genuineness of this chapter in particular. Semler advances a supposition respecting it, which (I had almost said) none but a man of such visionary phantasies could have advanced. He supposes that all the persons to whom greetings are sent in verses 1—16, are those whom the bearers of the epistle expected to visit on their way to Rome; and of course, that none of these were to be found in Rome itself. Consequently, according to him, this part of the epistle was a mere letter of commendation or introduction, designed for the bearers of the epistle, and not for the church at Rome.

According to this, then, the first stage of the journey of the letter-carriers was only to Cenchrea, some seven or eight miles from Corinth, to the house of Phebe. But the singularity of Paul's recommendation is, that instead of commending *them* to her hospitality, he commends her to the hospitality of those whom he addresses: *συνίστημι δὲ ὑμῖν Φοίβην . . . ἵνα αὐτὴν προσδέξησθε, κ. τ. λ.* Semler felt the incongruity of this, and referred *προσδέξησθε* to *receiving into communion*. Did Phebe, then, living within a couple of hours' walk from Corinth, and famous as she was for being a *προσ-*

τάτις πολλῶν (vers. 2), need a written recommendation of Paul, in order that the bearers of his letters might admit her to church communion? But besides this, the word προσδέξασθαι, in such a connection does not admit of such a sense. Comp. Phil. ii. 29, and also (as to general meaning) 3 John v. 6.

Thus much for the outset of this journey. Nor is the progress more fortunate. Aquila and Priscilla are next recommended to the letter-carriers. But the last which we know of them, before the writing of this letter, is that they are at Ephesus, Acts xviii. 18, 19, 26. But Semler provides them with a house at *Corinth*; and this, probably, because it would not be very natural for those who were to travel westward toward Rome, to go some hundreds of miles eastward, i. e., to Ephesus, in order to get to the capital of the Roman Empire. But how is the matter helped by this process? What have we now? A letter of introduction (so to speak) from Paul, directing his messengers to greet Priscilla and Aquila on their journey, while these same persons lived in the very town from which they started! Hug has well expressed his views of this matter. After speaking of the first stay of Aquila and Priscilla at Corinth (Acts xviii. 2.) and of a second at Ephesus (Acts xviii. 18, 19,) he thus proceeds: "Whence now this *third* or *Semlerian* house at Corinth, I know not," Einleit. II. p. 397, ed. 3. But, lastly, what are we to do with verses 17—20, on the ground of Semler? Were the bearers of the letter so divided as is there described; and was their obedience (ὕπακοή) so celebrated as is there hinted? Above all, what is to be done with verses 21—24? Would Paul send *written* salutations from those who were with him at Corinth, to the bearers of his epistle who set out from the same place? Did they not confer with Paul himself, and did not his friends as well as himself see and converse with them? And what shall we say to ver. 16, which directs Paul's messengers to *salute one another*?

But enough of this. Let us briefly examine some of the *external* evidences which Semler adduces against the genuineness of chap. xvi.

(a) 'Marcion, as Origen testifies, excluded chaps. xv. xvi. from the epistle.'

But according to Rufin's translation of Origen (the original here is lost), the words of this writer are: "Caput hoc [i. e., xvi. 25—27], Marcion, a quo Scripturæ evangelicæ et apostolicæ *interpolatæ sunt*, de hac epistola *penitus abstulit*; et non solum hoc, sed et ab eo ubi scriptum est: 'Omne autem quod non ex fide est, peccatum est' [Rom. xiv. 23] usque ad finem totius epistolæ, cuncta *dissecuit*." From this nothing more can be gathered, than that Marcion wholly omitted the doxology in xvi. 25—27, and separated (*dissecuit*) chaps. xv. xvi., from the rest of the epistle. There is an evident distinction here, between *penitus abstulit* and *dissecuit*. This sepa-

ration Marcion might make, as others have done, because of the diverse matter contained in these chapters. And even if Marcion omitted the whole, he stands convicted before the world of such notorious falsifications of the sacred writings, that it would weigh nothing.

(b) 'Euthalius, in his *Elenchus capitulorum*, leaves out chap. xvi.'

True; but Euthalius, in his *Elenchus*, mentions only those chapters which were publicly read; and chap. xvi. was usually omitted in the public reading of the epistle. That he did not acknowledge this chapter as a part of the epistle, is altogether improbable, since, in reckoning the *στίχοι* of the whole epistle he includes those of chap. xvi.

(c) 'Tertullian (cont. Marc. v. 13) cites Rom. xiv. 10 thus: 'In clausula, tribunal Christi comminari Paulum.'

But what should hinder Tertullian from saying that chap. xiv. 10 is in the *clausula*, i. e., closing part, of the epistle? Is it not in such a part? Can any thing be *satisfactorily* proved, moreover, by urging a sense of words strictly and logically exact, in such a writer as Tertullian?

As to any alleged discrepancy of manuscripts, with regard to a part of chap. xvi., I shall have occasion to notice this in the sequel.

But, very recently, another doubter in the genuineness of chap. xvi., of a more solid cast than Semler, has made his appearance. Schott, in his *Isagoge ad Nov. Test.*, recently published, in a note, p. 284 seq., has assigned other, and perhaps better, reasons than those of Semler, for his doubts. Let us examine them.

(a) 'Paul salutes many persons, in xvi. 5—15, as being at Rome, and in a very *familiar* way. How could he, who had never been at Rome (Rom. i. 13), do this?

The answer is, that several of these persons were his own kinsmen; see § 1 above. With all or most of them he had very probably met, in the course of his travels. Intercourse between the metropolis of the Roman Empire and the large towns of the provinces, was very frequent; especially with Corinth, the headquarters of Achaia, and Ephesus of Asia Minor. And even if Paul had not seen all the persons whom he salutes, what is easier than to suppose that their character and standing were known to him, and therefore he sent them salutations? It is plainly a mistake, to suppose that none but personal acquaintances are saluted in the Pauline epistles.

(b) 'But Paul makes no mention of any of the persons here saluted as being at Rome, in his other epistles written there, e. g., in his epistles to the Ephesians, Colossians, Philippians, and Philemon.'

The answer is, that in only one of these (that to the Colossians) does he send any thing but a mere *general* salutation. Moreover, as

all these epistles must have been written some two years and a half, and may have been written some four years later, than the Epistle to the Romans, so the state of that church, exposed as it was continually to increase and decrease, may have greatly altered when he wrote the last-named epistles; or the persons named in his Epistle to the Romans may have gone elsewhere in order to propagate the gospel; or they might have deceased; or it might be that they did not happen to pay him a visit while he was writing the above named epistles, and so a greeting from them was not mentioned. A thing of this nature is so accidentally varied, that we cannot make any conclusions which are valid, either from this appearance or from that.

(c) 'Aquila and Priscilla are saluted as being at Rome. In Acts xviii. 19, 26, we find their abode at Ephesus; and in Paul's last stay at Ephesus, when he wrote the First Epistle to the Corinthians, we find them still there, 1 Cor. xvi. 19.'

All this I concede. But since Aquila and Priscilla had, for some time, been obliged to relinquish their abode at Rome, on account of the decree of Claudius, what is more natural than to suppose, that, as soon as might be, they would return to Rome, at least long enough to adjust their affairs there, which it is more than probable had been embarrassed by the decree of banishment?

(d) 'But 2 Tim. iv. 19, written at Rome, greets Priscilla and Aquila as residing at Ephesus.'

I grant it. But when was this written? Just before the final martyrdom of Paul (iv. 6—8) i. e., probably some ten years after the Epistle to the Romans was written, and also after the persecution by Nero had commenced. What difficulty now in the supposition, that Aquila and Priscilla had fled from Rome when this persecution broke out, and gone back to their former station at Ephesus, where they had spent several years? There Paul salutes them in 2 Tim. iv. 19.

Lastly, Professor Schott expresses his belief, that chap. xvi. is made up of fragments of some brief epistle of Paul's, written at Corinth, and addressed to some church in Asia Minor, and added by mistake, *piece by piece* as it was discovered, to the Epistle to the Romans. Verses 1—16 composed the first fragment; verses 17—20, the second; verses 21—24, the third; verses 25—27, the fourth.

But what a series of conclusions is here made out, without a syllable of historical evidence? Where is the evidence of the lost epistle to an anonymous church in Asia Minor? Where that it was lost excepting a few scattered fragments which "*sensim sensimque deprehendebantur*?" And the conceit of adding all these fragments to the Epistle to the Romans, which already had a good ending with chap. xv.; how should this have ever entered any one's head? Why add them to this epistle, rather than to some of Paul's shorter

epistles? And then the persons themselves named in chapter xvi.; what a singular phantasy it must have been in the compiler, to have supposed that, if they belonged to some church in Asia Minor, their names could be tacked on to the epistle written to the church at *Rome!*" How can we admit such gratuitous and improbable hypotheses as these?

Nor can I admit what has frequently been said in respect to chap. xvi., viz., that it is wholly unconnected with the preceding part of the epistle, and may be disjoined from it without injury to it. Thus much is true, indeed, viz., that salutations and expressions of Christian courtesy are not doctrinal discussions nor practical precepts; in a word, the sixteenth chapter, which is principally made up of salutations, must of course be diverse from the preceding part of the epistle. But is it not equally true that chaps. xii.—xv. differ as much from the preceding ones, as chap. xvi. does from all the others? Is it proper, moreover, that Christian salutations should be exchanged, in epistles like that of Paul? This will not be denied. The force of such examples of kindness, and courtesy, and benevolent feeling, is scarcely less than that of direct precept; and in some respects it has evidently the advantage of precept, inasmuch as *practice* speaks louder than theory. Why, then, should the salutary part of the epistle be thrown away? And would not rejecting it be an injury to the congruity and to the general good effect of the whole?

Nor is it correct to say, that there is not an evident relation and connection of some part of chap. xvi., with what precedes, besides that which has just been mentioned. Let any one diligently consider the contents of verses 17—20, and he will see plainly that they refer to the divisions and erroneous sentiments which are the subject of particular discussion in chaps. xii.—xv. Let him compare xvi. 19 with i. 8, and he will see the same person expressing himself in the same circumstances. In a word, it would be truly wonderful, if the straggling fragments of an epistle, sent to some unknown church in Asia Minor, should fit the place of conclusion to the Epistle to the Romans so well as its present conclusion fits it.

What can we say, moreover, to the *τολμηρότερον δὲ ἔγραψε ὑμῖν* of xv. 15, if Paul does not refer to the *whole* of the preceding epistle? It would be even ridiculous, on any other ground. And what a singular epistle chaps. xv. xvi. would make out, consisting almost wholly of *salutations!*

Eichhorn (Einleit. in das N. Test.) has advanced a hypothesis still more fanciful, if possible, than that of Semler or Schott. Chap. xvi. 1—20 is, according to him, a letter of recommendation to the *Corinthian* church, which Paul wrote for Phebe, the deaconess mentioned in verses 1, 2. This, after it had been read by them, she obtained again, and carried it along with her to Rome; and because the

church there were unwilling that any thing from the hand of Paul should perish, they tacked it on upon the epistle of Paul to them, so as to make out a conclusion for it!

Is it worth the pains to refute such criticism? Or rather, can the name of *criticism* be fairly given to such extravagant and incongruous suppositions? One is ready to ask: What sort of a church must it have been, in the metropolis of the world, and whose fame had gone abroad through the whole empire, that could deal thus with Paul's epistles? Why was not the letter of Phebe kept by itself, and published by itself, as well as John's letter to the "elect lady?" But this is only one among the numerous conceits, which are intermingled with the striking and instructive compositions of Eichhorn.

Finally, as no *internal* evidence can be made out, that chaps. xv. xvi. are spurious; so no *external* evidence of any considerable weight can be adduced in favour of this supposition. The manuscripts (with some variety as to the position of xvi. 25—27, and with the omission of these verses in a few cases) are all on the side of the genuineness of these chapters; I mean, that all which are of any authority are so. Jerome (Comm. in Eph. iii. 5) mentions that he knew of some manuscripts which omitted xvi. 25—27; and Wetstein cites a Codex Latinus which does so. But in regard to all the rest of chaps. xv. xvi., it will not be contended that any authority from manuscripts, Fathers, or Versions, warrants us in suspecting them. Even as to Marcion himself, there is no certain evidence, as we have seen, that he rejected them. Why, then, should we reject them at the present time?

§ 6. *Different position in Manuscripts of xvi. 25—27.*

There is a difference in respect to the location of these verses containing a general doxology, which seems to be somewhat difficult of solution.

(1) In Cod. J., and in most of the Codd. minusc.; in the Lectionaries Arab. polyglot. et triglot., in Slav. Ms. and most Codd. Armen.; also in Chrys., Theod., Damasc., Theoph., and Oecumenius; they stand only and immediately after chap. xiv. 23. In Cod. A., 17, Armen. edd. quib., they stand both here and at the end. After xiv. 23, they are placed by Beza, Grotius, Mill, Hammond, Wetstein, Semler, Griesbach, Morus, Eichhorn, Flatt, Tholuck, Paulus, and some others.

This is the sum of the *external* evidence, in respect to this position of the verses in question. But in whatever way they may have been transferred thither, it seems difficult to avoid the feeling of incongruity as to such a position. It is an evident interruption of the tenor of the discourse. The *οφείλομεν* δὲ of xv. 1, shows that it is

a *continuation* of a preceding discourse; and so plainly does the matter of verses 1—13 itself indicate. Nor am I able to persuade myself, that the matter at the close of chap. xiv. is of such a tenor, as entitles us to believe that Paul here breaks out into an animated doxology. Usually, it is only after the enunciation of some deep, sublime, soul-stirring truth, that he betakes himself to expressions of this nature *in medio cursu*. What is there in the discussion about eating meats or refraining from them, to move his soul to the sublime doxology contained in xvi. 25—27? I must accord therefore with Knapp, who places these verses at the end of the epistle.

(2) A few MSS., &c., omit the verses in question. Jerome (on Eph. iii. 5), speaking of the passage in Romans, says, “in *plerisque* codicibus invenitur;” which would seem to mean, that in some Codices of his time it was omitted. The verses are omitted by Cod. D., but not *a prima manu*; in F., G. (in the latter a space is left for them); also in Codd. Vindob. 57, 67, 68, 69, 70, as stated by Koppe; in an unknown MS. mentioned by Erasmus; and in Vers. Armen., of some editions.

Eichhorn, as usual, has built a singular castle in the air upon this fact. He accounts for all the varieties in the manuscripts in this way: (1) The original piece of parchment on which Paul's epistle was written, was filled when the scribe came to xiv. 23. He then took a small and separate piece of parchment, on one side of which he wrote the salutations in verses 21—24; and on the other the doxology in verses 25—27. But the letter not being immediately sent, the apostle made additions to it; first of chap. xv., and then of xvi. 1—20. So then the epistle was sent to the church at Rome, on *four* separate pieces of manuscript. In copying this, some ended the epistle with xiv. 23; others added to this the doxology in xvi. 25—27; a third class copied as far as xiv. 23, and then added the postscripts of the apostle (xv. 1—xvi. 20), and finally the small leaf of parchment written with the body of the epistle (which is the usual form of the epistle); while a fourth class, copying from these different copies, inserted the doxology both after xiv. 23, and at the end of the whole epistle.

Sorry copyists, indeed, they must have been at Rome, to make such mistakes as these! One is ready to wonder, why the *additional* parchments were not joined on to the original one, in proper order, and not left in the form of Sybilline leaves; a thing which required nothing more than a little paste or glue, and a moment's attention. Then, supposing them to have been left separately, were there no marks added by the writer, to direct the reader's attention and perusal? Are important documents wont to be made out in such a negligent manner? But (which is directly to our present purpose) how came any copyist to imagine, that the letter ended with chap. xiv. 23? Or why, as so many mistakes were made about the order

of the small piece of parchment first added, were none made about the order of the two different postscripts, viz., xv. 1—33 and xvi. 1—20?

I am grieved to add, that Griesbach, in attempting to account for the variations of manuscripts in regard to xvi. 25—27, has advanced suppositions not less visionary and gratuitous than those of Eichhorn. This is the more to be wondered at, since Griesbach is not much prone to phantasies of this nature. The reader of Eichhorn is not surprised to find such a conceit in him; for a critic, who could add on the last twenty-six chapters of the book of Isaiah (which he names Pseudo-Isaiah), to the genuine works of that prophet, because the copyist happened to have room to spare in his parchment and wanted to fill it out (Einleit. in das. A. Test. iii. p. 91, ed. 3d), may well be imagined not to be incapable of making suppositions like those above related.

But what if we, at the present day, are unable to account for the confusion of manuscripts, with regard to xvi. 25—27? Will this oblige us to resort to suppositions altogether incredible in themselves? To say the least, it should not induce us thus to do. We cannot, then,—at least until we come to the persuasion that parchment was as scarce and dear in ancient times as Eichhorn (so often as it suits his critical convenience) makes it, we cannot—admit a supposition which involves such an entire *ὑπόθεσιν πρότερον*, in a most solemn and important epistle of Paul. And even if we admit that parchment was so scarce and so dear, we are, after all, at our wits' end to know why the concluding piece was not joined on to the same roll which contained the rest of the epistle.

(3) With the *Textus Receptus*, which places these verses at the end, agree Codd. B., C., D., E., 16, 66; Codd. minusc. 80; also Syr. Erp., Copt., Aeth., Vulg., and the Latin Fathers in general. With Erasmus, Stephens, Bengel, Koppe, Boehme, Hug, Knapp, Bertholdt, De Wette, Rückert, and others, I am persuaded that this is their genuine place. What shall we say of *ἐν τῇ Τίμει, ἡ γράψας τὴν ἐπιστολὴν*, in xvi. 22? Does it not of course imply, that it is near the close of the epistle, and that the epistle is *one*? And if so, then are chapters xv. xvi. a genuine and original part of it, as Bertholdt has well remarked, Einleit. vi. § 715.

‘But how can so many doxologies be accounted for?’ To which I answer, that no serious difficulty lies in the way of this. It is not natural to suppose, indeed it cannot well be supposed, that the apostle wrote the *whole* epistle in a single day, or at a single sitting. If, in the midst of his multiplied engagements and his short stay at Corinth, he was several days, or even weeks, in writing it (which we may easily and probably suppose); then we can account for the various doxologies and apparent closes of the epistle, in chapters xv., xvi. It is easy to believe, that xv. 33 was the first pause which was made

with the probable design, originally, of ending the epistle there. Afterwards, renewed and additional intelligence coming from Rome, with kind greeting of friends there, he was induced to add, in return, the greetings in xvi. 1—16; to which he subjoined the warnings, and the apparent conclusion in verses 17—20. The definiteness with which he here speaks of the divisions and erroneous sentiments in the Church at Rome, in all probability had its origin in the very recent information which he had obtained from that city. Finally, before sending away his epistle, other Christians at Corinth, deeply interested in the affairs of the Church at Rome, visited the apostle and desired him to express their salutations. This done, he adds, as usual, another kind wish and prayer for the Church which he addresses, xvi. 24. And then, in reading over and correcting the copy which Tertius had made of the whole, Paul, at the close of all, subjoined the general doxology which is contained in verses 25—27.

If you say: 'Here are almost as many suppositions as those of Eichhorn and Griesbach;' my reply is, that there are almost as many in respect to number, but still of a totally different character. Here the appeal is made to the internal state of the epistle itself, and to the probable and natural circumstances which accompany the writing of such a letter. Nothing stands in the way of believing the things just suggested to be altogether probable. But when all these phenomena are made to depend on odd pieces of parchment, and Sibylline leaves, strangely forwarded without juncture or order, and as strangely mistaken in the copying, how can we satisfy ourselves with such suggestions?

That the manuscripts differ so much, as to xvi. 25—27, is indeed a striking circumstance in the critical history of the epistle to the Romans. But if any one will attentively reflect on the several apparent conclusions in the epistle (xv. 13, 23, and xvi. 20, 24), he may easily be induced to believe, that the confusion in the manuscripts has arisen from this circumstance. Copyists supposed there must be some mistake in having a conclusion in xvi. 24, and then another superadded in verses 25—27. It was natural for them to find a difficulty in this. Therefore, with the conviction that here was some mistake, they sought an earlier place for these verses; and they could find none which was not already occupied by something of the like nature, without going back to xiv. 23. Here, then, some of them placed xvi. 25—27, and others followed these copies. In the mean time, other copies continued to be taken after the original order of the epistle, and thus a discrepancy arose. Some copyists, perceiving this discrepancy, and also the fact that chapters xv. and xvi. contain so many formulas of conclusion, omitted xvi. 25—27; while others, finding these verses in some copies of xiv. 23, and in others at the end of the epistle, copied them both. In this way we can easily account for all the discrepancies that exist, without resorting to any forced or

unnatural suppositions. We may add to all this, moreover, the probability that the *public lectures* of the epistle extended only to the end of chap. xiv.; to which it was altogether natural to add xvi. 25—27 as a proper close; and that the practice of reading the epistle in this manner, gradually introduced the writing of manuscripts in the same way.

(4) A few critics reject the verses in question as spurious. So Schmidt, and Reiche in his recent commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. The latter has argued at length against their genuineness. His arguments are derived from the alleged style and manner of the doxology. He accuses it of being deficient in simplicity, of bombastic and overstrained expression, of a dogmatic manner; of being doubtful and dark and unusual, yea, unintelligible; of a drawling repetition for three times of *κατα*; of a doubtful construction of *ὃ* near the close; of expressions not Pauline, not proper, *e. g.*, *εὐαγγέλιόν μου καὶ κήρυγμα Ἰ. Χριστοῦ*; and finally he says, it is all made up of shreds collected here and there from the writings of Paul, *e. g.*, from Rom. ii. 16; Gal. i. 6; Eph. iii. 3; Col. i. 26; 2 Tim. i. 8; Tit. i. 1; Rom. i. 5; 1 Tim. vi. 16; Rom. ii. 16, i. 9; Heb. xiii. 20—23; in which places, if the reader pleases to turn to them, he will find in succession expressions like those in our text.

That most of these accusations are not well founded, the reader may satisfy himself by thoroughly studying the verses under examination. That the expressions here resemble other expressions of Paul, can surely be no proof of their *spuriousness*, nor of their being dark and unintelligible. I will not say, that *internal* evidence can in no case be proof of spuriousness; for this would be an extravagant assertion. But we may well say, that when all critics except *two* have failed to discover the *internal* evidences just alleged, there cannot be much probability in favour of their existence. The doxology, although it is somewhat difficult of interpretation on account of its complex nature, seems to me evidently to be in the spirit and manner of Paul.

§ 7. *State of feeling and opinion in the Church at Rome, when the epistle was written.*

That this Church consisted of Jews and Gentiles, we have already seen; § 2 above. That many of the erroneous views which Paul combats in it, were such as the Hebrews were prone to cherish, there can be no doubt on the part of any one well acquainted with the history of Jewish opinions. That grounds of dissension among its members existed in the Church of Rome, we can hardly refuse to believe, when we consider the general tenor of the epistle. The national pride of the Jew; his attachment to the Mosaic institutes, and especially to the Levitical rites and distinctions of clean and

unclean ; his impatience of subordination in any respect to Gentiles ; his unwillingness to believe that they could be admitted to equal privileges with the Jew, in the kingdom of the Messiah, and particularly without becoming proselytes to the Mosaic religion ; his proneness to feel indignant to the government of heathen magistrates over him ; all this lies on the face of the epistle, and cannot well be overlooked by any considerate and attentive reader.

On the other hand ; the Gentiles disregarded the prejudices of the Jews, especially about circumcision, and meats and drinks, and holidays ; they were wounded at the claim of superiority which the Jews seemed to make ; and, knowing that the great apostle to the Gentiles was an advocate for their equal rights and privileges, they no doubt engaged in contest with the Jews with an unyielding spirit. Such a state of things very naturally gave rise to discussions in the Epistle to the Romans, and to all the cautions and precepts contained in the hortatory part of the epistle.

With this general view of the condition of the Church before us, we need not be solicitous to determine whether the apostle had special and local objects in view, when he wrote it, or more general ones. My answer to this question would be, that he had both in view ; i. e., he meant to establish some great and general principles of Christianity, and also to apply them to the state of the Church at Rome. Nothing can be more natural than this supposition ; and so Luther, Calvin, Melancthon, Bucer, Michaelis, Tholuck, and others, have for substance judged. That Paul intermingles with general truths many things which are local, is almost a matter of course in an epistle to a particular church. The contents of the epistle itself, or a brief analysis and synopsis of the whole, I reserve for a separate statement.

BRIEF ANALYSIS

OF THE

CONTENTS OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

WERE I to select a motto, which would in a single brief sentence designate the substance of what this epistle contains, it should be taken from the apostle Paul himself:

ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ ἩΜΙΝ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ἈΓΙΑΣΜΟΣ,

CHRIST OUR JUSTIFICATION AND SANCTIFICATION.

The first five chapters exhibit Christ as the author and efficient cause of our justification.

After an appropriate and affectionate introduction (i. 1—16), the apostle proceeds to show, that the Gentiles had universally transgressed the law of God which was written on their hearts, because they had indulged in a great variety of sins which they knew to be wrong (i. 17—32). He next proceeds to show, that the Jews were even more guilty still, inasmuch as they had sinned against more light and more distinguished privileges (ii. 1—3, 19). He now draws the conclusion from these premises, that justification by deeds of law, *i. e.*, on the score of merit or on the ground of perfect obedience, is impossible; for, inasmuch as all men have sinned against the law of God, all are under its condemnation, and therefore grace or mercy only can save them from perishing. This grace is vouchsafed only through Christ, and has been procured by his sufferings and death in behalf of sinners (iii. 20—21).

The Old Testament also teaches the same doctrine of *gratuitous* justification; and that this should be extended to Gentiles as well as Jews (iv. 1—25).

The happy fruits of such a state of justification—peace with God, support and consolation in the midst of trials and sufferings, a hope which maketh not ashamed, and never can be disappointed—are next described by the writer (v. 1—11). And that it is perfectly proper and becoming on the part of God, to extend those blessings to all, both Jews and Gentiles, is strikingly taught by an exhibition of the fact, that all have been made to share in the evils which flowed from the apostasy of our original progenitors (v. 12—19). Even in those cases where sin has exhibited its greatest power, the grace of the gospel is made to triumph over it (v. 20, 21).

Thus is CHRIST OUR JUSTIFICATION set forth by the apostle. He comes next to exhibit CHRIST OUR SANCTIFICATION. This important topic he introduces, by discussing the objection raised against the doctrine of gratuitous justification, *viz.*, *that it tends to encourage sin*. He shows in the first place; from various considerations, the incongruity and impossibility of this (vi. 1, 23). He then proceeds to contrast a state of grace and the means and motives to holiness which it furnishes, with a legal state; and to show that in the latter, the sinner has no hope of maintaining a holy character, while in the former he is abundantly furnished with the means of doing it; consequently that a state of grace, so far from encouraging men to sin, affords them the only hope of their being able to subdue and mortify sin (vii. 1—8, 17).

The apostle then, as he had before done at the close of his discussion respecting justification (v. 1—11), goes on to show the consolation which the gospel affords, under the various troubles of the present life (viii. 18—27); and in the sequel he concludes, as in the former case, with exultation in the certainty of future and eternal glory to all who truly love God (viii. 28—39).

The part of the epistle properly *doctrinal*, concludes with the 8th chapter. Chapter ix. discusses the objection raised against the dealings of God with his creatures, when he makes some of them the distinguished subjects of his mercy, and passes by others. Chap. x. confirms still farther, by various considerations, and particularly by texts cited from the Old Testament, the idea that the Jews who remain in unbelief are and must be cast off; and therefore that this is not a new or strange doctrine. Chap. xi. continues to urge the same subject; but at the close deduces from it the cheering consolation, that even the rejection of the Jews will be made a great blessing to the world, as it will be the occasion of salvation being sent to the Gentiles. And if their *rejection* be attended with consequences so important, then surely their *reception* again will fill the world with its happy fruits.

The rest of the epistle is *hortatory*, and is adapted specially to warn the Church at Rome against several errors, to which, in their circumstances, they were peculiarly exposed. First, they are exhorted to lay aside all pride, and envious distinctions, and claims to preference on the ground of office, gifts, &c.; and to conduct themselves in a kind, affectionate, gentle, peaceable manner (xii. 1—21).

Next, they are exhorted to a quiet and orderly demeanour in regard to the civil power, which the Jews were especially prone to contemn (xiii. 1—7). The great law of love is to be regarded and obeyed toward all men, without or within the Church (xiii. 8—14).

Thirdly, the Gentile Christians are admonished to respect the scruples of their Jewish brethren on the subject of eating meats offered to idols, and admonished that they have no right to interfere either in this matter or in other things of the like tenor (xiv. 1, xv. 7). On the other hand, the Jews are admonished that their Gentile brethren have equal rights and privileges with themselves, under the gospel dispensation (xv. 8—13).

The writer then expresses his good hopes concerning them all, his kind and tender regard for them, and his purposes in respect to visiting them.

Lastly, he subjoins the salutation of the various Christians who were with him; cautions them against those who seek to make divisions among them; and concludes with a doxology.

Such is the brief sketch of the contents of the epistle before us. It is one, however, which the reader may perhaps not fully understand and appreciate, until he shall have attentively studied the whole; but still, one to which he may recur, in order to satisfy himself in some measure respecting the relation which a particular part has to the whole. To make this satisfaction complete, it is important that he should become well acquainted with the general scope and object of the whole epistle. The details of the respective parts are given in the introductions to each, which are embodied with the commentary, although distinguished from it by the smaller type in which they are printed.

COMMENTARY ON THE ROMANS.

CHAP. I. 1—16.

THE introductory part of the Epistle to the Romans, I. 1—16, contains, (1) A salutation, vers. 1—7. (2) A brief declaration of some personal wishes and concerns, vers. 8—16. The apostle, being a stranger in person to the Church at Rome, begins his epistle with exhibiting the nature of his office and of his relation to the Church of God, ver. 1. Having mentioned that he had been set apart for the service of God in the *gospel*, he hints, in passing, that this same gospel had been before announced by the ancient prophets, ver. 2, and that it has respect to him who was of the seed of David according to the flesh, or in his humbler condition, but the decreed Son of God who dispensed the Holy Spirit with power after his resurrection, vers. 3, 4. From him, who was thus the constituted *Lord of all*, Paul avers that he had received such grace as made him one of Christ's devoted followers, and also the office of an apostle to the Gentiles, in order to promote the knowledge of a Saviour among them, ver. 5; and inasmuch as the Romans were among these Gentiles, and were called to be heirs of the grace of life, ver. 6, he addresses them, wishing them every needed spiritual and temporal blessing.

He next passes on to circumstances of a personal nature, which seem to prepare the way for the subsequent addresses that he is to make to them. He thanks God that their Christian faith is so distinguished as to become a matter of universal notice, ver. 8; declares the strong desire which he had long cherished of paying them a visit, and that they had been the continual subject of his remembrance when coming before the throne of grace, vers. 9, 10; and alleges his wish not only to impart spiritual consolation and joy to them, but to receive the same from them, vers. 11, 12. He then repeats his declaration respecting the desire he had all along cherished, of paying them a visit, and states the reasons why he had not fulfilled it, ver. 13. He expresses a wish to preach among them, as well as among other Gentiles, inasmuch as he considers himself under obligation to preach the gospel to all classes of men among the heathen, vers. 14, 15. Of this gospel he is not ashamed, knowing that by it the mighty power of God is manifested in the salvation of both Jews and Greeks, ver. 16.

Here the *introduction* properly ends; inasmuch as the next verse exhibits one great theme of the epistle, and is the subject which gives occasion to all the remarks that follow, to the end of chap. v.

The reader of Paul's writings cannot fail to remark, how different was the *mode* of writing epistles in ancient times, from that which we now practise, in regard to some things pertaining to address, subscription, &c. Paul *prefixes* his name, instead of *subscribing* it at the end of his letters, as we now do. In the like way, and after his example, the *letters missive*, &c., of churches to each other, are still drawn up among us.

represented as being devoted to the service of Christ, and then as commissioned with a special office in that service; which could not be said of every δούλος. So Reiche and Glöckler, in their recent Commentaries.

Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, in the Gen. here, shows the relation in which Paul stood to the Saviour, and that the apostle's business or object (as δούλος) was to promote the cause of Christ or to forward his work. Ἰησοῦς is the Greek form of the Hebrew name יֵשׁוּעַ or of its later abridgment and substitute יְשׁוּעַ, i. e., *Saviour*, or *he who will save*. Χριστός is properly a participial adjective, formed from χρίω, *to anoint*, and means *the anointed one*. It is, like κύριος, which is properly an adjective, usually employed by prefixing the article as an *appellative*, when applied to the Saviour, and commonly it designates him as *king*, or *possessed of royal dignity*. Kings were anointed to their office, among the Jews; and also high priests. The name *Christ* Ἰησοῦς, Χριστός, *the Messiah*, may refer then to either of these high offices or dignities; for he is both king and priest for ever. The use of χριστός alone in the Gospels, is hardly to be regarded in the light of a proper *cognomen*, but rather as a mere *attributive* appellation. In the epistles, it is not unfrequently used in the way of a proper *cognomen*.

Κλητός, lit. *called*, but the meaning here is *chosen, invited*, viz., chosen to the office of an apostle; see Acts ix. 15, σεῦδος ἐκλογῆς μοί ἐστιν οὗτος, also Acts xxvi. 17, where the κλητός here is expressed by ἐξαίρουμένός σε, *I have taken thee out of, I have selected thee from*. In Gal. i. 15, it is more fully expressed by ὁ ἀφορίσας με ἐκ κοιλίας μητρὸς μου, καὶ καλέσας διὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ, i. e., *who set me apart or designated me from my earliest years for the apostolic office, and in due time called me to it by his grace*; Jer. i. 5. The word κλητός sometimes has the sense merely of *invited, bidden*; e. g., Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14. Yet in the writings of Paul it is not so used, but always in the sense of *efficient calling*, as we say, i. e., it means not only that the person designated has been *invited* or *selected*, but that *he has accepted the invitation*; 1 Cor. i. 1, 2, 24. Rom. i. 6, 7. viii. 28; with which collate Gal. i. 15. Jude v. 1. Heb. iii. 1. Rom. xi. 29. Eph. iv. 1.

Ἀπόστολος may mean a *legate* of any kind, *one sent by another* on any kind of business or message. The word is used in this way, in John xiii. 16. Phil. ii. 25. A *divine messenger* or *prophet* it designates in Luke xi. 49. Eph. iii. 5. Rev. xviii. 20. ii. 2; and in like manner it also signifies *the messengers of Christ*, which is

the usual meaning of the word throughout the N. Testament. To invest them with this office, an immediate choice by the Saviour in person seems to have been necessary. This is implied in our text; and more plainly still in Gal. i. 1.—Occasionally the *companions* of the apostles, or the *delegates* sent by them, are called *apostles*; so in 2 Cor. viii. 23. Acts xiv. 4, 14. Rom. xvi. 7.

Ἀφωρισμένος Θεοῦ, lit. *separated* or *set apart* for the gospel of God, i. e., chosen or selected in order to preach the gospel of God, viz., that gospel of which God is the author, Θεοῦ being *Genitivus auctoris*. The word ἀφωρισμένος seems to be intended as epexegetical of κλητός, i. e., it expresses the same idea in different language. Hesychius explains ἀφώρισμένος by ἐκλεγμένος, *chosen*, διακεκριμένος, *selected*. In the same sense ἀφορίσαι occurs in Acts xiii. 2. See the same sentiment in Gal. i. 15, Jer i. 5. The meaning is, that God, who foreknows all things, did set him apart, choose, select him for the work of the gospel, even from the earliest period of his life, Gal. i. 15. So it is said of Jeremiah, that he was set apart, selected, for the prophetic office even before he was formed in his mother's womb; by all which expressions is meant, that God who knows all persons and events before they exist or take place, has a definite object in view which he intends to accomplish by them. In classic Greek, the verb ἀφορίζειν is more usually employed in a bad sense (*in malam partem*), meaning to *exterminate*, *excommunicate*, *repudiate*, &c. But in Hellenistic Greek it is more commonly employed *in bonam partem*, as here.

Εἰς εὐαγγέλιον has the same sense as εἰς τὸ εὐαγγελίσασθαι εὐαγγέλιον, *in order to preach the gospel*. This method of using the Acc. (with the preposition εἰς prefixed) as a *nomen actionis*, is a frequent idiom of Paul's writings, and resembles the use of the Heb. Inf. (with a ? prefixed) as a *nomen actionis*. Εὐαγγέλιον itself is sometimes employed to denote the *preaching of the gospel*; e. g., 1 Cor. iv. 15, ix. 14—Εὐαγγέλιον Θεοῦ Chrysostom understands as meaning the *gospel concerning God*, viewing Θεοῦ as *Genitivus objecti*. But this interpretation is plainly erroneous; for the *object* is supplied in ver. 3, viz. εὐαγγέλιον Θεοῦ περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ. Theophylact rightly explains the phrase: ὡς δωρηθὲν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, [the gospel] as *given by God*. For the sentiment that the gospel is of God, and that Christ taught it as received from him, let the reader compare John viii. 28, 38. v. 19, 30. xii. 49. xiv. 10, 24. xvii. 4—8.

(2) Ὁ προεπηγγέλτατο ἁγίαις, which he formerly, or in former times, declared or published by his prophets, in the holy Scriptures.

In like manner, Paul in his defence before Agrippa says, that he had proclaimed nothing as a preacher of the gospel, which the prophets and Moses had not declared should take place, Acts xxvi. 22 That Christ and all his apostles believed and taught, that the Old Testament abounds in prophecies respecting him, there can be no doubt on the part of any one who attentively reads the New Testament; see Acts x. 43, xviii. 28. 1 Peter i. 10. 2 Peter i. 19.

Even the heathen of the apostle's time had become acquainted with the expectations of the Jews, in regard to the appearance of the Messiah; which expectations were excited and cherished in the Hebrews, by the perusal of their own ancient Scriptures. Thus Tacitus speaks of this subject; "*Pluribus persuasio inerat, antiquis sacerdotum literis contineri, eo ipso tempore fore, ut valesceret Oriens, profectique Judææ rerum potirentur,*" Hist. V. 13. In the same manner Suetonius his contemporary expresses himself: "*Percrebuerat Oriente toto vetus et constans opinio, esse in fatis, ut eo tempore Judææ profecti rerum potirentur,*" in Vespas. c. 4. The first promises respecting the Messiah were merely of a general nature, unaccompanied by peculiar and characteristic declarations; *e. g.* Gen. iii. 15, xii. 3, xvii. 4, 5, xlix. 10. In later times, it was foretold that the expected King and Deliverer would be of the progeny of David, 2 Sam. vii. 16. Psalm lxxxix. 35—37. In several Psalms, some traits of the life, office, character, and sufferings of this illustrious personage were given; *viz.* Psalm ii. xvi. xxii. xlv. cx. etc.; still more graphically is the Messiah described in Is. liii.; and individual occurrences in his history are given in later prophets, *e. g.*, Zech. ix. 9. xi. 13, Mal. iii. 1, seq. iv. 2, seq. It has been observed, that Malachi's declaration in the last chapter of his prophecy, is homogeneous with the very first annunciation of the gospel in Mark i. 2. Our English version of *προειπηγγέλματο*, *promised afore*, does not give the proper meaning of the word.

Ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις, in the Holy Scriptures. The Jews employed either *γραφὴ* the singular, or *γραφαί* the plural, indifferently. The first means the *corpus librorum sacrorum*; the second refers to the same collection, as made up of several particular writings. The epithet *ἁγίαι* is given to *γραφαί*, because the Scriptures were regarded as worthy of all reverence, or because they were looked upon as being inspired by *τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον*.

(3) *Περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*, respecting his Son. This clause should be joined, in the reader's mind, to *εὐαγγέλιον* Θεοῦ at the close of ver. 1.

Verse 2 is a circumstantial declaration, thrown in to enhance the value of the gospel, or its credibility and dignity. There is no necessity here of actually inserting a parenthesis, as some do, any more than in many other cases where explanatory circumstances are added in the like way. Tholuck joins *περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ* with *προεπηγγέιλαιτο*; but as the verb itself relates to *εὐαγγέλιον* Θεοῦ, it seems to me more congruous to refer *περὶ κ. τ. λ.* to the same words.

Τοῦ γενομένου . . . σάρκα, who was born of the seed of David, in respect to the flesh. The verse itself is replete with difficulties; and especially so to one who is not familiarly conversant with the character of Paul's style. Tholuck compares the latter to the urgent force of waves, which swell one above another in continual succession. It is an obvious peculiarity of this apostle's style, that he abounds in what are commonly called parenthesis. His mind was so glowing and so full of ideas, that the expression of a single word often calls forth, as it were, a burst of thought respecting the import of that word, which hinders him from advancing in the sentence that he had begun, until he has given vent to the feelings thus incidentally occasioned. The expression of these feelings makes here what may be named *parenthesis*; although it may not always be designated as such in our printed books. To illustrate what I mean, let us take the examples in the first paragraph of the epistle before us. When Paul (ver. 1) had named the *εὐαγγέλιον* Θεοῦ which would recall to the minds of his readers the gospel that was then preached by himself and others, he immediately adds, in order to enforce on their minds a becoming idea of the dignity and excellence of this gospel, ὃ προεπηγγέιλαιτο διὰ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις after which he resumes his subject. But no sooner has he uttered the words *τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*, than another burst of thought respecting the exalted personage thus named escapes from him. First, this *Son* is *γενομένου . . . σάρκα*, a descendant of David, the most exalted king who ever occupied the Jewish throne, according to the promises respecting the Messiah, *e. g.*, in 2 Sam. vii. 16, Ps. lxxxix. 35—37. Secondly, he is *τοῦ ὀρισθέντος . . . νεκρῶν, i. e.*, he is the Son of God clothed, according to decree, with supreme dominion, especially in regard to the bestowment of the Holy Spirit, after his resurrection from the dead. Having thus designated some striking characteristics of the Son of God, he resumes his theme by the words *Ἰησοῦ . . . ἡμῶν*, which are in apposition with *τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ* in ver. 3. The words *τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν* again suggest another train of thought, which the writer stops

to utter, viz. δι ου . . . Χριστοῦ, after which he resumes his theme and finishes the sentence by πᾶσι τοῖς . . . Χριστοῦ, ver 7. The greater part of this apparently involved sentence, might evidently be included in parenthesis; and then the simple sentence would run thus: Παῦλος . . . ἀφωρισμένος εἰς εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ . . . Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν . . . πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν κ. τ. λ.

Every reader should take especial notice of this characteristic in the writings of Paul, as it will help him to unravel many a sentence which would otherwise seem perplexed and perhaps even irrelevant. To understand the writings of this apostle, something more than a knowledge of grammar or of mere words is necessary. We must be able to enter into the feelings and sympathies of the writer, and thus to trace his modes of thought and expression in cases that seem obscure, as well as in those which are plain.

Γενομένου, *descended, born*; for so the word is not unfrequently employed.—Ἐκ σπέρματος, *of the posterity, of the lineage*.—Κατὰ σάρκα, *in respect to human nature or his fleshly existence*. Σὰρξ denotes literally *flesh*, i. e., the flesh of a living or animated being, in distinction from that of a dead one, which is *κρίας*. It denotes *body* also; not in the sense of *σῶμα* which has reference to the compacting of the whole of the parts into one mass, but *body* as distinguished from mind, the *visible* part as distinguished from the *invisible* one. Hence it is very often used, both in the Old Testament and the New, for our *animal nature*, the *animal man* (so to speak). Frail, perishable man, also, and man with carnal appetites and passions, are often designated by it; as every lexicon will show. As kindred with this, it often means *man as living in his present fleshly and dying or transitory state*, in distinction from another and different condition in a future world; so Gal. ii. 20. Phil. i. 22, 21. Heb. v. 7, applied to Christ. 1 Pet. iv. 2. 2 Cor. x. 3. In the passage before us, the *human nature or condition* of Christ, as descended from the royal progeny of David, is designated. But why so? Because the promise was made to *David*, that the Messiah should descend from him. Hence the genealogy in Matthew: "The Son of *David*, the Son of Abraham." So the common feeling and views of the Jews decided: "How do they [the Scribes] say, that the Christ is *David's Son*?" So the blind man (Luke xviii. 39) says: "Jesus, thou *Son of David*, have mercy on me." Comp. also Luke i. 27, 32. Matt. xv. 22. xii. 23. xxi. 9. 15. xxii. 41—46. John vii. 42. 2 Tim. ii. 8; which most abundantly illustrate the views of the Jews and of the apostles. It is

not, therefore, merely *a son* of David which is designated by the phrase before us, but *the long expected and hoped for Son* of David, i. e., the promised Messiah.

We must regard τοῦ γενομένου ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, then, as a clause in opposition to υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, added for the sake of pointing out the fulfilment of the promises of God and the expectations of pious Jews, in regard to the Messiah or Son of God; a thought naturally suggested by what the writer had said before in relation to the declarations in the Scriptures. But lest the reader might argue that *Son of David*, considered as meaning *Messiah*, implied nothing more than one of David's natural descendants in the ordinary way, Paul adds κατὰ σάρκα, in respect to his human nature; where σάρξ is plainly employed in the same sense as in John i. 14, ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, i. e., the *Logos* became man, or took on him a human nature. But if the Son of God was a mere man, in the view of Paul, how strange it would be for him to say: γενομένου . . . κατὰ σάρκα; an expression never used respecting any other individual. The application plainly is, that he had some other nature than the human. The same distinction is implied in Rom. ix. 5, ἐξ ὧν ὁ Χριστὸς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα. In his other nature, he is there said to be ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός.

Thus we have one special characteristic of the Son of God or of the promised Messiah, viz., that he was, as to his human nature, of the royal progeny of David. Now follows a second, of a more exalted and peculiar kind:

(4) Ὁρισθέντος . . . νεκρῶν. The word ὁρισθέντος has often been rendered *decreed*, *decided*, *ordained*; so Calvius, Erasmus, Faber, and many others. In like manner the oldest Latin interpreters exhibit *qui prædestinatus est*; as appears from the Latin interpretation of Irenæus, III. 18, 32; from Rufin's version of Origen, and Hilary *De Trinitate*, VII. In the like way, also, some recent interpreters have rendered ὁρισθέντος. Of the former mode of translating we may truly say, that it accords with the meaning of the word ὁρίζω in Heb. iv. 7. Acts xi. 29. ii. 23. x. 42. xvii. 26, 31. Luke xxii. 22; and these are all the instances in which it is used in the New Testament, excepting the case before us.

But this sense of the word is alleged, by many critics, not to accord with the design of the writer. In order to prove this, they suppose the passage (by way of illustration) to be construed thus: ' *Ordained* to be the Son of God with power, κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιωσύνης,

i. e., by the miraculous gifts which the Spirit conferred upon him, or by the miracles which the Spirit enabled him to perform ;' and then ask, 'How did the miraculous gifts or deeds of Jesus *ordain* him to be the Son of God, or *constitute* him such? He possessed these gifts, or performed these miracles, because he was the Son of God ; he was not made so by the possession of his gifts or the performance of his deeds.' And admitting their grounds of interpreting the rest of the verse, their objection seems to be decisive against the exegesis which they oppose.

Grotius, in order to relieve this difficulty with respect to *ὁρισθέντος*, construes the passage thus : 'The regal dignity of Jesus, as Son of God, was *predestinated*, or *prefigured*, when he wrought signs and wonders in his incarnate state.' But how *predestinating* can be made to mean *prefiguring*, I am not aware.

Others construe thus ; 'Ordnained to be the powerful Son of God, in his *pneumatic* condition [or state of exaltation], by his resurrection from the dead.' But in this case we are compelled to ask : How could his resurrection *decree* or *ordain* his exalted state? It might be the consequence of a decree that he should be exalted ; it was so ; but in what manner the resurrection could *ordain* or *decree* his exaltation, it would be difficult to explain.

There is yet another sense, in which the passage before us has been taken, viz., 'Constituted the Son of God *with power*, in his *pneumatic* condition, *after* his resurrection from the dead.' For although he was the Son of God *before* his resurrection, yet he was not the Son of God *ἐν δυνάμει*, in the sense here meant, until after his ascension to the right hand of the Majesty on high.

One might hesitate, perhaps, between this sense and the one given by Origen, Chrysostom, Cyril, Theodoret, Theophylact, Œcumenius, the Syriac version, and the great majority of modern critics ; viz. *ὁρισθέντος* = *δειχθέντος*, *ἀποφανθέντος*, *κρίθέντος*, *ὁμολογηθέντος*, *shown*, *demonstrated*, *exhibited*, *declared*. Of such a meaning for *ὁρίζω*, it is true, no example can be found in the New Testament, nor in the classics, which seems to be exactly in point. Passow gives no sense of this kind to *ὁρίζω*, in his lexicon. I find only one example (if indeed this be one) in the instances produced by Elsner, which will stand the test of scrutiny ; this is : "A patron of what is just, *δικαστὴν ὁρίζομεν γνήσιον*, we call a true judge, or we declare to be a judge worthy of the name." But even here, the sense of *deciding*, *determining*, *defining*, is altogether a good one, and equally

good for *ὀρίζωμεν*; and this agrees with the usual meaning of the word. Still, as *ὀρίζω* (from *ὄρος*) means literally to *prescribe the boundaries* or *limits* of any thing, and thus, by defining it, to distinguish it from other things; so the secondary meaning given by Chrysostom, viz. *δεδιχθίς, ἀποφανθίς, declared, shown*, is not an unnatural one, although destitute (so far as I can discover) of any actual *usus loquendi* to support it. The lexicon of Zonaras gives the same gloss to the word: *ὀρίσθίς = ἀπεδεδιχθίς, ἀποφανθίς*.

It is a safe rule, not to adopt the meaning of a word which is not supported by the *usus loquendi*, when another meaning which is supported by it can be given, that will make good sense. And in the case before us it is as good sense to say, that 'Christ was *constituted* the Son of God with power, after his resurrection from the dead,' as to say, that 'Christ was *shown* to be the Son of God with power, after his resurrection from the dead.' For after the resurrection, he was advanced to an elevation which, as Messiah, he did not before possess; com. Phil. ii. 9—11. Heb. i. 3. ii. 9. xii. 2. Rev. iii. 21. Matt. xix. 28. Nay one might say, that the more energetic meaning of the word is to be found in *constituted*. As an instance of the like sense, appeal has been made to Acts x. 42, where Christ is said to be *ὁ ὀρισμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ χριστὸς ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν, the constituted or appointed judge of the living and the dead*. For the like sense of *ὀρίζω*, appeal is also made to Acts xvii. 31, *ᾧρισε, sc. κριτήν, i. e., he [God] hath constituted or appointed him [Christ] the judge, &c., comp. xvii. 26, ὀρίσας . . . καιροῦς*. But of this meaning of *ὀρίζω* as applicable to Rom. i. 4, I now doubt (as will be seen in the sequel); although I formerly was disposed to adopt it.

If we should construe the phrase, as some do: 'Declared to be the Son of God with power, by the Holy Spirit, on account of (by) his resurrection from the dead;' one might then ask: How could the *resurrection* declare in any special manner, that Christ was the Son of God? Was not Lazarus raised from the dead? Were not others raised from the dead, by Christ, by the apostles, by Elijah, and by the bones of Elisha? And yet was their resurrection proof that they were the sons of God? God did indeed prepare the way for universal dominion to be given to Christ, by raising him from the dead. To the like purpose is the apostle's assertion in Acts xvii. 31. But how an event common to him, to Lazarus, and to many others, could of itself demonstrate him to be the Son of God *ἐν δυνάμει, remains to be shown*.

Nor have the reasons produced by Reiche in his recent commentary, and also by my friend, the Rev. A. Barnes, in his excellent little volume on the Romans, in favour of this interpretation, served to satisfy my mind of its validity. They both, with many others, understand *ἐν δυνάμει*, here as *adverbially* employed, and make it to qualify *ὁρισθέντος*, so that the meaning is, *powerfully demonstrated or shown*. Nothing, indeed, is more certain in grammar, than that the Dative case of nouns, either with or without a preposition before it, may be and often is employed in an *adverbial* way; so that *ἐν δυνάμει* might easily be rendered in the same way as *δυνάτως*. My difficulties do not arise from this source, therefore, but from the unsuitableness of the application in this case. Had the apostle meant that *ἐν δυνάμει* should qualify *ὁρισθέντος*, all the usual principles of Greek construction and syntax would demand that he should have written, *τοῦ ἐν δυνάμει ὁρισθέντος υἱοῦ*, the place between the article and the participle being the appropriate one, in order to avoid ambiguity of sense or construction, when a *noun* is thus employed. Then again, no example has been produced, and I must doubt, until I see it, whether any can be produced, of the Greeks applying *δύναμις* to designate the *force* or *strength* of a logical demonstration made only to the mind. It always, certainly in the New Testament, has reference to the active force or energy of an *agent*, either corporeal or spiritual, when employed in such a way. The Greeks would characterize the *demonstrative* force of evidence or logic, in a very different way from this. The objections, therefore, in point of grammatical construction and propriety of idiom, seem to me to be conclusive against such an exegesis. And the references by the commentators in question to Col. i. 29, *τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐνεργουμένην ἐν ἡμῶι ἐν δυνάμει* and to Mark ix. 1, *ὥς ἂν ἴδωσι τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκκληστῶν ἐν δυνάμει*, do not give any satisfaction as to their application of *ἐν δυνάμει* in the case above, because here the *δύναμις* is that of *agents*, and not that of logic or evidence. *The kingdom of God*, of course means the *persons* who compose it, and *ἐν δυνάμει* the *efficiency* with which they act, or (at least) with which God himself acts, in building it up.

Nor am I convinced, that the resurrection *powerfully demonstrated* Christ to be the Son of God, by the allegation (in order to remove an apparently formidable difficulty as stated above), that 'in the circumstances of the case, after all the special claims that Jesus had made to be considered as the Messiah, his resurrection was a signal

proof that he was the Son of God.' This it would do, however, only in an *indirect* way, and such an inference could be drawn from it only by virtue of reasoning from consequences. It proved only, that the claims of Jesus were allowed to be just and true. How could the power of God the Father, exerted to raise Christ from the dead, prove the divine or exalted nature of the latter? It proved only that God is Almighty, and he regarded with approbation the claims of Jesus. One of these claims was, that he was the Son of God; but this was only one among many others. How then could the whole force of the evidence to be drawn from the resurrection, concentrate in this sole point? And when Reiche asserts (p. 119), that "Paul always appeals to the resurrection of Christ as the *principal evidence* of his divinity," and refers us to Col. xv. 3, 17. Rom. iv. 24. Acts xvii. 23, as proofs of this, one is tempted to ask, what is meant by *evidence*? These passages merely show that Christ was raised from the dead, in order to complete the work of mediation and redemption, and also to be the future judge of the world; nothing more. Nor is it in the nature of things, that resurrection from the dead can prove *Godhead*? Was it the Godhead that died, and was raised again; or was it the *man* Christ Jesus? How could the raising of the man by the Father, then, prove the Godhead of Christ? In whatever light I look at this interpretation, I feel constrained to reject it. Neither Paul nor any other New Testament writer makes the evidences of Christ's divine nature, (or higher nature, if you choose so to name it), to depend on the resurrection; at least this is done nowhere, unless it be in the passage before us. Would it not be strange that this should stand entirely alone, in respect to such an important point as the interpretation in question makes it?

Let us now see whether a more defensible meaning than those above produced, can be given.

I understand *ἀποθνήσκω* in its usual (and only defensible) meaning, viz. *decreed, appointed, established by decree, determined by decision*, viz. of a superior. I find in this sense of the word a most expressive meaning in reference to Ps. ii. 7, which, I doubt not, the apostle had in his mind: "I will declare *the decree*, (אֶפְתָּחַ אֶל־אֱלֹהִים); The Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee." Here then is the *decreed, destined, or appointed* Son, to whom Paul refers, the very Messiah promised in one of the most explicit and striking predictions in all the Old Testament;

comp. ver. 2, *ἐν γρηφαῖς ἀγίας*. And what is the *decree* of which the Psalmist speaks? It is, that the Son shall be made universal king, and that his enemies shall be dashed in pieces before him, Ps. ii. 8—12; and all this not in a temporal but *spiritual* sense. What is this now but to be the Son of God *ἐν δυνάμει*? And when Mr. B. suggests, that he knows of ‘no passage where *δύναμις* means *authority, office, etc.*’; he need only to consult Matt. xxvi. 64. Mark xiv. 62. Luke xxii. 69. Luke iv. 36. Acts iv. 7. 1 Cor. v. 4. Rev. xiii. 2, iv. 11. v. 12. vii. 12. xii. 10, in order to correct this impression. It is even employed (by metonymy) for those in office and clothed with power, *e. g.*, 1 Cor. xv. 24. Eph. i. 21; so for angels good or bad, who are high in station, Rom. viii. 38. 1 Pet. iii. 22. Matt. xxviii. 18, has *πᾶσα ἐξουσία*, not *δύναμις*, as he supposes; a mistake into which the first edition of my work (p. 68) probably led him.

It would be clear enough, then, that we might construe τοῦ ἐπιστήριτος υἱοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει, as meaning ‘the Son of God, who by decree is possessed of universal authority or dominion.’ My only doubt whether *ἐν δυνάμει* should be so construed here, arises from its junction with the next words;

Κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιασμένης, which, like every other expression in this verse, is contested, some translate, *by the Holy Spirit*; and some, *by a holy spirit*, *i. e.*, a divine and miraculous power, which some represent as the miraculous power with which Christ was endowed, and others as that which was shown in raising him from the dead. A third party construe *πνεῦμα* here, as designating the higher nature or condition of Christ, *i. e.*, his *pneumatic* nature or condition, if I may so express it.

Schleusner, Flatt, Bengel, and others, find in *ἁγιασμένη* a meaning designedly different from that of *ἁγιότης* or *ἁγιασμός*. Thus Bengel, “*ἁγιότης sanctitas, ἁγιασμός sanctificatio, ἁγιασμένη sanctimonia.*” But this seems to be imaginary; for even in Latin, *sanctimonia* and *sanctitas* differ only in form, not in sense. In Greek, as there is no difference between *ἁγαθωσύνη* and *ἁγαθότης*, so there appears to be none between *ἁγιασμένη* and *ἁγιότης*. The Seventy use *ἁγιασμένη* for *ἰσχύς*, *strength*, in Ps. xcvi. 6 (xcv. 6); for *ἰσχύς* in Ps. xcvi. 12 (xcvi. 12); and for *ἰσχύς* in Ps. cxlv. 5 (cxliv. 5.). But as *πνεῦμα* is here joined with *ἁγιασμένης*, I cannot well doubt that the word *ἁγιασμένης* is employed in the place of the adjective *ἁγιον*, (like *ἰσχύς*

in הַר הַקֹּדֶשׁ , i. e., *my holy mountain*.) So the Gen. case of nouns is employed in almost innumerable instances. If we may conjecture a reason why the apostle here preferred $\alpha\gamma\iota\omega\sigma\upsilon\eta\varsigma$ to $\delta\gamma\iota\omicron\varsigma$, we might say that it was because he wished to avoid the dubious meaning $\delta\gamma\iota\omicron\varsigma$ would seem to give to the passage, as the reader might naturally refer such an epithet to the Holy Spirit as an *agent*.

I cannot but regard it as quite certain, that $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\mu\alpha\ \alpha\gamma\iota\omega\sigma\upsilon\eta\varsigma$ here, is employed in a similar way with $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\alpha$ in the preceding phrase. There $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\alpha$ shows in *what respect*, in *regard to what* Christ was the Son of David. Here $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\mu\alpha\ \alpha\gamma\iota\omega\sigma\upsilon\eta\varsigma$ shows in *what respect* the apostle means to set forth Christ as *the decreed Son of God with power*. Not that the mention of one leading particular in which his power was displayed, excludes the possession of other powers by him. So much only is meant, and so much is altogether true and striking, viz. that power in bestowing the $\pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\mu\alpha\ \alpha\gamma\iota\omega\sigma\upsilon\eta\varsigma$, i. e., in causing *the new moral creation*, is one of the most conspicuous of all proofs that Jesus is indeed *the decreed Son of God*, who was promised in ancient times, and predicted in the Holy Scriptures, by a declaration and an oath never to be forgotten.

We shall see, in the sequel, more abundant reason for this interpretation. But we must first examine the meaning of $\epsilon\kappa\ \alpha\nu\alpha\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu$. This is another contested phrase. Many have rendered $\epsilon\zeta$ *by*. So Chrysostom; who deduces from our verse three proofs which were exhibited in order to show the divine nature of Christ; viz. (1) Ἐν δυνάμει , i. e., the wonderful miracles which Christ wrought. (2) The gift of the Holy Spirit, $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\mu\alpha\ \alpha\gamma\iota\omega\sigma\upsilon\eta\varsigma$. (3) The resurrection. The difficulty with the first and third particulars of his reasoning, is, that in the same manner prophets, apostles, and others may be proved to be divine, for the Saviour says that his disciples will perform "*greater works than he*," after his ascent to the Father; and many others were raised from the dead as well as Jesus. As to the gift of the Spirit, that will be noticed in the sequel. There can indeed be no doubt, that $\epsilon\kappa$ ($\epsilon\zeta$) is, so far as this preposition merely is concerned, susceptible of such an interpretation. It is often used in the sense of *propter*, *ex*, and designates the *causa occasionalis*; e. g., John iv. 6, 'Jesus being wearied $\epsilon\kappa\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \omicron\delta\omicron\tau\omicron\pi\omicron\iota\alpha\varsigma$,' so in Acts xxviii. 3. Rom. v. 16. Rev. viii. 13; or it designates the *causa instrumentalis*, 1 Cor. ix. 14. 2 Cor. vii. 9. Rev. iii. 18. But,

on the other hand, that *ix* signifies *after, since*, in respect to time, is equally clear and certain; *e. g.*, *ix* κοιλίας μητρὸς, FROM the time of one's birth; Matt. xix. 20, *ix* νήνετος, FROM early youth; Luke viii. 27, *ix* χρόνων ἰκανῶν, a long time SINCE; xxiii. 8, John vi. 64, vi. 66, ix. 1, 32. Acts ix. 33. xv. 21. xxiv. 10. Rev. xvii. 11, *ix* τῶν ἐπτά ιερῶν, AFTER the seven; 2 Peter ii. 8.; comp. Sept. in Gen. xxxix. 10. Lev. xxv. 50. Dent. xv. 20.—So in the classics; Arrian Exped. Alex. I. 26. 3. *ix* νότων σκληρῶν AFTER vehement south winds. III. 15. 13. V. 25. 3. Hist. Ind. 33. 5. *ix* τοσάνδε κακῶν, AFTER so many evils. Xenoph. Res Græcæ, VI. ἐξ ἀριστοῦ AFTER dinner. No doubt can be left, then, that ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν may be rendered, AFTER the resurrection from the dead, or SINCE his resurrection, etc. So Luther, SINT der Zeit er auferstanden ist, SINCE the time when he arose.

Ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν, moreover, is one of those combinations of the Gen. case with a preceding noun which express great latitude of construction. Here it is equivalent to ἀναστάσεως *ix* νεκρῶν. Both phrases, viz. ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν and ἀνάστασις *ix* νεκρῶν, are used by the New Testament writers; *e. g.*, the first, in Matt. xxii. 31. Acts xvii. 32. xxiv. 21. xxvi. 23; and Paul limits himself to this same phraseology, *e. g.*, 1 Cor. xv. 12, 13, 21, 42. Heb. vi. 2; the second, in Luke xx. 35, Acts iv. 2. I can perceive no difference whatever in their meaning. In regard to the latitude in which the Genitive is employed, in order to designate relations which might otherwise be expressed by a preposition, see § 99 of my New Testament Grammar.

The way is perfectly clear, then, to translate AFTER his resurrection from the dead, so far as philology is concerned. Does the nature of the case admit or demand this? It seems to my mind that it does. The manner in which the outpouring of the Spirit is spoken of, as connected with or following the resurrection and consequent glorification of Christ, appears to render this altogether probable, if not certain. Jesus, in promising a copious effusion of the Spirit, says, that "out of the belly [of believers] shall flow rivers of living waters," John vii. 38. The evangelist immediately adds, that "he spake this of the Spirit, which they that believe on him should receive, for the Holy Ghost was not yet given, BECAUSE JESUS WAS NOT YET GLORIFIED." In entire accordance with this are the representations of the Saviour, in his last conference with his disciples; "If I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you," John xvi. 7. This

Comforter was to come *after the departure* of Jesus; he was then to abide with the disciples (John xiv. 16); to teach them all things (John xiv. 26); to guide them into all the truth (xvi. 13); to testify of him (xv. 26); and to convince the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment (xvi. 8—11). So on the great day of Pentecost (which the apostle would seem to have had in his eye when he wrote our text), Peter says, that the notable outpouring of the Spirit then experienced, was a fulfilment of the prophecy in Joel respecting this event; Acts ii. 14—21. Isa. xlv. 3, refers to the like event. In looking at Acts i. 8, it would seem as if the very thing in our text is specifically designated by the words of Christ to his apostles; *λήψεσθε δύναμιν ἐπιστέλλοντες τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐφ' ὑμᾶς*. Here the *δύναμις* which Christ is to bestow by the sending of the Spirit, is expressly designated; and, as the sequel of the narration shows, it means an extraordinary and hitherto unknown effusion of the Spirit. All the subsequent history of the churches illustrates this. All the extraordinary revivals of religion that followed, were in consequence of the extraordinary outpouring of the Spirit which ensued upon the resurrection and glorification of the Saviour.

The conclusion which I deduce from the whole is, that *τοῦ ἐπιστέλλοντος υἱοῦ . . . νεκρῶν* means, that 'Christ was the Son of God, agreeably to the decree in the Holy Scriptures, *i. e.* (in Psalm ii. 7); and Son of God endowed with power, which he displayed by sending the Spirit in an extraordinary and glorious manner after his resurrection and consequent exaltation.' In this simple way, supported by the testimony of the Scriptures as to facts, and its *usus loquendi* as to meaning, would I explain this endlessly controverted verse, respecting which scarcely any two commentators of note wholly agree, and in regard to which, I am now persuaded, that I was in some respects mistaken in the first edition of this commentary. The ground of my mistake was, looking to a distance too great for explanatory facts and principles, when they lay near at hand.

That the sense now given is far more noble and pregnant with meaning, than the simple declaration that Christ was shown to be the Son of God by his resurrection from the dead, can scarcely fail of being felt by every reader. As now explained, the declaration of the apostle respects one of the highest, most striking, and most glorious of all the proofs that Christ was the true son of God. It means no less than to assert, that he was and is the author of the *new creation*, of the *making of all things new*, by the peculiar dispensation of his Spirit

after his glorification. That glorification was plainly commenced by his *resurrection*. Paul in his address in the synagogue at Antioch in Pisidia (Acts xiii.) explains the resurrection, indeed, as in part a fulfilment of the prediction in the second Psalm respecting the elevation of Jesus as the Son of God. And so it truly was; inasmuch as it was the commencement of his glorification. But the interpretation given above abates nothing from this. It is built on the very supposition, that his resurrection must *precede* the special *δύναμις*, which he exercised, in pouring out the Spirit in an extraordinary manner so as to establish his new spiritual kingdom. In a word, as God at the beginning manifested his power and Godhead by creating the world from nothing, so the Son of God exhibited his all-glorious character in the *new creation* effected by the Spirit of holiness, dispensed by him in so peculiar a manner after his glorification. This is the highest evidence we can have of his being indeed *the decreed Son of God*, and Saviour of Sinners. The whole expression, τοῦ ἐξοριστοῦ υἱοῦ . . . νεκρῶν, serves to distinguish what Jesus manifested himself to be *after* his resurrection, in distinction from the development he made of himself *before* this period. Before the resurrection "he was anointed with the Holy Ghost and with power" (Acts x. 38); but "the Holy Ghost was not yet given [i. e., bestowed on men], because Jesus was not yet glorified" (John vii. 38). It is in reference to the *manifestation* of what Jesus was endowed with, and in reference to the decree which respected his spiritual kingdom and reign (Ps. ii.), that the apostle speaks in our text.

With this view of the subject, I cannot (with some expositors) regard κατὰ σάρκα and κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης as designedly *antithetic* expressions. This indeed they cannot strictly be; inasmuch as both respect the same person. Nor can I now any longer regard them as a *designed* contradistinction; for to make out this, we must suppose that the one relates to his *human* person, and the other to his *divine*. It is indeed true, as I formerly maintained, that the *higher* and *glorified* nature of Christ (not simply his *divine* nature), is several times called πνεῦμα, (but not πνεῦμα ἁγίου nor πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης). The reader may find instances of this nature in 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18. Heb. ix. 14. 1 Cor. xv. 45. 1 Pet. iii. 18, and perhaps in 1 Tim. iii. 16. It is also true, that "decreed Son of God possessed of power in his glorified state," would be a sense altogether accordant with fact and with the analogy of the Scrip-

tures. But the interpretation given above now seems to me, after much consideration, to be better supported by the context and the intention of the writer; who designs to exhibit Christ as predicted in the Holy Scriptures, first as 'the Son of David in respect to his human nature,' and then as 'the decreed Son of God in respect to the manifestations of his spiritual power in the *new* creation.' Consequently, if this view be correct, we must understand *κατὰ σάρκα* as explaining τοῦ γενομένου, by showing in what respect Christ was descended from David; and *κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης* as explaining in what respect the δύναμις of the decreed Son was peculiarly exercised so as to afford satisfactory evidence of his character and dignity. Not *antithesis*, then, nor even *contra-distinction*, is intended between *κατὰ σάρκα* and *κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης*, but simply the like construction is repeated in order to show a reference of the like nature in the two cases. Glöckler, in his recent, original, and in many respects striking Commentary on the Romans, understands πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης in the same way as I have done, but he has missed the scriptural reference to Old Testament prophecy which is contained in τοῦ ἐπιστήριος υἱοῦ. He has therefore applied ἐν δυνάμει to ἐπιστήριος, in the old way, and construes the *κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης* as proving the *Godhead* of Christ. *Consequently*, I should readily admit this; for who that is not *divine*, can dispense the Holy Spirit? But the object of the apostle here is not directly to prove the divine nature of Christ, but to show that he is the decreed and predicted Son of God, whom the Holy Scriptures had taught the Jews to expect.

The phrase υἱοῦ Θεοῦ, which stands connected with all the predicates that have now been explained, is one of high and holy import. If I rightly understand the meaning of it, it designates *the Messiah, the King of Israel, the Lord of all*, in the passage before us. Such was Christ constituted, after his resurrection from the dead, when he ascended to take his place at the right hand of the Majesty on high, was made κληρονόμος πάντων, and copiously poured out *the Spirit of holiness*. But as this phrase is of such great importance, and requires to be copiously discussed, I must refer the reader to Excursus I. where he will find the discussion.

The apostle having thus given his views respecting the dignity of Christ, he now resumes the theme mentioned at the beginning of ver. 3, viz. τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, by adding the other usual appellatives of honour and office given to the Son: which are, Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κα-

ἔσω ἡμῶν. *Κύριος* is a word of deep interest to Christians. Applied to Christ, it properly denotes him as *suprema Ruler or Lord*, specially of his church. Matthew and Mark do not apply this title absolutely to Christ, except after his resurrection, Matt. xxviii. 6. Mark xvi. 19, 26. But Luke, John, and Paul, apply it to him everywhere and often. With Paul the application seems to be in a manner exclusive. God the Father, or God absolutely considered, is named *κύριος* about thirty times, in the Old Testament passages which Paul cites; but elsewhere, with the exception of some four or five instances, Paul gives to Christ *exclusively* the title of *κύριος* or *ὁ κύριος* in more than two hundred and fifteen instances; see Bibl. Repos. I. 783, seq. The article makes no difference in the meaning, inasmuch as the word is a kind of proper name by usage, is employed in like manner as one, and may therefore take or omit the article at the pleasure of the writer. See the Essay on the meaning of the word *κύριος*, in the Bibl. Repos. as above, where the subject is examined at length.

(5) Δι' οὗ . . . ἀποστολήν, *by whom we have received grace and the office of an apostle*. Chrysostom, Grotius, and others interpret this as though it meant *χάριν τῆς ἀποστολῆς*, the favour or privilege of an apostolic office; i. e., they construe the last words as a hendiadys. Augustine says: "*Gratiam cum omnibus fidelibus accepit—apostolatium, non cum omnibus.*" I prefer to separate the meaning of the words. As to *χάρις*, I consider it as having reference to the peculiar grace bestowed on Paul, who had been a persecutor; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 9, 10. Gal. i. 13—16. 1 Tim. i. 12—16, which seem to make this clear. As to *ἀποστολή*, comp. Acts ix. 15. xiii. 2. xxii. 21; also the passages just cited above.

Εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστει, *on account of the obedience of faith*. Εἰς, followed by an Acc., in almost innumerable instances designates the *object* or *end* for which any thing is, or is done. The idea here is, that the office of an apostle had been given to Paul, 'in order that (εἰς) he should further or promote obedience to the faith,' i. e., to the gospel; or (as we should here construe *πίστει*) *the obedience of faith*, viz. that which springs from *subjective* or *internal* faith. I prefer this latter sense, as being on the whole the most energetic. It seems to me probable, that the apostle meant to designate the *obedience of faith* as contra-distinguished from *legal obedience*.

Ἐν πάσι τοῖς ἔθνεσι, *among all nations; in among*, a common sense of the word, see Bretchn. Lex. iv. "Ἐθνεσι may be rendered *Gen-*

tiles here, inasmuch as Paul was "the apostle of the Gentiles:" but the expression seems to be more general. He seems to say, that he received the office of an apostle, in order that the gospel might be preached to all nations, to Gentiles as well as to Jews.

Ἔνεκα τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ, *for his name's sake*, which means *on his account*. But with what is this to be joined? Does the apostle mean to say, that he had received χάριν καὶ ἀποστολήν on his [Christ's] account; or does he join the latter expression with εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστει, and thus designate the following sentiment, viz. that 'obedience springing from Christian faith may be promoted among all nations, so that Christ may be glorified?' In this latter way I should prefer to interpret it; and so Tholuck has done in his Commentary, as also Castalio and others.

(6) Ἐν οἷς εἰσὶ καὶ ὑμεῖς, *among which [nations are ye Romans]*. The writer means to say; 'Among those nations are ye, who have been won over to obey the Christian faith.' So the sequel: κλητοὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, *the called of Jesus Christ, i. e., the called who belong to Christ*. Κλητός (see on the word under ver. 1) means, by the usage of Paul, not only those to whom the *external* call of the gospel has been addressed, but those who have also been *internally* called; in other words, it designates *effectual* calling. My reason for supposing Ἰ. Χριστοῦ here to be a genitive which designates *belonging to*, rather than a *Genitivus agentis* (in which case it would signify *of* or *by Christ*), is, that the usual idiom ascribes the *calling* of sinners to Christ, as effected by the agency of the Father, or of the Holy Spirit. Κλητοὶ Ἰ. Χριστοῦ, according to the interpretation now given, would mean 'Christians effectually called.' So Tholuck, Reiche, and others.

(7) Πᾶσι . . . θεοῦ, *to all who are at Rome, beloved of God; i. e., to all these λέγω, γράφω*, I say what follows in the sequel, viz. χάρις ὑμῖν, &c. I am inclined to think, that in saying ἐν Ῥώμῃ the apostle meant to include not only the Christians who habitually dwelt there, but also Christians from abroad, more or less of whom must have frequented that great city. Such was the concourse of Greeks there in Juvenal's time, that he calls it *Græcam urbem*. Christian foreigners who were in the city, no doubt would attend worship with the church which belonged there; so that the apostle might well address the whole body of those who joined in Christian worship. Still the language, πᾶσι . . . ἐν Ῥώμῃ, does not make this supposition certain.

Ἀγαπητοὺς Θεοῦ beloved of God; an appellation often bestowed on the ancient people of God, or at least implied by what is said concerning them, and which Paul here applies to Christians, the *true Israel* of God. They are the objects of God's love, because they are his children by a new and spiritual birth, because they bear his image, and also because they possess a filial and obedient spirit.

Κλητοὺς ἁγίοις, chosen saints, or saints effectually called. So most editions and commentaries unite these words, making *κλητοὺς* an adjective qualifying *ἁγίοις* and so I have translated them. This may be correct, inasmuch as the apostle had just before called them *κλητοὶ* I. Χριστοῦ. If this union of the two words was intended by him, they mean as much as to say, *called or chosen to be holy or to be consecrated to God, to be devoted to him.* In the mean time, it is evident that the words may be pointed thus, *κλητοὺς, ἁγίοις, to those who are called, who are devoted to Christ.* The sense is substantially the same, whichever way we choose to interpret the words.

As to the appellations *ἀγαπητοὺς Θεοῦ, κλητοὺς ἁγίοις*, the reader may compare the terms of honour and affection given to God's ancient people, in Exod. xix. 6. Deut. xxxiii. 3. xxxii. 19; with these compare also 1 Pet. ii. 9. 1 Tim. iii. 15. Phil. ii. 15. 1 John iii. 1, 2, 10. v. 1. given to Christians in the New Testament.

Χάρις ὑμῖν, sc. ἔστω, may grace be imparted to you! *Χάρις* I understand as meaning every Christian grace and virtue, which the Spirit of God imparts to the followers of Christ; divine favour in the most extensive sense, but specially in the sense of *spiritual blessings*.—*Εἰρήνη*, like the Heb *שָׁלוֹם* means *happiness* of every kind, *peace* with God and man, and so a state of quiet and happiness. The same word (*שָׁלוֹם*) is used, down to the present hour, among the oriental nations who speak the Shemitish languages, as an appropriate expression in their formulas of greeting or in expressing their good wishes.

Πατὴρς ἡμῶν, i. e., the Father of all Christians, of you and me. So Christ has taught his disciples when they approach God in prayer, to say *πάτερ ἡμῶν*.—*Κυρίου*, see under ver. 4. One would naturally expect the *article* here, before the monadic nouns *Θεοῦ* and *κυρίου*. But nothing is more common than to omit it before such nouns, when frequently employed, and where there is no danger of mistake. See N. Test. Gramm. § 89, 2. *a. b.* More common is it to employ the *article* before an exegetical appellation in apposition, like *πατὴρς ἡμῶν* in the present case. But even here the practice is not uni-

form; and moreover the article before *πατρός* in the present case might be dispensed with also, on the ground that *ἡμῶν* sufficiently marks its definitive nature; N. Test. Gramm. § 89. 6, comp. p. 3.

It should be remarked here, that in this prayer or wish Paul seems to take it for granted, that the blessings for which he asks, come as really and truly (not to say as much) from the *Lord Jesus Christ* as from *God our Father*. To the one then he addresses his prayer, as well as to the other.

The reader, in looking back on what he has now read, will find the whole paragraph exceedingly characteristic of the manner in which Paul often writes. With regard to the parenthetic explanations or remarks in ver. 3, 4, (see the remarks on the course of thought in these verses, under ver. 3), we have seen that they were occasioned by the association of ideas in the writer's mind, which were connected with the mention of *τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*. So in respect to ver. 5. and 6 again; they were evidently suggested to the mind by *τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν*, in ver. 4. Having expressed the thoughts which *κυρίου* thus spontaneously suggested, the writer again resumes the direct address or salutation which he was making: *πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν κ. τ. λ.* The words necessarily connected in the paragraph stand thus: *περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ . . . Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν . . . πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ κ. τ. λ.*; so that the whole *seven* verses make but one sentence, which is grammatically connected together. In this are *three* parentheses, if we count *ἡ προσηγγελία διὰ τῶν προφητῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν γραφαῖς ἁγίαις* as one; which we may do. This is an unusual number, even for Paul, in one sentence. Yet the characteristic of style developed by it is often to be seen, more or less, in the works of this distinguished apostle.

(8) The apostle now proceeds to the expression of his kind feelings and wishes toward the Church at Rome, in order to prepare the way, as it was natural for him to do, to be the more kindly listened to by them. *Πρῶτον* in the *first place*, *first of all*, viz. before I speak of other things. It does not here mean *first in point of importance*, but *first in order of time*.—Miv Bretschneider (Lex.) considers as here placed *absolutely*, i. e., without its usual corresponding *δέ*; for he says: "No *δεύτερον* follows," i. e., no additional clause connected with *δέ*. But in this I think he is mistaken. For the apostle, after two paragraphs in his usual manner, which begin with *γάρ* (illustrating and confirming first what he had said in ver. 8, and then what he had said in ver. 10), proceeds to the *δεύτερον* of his declarations in

ver. 13, viz. *οὗ θεέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς κ. τ. λ.* That is, *first* the apostle thanks God for their faith, &c.; and *secondly*, he is desirous to tell them how much he has longed to pay them a visit, &c. Reiche denies that *μὲν* in ver 8 and *δέ* in ver. 13. can stand in relation to each other. But in this he is not supported by the principles of philology. *Μὲν* and *δέ* stand not only at the head of antithetic and discrepant clauses, but also before those which express a difference of one thought from another, and so in the room of our *first, secondly, &c.* See Passow's Lex. *μὲν*.

τῷ θεῷ μου, *my God*; the Christian religion which teaches us to say *πάτερ ἡμῶν*, allows us to say *θεός μου*.—*Διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, *per Christum, auxilio Christi, interventū Christi, i. e., through, by, or in consequence of, what Christ has done or effected*; in other words, *Christo adjuvante, Deo gratias ago respectu vestrum omnium, ut fides vestra, &c.* The meaning seems to be, that as a Christian, as one on whom Christ has had mercy, and who has now a Christian sympathy for others beloved of Christ, he thanks God for the prosperous state of the Church at Rome. *Διὰ Ἰ. Χριστοῦ* may also be joined with *θεῷ μου*, and the sense be thus given: 'I thank God, who is my God through what Jesus Christ has done for me; to him I belong as one of his, through the intervention of Christ.' So Glöckler. Barnes construes *διὰ Ἰ. Χριστοῦ* as pointing out the medium through which the thanks of the apostle were offered. This is altogether consonant with the Christian economy; but it does not seem to me to be the most natural sense of the passage.

Ἕνεκα πάντων ὑμῶν, *on account of you all*; not *for you* in this sense, viz. in your room or stead.—*Πίστις ὑμῶν*, *your Christian belief, your faith in the gospel*.—*Ὁλῶ τῷ κόσμῳ*, *i. e., through the Roman empire*. *Κόσμος* and *οἰκουμένη* are frequently used in a *limited* sense, like the *עוֹלָם* and *עוֹלָם* of the Hebrews. Nothing is more natural than to suppose, that the faith of the Church at Rome might have been widely known or reported, in consequence of that great city being frequented by strangers from all parts of the empire.

(9) *Μάρτυς γὰρ . . . θεός*, *for God is my witness*. *Γὰρ explicantis et confirmantis*; *i. e., the apostle unfolds and confirms, in the following sentence, the evidence of his strong sympathies with them, and of his gratitude to God on their account*. The reason why he here makes the appeal to God seems to be, that, as he was a stranger in person to the Church at Rome, they might otherwise think his expressions to be merely those of common civility.

ὧς λατρεύω . . . αὐτοῦ, *whom I serve in my soul (sincerely) in the gospel of his Son.* Ἐν τῷ πνεύματι μου I understand as designating sincerity, i. e., *real, internal, spiritual devotedness*, in distinction from what is merely external or apparent. The apostle means to say, that he was sincerely and really devoted to the cause which he professed to love and to promote: comp. Phil. iii. 3. 2 Tim. i. 3. Eph. vi. 6. Rom. ii. 28, 29.

Ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ may mean, *by the preaching of the gospel which has respect to his Son*; more probably it means, *in the gospel which has respect to his Son*, comp. ver. 2; or it may mean *the gospel of which his Son is the author*, and which he taught me. See, on the various meanings of the Gen. case, New Testament Grammar § 99. That *ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ* does not here refer to the *preaching* of the gospel, but to living spiritually according to its precepts, seems rather more probable because of the *ἐν τῷ πνεύματι μου* which precedes, and which seems to define the kind of service rendered by the apostle. However, the other sense is allowable, although Reiche is strenuous against it.—Ὡς ἀδιαλείπτως . . . ποιῶμαι, *how unceasingly I make remembrance of you.* This shows the intense zeal which the apostle cherished for the welfare of the Christian Churches; for if he thus constantly interceded with God for the Church at Rome, which he had never visited, we cannot suppose that he forgot other churches which he had been the instrument of establishing. How different a phase would the Christian Church speedily assume, if all its ministers were now actuated with the same degree of zeal which Paul exhibited! Ποιῶμαι, *I make to myself*, Midd. voice.

(10) Πάντοτε . . . δεόμενος, *always making supplication in my prayers*; which is confirming what he had said before, ἀδιαλείπτως μνήσαν ὑμῶν ποιῶμαι, and at the same time pointing out the manner in which he made this μνήσαν, viz., in his supplications before God. Ἐπὶ τῶν προσευχῶν μου means, literally, *during my prayers*, or *when I pray*. Glöckler; 'In addition to my other prayers, I also ask this,' &c.; which is unnecessary.

Εἴπως . . . ὑμᾶς, [that] *if possible, at some time before long, I may (God willing) make a prosperous journey, and come to pay you a visit.* Εἴπως expresses a degree of uncertainty which hung over the future, in the writer's own mind, i. e., it means *perhaps, if possible, if in some way, if by any means.* Ἡδὲ, followed by the Future, means *now, brevi, by and by, soon, before long.* Περὶ αὐ-

quando, tandem, at last, at some time, at some future period; (πρί, with the accent on the penult, means when.) Both the words ἤδη and πρί, have often nearly the same meaning when connected with a future tense. They may be here rendered thus: ἤδη, *now, before long; πρί, at least, at some time, or at some future period*; so in the version, where I have given to each word its own particular and appropriate meaning, merely reversing the order, because of our English idiom.

Εὐδοκῆσθαι means, *to make a pleasant or prosperous journey.* A journey to Rome, which the apostle so ardently longed to visit, would in itself of course have been a *pleasant* one.—Εν τῷ θελήματι τοῦ θεοῦ, *i. e., Deo volente.* Grotius renders the passage very happily: *Si forte Dei voluntas felicitatem mihi indulgeat ad vos veniendi.*

(11) γάρ, in this verse, precedes a sentence designed to illustrate and confirm the declaration which Paul had just made, viz., that he felt a deep interest for the Church at Rome, and hoped yet to enjoy the pleasure of visiting them.—“*ἵνα τι . . . πνευματικόν, that I may impart to you some spiritual favour or gift.* Bengel, Michaelis, and others, interpret χάρισμα πνευματικόν, as meaning, *miraculous gift*, such as the apostles sometimes imparted by the imposition of hands. Augustine understands by the same words, *the love of one's neighbour*, supposing that the Jewish Christians at Rome were deficient in this virtue. But in ver. 12, the apostle expresses his expectation of receiving on his part a benefit like to that which he bestows on them; so that both of these methods of explanation seem to be fairly out of question. What he expected *from* them, was συμπαρακληθῆναι . . . διὰ τῆς ἐν ἀλλήλοις πίστεως: consequently this was what he expected to do *for* them, viz., to encourage, animate, and strengthen them in their Christian profession and virtues. He speaks of a *spiritual* gift, as characteristic of the graces of the gospel, of which the Spirit is the efficient author, and as differing from common gifts of a worldly nature, often bestowed by friends who pay visits to each other.

So the latter part of our verse: εἰς τὸ στηριχθῆναι ὑμᾶς, *that you may be confirmed, viz., in the manner stated above.* Nor does it follow, that the apostle viewed the Church at Rome as weak in faith, because he says this; unless we say that he was himself weak in faith, because he expects the like advantage of confirmation from his intercourse with them. Faith that is already strong, and Christian virtue that is conspicuous, are capable of becoming still

more so; and therefore expressions of this nature are never applied amiss, even to Christians of the highest order. The apostle "did not as yet count himself to have attained" all that elevation of Christian character of which he was capable, and which it was his duty to attain; Phil. iii. 13, seq.

(12) Τοῦτο δὲ ἵστι, *that is, id est*, prefixed to an *epexegetis*, or an *ἐπεξηγησῆαις* (*correction*) as the Greeks named explanatory clauses of such a nature as that which now follows. The apostle, lest the meaning of the preceding declaration might be misconstrued, adds (in ver. 12) the more full expression of his sentiment. He does not mean to assert, that the consequence of his visiting Rome would be merely their confirmation in the Christian faith, and so the advantage be all on their side; but he expects himself to be spiritually benefited by such a visit; and this he fully expresses in ver. 12. The remark of Calvin on this passage is very striking and just; "See with what gentleness a pious soul will demean itself! It refuses not to seek confirmation even from mere beginners in knowledge. Nor does the apostle use any dissimulation here; for there is none so poor in the Church of Christ, that he cannot make some addition of importance to our stores. We, unhappily, are hindered by pride from availing ourselves properly of such an advantage." How very different is the spirit and tenor of this remark from that of Erasmus, who calls the expression of the apostle, *pia vafrities et sancta adulatio!*

Συμπαράκληθῆναι . . . ἐμοῦ, *to be comforted among you by the mutual faith both of you and me.* Παράκληθῆναι, in Attic Greek, means *to call, to invite, to exhort*. But in Hellenistic Greek, it not only means *to exhort*, but specially to address one in such a way as to administer comfort, encouragement, hope, resolution, &c. I have rendered the word *comfort*, only because I cannot find any English word which will convey the full sense of the original.—'Εν, *among*; and so, oftentimes; see the lexicons.—'Εν ἀλλήλοις, placed between the article and its noun, is of course employed in the manner of an *adjective*, i. e., it means *mutual*.—'Τμῶν τε καὶ ἐμοῦ seems to be a repetition of the idea conveyed by ἐν ἀλλήλοις. This repetition is intensive, and denotes the strong desire which the apostle entertained, to be understood by the Church at Rome as saying, that he expected good from *them*, as well as hoped that they might receive good from him.

(13) The apostle had already signified his desire to visit Rome.

vers. 10, 11. But here he proceeds to show how *definitely* and *frequently* he had cherished such a desire; which gives intensity to the whole representation.

Οὐ θέλω δὲ . . . ὑμᾶς, *moreover, I am desirous, brethren, to have you know, that I have often purposed to come to you.* Δὲ in this passage I regard as corresponding to μὲν in ver. 8, and so making the τὸ δεύτερον or *apodosis* of the apostle's discourse; see the note on ver. 8. Οὐ θέλω ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν is the same in sense as θέλω ὑμᾶς γινώσκειν; but the first form of expression (in a negative way), is what the Greeks call *λιτότης*, i. e., a softer or milder form of expression than direct affirmation.

Πολλάκις προεβίμην, *I have often purposed*; comp. Acts xix. 21. Rom. xv. 23, 24. How often the apostle had purposed this, we have no means of ascertaining. But one thing is clear from this and many other like passages, viz., that the apostles were not *uniformly* and *always* guided in *all* their thoughts, desires, and purposes, by an infallible Spirit of inspiration. Had this been the case, how could Paul have *often* purposed that which never came to pass? Those who plead for such a *uniform* inspiration, may seem to be zealous for the honour of the apostles and founders of Christianity; but they do in fact cherish a mistaken zeal. For if we once admit, that the apostles were *uniformly* inspired in *all* which they purposed, said, or did; then we are constrained of course to admit, that men acting under the influence of inspiration, may purpose that which will never come to pass or be done; may say that which is hasty or incorrect, Acts xxiii. 3; or do that which the gospel disapproves, Gal. ii. 13, 14. But if this be once fully admitted, then it would make nothing for the credit due to any man, to affirm that he is *inspired*; for what is that inspiration to be accounted of, which, even during its continuance, does not guard the subject of it from mistake or error? Consequently those who maintain the *uniform* inspiration of the apostles, and yet admit (as they are compelled to do) their errors in purpose, word, and action, do in effect obscure the glory of inspiration, by reducing inspired and uninspired men to the same level.

To my own mind nothing appears more certain than that inspiration in any respect whatever, was not *abiding* and *uniform* with the apostles or any of the primitive Christians. To God's only and well-beloved Son, and to him only, was it given to have the Spirit ἀμετρώς or οὐ ἐκ μέτρου, John iii. 34. All others on whom was be-

stowed the precious gift of inspiration, enjoyed it only *ἐκ μέρους*. The consequence of this was, that Jesus "knew no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth;" but all his followers, whenever they were left without the special and miraculous guidance of the Spirit, committed more or less of sin and error.

This view of the subject frees it from many and most formidable difficulties. It assigns to the Saviour the *pre-eminence* which is justly due. It accounts for the mistakes and errors of his apostles. At the same time, it does not detract in the least degree from the certainty and validity of the sayings and doings of the apostles, when they were under the special influence of the Spirit of God.

Καὶ ἐκωλύθη . . . δεῦρο, but have been hindered until now.—*Καὶ* although or but; Bretschn. Lex. *καί*, III. "ex Hebraismo, *καί* set particula adversativa, *sed, vero, at;*" of which he gives many examples. The well-known power of *!* to stand before a *disjunctive* clause, throws light on this usage; which is very unfrequent in classic Greek. It cannot be truly said, in cases of this nature, that *καί* (or *!*) properly signifies *but*; yet it may be truly said, that *καί* (!) connects sentences, or clauses of sentences, whose meaning is *adversative* or *disjunctive*. The *conjunctive office* consists in connecting the sentences, or parts of them; the *disjunctive sense* lies in the nature of the propositions. We may lawfully translate *ad sensum*, in such cases, and so render *καί* (!) *but, although*.

ἵνα τινὰ . . . ἴδωσιν, that I may have some fruit even among you, as also among other Gentiles; i. e., that I might see my labours to promote the gospel crowned with success even at Rome, the capital of the world, as well as in all other places where I have preached. Comp. John xv. 16, iv. 36—38. Phil. i. 11. Col. i. 6.

(14) *Ἑλλήσιν τε . . . εἰμὶ*, I am indebted both to Greeks and Barbarians, to the learned and the ignorant; i. e., *ὀφειλέτης εἰμὶ εὐαγγελιζέσθαι*, I am under obligation to preach the gospel; comp. 1 Cor. ix. 16. 2 Cor. ii. 6. iv. 5. In classic usage, *βάρβαροι* means *all who spoke a language foreign to the Greek*; 1 Cor. xiv. 11. Acts xxviii. 2, 4. Of course, the Romans themselves, by this usage, would be named *βάρβαροι* and so Philo constantly names them; and Plautus himself calls the Latin language *barbara lingua*, and Italy *barbaria*. But here the question with the apostle seems not to be in respect to language, but only in regard to circumstances and state of knowledge. *Ἑλλήσι*, therefore, appears to be equivalent to *σοφοῖς*, and *βαρβάροις* to *ἀνοήτοις*. Considered in this way, *Ἑλλήσι καὶ βαρβά-*

ποις mean the polished or unpolished, or the learned and ignorant, or (to use the idiom of the present day) 'the civilized and the savage.'

Σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀνοήτους should be regarded here as characterizing the state of knowledge, rather than the state or measure of the faculties of men thus designated. *Learned and unlearned* is a version *ad sensum*.

Still if any one choose to consider the two couplets here as designating, the first *those who spoke Greek* and *those who did not*, the second *the learned and the ignorant*, be they of whatever nation they might be; and so the whole to be designed simply as expressing with force and by specific language the general idea of obligation to preach to all nations and classes of men without distinction, he will not wander far from the mark. This is the most simple and natural view of the subject. Glöckler joins "Ἑλλῆσι τε καὶ Βαρεβάροις with the preceding *Ἰουδαίῃσι*; invitâ Minervâ.

(15) Tholuck finds much difficulty in the οὕτω of the clause which follows; and after discussing it at some length, comes to the conclusion, that the apostle has here "fallen out of his construction," inasmuch as the nature of his sentence requires that καὶ ὥς should be placed before "Ἑλλῆσι, in order to make out the comparison. But I do not feel this difficulty. Surely οὕτω or οὕτως often stands alone, without a preceding καὶ ὥς or ὡςπερ as any one may see by opening a lexicon or concordance. Οὕτω is often employed in this way, in the sense of *similiter*, *simili modo*, *eodem modo*, *in the like way*, *in such a way*, *in a similar manner*, *in the same manner*. Thus in Matt. v. 16. vii. 17. xviii. 14. Mark xiii. 29. xiv. 59. Luke xiv. 33, et sæpe alibi. What hinders now that we should understand it, in the verse before us, in the same way? 'I am under obligation,' says the apostle, 'to preach the gospel [for εὐαγγελίσασθαι is implied in the first clause] to all classes of men.' What then? 'So, i. e., circumstances being thus, I am ready (τὸ κατ' ἐμὲ πρὸς ὅθιμον) to preach the gospel even to you who are at Rome.' If the reader does not think that the above references go so far as to give to οὕτω the sense here assigned to it, viz., *matters being thus* or *circumstances being thus*, or *I being in this condition*, he may turn to John iv. 6, where it is said: "Jesus being weary on account of his journeying, *καθίστητο οὕτως ἐπὶ τῇ πηγῇ*," he sat down in this condition upon the well, viz., in a state of weariness. All the attempts that I have seen to give οὕτως any other sense, seem to be in vain. Compare

also Rev. iii. 16, "I would thou wert either cold or hot! *Oûtwc, so,*" i. e., the matter being thus, "since thou art neither cold nor hot, I will spue thee out of my mouth." In like manner in the text before us; *oûtwc*, 'the matter being thus, viz., it being true that I am under obligation to preach to all classes of men, I am ready to preach at Rome;' or, 'since I am bound in my duty to preach to all, in accordance with this (*oûtwc*) I am ready to preach the gospel at Rome. If *καθώς* were placed before *ἑλλήσι*, as Tholuck and others judge it should be, the sentiment would be thus: 'In proportion to my obligation to preach to all men, is my readiness to preach at Rome;' a sentiment which, although doubtless true, does not seem to me to be the one which the apostle means here to convey. It is more simple to understand him as saying: 'Since I am bound to preach to all, in accordance with this obligation I am ready to preach even at Rome (*καὶ ὑμῖν*), formidable and difficult as the task may seem to be.' Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 16. In this view of *oûtwc* I find Reiche, in his recent work, fully to agree.

Τὸ κατ' ἐμὲ πρόθυμον, [lit. there is,] a readiness in respect to myself, q. d., I am ready. Or it may be interpreted in this way: 'There is a readiness so far as it respects me,' namely, to the extent of my ability, so far as it depends on me; meaning to intimate, that the actual disposal of the matter is to be wholly committed to God. As to *τὸ πρόθυμον* (an adjective of the neuter gender) being used for a noun, nothing is more common than for the Greeks to employ adjectives in this way.

Καὶ ὑμῖν has an emphasis in it, i. e., even to you, at Rome, the metropolis of the world. In other words: 'I shun not to preach the gospel any where; to the most learned and critical, as well as to the most unlearned and unskilled in judging.' *Ἐν, at*; and so often times before nouns of place.

(16) *Οὐ γὰρ . . . Χριστοῦ*, for I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ; a reason or ground of his readiness to preach it, which he had just before asserted; and therefore it is introduced by *γὰρ*. The apostle Paul gloried in the gospel; in fact, he gloried in nothing else. Although Christ crucified was "to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness," he shunned not to preach it on this account, but was willing, even in presence of the learned and the sophists at Rome, to proclaim the truth as it is in Jesus.

The reading *τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, is marked by Knapp as wanting an ade-

quate support, and is rejected by Mill, Bengel, Koppe, Griesbach, and Lachmann. In respect to the sense of the passage, its insertion or rejection will make no important difference. If retained τοῦ Χριστοῦ must be construed as *Genitivus objecti*, i. e., the gospel respecting Christ, or of which Christ is the object.

Here ends the first or salutatory part of this epistle. The remainder of verse 16 (with verses 17, 18) constitutes the leading subject or theme of the epistle; which the writer here as it were formally proposes, and which he in the sequel proceeds to confirm, illustrate, and fortify.

CHAP. I. 16—18.

These four verses contain four propositions, which lie at the basis of all that may be appropriately called the *gospel of Christ*. (1) To gospel truth is imparted a divine energy, in saving the souls of men. (2) Those only can be saved by it, who believe it and put their confidence in it. (3) The pardon of sin, or the justification which God will bestow only on sinners who believe in Christ, is revealed from heaven, and proposed to all men for their reception. (4) From the same source a revelation is made, that the unbelieving and ungodly will be the subject of divine indignation and punishment. The apostle does not proceed, formally and in order, to illustrate and establish these propositions separately and successively; but now one part of these respective truths, and then another, comes into view as he proceeds, and the whole is fully developed by him in the course of the epistle.

Δύναμις γὰρ . . . πιστεύοντι, for it is the power of God, unto the salvation of every one who believes; i. e., it is the efficacious instrument, by which God promotes or accomplishes the salvation of all believers. Δύναμις Θεοῦ means, that in and by it God exerts his power, that it is powerful through the energy which he imparts; and so it is called *the power of God*. The γὰρ serves to introduce the reason why the apostle is not ashamed of the gospel. It is mighty through God εἰς σωτηρίαν, to salvation, i. e., to the accomplishment or attainment of salvation. Εἰς with the Accusative is, in a multitude of cases, used in the like manner.—Παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι, *Dativus commodi*: the gospel brings salvation to every believer, or it is the means of imparting it to him.

Ἰουδαίῳ . . . Ἕλληνι, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek. In proclaiming the gospel, the primitive preachers of it, themselves being *Jews*, were directed first to proclaim the offers of mercy through a Saviour to the Jews, wherever they went, and then to the Gentiles; which was the order usually followed, and to which the clause before us seems to advert. That the περὶ here merely relates to the *order* in which the gospel was proposed, and not to

any substantial preference of the Jew over the Greek, the sequel of this epistle most abundantly shows. So Chrysostom: *τάξιώς ἐστὶ πρῶτον*, i. e., *πρῶτον* relates merely to *order*.

(17) *Δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ*. *Γὰρ illustrantis*, as lexicographers say. In the preceding verse the apostle has said, that the gospel is, through divine power accompanying it, an efficacious instrument of salvation *πᾶσι τοῖς πιστεύουσιν*, to every believer. On this last expression an emphasis is to be laid; inasmuch as the great object of Paul, in the epistle before us, is to show that salvation is *gratuitously* bestowed on the *believer* in Christ, but never conferred in any case on the ground of merit. The design of verse 17 is to suggest, that *faith* or *belief* is the appointed means or *conditio sine qua non* of justification, i. e., of obtaining pardoning mercy from God; that the Old Testament Scriptures confirm this idea; and consequently, that salvation is granted to *believers*, and to them only; all which goes to illustrate and establish the affirmation in ver. 16. It is in this way that *γὰρ* connects the fine and delicate shades of thought and processes of reasoning, in the Greek language; a circumstance which has, unhappily for the criticism of the New Testament, been quite too much overlooked by the great body of interpreters.

Δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is a phrase among the most important which the New Testament contains, and fundamental in the right interpretation of the epistle before us. To obtain a definite and precise view of its meaning, we must betake ourselves; in the first place, to the verb *δικαίω* for from the meanings which this verb conveys, come nearly all the shades of meaning that belong to *δικαιοσύνη* and *δικαίωσις*, so often employed (especially the former) in the writings of Paul.

The Greek sense of the verb *δικαίω* differs, in one respect, from the corresponding Hebrew verb *קָדַשׁ*; for this (in Kal) means *to be just, to be innocent, to be upright*, and also *to justify one's self, to be justified*, thus having the sense of either a *neuter, reflexive, or passive* verb. In the active voice, *δικαίω* in Greek has only an *active* sense, and it is used in pretty exact correspondence with the forms *קָדַשׁ* and *קִדְּשׁ* (Pel and Hiphil) of the Hebrews, i. e., it means *to declare just, to pronounce just, to justify*, i. e., to treat as just; consequently, as intimately connected with this, *to pardon, to acquit from accusation, to free from the consequences of sin or transgression, to set free from a deserved penalty*. This last class of meanings is the one in which Paul usually employs this word. As a *locus classicus* to vindicate this meaning, we may appeal to Rom. viii. 33, 'Who

shall *accuse* the elect of God? It is God ὁ δικάων, *who acquits them*, viz. of all accusation, or '*who liberates them from the penal consequences of transgression.*' Exactly in the same way is it said, in Prov. xvii. 15, 'He who *justifieth* (דִּינֵם) the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are an abomination to the Lord.' So in Ex. xxiii. 7, 'I will not *justify* (דִּינֵם) the wicked.' In the same manner Is. v. 23 speaks: 'Who *justify* the wicked (דִּינֵם) for a reward.' In these and all such cases, the meaning of the word *justify* is altogether plain, viz. it signifies *to acquit, to free from the penal consequences of guilt, to pronounce just, i. e., to absolve from punishment, it being directly the opposite of condemning or subjecting to the consequences of a penalty.*

In this sense Paul very often employs the verb; e. g. Rom. v. 1, δικαιωθέντες, *being freed from punishment, being acquitted, being pardoned* εἰρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. Rom. v. 9, δικαιωθέντες, *being acquitted, pardoned* σωθησόμεθα δι' αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς, which salvation is the opposite of being subjected to punishment, or of *not being justified.* In Gal. ii. 16, 17, δικαιώω is four times employed in the sense of *absolved, acquitted, or treated as just, i. e., freed from penalty and admitted to a state of reward.* So Gal. iii. 8, 11, 24. v. 4. Tit. iii. 7. In Romans iv. 5, τὸν δικαιούντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ is plainly susceptible of no other than the above interpretation; for those who are ungodly, can never be made *innocent* in the strict and literal sense of this word; they can only be *treated as innocent, i. e., absolved from the condemnation of the law, pardoned, delivered, from the penalty threatened against sin.* That the idea of *pardon, or remission of the penalty threatened by the divine law, is the one substantially conveyed by δικαιώω and δικαιόσθην, as generally employed in the writings of Paul, is most evident from Romans iv. 6, 7; where the blessedness of the man to whom the Lord imputes δικαιοσύνη, i. e., whom he reckons, counts, treats as δίκαιος, is thus described: "Blessed are they whose *iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered; blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputes not sin,*" i. e., whom he does not treat or punish as a sinner. This passage is a fundamental explanation of the whole subject, so far as the present class of meanings attached to δικαιώω and δικαιόσθην is concerned.*

In the same sense we have the word δικαιώω in Rom. iii. 24, 26, 28, 38. iv. 2, et al. sæpe. So Acts xiii. 38, 39. Luke xviii. 14 Comp. Sept. in Gen. xxxviii. 26. Job xxxiii. 32. Is. xliii. 26.

The way is now open for an easy and intelligible explanation of the nouns, which stand intimately and etymologically connected with the verb *δικαίωω*. These are three, viz. *δικαιοσύνη*, *δικαίωμα*, and *δικαίωσις*, all employed occasionally in the very same sense, viz. that of *justification*, i. e., acquittal, pardon, freeing from condemnation, accepting and treating as righteous. All three of these nouns are employed occasionally by the Seventy in rendering the Hebrew word *צדקה*; which I mention merely to show that the *usus loquendi* could employ all of them in the same sense; e. g., *δικαιοσύνη* for *צדקה*; in Prov. xvi. 11. xvii. 23. Is. lxi. 8. Ezek. xviii. 17, 19, 21, &c.; *δικαίωμα* for *צדקה*, Ex. xxi. 1, 9, 31. xxiv. 3, et sæpissime; *δικαίωσις* for *צדקה*, Lev. xxiv. 22.

In like manner all three of these nouns are employed in Paul's epistles: e. g., *δικαίωμα* in the sense of *pardon*, *justification*, Rom. v. 16, where it stands as the antithesis of *κατάκριμα*; *δικαίωσις* in Rom. iv. 25, where it plainly means *justification*; and so in Romans v. 18, where it is the antithesis of *κατάκριμα*.

But the word *δικαιοσύνη* is the *usual* one employed by Paul to designate gospel-justification, i. e., the pardoning of sin, and accepting and treating as righteous. So we find this word plainly employed in Rom. iii. 21, 22 (comp. ver. 24), 25, 26. iv. 11, 13. v. 17, 21. ix. 30, 31. x. 3, 4, 5, 6, 10. 2 Cor. v. 21 (abstract for concrete). Phil. iii. 9. Heb. xi. 7. et alibi sæpe.

With these facts before us, we now return to our text. *Δικαιοσύνη* *θεοῦ* seems very plainly to have the same meaning here that it has in Rom. iii. 21, and in the other passages just referred to in this epistle, viz. the *justification* or *pardoning mercy* bestowed on sinners who are under the curse of the divine law; or the state or condition of being pardoned, i. e., justified or treated as just. In this sense it is allied to, but is not altogether the same as, the Hebrew *חַסְדִּים*, which often means *kindness*, *benignity*, *favour*, *deliverance from evil*; e. g., Is. xlv. 8, 24. xlv. 13. xlviii. 18. li. 6, 8. liv. 17. lvi. 1, and often in the Psalms.

The reader must be careful to note, however, the simple idea of *pardon*, unattended by any thing else, i. e., the mere deliverance from punishment is not all which is comprised in the meaning of *δικαίωω* and *δικαιοσύνη*. The idea is more fully expressed by *accepting and treating as righteous*. Now, when this is done by a benefactor, he does not stop with the simple remission of punishment, but he bestows happiness in the same manner as though the offender had

been altogether obedient. As there are but two stations allotted for the human race, i. e., heaven or hell; so those who are delivered from the latter, must be advanced to the former.

All is now plain. *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* is the justification which God bestows, or the justification of which God is the author; or if any one prefers, he may call it that state of pardon and acceptance which is the result of mercy proffered in the gospel and dispensed on account of the atonement made by Christ. That Paul should call it *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, was very natural, when he wished to distinguish it from that righteousness which the Jews supposed themselves to possess in consequence of legal obedience, and which entitled them (in their own view) to divine acceptance. The justification which God allows, or that kind of righteousness which he now admits as a condition of acceptance, is *ἐκ πίστεως, οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων*, and therefore altogether a matter of *gratuity*, and not of merit or desert. This general view is made altogether clear, by comparing Rom. iii. 21—24; and indeed the whole tenor of the discussion in the epistle to the Romans, seems imperiously to demand this sense.

Having thus explained my own view of the meaning of *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*, which is for substance the same as that defended by Luther, Wolf, Heumann, Limborch, Flatt, Macknight, Usteri, Reiche, and many others, it may be proper, considering the importance of the subject, briefly to review some of the leading opinions that have been advanced and defended by others.

I. The first class are those who regard *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* here as designating an attribute of God; in which case *θεοῦ* is regarded not as *Gen. auctoris*, but as *Gen. possessionis*.

Yet those who hold to such an opinion are by no means agreed in the mode of special explanation. (a) Some regard *δικαιοσύνη* as designating the perfect holiness and uprightness of the Saviour's character, which is imputed to believers. So Chemnitz, Hoepfner, Schroeder, and many others.

But how can this *δικαιοσύνη* in Christ be *ἐκ πίστεως*, and especially *διὰ πίστεως ἑαυτοῦ*? Phil. iii. 9. Is Christ righteous, then, by having faith in himself? And in what part of the Bible are we to find the doctrine, that his righteousness and perfect holiness is actually transferred or imputed to us? In such a case, our pardon would no more be of *grace*; and our claims would no more depend on *mercy*, but on *justice*; a sentiment the very opposite of gospel-doctrine. If a friend gives me, who am a debtor, a sum of money sufficient to pay

off my debt, my creditor is bound as much on the score of *justice* to give up my bond of payment when I deliver to him this money, as if it had been all earned by my own industry. It is no concern of his, how I obtain the money.

(b) *Δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* means *God's fidelity or veracity* in the bestowment of grace according to the promises of the gospel. So Beza, Piscator, Turretin, Locke, Böhme, and others.

But how can God's *fidelity* or *veracity*, or any other of his attributes, be *ἐκ πίστεως*, or *διὰ πίστεως*, or *ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει*?

(c) *God's vindictive justice*. So Origen, Theodoret, Grotius, Wetstein, Marckius, Bretschn. (Lex.), Fritsche, and some others.

But vindictive justice is manifested in the *punishment* of sinners, not in their pardon. The *δικαιοσύνη* here is that which *pardons*.

(d) *Rewarding justice*, i. e., that which bestows favours on the virtuous. So Calov, Storr, and others.

But how can this attribute of God be *by faith*, and *by faith in Christ*?

(e) *Goodness of God*. So Schoettgen, Morus, Voorst, and others.

But here again, goodness, considered simply in the light of a divine attribute, cannot be regarded as what the apostle means to designate; for how can this be *ἐκ πίστεως*?

II. *Δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* is regarded as something which belongs to men; either as an attribute, quality, &c., or else as a state, condition, &c., of which God is the author or giver; so that *Θεοῦ* is construed as *Gen. auctoris*. But here again, there is some variety of opinion; for,

(a) Some hold that *δικαιοσύνη* means *internal righteousness, virtue, or holiness* such as the gospel requires. So Ammon, Schleusner, Tholuck, Paulus, Schultz, Winer, Wahl, Glöckler, and others. But some of them explain this, as meaning *the way and manner of obtaining this holiness*.

So far as Rom. i. 17 is concerned, this is a possible sense. But the phrase *δικαιοσύνη* is so often employed by Paul to designate *pardon, forgiveness*, or at least a state of *pardon* or of *being forgiven*, that it cannot well be supposed it is here employed in a different sense, in proposing the theme which the apostle afterward discusses.

That *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ . . . ἐκ πίστεως* had a direct reference, in the writer's mind, to liberation from punishment and the obtaining of salvation, seems to be clear from the quotation which he immediately makes from the Old Testament, in order to sanction the sentiment which he had uttered, viz. *δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζῆσθαι, he who is just, i. e.,*

he who is accepted or regarded as *δίκαιος*, shall obtain life by faith, i. e., shall be happy by faith (not by merit). Such then is the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*. It bestows unmerited favour on perishing sinners; not on him who has fulfilled the law, (for who has done this?) but on him who believes on Jesus; comp. Romans iv. 3—5.

Such a *δικαιοσύνη*, which is from God, or is of divine appointment, is revealed *in* or *by* the gospel, *ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται* for *αὐτῷ* refers to τὸ εὐαγγέλιον in ver. 16. The apostle does not mean to say, that nothing respecting such a faith was before revealed; for he appeals immediately to the Old Test. Scriptures, in order to confirm the sentiment which he had just uttered. But the gospel, in the first place, makes such a revelation one of its *most prominent* features; and therefore, secondly, justification by faith is revealed in it *more fully* and *explicitly* than it ever had been before. In the like way, life and immortality are said to be brought to light by the gospel, 2 Tim. i. 10.

Ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, a controverted, and (by reason of its connection) very difficult phrase. The main question is, whether *ἐκ πίστεως* is to be joined with *δικαιοσύνη*, or whether it belongs in sense to *εἰς πίστιν*, so that *ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν* would make a kind of *climactic* expression, which would be equivalent to the following phrase, viz., 'from a lower to a higher degree of faith.' In this latter way Theophylact understood it; for he says, οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ τὸ πρῶτως πιστεῦσαι, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς εἰσαγωγικῆς πίστεως δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἀναβαίνειν εἰς τὴν τελειότεραν πίστιν i. e., 'our first belief is not sufficient, but we must ascend from our inceptive faith to a more perfect degree of it.' So Clemens Alex. (Strom. V. 1): Κοινὴ πίστις καθάπερ θεμέλιος, καθὼς ὁ Κύριος λέγει, ἡ πίστις σου σέσωκέ σε, i. e., 'a common faith is as it were a foundation, as Christ said: Thy faith hath saved thee.' He then goes on to say, that 'a *τελεία πίστις* is one which can remove mountains; on which account the apostles themselves made this request: Lord, we believe, help thou our unbelief!'

Tholuck approves of this exegesis; and it is substantially the same as that which has been defended by Melancthon, Beza, Calov, Le Clerc, and many others. But three difficulties seem to lie in the way of admitting it; the first, that it does not appear at all to answer the exigency of the passage; the second, that the *usus loquendi* of Paul's epistles is against it; the third, that the context is evidently repugnant to it.

(a) *The exigency of the passage.* The exegesis in question would

make Paul's main *thesis* to be this: 'The justification which God bestows, (or, according to Tholuck, the fulfilling of the law which he requires,) is revealed in the gospel, from a lower degree of faith to a higher,' i. e., (as I suppose is meant,) it is so revealed, as that men are required to advance from a lower degree of faith to a higher one. But this would indeed be a most singular mode of expressing such a sentiment; one of the last which the usual method of thought and expression can well be supposed to devise. One might expect, if this idea is intended to be contained in the passage, that the writer would have said: *Δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἵνα προβαίνωμεν* (or *προβῶμεν*) *ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν* or at least that some mode of expression like this would have been employed. But if the sense be not, that justification is so revealed by the gospel as that men are required to advance from a lower to a higher degree of faith, then, after all, *ἐκ πίστεως* must be joined in effect with *δικαιοσύνη*, and we must say, 'The justification which is *ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν*, is revealed,' &c. But to such a junction Tholuck objects, on account of the separation of *ἐκ πίστεως* from *δικαιοσύνη*. A word on this point, in the sequel.

I have said that this sentiment does not fit the *exigency of the passage*; and my reason for saying this is, that it represents the apostle, not as proposing the grand theme of gratuitous justification (which is evidently the main subject of his epistle), but as proposing the *climactic* nature of the faith connected with justification, as his great topic. How can this well be imagined by a considerate reader of his epistle?

(b) *It is against the usus loquendi of homogeneous passages*; e. g., Rom. iii. 22, *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως* (altogether of the same tenor as *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ . . . ἐκ πίστεως* in our verse); Rom. iii. 30, *ὅς δικαιώσει . . . ἐκ πίστεως, καὶ . . . διὰ πίστεως* Rom. iv. 11, *σφραγίδα τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως* Rom. iv. 13, *διὰ δικαιοσύνης πίστεως* Rom. v. 1, *δικαιωθέντες ἐκ πίστεως* Rom. ix. 30, *τὰ ἔθνη . . . κατέλαβεν . . . δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ πίστεως* Rom. ix. 32, *ὅτι οὐκ [Ἰσραὴλ ἦν διώκων δικαιοσύνην] ἐκ πίστεως* Rom. x. 6, *ἡ δὲ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη* and so in the other epistles of Paul, e. g., Gal. ii. 16, [*δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος*] *διὰ πίστεως* Gal. iii. 8, *ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοῦ τὰ ἔθνη ὁ Θεός* Gal. iii. 11, *ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται* (a quotation); Gal. iii. 24, *ἵνα ἐκ πίστεως δικαιωθῶμεν* Gal. v. 5, *ἐκ πίστεως ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχόμεθα* Phil. iii. 9, *δικαιοσύνην . . . τὴν διὰ πίστεως* Heb. xi. 7, *τῆς κατὰ πίστιν δικαιοσύνης* et alibi sæpe. These are enough to show what Paul (I had almost said every where, and always) presents

to our view, in respect to the subject of justification. Can there be any good reason to apprehend, that in proposing the *theme* of his whole epistle, he should not propose the same *justification by faith* of which he afterwards so amply treats?

‘But,’ it is replied, ‘how could Paul separate *ἐκ πίστεως* so far from *δικαιοσύνη*, if he means that the former should qualify the latter?’ I answer, it was because *δικαιοσύνη*, as here employed, has already a noun in the Genitive (*Θεοῦ*) connected with it. The writer could not say *ἡ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* (which would, I believe, be without a parallel); nor was it apposite to say, *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ ἐκ πίστεως*, because the writer was hastening to say, that God’s appointed method of justification *was revealed* in the gospel. When this idea, which was uppermost in his mind (because he had just said that *he was not ashamed of the gospel*), was fully announced, the writer proceeds immediately to specify more particularly the *δικαιοσύνη* in question. It is a *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως* in accordance with which he has, in almost numberless examples, elsewhere made declarations.

The easiest and most direct solution is, to suppose *δικαιοσύνη* to be repeated here before *ἐκ πίστεως*. The sentence would then run thus: *Δικαιοσύνη γὰρ Θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται [δικαιοσύνη] ἐκ πίστεως κ. τ. λ.*; or *γενομένη* may be supplied by the mind, before *ἐκ πίστεως*. In this way, *ἐκ πίστεως* is *exegetical* merely of what precedes. The idea conveyed by *δικαιοσύνη* is resumed by the mind, and it is made still more definite by this adjunct.

(c) That this is the real sentiment and design of the apostle, seems quite clear from the context, *i. e.*, from the quotation which he forthwith makes in order to confirm what he had said, *viz.* *ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται*. Does not *δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως* clearly and unavoidably correspond with the *δικαιοσύνη . . . ἐκ πίστεως* which immediately precedes?

I merely add, that Flatt, Bengel, Hammond, and others, interpret the passage in the same way as I have done. The more I study the passage, the more difficulty I feel in construing it as meaning *revealed from faith to faith*. What can be the meaning of *revealed FROM faith*? And if *ἐκ πίστεως* does not qualify *ἀποκαλύπτεται*, then it must qualify *δικαιοσύνη* in which case the meaning that I have given seems nearly certain. And so Reiche construes *ἐκ πίστεως*, connecting it with *δικαιοσύνη*, and supposing *γενομένη* to be implied before it, which is admissible.

In respect to the thing itself, *viz.* *justification by faith*, faith desig-

nates the *modus in quo*, or the *means by which*; not the *causa causans seu efficiens*, i. e., not either the meritorious or efficient cause or ground of forgiveness. Every where the apostle represents *Christ* as this cause. But faith (so to speak) is a *conditio sine qua non*; it is a taking hold of the blessings proffered by the gospel, although it is by no means the cause or ground of their being offered. If the readers of this epistle will keep in mind these simple and obvious truths, it will save them much perplexity. *Justification by faith*, is an expression designed to point out *gratuitous justification* (Rom. iv. 16), in distinction from that which is by merit, i. e., by *deeds of law*, or entire obedience to the precepts of the law. The word *faith*, as used in this phrase, is designed to show, that the justification which we are now considering can be conferred only on *believers*, and that it is to be distinguished from δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων, i. e., meritorious justification. It is not designed to show that faith is, in any sense, the *meritorious* or *procuring* cause or ground of justification.

Εἰς πίστιν, in order to be believed, for belief. Such a use of the Acc. with εἰς is exceedingly frequent in Paul's epistles. It is equivalent to the Infinitive mood with the article before it; e. g., in ver. 5. above, εἰς ὑπακοήν = εἰς τὸ ὑπακουθῆναι so in ver. 16, εἰς σωτηρίαν = εἰς τὸ σωθῆναι, et sic al. sæpe. The reason why the apostle adds εἰς πίστιν seems to be, because he had said εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι. In accordance with this he here says, that *gratuitous justification* (δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως) is revealed, so that all, both Jews and Greeks (Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἑλλήνι) may believe and be saved; i. e., they can be saved through belief, and in this way only. Or we may construe εἰς πίστιν as Reiche does, viz. δικαιοσύνη is revealed to belief, i. e., to believers; comp. iii. 21.

If ἐκ πίστεως is to be attached to ἀποκαλύπτεται, I should think the sentiment must be, that 'the gospel is revealed by means of faith, i. e., by means of those who have faith in Christ, and in order to promote faith;' thus making a kind of *paronomasia*, to which the writings of Paul are by no means a stranger. But I cannot apprehend this to be the true sentiment.

It should be remarked here, how faith is represented as the necessary condition of δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, and also that this is revealed to those who have faith, or at least for the sake of promoting faith. Thus the gospel scheme seems to begin and end (as it were) with faith 'He that believeth shall be saved.'

Καθὼς γέγραπται, in accordance with what is written, agreeably to

what is written, viz. in the Scriptures. The Talmudists very often appeal to the Scriptures in the like way, by the formulas *כְּכַתְּבִינִי*, *as it is written*; *כְּכַתְּבִינִי הָיָה דְּכַתְּבִי*, *according to that which is written*; or *כְּכַתְּבִינִי הָיָה דְּכַתְּבִי*, *as the Scripture says*. It is not necessary to suppose, in all cases of this nature, that the writer who makes such an appeal, regards the passage which he quotes as specific *prediction*. Plainly this is not always the case with the writers of the New Testament; as nearly all commentators now concede. Compare, for example, Acts xxviii. 25, seq. Rom. viii. 36, ix. 33, x. 5. xi. 26, xiv. 11, &c. Such being the case, it is not necessary that we should interpret the passage which follows (Hab. ii. 4.), as having been originally designed to describe *gospel justification by faith*; for plainly the connection in which it stands does not admit of this *specific* meaning. But it then involves the same *principle* as that for which the apostle is contending, viz., that 'the means of safety is confidence or trust in the divine declarations.' The prophet Habakkuk sees, in prophetic vision, "troublesome times" coming upon Judea; and he exclaims, *בְּאַמְּוֹנָתִי יִחְיֶה*, *יִצְחָק*, *ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται*, *the pious man shall be saved by his confidence or faith*, viz., in God. It was not, then, by relying on his own merit or desert that safety could be had; it was to be obtained only in the way of believing and trusting the divine declarations. Now the very same *principle* of action was concerned in so doing at that time, which is concerned with the faith and salvation of the gospel. Of course the apostle might appeal to this declaration of Habakkuk, as serving to confirm the *principle* for which he contended.

Dr. Knapp and many others join *ἐκ πίστεως* with *δίκαιος*, and then translate the passage thus: *The just by faith shall live*; i. e., he who possesses faith shall be happy. The sentiment is true; but it does not comport, I apprehend, with the design of Habakkuk, who must have written *בְּאַמְּוֹנָתִי* if he intended this, and not (as he has done) *בְּאַמְּוֹנָתִי*.

If it be viewed as a simple *illustration of a general principle*, all difficulty about the quotation vanishes. As the Israelite, in the time of Habakkuk, was to be saved from evil by means of *faith*, so Jews and Gentiles are now to be saved by means of *faith*. What real difficulty can there be in such a comparison as this?

To the whole I subjoin the brief comment which J. A. Turretin has so strikingly given, in his *Praelectiones* on the epistle to the Ro-

mans: "Apostolus noster, ubi agit de justificatione et salute hominum, sæpe vocat *justitiam Dei* eam justificationis rationem quam Deus hominibus commo iſtrat, et cujus ope eos ad salutem ducit." Again: "*Justitia Dei* . . . est ipsamet hominis justificatio, seu modus quo potest justus haberi apud Deum, et salutis particeps fieri;" a definition of which one may almost say: *Omne tulit punctum.*

Turretin has, indeed, construed *ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν* nearly as Tholuck has done. But the *usus loquendi* of Paul in such constructions is decidedly against him: e. g., Rom. vi. 19, 'Since ye have yielded your members as servants of impurity, καὶ τῇ ἀνομίᾳ εἰς ἀνομίαν, and to iniquity for the commission of wickedness, so should ye yield your members as servants τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ εἰς ἁγιασμὸν unto righteousness, in order that ye may practise holiness;' 2 Cor. ii. 16, '[The gospel is] to some ὁσμὴ θανάτου εἰς θάνατον, and to others, ὁσμὴ ζωῆς εἰς ζωὴν, a savour of death to the causing of death, and a savour of life to the causing of life.' In these and all such cases, the Accusative with *εἰς* before it, denotes the *end*, or *object*, to which the thing that had just been named tends. So must it be, then, in the text; the [δικαιοσύνη] *ἐκ πίστεως* is revealed or declared to the world *εἰς πίστιν*, i. e., in order that it may be received or believed.

(18) Ἀποκαλύπτεται γὰρ . . . ἀνθρώπων, for the wrath of God from heaven, is revealed against all ungodliness and unrighteousness. As to the γὰρ with which this verse is introduced, I am now persuaded that it refers to an *implied* thought in the mind of the writer, which intervened between verses 17 and 18, viz. 'This δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ is now the only δικαιοσύνη possible for men.' That this is so, the sequel shows; which is designed to prove that all men are in a state of sin and condemnation, and can be saved only by *gratuitous* pardon. To the same purpose is Reiche's remark on γὰρ as here employed. See Bretsch. Lex. on γὰρ, where this principle is illustrated copiously.

Ὁργὴ Θεοῦ, literally, the wrath of God, divine indignation, or (to use a softer phraseology) God's displeasure. That the phrase is *anthropopathic* (i. e., is used ἀνθρωποπάθως), will be doubted by no one who has just views of the divine Being. It is impossible to unite with the idea of complete perfection, the idea of anger in the sense in which we usually cherish that passion; for with us it is a source of misery as well as sin. To neither of these effects of anger can we properly suppose the divine Being to be exposed. His *anger*, then, can only be that feeling or affection in him, which moves him to look on sin with disapprobation, and to punish it when connected

with impenitence. We must not, even in imagination, connect this in the remotest manner with *revenge*; which is only and always a *malignant* passion. But vengeance, even among men, is seldom sought for against those whom we know to be perfectly impotent, in respect to thwarting any of our designs and purposes. Now as all men, and all creation, can never endanger any one interest (if I may so speak) of the divine Being, or defeat a single purpose; so we cannot even imagine a motive for *revenge*, on ordinary grounds. Still less can we suppose the case to be of this nature, when we reflect that God is infinite in wisdom, power, and *goodness*. This constrains us to understand such phrases as $\delta\epsilon\gamma\eta$ Θεοῦ, x. τ. λ. as *anthropopathic*, i. e., as speaking of God after the manner of men. It would be quite as well (nay, much better) to say, that when the Bible attributes *hands, eyes, arms, &c.*, to God, the words which it employs should be literally understood, as to say, that when it attributes *anger* and *vengeance* to him, it is to be literally understood. If we so construe the Scriptures, we represent God as a malignant being, and class him among the demons; whereas by attributing to him *hands, eyes, &c.*, we only commit the sin of *anthropomorphism*.

The lexicons make $\delta\epsilon\gamma\eta$ to signify *punishment*. By way of consequence, indeed, punishment is *implied*. But $\delta\epsilon\gamma\eta$ Θεοῦ is a more fearful phrase, understood in the sense of divine displeasure or indignation, and more pregnant with awful meaning if so rendered, than it is if we give to it simply the sense of *κόλασις*, as so many critics and lexicographers have done.

Ἄπ' οὐρανοῦ, another *locus vexatus*. Is it to be joined with Θεοῦ; or should we refer back to ἀποκαλύπτειν, and construe it as implying the method in which the divine displeasure is made known? The latter way is the one which almost all commentators have chosen, although there is almost an endless diversity among them as to the meaning of Ἄπ' οὐρανοῦ. E. g. (1) The *heavens* declare the glory of God, and so point men naturally to his worship, and by consequence warn them to forsake sin. (2) Storm, tempest, hail, thunder, lightning, &c., *from heaven*, declare the wrath of God against sin. (3) Christ will be revealed *from heaven*, at the last judgment, to punish sin; so Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Limborch, &c. (4) Judgments which come from God, who is in heaven, testify against sin; so Origen, Cyril, Beza, Calvin, Bengel, &c. (5) In consequence of an appointment of heaven, the divine displeasure against sin is testified by conscience in every breast. (6) The displeasure of God against

sin is revealed, through divine appointment, or by the arrangement of the supreme Being.

This last interpretation I think to be nearly right. But the *usus loquendi* (which seems unaccountably to have been overlooked here) enables us to be more explicit. In Heb. xii. 25, the apostle says: "If they escaped not who rejected τὸν ἐπὶ γῆς . . . χημαρίζοντα, him who on earth [at Mount Sinai] warned them, much more shall we not escape, if we reject τὸν ἀπ' οὐρανῶν [χημαρίζοντα] him [who warneth us] from heaven;" comp. Mark i. 11, where a voice ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν says: "This is my beloved Son," &c. Now if such phraseology be compared with Matt. v. 45, τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς vi. 1, πατρί . . . ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς vi. 9, πατέρ ἡμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, et al. sæpe, it would seem sufficiently plain, that God coming from heaven where he dwells, or God belonging to heaven, is intended to be designated by the phrase Θεοῦ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ. So Reiche. That ἀπό, in a multitude of cases, is put before a noun of place, in order to designate that one belongs to it, scarcely needs to be suggested; e. g., Matt. ii. 1. iv. 25. 2 Thess. i. 7. John i. 45. xxviii. 21, et al. sæpe. The sentiment I take to be this: 'The God of heaven, or the God who dwells in heaven, i. e., God supreme, omnipotent, has revealed his displeasure against sin;' and, therefore, escape from punishment can be only by the δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ.

How the revelation of God's displeasure is made, is disclosed by the sequel. To the heathen it is made by God's works and their own consciences, Rom. i. 20, 32. ii. 14, 15.

'Ασέβειαν, impiety towards God (from a privative and σέβωμαι to worship); ἀδικίαν, injustice, unrighteousness, toward men.

Τῶν τὴν . . . κατεχόντων, who keep back or hinder the truth by iniquity. So the verb κατέχω most naturally means; comp. Luke iv. 42. Philem. ver. 13. 2 Thess. ii. 6, 7. It also means to hold firmly, to grasp hold of, to take possession of and retain, &c., as may be seen in the lexicons; but these meanings do not fit well here. Theophylact explains κατεχόντων by καλύπτειν, σκοτίζειν. The meaning seems to be: 'Who hinder the progress or obstruct the power of truth, in themselves or others.'

But of what truth? 'Αλήθεια cannot here mean the gospel; because the writer goes on immediately to say, that the light of nature sufficed to teach the heathen better, than to restrain the ἀλήθεια in question. 'Αλήθεια is here, then, that truth which the light of nature taught respecting the eternal power and Godhead of the Creator

When the apostle says in ver. 18, τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων, in his own mind he singles out of the ἀνθρώπων (*all men*) whom he has just mentioned, the heathen or Gentiles, whose vicious state he immediately proceeds to declare. This is the theme for the remainder of the first chapter.

Ἐν ἀδικίᾳ may mean *by iniquity*, *in* standing before the *means* or *instrument*, as usual; or else it is used adverbially = ἀδίμως. Reiche prefers the latter sense; which is agreeable to idiom. To fill out ver. 18 completely, the reader must supply, in his own mind, [ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν] τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κ. τ. λ.

CHAP. I. 19—32.

THE apostle, having intended in his own mind to designate the heathen or Gentiles, by mentioning those 'who hinder the truth through unrighteousness,' now proceeds to illustrate and confirm his charge against them. God, says he, has disclosed in the works of creation his eternal power and Godhead; and this so clearly, that they are without excuse for failing to recognize it, verses 19, 20. And since they might have known him, but were ungrateful, and refused to glorify him, and darkened their minds by vain and foolish disputations; since they represented the eternal God to be like mortal man, and even like the brutes which perish; God gave those up to their own base and degrading lusts, who thus rendered to the creature the honour that was due to the Creator, verses 21—26. Yes, he gave them up to the vile and unnatural passions which they cherished, verses 29, 30; and these they not only commit themselves, although they know them to be worthy of death, *i. e.*, of condemnation on the part of the Divine lawgiver, but by their approbation they encourage others to commit the like offences.

Such being the state of facts in regard to the heathen world, it follows of course that they *justly* lie under the condemning sentence of the divine law. It is not the object of the apostle to prove that every individual heathen is guilty of each and all the sins which he enumerates; much less does he intend even to intimate that there are not other sins, besides those which he enumerates, of which the Gentiles are guilty. It is quite plain, that those which he does mention, are to be regarded merely in the light of a *specimen*. Nor will the charges which he here makes, prove that every individual of the Gentile world was, at the moment when he was writing, guilty of all the things preferred against the heathen. If we suppose that there might then have been some virtuous heathen, (a supposition apparently favoured by Rom. ii. 14), such persons must have abstained from the habitual practices of the vices named, and from others like them. But it suffices for the apostle's purpose, to show that they once had been guilty of them; which of course was to show their absolute need of salvation by a Redeemer, *i. e.*, of gratuitous pardon procured through him. The case may be the same here, as that which is presented in chap. ii. iii., where a charge of universal guilt is brought against the Jews. Certainly this was not designed to prove that there then existed no pious Jews, who were not liable to such charge in its full extent, at the moment when the apostle was writing. Nay, it was of course true to *some* extent, even of the pious, at the time when Paul was writing, that they daily committed sin in some form or other; and the same was true of

pious Gentiles, if indeed there were any such. *All men*, then, were guilty before God, although all men might not practise the particular vices which the apostle named, when he was writing. It matters not for his purpose to prove this. All who could sin, had sinned, and did then sin, in some way or other; all this is now, and always has been true. Of course, all have fallen under the condemnation of the divine law, and salvation by the grace proffered in the gospel, is the only salvation which is possible for them.

The question *when* men begin to sin, it is not the object of the apostle here to discuss. Nor is it even the *degree* of their depravity, which is his main design to illustrate and prove. The *universality* of it is the main point; and it is all which is essential to his argument. To this universality Paul admits of no exception; but then we are of course to understand this, of those who are capable of sinning. It is thus that we interpret in other cases. For example, when it is said: "He that believeth not, shall be damned," we interpret this of those who are capable of believing, and do not extend it beyond them. With the question, *when* individuals are capable of believing or of sinning, I repeat it, Paul does not here concern himself. Neither mere infancy, nor entire idiocy, is the object of his present consideration. He is plainly speaking of such, and only of such, as are capable of sinning; and these, one and all, he avers to be sinners, in a greater or less degree. Such being the fact, it follows, that as "the soul which sinneth must die," so, if there be any reprieve from this sentence, it must be obtained only by pardoning mercy through a Redeemer.

I add merely, that the clause *τὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχόντων*, properly belongs to that division of the discourse which we are now to examine; but the connection of it with the general proposition in the preceding part of ver. 18, is made so intimate by the present grammatical structure, that I deemed it best not to disjoin them in the commentary.

(19) But how is it to be made out, that the heathen keep back the truth respecting the only living and true God, by their unrighteousness? I answer, by showing that to all men is made, in the works of nature, a revelation so plain of the eternal power and Godhead of Jehovah, that nothing but a wilful and sinful perversion of the light which they enjoy, can lead them to deny this great truth. So the apostle: *Διότι . . . αὐτοῖς, because that which might be known concerning God was manifest to them.* *Διότι* = *διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι* and equivalent in logical force here to *γὰρ*, stands before a clause which assigns a reason why the apostle asserts that the heathen *hinder the truth by iniquity*. The amount of the proof which follows is, (1) That the truth was knowable. (2) That nothing but base and evil passions keep men from acknowledging and obeying it.

τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, literally *the knowledge of God*, or *that concerning God which is knowable or known*. That the neuter adjective is used for a noun, is in accordance with a well-known and common Greek idiom. The meaning *that which is knowable*, seems on the whole to be best; and that *τὸ γνωστὸν* may be thus rendered we can have no doubt, when we compare *τὸ νοητὸν* *intelligible*, *τὸ αἰσθητὸν* *quod perceptum sit*, *τὸ ἀόρατον* *quod non visum sit*, i. e., *invisible*, &c. Ernesti denies that *γνωστὸν* can be rendered, *that which is to be known*, or *that*

which is knowable, (N. Theol. Biblioth. X. 630); and this has been greatly contested among critics. Buttmann (Gram. § 92. Anm. 3, comp. my N. Test. Gramm. § 82, Note 1.) seems to have decided this point, however, beyond any reasonable doubt. He says, indeed, that *verbals* in -τός frequently correspond to the Latin participles in -tus; so πλεπτός *stricken*, στρεπτός *perverted*, ποιητός *made*, *factus*, &c. But "more commonly," he adds, "they have the sense of *possibility*, like the Latin adjectives in -ilis, or the German ones in -bar; as στρεπτός *versatilis*, ὁρατός *visibilis*, ἀκουστός *audibilis*." This appears more fully when ἵστί is joined with these adjectives or verbals; *e. g.*, βιωτὸν ἵστί, *one can live*, (*quasi* 'it is live-able'); τοῖς οὐκ ἐξίτὸν ἵστί, *they cannot go out*, (*quasi* 'to them it is not go-able'). It is strange, indeed, that this should so long and so often have been called in question; especially as Plato frequently uses the very word under examination, in connection with δοξαστόν, *e. g.*, τὸ γνωστόν καὶ τὸ δοξαστόν, *that which is knowable and that which is supposable*, de Repub. Lib. v.

Τοῦ Θεοῦ concerning God, Θεοῦ being *Genitivus objecti*, as grammarians say. For an extended statement of the latitude of the Genitive, in regard to the many various relations which it expresses, see N. Test. Gramm. § 99. Examples in point are Matt. xiii. 18, παραβολὴ τοῦ σπειρόντος, *the parable CONCERNING the sower*; 1 Cor. i. 18, ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ σταυροῦ, *the declaration CONCERNING the cross*. So λόγος τινός a report CONCERNING any one, Xen. Cyrop. vi. 3. 10. viii. 5. 28. Comp. Luke vi. 12. Rom. xiii. 3. John xvii. 2. Heb. ix. 8, et alibi.

Ἐν αὐτοῖς may be construed *among them*. So *in* often means; *e. g.*, Matt. ii. 6, ἐν τοῖς ἡγεμέσιν, *among the leaders*; Luke i. 1, ἐν ἡμῖν, *among us*; Rom. i. 6, ἐν οἷς *among whom*; Rom. xi. 17. 1 Cor. iii. 18, &c. The sense would then be: 'What may be known [by the light of nature] concerning God, was manifest among them,' *i. e.*, in the midst of them, or before their eyes. The more probable sense, however, seems to be *in them*, *i. e.*, in their minds or consciences; comp. Rom. ii. 15. Acts xiii. 15. Some prefer to render ἐν αὐτοῖς as they would the simple Dative αὐτοῖς, *viz.*, *to them*, and appeal to such examples as 1 Cor. xiv. 11. Matt. xvii. 22. Luke xxiii. 31. xii. 8, and even to Acts iv. 12. 1 Cor. ii. 6. 2 Cor. iv. 3. But the preceding method of construction is plainly the more certain and simple one. Tholuck and Reiche accordingly prefer to render ἐν αὐτοῖς *in them*; and they interpret it as referring to their *moral sense*, by which they may come to discern and judge of the evidences of divine power and God-head. That *in* before the Dative, can never be properly considered

the same thing as the simple Dative, seems to be conclusively shown by Winer, N. Test. Gramm. p. 177, ed. 3.

The γάρ in ὁ Θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανέρωσεν is γάρ *confirmantis*.

(20) Τὰ γὰρ . . . καὶ θεϊότης may be regarded as a *parenthetic explanation*. The γάρ here is also γάρ *confirmantis vel illustrantis*, and has special relation to the clause or declaration immediately preceding, i. e., it stands before an assertion designed to illustrate and confirm the preceding declaration.

Τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ, *for the invisible things of him, i. e., of God*. 'Αόρατα, means the attributes or qualities of the divine Being; which are ἀόρατα, because they are not objects of physical notice, i. e., are not disclosed to any of our corporeal senses. Of course the expression refers to the attributes belonging to God considered as a *spirit*; 1 Tim. i. 17.

Ἀπὸ κρίσεως κόσμου, *since the creation of the world, or since the world was created*. That ἀπὸ may be rendered *since*, scarcely needs proof; e. g., ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ἀπὸ τῆς ὥρας ἡμετέρας, &c.; see Lex. in verbum. With equal propriety, so far as the *usus loquendi* merely is concerned, might it be rendered *by, by means of*, a sense which ἀπὸ very frequently has. But the reason why it should not be rendered in this latter way, is that ποιήμασι designates the means *by* which. By τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ . . . καθορᾶται, the writer means to say, that *ever since* the world was created, the evidences of eternal power and Godhead have been visible to the mind; which, indeed, must be as true as that they are now visible.

Τοῖς ποιήμασι, *by things which are made, i. e., by the natural creation*. Ποιήμασι, might be rendered *by his operations*, inasmuch as nouns ending in the neuter -μα not frequently in the Hebrew-Greek have the same meaning as those which end in -σις; e. g., δικαίωμα, δικαίωσις, *justification*. If it were thus rendered, the sense would be, that the operations of God in the world of nature continually bear testimony respecting him. This is not only true, but a truth scarcely less striking, as it now appears to us through the medium of astronomy, natural philosophy, and physiology, than that which is developed by *creative power*. Nevertheless, as the discoveries of modern science were unknown to the heathen, so it seems most congruous here to explain ποιήμασι *by things made, the natural creation*, which the heathen, in common with all others, were continually reminded of by their external senses.

The due result of serious notice is, that τὰ ἀόρατα τοῦ Θεοῦ may be

νοούμενα, apprehended by the mind, understood. *Νοούμενα καθορᾶται* means, are distinctly seen, are intelligibly perceived, i. e., they are so, or may be so, by the aid of the things which have been made. In other words: God's invisible attributes, at least some of them, are made as it were visible, i. e., are made the object of clear and distinct apprehension, by reason of the natural creation. So the Psalmist: "The heavens declare the glory of God; the firmament sheweth forth the work of his hands. Day unto day uttereth speech, night unto night sheweth knowledge," Ps. xix. 1, 2.

But what are the attributes of God which are thus plainly discernible by his works? The answer is, ἡ τοῦ αἰδίου αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ Θεότης, both or even his eternal power and Godhead. This clause is exegetical of τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ. Δύναμις must here have special reference to the creative power of God; and this seems to be called αἰδίου, because it must have been possessed antecedently to the creation of the world, or before time began. Still, although δημιουργία (creative power), as Theodoret says, is here specially meant, I apprehend that the sense of δύναμις is not restricted to this. He who had power to create, must of course be supposed to have power to wield and govern.

Θεότης is distinguished by Tholuck and others, from Θεϊότης for they represent the latter as signifying the Divinity or the Divine nature, while the former is represented as meaning the complexity of the divine attributes, the sum or substance of divine qualities. I cannot find any good ground, however, for such a distinction. Θεϊότης is the abstract derived from Θεός and from this latter word is formed the concrete or adjective derivate Θεϊός, divine. τὸ Θεϊόν of course means divinity; and from this comes another regular abstract noun Θεϊότης, with the same signification. So Passow: Θεϊότης, Göttlichkeit, göttliche Natur, i. e., divinity, divine nature. He then adds: "In particular, divine greatness, power, excellence, eminence," &c.; i. e., Θεϊότης designates the divinity with special reference to these qualities—the identical manner in which the word is employed in our text. The same lexicographer defines Θεϊότης the Godhead, the divine Being, divine excellence. In the same sense, viz., that of Godhead, Divinity, is τὸ Θεϊόν plainly used in Acts xvii. 29. So Θεϊότης Wisd. xviii. 9. So Clemens Alex. (Strom. V. 10), τὸ μὴ φθίσεσθαι, Θεϊότητος μετέχειν ἰστί, not to perish, is to be a partaker of Godhead or Divinity.

If Θεϊότης be interpreted here as a word designating "the sum of all

the divine attributes," we must regard *natural theology* as equally extensive with that which is revealed, so far as the great doctrines respecting the Godhead are concerned. Did the apostle mean to assert this? I trust not. I must understand *θεϊότης*, then, as designating *Divinity, divine nature, divine excellence or supremacy, i. e.,* such a station, and condition, and nature as make the Being who holds and possesses them to be truly divine, or God. *Eternal power and supremacy or exaltation* appear, then, to be those qualities or attributes of the divine Being, which the works of creation are said by the apostle to disclose. And when examined by the eye of philosophy and reason, the evidence appears to be of the very same nature which he has here designed. At all events, the heathen never have made out any very definite and explicit views of God as *holy and hating sin*; not to speak of other attributes, of which they had quite imperfect and unsatisfactory views.

On this deeply interesting subject, viz., the disclosures of the natural world in respect to the Creator, Aristotle has said an exceedingly striking thing (*De Mundo*, c. 6), *πάσῃ θνητῇ φύσει γενόμενος ἀθεώρητος, ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεωρεῖται ὁ Θεός, God, who is invisible to every mortal being, is seen by his works.* Comp. also a striking passage of the like tenor, in *Wisdom*. xiii. 1—5.

Εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους, so that they are without excuse. *Εἰς* τὰ, followed by an *Inf.*, is often used in the same manner as *ὥστε* *e. g.,* Luke v. 17. Rom. iv. 18, vii. 4, 5. xii. 3. *Εἰς τὸ κ. τ. λ.,* is joined in sense with *ὁ Θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφάνερωσε* (the first clause in ver. 20 being a parenthesis); *i. e.,* 'God has exhibited, in his works, such evidences of his eternal power and Godhead, that those are without any excuse *who hinder the truth by reason of their iniquity.*' That the apostle means to characterize the heathen by all this, is clear from the sequel.

(21) *Διότι γινόντες τὸν Θεόν, because that having known God.* The *διότι* here is considered by Glöckler as co-ordinate with that in ver. 19; and both the clauses in vers. 19, 20, and in vers. 21—23 he considers as *protases* to *διὸ κ. τ. λ.* in ver. 24 seq. He arranges the sense therefore in this manner: '*Because* the knowledge of God was disclosed to them, &c.,—*because,* when they knew God, they did not glorify him, &c.,—*διὸ, therefore* God gave them over,' &c. But this is grounded upon an entirely mistaken view of the nature of *διότι*; which can no more stand in the real protasis of a sentence that is independent of a preceding one, than *γὰρ* can; as every one may see,

by inspecting the examples of its use in the Concordance. We must consider the *διότι* in ver. 19, then, as prefatory to a reason why the heathen suppress the truth iniquitously; and the *διότι* in ver. 21 as prefatory to a reason why *they are without excuse*. In the same way *γάρ* often follows in two and even three successive clauses, prefatory to successive reasons for successive assertions.

Γινόντες here is employed in a sense that comports with the meaning of *τὸ γνωσθὲν* in ver. 19, and may mean either *actual knowledge*, or *opportunity to know, being furnished with the means of knowing, having the knowledge of God plainly set before them*.

Ὅχ ὡς . . . εὐχαρίστησαν, *they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful*; i. e., they paid him not the honour due to him as the Creator and Governor of all things, nor were they thankful for the blessings which he bestowed upon them. The particle *ἢ*, after a negative clause, means *nor, neither*.

Ἄλλ' ἡμαρταιώθησαν . . . αὐτῶν, *but indulged foolish imaginations or vain thoughts*. So we may render the passage, if we follow the more common meaning of *μαρταιῶω*, which not unfrequently corresponds to the Hebrew *כָּפַל, לִכְפֹּל*, *insipide, stulte agere*. The Vulgate renders *ἡμαρταιώθησαν* by *evanuerant*, and Erasmus by *frustrati sunt*; and to the like purpose many critics have interpreted it. But the evident intention of the writer seems here to be, to describe a state of mind or feeling, not to express the result of it.—*Διαλογισμὸς* may be translated *thoughts, reasonings, or disputations*; for the word has each of these senses. The first seems the most appropriate here, on account of the clause which immediately follows, and which shows that *the state of the interior man* is designed to be described. It should be noted, moreover, that *διαλογισμός*, as meaning *thought or imagination*, is commonly taken in *malam partem*, i. e., as designating *bad thoughts, evil imaginations, e. g.,* Matt. xv. 19. Mark vii. 21. La. lix. 7 (Sept.) 1 Cor. iii. 20.

If we construe the words before us in this way, the sense will be: 'They foolishly or inconsiderately indulged evil imaginations,' i. e., base and degrading views respecting the nature and attributes of God, and the honour due to him, as the sequel (vers. 22—25) shows, particularly ver. 23.

But there is another sense of the expression before us, which I am strongly tempted to adopt. The Hebrew *פְּזִיז, vanitas, ματαιότης, μάταια*, as is well known, is often employed to designate idols and

idolatry. Hence *μάταια* is frequently employed by the Septuagint to designate idols; *e. g.*, 2 Kings xvii. 15. Jer. ii. 5. viii. 9. Amos ii. 4. 1 Kings xvi. 13, &c. So also in the New Testament, Acts xiv. 15. From this usage, as one might naturally conclude, the verb *ματαιίζω* (which means literally *μ α τ α ι ζ ω* *facere vel fieri*) sometimes means, *to be devoted to μάταια, i. e., to idols*; *e. g.*, 2 Kings xvii. 15. Jer. ii. 5. *ἡμαρτωλώθησαν, they became devoted to idolatry, or to vanities* (which is the same thing). The phrase in our verse is plainly susceptible of the like rendering, *viz., In their evil imaginations or by reason of their wicked devices, they became devoted to idolatry, or devoted to vanities* (which has the same meaning).

But on the whole, it is safer perhaps to regard the clause before us as a kind of parallel with the one which follows; in which case, the first asserts that the heathen foolishly indulged in wicked devices, and the second, that in consequence of this, their inconsiderate minds became darkened. The clause under examination will then be of the like tenor with ver. 22.

Καὶ ἡσκορίσθη . . . καρδία, and their inconsiderate mind was darkened. *Καρδία*, like the Hebrew *לֵב* very often means, *animus, intellectus, the mind*; and this is plainly its meaning here.—*Ἀσύνετος* means *stolidus, insipiens, or imprudens*, which latter word means, *wanting in consideration and foresight*. I hesitate between this meaning, and that of *stolidus* in the sense of the Hebrew *לָמַד* *i. e., impious, wicked*. The *καρδία* which had foolishly indulged evil imaginations respecting God, may be truly characterised either as *inconsiderate* or as *impious*. On the whole, the latter seems to convey rather the most energetic meaning; but the former accords better with the idea, that the second clause (now under examination) is parallel with the clause which precedes it.

It will be observed by the attentive reader, that the apostle here represents *the darkening of the mind* to be a consequence of the wicked imaginations which the heathen had indulged. Men had once a right knowledge of the true God; they all have opportunity to be acquainted with his true attributes. But in this condition, they choose foolishly to indulge in wicked devices and imaginations; and in consequence of this, they lose even what light they possessed, *ἡσκορίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία*.

(22) *Φάσκοντες . . . ἡμαρτανόθησαν, professing themselves to be wise, they became fools.* The antithesis of the sentiment here is strong.

The pretensions of many heathen philosophers to *wisdom*, are well known. From these sprung the names φιλόσοφοι, φιλοσοφία, σοφοί, σοφισταί, &c. Φάσκω means *to declare, to affirm*; which, in the present case, means the same as *to profess*. So the Greeks used φάσκω e.g., οἱ φιλοσοφεῖν φάσκοιτες, *those who profess to philosophize*. To the same purpose Cicero says: "Qui se sapientes esse profitentur," Quæst. Tusc. I. 9.

(23) Καὶ ἥλλαξαν . . . ἐπιτεῶν, *and exchanged the glory of the immortal God, for an image like to mortal man, and fowls, and quadrupeds, and reptiles*. Τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφ' αἰῶνος Θεοῦ means *the majesty and excellence of the eternal God, or the glorious and eternal God*. In ἥλλαξαν . . . ἐν ὁμοιώματι, the Dative with ἐν before it follows the verb. In such cases the usual construction is to put the simple Dative after the verb, i. e., the Dative of the noun designating the thing for which another is exchanged; e. g., Lev. xxvii. 10, οὐκ ἀλλάξει . . . καλὸν ποιηρῶ. Ibid. ἀλλάξει . . . κτήνος κτήνει. Lev. xxvii. 33. Ex. xiii. 13. The classic writers usually say, ἀλλάσσειν τί τινας, or τὶ ἀντί τινας; but sometimes ἀλλάσσειν τί τινα. I find no construction like this in ver. 23, except in Ps. cv. 20, where in the Sept. ἥλλάξαντο τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι μέσχου occurs. Tholuck says, that ἐν ὁμοιώματι stands for εἰς ὁμοίωμα; and he construes it here as meaning *the transmuting of one thing into another*, i. e., making out of one thing something different from it. But this is not the common use of ἀλλάσσω, in cases like ours, although the verb occasionally admits of this sense (see ver. 26 below, where, however, the Accusative with εἰς is employed). But usually it means *to commute one thing FOR another* (not to transmute one thing *into* another). Nor can it be the design of Paul to say, that the heathen changed the glorious and immortal God into an image of perishable man and animals, (for how could they do this?) but to say that they exchanged the former (as an object of worship) for the latter; which is the exact state of the case.

Such being the fact, both as to the sense of the passage and the more usual construction of the verb ἀλλάσσω, I must regard ἐν ὁμοιώματι here as being of the same import and design as the simple Dative unattended with the preposition; of which examples are not wanting in the New Testament, and which Ps. cv. 20, confirms.

Ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνης is like the Hebrew עֲלֵי נִימֹץ, *the resemblance of the image*, i. e., an image *resembling or like unto*. Φθαρτοῦ is designed as the antithesis of ἀφθάρτου, and means *frail, perishable, mortal*.

Πεποιητῶν κ. τ. λ. How extensively such idolatry as is here described, has been and still is practised among the heathen, is too well known

to need any formal proof in the present case. Juvenal (Sat. xv.) has drawn an admirable picture of Egyptian superstitions. The following lines are sufficiently graphic :

"Quis nescit . . . qualla demens
Ægyptus portenta colat? Crocodillon adorat
Pars hæc; illa pavit saturam serpentibus Ibm.
Oppida tota canem venerantur, nemo Dianam."

And after saying that they worshipped various productions of the earth, and even culinary vegetables, he exclaims :

"O sanctas gentes, quibus hæc nascuntur in hortis
Numina!"

Comp. Pa. cxv. cxxxv. 15, seq. Is. xlv. 9—17, where is a most vivid description, in some of its traits not unlike to the hints in Horace, Lib. I. Sat. 8.

(24) Such was the impiety and folly of the heathen. Even their philosophers and learned men could not be exempted from part of the charges here brought against the Gentiles. On account of such sins, God even gave them up to their own lusts; *διὸ καὶ παρέδωκεν . . . ἀναξαρσίαν, wherefore God even gave them up, in the lusts of their hearts, to impurity; i. e.,* God gave them over to the pursuit of their lusts, and to the dreadful consequences which follow such a course, because they were so desperately bent upon the pursuit of these objects, and would hearken to none of the instructions which the book of nature communicated. The imputation is, that in apostatizing from the true God, and betaking themselves to the worship of idols, they had at the same time been the devoted slaves of lust; which indeed seems here also, by implication, to be assigned as the reason or ground of their apostacy. Every one knows, moreover, that among almost all the various forms of heathenism, impurity has been either a direct or indirect service in its pretended religious duties. Witness the shocking law among the Babylonians, that every woman should prostitute herself, at least once, before the shrine of their Venus. It is needless to say, that the worshippers of Venus in Greece and Rome practised such rites: or that the *mysteries* of heathenism, of which Paul says "it is a shame even to speak," allowed a still greater latitude of indulgence. Nor is it necessary to describe the obscene and bloody rites practised in Hindoostan, in the South Sea and the Sandwich Islands, and generally among the heathen. Polytheism and idolatry have nearly always been a religion of *obscenity* and *blood*.

This the apostle plainly intimates; for after saying that men had substituted idols for the only living and true God, he immediately subjoins: 'Wherefore God gave up them to pursue their lusts, who were so eager in pursuit of them.' This of course is taking it for granted, that in plunging into polytheism and idolatry, they had at the same time plunged deep into the mire of impurity. How well such a representation accords with fact, the history of heathenism will testify most abundantly. It lies on the face of almost every page, written in characters 'which he who runneth may read.'

The *διό* here: = *διὰ τὸ*, *on account of which, for which reason*. For *substance* it has the same sense with *διότι*; yet it is employed more frequently in the way of *illation*, while it has a more specifically *relative* meaning than *διότι*. Thus *διότι* in ver. 19, stands at the head of a declaration intended to illustrate and establish the truth of the preceding assertion; so again of *διότι* in ver. 21; but *διό* in ver. 24, stands at the head of an *illation* from all the preceding premises in verses 19—23.

Παρίδωκε, *gave up, gave over, i. e.*, left them to pursue their own desires, without checking them by such restraints as he usually imposes on those who are not hardened and obstinate offenders. It seems here neither to denote an active 'plunging into sin,' on the one hand; nor a 'mere inactive letting alone,' on the other; but a withholding, by way of just retribution for their offences, such restraints as I have just described. The verb *παράδιδωμι* is commonly employed to designate *delivering over* to prison (Acts viii. 3), to bonds (2 Pet. ii. 4), to the executioner or condemning judge (Matt. xviii. 34, xxvii. 2, 26). So here it is a *giving or delivering over* to the consequences of their own lusts, *i. e.*, a judicial abandonment of wicked heathen.

'*Ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις*, *in their lusts, i. e.*, God gave them up [being] in their lusts, *εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν κ. τ. λ.* But most critics construe *ἐν* here as meaning *by* in the sense of *on account of, by reason of*. The sense is good, indeed, when rendered in this way, and the *usus loquendi* above exception; see Bretschn. Lex. *ἐν* No. 6. ed. 2nd. But I prefer to render it in the following way, viz. *God gave up them* [being] *in their lusts, &c.*; *i. e.*, he gave them up who were filled with lust, he gave them up to the pursuit of it, he abandoned them to the perverse desires of their own hearts, and to the consequences which would follow. In this way, *ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν καρδιῶν* becomes equivalent to an adjective qualifying *αὐτοὺς*. Of a usage like this in respect to the Dative, with *ἐν* before it, the New Testament affords

most ample proofs; e. g., Luke iv. 32, *ἐν ἰξουσίᾳ ἦν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ*, *his word was powerful*; Rev. i. 10, *ἐγενόμην ἐν πνεύματι*, *I was inspired*; John xvi. 25, *ἐν παραβολαῖς λαλεῖν*, *to speak parabolically*; John v. 5, *ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ ἔχων*, *being weak*; Rom. xvi. 7, *οἱ γεγόνασιν ἐν Χριστῷ*, *who became Christians*; and thus very often, as may be seen in Bretschn. Lex. iv, No. 5. Comp. Ps. lxxxi. 13. 'Εν employed in this way, may be called *in conditionis*; inasmuch as the noun before which it stands, serves to designate *condition, habitude, or relation*. 'Εν thus employed agrees with the so-called 3^d *predicate* of the Hebrews, i. e., 3^d prefixed to a noun which is employed in the sense of an adjective.

Εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν, *to the practice of impurity*, where *εἰς* before the Accusative denotes, as usual, *the object for which* any thing is, or is done. The sense is the same as *εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν τὴν ἀκαθαρσίαν*.

Τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι . . . ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, *to dishonour their own bodies among themselves, or that their own bodies should be mutually dishonoured* (*ἀτιμάζεσθαι* in the Passive). *Τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι* is constructed after *παρέδωκε* implied. This kind of Infinitive (viz. the Infinitive with *τοῦ* before it) has, until recently, been generally reckoned as an imitation of the Hebrew Inf. with *ל*. But Winer (N. Test. Gramm. § 45. 4, ed. 3rd) has shown abundantly that it is no Hebraism, but is very common in the Greek classics; see my N. Test. Gramm. § 138. The older critics used to solve this form of the Infinitive (where *τοῦ* intimates *design, object, end*), by supplying *ἵνα* or *γάρ* before it. Winer constructs *τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι*, in the present case, by making it the Genitive after *ἀκαθαρσίαν*. I prefer the other method, which makes the clause *epexegetical*.

In respect to the *fact of dishonouring their own bodies*, i. e., subjecting themselves to base and degrading lusts, we shall see more in the sequel.

'Εν ἑαυτοῖς, *among themselves*. For this frequent sense of *ἐν*, see Bretschn. Lex. iv I. 6.

(25) A repetition of the idea contained in ver. 23—*καὶ ἠλλαξαν κ. τ. λ.*, but with some additions. *Οἱ τινες μετήλλαξαν . . . ψεύδει ὡς ἐκείνην* *exchanged the true God for a false one*. 'Αλήθειαν τοῦ Θεοῦ = τὸν ἀληθῆ Θεόν. More usually it is the *latter* of two nouns which is employed as an adjective in order to qualify the former: but sometimes the first noun performs the office of an adjective; compare Heb. Gramm. § 440. b. Both *ἀλήθειαν* and *ψεύδει* are examples of the *abstract* for the *concrete*; *ψεύδει* corresponding to the Hebrew *לִפְנֵי מַשְׁכָּן*, which are so often employed to designate idols. In regard to *μετήλλαξαν . . .*

ἐν τῷ ψεύδει, see on ἡλλαξαν . . . ἐν ὁμοιωμάτων in verse 23. But ἀληθεια may be rendered *true worship*, and ψεύδει *false worship*.

Καὶ ἰσεβάσθησαν . . . κτίσαντα, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator.—Σεβάζομαι signifies to venerate, to worship, and designates the state of mind in the worshipper. The Aorists passive often have the sense of the Middle voice, and so, therefore, not unfrequently have an active sense, as here: N. Test. Gramm. § 61, 1. Λατρεύω designates either internal worship (see ver. 9 above), or external. Here, as it is joined with σεβάζομαι, it more naturally designates the *external* rites of the heathen religion.—Τῇ κτίσει, the creature, created things; see the close of verse 23.—Παρά, more than, above; compare Luke iii. 13. Heb. i. 4. iii. 3. ix. 23. xi. 4. &c.; and see Bretschn. Lex. παρά III. 2. e. But here the sense seems to require παρά to be rendered, *rather than*.

*Ὁς ἰστίη . . . ἀμήν, who is blessed for ever, Amen. Doxologies of this nature are not unusual in the writings of Paul; see Gal. i. 5. Rom. ix. 5. 2 Cor. xi. 31. The Jewish Rabbies from time immemorial have been accustomed to add a doxology of the like nature, whenever they have had occasion to utter any thing which might seem reproachful to God. The Mohammedans have borrowed this custom from them, and practise it to a great extent. Tholuck mentions an Arabic manuscript in the library at Berlin, which contains an account of heresies in respect to Islamism; and so often as the writer has occasion to name a new heretical sect, he immediately adds: 'God be exalted above all which they say!'—Εὐλογητός means *worthy of praise, deserving to be extolled*.

Ἀμήν, the usual response of the Hebrew solemn assemblies to the words or precepts of the law, when read; see Deut. xxvii. 15—26. The Hebrew אָמֵן means *verum, certum, ratum sit i. e., ita sit*; which is the usual sense of ἀμήν in the New Testament, as in Rom. ix. 5. xi. 36. Gal. i. 5. Eph. iii. 21, et al. sæpe. As to the custom of public religious assemblies in respect to using this word, see 1 Cor. xiv. 16. It is to be understood as a solemn expression of assent to what has been said, and an approbation of it on the part of those who use it.

(26) As ver. 25 is a repetition and amplification of the sentiment in ver. 23.; so vers. 26, 27, are a repetition and amplification of the sentiment in ver. 24. There is the same connection in both cases; e. g., after asserting the idolatry of the heathen in ver. 25, the apostle proceeds (as in ver. 24) to say: Διὰ τοῦτο κ. τ. λ., i. e., because they became idolaters and polytheists, God gave them up to the vile pas-

sions which they indulged in this species of worship.—*Διὰ τοῦτο . . . ἀτιμίας* on account of this [their idolatry] God gave them up to base passions. For the sense of *παρίδωκεν ὁ Θεός*, see verse 24.—*Πάθη ἀτιμίας*, base passions, where *ἀτιμίας* (the latter of two nouns in regimen) holds the place of an adjective, agreeable to common usage; see the remarks on verse 25.

Αἱ τε γὰρ . . . φύσιν, for their women exchanged their natural usage, into that which is unnatural or against nature. *Παρά* not unfrequently has the sense here assigned, as may be seen in the lexicons; comp. Acts xviii. 13. So Plato *παρά φύσιν ἡδόνῃ*, unnatural pleasure. *τῇ φυσικῇν χρῆσιν* means *usus venereus*. But whether the apostle refers here to the Greek *τριβάδες* or *τραπίστριαι*, or to those who were guilty of prostituting themselves in the vile and unnatural manner mentioned in verse 27, it would be difficult to determine; nor is it necessary. Those who wish to trace evidences of the facts alluded to, may consult Seneca, Ep. 95. Martial Epigr. I. 90. Athenæus, Deipnos. 13. p. 605. Tholuck on the State of the heathen World, in Neander's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, I. p. 143 seq., translated in the *Biblical Repository*, vol. II. Sueton. Nero, 28.

(27) *Ὁμοίως τε καὶ . . . ἀλλήλοις* in like manner, also, the males, leaving the natural use of the female, burned in their lust toward each other. Literally *ὁμοίως τε καὶ* may be rendered *moreover, in like manner too*. *Τὶ καὶ* is often employed in enumerating particulars, in order to designate an intimate connection between them. This it signifies in a more emphatic manner than *καὶ* simply; and in this respect the Greek *τί* answers well to the Lat. *que*. *Τί* is employed rather to annex clauses than words, and in this respect differs from *καὶ* at the same time *τί* is more commonly connected only with clauses which are not necessary to complete the sentence in itself, but are epexegetical, *i. e.*, serve for confirmation, illustration, amplification, &c. But in this instance some good Codd., and many versions and fathers, read *δέ* instead of *τί* and *δέ* is preferred by many critics.

The evidences of the fact here stated by the apostle are too numerous and prominent among the heathen writers to need even a reference to them. Virgil himself, 'the chaste Virgil,' as he has been often called, has a *Corydon amabat Alexin*, without seeming to feel the necessity of a blush for it. Such a fact sets the whole matter in the open day. That at Athens and Rome *παιδεραστία* was a very common and habitual thing, needs no proof to one who has read the Greek and Latin classics, especially the amatory poets, to any con-

siderable extent. Plutarch tells us that Solon practised it; and Diogenes Laertius says the same of the Stoic Zeno. Need we be surprised, then, if the same horrible vice was frequent in the more barbarous parts of Greece and the Roman empire? Would God that nations called Christian were not reproachable with it; and that the great cities of the old world (possibly of the new also), did not exhibit examples of it almost as flagrant as those of Greece and Rome!

"*Ἄρσενες . . . πατερνάζόμενοι*, *males with males doing that which is shameful*. A further description of what the writer means, so as to leave no doubt about the design of the preceding affirmation.

Καὶ τῇ . . . ἀπολαμβάνοντες, *and receiving in themselves the reward which is due to their error*. The apostle doubtless means, here, the evil consequences, both physical and moral, which followed the practices on which he is animadverting. In respect to the first, their bodies were weakened, their health impaired, and premature old age came on both in a mental and physical respect. With regard to the second, what else could be expected from those who sunk themselves far below the brute creation, but that their moral sense would be degraded, their conscience "seared with a hot iron," and all the finer feelings and delicate sensibilities of life utterly extinguished? No example in the whole brute creation can be produced, which resembles the degradation of the *παιδερασταί*; and it follows, by an immutable law of a sin-hating God which is impressed on the very nature of all moral beings, that degradation and shame should result from the gratification of viler than beastly appetites. The despots, princes, and rich men of the East, who practise polygamy and keep extensive harems, are usually *superannuated* by the time they are *forty* years of age; how much more might this be naturally expected, as to the offenders mentioned in the verses under examination?

(28) *Καὶ καθὼς . . . ἐν ἐπιγνώσει*, *and inasmuch as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge*. *δοκιμάζω* usually means *to try, prove, examine, &c.* But a secondary sense of the word is, *to approve, to choose*; like to *δόκιμος* *approved, accepted, agreeable, &c.* The apostle means here to say, that the heathen voluntarily rejected the knowledge of the true God, which, to a certain and important extent, they might have gathered from the book of nature so widely spread open before them—"Ἐχθρὸν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει" may be considered as equivalent to *ἐπιγινώσκειν*; or, which is still better, to designate that failure *to retain in their knowledge* what God had revealed to them in the book of nature, which book the apostle accuses them of neglecting.

Παρίδωκεν . . . νοῦν, *God gave them up to a reprobate mind*. See on ver. 24 for παρίδωκεν.—'Αδόκιμος is the negative or antithesis of δόκιμος and therefore means *reprobate, that which is to be rejected, unapproved*. Beza has rendered this adjective as though it had a neuter active sense, *a mind incapable of judging*. But the *usus loquendi* will not bear this; although adjectives in -ιμος sometimes have an active sense; see Buttm. *ausführl. Sprachl.* 2 Abth. p. 341. The meaning here of ἀδόκιμον νοῦν is *wicked or vile mind*, which is deserving of condemnation or execration. There is here an evident paronomasia of ἀδόκιμον with ἰδοκίμασαν.

Ποιῶν τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα, *to do those things which are disgraceful, i. e., which are indecorous, shameful*. God, in his righteous judgment, abandoned those who practised such vices to the legitimate consequences of their own passions and conduct.

(29) Πεπληρωμένους, *filled, full of, abounding in*. The construction, if completed, would be [παρίδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ Θεὸς] πεπληρωμένους κ. τ. λ.; so that πεπληρωμένους agrees with αὐτοὺς in the preceding verse. It is here followed by the *Dative* of the succeeding nouns; and so in some other cases, Wahl's *Lex.* under πληρέω. The Genitive is more common after verbs of *abounding*.

'Αδίκια is a *generic* word here, *iniquity, sin*, which comprehends all the particular vices that are afterwards named.—Πορνεία is omitted in some manuscripts, viz. A. B. C., several younger MSS., and some of the versions and fathers. In some, it is placed after πορνεία. The enumeration seems quite incomplete without it; as it is a sin which most of all was universal among the heathen. In the New Testament, the πορνεία has an extended sense, comprehending *all illicit intercourse*, whether fornication, adultery, incest, or any other *venus illicita*. See Bretsch. *Lex.* on the word.

Πονηρία, *malice, i. e., versuta et fallax nocendi ratio*, as Grotius defines it. *Malice* is a wicked desire or intention of doing harm to others, in a fraudulent and deceitful manner. This word is omitted in D. E. G. in codd. Clar. Boern.; which generally read, ἀδίκια, κακία, πορνεία, πλεονεξία, κ. τ. λ.—Πλεονεξία, *covetousness*. Where luxury abounds, and devotedness to sinful pleasures, there a thirst for gold will also reign, because it is necessary to supply the means of pleasure. Petronius strikingly represents Rome as covetous of the wealth of other nations, in the following manner:—

. . . Si quis sinus abditus ultra,
Si qua foret tellus quæ sulvum mitteret aurum,
Hostis erat, fatisque in tristia bella paratis
Quærebantur opes.

Kakia, among the Greeks, was the antithesis of *ἀρετή*, when taken in a *generic* sense. But when taken (as here) in a *limited* one, it means *the habit of doing mischief, or harm to others* in any way. It differs from *πονηρία*, *malice*, inasmuch as that more particularly designates a state of mind, and the craftiness by which the purposes it forms are to be executed. *Kakia* means any kind of *injurious treatment*.

Μιστούς is of the same meaning as *πεπληρωμένους* but it seems to be introduced here merely for the sake of varying the construction of so many nouns. As it governs the Genitive, so the Genitive here follows it, and this makes a variety in the construction. The ellipsis is as before, [*παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ Θεός*] *μιστοὺς κ. τ. λ.*—*Φόνος*, *envy*, seems to be a widely spread passion of the human breast. It exists at almost all times and in all places, where one part of the community is, or is thought to be, more happy or distinguished than another. This passion was in the highest degree predominant at Rome.—*Φόνος*, *murder or manslaughter*, both public and private, legalized and forbidden, was extremely frequent at Rome; *e. g.*, the gladiatorial fights, the destruction of slaves, the executions by the Roman emperor's orders, and deaths by poison, assassination, &c.—*Ἐγίς* of course followed on in such a train.—*Δόλος* is strikingly exemplified by a verse of Juvenal: "*Quid Romæ faciem? Mentiri nescio*," Sat. III. 41.—*Κακοήθεια* means *malevolence*, particularly that species of it which perverts the words and actions of another, and puts a wrong construction on them in order to gratify a love of mischief, when it was easy and proper to put a good construction upon them. It differs *specifically*, therefore, from *πονηρία*.

(30) *Ψιθυριστής* means *a slanderer in secret*.—*Κατάλαλος*, *a slanderer in public*.—*Θεοστυγίς*, *haters of God*. Grotius says, it should be written *Θεοσύγυις*, *i. e.*, with the tone or accent on the penult, in order to have an *active* sense. But this is not necessary; for Suidas defines *Θεοστυγίς* (oxytone) by *οἱ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ μισοῦμένοι, καὶ οἱ Θεὸν μισοῦντες*. In the same manner Passow gives the meaning of the word. That the *active* sense is here required, the context clearly shows; inasmuch as the vices of men are here designated, not the punishment of them.—*Ῥβριστάς*, *reproachful*, *i. e.*, lacerating others by slanderous, abusive, passionate declarations.—*Ῥρηφάνους*, *proud*, *i. e.*, looking with disdain upon others, and thinking highly of themselves.—*Ἀλαζόνας*, *boasters*, *i. e.*, glorying in that which does not belong to them, whether wealth, learning, talents, or any thing else.—*Ἐφευριτάς κακῶν*, *inventors*

of evil things. This doubtless refers to the inventions in luxuries, vices, &c., which were constantly taking place in the great cities of ancient times, where there was a competition in pleasures among the wealthy. *ἰονεῦσιν ἀπειθεῖς*, *disobedient to parents*; a vice exceedingly common among the heathen, multitudes of whom cast out their parents, when they are old, to perish from hunger, or cold, or by the wild beasts. The accusative cases, throughout this and the following verses, are all governed by *παρίδωκεν ὁ Θεός*, brought forward from verse 28 in the mind of the writer, and to be supplied by the reader.

(31) *Ἀσυνέτους*, *inconsiderate or foolish*; compare verses 21, 22.—*Ἀσυνθέτους*, *covenant breakers, perfidious*.—*Ἀσπέργους*, *destitute of natural affection*. The writer probably refers here, to the usual practices among the heathen of exposing young children to perish, when the parents had more of them than they thought themselves able to maintain, or had such as they did not wish to take the trouble of bringing up. Tertullian (in Apologetico) repeats this accusation against them in a tremendous manner: “. . . qui natos sibi liberos enecant . . . crudelius in aqua spiritum extorquetis, aut frigori et fami et canibus exponitis.”—*Ἀσπίδους*, *implacable, qui pactum non admittit*. Some manuscripts (A. B. D. E. G. et al.) omit the word; but still its authority does not seem fairly to be doubtful. This is a well-known trait of the heathen character, exemplified in a most striking manner by the *Aborigines* of this country.—*Ἀνελέημονας*, *destitute of compassion, unmerciful*. What, for example, are or were the provisions made for the poor and suffering, among the heathen?

(32) *Οἶτινες . . . ἐπιγινώσκοντες*, *who knowing the ordinance of God*. *Ἐπιγινώσκοντες* is here to be taken in the like sense with *γινώσκοντες* in ver. 21; see the remarks on this. In Rom. ii. 14, 15, Paul asserts that ‘the heathen who have no written law (revelation), are a law to themselves, for they give evidence that the requisitions of the divine law are written upon their hearts.’ He refers of course, in these and the like expressions, to leading and principal traits of moral duty. So in our text, when he speaks of the Gentiles as *knowing God*, he means, that the disclosures made respecting God in the works of nature, and respecting the duties which he demanded of them in their own consciences or moral sense, were of such a kind as fairly to give them an opportunity of knowing something respecting the great outlines of duty, and of rendering them inexcusable for neglecting it.

Τὸ δικαίωμα, *statute, ordinance, precept*. The Seventy employ it

often, in order to translate the Hebrew דָּן, דָּנָה, דָּנָה. The use of δικαίωμα in such a way, seems to be quite *Hellenistic*. Suidas, however, defines it thus: δικαίωμα νόμος, ἐντολαί. Clear cases of usage in such a sense, are 1 Macc. i. 13. ποιῶν τὰ δικαίωματα τῶν ἱθνην and Test. XII. Patriarch., ποιῶν τὰ δικαίωματα Κυρίου, καὶ ὑπακούειν ἐντολὰς Θεοῦ, Fabric. Cod. Pseudep. I. 603.

What the δικαίωμα or Π is which the heathen knew or might have known, is now declared, viz., ὅτι οἱ . . . εἰσὶν, *that they who do such things* [such as he had just been mentioning], *are worthy of death*. As the affirmation here has respect to those who did not enjoy the knowledge of a written revelation, so *death* can hardly be taken in the *full* and exact *scriptural* sense of the word; (on this sense, see the remarks on Rom. v. 12). It must, however, be taken in a sense strictly analogous with this, viz., as meaning *punishment, misery, suffering*. The very nature of the term implies this. That the word θανάτου is *figuratively*, not literally employed here, is sufficiently plain from an inspection of the catalogue of vices which the apostle had just named. Surely he does not mean to say, that *all* of these deserved capital punishment from the civil magistrate in the *literal* sense; and that this was a case so plain, that the heathen themselves clearly recognised it.

A certain degree of vitiosity is manifested, by the commission of crimes or the practice of wickedness; in some cases a very high degree. But still, in many cases crimes are the result of a sudden *impetus* of passion and temptation, in the midst of which men abandon reflection. It requires, therefore, in the main, a higher degree of depravity coolly to applaud and deliberately to justify and encourage wickedness already committed or to be committed, than it does to commit it in the moment of excitement. Hence the apostle considers this as the very climax of all the charges which he had to bring against the heathen, that they not only plunged into acts of wickedness, but had given their more deliberate approbation to such doings. Οὐ μόνον . . . πράσσουσι, *not only do the same things, but even commend those who do them*. It is often the case, that wicked men, whose consciences have been enlightened, speak reproachfully of others who practise such vices as they themselves indulge in. Few profligate parents, for example, are willing that their children should sustain the same character with themselves. But when we find, as in some cases we may do, such parents encouraging and

applauding their children in acts of wickedness, we justly consider it as evidence of the very highest kind of depravity.

There is some variety in the readings of the MSS. and Versions, as to *ἐπιγόνους*, but not enough to render its authority doubtful.

It is of such depravity as this, that the apostle accuses the heathen. And justly; for even their philosophers and the best educated among them, stood chargeable with such an accusation. For example; both the Epicureans and the Stoics allowed and defended *παιδεραστία* and incest, numbering these horrid crimes among the *ἀδιάφορα*, *things indifferent*. Aristotle and Cicero justify revenge. Aristotle (Polit. I. 8) represents war upon barbarous nations to be nothing more than a species of *hunting*, and as altogether justifiable. The same writer justifies forcible abortion, Polit. VII. 16. Other philosophers represent virtue and vice as the mere creatures of statute and arbitrary custom; or (to use the words of Justin) they maintain, *μηδὲν εἶναι ἀρετὴν μηδὲ κακίαν, δόξη δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ταῦτα ἡγεῖσθαι*, *that there is nothing either virtuous or vicious, but that things are made good or evil merely by the force of opinion*.

This is sufficient to justify the declaration of the apostle; for if philosophers thought and reasoned thus, what must the common people have done, who were more exclusively led by their appetites and passions? The picture is, indeed, a dreadful one; it is truly revolting in every sense of the word. But that it is just, nay, that it actually comes short of the real state of things, particularly on the score of impurity and cruelty, there cannot be the least doubt on the part of any man who is acquainted with the ancient state of the heathen world, and of Rome in particular. Poets, philosophers, and historians, have confirmed the words of Paul: and the relics of ancient cities in Italy, (in pictures, carvings, statues, &c.)—cities destroyed near the time when the apostle lived—bear most ample testimony to what he has said of their lasciviousness and shameless profligacy. One has only to add, with the deepest distress, that in many of the great cities of countries called Christian, there is fearful reason to believe that there are abominations practised in various respects, which even exceed any inventions of heathen depravity.

How often is one obliged to exclaim with the apostle, *παρίδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὡς οὐδὲν*! The evidence of this lies in more than beastly degradation.

It has frequently been asked, whether the apostle intended here to draw a picture of the philosophers and sophists, or only of the common people: whether he meant to say that *all* the heathen were guilty of the vices which he names, or only a part of them, &c. The answer to these questions has in part been given above; and as to the rest, it seems not to be difficult. It is sufficiently plain, I trust, from the nature of the case, as has been already stated, that Paul does not mean to assert of every individual among the heathen, that he stood chargeable with each and every crime here specified. This is impossible. He means only to say, that these and the like vices (for surely they were guilty of many others), were notorious and common among the heathen; and that every individual capable of sinning, philosophers and common people, stood chargeable, in a greater or less degree, with some of them. In this way he makes out a part of his main proposition, viz. that *all men are under sin*; consequently that *all are in a lost condition, or in a state of condemnation*. These declarations being established, it follows of course that *all men need a Saviour, and can be delivered from the curse of the divine law, only by means of atoning blood, which procures gratuitous pardon for them*.

That the apostle has been here describing the *heathen*, is clear from verses 20—23, where all that is said applies in its proper force only to them.

That the heathen had a *moral sense*, is clear from Rom. ii. 14, 15. One may even suppose it to be probable that some of them did, to a certain extent, obey this internal law; at least, we may well suppose that they *could* obey it. This seems to be implied in Rom. ii. 26, and perhaps in Acts x. 35. It is on this basis that the apostle grounds his charges of guilt against them. They *knew*, at least they might have known, that what they did was against the law of nature, against their *consciences*, against their internal persuasion with respect to right and wrong. Consequently they were verily guilty in the sight of God; not for transgressing the precepts of a revelation never made known to them, but for violating a law that was within them, and shutting their eyes against the testimony of the natural world. Most clearly and fully does the apostle recognise and teach all this, Rom. ii. 12—16, 26, 27. Consequently no one can accuse God of injustice, because he blames and condemns the heathen; for

he makes the law which was known to them the measure of their blame and condemnation (Rom. ii. 12, seq.), and not a revelation with which they were not acquainted.

When this subject, therefore, is contemplated in its full and proper light, it becomes clear, that neither the accusations of the apostle, nor the deductions which he makes from them, are subject to any just exception. Thus far his argument is good, and conclusive. It is clear that the Gentiles need a Saviour; it is equally clear that they need gratuitous justification, and that they must perish without such a provision for them. It remains then to be seen, whether the same things can be established with respect to the Jews.

On the method of establishing the declaration which the apostle makes concerning the depravity of the Gentiles, it may be proper here to add a single remark. He goes into no formal *argument*. In the passage which we have been considering, he does not even appeal (as he sometimes does, Tit. i. 12), to the testimony of their own writers. The ground of this must be, that the facts were plain, palpable, well known, and acknowledged by all. To mention them merely, was to establish his allegation; the appeal being made to the certain knowledge of every reader. In particular, he was well assured that the Jewish part of his readers would call in question none of the allegations which he made in relation to the vices of the Gentiles. There was no need, therefore, of any more formal proof on the present occasion. A plain statement of the case was sufficient. We shall see that the writer occupies more time, and makes greater effort, to confirm his declarations respecting the Jews.

Reiche, in his recent Commentary (p. 173 seq.), labours to show, that the *giving over* of the heathen to their lusts, &c., must mean an *active* hardening of them, or demoralization of them on the part of God. This, however, he does not consider as the apostle's real opinion, but only his argument *κατ' ἀνθρώπων*, i. e., in conformity with the Jewish prejudices and modes of argument in respect to the heathen. In like manner he considers the criminality which the apostle attaches to idol-worship, in verses 21—25, to be an allegation *κατ' ἀνθρώπων*. One is pained to meet with not a few remarks of this nature, in a work as valuable in many respects as the Commentary of this writer is. What means the *second* commandment? And what, all the zeal testified through the Old Test. against the sin of idol-worship? And how was the apostle to convict the *Gentiles* at Rome, by employing a mere *κατ' ἀνθρώπων*, Jewish opinion or prejudice, as an

argument against them? Neither the frankness, the sincerity, nor the good sense of the apostle, will permit me to accede to the sentiments of Reiche.

CHAP. II. 1—29.

THE apostle, having thus concluded his short but very significant view of the *heathen* world, now turns to address his own nation, the Jews, in order to show them that they stood in need of the mercy proffered by the gospel, as really and as much as the Gentiles. But this he does not proceed to do at once, and by direct address. He first prepares the way by illustrating and enforcing the general proposition, that all who have a knowledge of what is right, and approve of it, but yet sin against it, are guilty; and as really so (for at first he goes no farther than this) as those who are so blinded as not to see the loveliness and excellence of virtue, and who at the same time transgress its precepts. This he does in verses 1—10; in which, although he had the Jews constantly in mind, he still advances only general propositions, applicable in common to them and to others; thus preparing the way, with great skill and judgment, for a more effectual charge to be made specifically against the Jews, in the sequel of his discourse. Such a view of his discourse will render easy the solution of the agitated question: Whom does Paul address in verses 1—8? Le Clerc supposes that he addresses the heathen philosophers; but Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Grotius, and others, that he addresses heathen magistrates. It seems quite plain, at least to my mind, that he directly addresses neither the one nor the other of these here, nor any other particular class of men; but that he employs *general* propositions only, in the verses, before us; and this, merely for the sake of preparing the way to convince the Jews, and to show that they too, as well as the Gentiles, are in a state of condemnation. In ver. 11 he first commences the direct attack (if so it may be called) upon the Jews, and continues it more or less directly, to chap. iii. 19.

The words of Turretin (*Expos. Epist. Pauli ad Rom. in cap. II.*) are so much to my purpose, that I cannot forbear quoting them. "Postquam ostendisset apostolus epistolæ suæ capite primo, Gentes ex propriis operibus justificari non potuisse, eo quod deploratissimus eorum status esset; idem jam Judæis capite II. demonstrare aggreditur. Verum id facit dextre nec mediocri solertia, statim ne nominatis quidem Judæis, positisque generalibus principiis, quorum veritatem et equitatem negare non poterant; quo facto, sensim eorum mentionem injicit; tandemque directe eos compellat, vividæque et pathetica oratione eorum conscientiam pungit, facitque ut de propriis peccatis volentes nolentes convincantur. Et in his quidem omnibus, deprimit supercilium Judæorum, qui ceteras gentes summo contemptu habebant, hæque se longe meliores et Deo acceptiores gloriabantur. At vero, non negatis Judæorum ad cognitionem quod adinet prærogativis, ostendit eos, ad mores quod spectat, quæ pars est religionis longe præcipua, Gentibus haudquaquam meliores fuisse, proindeque Dei judicio et damnationi haud minus obnoxios fore."

So far as the contents of the present chapter then are concerned, we have, in verses 1—8, the general considerations already named; in vers. 9—16, the apostle shows that the Jews must be accountable to God as really and truly, for the manner in which they treat the precepts contained in the Scriptures, as the heathen for the manner in which they demean themselves with respect to the law of nature; and that each must be judged, at last, according to the means of grace and improvement which he has enjoyed.

In verses 17—29 he advances still farther, and makes a direct reference to the Jew alone.

He shows here, that those who sin against higher degrees of knowledge imparted by revelation, must be more guilty than those who have offended merely against the laws of nature; i. e., he plainly teaches the doctrine, that guilt is proportioned to the light and love that have been manifested, and yet been abused. The very *precedence* in knowledge, of which the Jews were so proud and so prone to boast, the apostle declares to be a ground of *greater* condemnation, in case those who possessed it sinned against it; a doctrine consonant as truly with reason and conscience, as it is with the declarations of the Scriptures; compare John III. 19. xv. 22—24. ix. 41.

(1) *Δὶδ κρίνων, therefore thou art without excuse, O man, every one that condemneth, or whosoever thou art that condemneth.*—*Δὶδ* here has been made the subject of much discussion. The point of difficulty respecting it is, to show how it stands connected as an *illative* particle, with the preceding discourse. As it is made up of *διὰ* and *ἰ*, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the word is, in its own proper nature, *illative*. To my own mind, the connection appears to be thus: ‘Since it will be conceded, that those who know the ordinances of God against such vices as have been named, and still practise them and applaud others for doing so, are worthy of punishment; it follows (*διὰ, therefore*) that all who are so enlightened as to disapprove of such crimes, and who still commit them, are even yet more worthy of punishment.’ The apostle here takes the ground, that those who were so enlightened and instructed by revelation as to condemn the vices in question, would of course sin against motives of a higher kind than those which influenced the heathen who were possessed of less light. It must be conceded, indeed, that *συνευδοκοῦσι* in i. 32 is designed to aggravate the description of the guilt which the heathen incurred, (and in fact it does so); yet it will not follow, that the sin of these heathen would not have been still greater, had they enjoyed such light from revelation, as would have led them fully to condemn those very sins in their own consciences, while they yet practised them. The main point, in the present chapter, seems to stand connected principally with the greater or less light as to duty. The heathen with less light went so far in vice as even to approve and applaud it, as well as to practise it; the Jew with more light was led irresistibly, as it were, to condemn such sins, but with all this light, and against all the remonstrances of his conscience, he violated the same precepts which the heathen violated. Now what the apostle would say, is, that he who sins while he possesses light enough to condemn the vice which he practises, is really and truly guilty, as well as he who sins while approving it. He takes it for granted that his readers will concede the point which he has asserted

respecting the guilt of the heathen; hence he draws the inference (*διό*), that on the like grounds they must condemn every one, who, like the Jew, sins against the voice of his conscience and against his better knowledge.

In like manner Flatt (Comm. über d. Römer) makes out the connection of *διό* here: "*Διό, because thou knowest τὸ δίκαιωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ* because thou knowest, that according to the divine decision they are worthy of punishment who practise such vices; because thou thyself dost acknowledge this *δικαίωμα Θεοῦ* so thou canst not excuse thyself for committing the like sins."

As to *πᾶς ὁ κρινων*, the proposition made by it is indeed *general*; but this is plainly a matter of intention on the part of the writer. He means to include the Jews in it; but at the same time he commences his remarks on them in this general way, for the very purpose of approaching gradually and in an inoffensive manner the ultimate point which he has in view.

'*Εν ᾧ γὰρ . . . κατακρίνεις, for in respect to the same thing [which] thou condemnest in another, thou passest sentence of condemnation upon thyself; or, in condemning another, thou passest sentence on thyself.*—'*Εν ᾧ, in respect to, with reference to; it may be translated, because that, inasmuch as, like the Hebrew קָרַן. The latter method would represent the apostle as saying: 'For the very act of condemning another, is passing sentence upon thyself.'* I prefer the former method, which represents him as saying: 'Thou who condemnest, dost pass sentence on thyself in respect to the very point which is the subject of condemnation;' i. e., thou who condemnest the practice of the vices just named, inasmuch as thou practisest the very same vices, thou dost come under thine own condemnation. That *κρίνω* has oftentimes the same sense substantially as *κατακρίνω*, every good lexicon will show. Such may be the case here; compare Matt. vii. 1. Luke vi. 37. Rom. xiv. 3, 4, 10, 13, 22. 1 Cor. iv. 5. Col. ii. 16; or we may render the passage thus: 'With that [sentence] which thou dost pass,' or 'while thou passest sentence' (*ἐν ᾧ while*, Mark ii. 19. Luke v. 3. John v. 7), viz. on the heathen, 'thou dost condemn thyself.'

The *γὰρ* in this clause is *γὰρ illustrantis vel confirmantis*: for the sentiments which follow are designed to show, that *πᾶς ὁ κρινων* is *inexcusable*, inasmuch as he stands chargeable himself with the very crimes which he censures in others.

Τὰ γὰρ . . . ὁ κρινων, since thou who condemnest, doest the same

things. The apostle asserts this, and leaves it to the conscience of his readers to bear witness to the truth of it, and to make the application. He has not yet named the Jews ; and therefore the charge is only *implied*, not expressed. As in the case where the woman taken in adultery was brought before the Saviour, and he said to her accusers : " He that is without sin, let him cast the first stone," and all withdrew because of conscious guilt ; so here, the apostle says : ' Every one who condemns the heathen for the crimes specified, [he was well aware that the Jews did this with a loud voice], condemns himself, because he is guilty of the like vices.' How is this shown ? Not by any arguments or testimonies ; for Paul knew that these were unnecessary. He knew that the consciences of his readers would at once bear witness to the truth of his allegations. Therefore he leaves it to their consciences. But still, external testimony to the facts alleged is not wanting. That the Jews of this period were grossly corrupt, is certain from the accusations which Jesus so often brought against them, as recorded in the Gospels. We may make the appeal to Josephus also, and in particular to the description which he gives of Herod and his courtiers.

The *γάρ* in the present clause is also inserted, because this clause is designed to confirm the preceding one, and to show *how* he who judged did condemn himself.

(2) *Οἶδμεν δὲ . . . πράσσοντας*, for we know that the judgment of God is according to truth, against those who do such things. The *δὲ* here is rather difficult of interpretation. A proper and simple *continuation* of discourse it may occasionally be ; but such a sense without some indication of diversity or antithesis, is not usually to be attached to it. Not unfrequently it assumes the place of a *causal* particle, and is equivalent to *γάρ* ; not because *δὲ* of itself has the same signification as *γάρ*, but because it connects sentences, or parts of sentences, which have a *causal* relation. 'In such cases,' says Passow, 'it may be translated *denn*,' i. e., *for, since, &c.* Here I take the connection of thought to be simply this : 'Thou art without excuse, who, &c.' . . . i. e., thou shalt not escape condemnation, 'for we know that the judgment of God, &c.' Reiche gives *δὲ* an *adversative* sense ; and to do so, he makes the sentiment opposed to be the supposition that 'God would not judge men.' But the preceding context does not supply this ; and the above method of interpretation, which is grounded on the context, is more simple and obvious, and is equally conformed to idiom.—*Κρίμα Θεοῦ* means *sentence of con-*

denmation on the part of God, Θεοῦ being *Genitivus auctoris*.—Κατὰ ἀλήθειαν may be construed in various ways; viz. (1) It may be taken (as usual in the classics) for *truly, verily*; i. e., just in the same sense as ἰσως, ἀληθῶς. This would make a good meaning in our verse; but not the best. (2) It may mean the same as κατὰ δικαιοσύνην, *agreeably to justice*, inasmuch as ἀλήθεια often means *vera religionis doctrina, vera atque salutaris doctrina*, &c. So Beza, Tholuck, and others. (3) A better sense still seems to be, *agreeably to the real state of things, in accordance with truth* as it respects the real character sustained by each individual. The sentiment then is: ‘Think not to escape the judgment of God, thou who condemnest the vices of the heathen, and yet dost thyself practise them; whatever thy claims to the divine favour on account of thy birth or thy spiritual advantages may be, remember that the judgment of God will be according to the true state of the case, according to the real character which thou dost sustain.’ I prefer this method of interpretation, as it renders the verse more significant, while the *usus loquendi* is fully retained.

Τὰ τοιαῦτα, *such things*, viz. such as he had just been mentioning. Observe that the apostle does not accuse the πᾶς ὁ κρίνων here of the very same things in all respects, (as αὐτὰ in the preceding verse might at first view appear to intimate); but he speaks of him who condemns as doing τὰ τοιαῦτα. Nor is it to be understood by this, that every individual among the Jews, or even that any one, was chargeable with each and every vice which he had named. Enough that any one or more of these vices might be justly charged on all. And even if it could be said, that there might be individuals who gave no *external* proofs to men that they were guilty of any of these vices; there certainly were none who were not more or less guilty, in the sense in which our Saviour declares in his Sermon on the Mount that men may be guilty of murder and adultery, i. e., *spiritually, internally, mentally*.

(3) Δογίζῃ δὲ . . . Θεοῦ, *dost thou not think this, then, O man, who condemnest those that do such things, and doest the very same things, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God?* Δί, says Flatt, appears to stand for οὐρ but why, he has not shown. Bretschneider has better explained it in his lexicon: “Δί . . . *addit vim interrogationi*.” Δί being in its proper nature *adversative*, it is very naturally employed in replies, answers, or questions which are designed to be in opposition to something which another may have said, or may be

supposed to cherish in his thoughts. It gives *energy* to the reply in Greek; but it cannot always be translated into our own idiom, whose particles are often so insignificant compared with the Greek ones. In the present case, I know not what can be done with *δι* better than to render it *then*, which makes the sentence in English approach very near to the energetic form of the Greek.

The sense of the verse appears to be as follows: 'Thou who condemnest others for vicious indulgences and still dost thyself practise the same, dost thou suppose, that while they cannot escape thy condemning sentence, thou canst escape the sentence of him who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity?' Well has Chrysostom paraphrased it: τὸ οὐκ οὐκ ἐξέφυγες κρίμα, καὶ τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ διαφεύξῃ; *thou hast not escaped thine own condemnation; and shalt thou escape that of God?*

(4) Ἡ τοῦ . . . καταφρονεῖς, *or dost thou despise his abounding goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering?* The word *πλεῖτος* is often employed by Paul in order to designate *abundance, copiousness; e. g.*, Eph. i. 7. ii. 7. i. 18. iii. 16. Rom. ix. 23. xi. 33, et alibi. The Seventy frequently employ it to translate *רַב* and *רַב־רַב*. Here *πλεῖτου* supplies the place of an adjective, and means *abundant or abounding*; comp. Heb. Gramm. § 440. b.

Χρηστότης, kindness, benignity. Ἀνοχῆς, literally *holding in*, i. e., checking or restraining indignation, forbearing to manifest displeasure against sin. *Μακροθυμίας, longanimity, רַב־חַסָּדִים* *slowness to anger, forbearance to punish.* Both words (*ἀνοχῆς* and *μακροθυμίας*) are of nearly the same import, and serve, as synonymes thus placed usually do, to give *intensity* to the expression. The meaning is as if the apostle had said: 'Despisest thou his abounding kindness and distinguished forbearance to punish?'

Καταφρονῶ means *to treat with contempt*, either by word or by deed. The apostle means to say here, that all the distinguished goodness which the *ὁ κρίνων* enjoyed, in consequence of his superior light, was practically neglected and contemned by him, inasmuch as he plunged into the same vices which the ignorant heathen practised.

Ἀγνοῶν . . . ἄγει, *not acknowledging that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance.* Ἀγνοῶν in the sense of *not recognizing or acknowledging.* Γινώσκω and the Hebrew *יָדַע* often mean *to recognize, to acknowledge*; as may be seen in the lexicons.—Τὸ *χρηστόν*, i. q., *χρηστότης*, by a common usage of the Greek tongue; compare τὸ *γνωστόν*

in i. 19.—*ἄγει*, *leads*; but as verbs often designate a tendency towards the action which they usually designate, as well as the specific action itself, so here the *tendency* or *fitness* to accomplish the end is designated; compare John v. 21, *ἐγείρει*, *has the power or faculty to raise up*; *ζωοποιεῖ*, *has the power of giving life*; Rom. i. 21, *γινώσκει*, *having opportunity to know*. The sentiment is, that the goodness of God which the *ὁ κρῖνων* enjoys in a peculiar manner, and which is manifested so highly in his forbearance to punish, is intended to teach him gratitude for his blessings, and of course sorrow (*μετάνοιαν*) for his offences in respect to that course of conduct which such a principle would dictate. Let the reader compare, for the sake of deeply impressing on his mind so important and striking a sentiment, the passages in 2 Pet. iii. 9. Ezek. xviii. 23, 32. xxxiii. 11.

(5) Κατὰ δὲ . . . καὶ ῥῆδαν, *according to thine obstinacy, however, and impenitent heart, or according to thy hard and impenitent heart*. Δὲ naturally connects sentences or clauses which are more or less *antithetic*; but the antithesis is sometimes implied merely, by what is said in the context, and not expressed. Here I take the antithetic sentiment to be: "Thou art indeed hoping to escape the judgment of God, but instead of this thou art heaping up treasures of wrath, &c." Δὲ, here rendered *however*, naturally refers back to ver. 3, and is properly *adversative* to the thought which the impenitent man cherishes. Σκληρότης means *insensibility* of heart or mind, a state in which one is not duly affected by considerations presented to his mind: δ.—Ἀμετανόητον καρδίαν means a heart not so affected as to sorrow for sin, through the goodness of God which is designed to produce such an effect. It is by such spiritual insensibility or stupidity, that a sinner is aggravating his condemnation; so the next clause.

Θησαυρίζεις . . . τοῦ Θεοῦ, *thou art treasuring up for thyself wrath in the day of wrath, when the righteous judgment of God shall be revealed*. Θησαυρίζεις, *to treasure up*, i. e., to lay up in store, to accumulate, to increase. In the choice of this term, there is a tacit reference of the mind to the preceding τοῦ πλούτου τῆς χρηστότητος—σεαυτῶν, *for thyself*, Dativus incommodi (as grammarians say); compare Rom. xiii. 2. Matt. xxiii. 31. James v. 3. See N. Test. Gramm. § 104. 2, Note 1.—Ὁργή, *wrath*, includes also the *punishment* which is the natural consequence of wrath. A *day of punishment* is called, in the Old Testament, יוֹם נִפְּלָא, יוֹם נִפְּלָא, יוֹם נִפְּלָא, i. e., a day when the displeasure of Jehovah is manifested.

'Εν ἡμέρᾳ ἐργῆς, i. e., ἐργὴν [τὴν ἰσομίνην] ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐργῆς, indignation that will be shown or executed *in the day of indignation, or punishment*. -- Καὶ ἀποκαλύψιως καὶ δικαιοκρισίας may be taken as a Hendiadys, and rendered *of revealed righteous judgment*. The meaning is: 'When God's righteous judgment shall be revealed, i. e., in the great day of judgment.' Griesbach, with a majority of MSS., omits the second καί; which makes the reading more facile.

(6) "Ος ἀποδώσει . . . αὐτοῦ, *who will render to every man according to his works, i. e., who will make retribution to every man, according to the tenor of his conduct*. The sequel shows what distinction the supreme Judge will make between men of different characters. Ἔργα means here, as often elsewhere, all the developments which a man makes of himself, whether by *outward* or *inward* actions; compare John vi. 27. Rev. xiv. 13. xxii. 12. The word is indeed more commonly used to designate *something done externally*; but it is by no means confined to this sense. Thus ἔργα νόμου means *any work which the law demands*; ἔργα Θεοῦ means *such works as God requires*; and in cases of this nature it will not be said, I trust, that God and his law do not require any thing but *external* works. It is truly surprising to see how many theories respecting future reward, have been made from this verse. The apprehension that Paul here contradicts *salvation by GRACE*, and makes it to depend on the merit of works, has no good foundation. The *good works* of the regenerate are imperfect. No man loves God with *all his heart* and his neighbour *as himself*. But there is some real goodness in the works of the truly sanctified; and this will be rewarded, imperfect as it is, not on the ground of law (which would demand entire perfection), but on the ground of *grace*, which can consistently reward imperfect good works. Thus the *grace* of the gospel and the *reward* here promised to good works, are altogether consistent. But those who remain impenitent and unbelieving, stand simply on *law-ground* as to acceptance, and must therefore be punished according to the measure of their sins.

(7) Τοῖς μὲν . . . αἰώνιον, *to those who by patient continuance or perseverance in well-doing, seek for glory, and honour, and immortality, or immortal glory and honour, [he will render] eternal life or happiness*. — Ὑπομνήν means *perseverance* or *patient continuance*. — Κατά, before the Accusative, frequently designates the *modus* in which any thing is done, or the state and condition in which it is; e. g., κατὰ τάξιν, κατὰ ζῆλον, κατὰ γνῶσιν, &c. — Ἔργου here has the epithet

ἀγαθοῦ, in order to distinguish it from the generic ἔργα used in the preceding verse.

Δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν is cumulative or intensive; i. e., it expresses happiness or glory of the highest kind. We may translate the phrase thus: *immortal glory and honour*, making ἀφθαρσίαν an adjective to the other nouns; or we may render it, *glorious and honourable immortality*, or *honourable and immortal glory*. I prefer the first. The idea is, indeed, substantially the same in all; but all do not seem equally congruous as to the method of expression. The joining of τιμὴ and δόξα in order to express *intensity*, is agreeable to a usage which is frequent in the New Testament; e. g., 1 Tim. i. 17. Heb. ii. 7, 9. 2 Pet. i. 17. Apoc. iv. 9, 11. So the Hebrew, הוד ודָּבָר.

The interpretation given above is the usual one, for substance, adopted by the great body of the commentators. But Reiche strenuously contends for the following arrangement: τοῖς μὲν [ἀποδώσει], καθ' ἰσχυρίην ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ, δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν, ζητοῦσι ζωὴν αἰώνιον, i. e., 'to those [will he render], according to their perseverance in well-doing, glory and honour and immortality, [even to those who] seek eternal life.' But when he says, in defence of this, that it is incongruous to speak of *SEEKING glory, and honour, and immortality*, and therefore ζητοῦσι must be joined with ζωὴν αἰώνιον, I acknowledge myself incapable of perceiving the weight of his argument. What is *glory*, but future happiness? What is *honour*, but the divine approbation? And what is *immortality*, but the perpetuity of these? And what is there more incongruous in seeking these, than in seeking ζωὴν αἰώνιον? Ζητεῖν, means *to labour for, earnestly to desire, to strive for with effort*; and all this the Christian certainly may and must do, in respect to glory, and honour, and immortality. The suggestion, that 'to seek after immortality would have no sense, because we are and must be immortal,' does not apply in this case; for it is not after immortality simply considered that we are to seek, but after an *immortality of glory and honour*. Besides, there is such an unnatural chasm between τοῖς and ζητοῦσι, in case we adopt the interpretation of Reiche, as should be admitted only from *necessity*; which does not here exist.

The μὲν at the beginning of the verse is the μὲν προτάσεως, i. e., μὲν designating the *protasis* in a sentence; the ἀπόδοσις here is verse 8, which commences with δι' ἀποδοτικῆς, i. e., marking the *apodosis*, and standing as the counter-part of μὲν in verse 7.

(8) Τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἐριθείας, *but to those who are contentious*. Ἐξ (ἐξ) before the Genitive of a noun, is often employed as an adjective in designating some particular description of persons or things. Thus ὁ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ = οὐράνιος ἡ ἐκ φύσεως, *natural*; τὸν ἐκ πίστεως, *credens*; ὁ ἐξ ὑμῶν, *yours*; οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς, *the circumcised*; so the classical οἱ ἐκ στοᾶς, &c. The objections of Glöckler against such a sense of ἐξ, have no good foundation. The apostle means here to designate those who contend against God, or rebel against him. The Seventy use ἐρεθίζω in order to translate נָחַץ, Deut. xxi. 20. xxxi. 27. What it means, moreover, is explained in the next clause by ἀπειθοῦσι. The derivation of ἐριθείας from ἐριθεύω, to *work in wool, to make parties, &c.*, is quite unnatural. It doubtless comes from ἔρις, ἐρεθίζω, as the sense of the word in the N. Test. clearly shows.

Καὶ ἀπειθοῦσι . . . ἀδικίᾳ, *and are disobedient to the truth, but obedient to unrighteousness*. Here (in a subordinate member of the apodosis of the sentence begun in verse 7) is a second μέν which is *protatic*, and another δὲ *apodotic*. The contrast of the two respective clauses in which they stand, is made very plain by ἀπειθοῦσι and πειθεμένους. The exact expression of this μέν and δέ, cannot be made out by any translation which the English language will permit. We have no words capable of designating such nice shades of relation as μέν and δέ signify here, and in like cases; shades very plain and palpable indeed to the practised critic in Greek, who, however, is still left without the power of expressing them in his own vernacular language. I have not in this case attempted an exact translation, for the reason just mentioned. The nearest to the original that I am able to come, is by the following version: *even those who disobey indeed the truth, but obey unrighteousness*. How imperfect an exhibition this is of the nicer colouring of the Greek expression, every one must feel who has “διὰ τὴν ἔξιν τὰ αἰσθητήρια γεγυμνασμένα πρὸς διάκρισιν.”

Ἀληθείᾳ here means *true doctrine*. As the proposition of the apostle is *general* here, *i. e.*, as it respects all, whether Jews or Gentiles, who disobey the precepts of religion and morality, so ἀληθείᾳ must be taken in a latitude that embraces the truth of both natural and revealed religion. On the other hand ἀδικίᾳ means *that which is unrighteous, that which the truth forbids*, it being here (as in i. 18) the antithesis of ἀληθείᾳ.

Ὁργὴ καὶ θυμός, *indignation and wrath*. Ammonius says, Θύμος μὲν ἐστὶ πρὸς καιρὸς, ὁργὴ δὲ πρὸς χρόνιον μνησικακία, *i. e.*, Θύμος is of *short dura-*

tion, but *δργή* is a long-continued remembrance of evil. There seems, however, to be no important difference between the two words, both meaning *excitement, the feeling of strong excitement, indignation, &c.* In the case before us, the expression appears to be merely, *intensive*; which (as usual) is effected by the accumulation of synonymous terms. In respect to the construction of these nouns in the Nominative case, it is an evident departure from the structure in the preceding verse, where *ζωὴν αἰώνιον* is in the Accusative governed by *ἀποδώσει* understood. Here *δργή* καὶ θύμος are the Nominative to *ἴσονται* implied. Such departures in the latter portion of a sentence, from a construction employed in the former part of it, grammarians call *ἀνακλινθόν* which means, that a construction begun, is not followed up or completed in the like manner.

(9) *Θλίψις* καὶ *στενωχὴρία* are words which correspond to *δργή* καὶ *θύμος*, and designate the effect of the latter. The meaning is, *intense anguish, great suffering*. The literal sense of the words, according to their etymology, would be *pressure* and *narrowness* or *want of room*; but the literal sense is abandoned, and the tropical one here employed. It is evident, at first sight, that the ninth verse is a repetition of the general sentiment contained in verse 8; while the 10th verse repeats the sentiment of verse 7. This repetition, however, is evidently introduced with the design of making a *specific* application of the threatening, and of showing definitely whom the apostle means to include in what he had said.

The construction in verse 8 is followed in verse 9; inasmuch as *ἴσονται* is plainly implied after *Θλίψις* καὶ *στενωχὴρία*. These two words, used in the way of expressing *intense suffering*, are often joined by classic writers: and so in Hebrew we have *קָצַף וְקָצַף* Is. xxx. 6.

Ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου, [great distress shall be] upon every soul of man, i. e., upon every man. In Hebrew, the *soul* of the righteous, of the wicked, of the poor, of the rich, of the hungry, of the thirsty, &c., means the righteous, the wicked, &c. So here, *the soul of man* means *man*; i. e., by metonymy, a leading or conspicuous part of man, is put for the whole person.—Ἰουδαίου . . . Ἑλλήνος, *first of the Jew, and then of the Greek*; i. e., the Jew, to whom a revelation has been imparted, shall be judged and punished first in order, because he sustains a peculiar relation to revealed truth which calls for this; compare i. 16. Here the apostle comes out and openly shows, that what he had been thus far saying only in *general* terms, is applicable to *Jews* as well as to *Greeks*.

(10) Δόξα δὲ . . . Ἑλληνι, *but glory, and honour, and peace, to every one who doeth good, first to the Jew, and then to the Greek.* That is, both threatenings and rewards are held out to the Jews and Greeks, in the same manner, and on the same condition. With God there is no προσωποληψία. This verse is a repetition of verse 7, with the addition of Ἰουδαίου τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἑλλήνος. But here εἰρήνη is substituted for ἀφθαρσίαν there. The meaning of εἰρήνη can be best made out by considering it as the opposite of that *enmity and disquietude* in which unsanctified men are involved, as it respects God. We might translate, *but happiness glorious and honourable, &c.* The meaning of the whole is plain. *Intensity* of affirmation is intended.

(11) Οὐ γὰρ . . . Θεῷ, *for with God there is no partiality, or no respect of persons.* The Hebrew עִנְיָן נִפְזָה means *to deal partially*, to look not at things, but at *persons*, and pass sentence accordingly. The phrases πρόσωπον λαμβάνειν or βλῆπτειν, and also προσωποληψία, are entirely Hebraistic in their origin; the classic writers never employ them. The apostle here explicitly declares, that there is no difference in regard to the application of the general principle which he had laid down, the Jew as well as the Greek being the proper subject of it. The γὰρ at the beginning of the verse is γὰρ *confirmantis*; i. e., ‘it will be that the one shall be punished and the other rewarded according to divine declaration, *for* (γὰρ) there is no partiality, &c.’

(12) A confirmation or explanation of what he had just said in the preceding verse; for if God judges every man according to the advantages which he has enjoyed, then there is no *partiality* in his proceedings; and that he does, the present verse explicitly declares.

Ὅσοι γὰρ . . . ἀπολοῦνται, *since as many as have sinned without a revelation, shall perish without a revelation.* Νόμος, like the Hebrew תּוֹרָה, often means *the Scriptures, the revealed law*; e. g., Matt. xii. 5. xxii. 36. Luke x. 26. John viii. 5, 17. 1 Cor. xiv. 21. Gal. iii. 10. Matt. v. 18. Luke xvi. 17. John vii. 49, et alibi. Here most plainly it means *the revealed law, revelation, or the Scriptures*; for verse 15 asserts directly that the heathen were not destitute of *all law*, but only of an *express revelation*. The classical sense of ἀνόμως would be *unlawfully*, = *παράνομως*. But plainly this meaning is here out of question.

Ἀνόμως ἀπολοῦνται means, that, when adjudged to be punished, they

shall not be tried by the precepts of a *revealed law* with which they have never been acquainted, but by the precepts of the *law of nature* which were written on their own hearts; see verse 15.

Kal ὅσοι . . . ἐπιθήσονται, and so many as have sinned under revelation, will be condemned by revelation. Here νόμος is employed in the sense pointed out in the preceding paragraphs. Ἐν νόμῳ in a state of law, i. e., of revealed law or revelation, with ἐν conditionis, as we may call it; for ἐν is often put before nouns designating the state, condition, or relation of persons or things; see Bretschn. Lex. ἐν, No. 5. It is equivalent to ἔννομος, 1 Cor. ix. 21, νόμον ἔχοντα, Rom. ii. 14. The sentiment is, that those who enjoyed the light of revelation (as the Jews had done) would be condemned by the same revelation, in case they had been transgressors. The ὅσοι employed in this verse is of the most general signification = *quicunque*; οἷσιν; would have a relative and limited sense.

(13) This declaration is followed by another which is designed to illustrate and confirm it, and which is therefore introduced with another γὰρ (γὰρ illustrantis et confirmantis). Οὐ γὰρ . . . δικαιώσονται, for not those who hear the law are just with God, but those who obey the law shall be justified; i. e., not those to whom a revelation has been imparted, and who hear it read, are counted as righteous by their Maker and Judge, but those who obey the law shall be counted righteous. The apostle here speaks of οἱ ἀκούοντες τοῦ νόμου, because the Jews were accustomed to hear the Scriptures read in public, but many of them did not individually possess copies of the sacred volume which they could read. The sentiment is: 'Not those who merely enjoy the external privilege of a revelation, have any just claim to divine approbation; it is only those who obey the precepts of such a revelation, that have any ground to expect this.'

(14) To this sentiment the apostle seems to have anticipated that objections would be made. He goes on to solve them, or rather to prevent them by anticipation. He had said that Jew and Gentile, without distinction, would come under condemnation for disobedience to the divine law, and also be rewarded for obedience (verses 9, 10); he had declared that there is no partiality with God, and that all would be judged by the precepts of law (verses 11, 12); he had intimated that those who were the hearers of the law (the Jews) would not on that account be accepted, but only those who obey it. It was natural now for some objector to say: 'The Gentiles have no revelation or law; and therefore this statement cannot be applied to them,

or this supposition cannot be made in relation to them.' The answer to this is, that the Gentiles have a law as really and truly as the Jews, although it is not written on parchment, but on the tablets of their hearts. That verse 14 is designed to illustrate the fact, that the Gentiles are under a law, in the same manner as verse 13 (*ὡς ἀποκατα τοῦ νόμου*) is designed to show that the Jews are under a law, there seems to be no good reason to doubt. The *γάρ* then in verse 14. is *γάρ illustrantis et confirmantis*.

An objection to this has often been made, viz. that in this way we may represent the apostle as affirming, that there were some of the heathen who did so obey the law as to be just before God. But this is a mistake. The apostle no more represents the heathen as actually attaining to this justification here, than he represents the Jew as actually attaining to it in verse 13. Surely he does not mean to say in verse 13, that there are any Jews who are actually *ποιῶνται τοῦ νόμου* in the sense which he attaches to this phrase: compare chap. iii. 19, 20, 23, 27, 30, 31. He is merely illustrating a *principle*, in both cases. The Jew expected justification on account of his *external* advantages. 'No,' says the apostle, 'this is impossible; nothing but *entire* obedience to the divine law will procure justification for you, so long as you stand merely on your own ground. And here the heathen may make the like claims. If you say that a heathen man has no law, because he has no revelation; still I must insist that he is in as good a condition with respect to actual justification, as you Jews are; for although he has no Scripture (and in this respect, no law), yet he has an *internal* revelation inscribed on his heart, which is a rule of life to him, and which, if perfectly obeyed, would confer justification on him, as well and as truly as entire obedience to the *written* law could confer it upon you. The principle is the same in both cases. You can claim no pre-eminence in this respect.'

It is plain, then, that the apostle is only *laying down*, or *illustrating a principle here*, NOT relating a historical fact; and this being duly apprehended, all difficulty about the sentiment of the passage is removed. Certainly there is no more difficulty in ver. 14, than must arise in regard to the *ποιῶνται τοῦ νόμου* of ver. 13. The writer means to say neither more nor less, than that *the Gentiles may have the same kind of claims to be actually justified before God as the Jews* (which of course has an important bearing on ver. 11); but, as the sequel shows most fully, *neither Jew nor Gentile has any*

claim at all to justification, since both have violated the law under which they have lived.

Φύσει . . . ποιῇ, *do in their natural state such things as revelation requires.* Φύσις, in a classical sense, means *the nature or natural state of a thing, the natural condition of any thing*; just in the same way as we use the word *nature* in our own language; *e. g.*, the Greeks said ἡ κατὰ φύσιν θάνατος, *natural death*; ὁ κατὰ φύσιν πατήρ, *natural father*; φύσιν ἔχει γίνεσθαι, *it naturally happens*, &c. In the verse before us, φύσει is equivalent to τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα: *i. e.*, it designates those who were acquainted with the only precepts of natural religion, and were destitute of a special revelation. In respect to the dative case (φύσει), it is the common method to which the Greeks have recourse, in order to express the state or condition of any thing; *i. e.*, *Dativus conditionis*. As to τὰ τοῦ νόμου, it means either ἔργα νόμου (see ver. 15), or else δικαιώματα νόμου, &c. *Those things belonging to the law* designates, of course, such things as the law requires.

Ὅδοι . . . εἰς νόμος, *these having no law, are a law unto themselves.* The construction is changed when ὅδοι (masc. gender) is employed; which is *constructio ad sensum*, ἄνθρωποι being understood. What is meant by *αὐτοῖς εἰς νόμος*, is explained in the following verse.

(15) Οἵτινες . . . αὐτῶν, *who show that the work which the law requires is written upon their hearts.* Οἵτινες refers to the Gentiles. —Τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου, *the work or duty of the law*, *i. e.*, that which the law demands. So, plainly, this much controverted passage should be rendered, if we compare it with other phrases of the like tenor; *e. g.*, 1 Thess. i. 3, ἔργου τῆς πίστεως, *work such as faith demands*; 2 Thess. i. 11, ἔργον πίστεως, *such work as faith requires*; John vi. 28, 'What shall we do that we may perform τὰ ἔργα τοῦ Θεοῦ, *such works as God requires*; to which the answer is (ver. 29.) 'τὸ ἔργον τοῦ Θεοῦ, *the work which God requires*, is, that ye should believe, &c.; John ix. 4, τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πέμψαντός με, *works enjoined by him who sent me*; 2 Tim. iv. 5, ἔργον εὐαγγελιστοῦ, *duty which the evangelical office demands*; et sic alibi. With these plain cases of usage before us, there is no need of endeavouring to prove (with Palaiet, Wolf, Schleusner, and others), that ἔργον is here merely *periphrastic*, *i. e.*, that ἔργον τοῦ νόμου means the same as νόμος. That such a *usus loquendi* is not unknown to the Greeks, may indeed be shown; *e. g.*, τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἔργον, *ιννοί φασιν, ἀπὸ βαρβαρῶν ἄρξαι*, *philosophy (some say) took its rise from barbarians*. Aristotle (Rhet. i. 15. 6) says: ποιεῖν τὸ ἔργον τοῦ

νόμου, to do what the law requires. The periphrastic use of *χρῆμα* and *πράγμα* in this way, is well known. But it is wholly unnecessary to have resort to this, when the expression *ἔργον νόμου* can be so easily explained without it. It means plainly, *such work, or duty as the law requires.*

This, *i. e.*, precept enjoining this, *is written on the hearts or minds* of the Gentiles. *Γραπτόν* is of course to be understood figuratively; and the idea conveyed by the whole expression is, that the great precepts of moral duty are deeply impressed on our moral nature, and co-exist with it, even when it is unenlightened by special revelation. There seems also to be an allusion in *γραπτόν* to the written law of the Jews; this was written on *tablets*, that on *the heart*. *Καρδιά*, like the Hebrew *לֵב*, very often stands for *mind* as well as *heart*. *Γραπτόν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις* is used as the antithesis of *γραπτόν ἐν πλαξὶ λιθίνῃς*, which characterized the revealed law of Moses; 2 Cor. iii. 3.

What was meant by the expression just considered, the apostle goes on to show by adding two exegetical clauses. *Συμμαρτυροῦσιν αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως, their conscience bearing witness, viz., τῷ αὐτῷ, to it, to the same ἔργον νόμου.* That is, the evidence that what the law of God requires is inscribed on the minds of the heathen, is the testimony of their consciences to such moral precepts. Some understand *συμμαρτυροῦσιν* as meaning, that the conscience bears testimony *in conjunction* with the heart or mind. But I apprehend this not to be the meaning of Paul. Compound verbs, like *συμμαρτυρέω*, not unfrequently have substantially the same sense as the simple forms, or the same with a little intensity. So in respect to *συμμαρτυρέω*, an undoubted instance of such usage occurs in Rom. ix. 1. And in our text, *written in their hearts or minds* is explained by adding, *the conscience bearing testimony, viz., to the precepts in question.* This is the evidence that these precepts are engraved upon the minds of natural men. The apostle does not mean to say, that there are two testimonies, one of the mind and another of the conscience; but that the conscience testifies to the fact which he had alleged in regard to the mind.

The apostle now adds a second confirmation of the fact, that the demands of the moral law are inscribed on the heart of men in a state of nature; viz., *καὶ μεταξὺ . . . ἀπολογουμένων, their thoughts alternately accusing or excusing them.* *Μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων, between each other, at mutual intervals, alternately, i. e., in succession, first one kind of thoughts, i. e., approbation; then another kind, i. e., dis-*

approbation.—*Λογισμός* means *ratiocination, judgment, reflection*. It designates a more deliberate act of the mind than a mere *ἐνθύμημα* or *ἐνθύμησις*.—*Κατηγορούντων*, *accusing*, in case the actions were bad; *ἀπολογουμένων*, *defending*, in case they were good. After each of these participles, *ἑαυτοῖς* or *ἄνθρωπον* is implied.

The meaning of this clause is not, as has frequently been supposed, that one man blames or applauds another, or that men mutually blame and applaud one another, (although the fact itself is true); but that in the thoughts or judgment of the same individual, approbation or condemnation exists, according to the tenor of the actions which pass in review before him. Thus the voice of conscience, which proceeds from a moral feeling of dislike or approbation, and the judgment of the mind when it examines the nature of actions, unite in testifying, that what the moral law of God requires is impressed in some good measure on the hearts even of the heathen.

Those commit a great mistake, then, who deny that men can have any sense of moral duty or obligation, without a knowledge of the Scriptures. The apostle's argument, in order to convince the Gentiles of sin, rests on a basis entirely different from this. And if it be alleged, that in this way the necessity of a revelation is superseded; I answer, not at all. The knowledge of some points of moral duty, or the power to acquire such knowledge, is one thing; a disposition to obey the precepts of natural religion is another. The latter can be affirmed of few indeed among the heathen of any age or nation. Again; faculties adapted to discover the path of duty are one thing, the use of them so as effectually to do this is another. The former the apostle asserts; the latter he denies. And justly; for after all, what have the heathen done and said which renders the gospel in any measure unnecessary? Little indeed; in some respects we may say, nothing. What *authority* had their precepts over them? And how was it with them as to doubts and difficulties about some of the plainest principles of morality? Their minds were blinded by their passions. Hence the voice within them was not listened to; but this does not prove that God left himself without sufficient witness among them. The apostle most plainly and fully asserts that he did not.

(16) *Ἐν ἡμέρᾳ . . . ἀνθρώπων*, *in the day when God shall judge the secret things of men*. But with what must we connect *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ*; Most commentators have said; 'With *κρίθουσας* verse 12, making

verses 13, 14, 15, a parenthesis.' So Grotius, Limborch, Wolf, Knapp, Griesbach, and others. This would then compare, as to construction, with Rom. i. 2—6. v. 13—18, and many other passages in Paul's epistles.

Others, as Beza, Heumann, Winer, join *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ* with *δικαιωθήσονται* at the end of verse 13, and make verses 14, 15, a parenthesis.

Bengel and Chr. Schmidt join *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ* with *ἐνδείκνυνται* in verse 15, making the sentiment to be, that in the day of judgment it will appear manifest to all, that men's consciences have testified in favour of the law of God, &c.

Somewhat different in sense from this, is the exegesis of Jerome, Theodoret, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Œcumenius, Calvin, Erasmus, and others; viz., that *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ* stands connected immediately with the participles *κατηγορούντων* and *ἀπολογουμένων* which makes the passage to mean, that in the judgment day the consciences of the heathen will accuse them of all that Paul has charged upon them. Several of these commentators, however, think that Paul means only to say, that *a fortiori* their consciences will then accuse them; without meaning to say, that they do not accuse them in the present life.

To this last interpretation Tholuck seems to accede. But I cannot accord with this exegesis, because the object of the writer, in verses 13—15, seems plainly to be merely a justification or confirmation of what he had said in verse 12, viz., that the heathen who had *no revelation*, still had a *law* which they were bound to obey, and by which they must be judged. How does Paul establish this? By an appeal to the fact that they have a conscience or a moral sense, and that they pass judgment of a moral nature upon their own actions. To say that this conscience and moral sense will be developed at the judgment-day, is saying what is not sufficiently apposite to his purpose. At the judgment-day, the heathen will be tried by what? By the law under which they were placed, and under which they acted, in the present life. What was this law? That of conscience or moral sense. Then the *accusing* and *excusing*, which are appealed to as evidence of this moral sense, are exercised in the present world; *i. e.*, its exercise *here* must of course be appealed to in order to sustain the apostle's argument, by which he designs to establish their present guilt.

For these reasons I must accede to the prevailing opinion among critics, viz. that *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ* is either to be joined with *κρίθησονται* in ver. 12, and that vers. 13—15 are a *parenthetic* explanation or confirma-

tion of ver. 12; or (which I think preferable) make verses 11—15 parenthetical, and unite ver. 16, *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ κ. τ. λ.* with ver. 11.

Τὰ κρυπτά augments the force of the affirmation; 'God will not only bring into judgment the *external* actions of men, but all their *secret* thoughts, desires, and affections.' Tholuck understands it as referring to the secret judgment of the mind or conscience, mentioned in the preceding verse, and makes the sense to be, that God will bring into *open* judgment all the *secret* judgments of the mind. But does this accord with the nature of the case? It is not the moral judgment of the mind, when it accords with the decision of the divine law (as is here supposed), which the apostle means to represent as judged by God; for these are not matters of punishment, when they are correct; but it is the secret wickedness of men, as well as their open vices, that will make the final judgment a time of awful terror. That such a view of the subject is here intended, seems to me quite plain; and so Turretin, Flatt, and most others. To the very same purpose Paul speaks in 1 Cor. iv. 5, where he represents the day of judgment as the time, when God will bring to light *τὰ κρυπτά τοῦ σκότους . . . καὶ τὰς βουλὰς τῶν καρδιῶν*.

Κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον μου, according to the gospel which I preach; compare 2 Tim. ii. 8. 1 Cor. xv. 1. Some have understood this of a *written* gospel of the apostle; but without any good critical or historical evidence.

Διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, by Jesus Christ. Compare Acts xvi. 31. John v. 27, 22. xvii. 2. Acts x. 42.

By affirming that *God will judge τὰ κρυπτά according to his gospel*, Paul seems to intimate, that a judgment-day is not plainly revealed by the light of nature; or, at least, that the *extent* of the sentence which will be passed at that time, is not understood by the heathen.

Notions of reward and punishment, in some form or other, belong to almost all the systems of heathenism; but such explicit views of a judgment-day as the gospel gives, are nowhere else to be found.

As the *secrets* of all hearts are to be revealed and judged, in the great day of trial, what but *Omniscience* is capable of passing sentence? To God alone is ascribed the power and prerogative of searching the heart: see 1 Sam. xvi. 7. 1 Chron. xxviii. 9. xxix. 17. Ps. vii. 9. Jer. xi. 20. xvii. 10. Rom. viii. 27. To Christ the same power is ascribed in Acts i. 24. Rev. ii. 23, besides the present passage. How can the Supreme Judge of all the human race be less

than *omniscient*; How can he do *full* and *impartial* justice, with any knowledge short of *omniscience*?

(17) The attentive reader cannot help observing the skill and address which Paul exhibits in this chapter. His object is, to show that his kinsmen the Jews are equally guilty with the Gentiles, or even more so; and consequently that salvation by grace is the only salvation which is possible for them. But knowing the proud and selfish feelings which the Jews possessed in regard to this subject, he does not assail them at once, but gradually, and with great address. In verses 1—8 of the present chapter, he discusses the subject on general grounds, bringing forward considerations applicable either to Jew or Gentile, but not once naming either. In verses 9—16 he makes the application of these considerations to both, and shows why both are to be considered as transgressors of the divine law, the one having sinned against the revelation contained in the Scriptures, the other against that which the book of nature discloses.

But he has not yet done with the subject. Guilt is proportioned to light and love abused. He ventures therefore, in the next place, to prefer a heavier charge against the Jews than he had done against the Gentiles. He takes them on their own ground; admitting, for the sake of argument, all the claims to pre-eminence which they were accustomed to advance, he then shows that these only increase their guilt so much the more, in case of disobedience.

Εἰ δὲ . . . ἐπνομαζῇ, *if now thou art surnamed Jew*. The reading *ιδέ*, (from which comes our English version *behold*), is found in very few manuscripts, and is of no good authority. The only difficulty with *εἰ δὲ* is, that it makes a *πρότασις*, to which there seems at first view, to be no corresponding *ἀπόδοσις*. However, this is not in reality the case; for vers. 21 seq. make in substance an *apodosis*. The relation between the two parts stands thus: 'If now thou art called a Jew, &c., i. e., if thou dost in fact enjoy a high pre-eminence as to privileges, . . . then how dost thou transgress the very law which thou teachest, and of which thou dost make thy boast?'

Ἰουδαῖος, a name of honour, much coveted by the Jews; comp. Gal. ii. 15. Phil. iii. 5. Rev. ii. 9.—'Επνομαζῇ more formal and solemn than *ὀνομαζῇ*. It is appropriate also; inasmuch as Ἰουδαῖος is a *surname*, which may be added to the individual name of every Hebrew.

Ἐπανακῶ τῇ νόμῳ, *thou retest upon the law, or thou leanest upon the law*, Ἐπανακῶ corresponds to the Hebrew, נשען, *to lean*

upon, to restore, to prop up one's self by; see in the Sept. 2 Kings vii. 2, 17. *ἐπανεπαύετο τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ*. This verb is also used in the sense of *adhering to*; see 1 Macc. viii. 12. Either meaning gives a good sense in the verse before us. I prefer the first, as being the more usual sense of the word, and altogether apposite. The Jew *leaned upon* the law, as defending his claims to precedence and to acceptance with God.—*Νόμῳ* of course means here the *Mosaic law*, or the *Jewish Scriptures*.

Καὶ . . . Θεῷ, and gloriest in God; i. e., dost claim to thyself honour or glory, because Jehovah, the only living and true God, is thy God; compare Deut. iv. 7. Ps. cxlvii. 19, 20. 2 Sam. vii. 23. It was on this account that the Jew felt himself so far elevated above the Gentile, and so disdained all comparison with him. As to the construction of καυχᾶσαι with ἐν and the Dative case, see Wahl on the word. The form καυχᾶσαι, 2nd person singular, is the old form of the second person passive and middle (καυχάσθαι) contracted. See New Testament Gramm. § 71. 5; also on verse 23.

(18) *Καὶ . . . διαφέρουσα, and art acquainted with [his] will, and canst distinguish things that differ. Γινώσκεις, knowest, art acquainted with, designates what the Jews were accustomed to say of themselves; or if viewed simply as a declaration of the apostle, the meaning is: 'Thou hast the means of knowing, thou art instructed in.' τὸ θεῖλημα, his will; where almost all the commentators say that αὐτοῦ or τοῦ Θεοῦ is to be supplied after θεῖλημα. But this is unnecessary; for, as is well known, the article frequently has the sense of a pronoun; see Middleton on the Greek article, chap. I. § 3 e. g., Acts xvii. 28, τοῦ γὰρ γένος ἰσμεν, for we are of HIS γένος. See New Testament Gramm. § 94.*

Δοκιμάζεις may mean either to *distinguish* or to *approve*; the word having both these meanings in the New Testament and in the classics. So *διαφέρουσα* may mean *things that differ*, or *things that excel*; the *usus loquendi* in both senses being equally certain. Tholuck explains the phrase as meaning: 'Thou approvest the things which are excellent.' I prefer the other sense, because the idea of *knowledge* or *instruction* is the one here intended to be urged; as is plain from the sequel. Such being the case, to *distinguish things that differ* is more characteristic of this, than the other rendering is, and therefore more appropriate. *Things that differ*, are virtue and vice, i. e., lawful and unlawful, praiseworthy and base things, &c. So Reiche.

Κατηχοίμενος ἐκ τοῦ νόμου *being instructed by the law ; i. e., being taught or enlightened by the Scriptures.*

(19) Πίπειθάς τε . . . σκόρει, *thou art confident moreover that thou thyself art a guide of the blind, a light to those who are in darkness.* This is figurative language, designed to show in a strong light the claims to superiority over the Gentiles, which were made by the Jews. *A guide to the blind* signifies one who is an instructor by means of superior knowledge, i. e., an instructor of those who are in a state of gross ignorance, viz., the Gentiles ; see Matt. xv. 14. —Ὡς τῶν ἐν σκόρει, the same idea by the use of another figure. Compare Is. xlix. 6. Luke ii. 32. John i. 8, 9, 4, 5, respecting the signification of the word *light*.—Σκόρος here, as often elsewhere, designates a state of ignorance.

(20) Παιδευτὴν . . . νηπίων, *an instructor of the ignorant, a teacher of little children.* Ἄφρων means *one who has not mental skill or consideration?* secondarily, *an ignorant person.*—Νηπίων of course here means, *children* of such an age as that they may receive instruction. I have therefore rendered it *little children*, in preference to *babes*, which naturally designates those not sufficiently mature for instruction.

Ἐχοντα . . . ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, *having the delineation of true knowledge in the Scriptures.* Μόρφωσις may be used in a bad or good sense. In a bad sense it occurs in 2 Tim. iii. 5, where *the form* (μόρφωσις) of godliness is opposed to the *power* of it, i. e., hypocritical pretences to piety are opposed to the real exercise of it. But the verb μορφῶω is used in a good sense in Gal. iv. 19, ‘until Christ μορφωθῇ *be formed* in you.’ The synonyme of μόρφωσις, viz., ὑποτύπωσις, is used in a good sense, 2 Tim. i. 13, ‘hold fast ὑποτύπωσιν of sound doctrine,’ &c. Μόρφωσις means *form, external appearance ; also, delineation, sketch, i. e., imitated form.* I understand it in the good sense, i. e., as meaning *delineation* in our verse, because the apostle is enumerating the supposed, or rather the acknowledged, advantages of the Jews. One of these was, that *true knowledge* (in distinction from the philosophy falsely so called of the Greeks) was in their possession, or at least in their power.

Τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, *of true knowledge ; a Hendiadys in which the latter noun qualifies the former.* The meaning of the whole is : ‘Est tibi vera sapientia in lege adumbrata.’

(21) Ὁ οὖν . . . διδάσκεις; *dost thou, then, who teachest others, not instruct thyself?* This constitutes in reality, although not for-

mally, the apodosis to the protasis which commences with *ὃ δὲ* in verse 17. *Argumentum ad hominem*; for it is as much as to say: 'Thou pridest thyself in thy superior knowledge, and requirest all others to sit at thy feet in the humble capacity of learners; making these lofty professions, now, art thou thyself at the same time ignorant of what thou professest to know?' The apostle implies by this, that many of the Jews were criminally ignorant. Reiche finds the apodosis in verse 25; Glöckler, in verse 23; alii aliter. The *ὅν* in verse 21, as well as the nature of its contents, seems to me to point plainly to the apodosis. Dr. Knapp has omitted the sign of interrogation after *διδάσκεις, κλέπτεις, &c.*; plainly to the disadvantage of the sense. The interrogation is, indeed, not one of doubt or simple inquiry, but is designed for reproof and conviction. It is, moreover, better accordant with the apostle's mode of reproof in this epistle, to suppose him here to be making interrogations (in the manner above stated), than to suppose him *directly* to make the charges, at first; as Dr. Knapp's pointing would indicate.

'Ο κηρύσσων . . . κλέπτεις; *thou who proclaimest that [men] must not steal, dost thou steal?* Dost thou practise the very vice, against which thou dost so loudly protest? *Κηρύσσειν, publicly to proclaim*; in respect to a teacher of religion or morality it means *to preach*.

(22) 'Ο λέγων . . . μοιχεύεις; *thou who forbiddest to commit adultery, dost thou commit adultery?* A crime very common among the Jews; for even the Talmud accuses some of the most celebrated Rabbies of this vice. 'Ο λέγων μή, *forbiddest, lit. who sayest: Not.*

'Ο βδελυσσόμενος . . . ἱεροσυλεῖς; *dost thou who abhorrest idols, commit robbery in sacred things?* Since the Babylonish captivity, the Jews have always expressed the greatest abhorrence of idolatry. But still, the real criminality of idolatry consists in taking from the only living and true God that which belongs to him, and bestowing it upon something which is worthless and vain. Now the Jews, who were prone to keep back tithes and offerings (Mal. i. 8, 12, 13, 14. iii. 10. Mark vii. 11), by so doing robbed God of that which was due to him, notwithstanding they professed a great abhorrence of idolatry which committed the like sin. I apprehend, however, that the word *ἱεροσυλεῖς* is here used in a somewhat wider extent than this interpretation simply considered would imply, *i. e.*, that it designates every kind of act which denies to God his sovereign honours and claims.

The exegesis of this word which assigns to it a *literal* sense viz., that of *committing sacrilege*, i. e., of robbing the temples of idols and converting their riches to individual use (contrary to the precept in Deut. vii. 25, 26), wants an *historical* basis for its support. When and where were the Jews accustomed to act in this manner? Yet Chrysostom, Theophylact, Le Clerc, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Fritsche, and others, have defended this interpretation.

(23) "Ὁς ἐν . . . ἀτιμάζεις; *thou who gloriest in the law, by the transgression of the law dost thou dishonour God?* For the construction of *καυχᾶσαι ἐν νόμῳ*, see on verse 17. As God was the author of the law, or supreme legislator, so the transgression of it was a dishonouring of him, a contemning or setting light by his authority. For the form of *καυχᾶσαι* (second pers. sing. pres. Middle voice), see New Test. Gramm. § lxxi. 5, and note on verse 17 above; also comp. in Matt. v. 36. viii. 2. Mark i. 40. ix. 22. Luke xvi. 25. 1 Cor. iv. 7. Rom. xi. 18, the like forms. The ending *-σαι* for the 2nd. pers. singular, is the ancient one, out of which the usual ending is made by dropping the *σ*, and then contracting the diphthong that remains.

(24) Τὸ γὰρ . . . γέγραπται, *for the name of God is blasphemed by you, or on your account, among the Gentiles; as it is written.* Γὰρ *confirmantis*.—Δι' ὑμᾶς may possibly mean *by you*, i. e., by you as authors or agents; like ζῶ διὰ τὸν Πατέρα, *vivo Patre vitæ meæ auctore*, John vi. 57; or like ζήσεται δι' ἐμέ, *ibid.*, et sic alibi; see Bretschn. Lex. διά, ii. 1. But the usual and natural meaning of δι' ὑμᾶς is *on your account*, i. e., you being the cause or ground of the blasphemy in question. This seems to be the most probable meaning here. The passage quoted seems to be Isaiah lii. 5; where, however, the Sept. has δι' ὑμᾶς διαπαντός τὸ ὄνομα μου βλασφημεῖται ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι, varying as to manner and some of the matter from the text quoted by the apostle. However, such variations are common in the New Testament text. The Hebrew runs thus: מִצָּרַיִן נִתְּסִיר כָּל-הַיּוֹם שְׁמִי, the sense of which is that the heathen blasphemed the name of Jehovah, because his people (by reason of their sins) were subjected to captivity. In the like manner Paul accuses the Jews of causing the name of Jehovah to be reproached among the Gentiles, because of the transgression against his laws which they committed. The original passage is not a proper *prediction*, but a simple declaration of a fact then existing. Paul quotes it here, for the sake of declaring that the same thing was true in his day; i. e., he expresses his own views and asserts facts,

in the language of an ancient prophet. The γάρ at the beginning of the verse shows that the design of the verse is, to illustrate and enforce the declaration contained in ἀτιμάζεις.

Ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι, is a *circumstance* added in the Sept. and by the apostle. It is not expressed in the Hebrew, but it is evidently *implied*. The meaning of the whole is, that the heathen themselves are led to blaspheme the name of God by the flagrant vices of the Jews; which was a heavy charge, and allowing its truth, it served abundantly to illustrate and confirm the declaration, that the Jews brought dishonour upon God by their offences—dishonour even from others. Of course their sins must have been great and conspicuous.

(25 Περιτομή) . . . πράσσης, *circumcision indeed is profitable, if thou dost obey the law.* Μὲν here belongs to the protasis, the apodosis to which commences with ἰὰν δέ. The γάρ in this verse is a matter of difficulty. Many MSS. and Versions omit it. Still, it has sufficient support to claim a place in the text. Although γάρ always implies some *preceding* sentiment to which it refers, yet this is not always *expressed*, but not unfrequently left to the mind of the reader to supply. In such a case we may sometimes render γάρ by *indeed*, *to be sure*, *truly*, (see Passow Lex. γάρ), which designate in some good measure the qualification of the sentence that γάρ designates. Here, as it seems to me, the sentiment in the writer's mind before writing γάρ was: 'Thou hast no reason for glorying in the law; for (γάρ) circumcision [the symbol or token of admission to the privileges of a Jew] will not avail thee in case thou transgressest the law, as in reality thou dost.' In such a connection of thought, which is naturally deduced from verses 23, 24, the appropriateness of γάρ is sufficiently plain. But when the *implied* clause is omitted, as in the version, then we may translate, as I have done, *circumcision INDEED is profitable, &c.*; which accords entirely with the principle laid down by Passow. Not that γάρ is an adverb of affirmation, *truly*, *certainly*, when considered in and by itself; but because the connection of thought is such, that in our language we come nearest to the whole sense of the passage by such a translation. In the case before us, verse 25 seq. are not a direct deduction from the preceding paragraph, but an illustration of a similar nature, designed to show that the Jew can claim no moral preference over the Gentile, on the mere ground of *external* privileges. As this is the main position of the apostle in this stage of his discussion, we might supply before γάρ in verse 25,

the general thought, viz., 'The Jew has no precedence in the matter of justification over the Gentile; for (γάρ) circumcision profits only when he does not transgress the law; and this never can be affirmed of the Jew.' But the manner in which the connection is made out above, connects γάρ with the more immediate context, and the παραζάσεως of verse 23, and παραζάτης of verse 25 show that the writer had such a connection in his mind.

'Εάν δὲ . . . γέγονεν, *but if thou becomest a transgressor of the law, thy circumcision becomes uncircumcision; i. e., if thou dost not obey the law, then the privileges to which thou art entitled as a Jew, will not save thee: thou wilt not be considered or treated as any better than an uncircumcised person, i. e., a Gentile or heathen man. In a word, not external privileges or pre-eminence, in themselves considered, but the use which is made of them, entitles any one to divine approbation or favour.*

How much the Jews attributed to circumcision, is strikingly illustrated in a passage of the Talmud (Shemoth Rabba, sect. 19. fol. 118): "Said Rabbi Berachias, When heretical, apostate, and impious Jews say: 'We cannot go down to hell because we are circumcised;' what does the blessed God do? He sends his angel, et præputia eorum attrahit, ut, ipsi præputiati [uncircumcised] in infernum descendant."

(26) 'Εάν οὖν . . . φυλάσσει, *if, moreover, the uncircumcised keep the precepts of the law.* Οὖν here, as often, serves merely for the external connection of vers. 25, 26, and not to point out a logical inference, deduction, &c., (which it frequently does). It might be rendered *then* or *so*. But verses 25, 26 seem to be simply *parallel* cases; and if so, *moreover*, is a more appropriate rendering. 'Απρεβυστία, abstract for concrete, as exhibited in the translation.—Δικαιώματα, *precepts*, מִצְוֹת.

Οὐχὶ ἡ . . . λογισθήσεται, *shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision?* That is, shall not he, in a heathen state, be accepted as readily as a Jew who obeys in a state of circumcision? In other words: Neither circumcision, nor the want of it, determines our deserts in the view of our Maker and Judge; but a spirit of filial obedience. "If ye love me, ye will keep my commandments."—Εἰς περιτομήν is after the Hebrew analogy, which puts before a noun designating that into which another thing has been changed, or which it has become, *e. g.*, יְהוָה הָיָה אִשָּׁה, *be men*, 1 Sam. iv. 9; 'Jehovah made the rib הָיָה אִשָּׁה, *a woman*, Gen. ii. 22. The

parallel between ἀκροβυστία γέγονεν in ver. 25, and εἰς περιτομὴν λογισθήσεται ver. 26, is very obvious.

The *possibility* that a heathen might keep the law, is here most plainly admitted; but this gives no ground for saying that such a case has ever *actually* existed. Still, the principle enforced is the same; and the assumption of such a case gives great force to the apostle's reasoning.

(27) Καὶ κρινεῖ . . . τελοῦσα, *yea, he who keeps the law in his natural uncircumcised state, shall condemn.* Καὶ affirmantis, qualifying κρινεῖ. Ἐκ φύσεως between the article and its following noun, takes of course the place of an adjective. φύσις plainly means here what we call a *state of nature*, in distinction from a state in which a revelation is enjoyed. The apostle states here and in the preceding verse, as before remarked, a *principle* for illustration merely; he does not aver, that what he describes is matter of *historical fact*; for this would contradict the whole tenor and object of his reasoning in general, which is to show that *all men without exception have sinned*, and therefore that all without exception must be saved by grace through faith in Christ, and can be saved only in this way. The efforts to prove from such passages as the present that there have been heathen who kept the whole law of God, are surely fruitless. The main argument of the apostle himself falls to the ground, if this be once admitted. It seems quite plain, that the whole is merely a *supposed case*—supposed for the sake of illustrating a principle; and in the process of argumentation, nothing is more common than this.

Σὺ τὸν . . . νόμου [condemn] *thee who art a transgressor of the law, although enlightened by the Scriptures and a partaker of circumcision.* Διὰ γράμματος καὶ περιτομῆς here coming between the article τὸν and its corresponding noun παραβάτην, evidently perform the office of *adjectives* qualifying παραβάτην. The διὰ here is *dià conditionis vel statûs*, if I may so speak. Διὰ is not unfrequently placed before nouns which designate *state or condition*; e. g., Rom. iv. 11, those who believe δι' ἀκροβυστίας, *in an uncircumcised state*; 2 Cor. ii. 4, I have written this διὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, *in a state of much weeping*; 2 Cor. v. 10, that every one may receive τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, [according to] *the things done in a bodily state*; Heb. ix. 12. 2 Pet. i. 3. 1 John v. 6; see Bretschn. Lex. διὰ I. 2. c. The idea intended to be conveyed by the apostle, is quite plain; viz. 'If a Gentile should do what the law requires, would not this show that you are worthy of condemnation who transgress the law, although you enjoy the light

of revelation and the privileges which a state of circumcision confers ?

(28) Οὐ γὰρ *ιστιν*, for he is not a Jew who is one externally; i. e., who is descended from Abraham, is circumcised, and enjoys the privileges of a written revelation, is not a Jew in the important and spiritual sense of the word; he is merely an *external* (not an internal) Jew. The grammatical construction completed without any ellipsis, would be, *ὁ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ* [*Ἰουδαῖος*], οὐκ *Ἰουδαῖος ἵστιν*.

Οὐδὲ ἡ ἐν *περιτομή*, nor is that which is external, [merely] in the flesh circumcision; i. e., that is not circumcision in its high and true sense, which is merely external, which pertains merely to the flesh. The sentence filled out would read thus: οὐδὲ ἡ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ [*περιτομή*], ἐν σαρκὶ [*περιτομή*], *περιτομή ἵστι*, i. e., true *περιτομή*.

(29) Ἄλλ' ὁ ἐν *Ἰουδαῖος*, but he who is a Jew in the hidden part; i. e., who is spiritually or internally a Jew, such an one only deserves the appellation *Ἰουδαῖος*. The clause filled out would stand thus: ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ *Ἰουδαῖος* [*Ἰουδαῖος ἵστιν*]; which latter clause the mind of the writer supplied from the first part of ver. 28.

Καὶ *περιτομή* *γράφματι*, and the circumcision of the heart, a spiritual not a literal one, [is the true circumcision.] There is the same ellipsis here, as in the preceding clause, *περιτομή ἵστιν* being understood after *ὁ γράμματι*. The words *πνεύματι* οὐ *γράφματι*, Œcumenius, Grotius, and most interpreters construe as referring to the Holy Spirit and to the precepts of the law; i. e., circumcision of the heart wrought by the operation of the Holy Spirit, not by following merely the literal precepts of the law. The sense is good, and the doctrine true; but I apprehend that the writer here uses *πνεύματι* and *γράφματι* merely as adjectives or adverbs to characterize more graphically the *περιτομή καρδίας* which he had just mentioned.

Ὁ δὲ ἱπαινος Θεοῦ whose praise is not of men, but of God; that is, the praise of the Jew, who is truly a Jew after the hidden or internal man, is not of men but of God. "Man looketh on the outward appearance, but God looketh on the heart." The Jews considered it as a great privilege and a ground of high pre-eminence over others, that they were descended from Abraham, were circumcised and were entrusted with the Scriptures. 'All this,' says the apostle, 'does not entitle them in the least degree to the praise of God. The state of the heart in the internal man, is what he considers; and this alone is of any real moral value in his sight.' 'You,' says he, 'who are nothing more than *external* Jews, are not Jews in the high

and noble sense which will make you to be heirs of the grace of life or of the promises of God. You have, because of your external privileges, no pre-eminence over the heathen on the score of *moral accountability*. All men, in regard to such an accountability, stand on a level, for each will be judged according to the law under which he acted; the Gentiles by the law of nature, the Jews by revelation.'

CHAP. III. 1—20.

NOTHING was more natural than for the Jew, who had entertained the most elevated notions of the advantages to which he was entitled from his *external* privileges, to feel strong objections to such a representation of the apostle as reduced Jews and Gentiles to a level in a *moral* respect. It was to be expected that the Jew would indignantly ask (and so the apostle represents him as asking): 'Of what advantage then can Judaism be? That is, provided the case is as you represent it to be,' ver. 1. To this the apostle replies in ver. 2, that the benefit of more light was conferred by such a privilege. But the Jew, not satisfied with a claim to pre-eminence of this kind, further inquires, how the apostle's views could be reconciled with God's fidelity to the promises which he had made to the Jews, ver. 3. The apostle replies, that this fidelity must not for a moment be called in question, but that we must adopt the sentiment of David (Ps. II. 4) in regard to this, ver. 4. The Jew still dissatisfied, urges further questions, by which he intends to hedge up the apostle's way: 'If the sins of the Jewish nation serve to render more conspicuous the justice of God, is it not unjust that he should punish us?' ver. 5. Not at all, replies the apostle; for on the same ground you might object to the truth, that God will judge the world, and of course punish the wicked; for his justice will be displayed in such a way as to redound to his glory, ver. 6. The Jew, not yet satisfied, asks: 'If God's faithfulness become more conspicuous by my unfaithfulness, why should I be condemned?' ver. 7. To which the apostle replies that he might just as well say: 'Let us do evil that good may come;' which in fact some did charge him with saying, although they deserved condemnation for so doing, inasmuch as the charge was false.

The Jew again asks, with evident disappointment: 'How then have we Jews any pre-eminence over the Gentiles?' To which the apostle replies: You have none, in respect to the matter that I am discussing. *All are sinners*. Your own Scriptures do abundantly bear testimony that your nation are transgressors, as well as the heathen. Prophets of different ages have borne testimony which conveys charges of the most aggravated nature, vers. 10—18. Now as what is thus said in the Scriptures was plainly said concerning the Jews, it follows, that your own sacred books bear testimony to the same doctrine which I affirm to be true. Consequently the whole world, Jews and Gentiles, are guilty before God, ver. 19; for by *works of law* none can be justified, inasmuch as the law condemns all transgressors, and sets forth their criminality instead of declaring their justification.

(1) *Τί οὖν . . . Ἰουδαίου*; *what advantage then hath the Jew?* or, *what pre-eminence hath the Jew?*—*Οὖν* then, is very often joined with *τι* in interrogatives. Both words united signify as much as to say: 'Allowing what you affirm, then how can this or that take place

or how can it be so or so?—Περισσόv signifies *that which exceeds* or *abounds, precedence, præstantia*. Sentiment: "If what you say is true, then how is the Jew in any better condition than the Gentile, or what pre-eminence has he over him?"

"Ἡ εἰς . . . περιτομῆς, or *what is the advantage or profit of circumcision?* That is, if the Jew is subject to the same condemning sentence as the Gentile, of what use is the rite of circumcision, and the relation in which it places him to the people of God?"

(2) Πολὺ . . . τρόπον, *much [advantage] in many respects, or in every respect*. Rendered in this latter way, πάντα would refer of course to something in the preceding context, and *every respect* would mean, every one already touched upon, *e. g.*, in ii. 17—23. Literally interpreted, πάντα must mean *in all respects*. But the real sense of the phrase here is better given by the translation, *in various or many respects, in a variety of ways*.

Πρῶτον μὲν γάρ . . . Θεοῦ, *the principal one however is, that they were entrusted with the oracles of God*. Beza renders πρῶτον, *primarium illud est quod*. But Tholuck takes the μὲν which follows πρῶτον, to be the μὲν of a *protasis*, to which indeed no *apodosis* succeeds. He says, that 'it agrees well with the fire of Paul's mind, to regard him as having forgotten what was to follow, or to have considered the *first thing* here suggested as adequate to his purpose, without suggesting any more.' But I must at least feel greater necessity than I see here, before I can adopt such a solution. Πρῶτον clearly means, in some cases, *imprimis, maxime omnium, particularly, specially, most of all*; *e. g.*, Matt. vi. 33. Luke xii. 1. 2 Pet. i. 20. iii. 3. 1 Tim. ii. 1. In these cases, it does not signify *first* in such a sense as implies a *second* in order, but *first* as the most eminent or most important thing in the writer's mind or intention; like the Hebrew ראשית, *e. g.*, ראשית גוים, the most distinguished of nations, Num. xxiv. 20. Amos. vi. 6.—Tholuck further suggests, that μὲν renders it probable that a *protasis* is here intended, although he does not think this decisive. And truly it is not decisive; for μὲν is not unfrequently used without any δὲ following, both in the classical writers and in the books of the New Testament; *e. g.*, 2 Cor. xii. 12. 1 Thess. ii. 18. Rom. vii. 12. xi. 13. x. 1, where "explicationi inservit;" and so μὲν γάρ in Acts xxviii. 22. 2 Cor. ix. 1. xi. 4. Heb. vi. 16. vii. 18; μὲν οὖν, Acts xxvi. 9. 1 Cor. vi. 4, 7, et alibi. Μὲν γάρ, in cases such as those just cited, seems evidently designed to answer the place of the Latin *equidem, quidem*, *i. e.*, to give *intensity* to a declaration; and

μὴν may in such cases be called *μὴν intensivum*, or *μὴν concessivum*, viz. implying that what is asserted, is supposed to be conceded; or at least that the speaker thinks it plainly ought to be conceded. It is indeed true, that *μὴν* may be said *always* to imply that another and different or opposite sentence or declaration must follow, although scarcely any usage is more frequent than the omission of this declaration in cases where it can be easily and naturally supplied by the reader. In the case before us the implication is, that to Jews were committed the divine oracles, and not to other nations: i. e., [οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι] *μὴν γὰρ ἐπιστεύθησαν τὰ λόγια τοῦ Θεοῦ*, [τὰ ἄλλα ἔθνη δὲ οὐκ ἐπιστεύθησαν κ. τ. λ.] See examples of the like nature, confirming and illustrating this principle, in Passow's excellent lexicon, s. v. *μὴν*, 2. g. In this way, since the *implied* opposition gives emphasis to what is expressed, we come to the conclusion that *μὴν* is to be taken in an *emphatic* sense, where it stands thus alone.

As to the *γὰρ*, it has indeed of itself no necessary connection with or influence upon the *μὴν*; and if the reader pleases, he may consider it as *γὰρ illustrantis*, i. e., *γὰρ* standing before a clause designed to illustrate or confirm what precedes; which is the case with the clause in which *γὰρ* here stands

In the case before us *μὴν γὰρ* implies, that the advantage [πρῶτον] of the Jew, it must be conceded, lay specially in his having the gift of a revelation filled with precious promises bestowed upon him. We may translate (ad sensum) thus: 'A peculiar advantage, as you must concede, is, that, &c.'; or, 'The most important advantage is, &c.'; both having substantially the same sense.

*Οτι . . . Θεοῦ is not to be construed by taking *λόγια* as a Nominative, for it is the Accusative after *ἐπιστεύθησαν*. It is a principle of the Greek language, that where a verb in its *active* voice governs the Accusative of a *thing* and the Dative of a *person*, the Accusative is retained after a verb of the *passive* voice. Such is the case with *πιστεύω* see Luke xvi. 11. John ii. 24; compare for the passive voice, 1 Cor. ix. 17. Gal. ii. 7. 1 Thess. ii. 4. 1 Tim. i. 11. Tit. i. 3. So frequently in the classics; see Wahl's Lex. in verb., also N. Test. Gramm. § 108. 6.

Λόγια, oracles, like the נְבִיאִים of the Hebrews, means any kind of divine response or communication, *effatum divinum*. Here, as verse 3 shows, the *λόγια* has special reference to those oracles which contain *promises* respecting the Messiah, the Jewish nation, &c.

In regard to the general sentiment of the verse, it is as much as to

say, that more light, and better spiritual advantages were bestowed upon the Jews than upon the Gentiles. Access to the Scriptures would give more light; the promises offered encouragement to a life of piety; and in consequence of the state in which revelation placed the Jews, to them were made the first offers of the gospel. It should be remarked here, that the apostle contents himself for the present with naming merely one ground of advantage which the Jew had. The pressure of objections seems to have occasioned his omission of other grounds of precedence. The reader will find others in chap. ix. 1. seq.

(3) *τί γάρ; what then?* The usual mode of asking questions, γάρ being very often joined with an interrogation: see Passow on γάρ. It seems to be γάρ *intensivum*, in most of such cases; as Acts xvi. 37, οὐ γάρ, *not at all*, 2 Tim. ii. 7. Job vi. 8. Phil. i. 18. In the present case, γάρ seems to have a reference to what had been said in the preceding verse. The course of thought appears to be thus: 'What then shall we say to this, viz., to that which I am now about to suggest?' That is; 'Allowing what you have said to be true, then if some of the Jews were unfaithful, as you intimate, would not this detract from the veracity of the divine promises?'

Εἰ ἡπίστανται . . . καταργῆται; *if some were unfaithful, will their unfaithfulness render void the faithfulness of God?* That is, if some of the Jews have been unfaithful to the covenant, and are in no better condition than the heathen, how will this consist with the fidelity of God in respect to his promise made to the Jewish nation? —'Ἠπίστανται is from ἀπιστία, which comes from ἀπιστος, *unfaithful*, (πιστός often means *faithful*). 'Απιστία therefore means, *not to be πιστός*, i. q., *to be unfaithful, treacherous, &c.* viz. in respect to their covenant with God. The meaning is: 'If the Jews practically disregard, i. e., would not dutifully receive and obey, divine revelation, &c.' — Πίστις, *fidelity, faithfulness in keeping promises*; compare Matt. xxiii. 23. 2 Tim. ii. 13, and perhaps Gal. v. 22. 1 Tim. i. 4, 19. Rev. ii. 19. xiii. 10. The μή before ἀπιστία αὐτῶν is *interrogative* and employed here (as usual) in a question to which a *negative* answer is of course expected; see New Testament Gramm. § 153, 4.

Μὴ γίνωται, *hoc minime eveniat!* *Let not this be supposed; or not at all, by no means!* Optative of γίνομαι joined with a negative. This should be included in verse 4. The Hebrew מִן הַיָּד הַזֹּאת corresponds to this.

(4) Γνωσθὲ δὲ . . . ψεύστης, *but let God be [accounted] true, and every man false.* Ἀληθής means *veracious, faithful to his word or promise.*—Υεύστης is the opposite of ἀληθής. The meaning is: Let God be regarded as faithful although all men should thereby be deemed guilty of unfaithfulness; i. e., much more becoming and proper is it, that men should impute unfaithfulness to themselves than to God. The second δὲ I have rendered *and* here, although it appears to be *adversative*. The sentiment is not injured by this version, and the repetition of *but* is avoided.

To confirm the pious sentiment which he had just uttered, the apostle appeals to an expression of David (Ps. li. 7), where, in signifying his penitence in view of his past transgressions, he says (Sept. Ps. l. 4): "Against thee only have I sinned, and done this evil in thy sight, ὅπως ἂν . . . κρίνεσθαι σε, *so that thou mayest be justified when thou speakest* (or *in thy words* פְּרִיָּתְךָ), *and be clear when thou art judged.*" The Psalmist means to say, that as he had sinned in a grievous manner against God, so God is to be justified and acquitted altogether, when he reproves him for his sin and pronounces against it the sentence of condemnation. The *like* use would Paul make of the sentiment contained in these words. 'Let us not,' says he, 'attempt to justify ourselves when we are accused of being unfaithful; but let us justify God in all respects, when he condemns our conduct and vindicates his own.'

Ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σου means, *when thou utterest reproof or condemnation*; i. e., the connection in which it stands gives it of necessity such a turn.—Νικήσης, *mightest overcome*, Heb. מִתְּקַן *mightest be pure*, i. e., mightest be adjudged to be pure, held to be guiltless or faultless. So in Rabb. Hebrew, and in the Gemara וְכִי means *vincere in causa*. He who in a judicial contest was adjudged to be *pure or guiltless*, of course was the victor; and on this account the Septuagint νικήσης (adopted by the apostle) is a translation of the Hebrew *ad sensum*, although not *ad verbum*.

Ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαι σε, Flatt, Reiche, and others construe as being in the *passive* voice. The Hebrew runs thus: פְּרִיָּתְךָ . . . פְּרִיָּתְךָ, *when thou speakest . . . when thou judgest, or in the judgment of thee*, i. e., when thou art judged. The sense here seems plainly to require us to understand the meaning as *passive*; for the apostle designs to say, that when the doings of God are judged of by his creatures, he must be acquitted. So in the present case, he must be acquitted of all *unfaithfulness*. The Psalmist (Ps. li. 7) employs

the verb יָצַק in its *active* sense, meaning to say, that when God condemns *he will act justly*. The use which the apostle makes of the sentiment, is of the same nature; for he means to say: 'In pronouncing sentence or condemnation upon men, thou art to be justified, and if thou art called in question for this, thou wilt prove to be victor, or come off clear in the contest.'

(5) *Εἰ δὲ . . . συνίστησι*, but if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of God. *Δί* "addit vim interrogationi, et usurpatur præsertim interrogatione repetitâ," Bretschn. Lex. *δί* 3. b. The sense of *δί* is plainly *adversative* here.—*Ἀδικία* is here the generic appellation of sin, for which a *specific* name (*ἁπιστία*) was employed in ver. 3, and *ψεύσμα* is used in ver. 7. In like manner, the *δικαιοσύνη* in ver. 5, which is a *generic* appellation, is expressed by a *specific* one (*πίστις*) in ver. 3, and by *ἀλήθεια* in ver. 7. The idea is *substantially* the same, which is designated by these respectively corresponding appellations. *Fidelity, uprightness, integrity*, are designated by *πίστις, δικαιοσύνη*, and *ἀλήθεια* while *ἁπιστία, ἀδικία*, and *ψεύσματι*, designate *unfaithfulness, want of uprightness, and false dealing*. All of these terms have more or less reference to the בְּרִית, *covenant, or compact* (so to speak), which existed between God and his ancient people. But in the present verse, they are to be taken in a sense somewhat more enlarged.

Δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ does not here mean (as it does in most cases where it is used in this epistle), the *justification which is of God*; it designates the *divine justice*, as the context clearly shows. For here the apostle (or the objector) is speaking of that attribute of God, *which is concerned with the judging or punishing of offenders*. Of course, the *retributive justice* of God must be understood by *δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ*.

Συνίστησι, sets off to advantage, shows forth, renders conspicuous. — *Τί ἐροῦμεν*; what shall we say? That is, how can we persevere in maintaining that the unbelieving part of the Jewish nation will be cast off, so long as even their very unbelief will be instrumental in setting off to more advantage, or in rendering more conspicuous, the retributive justice of God, and so of causing the more glory to his name? The equivalent of *τί ἐροῦμεν*, is common in the Rabbinic writings, where it runs thus: מִיָּדָא אֵיכָא מִיָּדָא, *quid est dicendum?* This is usually expressed by the abbreviation מִיָּדָא.

Μὴ ἄδικος . . . ἐργήν; is God unjust, who inflicts punishment? If

the interrogation were here made by *μή οὐ*, *is not*, etc. the solution of the sentence would be easy. But *μή* corresponds to the Latin *numne*, and asks a question to which a *negative* answer is usually expected as a matter of course. The Attics employed it, however, with somewhat greater liberty, and in cases where a negative answer did not of course follow. On the contrary, *οὐ* is used as an interrogation, where an *affirmative* answer is of course expected. For an example of both cases: *Μή δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο εἶναι εὖθες;* *Does this seem to you foolish?* Ans. No. *Οὐ καὶ καλὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν;* *Is not a good thing something excellent?* Ans. Yes. We cannot translate, therefore, as Turretin and many others have done: *Nonne injustus Deus, dum infert iram?* *i. e., is not God unjust, etc.?* This would indeed make the sentiment more easy and intelligible, when viewed as coming from the objector; for that it is to be attributed to him appears from the sequel, *κατὰ ἀνθρώπων λέγω*. After all, however, nearly the same sentiment comes out of the passage in another way. The objector asks: *Τί ἐροῦμεν; μή ἄδικος κ. τ. λ.;* That is; 'Can it be now that God deals unjustly in the infliction of punishment [as your positions would seem to indicate]?' The answer is in the *negative* of course: *μή γίνετο*. The objector means by the question which he puts, the same thing as to say; 'I cannot believe your representation, for it would make God unjust.'

The immediate *occasion* for such a question on the part of the objector, seems to be furnished, of course, by the sentiment of the preceding verse. God, says the apostle, is to be justified in his condemning: yea, he is altogether to be vindicated in it, even if all men are by him found guilty of unfaithful and treacherous dealing. 'But,' replies the objector, 'on your ground we may go on and say, that glory redounds to God because of such dealing on the part of men; for this gives opportunity for God to display his justice to greater advantage than it could otherwise have been displayed. Why not, now, carry these considerations forward, and come to the result to which they would naturally lead? Why not conclude, that God is unjust when he inflicts punishment? For this would seem to be a necessary consequence, if it be true that his justice is displayed to the greatest advantage by reason of the wickedness of men, and he thus gets to himself the more honour and glory.'

Tholuck attributes *μή ὁ Θεός κ. τ. λ.* to the apostle himself, as an answer to the preceding question. But the *κατὰ ἀνθρώπων λέγω* and the *μή γίνετο* which follow, seem to me clearly to decide against this.

Κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω, *I speak after the manner of men; i. e., I speak as men are often accustomed to do.* The expression itself is *general*; but the class of men whom the writer has in his mind here, are plainly the objectors to his doctrine. The expression κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω may mean: *I speak more humano, i. e., in such a manner as is intelligible to men, in such language as men may comprehend; so ἀνθρώπινον λέγω, in Rom. vi. 19; and κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω, in Gal. iii. 15.* In the sense *first* attributed to the phrase, the Greek and Latin writers often use the like expression; *e. g.,* Aristoph. *Ranæ*, ver. 1090, ὃν χρὴ φράζειν ἀνθρωπινῶς, *which one must describe in a way that is usual among men*; Athen. *Deipnos*. Tom. III. Lib. IX. 29, ἀνθρωπινῶς λαλεῖν, *to speak like other folks.* So Cicero: *hominum more dicere*, de *Div. II.* 64. In like manner the Rabbins, when they wish to express what is commonly understood or affirmed by men in general, say: אֲנִי כְּרַבָּנִים אָמַרְתִּי, *as men usually affirm, or say.*

(6) Μὴ γίνωτο, *by no means.* This is the *negative* answer, given by the apostle to the question: Μὴ ἄδικος κ. τ. λ.

Ἐπεὶ πῶς . . . κέσμεν; *otherwise, how shall God judge the world? i. e., if it is not to be denied that God is unjust, or if we must concede that he is unjust, then how shall we admit the doctrine of a future or general judgment?—Ἐπεὶ, otherwise; comp. Rom. xi. 6, 22. 1 Cor. v. 10. vii. 14. xiv. 16. xv. 29. Heb. x. 2, et alibi.* The question, ‘How shall God judge the world?’ is founded on the concessions or established opinion of the Jews respecting a judgment-day, which were well known to the apostle. The expression implies as much as to say: ‘You Jews concede that there will be a time of judgment, when God will punish the wicked and reward the righteous. But how can this be, if your objections have any force? The retributive justice of God will be rendered conspicuous, when the wicked shall be condemned and punished, and God will be glorified thereby, just as in the present case; if this then be a reason why God should not punish, it is a reason why there should be no judgment; and in order to be consistent, you must deny this also.’

In this way we see, that the argument of the apostle is in a manner *ad hominem*, being founded on the concessions and established opinion of the Jews; which, however, in this instance, was in itself a well-founded and correct opinion.

Venema, however, with Ernesti, Limborch, Koppe, Cramer, Stolz, Reiche, and others, contend that κέσμεν here means only the *heathen*; and Reiche has endeavoured, at great length, to establish this inter-

pretation. But I do not see any thing to be gained from it. The Jews admitted a *general* judgment as well as a judgment of the heathen. Why then could not Paul argue from this as well as from the other? The *nerve* of the argument is the same in both cases; and this is, that 'because God brings good out of evil, he is not therefore bound to remit the punishment of the evil, which must be inflicted at the day of judgment.'

(7) *Εἰ γὰρ . . . αὐτοῦ, still, if the truth of God has abounded the more unto his glory, on account of my false dealing.* Tholuck understands these to be the words of the apostle. To me they appear very plainly to be the words which he attributes to the objector. The *γὰρ* at the beginning of the verse refers to an implied thought in the mind of the objector, viz., 'My objection is still valid; for (*γὰρ*) if the truth, &c.' As to *ἀλήθεια* and *ψεύσματι*, see on verse 5. '*Ἀλήθεια* here means, God's *faithful dealings* with his people, both in his threats and promises; *ψεύσματι* means their *unfaithfulness* as to his covenant, their false and treacherous dealings in respect to their vows and obligations. Sentiment: 'If the veracity and faithfulness of God are rendered more conspicuous, and this unto his own glory, by the false and deceitful conduct of his covenant people, why, &c.' Reiche insists here, that *ἀλήθεια* must refer to *true religion* in opposition to *idolatry* (*ψεύσμα*); and so he makes out the verse to apply to the *heathen*. Why then does he not refer *ἀληθής* and *ψεύστης*, in verse 4, to the heathen? Is it not evident that the *nouns* here merely correspond to the *adjectives* there? Why should the sense then oblige us to make a different reference of the meaning?

The nice observer of idiom will note, that the *conditional* sentence here, beginning with *εἰ* has an Aor. Indic. (*ἐπερίσσευσε*) in it, and therefore indicates that the speaker here states a case which he did not believe could take place, *i. e.*, it could not take place in the manner and measure that the language might seem to import. It is *conditionality* not founded on probability, but stated for the sake of objection. See New Test. Gramm. § 129. 3. *d.*

Τί ἔτι . . . κρινομαι; then why am I still condemned as a sinner? That is, why should I suffer punishment on account of that very thing which has contributed to the glory of God, inasmuch as it has occasioned the greater display of his perfections?

(8) *Καὶ μή . . . ἀγαθά; shall we then [say], (as it is slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we do say): Let us do evil that good may come?* As *μή* is simply *interrogative* here, it cannot be

rendered (as in our English version), *not*. *Μή* is connected with *ἐροῦμεν* or *λίγωμεν* understood, as appears from the following clause with *εἰ*; or it may be connected simply with *ποιήσωμεν*. The answer of the apostle is by a question which strongly implies disapprobation of the sentiment in the preceding clause; 'Shall we then speak out and say: Let us do evil that good may come? as some do actually, although slanderously, accuse us of saying.' 'Ὅτι, when the verse is thus explained, may be regarded as a particle marking *cited words* (for so it is often used in all parts of the New Testament), viz., the words *ποιήσωμεν* κ. τ. λ. Or the whole may be construed thus: *Shall we say, then, that we may do evil, &c.* *Καὶ* is here a *continua-tive* of the apostle's reply to the objector.

Βλασφημούμεθα, literally, *we are slanderously reported*, viz., it is slanderously reported that we say, etc. In the paragraph above, I have rendered *ad sensum* rather than *ad literam*.

The occasion given for the enemies of the gospel thus to slander Paul and others, was, that he preached the doctrine, that God would be glorified by the display of his justice in the condemnation of sinners, and that where sin abounded grace did much more abound; doctrines easily abused by a carnal mind, but which contain truths awful and delightful. Would God that abuse of them might have never extended beyond the apostolic age!

*Ὡν τὸ κρῆμα ἰνδικόν ἐστι, *whose condemnation is just*. He means, that the condemnation of those who falsely attributed such doctrines to the apostles and other preachers, was just; in other words, that their offence was of such a nature as to deserve punishment.

(9) Τί οὖν; *What then?* The question is by the objector; and οὖν, in such a connection, implies as much as to say: 'What now can be gathered from all this?'

Προεχόμεθα; *Have we [Jews] any preference?* That is, allowing all that you have said to be true, what preference now can we assign to the Jews? Have they any ground at all for a claim of superiority? *Προεχόμεθα* may be construed as in the Passive, i. e., are we preferred?—Have we any precedence? So in Plut. de Stoic. τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πᾶσι προσήκει, κατ' οὐδέν προεχομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Διός, i. e., this is necessary for the good, *who are not indulged at all with a preference by Jupiter*.

Οὐ πάντως *none at all*; i. e., none as it respects the great point in debate, viz., whether all men are sinners before God, and under the condemning sentence of his law. So the latter part of the verse leads us to explain the sentiment; and a comparison with vers. 1, 2,

above, and ix. 1—5, will oblige us thus to interpret it; for superiority of another kind, i. e., in external advantages, is there directly asserted of the Jews by the apostle himself.

Προητιασάμεθα . . . εἶναι, for we have already made the charge against both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin. I cannot find, in the best lexicons, any evidence that *προαιράομαι* means directly to prove. *Airia* is accusation, cause, ground, reason; hence the verb *airiáομαι* means to accuse, to show cause, &c.; generally in a bad sense, implying the preferring or supporting of a charge against any one. According to this, the apostle means to say, that having already advanced or supported the charge against Jews and Gentiles of being sinners without exception, and of standing in need of the mercy proffered by the gospel, of course he cannot now concede, that the Jews have any exemption from this charge, or any ground of preference to the Gentiles, so far as the matter of justification is concerned. *Προητιασάμεθα*, however, may here mean, and probably it does mean, *we have shown reason why*, or *we have supported the charge that*, &c.

ὑφ' ἀμαρτίαν means, under the power, or control of sin, subject to its dominion.

(10) *Καθὼς γεγραπται κ. τ. λ.* What is the object of this appeal? Evidently it is to illustrate and confirm the point now in debate. And what then is this point? Why plainly, that the Jews have no preference over the Gentiles, so far as their guilt and inability to justify themselves are concerned. The apostle had just said (in answer to the question put by a Jew, Have we any pre-eminence?) *οὐ πάντως*. Why not? Because he had already shown reason why the Jews, as well as the Gentiles, are involved in the charge of universal guilt; therefore, both were in the same condition, with respect to their need of a Saviour. What then is the object of further proof or illustration here? Surely it must be the point in question, viz., whether in fact the Jews, equally with the Gentiles, lie under the imputation of guilt before God. The quotations then, have special reference to the Jews. So Chrysostom, Calvin, Grotius, Tholuck, Flatt, and others. So verse 19 obliges us to construe the quotations in question.

The quotations are taken from various parts of the Hebrew Scriptures, and mostly in the words of the Septuagint. The general strain and object of them is to show, that in ancient times charges of guilt were made against the Jews, not less aggravated than those

now made by the apostle. The Jew could make no satisfactory reply to this, so long as he allowed the full weight and authority of the Old Testament. The apostle then, by adducing such charges from the Jewish Scripture, says in effect: 'You cannot accuse me of making strange and novel charges against you. Your own Scriptures are filled with charges of the like nature.'

That such is the general object of the quotations which follow, there seems to be no good reason to doubt. Certainly some of the passages adduced have not an *unlimited* signification, applicable to men of all times and all nations; at least they have not such a meaning in the Old Testament, in the connection in which they stand. Nothing can be more certain than that the writers of most of them are not treating of the question, whether *all* men are depraved; but are advancing charges against the unbelieving and impious part of the Jewish nation. Now what characterized unbelieving Jews of old, may still be affirmed of them, *i. e.*, of all who reject a Saviour. This must proceed from wickedness of heart; and therefore the apostle may apply to all who are guilty of it, those descriptions of wicked Jews which the Old Testament exhibits.

Such seems to be the plain and obvious method of interpreting the quotations before us. I am well aware that they have not unfrequently been understood and explained in a different way, *viz.*, as having a *direct* bearing on the *universal* depravity of the human race. The context both in verses 9 and 10 shows, however, that such an assumption is not well-grounded, and that the citations have respect to the apostle's argument in regard to the moral condition of all unbelieving Jews. I say *unbelieving* Jews; for it is not to his purpose to show that such as believe and are already justified, are still under the condemning sentence of the law; nor could this be said without contradicting what he frequently asserts, in the sequel of this epistle.

In the way in which I interpret the quotations that follow, there is no difficulty with respect to the explanation of them, as they stand in the Old Testament. But in the other method, which makes them *universal* propositions, and makes the original authors to speak directly to the point of *universal* depravity, the difficulty of exegesis is insurmountable. Several of these passages, as they stand in the Old Testament, must have absolute violence done to them, in order to make them speak in this manner. This in itself, is a strong reason for suspecting such an interpretation; and when united with the

other reasons named, seems to be amply sufficient to justify us in rejecting it.

Let us proceed to consider each of the quotations separately. "Ὅτι οὐκ . . . ἔστι, is a quotation *ad sensum* of Ps. xiv. 1; where the Hebrew has אֵין עֹשֶׂה טוֹב; and the Septuagint, οὐκ ἔστι ποιῶν χρηστότητα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἰσως ἰνός. In Ps. liii. (a repetition of Ps. xiv.), the Septuagint has simply οὐκ ἔστι ποιῶν ἀγαθόν while the Hebrew is the same as above. It would seem, therefore, that the apostle had his eye or his mind upon Ps. xiv., when he made the quotation before us; and that he has varied from the *diction*, but followed the *sense* of the original. Instead of saying *there is none that doeth good*, he says, *there is none righteous* (*idem per alia verba*). The οὐδὲ ἔστι of our text, evidently corresponds to the Septuagint οὐκ ἔστιν ἰσως ἰνός.

(11) Οὐκ ἔστιν στυγῶν . . . Θεόν, corresponds to the Hebrew הֵאֵשׁ מִשְׁכִּיל רִשׁ אֶת־אֱלֹהִים, *whether there is any one who understandeth, who seeketh after God*, Ps. xiv. 2. The question in the Hebrew implies a *negative*; and a simple negative is made by Paul, who says, οὐκ ἔστιν κ. τ. λ. The Septuagint runs literally: *Ei ἔστι στυγῶν ἢ ἀλλήτῳ τὸν Θεόν*. Paul has cited *ad sensum*, and nearly *ad verbum*. Στυγῶν instead of στυγείς, as from στυγέω the old root. See § 81 of New Test. Gramm. Comp. § 80.

(12) Πάντες . . . ἰνός, cited exactly from the Septuagint version of Ps. xiv. 3. The Hebrew runs thus:

הַכֹּל סָר יְהוָה נֶאֱלָהוּ

אֵין עֹשֶׂה טוֹב

אֵין נִם אֶתֶר

Whether all have gone out of the way, and together become corrupt? None doeth good, not even one. Paul omits, as the Septuagint also does, the interrogatory sense of the first clause, made by הַכֹּל (which is co-ordinate with הֵאֵשׁ in the preceding verse), and renders simply: Πάντες ἐξέκλιναν altogether *ad sensum*.

The word στυγῶν in verse 11 means *to have an enlightened knowledge*, viz. of God and duty.—Ὁ ἀλλήτῳ (Heb. רִשׁ) means, *to worship God, to seek him in acts of devotion, meditation, &c., to be a devoted worshipper*.—Ἐξέκλιναν in verse 11 means, *have departed from the right way, from the paths of piety and happiness*.—Ἡχθροίθησαν, *have become corrupt, literally have become unprofitable or use-*

less. But as the meaning is here a *moral* one, the first rendering is the most appropriate.

In regard to the *original* meaning of these quotations, there seems not to be much room for dispute. Who is it of whom the Psalmist is speaking? It is נָלֵךְ, ὁ ἄρρεν, as ver. 1 determines. But are *all* men without exception ἄρρενες? Whatever may be the fact, yet it is not *here* asserted; for in ver. 4 the *workers of iniquity* are expressly distinguished from *my people*. In ver. 5, *the generation of the righteous* is distinguished from *the workers of iniquity*. It is plain, then, that the Psalmist is here describing two parties among the Hebrews; the one wicked, yea altogether corrupt; the other righteous, *i. e.*, belonging to the true people of God.

The application of this passage by the apostle is plain. All unbelievers, all who put not their trust in Christ, are of the same character with those wicked persons whom the Psalmist describes. And what is now true of them, was once true of present believers, *i. e.*, before they became penitent.

(13) Τέφος . . . ἐδολοῦσαν, verbatim with the Septuagint version of Ps. v. 10 (v. 9); which runs thus in the Hebrew :

קָרַךְ פִּתְחוֹ נֶרְנָם
לְשׁוֹנָם יַחֲלִיקֵן

An open sepulchre is their throats; with their tongues do they flatter, or speak deceitful things. Sentiment: 'As from the sepulchre issues forth an offensive and pestilential vapour; so from the mouths of slanderous persons issue noisome and pestilential words.' Or if it may mean, as some suppose, that 'their throat is like an open sepulchre, swallowing up and destroying all' (Reiche, Barnes), then what is the sense of *their tongues*? This shows that *noisome and pestilential falsehood and flattery or deceit*, is the idea which is intended to be expressed.—'Ἐδολοῦσαν, *speak deceit, deceive.* The form of the word is the Alexandrine or Boeotian -σαν instead of -ν, which is frequent in the Imperf. and 2nd Aorist; *e. g.*, ἐλάβισαν, ἐμάθοσαν, &c., for ἐλαβον, ἐμαθον, &c. 'Ἐδολοῦσαν stands for ἐδολίου, Imperfect active: see N. Test. Gramm. § 65. 8.

The context in Ps. v. shows, that *the workers of iniquity* there mentioned are the party opposed to David. Those who opposed the *Son of David*, are characterized by Paul in a similar manner.

Ἰὼς ἀσπίδων ὑπὸ τὰ χεῖρα αὐτῶν, accords verbatim with the Septuagint

version of a part of Psalm cxl. 4. (cxl. 3). The Hebrew runs thus: *הַמָּוֶת עַל־שִׁפְיוֹתָם הַיָּדָוִת עַל־שִׁפְיוֹתָם*, the *poison of asps, or of the adder, is under their lips*; i. e., their words are like poison, they utter the poisonous breath of slander. The phrase before us gives intensity to the preceding description; all of which, however, is not intended to designate merely some specific kind of slander, but the sinful exercise of the tongue, which (as James expresses it) is *πῦρ, ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας*, iii. 6.

Here again, the persons characterized are the enemies of David. What was said of them may be applied, as the apostle here intimates by the quotation, to all those who refused submission to 'David's Lord that sat upon his throne.'

(14) *Ἦν τὸ . . . γίμει*, runs thus in the Septuagint: *ὃ δ' ἀρᾶς τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ γίμει καὶ πικρία; καὶ δόλου* (Ps. ix. 7), which corresponds to the Hebrew in Psalm x. 7, *אֵלֶּה פִּיּוּרֵי מַלְא וּמְרֻמוֹת*, excepting that *ὃ* is added by the Seventy, and also *δόλου*. The apostle has quoted the Hebrew, as it would seem, and exactly *ad sensum*, the suffix pronoun in *פִּיּוּרֵי* being *generic*, and indicating a real *plurality*, which Paul expresses by *δν*.

The violent and embittered enemies of the Psalmist are here characterized. The application is the same as before.

Πικρίας is used to translate the Hebrew *מְרֻמוֹת*, which literally signifies *fraud, deceit*. But as *false accusations* are here meant, which tend to destroy reputation and confidence, and proceed from *bitterness* of spirit, so *πικρία* (*bitterness*) is employed to characterize them, it being used *ad sensum* in a general way. Or did the Seventy read *מְרֻרוֹת*, *bitterness*?

(15—17) *Ὁ οὐκ ᾔδει; . . . ἔγνωσαν*, abridged from Is. lix. 7, 8. The Septuagint and Hebrew run thus:

Οἱ πόδες αὐτῶν ἐπὶ σπυγρίαν τρέχουσι,
ταχυνοὶ ἐκχέαι αἷμα, καὶ οἱ διαλογι-
σμοὶ αὐτῶν διαλογισμοὶ ἀπὸ φόνων συν-
τριμμα καὶ ταρακωρία ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς
αὐτῶν, καὶ ὁδὸν εἰρήνης οὐκ οἶδασιν.

רַגְלֵיהֶם לָרֹעַ יִרְצוּ וַיִּמְחְרוּ לְשֹׁפָחַי דָּם
נָקִי מִחֲשֹׁבֵתֵיהֶם מִחֲשָׁבוֹת אָחָ שָׂר
וַיִּשָּׂר בְּמַסְלֹותָם : דֶּרֶךְ שָׁלוֹם לֹא
יָדְעוּ

Here the expressions are altogether of a *general* nature, as they stand in the prophet, and plainly characterize a great part of the

Jewish nation in the time of the writer; compare Is. lix. 2, 4, 9—15. Of course this is still more directly to the apostle's purpose, than the preceding quotations. Those correspond with his intention in the way of *implication*; but the present quotation corresponds in the way of *direct analogy*.

An inspection of the *original* will disclose how much the apostle has abridged it, in his quotation. Also in quoting he has substituted ἰξίς for ταχίνοι in the Septuagint; then passing by a whole clause, viz., "their thoughts are thoughts of evil," he quotes the rest verbatim. Both the Seventy and Paul omit the Hebrew עֲרֵב in the phrase עֲרֵב דָּם, *innocent blood*.—Ἐκχίσαι, 1 Aor. Inf. comes from ἰχίω, Fut. ἰκχέσω (in the New Testament ἰκχῶ, as an Attic Fut. from the regular ἰκχίσω, N. Test. Gramm. § 65. 3), 1 Aor. ἰξίσα after the manner of verbs in λ, μ, ν, ξ. A few verbs in Greek follow this method of forming the first Aorist. See Gramm. § 65. 10.

Sentiment: 'They are ready and swift to engage in crimes of the highest degree; *destruction and misery attend their steps*, i. e., wherever they go, they spread destruction and misery around them. The way of happiness they take no knowledge of, or they give no heed to what concerns their own true welfare or that of others.'

(18) οὐκ ἴσσι . . . αὐτῶν, is exactly quoted from the Septuagint, and corresponds to the Hebrew, excepting the final αὐτῶν, which in the Hebrew and Septuagint is in the *singular* number. But then it is the singular *generic*, and so corresponds exactly in sense to the plural αὐτῶν of the apostle. The Hebrew original is in Psalm xxxvi. 1, and it runs thus: יְיָ לִפְנֵי עֵינָיו אֵין יִרְאָה, *there is no fear of God before his eyes*; i. e., he has no reverence for God, no fear of offending him which puts any effectual restraint upon his wickedness.

(19) Οἶδαμεν δὲ . . . λαλεῖ now we know that whatsoever things the law saith, it addresses to those who are under the law; i. e., we know that whatever the Old Test. Scriptures say, when they speak in the manner now exhibited, they address it to those who are in possession of these Scriptures, viz., to the Jews.—Δε continuativum, *nunc*, German *nun*, English *now*, in the sense of a *continuative*.—Τοῖς ἐν νόμῳ, *those who have a revelation or are under the law*; *in conditionis*, compare what is said on ἐν under chap. i. 24.

The object of the apostle is to show, that the Jews can in no way avoid the force of what is here said. It was originally addressed to the Jews, in a direct manner. What he has quoted was indeed

spoken at different times, to different classes of persons, and uttered by various individuals. But still the *principle* is the same. *Jews* are addressed ; and the Jews are accused in the very same manner, i. e., with equal force, by their own prophets whose authority is acknowledged, as they were accused by Paul. The *principle* then by which such an accusation is to be supported, is thus established. As to the actual application of this, and the *facts* respecting the conduct and character of the Jews in the apostle's time ; all the writings of the New Testament, of Josephus, and others, and the direct assertions of Paul in this epistle, go to show that no injustice at all was done to them in the present case.

It is this principle, viz., that in consistence with the fidelity of God to his promises, and consistently with the ancient Scriptures, the Jews might be charged with wickedness even of a gross character, and such as brought them as truly under the curse of the divine law as the polluted heathen were under it,—it is this, which the apostle has in view to establish by all his quotations ; and this he does entirely establish. When thus understood, there remains no important difficulty respecting the quotations. He did not need these proofs from Scripture, in order to settle the question about the depravity of the *Gentiles*. The Jews would reluctantly only against the truth of the charges made against themselves. The character of the heathen was too palpable to be denied. That of the Jews, indeed, was scarcely less so in the eyes of others : but still, they themselves expected to escape divine justice, on the ground of being God's *chosen people*. All expectation of this nature is overturned by the declarations and arguments of the apostle, in chaps. ii. iii. of this epistle.

Such as undertake to prove *universal* depravity directly from the texts here quoted, appear to mistake the nature of the apostle's argument, and to overlook the design of his quotations. It is impossible to make the passages in the Old Testament, as they there stand, to be *universal* in their meaning, without doing violence to the fundamental laws of interpretation. And surely there is no need of doing thus. The whole strain of the apostle's argument at large, goes to establish universal depravity ; I mean the universal depravity of all who are *out of Christ*, and are capable of sinning. The doctrine is safe, without doing violence to any obvious principle of exegesis ; which we never can do with safety. I need scarcely add, that Platt, Tholuck, and nearly all distinguished commentators of the present

day, so far as I know, agree in substance with the interpretation which I have now given. Yet Reiche objects to the view here given, on the ground that it would represent Paul as arguing from his own authority and not from the Old Test. But what hinders such a supposition? Does not Paul teach, exhort, reprove, make declarations and assertions, throughout the epistle, on his own authority? And had he not the same authority as the writers of the Old Testament? He appeals, indeed, to the Old Test. and often does so, for the satisfaction, or the confounding of the Jews. But we are not to suppose that Paul wrote this epistle without any reference to his own authority as an apostle, after what he had set forth at the beginning of it. See some remarks on this subject on the next page.

ἵνα πάντες . . . ὁσιῶν, so that every mouth must be stopped, and the whole world become guilty before God. *ἵνα* has here the *ecbatic* sense, not the *telic*; for to assert that the Old Test. was written principally to stop the mouths of the guilty, would be a singular position indeed. See the excellent essay of Tittmann on *ἵνα*, in the Bibl. Repository, No. I. of 1835.—*Πάντες ὁσῶμα φραγῆν*, *i. e.*, every man, all men, whether Jews or Gentiles, must be convicted of sin, and be unable to produce any thing to justify their conduct; compare Job v. 16. Ps. cvii. 42. The phraseology is borrowed from the custom of gagging criminals, *i. e.*, stopping their mouths in order to prevent apology or outcry from them, when they were led out to execution.—*Ἵπὸδικος, reus, sons, i. e.*, guilty, deserving of condemnation.

But how extensive is the conclusion here? I answer, (1) It extends to *all* who are out of Christ. I draw this conclusion, not so much from the mere forms of expression, such as *πάντες ὁσῶμα* and *πᾶς ὁ κόσμος*, as I do from the nature and object of the apostle's argument. What is this? Plainly his design is, to show that there is but *one* method of acceptance with God now possible; and this is in the way of gratuitous pardon or justification. But why is this necessary in *all* cases? The answer is: Because all have sinned. Certainly, if those who do not believe in Christ cannot obtain pardon without him, this is because they are sinners, and have no claim on the score of justice or law.

But (2) All who are in Christ, *i. e.*, are justified, have once been sinners, and do still commit more or less sin, for which pardoning mercy becomes necessary. Once they were among the impenitent and unregenerate. What the apostle asserts then, in our next, of *all*

men, need not be limited, and should not indeed be limited, merely to those who are out of Christ at any particular time, but may be extended to all who were ever out of him.

That this is a *bonâ fide* application of the principle which he here contends for, is clear from his own commentary on this doctrine in chap. iv. For what does he say there? He shows that even Abraham and David, as well as the grossest sinners, were justified only in a *gratuitous* way, being utterly unable to obtain the divine approbation on the ground of perfect obedience. What is the inference from all this? Plainly that all men are sinners, and that none therefore can be saved by their own merits. So does verse 20 virtually declare; and verse 23 says it explicitly.

In form, the argument of Paul extends only to those who are *out of Christ*; but as this has once been the condition of all men without exception, so in *substance* it embraces all men without exception, who "by nature are children of wrath, being children of disobedience;" for "that which is born of the flesh, is flesh."

I cannot forbear to add, that it seems to me a wrong view of the apostle's meaning in verses 10—19, which regards him as labouring to prove directly the universality of men's depravity, merely by the *argument* which these texts afford. Paul has other sources of proof, besides that of argument; for if he himself was an *inspired* apostle, then surely his own declarations respecting the state of the heathen or Jews, were to be credited on just the same grounds as those of the ancient Psalmist and of the Prophets. Why not? And then, why should we be solicitous to show that every thing in Paul's epistle is established by *argumentation*? Had the apostle no other way of establishing truth, except by argumentation? Are not his own declarations, I repeat it, as weighty and credible as those of the ancient prophets? If so, then we need not be anxious to retain the argument as a *direct* one, in verses 10—19. Enough that it *illustrates* and *confirms* the PRINCIPLE which the apostle asserts, and for which he contends. The argument from this principle is irresistible, when we once concede that Christ is the only Saviour of all men without exception; for this cannot be true, unless all men without exception are sinners. Of course I mean, all who are capable of sinning.

(20) Διότι . . . αὐτοῦ, *because that by works of law shall no flesh be justified before him.* Διότι, *on account of, because that, for.* In this sense it differs little or nothing from γὰρ. It is not employed to designate a *logical* conclusion from premises, but stands before a

clause which assigns a reason or ground of something already affirmed. Turretin, Morus, Rosenm., Bretsch. (lex.) have here mistaken it for *therefore*; and I was misled by their authority, in the first edition of this work. The appeal of Bretsch. (lex.) to Acts xvii. 31. Rom. i. 21. viii. 7. 1 Pet. ii. 6, does not at all support his conclusion, διότι being employed in all these cases as above stated.

"Ἔργων νόμου, *works of law*, i. e., such works as law requires; just as ἔργα Θεοῦ means, 'such works as God requires or approves;' and so ἔργα τοῦ Ἀβραάμ, John viii. 39, τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν [τοῦ διαβόλου], John viii. 14; τὰ ἔργα τῶν Νικολαϊτῶν, Rev. ii. 6; and so ἔργα τῆς πόρνῆς — τῆς σαρκὸς — τοῦ διαβόλου — τῆς πίστεως, &c., &c. From these and a multitude of other examples, which every good lexicon and every concordance will supply, it appears entirely plain that ἔργα and ἔργον, followed by a Genitive which qualifies it, mean something to be effected or done, which is agreeable to the command, desire, nature, &c., of the thing which is designated by the Genitive noun.

Concerning this usage, there is no just room to doubt. But the sense of νόμου has been thought to be less obvious. Does νόμος then mean *ceremonial law*, or *revelation* in general, or *the moral law* whether revealed or natural? Ambrose, Theodoret, Theophylact, Pelagius, Erasmus, Cornelius a Lapide, Grotius, Koppe, Ammon, and others, have explained νόμος as meaning the *ceremonial law*. But is this correct? The meaning of a word which is capable of various significations, is always to be judged of by the *object* or *design* of the writer, so often as this is practicable. What then is the object of Paul in the present case? Surely it is, to show that both Gentiles and Jews need that gratuitous justification which the gospel proclaims, and which Christ has procured; compare iii. 9, πᾶν σόμα and πᾶς ὁ κόσμος in iii. 19, πάντες in ver. 23, together with ver. 29. Compare also chap. i. 19—32 with ii. 17—29. Nothing can be more certain than that the conclusion of the apostle is a *general* one, having respect to Jew and Gentile both. But how can it be apposite to say, in respect to the Gentiles, that they cannot be justified by the *ceremonial law*? Did the apostle need to make a solemn asseveration of this? Were the Gentiles sinners, because they had not kept the *ritual laws* of Moses? So the apostle does not judge; see ii. 14, 15, 26. How, then, can he be supposed to say in reference to the Gentiles (for the present verse refers to them as well as to the Jews), that *by the law is the knowledge of sin*? What knowledge of the *ceremonial law* of Moses did the heathen possess?

I remark in the next place, that transgressions of the *ritual* law are no part of the accusation which the apostle here brings against the Jews. In chap. ii. 17—29, he accuses them of breaking *moral* laws; and after having enumerated a long catalogue of crimes common among the Gentiles in chap. i. 19—32, he goes on immediately to intimate in chap. ii. 1, seq., that the Jews were chargeable with the same or with the like crimes. In ii. 14, seq., and ii. 26, seq., he intimates that the law, inscribed upon the consciences and minds of the heathen, inculcated those very things with regard to which the Jews were sinners. In iii. 9, seq., he brings Jews and Gentiles under the same accusation, explicitly charging all with being sinners, and sinners against a law which was common to both; as chap. ii. 15, 16, 26, seq., most explicitly show.

Again; when it is asked in Rom. vi. 15, *Shall we sin because we are not $\text{\iota}\nu\delta\ \nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\upsilon$ but under grace?* what sense would there be in this question (which is supposed to be urged by an objector), provided the *ceremonial* law be meant? Would an objector in the possession of his senses ask the question: 'Have we liberty to break the *moral* law, i. e., to sin, because we are not under the ceremonial?' Or, 'because the *ceremonial* law will not justify us, may we not break the *moral* law?' Yet $\nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\upsilon$ in Rom. vi. 15, is plainly of the same nature as $\nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\varsigma$ in iii. 20.

Finally; the apostle every where opposes the $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ or $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\nu\eta$ of the gospel, to that justification which results from works in general, works of any kind whatever; e. g., 2 Tim. i. 9. Eph. ii. 8, 9. Tit. iii. 5. Rom. iv. 2—5, 13—16. iii. 27. xi. 6. and in many other places. In all such cases, *justification by works* means a *meritorious* justification, while that which is by faith means a *gratuitous* justification.

From all this it results, that $\nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\upsilon$ must here mean the *moral* law, whether written or unwritten, i. e., law in general, any law whether applicable to Gentile or Jew, any rule which prescribes a duty by obedience to which men might claim a promise of reward. Nor can this duty be limited merely to what is *external*. Surely the law of God, whether natural or revealed, does not have respect merely to the *external* conduct of men; it also has reference to the *state of their heart and feelings*. So does Paul teach most explicitly, in Rom. ii. 28, 29, in Rom. ii. 16, and very often elsewhere.

Understood in this way, the phrase $\epsilon\gamma\gamma\alpha\ \nu\acute{o}\mu\omicron\upsilon$ is plain. Neither Jew nor Gentile can be justified before God on the ground of obe-

dience; "all have sinned and come short of the glory of God;" each one has broken the law under which he has acted; the Gentiles, that which was written on their minds and consciences, ii. 14, 15; the Jews, that which was contained in the Scriptures, ii. 27. Now as the law of God, revealed or natural, requires *entire* and *perfect* obedience, just so far as it is known and understood, or may be so without criminal neglect on the part of men; and since "the soul which sinneth must die," and "he who offendeth in one point is guilty of all;" it follows of necessity that all men, whether Jews or Gentiles, while in an unconverted state, are under the condemning sentence of the law; and therefore that they cannot possibly claim acceptance with God on the ground of perfect obedience. Nay, so far are they from this, that they can expect nothing but condemnation and misery from simple *retributive* justice being exercised toward them under a pure system of law; for "all have sinned," and therefore "all have come short of the glory of God."

In no other way, as it seems to me, can the general course of argument by the apostle be understood and interpreted so as to preserve consistency with the other parts of this epistle, and with his other writings, or so as to harmonize with the particular design and object of the writer. Accordingly Storr, Flatt, Tholuck (not to mention a multitude of the older commentators), have explained *ἐργων νόμου* substantially in the same manner as I have done.

I add merely, that the question here is, whether men in their present state and character, being *actual* transgressors, can be justified by the law. The generic and *abstract* question, whether human nature is *capable* of fulfilling the law, is not the subject of discussion. Nor can this be a question of moment, so far as the simple doctrine of justification is concerned; inasmuch as it is quite certain that all men born in the natural way, who are capable of sinning, do sin.

Δικαιωθήσεται, see on *δικαιοσύνη* in i. 17, where the verb *δικαίω* is also explained. It means here *to be accepted and treated as having fully kept the precepts of the law*.—Οὐ πᾶσα . . . σάξ=לֹא כָל־אֶחָד, *no one*; a true Hebraism in all respects. Indeed the expression would hardly have been intelligible to a mere Attic Grecian, there being nothing like it in his own dialect.

If *all the world* are ὑπόδικος τῷ Θεῷ, then must it be true that none can be δικαῖος before him in a legal sense, *i. e.*, on the ground of perfect and meritorious obedience. Ἐν ὧπιον αὐτοῦ = רְצוֹנֵהוּ, *in his view, in*

his sight, in his presence. The mind of the writer here contemplates mankind as standing before the divine tribunal, in order to be judged of the things done in the body.

Διὰ γὰρ . . . ἀμαρτίας, *for by law is the knowledge of sin.* The γὰρ here introduces a reason or ground why *works of law* will not justify. The law condemns but does not justify; and this, because men have broken it. Νόμου here must evidently mean the same as it does in the clause ἐξ ἔργων νόμου which clearly signifies any law of a moral kind, either natural or revealed. Turretin understands νόμου, in the phrase before us, as meaning the Jewish Scriptures. But inasmuch as the preceding phrase is general, it must be understood so here. All law is a rule of action, in the most extensive sense of this word, embracing the internal as well as the external developments of the human soul. By this rule all actions are to be scanned; the Gentiles are to scan theirs by the law written upon their own minds, ii. 14, 15: the Jews by their own Scriptures. The precepts of law, whether natural or revealed, by commanding this and prohibiting that, serve to make known the nature of sin; for all sin is ἀνομία, *want of conformity to the law.* The simple design of the apostle in saying διὰ γὰρ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις ἀμαρτίας, is to remind those whom he addressed, that the law (any law either natural or revealed), so far from holding out to men who are *sinner*s the prospect of justification before God and promising them acceptance with him, is the very means of bringing them, by its disclosures respecting the nature and guilt of sin, to a knowledge of their unhappy and desperate condition, inasmuch as it shows them that they are exposed to its full penalty for every transgression which they have committed. The word ἐπίγνωσις is stronger than the simple word γνῶσις and in this way the apostle means to intimate the clear knowledge of sin which the law communicates.

CHAP. III. 21—31

THE apostle having shown that both Jews and Gentiles are all under sin, and therefore are obnoxious to the penalty of the divine law; having also declared (what must indeed be obvious from the fact just stated), that *gratuitous* pardon or justification is the only way of salvation now open for men; he proceeds to intimate, that this way of salvation is disclosed in the Old Testament Scriptures, verse 21; even that justification which is proposed to all men without distinc-

tion, and conferred on all who believe in Christ, verse 22. No difference can be made, as to the need of such a justification, between the Jew and Gentile, inasmuch as all without exception are sinners, and therefore stand in the same need of gratuitous pardon, verse 24. Christ is set forth to all men as a propitiatory offering or sacrifice, the efficacy of which may be experienced by faith in his blood; and Christ is set forth in this manner, in order that God may manifest to the world the provision which he has made for the forgiveness of sins committed in former ages, and also under the new dispensation, thus disclosing a way in which his holy regard to justice may be preserved, and yet his pardoning mercy be bestowed on the penitent believer in Jesus, verses 25, 26. All boasting then of salvation, on the ground of our own merits, is entirely excluded, because justification by faith, from its own nature, must be wholly gratuitous, verse 27. Well may we conclude, then, from all this, that we are *gratuitously* justified, and not on the ground of merit, verse 28. God, moreover, justifies all on the same ground, because he stands in the same relation to both Jews and Gentiles, verse 29; both the circumcised and the uncircumcised he justifies by faith, verse 30. But are the Old Testament Scriptures annulled, by inculcating such doctrine? Not at all: for (as was before said, verse 31) they teach the very same doctrine, verse 31.

(21) *Nuní* δὲ . . . *πεφανερωται*, but now, the justification without law which is of God, is revealed. *Nuní*, now, i. e., under the gospel dispensation, in distinction from ancient times, or former days.—*Δι* “*particula discretiva, opposita conjungens.*”—*Χωρίς νομίου*, without law, i. e., without the aid or concurrence of law, or in such a way as not to be by means of law, or in a way different from or contrary to that of legal justification which rests solely on the ground of perfect and meritorious obedience. *Χωρίς νόμου*, may be interpreted as qualifying *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, or it may possibly be joined in sense with *πεφανερωται* the meaning in either case may perhaps be substantially the same. I interpret it as qualifying *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, both on account of its position in the sentence, and because of its more appropriate meaning when thus construed; for thus considered it designates that this *δικαιοσύνη* is *gratuitous*, i. e., not on the ground of merit or legal obedience.

Δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ see on i. 17.—*Πεφανερωται*, is disclosed, manifested, revealed, viz., in or by the gospel.

Μαγευομένη . . . *προφητῶν*, which is testified, i. e., plainly and openly declared, by the law and the prophets, i. e., by the Old Testament, the Jewish Scriptures; compare Matt. v. 17. vii. 12. xi. 13. xxii. 40. Luke xvi. 16. John i. 45. 4 Macc. xviii. 10. The apostle means by this to aver, that he teaches no new thing; he only repeats what in substance has been declared respecting *gratuitous* justification, by the Old Testament Scriptures. And when he says *νυνí* . . . *πεφανερωται*, is NOW revealed, in the preceding part of the verse, he means that this shall be *emphatically* (not absolutely) understood; otherwise the same verse would contain a contradiction of itself.

He designs to say, that gratuitous justification is more fully and amply revealed by the gospel.

What is merely hinted in the declaration before us, Paul goes on fully to develop in chapter iv.

(22) What that *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* is, which is *χωρίς νόμου*, the apostle next proceeds explicitly to develop. *Δικαιοσύνη δέ . . . Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, *the justification then which is of God by faith in Jesus Christ*. This explanation makes it clear as the noon-day sun, that *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, in this connection, does not mean unrighteousness or the love of justice as an *attribute* of God. For in what possible sense can it be said that God's righteousness or justice (as an essential *attribute*) is by faith in Christ? Does he possess or exercise this attribute, or reveal it, by faith in Christ? The answer is so plain that it cannot be mistaken. The *δέ* here is placed in a clause added in the way of explanation, but containing something *diverse* still from the preceding clause. It may be regarded as equivalent to the Latin *videlicet*, the German *namlich*, and our English to *wit, namely*. So Bretsch. (lex.) Beneke. Reiche thinks it stands as *adversative* to *χωρίς νόμου*. To me it seems plainly to stand in a clause which is a *resumption* of the preceding *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* for the sake of further explanation. The Attics often employed *δέ* as a sign of *resumption*; see Passow on *δέ*. In such a case, it is equivalent to our, *and so, therefore, then*. The shade of thought appears to be this: 'As it is a justification *χωρίς νόμου*, then or therefore (*δέ*) it is a justification by faith;' or the sense will be good if we construe thus: 'a justification *χωρίς νόμου*, namely (*δέ*) a justification by faith.' But this latter usage of *δέ* without any *adversative* sense in any respect, seems hardly admissible. Bretsch. (lex. *δέ*, 3. d) has failed to prove it by his citations. The Attic usage in *resumption* seems to be the most facile mode of explanation; because a resumption for the sake of further explanation implies some *diversity* of declaration, and *δέ* is designed to note any thing of this nature. The translation of it is indeed difficult, because of the poverty of our language; and it must be different according to the different nature of the sentiment and the connection. In the present case then, (German *also*) seems to give the sense of the original, as nearly as we can give it by a version.

Διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, by *Christian faith*, i. e., by that faith of which Jesus Christ is the object, *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* being *Genitivus objecti*; for most clearly it is not faith which belongs to Christ himself, but the faith of sinners towards him. The meaning of the apostle is, that

the gratuitous justification which the gospel reveals, is that which is to be had by believing and trusting in Christ as our Redeemer and Deliverer; compare vers. 23—26. Faith, indeed, is not to be regarded as the meritorious cause or ground of justification (which is wholly *gratuitous*, ver. 24), but only as the means or instrument by which we come into such a state or relation, that justification can, consistently with the nature and character of God, be gratuitously bestowed upon us.

Εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας, to all and upon all. Luther understands *ἐρχομένη* before *εἰς πάντας*, i. e., [*δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ ἐρχομένη*] *εἰς πάντας*. The sense is good; but may not the same end be attained in another way? May we not construe *εἰς πάντας* as connected with *παραίεσθαι*? I am aware that *παραίεω* usually governs the simple Dative after it in such cases; but then it is equally certain, that the New Testament writers often use the Accusative with *εἰς* instead of the simple Dative, or the Dative with *ἐν* see Bretschn. Lex. *εἰς*, 5. b. Very naturally may we suppose, that after *παραίεσθαι* the persons would be named to whom the revelation is made. May we not suppose them to be designated by *εἰς πάντας*?

Ἐπὶ πάντας appears to mark the subjects, who receive the *δικαιοσύνη* in question; which is clear from the *τοὺς πιστεύοντας* that follows and qualifies it. I am aware, indeed, that many commentators suppose that *πιστεύοντας* belongs equally to both cases of *πάντας*. But may we not suppose, that *εἰς πάντας* denotes to whom the proclamation of *δικαιοσύνη*, *gratuitous pardon*, is made, i. e., that it is made to all men? *Καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας* I should then consider as a kind of parenthesis thrown in to guard against the idea that the actual bestowment of justification is as universal as the offers of it. The offer is made to all men without exception; *believers* only, however, are entitled to the actual reception of it. My reason for supposing such a parenthesis here, is, that the writer immediately resumes the generic or universal idea, *ὃ γὰρ ἴσθι κ. τ. λ.*, which shows that his mind is intent on the illustration of *εἰς πάντας*, as his principal proposition. Besides this, the clause *ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας* is omitted in A., B., C., Copt., Æth., Arm., Clem., Origen; which shows at least that it was not deemed essential to the *principal* sentiment. The main object is to show, that there is no exception at all as to the need of that justification which the gospel proposes. As this is plainly his main point, Paul only suggests, here and there by the way, the extent in which the justification proposed is actually bestowed—*ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας . . . καὶ δικαιώματα τὴν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ* (ver. 26).

It is by overlooking these nicer shades and connections of thought in this paragraph, that many critics have come to the conclusion, that no difference exists here between *εις πάντας* and *ἐπὶ πάντας*. So Reiche; who thinks them to be merely *intensive*. But this is a position which seems to be contradicted by the course of thought before and after these expressions. Before *ἐπὶ πάντας* either *ἰστί* or rather *ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἰστί* seem to be implied; and then *ἐπὶ* is used in the sense of *ad commodum*, *for*; comp. Heb. viii. 8. Heb. xii. 10; see also Bretschn. Lex. *ἐπὶ*, III. 5.

Οὐ γάρ ἐστί διαστολή, *for there is no distinction or difference; i. e.*, in regard to the matter of justification by faith or gratuitous justification; all men stand in the same need of it, and must perish without it. In this respect there is no distinction whatever between Greek and Jew; for as all have sinned, so justification by *deeds of law*, *i. e.*, by perfect obedience to the law, is an impossible thing, inasmuch as it is impossible that a sinner should lay in any proper claim to such a justification. The γάρ here is γάρ *illustrantis* vel *confirmantis*, the sequel being designed to illustrate and confirm the affirmation made above, viz., that the justification which is of God without law, *i. e.*, *gratuitous* justification, is revealed *εις πάντας*.

(23) Πάντες γάρ . . . Θεοῦ, *for all have sinned, and come short of divine approbation, or of the glory which God bestows*. The γάρ here is again γάρ *illustrantis* vel *confirmantis*, *i. e.*, it is placed at the commencement of a sentence which is designed to illustrate and confirm the preceding assertion, and to show the reason why there is no *διαστολή*. Ὑστερῶ comes from ὕστερος, *last*, and sometimes means (as its etymology would indicate) *to be last or inferior*, 1 Cor. xii. 24. viii. 8. 2 Cor. xi. 5. xii. 11. The passive voice (ὕστεροῦνται is passive) is used in the same sense (for substance) as the active; ὕστερῶ meaning *deficio*, *destituo*, and ὕστερέομαι *destituor*, *I am wanting in*, *I am deficient in*. The idea in our text is that of *failing*, *wanting*, *being deprived* or *destitute of*. The verb, when used in this way, of course governs the Genitive by the usual principles of syntax.

Δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ is rendered by many as I have rendered it, viz., *the divine approbation*. So indeed most commentators translate it: and with good philological support, inasmuch as δόξα often and even commonly means *praise*, *approbation*, in the classics, and has a like sense in the N. Test., *e. g.*, John v. 41, 44. vii. 18. viii. 50, 54. xii. 43. Nevertheless, as δόξα very often means, by N. Test. usage, *a glorified state*, *a splendid glorious condition*, *supreme happiness*, it may be so

taken here, and Θεοῦ may be construed as *Genitivus auctoris*, so that δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ would mean, *the glory which God bestows*, or of which God is the author. So Semler, Morus, Böhme, Chrysostom, Beza, Hammond, Bengel, Glöckler, and others. But still, as the subject is here that of *justification*, viz., acquittal, δόξης may be employed in the *classic* sense of *opinion* (here *good opinion, approbation*), i. e., the approbation of the final judge of men, when they stand before his tribunal. The idea would then be, that inasmuch as all men have broken the law of God, so they cannot expect his approbation in the day of trial, provided they stand upon the ground of their own merits. Hence the necessity of some other method of justification different from that which is *by works of law*. This opinion on the whole, seems to be the most apposite.

(24) Δικαιοῦμενοι . . . Ἰησοῦ, [all] *being justified freely by his grace through the redemption which is by Christ Jesus*. On the one hand the apostle declares that all have sinned, and thus they have rendered a sentence of acquittal and reward impossible on the ground of *law*. He now asserts the counterpart of this, viz., that all who obtain justification must obtain it *gratuitously* and only by virtue of the redemption that Christ has accomplished; a proposition which contains the very essence of all that is peculiar to the gospel of Christ, or that can make a solid foundation on which the hopes of perishing sinners may rest.

The ellipsis before and after δικαιοῦμενοι may be filled out thus: [πάντες] δικαιοῦμενοι [εἰς]; for δικαιοῦμενοι here evidently stands in the room of a verb. In fact, verses 23, 24, are really two different sentences; while the present grammatical construction of them makes but one.—Δωρεάν, *freely, gratuitously, in the way of mere favour* Δωρεάν (Heb. עָרַם) comes from δωρεά, *donum gratuitum, beneficium*; and this, with δωρον *munus*, δώρημα *beneficium*, and δωρέομαι *dono*, all originate from δίδωμι or δίδω *to give*.

Τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι, *by his grace*, epexegetical of δωρεάν, and added to give intensity to the whole sentence or affirmation; comp. Eph. ii. 8, 9. 2 Tim. i. 9. Tit. iii. 4, 5.

Ἀπολυτρώσις, *redemption*. The force of this word may be best seen by recurring to its root λύτρον, which means, 'the price of ransom paid for a slave or a captive, in consequence of which he is set free.' Λυτρώω and ἀπολυτρώω both mean, *to pay the price of ransom*; ἀπολυτρώω is somewhat *intensive*, and = *pay off*. Accordingly λύτρωσις and ἀπολυτρώσις mean, (1) *The act of paying this price*; and (2) *The conse-*

quences of this act, viz. *the redemption* which follows it. In this way the idea of ἀπολύτρωσις comes at times to be merely a generic one, i. e., *liberation, deliverance*.—Τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ designates the author of our redemption or liberation, viz., him who paid the ransom and procured our freedom, when we were the slaves and captives of sin and Satan, and exposed to the wrath of God, i. 18. The sequel defines more exactly what the writer understands by ἀπολυτρώσις in this place.

(25) The most important word in the translation of the first clause of this verse, is ἱλαστήριον, the sense of which must first be determined. In classic Greek it is equivalent to the adjective ἱλάσιμος, *propitiatory, atoning*; which comes directly from ἱλασμός, *atonement, propitiation*; ἱλάσιμος, ἱλαστικός, ἱλαστήριος (the last three are equivalents), and ἱλασμα, all come from ἱλάσκομαι or ἱλάομαι (ἱλέομαι Att.), which Homer always employs to designate *the making of propitiation or atonement to the gods*. The later Greeks sometimes used ἱλάσκομαι in the sense of *being propitious*.

In our text ἱλαστήριον is an adjective used in an elliptical way, like other adjectives of a similar nature; e. g., χαριστήριον, σωτήριον, τὰ ἐτήσια, τὰ γενέθλια, &c. The question naturally arises: What is the noun here to be supplied after ἱλαστήριον? Is it ἐπίθεμα (ἐπίθεμα), *cover*; or δῶμα, *offering or sacrifice*?

In the first of these ways, the Seventy employ ἱλαστήριον sometimes joining it with ἐπίθεμα, Ex. xxv. 17; but usually omitting ἐπίθεμα and using ἱλαστήριον alone, in the same sense which both words would give; e. g., Ex. xxv. 18, 19, 20 bis, 22. xxxvii. (Sept. xxxviii.) 6, 7, 3, 8 bis. Lev. xvi. 2, 13, 14, 15, &c. In all these cases whether ἱλαστήριον has ἐπίθεμα expressed or not, the Hebrew word is הָכֹסֶת, *covering*, viz. the covering of the ark of the covenant in the most holy place, which was overlaid with pure gold (Ex. xxv. 17), over which the cherubim stretched out their wings (Ex. xxv. 20), and which was the throne of Jehovah in his earthly temple, the place from which he uttered his oracles, and communed with the representatives of his people, Ex. xxv. 22; comp. Ex. xxxvii. 6—9. Into the inner sanctuary where the ark was, the high-priest entered but once in a year (Heb. ix. 7), when he sprinkled the הָכֹסֶת ἱλαστήριον [ἐπίθεμα] with blood, in order to make propitiation for the sins of the people, Lev. xvi. 2, 15, 16.

In like manner with the Seventy, Philo calls the הָכֹסֶת, πῶμα ἱλαστήριον and ἐπίθεμα ἱλαστήριον, i. e., a *propitiatory covering*; Vita Mosis, III. 668. (Frankf. ed.) Also in de Prof. p. 465.

Such is the Septuagint usage of *ἱλαστήριον*. But was Paul necessarily limited to this? Certainly not, inasmuch as the common Greek idiom afforded him another combination of *ἱλαστήριον*, viz. *ἱλαστήριον θύμα*, *propitiatory sacrifice* or *offering*. So Dio Chrysostom, Orat. II. 184, *ἱλαστήριον Ἀχαιοὶ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ*, the Greeks [made] a *propitiatory offering* to Minerva. So Josephus, *ἱλαστήριον μνημα*, a *propitiatory monument*, Antiq. XVI. 7. 1. So in 4 Macc. xvii. 22, *ἱλαστηρίου θανάτου αὐτοῦ*, his *propitiatory death*. Symmachus in Gen. vi. 14, *ἱλάσεις ἱλαστήριον*.

Which now of these two methods of construing *ἱλαστήριον* shall we choose? Origen, Theodoret, Theophylact, Œcumenius, Erasmus, Luther, and others, have preferred the former: Hesychius, Grotius, Le Clerc, Kypke, Turretin, Elsner, Flatt, Tholuck, and others, the latter. "Fatemur (says Turretin) expositionem illam [priorem] minus commodam nobis videri;" after which he goes on to say, that he understands by *ἱλαστήριον* an *expiatory victim*. I most fully agree with Turretin. A good reason for this opinion is, that in the phrase *ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ* which follows, there is a reference to the αἷμα of the *ἱλαστήριον*. It may be said, that if Christ be represented as the *mercy-seat* which was sprinkled with propitiatory blood, αἵματι αὐτοῦ may refer to this. But my answer is, that such an image is unnatural; for then Christ would be represented as a *mercy-seat*, sprinkled with his own blood; an incongruous figure, if the analogy of the Jewish *mercy-seat* be consulted. But if *ἱλαστήριον* means a *propitiatory sacrifice*, then is the usage altogether congruous; inasmuch as the blood was sprinkled round about upon the altar, where the sacrifice was laid, Lev. i. 5, 11. iii. 8.

There is another way of casting light upon this subject, viz. by investigating the meaning of *προΐδεναι*. In the classics, *προΐδηναι* means (1) *To lay before, to set before*, e. g., to set any thing before one for him to eat; also to set a mark before one, or a punishment, or a reward; i. e., to *propose*. (2) *Publicly to expose* or *to hold up to view*, e. g., to expose goods, wares, &c., for inspection and sale; also to *declare* enmity, war, hatred, &c. (3) It means to *prefer*; which is the least common signification. In the New Testament *προΐδηναι* is sometimes used in the sense of *purposing, decreeing, constituting*; e. g., Rom. i. 13. Eph. i. 9. So also in Joseph. Antiq. IV. 6, 5. But with this meaning the verb is *intransitive*, and of course is not followed by the Acc. case.

Of these various meanings, the second classical one seems plainly

to be that which is best adapted to our text; for this best agrees with the *εις ἑνδειξιν* and *πρὸς ἑνδειξιν* which follow. "Ὁν προέθετο ὁ Θεὸς ἱλαστήριον may then be rendered, *whom God hath openly exhibited to the world as a propitiatory sacrifice*. But suppose now that we construe ἱλαστήριον as meaning *mercy-seat*, then where is the *congruity* of the image? Was the *mercy-seat* exhibited to the view of those for whom atonement was made? Never; the high-priest only saw it once in each year, on the great day of atonement. To avoid this evident incongruity, one must render προέθετο, *constituit*; and then the evident reference made by it to *εις ἑνδειξιν* and *πρὸς ἑνδειξιν*, is lost or obscured.

On the whole, I see no congruous method of interpreting the passage before us, except by rendering ἱλαστήριον *propitiatory sacrifice*. In respect to the sentiment which this rendering exhibits, compare John i. 29. Eph. v. 2. 1 Pet. i. 19. ii. 24. Heb. ix. 14. 1 Cor. v. 7. If ἱλαστήριον be rendered *propitiation* (as in our English version), the sense will be the same.

Διὰ τῆς πίστεως, *by faith*, i. e., this sacrifice then produces its propitiatory effect, when faith is exercised in the blood, i. e., death of the victim which is offered. In other words: Christ makes expiation which is effectual for such, and only such, as trust or put confidence in his atoning blood, i. e., who believe in him as the "Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world." So Glöckler and others.

Διὰ τῆς πίστεως may also be connected with δικαιούμενοι or with προέθετο so Reiche and others; but not to so good purpose, nor so naturally, as with ἱλαστήριον.

Ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ means *his bloody death*; the expression and image being borrowed from the expiatory blood of the ancient sacrifices. Faith in his blood or in the death of Jesus, as the means of expiation, seems to be the distinguishing trait above all others of true Christianity. The phrase ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ may also be connected with δικαιούμενοι. So Reiche, Winzer, Fritsche, and others. The sense remains *substantially* the same. Or it may be connected with ἱλαστήριον, and still the same sentiment for substance be retained. So Chrysostom, Theodoret, Vitringa, Calov, and others.

Εἰς ἑνδειξιν . . . πρὸς ἑνδειξιν. Two questions that are very important in respect to the interpretation of vers. 25, 26, arise here, viz. (1) Are *εις* and *πρὸς* used in this place as equivalent terms, and joined with ἑνδειξιν as designating a sense which in both cases is the

same? (2) Is *πρὸς ἑνδειξιν* *co-ordinate* with *εἰς ἑνδειξιν*, i. e., is it arranged in the same manner, and does it sustain the same relation to the *first* part of the whole sentence? As to the first question; nothing can be more certain than that both *εἰς* and *πρὸς* stand before the Accusative case, and before the Infinitive mode used as a noun in the Accusative, in order to designate the *intention, object, purpose, design, end, &c.*, of any thing; e. g., *εἰς ζωὴν* in order to obtain life, *εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν* in order to commit iniquity, *εἰς ὃ* for which purpose, *εἰς τοῦτο* for this purpose, *εἰς τὸ ἰμπαίξαι* in order to mock. Matt. xx. 19, *εἰς τὸ σταυρωθῆναι* in order to be crucified, and so in numberless instances; see Bretsch. Lex. *εἰς* 3. The same thing is true of *πρὸς*: e. g., *πρὸς τὸ θεωθῆναι*, in order to be seen, Matt. vi. 1; *πρὸς παραχειμάσαι*, for the sake of passing the winter, Acts xxvii. 12; *πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι*, in order to lust, Matt. v. 28; *πρὸς οἰκοδομὴν*, for the sake of edification, Rom. xv. 2; *πρὸς ἐντροπήν*, for the sake of shaming you, 1 Cor. vi. 5, et al. *sæpe*; see Bretschn. Lex. *πρὸς*, III. c.

So far then as *usage* is concerned, it is a perfectly plain case, that *εἰς ἑνδειξιν* and *πρὸς ἑνδειξιν* may be altogether equivalent. Tholuck thinks that the change of prepositions (*εἰς* and *πρὸς*) makes against the *co-ordination* of *εἰς ἑνδειξιν* and *πρὸς ἑνδειξιν* and yet in commenting on verse 30 below, he is obliged to admit, that *ἐκ πίστεως* and *διὰ πίστεως* are altogether equivalent. Such I take to be the case with the *εἰς* and *πρὸς* in question; and therefore,

(2) I must, with Flatt, Turretin, and many other expositors, explain *εἰς ἑνδειξιν* and *πρὸς ἑνδειξιν* as *co-ordinate*. The arrangement of the thought stands thus: ὃν προέθετο ὁ Θεὸς ἰλαστήριον . . . εἰς ἑνδειξιν ὃν προέθετο ὁ Θεὸς ἰλαστήριον . . . πρὸς ἑνδειξιν which arrangement fully exhibits what I mean, by saying that the expressions are *co-ordinate*. And this arrangement seems to be plainly and fully confirmed, by the antithetic comparison of *πρὸς γεγονότων* (*past*) in one clause, and *ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ* (*present*) in the other.

Τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ, of his justification, i. e., of the justification which he proffers, or of which he is author. But here again is great diversity of opinion among commentators. Ambrose, Locke, and others, understand *δικαιοσύνης* as meaning *veracity*; Theodoret, Socinus, Grotius, Bolten, Koppe, and Reiche, explain it as meaning *goodness*; like the Hebrew *יִשְׁרָאֵל*. Flatt renders it *sanctitas*; Tholuck says that *δικαιοσύνη*, in Paul's writings, always means *righteousness* or *holiness*; in which he is most surely mistaken. To my own mind nothing can be plainer, than that *δικαιοσύνης* has the same sense

here as in chap. i. 17, and as in verse 22 above; where it seems too plain to be mistaken. What can be more congruous, than that it should be taken here in a sense which is homogeneous with δικαιοσύνη in verse 20, and δικαιούμενοι in verse 23?

What now is the sentiment which is in accordance with this? It is as follows: 'God has openly exhibited Christ to the world as a propitiatory offering for sin, unto all who believe in him, in order that he might fully exhibit his pardoning mercy (his δικαιοσύνη) in respect to the forgiveness of sins under the past and present dispensation.'

Is not this plain and consistent sentiment, congruous with the design of the writer and with the nature of facts? How or why so much difficulty should have been made about the word δικαιοσύνης here, I am not able to explain. Turretin, indeed, calls the exegesis which I have given, "frigida repetitio . . . apostolo nostro haud satis digna." I should have been better satisfied, if he had given some valid reason for such a remark; which it is always easier to make than to justify. One good rule in the explanation of Scripture is, that the same writer, on the same topic, and in the same connection of reasoning and thought, must be construed as using the same phraseology in the same sense. All I ask here is, that a maxim so plain and reasonable should be observed. And where is the "repetitio" in this case? Where has the apostle before said, that God had openly proposed to the world the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ, in order to exhibit his pardoning mercy for sins committed under the old and under the new dispensation? And as to the "frigida;" if there be any one sentiment in the whole New Testament, respecting the efficacy of the atoning blood of Jesus with regard to power and extent, which stands at the head of all others, the sentiment here developed holds this very place. It has its express parallel only in Heb. ix. 15. I feel constrained, therefore, to differ here exceedingly from Turretin, as to what he names *frigida interpretatio*. It is as opposite to this, as light is to darkness.

Διὰ τὴν . . . Θεοῦ, *through remission by the forbearance of God of sins formerly committed.* That διὰ not unfrequently has the meaning in respect to, in regard to, may be seen by consulting Matt. xviii. 23, διὰ τοῦτο, in respect to this, viz., the sentiment which Jesus had just uttered. So also, with another shade of sense, Matt. xxi. 43. xxiii. 34, διὰ τοῦτο, for the sake of this, on account of this; Mark xi. 24.

Luke xi. 49. 1 Thess. iii. 7, διὰ *on account of*. So Flatt on our verse: διὰ, in *Rücksicht auf*, i. e., *in respect to*. But still, I do not take διὰ here as meaning merely *in respect to*, *in regard to*. A common meaning of it is, *per*, *propter*. Here I understand it is designating the manner in which δικαιοσύνη has exhibited itself, viz., *by* or *through remission*, &c. So Reiche. But there is another sense still in which it may be here interpreted; viz., *on account of*, *for the sake of* remission, &c. This would make it co-ordinate with εἰς ἵνδουξιν κ. τ. λ., and with πρὸς ἵνδουξιν κ. τ. λ.; and it would be rather more consonant with usual Greek idiom as to the meaning of διὰ. We should then have *three* co-ordinate clauses explanatory of προΐστω κ. τ. λ., instead of two. I should embrace this last interpretation, were it not that εἰς ἵνδουξιν and πρὸς ἵνδουξιν seem rather to favour the reception of only *two* co-ordinate clauses. The variation of the *prepositions*, in this case, would make nothing decisive against such an exegesis. Paul often varies them, where the sense is designed to be substantially the same.

The clause διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν . . . Θεοῦ, must on the whole then, be regarded as epexegetical of the preceding δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ, viz., his δικαιοσύνη was manifested *on account of*, *in respect to*, the remission of sins committed in former times, &c.

Πάρεσιν (from παρήμι) means *remission*, *passing by*, *dismissing*, &c.; and therefore it has the same sense with ἄρεσιν, as we should expect from the etymology of the word.—Προγεγονότων, *formerly done*, *committed in times before*. In the sense of *done*, *taken place*, or *committed*, γίνομαι is often used with respect to actions; e. g., Matt. vi. 10. Luke x. 13. xxiii. 24. ix. 7. xiii. 17, et alibi; see Bretschn. Lex. γίνομαι, 3.

(26) Ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ, *during the forbearance of God*. The uniting of this clause with verse 26, seems to be a mistake in Robert Stephens; for it is better connected with the preceding verse, and has reference either to πάρεσιν or προγεγονότων ἀμαρτημάτων. But to which of these? Does the writer mean to say, *remission . . . through the forbearance of God* to punish sin; or *sins formerly committed, while God forbore to punish*? The latter sense might be made out; for ἐν often has the sense of *during*, *dum est*; e. g., Matt. xii. 2, ἐν σαββάτῳ, *during the Sabbath*; Matt. xiii. 4, ἐν τῷ σπείρειν, *inter serendum*, *during the action of sowing*; John ii. 23, ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ, *during the feast*; John vii. 11. Acts viii. 33. xvii. 31. Rev. i. 10. But the former sense is preferable, and gives the idea of *remission* as introduced by, or con-

nected with *forbearance to punish*. Both together make the idea of *justification* an intensive one.

As to the general sentiment of the clause, it has in some respects a parallel, in Acts xvii. 30. "As to the times of this ignorance, *ὑπερῖδων ὁ Θεός*," i. e., God forbore punishment. But in our text the apostle speaks of the actual *remission* of sin which is connected with justification, i. e., the pardon of sin.

Πρὸς ἰνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ, is the same in all essential respects as *εἰς ἰνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ* in verse 25, for it is a mere resumption of the latter. 'Εν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ, *at the present time*, i. e., under the new dispensation. Thus has the apostle shown, that the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ extends, with respect to its efficacy, to all ages of the world, to all generations and nations; i. e., that it is capable of such an extent, where such a faith as God requires is exhibited. The parallel of this remarkable and most cheering and animating sentiment, is to be found in Heb. ix. 15. It is implied in other passages of the New Testament, not unfrequently; but it is no where else so explicitly asserted. The sentiment shows, moreover, in what light the apostle viewed the death of Christ. If this were to be regarded only as the death of a martyr to the truth, or as an example of constancy, &c., then how could its efficacy take hold on *προγεγονότων ἀμαρτημάτων*, whatever it might do as to those who lived *after* his death took place? This question seems to suggest the necessity of ascribing a *vicarious* influence to the death of Jesus; for how else can it avail for the forgiveness of sins committed in early ages?

Reiche, indeed, and some others, think the *προγεγονότων ἀμαρτημάτων* relates merely to the sins of individuals *before their conversion*; and so he doubts whether any promise of forgiveness is extended to sins committed *after* conversion; and there has been a serious controversy in Germany, excited by Loeffler, whether sins after regeneration are pardonable. How this could be called in question, after considering the examples of David, Peter, and others, and reflecting on such texts as 1 John ii. 1, 2, may justly be thought strange, if any thing in theology could be called so. According to the interpretation of Reiche, *ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ* is deprived of any important meaning. Mr. Barnes also rejects the idea that *προγεγονότων* refers to *past ages*, and thinks that the text requires no more than to understand it as designating the *past sins* of each individual living under the gospel. But what inducement the apostle could have to put in *προγεγονότων* on such a ground, or how *προγεγονότων ἀμαρτιῶν* could differ from the simple

ἀμαρτίων, as individually applied, I do not see. Less still do I feel the force of his remark, that it would be difficult, on the ground of the exegesis which I adopt, to avoid the conclusion that all men will be saved. If there be any foundation for this in the text, it applies with equal force to *gospel times*, and must prove the salvation of all who live in them. But the apostle has fully avoided any conclusion of this nature, as to the time *before* or *since* the gospel was published, by stating that salvation is ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας. Besides, ἐν τῇ νῦν καιρῷ is evidently emphatic and antithetic; and the antithesis can be found only in πρὸς γογγύσας ἀμαρτίων. The question is, 'whether Christ is the only Saviour of the race of man;' and this naturally extends to *past* ages, as well as present. Such a view exceedingly ennobles the whole subject, and is altogether consonant with the epistle to the Hebrews. Comp. Rom. v.

Εἰς τὸ εἶναι . . . Ἰησοῦ, *that he might be just, and yet the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus, i. e., has the faith of a Christian.* Here again is a great diversity of sentiment concerning δίκαιον some making it to signify *kind, benignant*, for which they appeal to Matt. i. 19. John xvii. 25. 1 John i. 9, and the frequent signification of the Hebrew דָּיָא and דִּקְיָא. But although the word is capable of this sense, the connection does not seem to admit it here, as it would make tautology. The difficulty seems to be, that commentators have overlooked the logical connection of the whole clause. The εἰς τὸ at the beginning of it, shows that it has a like object with εἰς ἐνδείξιν and πρὸς ἐνδείξιν, and is co-ordinate with them. There seems to me, however, to be this difference, viz., that in εἰς τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον κ. τ. λ., the writer looks back to the whole sentiment proposed in verses 21—24; which is, that all men are sinners, that a regard merely to law, i. e., justice merely on the part of God (he being δίκαιος merely) does not in itself permit justification by overlooking or setting aside the penalty against sin, and that the death of Christ is an expedient of infinite wisdom, by which the full claims of the law may be admitted, and yet the penalty avoided, because a moral compensation or equivalent has been provided by the sufferings of him who died in the sinner's stead. Here then are two things conspicuous, in this wonderful arrangement of wisdom and benevolence; *the first*, that God will not give up the penalty of his law without an adequate substitute for it, for he is δίκαιος, i. e., he retains a high and immutable regard to justice or rectitude, he is unwilling to sacrifice any part of the purity and strictness of his law, which is 'holy, and just, and

good;’ *the second*, that God has still provided a way by which he may retain all his regard to justice, and his law remain without being in any measure dishonoured or sacrificed, and yet the penitent sinner may be pardoned and treated as though he had yielded perfect obedience to it. These I take to be the sentiments conveyed by *δικαιον* and *δικαίουντα* in this passage. Bengel has happily expressed it; “Summum hic paradoxon evangelicum; nam in lege conspicitur Deus et condemnans, in evangelio justus ipse et justificans, peccatores.” As I can find no case in which *δικαιος* appears to mean either *justified* or *justifying*, I must retain the sense of *just* in this place.

Τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ is like οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς, οἱ ἐξ ἰσθμίας, &c. The phrase may be correctly translated: *The believer in Jesus*, or *him who is of the faith which believes in Jesus*, i. e., the true Christian believer. Ἰησοῦ is the Gen. of the *object*.

(27) Πῶ οὖν ἡ καύχησις; *where then is boasting or glorying?* That is, if what I have said be true, viz., that all men, both Jews and Gentiles, are sinners, and can be justified only by grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; then it follows, that all boasting of their own merits, all occasion of glorying in their special privileges is entirely excluded. This has a special reference to the Jews, who were so prone to boast of these things.

Διὰ ποῦ νόμου; *by what law or economy?* Νόμου appears to be used here in the sense of *religious economy* or *dispensation*, i. e., that which ordered or regulated the lives of men, and prescribed the reward of actions either good or bad.

Τῶν ἔργων; i. e., is it excluded, διὰ νόμου τῶν ἔργων; Is it excluded by that economy or rule of life, which places justification on the ground of perfect obedience to the law, i. e., of entirely performing all those *works* which the law demands?

Οὐχ! . . . πίστεως, *no, but by the economy or rule of faith.* That is, faith being the condition of justification under the gospel arrangement or νόμος, this excludes all claims of desert on the part of the sinner. The very statement of itself shows, that although faith is a *conditio sine qua non* of justification, yet it is *not* the *meritorious* or *procuring* cause of it. Νόμου πίστεως means *that arrangement which makes faith necessary to salvation*, but which, at the same time, bestows salvation merely as a gratuity.

(28) Λογιζόμεθα . . . νόμου, *we conclude, therefore, that a man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law*, i. e., we reckon or count it as certain, that men are justified in a *gratuitous* manner

through faith in Christ, and not by perfect obedience to the law or by perfectly doing those things which the law requires. What is meant by the phrase *being justified by faith*, is sufficiently plain here, inasmuch as it is opposed to *justification by works*; i. e., on the score of merit or perfect obedience. See remarks on chap. iv. 5. For γὰρ here, some Codices, &c., have οὖν; which gives a better sense, inasmuch as the conclusion here is a *logical* inference and not a mere *casual* suggestion. But as the weight of authority is on the side of γὰρ, I have followed this in the regular version.

Luther translates πιστι, ALLEIN durch den Glauben, i. e., by faith only, thus adding only to the text. And such were his views on this subject, that he rejected the epistle of James from the canon of the New Testament, because he thought that the second chapter of this epistle taught a doctrine different from that which Paul here inculcates. I must refer the reader to Excursus II. for a brief view of this subject.

(29) Ὁ Ἰουδαίων . . . ἰθὺν; *Is he the God of the Jews only? Is he not also of the Gentiles?* That is, why should it not be acknowledged, that “the God of the spirits of all flesh,” who “has made of one blood all the nations that dwell upon the face of the earth,” and who of old was named אֱלֹהֵי קַיָּה שְׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ—why should he not sustain the same relation to the *Gentiles* as to the *Jews*, and admit them to the like privileges? The ἤ here is simply interrogative. But an interrogation made by this, supposes that the person who is addressed will agree in the answer with the person who puts the question; so nicely are the Greek interrogative signs adjusted.

(30) He should, he must be so regarded. Ναί, καὶ [Θεός] ἰθὺν. To confirm this he adds: ἐπείπερ . . . πιστεύς, since it is one and the same God, who will justify the circumcised by faith, and the uncircumcised by faith. Εἷς, one and the same; so Luke, xii. 52. 1 Cor. x. 17. xi. 5, et al.—Ἐκ πίστεως and διὰ τῆς πίστεως are of the same import; for both ἐκ and διὰ are placed before the Genitive as signifying in the same sense the *instrumental* cause, in almost numberless examples.—Πιστομένην and ἀποβυστίαν are examples of the *abstract* put for the *concrete*, = Jews and Gentiles.

(31) Νόμον οὖν . . . πιστεύς; *Do we then make void the law through faith?* That is, do we counteract or annul the Old Testament Scriptures, by inculcating *gratuitous* justification? So I feel obliged to construe νόμον here, when I compare this verse with vers. 20, 21, and with chap. iv. where the object of the writer throughout is, to

show that the Old Testament inculcates the same doctrine as that which he here urges. So Flatt, Koppe, Tholuck, and others. Chrysostom also says νόμον here: τοῦτο [i. e., δικαιούν] οὐχ ἵσχυσεν ὁ νόμος. The argument which renders this exegesis quite plain, is that the apostle immediately proceeds to answer the objection here made, by showing that the Old Testament actually teaches the doctrine in question.

Νόμον ἱστώμεν, we confirm the law; i. e., we inculcate that which entirely accords with the Old Testament, and only serves to confirm it. Ἰστώμεν, is the unusual contract-form, from ἱστάω instead of ἱστῶμεν.

How *gratuitous justification* can be said to confirm or establish the *moral law* (as this text has been often explained), it seems difficult to make out. It would seem to be the *atonement* which goes to establish the claims of the moral law; how can *remission of the penalty* of itself establish such a law? That the doctrine of justification by faith does not, indeed, overthrow moral obligation; yea, that such a justification even serves in a most important way to promote holiness of life; the apostle shows in chap. vi. But his present concern is with the objection made to his sentiments, viz., the objection that he is weakening the force of the ancient Jewish Scriptures. Accordingly, he discusses this question at large in the following chapter.

CHAP. IV. 1—12.

THE writer now proceeds to show, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament do in fact confirm the view which he had given of *gratuitous justification*. To the question: What special advantages were bestowed on Abraham, in consequence of his peculiar covenant relation to God? the apostle replies, that he had no cause of glorying before God, on the ground of any *external privilege* which was his, verses 1, 2. The Scripture asserts, that *Abraham's faith was imputed to him for righteousness*; and consequently that he was gratuitously justified, verses 3, 4. So also David speaks of the subject of justification, representing it as *gratuitous forgiveness*, not as acceptance *pro meritis*, verses 6—8. If it be asked now, whether such forgiveness belongs only to those who are circumcised, i. e., to Abraham and his natural posterity, the answer is, that such cannot be the case; for Abraham was himself justified *antecedently* to his circumcision; and he received this rite merely as a token of confirmation in respect to the blessing already bestowed, and in order that he might be a spiritual father, i. e., an eminent pattern or exemplar of spiritual blessings, both to Gentiles and Jews, verses 9—12.

Verses 1—12 may be divided into three distinct parts, if the reader desires it; viz., (1)

Vers. 1—5, the justification of Abraham was *gratuitous*. (2) Vers. 6—8, David discloses the same views as to the method of acceptance with God. (3) Vers. 9—12, circumcision was not, and could not be, any ground at all of the justification of Abraham. I have, however, chosen to connect these under one general head, because I view the third particular as the answer to the question in ver. 1, and the first and second particulars as being preparatory to this, and also as having respect to the main design of the writer, which is, to show that the Old Testament Scriptures do in fact exhibit the same views of justification which he has given in the preceding context. The particular introduction to the remaining parts of the present chapter, will be found in its appropriate place.

(1) *Τί οὖν . . . κατὰ σάρκα ;* *What then shall we say that Abraham our father obtained in respect to the flesh ?* This question is parallel with those in chap. iii. 1. The apostle evidently suggests it as one which an opponent to his views would naturally ask. The import of it is : ‘ How then will your doctrine concerning justification as entirely gratuitous, agree with the views which the Scripture leads us to take of Abraham ? Had he no advantage from his precedence and privileges ? Was the covenant and rite of circumcision, by which he was distinguished from all the rest of the world, of no avail in his case ? Such is evidently the tenor of the discourse, whether we suppose the apostle to put such interrogations in his own person, or in that of his opponent.

Οὖν, then, i. e., on the ground which you take, what can we say, &c. ? The use of *οὖν* in questions where objections are raised, is very common among the Greeks. The meaning I have given above.—*τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν, our father,* shows that the objector here is supposed to be a Jew. *Εὐχρίνας obtained ;* comp. Luke i. 30. Heb. ix. 12,—*κατὰ σάρκα* is a controverted phrase here. Should it be united in sense with *τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν* ? Or must we join it with *εὐχρίνας* ? If the question here concerned the relation of Abraham respectively as a *spiritual* father and as a *natural* one, we should feel in a measure necessitated to join *κατὰ σάρκα* with *τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν*. Chrysostom, Erasmus, Limborch, and others, do thus join it ; and some manuscripts, in accordance with such views, have transferred *εὐχρίνας* and placed it *before* *τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν*. But as the weight of authority is against these ; as the *hyperbaton* or transposition, taking the text as it now stands, would be abrupt and improbable if we should join *κατὰ σάρκα* with *τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν* ; and especially as *κατὰ σάρκα* would not then add any thing to the idea designated by *τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν* ; so it would seem to be more eligible, to regard *κατὰ σάρκα* as qualifying *εὐχρίνας*. One meaning which has been given here to *σάρξ*, is *external privileges* or *advantages* ; and the appeal is made to 1 Cor. x. 18.

Phil. iii. 3. Gal. vi. 12, in order to confirm this; but these texts all plainly relate to circumcision. *σάρξ* sometimes means *that which is external* or *physical*, in distinction from that which is internal or spiritual; *e. g.*, Gal. iv. 23. Rom. ix. 8. In accordance with this general idea, and with probability on their side, Wetstein, Venema, Michaelis, Koppe, Bretschneider (*Lex.*), and others, understand by *κατὰ σάρκα* in our text, *circumcision*; *σάρξ* being frequently used to designate the physical member which was circumcised, or fleshly circumcision, *e. g.*, Phil. iii. 3. Gal. vi. 12. 1 Cor x. 18. Eph. ii. 11. Col. ii. 13; comp. Gen. xvii. 11, 14, 24, 25. Tholuck makes the objection to this exegesis, that the apostle does not undertake, in the sequel, to show that *circumcision* was not the ground of Abraham's justification, but that *works* were not. He also suggests, that the second verse seems to construe *κατὰ σάρκα* as being equivalent in sense to *ἐξ ἑγῶν*, Calvin renders *κατὰ σάρκα*, *naturaliter*; and Grotius, *propriis viribus*; to support which appeal has been made to Matt. xvi. 17. Gal i. 16; but there the phrase is, *flesh and blood*. But if we consider *κατὰ σάρκα* as the opposite of *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, and regard *πνεῦμα* as designing the *gracious spiritual influences* vouchsafed to believers under the gospel, the meaning of *κατὰ σάρκα* would then be: 'In respect to efforts by one's own natural powers, or efforts made in one's own strength.' This is the interpretation which for substance Tholuck defends. If however *κατὰ σάρκα* is to be taken as qualifying *εὐγενέας* (and so the present text compels us to take it), I must prefer the predominant sense of it in the epistles of Paul, *viz.*, *in respect to circumcision*; comp. iii. 1. where the very same question is put in a more literal way. The meaning of the question would then be: What good or advantage has Abraham our father obtained, in respect to the distinguishing rite which separated him from all the world and consecrated him to God? Of what use was it? The apostle in answer to the like question in chap. iii. 1. shows that the Jewish nation were all under sin and under condemnation, and that they can therefore lay no claim to justification on the ground of external privileges. The objector, however, is not satisfied with this general answer, but now suggests the case of Abraham as a more urgent one, and wishes to know whether we can justly hold that no pre-eminence was given to him on account of the covenant and the rite of circumcision. The apostle in his answer does not deny, or rather he *tacitly* admits, that Abraham enjoyed some advantage on account of his external privileges. He admits the same

thing *expressly* of the whole Jewish nation, iii. 2. But as to the great subject in question, viz., *gratuitous justification*, Paul avers at once that Abraham was not justified at all on the ground of his external advantages, or of any merit; for then he would have had matter of boasting. But this he has not before God; whatever may be the praise which his privileges or his conduct in general may deserve from men.

The particular reason why Paul introduces the case of Abraham here, in distinction from that of the Jews at large, seems to be, the use which he is to make of it in the sequel, in refuting the assumption of the objector. After showing in verses 2—9, that the justification of Abraham must have been gratuitous, the apostle proceeds to a special refutation of the idea that Abraham could have been justified *κατὰ σάρα*, i. e., on account of the rite and covenant of circumcision. Tholuck is therefore mistaken, when he states that the apostle has not laboured to contradict this groundless objection of the Jew. Indeed he has made this contradiction so prominent and striking, that one cannot well avoid the supposition, that he had this thing in view when he used the phrase *κατὰ σάρα*.

(2) *Εἰ γὰρ . . . καύχημα* [no ground of boasting], for if Abraham was justified by works, he has ground of boasting. This is the real response of the apostle, which is marked by the nature of the sentiment. *Γὰρ* is often implied in making replies; but when so employed, it is often the case that something is *implied* which is to precede it. So here the apostle means to say that Abraham had no *καύχησις* (comp. iii. 17), i. e., no ground for attributing justification to his own merits. The *γὰρ*, therefore, here follows *οὐ καύχησις*, which is to be mentally supplied before the clause in which the *γὰρ* stands. It introduces the reason why he has no ground of glorying in his own works.

That Abraham was not *justified* by any works or merits of his own, certainly not in the sight of God, the apostle now goes on to assert and to prove. When he says, *εἰ, if, &c.*, he makes a supposition which he regards as untenable; for this is indicated by the *Ind. Præter* (*ἰδιαιωθέν*) joined with *εἰ*; see New Testament Grammar, § 129. 3. d. We should naturally have expected after this, that the Imperf. *ἔχῃ ἄν* (instead of *ἔχῃ*) would have been used in the *apodosis* of this conditional sentence. The use of the present instead of this, shows a design on the part of the writer to say, not only that Abraham *would have had* ground of glorying, in case of

perfect obedience, but that the same would have continued down to the then present time.

'Αλλ' Θεόν, *but not* [*i. e.* he had no ground of boasting] *before God*. Whatever advantage then the Jew might attribute to Abraham, he could not justly attribute that of obtaining justification by his own privileges or merits. So the writer goes on to prove from the Jewish Scriptures.

Οὐ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν may be considered either as referring to ἔχει καύχημα or to ἐξ ἔργων ἰδικαιώθη. The sense will be substantially the same. The immediate antecedent, in such a case, has the preference; and therefore I consider it as referring to ἔχει καύχημα.

It is singular, that such critics as Beza, Grotius, Semler, Koppe, Tholuck, and Rückert, should understand the reasoning of the apostle in this verse thus; 'If Abraham were justified by works, then he would have cause of glorying; he had glory indeed among *men* on this account, but *not before God*.' 'Αλλά in this case, is understood as *concessive* (in part) and at the same time *adversative*. But the sequel in verses 4, 5, introduced by γὰρ *confirmantis*, shows, that the apostle's object is to prove simply, that Abraham had no ground of acceptance *before God* on account of his works or merit, but that he was justified altogether in a *gratuitous* manner. Inasmuch then as the apostle is not discussing the question, whether Abraham had any ground of praise or justification from *men*, but merely on what ground he was justified before God, the mode of reasoning stated above would be altogether inapposite to the writer's design. Besides, if it were true that Abraham were justified by works, according to the supposition made, then it would be true also that he would have the praise of God as well as of men; so that the denial here of such a praise would contradict the nature of the case and other Scriptures; comp. ii. 6, 29. Reiche has examined at length and wholly refuted the above exegesis.

The reasoning of the apostle may be simply stated thus: 'If Abraham had been justified by his own merit, then he would have ground of glorying; but he has no ground of glorying before God; [therefore he was not justified by his merit.]' The conclusion is omitted by the apostle, apparently on the ground that every intelligent reader's mind will supply it. But that he supposes such a conclusion is clear from verses 3, 4, inasmuch as these are expressly introduced, for the sake of confirmation, as the γὰρ at the commencement of them shows.

(3) *For what saith the Scripture? And Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness*; see Gen. xv. 6, which runs thus: "And he [God] counted it to him [Abraham] as righteousness." Instead of the *active* form, the apostle (with the Seventy) employs the *passive* one, which for substance communicates the same sense. But what is λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην?

The word λογίζεσθαι usually means, *to reckon to one what he actually possesses*, or *to impute that to him which actually belongs to him*, i. e., to treat him as actually possessing the thing or quality reckoned to him; e. g., Ps. cvi. 31 (cv. 31), which states the case of Phinehas' good deed in slaying the polluted Israelite and Midianitish woman, and says, 'it was counted to him for righteousness' (Num. xxv. 6, seq.); 2 Sam. xix. 19, where Shimei prays David: μὴ λογισάσθω ὁ κύριός μου ἀνομίαν, i. e., the iniquity which Shimei himself had done. The same in Ps. xxxii. 2 (xxxii. 2), where David pronounces the man blessed, to whom the Lord does not impute iniquity (οὐ μὴ λογίζεσθαι ἀνομίαν). In Lev. vii. 8 (vii. 18) the Sept. has οὐ λογισθήσεται αὐτῷ, viz., the informal and untimely offering which any one makes, shall not be reckoned to him as an offering. So in Lev. xvii. 4, if a man kill a victim for sacrifice without bringing it to the door of the tabernacle, "blood," i. e., bloodguiltiness, "shall be imputed to him, ἵκειν ᾧ λογισθήσεται . . . αἷμα." Num. xviii. 27, "Thus your heave-offering λογισθήσεται ὑμῖν, shall be counted to you as wheat from the floor, &c., Prov. xxvii. 14, "He that blesseth his friend with a loud voice, rising up early in the morning, a curse shall be counted to him." (בְּשֵׁף, the Sept. does not employ λογίζομαι here). These are all the instances in the Old Test. where the word בְּשֵׁף, which corresponds to λογίζομαι, is employed in designating any action, word, or thing, as imputed or reckoned to a person: and in all these, it is uniformly one's own doings, words, or actions, and not those of another, which are imputed. The verb בְּשֵׁף is indeed often employed in other cases; but only in the sense of *thinking, supposing, imagining, devising*; or else as signifying *making account of, regarding, or esteeming*; all of which cases have no direct bearing on the present investigation.

In the New Test. the word λογίζομαι is often employed, like the Hebrew בְּשֵׁף, in the sense of *thinking, computing, reckoning, esteeming, regarding, supposing, considering, devising, meditating, &c.*; in which senses it has no direct bearing on our present enquiry. The only cases that are apposite to our purpose, are those in which some-

thing is *imputed* or *counted* to persons. These, independently of the instances which relate directly to Abraham's case, are 2 Cor. v. 19, where it is said: "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself, not *imputing* ($\mu\eta$ λογίζεμενος) to them their trespasses, i. e., their *own* sins. In 2 Tim. iv. 16, Paul says of those who forsook him: " $\mu\eta$ αὐτοῖς λογισθεῖν, let it not be imputed to them," i. e., let, not their offence be reckoned to them. All the other cases in which λογίζομαι is employed in the sense of *reckoning something to an individual*, are of one tenor, and have respect either to Abraham himself, or else to those whose case is compared with his. These may be found in Rom. iv. 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 22, 23, Gal. iii. 6. James ii. 23. In Rom. v. 13, $\epsilon\lambda\lambda\omicron\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ is construed by many as meaning *imputed* or *counted*, but I apprehend the true meaning to be *regarded*, *made account of*. In Philem. ver. 18, the same word again occurs, and there in the sense of *reckon*, or *put to the account of*. But this is a different word from λογίζομαι, which is now before us, and is never employed in respect to the matter of justification. In all the cases of λογίζομαι as applied to Abraham's faith, or to that of others who follow his example, it is only *his* or their *own* faith, which is counted for righteousness; not the faith of others put to their account.

But another point of no small philological interest to be investigated, is the peculiar form of the expression λογίζομαι εἰς. Indeed the sense of the passage before us seems, at first view, as if it must turn upon this. But here nothing except resort to the Hebrew idiom can solve the difficulty; for the form of expression is purely *Hebraistic*. The Hebrews had two modes of expression when they said that *one thing was counted or reckoned as another*. (1) The thing counted or reckoned was put in the Accus. after שׁוּבָה; and the thing for which or as which it was counted, was put in the Dat. with לְ (= *to*) before it; e. g., Job xiii. 24, וְתִשְׁבְּחֵנִי לְאֹיִבַי, and thou dost count me for an enemy. In like manner, Job xli. 19, 24. xix. 15. xxxiii. 10. 1 Kings x. 21. Lam. iv. 2, where the Pass. retains the Dat. after it. (2) The thing counted was put in the Acc. as in No. 1, while the thing for which it was counted took the particle אֲשֶׁר before it; e. g., Job xix. 11, וְאֲשֶׁר יִסְמְךָ כְּאֹיִבִי, and he counts me as his enemy. So Isa. xl. 15. Num. xviii. 27. Once (Ps. lxxxviii. 5) we have אֲשֶׁר (with) instead of אֲשֶׁר (as.)

In accordance with the first mode (the Acc. of the thing and the Dative of the person with לְ) are most of the cases where any thing

is said to be *reckoned* or *imputed* to individuals; e. g., Ps. xxxii. 2 (xxxi. 2.) Gen. xv. 6. 2 Sam. xix. 26; and with the Pass. voice retaining the Dat. after it, Lev. vii. 18 (vii. 8.) xvii. 4. Num. xviii. 27. Prov. xxvii. 14. In Ps. cvi. 31, we find ζ both before the *thing* reckoned and *person* to whom it is reckoned.

I do not apprehend that any important difference as to the sense can be pointed out between the two modes of expression in the Hebrew as designated above, viz., ζ $\alpha\psi\eta$ and ϵ $\alpha\psi\eta$. The form $\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\zeta\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, or $\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\zeta\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ or $\acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$, is employed by the Sept. for ζ $\alpha\psi\eta$, e. g., $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ for ζ in Job xli. 24 (23). Lam. iv. 2; $\acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$ for ζ in Job xli. 19 (18.) xxxiii. 10. In like manner, $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ is put for ϵ , in Num. xviii. 27. Is. xl. 15. Job xix. 11 ($\acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$.) Nor do I apprehend that $\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\zeta\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ and $\lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\zeta\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$ $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ or $\acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$ have any perceptible difference of meaning. And in our text, whether we say with the apostle: *καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην*, and it [i. e., Abraham's act of believing] was counted to him for righteousness; or say, in more exact conformity with the shape of the Hebrew; *καὶ αὐτὸ ἐλόγησεν αὐτῷ ὡς δικαιοσύνην*, i. e., he [God] imputed it [the act of believing] to him as righteousness: the sense is one and the same. The bare expression, in and by itself, and simply considered, can mean no more than that *God imputed the act of believing to Abraham as righteousness*.

The *gratuity* then of Abraham's justification cannot be made out, as it would seem, merely from the *mode* of expression here employed. This of itself would not decide the point. It decides no more than that God reckoned Abraham's faith as a *righteousness* or *righteous act*. And so the same thing is said of the act of Phinehas, Ps. cvi. 31. And in general, where one's own act is said to be imputed to him, whether it be a good or bad one, the meaning is not of course that it is *gratuitously* imputed to him, but that it is imputed to him because it belongs to him, and therefore the imputation or reckoning to him accords with the reality.

On this account some commentators have considered Paul here as putting a forced sense upon the words of Gen. xv. 6, which they say, decides nothing more than that God counted to Abraham an act of faith as righteousness, which was indeed such an act, and therefore deserved to be so counted. And further, to confirm this view they suggest, that *faith* is a *DUTY*, and therefore to be placed on the same ground with all other duties; and that Christ himself

calls it the *work of God*, viz., the work which God requires, John vi. 29. How then, they ask, can this prove the *gratuitous* justification of Abraham?

The difficulty at first view seems to be considerable. Nevertheless a due consideration of the nature of the case will help, I trust, to remove it.

There are but two methods of acceptance with God, or of justification before him, which are possible: the one by complete obedience to the law of God, and therefore on the ground of *merit*; the other, by gratuitous pardon and acceptance vouchsafed to him who has broken the law. The simple point which Paul is here labouring to establish, is, that the first method of justification is impossible, under the present circumstances of men and with their present character; and consequently that *gratuitous* justification is the only way of acceptance that is now open.

Now Abraham either kept all the law, or he did not. It is taken for granted, (as well it might be, after what the apostle had said,) that *he did not*. Justification on the ground of *merit* then, is out of all question. There remains therefore only *gratuitous* justification.

But how much must *gratuitous* be supposed to mean? Does it imply that there is no *condition* on which the gratuity is to be bestowed, no regard to character, state of mind, penitence, confidence in proffered mercy, or any thing else? Certainly not. The gospel with all its freeness and largeness of beneficence, promises salvation only to those *who believe*. "He that believeth, shall be saved."

Here then is the general principle, or *conditio sine qua non*, of free and unmerited pardon and acceptance. Does the example of Abraham confirm and ratify this principle? It does. It is an instance in point. He *believed*, and righteousness was counted to him. But this could have been done in no other way, than that by belief he was brought within the pale of offered mercy. If a man commits one sin, and thus comes under the curse of the law, all hopes of acceptance or salvation on *law-ground* are utterly at an end. But here Abraham, a sinner, once probably an idolater (Josh. xxiv. 14,) was accepted and treated as righteous, when he exercised an act of faith, which is the necessary condition of gratuitous pardon. Now this could not have taken place, if Abraham had not been *gratuitously* accepted. The gospel condition of gratuitous justification was complied with by him, i. e., he exhibited faith; and

so acceptance, such as the gospel promises, was the consequence of this faith, or was connected with it.

We are not to understand the apostle, as it seems plain to me, to assert that Abraham's faith, as such, was in the particular instance related in Gen. xv. 1—5, the principal ground or *meritorious* cause of his final and complete justification. This would defeat the express declarations of verses 4, 5. In these he takes it for granted, that Abraham could plead no merit, and make no claim on the score of simple justice. He takes it for granted too, that *justification by faith* does of necessity imply, (as truly it does and must imply,) that the acceptance in such cases is a matter of mere *gratuity*, and not of merit or desert.

Faith then may be a *duty* and a *work*, and may be one necessary to gratuitous justification, and may be required because it is reasonable in itself and necessary in order to prepare the sinner for justification: and yet the man who is already a sinner can put in no claim for acceptance on the ground of *merit*, because he exercises faith. Acceptance in this way must of course be *gratuitous*.

Why then does not the apostle establish his point, when he shows that Abraham was accepted in consequence of *believing*, and not because he had obeyed the whole law?

No act of Abraham, after he had once fallen under the curse of the law, could of itself redeem him from that curse. Nothing that he did, or could do, would atone for past sins. And no act that he did would be *perfect*. Acceptance therefore on the ground of merit, was impossible in these circumstances; and any act of his, either faith or any other, if counted at all for righteousness, must be so counted *gratuitously*. But if so, then the very point which Paul is labouring to establish, is confirmed.

It is the *nature of the case* then, and not the diction merely which is employed, that shows what it is which is here proved by the apostle. We might indeed make some appeal to the nature of the language. We might say, that *faith* is not properly *obedience to the law*, as such; certainly, it is not *entire* obedience. Nor was the faith that was exercised by Abraham full and perfect. At least we may argue this from the imperfect condition of any and every sinful man. That it should be *counted for righteousness*, then, would seem to imply, that it was counted for something which in and of itself it was not, *i. e.*, it was not a *perfect* righteousness such as the law demands. To count it then for a righteousness would imply an act of *grace* on

the part of God. Not that the apostle means to say, that God actually, in his own real estimation, judged Abraham's faith to be a different thing from what it was, and a perfect virtue which of itself could claim acceptance with him. It is impossible for a moment to suppose this; because it would be supposing that God puts a wrong estimate upon things. We come therefore of necessity to the conclusion, that *counting for righteousness* means, *to accept and treat as righteous*. More than this we cannot suppose, without at the same time supposing, that God makes in his own mind an estimate of things different from what they really are.

It is highly important that the reader should here call to mind, also, that Paul is not now labouring to show in what relation Christ stands to all that find acceptance, as the meritorious cause or ground of their pardon. He had already shown this, in the preceding chapter. The simple point now before him is, whether justification through this Saviour is *meritorious* or *gratuitous*. Hence he does not say here, that the righteousness of Christ became the righteousness of Abraham by imputation or transfer. It was inapposite to his present purpose to discuss this point. He simply avers, that the *conditio sine qua non* of gratuitous justification was complied with by Abraham, who therefore was justified in a *gratuitous* manner. Whatever other parts of Scripture may teach in relation to the imputed righteousness of Christ, no declaration on that point is to be found here. Abraham's *own faith*, and an individual act of it, viz., his giving credit to the divine promises, is the subject of the apostle's assertions.

In a word; the shape of Paul's argument appears to me as being substantially this, viz., 'justification is *gratuitous*; for righteousness was not counted to Abraham on the ground of perfect obedience, but in consequence of his compliance with the necessary condition of gratuitous justification, i. e., in consequence of his exercising faith. Now if he was accepted and treated as just on such ground, it follows of necessity that he could not have been accepted on the ground of merit, and consequently that his justification was *gratuitous*.'

In other words; Paul introduces an individual occurrence and example in the life of Abraham, in which case faith was counted and treated as obedience, in order to prove that justification, even in respect to the most eminent of all the Hebrew saints, was a mere matter of gratuity. Now if this was true in his case, it must be in all others. And thus his object is gained by an illustration

and confirmation of the principle which he is endeavouring to inculcate.

(4) Τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ (Midd. voice), *to him who worketh, i. e., to him who performs all the ἔργα νόμου, to him who yields entire obedience to the precepts of law; compare the remarks on ἔργα νόμου under iii. 20 above.* Ἐργαζομένῳ here is equivalent to ὁ ποιῶν τὰ ἔργα comp. iii. 20, 27, 28. ii. 15; also verse 6. below. Luther translates: *Der mit Werken umgeheth*; Beza: *Is qui ex opere est aliquid promeritus*. Tholuck defends Luther's version. To me it seems to convey truth, but not the *whole* truth. Better has Turretin said: *Per eum qui operatur non intelligimus . . . eos qui bona opera faciunt, sed eos qui perfectè implērunt legem Dei absque ullo defectu*.

Reiche thinks that this is giving an emphasis or intensity to the word ἐργαζομένῳ which does not belong to it. The ground of his objection is, that in this way all rewards would be excluded, inasmuch as no man is perfect. But is it not true that all rewards of *merit* on law-ground, *i. e.*, that of entire perfection, are excluded? It seems to be a very clear doctrine of the New Testament, that the good works which are rewarded, are *gratuitously* rewarded in proportion to their desert of reward. *Imperfect* good works can now be accepted and rewarded, through grace by Christ, which under a law-system could put in no claim for reward or acceptance; a principle that does not seem to be generally understood.

Ὁ μισθός . . . χάριν, *reward is not rewarded or counted as a matter of grace; i. e.*, it is his just *due*, as the sequel (ἀλλὰ κατὰ δφείλημα) shows: a due in consequence of the promise or engagement of reward which the law contains, and not because the obedience of men can really profit the Divine Being, so as to lay him under obligations on this account.

(5) Τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐργαζομένῳ, *but to him who does not yield perfect obedience*; plainly the opposite of the first part of the fourth verse. The meaning is: 'To the sinner who has not exhibited perfect obedience, but πιστεύοντι κ. τ. λ., who believeth on him who justifieth the ungodly,' *i. e.*, on Christ who died for sinners, and on account of whose death they are justified; comp. v. 8—10. iv. 25. 1 Pet. iii. 18. Heb. ix. 28, et al.

λογιζεται . . . δικαιοσύνης, *his faith is counted as righteousness; i. e.*, through belief in Christ who died for sinners, he comes to be treated or accepted as if he were himself righteous; in other words, through the favour of God he is freed from the penalty of the law,

and accepted and treated as he would be, had he been perfectly obedient. The meaning of the phrase, *counted for righteousness*, is of course the same here as in ver. 3; and in both cases it is very plain, that it signifies *gratuitous* or *unmerited* justification on the grounds already explained. We may add here, that by the apostle's own explanation in the context, this justification is one which is *κατὰ χάριν* (24), and *χωρὶς ἔργων* (verse 6.) While *faith* or *belief* then is absolutely necessary in order to prepare a man to become the proper subject of the gratuitous justification which the gospel proffers; while without faith he cannot be justified; yet faith is not in any *legal* sense the meritorious ground of justification, nor does the promise attached to it imply a reward of *merit*, but only of *grace*.

The whole matter lies in a short compass. 'On the ground of works, *i. e.*, of perfect obedience and therefore of merit, none can be justified, because all are sinners. If any then are justified at all, it must be of *grace*; but this grace, although *freely* bestowed and without any just claims on the part of the sinner, is still *not unconditionally* bestowed. *Faith* in him who died to save sinners, is requisite to prepare one for the reception of pardon; and he who is justified in this way, as a consequence of his faith, is still justified in a manner altogether gratuitous.'

Some commentators suppose that Paul means to characterize Abraham, by the *μὴ ἐργαζομένῳ* and *τὸν ἀσπεζῶν* in verse 5. But although he doubtless means to include him, yet the propositions in verses 4, 5, are of wider extent than an individual case, and they declare a general truth of which Abraham's case is only a particular example or illustration.

(6) *Καθάπερ καὶ . . . ἀνθρώπου, in the like manner, also David congratulates the man.* The apostle having adduced the example of Abraham as being *gratuitously* justified through faith, now goes on to add the example of David, in order to show (what he had before asserted in iii. 31) that he does not disannul the Old Testament Scriptures by avowing the doctrine of *gratuitous* justification. *Δίγμι μαχαρισμὸν, utters congratulation.* *Μάχαρ* means *happy*; *μαχαρίζω*, to call or pronounce one happy, *i. e.*, congratulate; and of course *μαχαρισμός*, means *congratulation*, not happiness. I have used the word *congratulate* in the translation here, because the words, *utters praise, eulogizes, praises, &c.* would not convey the idea of the original. *Felicem dicere* the Latins could say; and we might translate *pronounceth happy, &c.* as I have done in the version. *Ὁ ὁ Θεός . . .

ἔργων, *i. e.*, whom God accepts and treats as righteous *χωρὶς ἔργων*, without entire obedience to the law, without having done all the works which the law enjoins; comp. verse 5 above, with the references there. *To impute righteousness without works*, designates the same thing for substance as *to count faith for righteousness*; both being designed to designate *gratuitous* justification.

From the use made of δικαιοσύνη in verses 3—6 here (and elsewhere in this chapter where the same phraseology occurs,) it is evident that the word is not to be understood in the sense of *justification* (which is the more common meaning of it in our epistle,) but in the usual sense of נָדָבָה. To say that *faith was counted for JUSTIFICATION*, would make no tolerable sense; but to say—*it was counted as complete obedience*, would be saying just what the apostle means to say, *viz.*, that the believer is gratuitously justified, in the manner that has been explained above.

(7) Μακάριοι, *happy, greatly privileged*.—Ἀφίθησαν, *are remitted*, from ἀφίημι *to remit, forgive*—ᾧς ἐπικαλύφθησαν *are covered*; a figurative expression, not unfrequently applied to the remission of sins. *To cover or conceal*, is to remove from sight or notice; and sins which are left out of sight and out of notice, of course are sins which are not punished. Comp. in Is. xxxviii. 17. Mic. vii. 19. Job. xiv. 17.

(8) *Happy the man, to whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity! i. e.*, the sin which he has committed. The meaning is: 'Happy the man who obtains forgiveness of his sins, and is accepted and treated as if he were righteous.' *To impute one's own iniquity to him*, is to hold him accountable for it in respect to the demands of punitive justice.

To cover sins and impute not iniquity, means to pardon sin and to treat with favour; and this is substantially the same thing which is designated by *counting faith for righteousness*; *i. e.*, both forms of expressions denote *gratuitous acceptance with God*. They differ not as to *substance* of meaning, but as to *modus* of diction or costume.

The apostle has now prepared the way to refute the special allegation designed to be made by the question in ver. 1, *τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν* Ἀβραάμ τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν εὐρηκέναι κατὰ σάρκα; He has shown that acceptance on the ground of merit or perfect obedience is out of the question; for even Abraham and David were justified through faith gratuitously, and not ἐξ ἔργων. No ground of boasting, then, could be claimed by either of these conspicuous individuals. It was

grace only that saved them. But if it is true in the general sense here stated, that salvation is in all cases entirely a matter of *gratuity*, a question still remains, viz. Is this gratuity bestowed only on those who are circumcised, i. e., on the Jews only, or is it also granted to the Gentiles? The prejudiced Jew of course would hold to the first. The apostle therefore, having discussed the general question, whether in respect to offences against the divine law, and in regard to the matter of justification, the Jew had any pre-eminence over the Gentile, now comes to the special consideration of the question about circumcision, which was first asked in chap. iii. 1, and again virtually repeated by the *ἐξηκείναι κατὰ σάρκα* in chap. iv. 1.

(9) The discussion on this particular point he now introduces by the inquiry : 'Ὁ μακαρισμὸς . . . ἀποβύσκειαν; [Is] *this congratulation then respecting the circumcised [only], or also the uncircumcised;* That is, granting there is cause for pronouncing blessed the man whose sins are forgiven and whose iniquities are covered, still it may be asked : 'Does gratuitous pardon belong only to the Jews? Or are we to suppose that David may here mean to include the Gentiles also? Do God's promised mercies belong to his own peculiar people only, who are of the circumcision ; or are they also bestowed on the idolatrous heathen ?

Λέγομεν γὰρ supposes an *implied* answer in the *affirmative* to the preceding questions, viz., 'The privilege belongs also to the uncircumcised.' That such may be the case, the apostle now proceeds to show, by the allegation that Abraham was justified in an *uncircumcised* state. The inference is, that David could not mean to exclude such cases as that of Abraham himself. In this way the *γὰρ* is easily accounted for here ; and the like is often true respecting its reference to some *implied* sentiment ; see Passow and Brettschn. on *γὰρ*. For a like *aposiopesis* of the answer to a question, see iv. 2.

(10) Πῶς οὖν . . . ἀποβύσκεια? *How then was it counted? While he was in a state of circumcision or of uncircumcision? Not in a state of circumcision, but of uncircumcision?* In *ἐν περιστάσει* x. c. λ., the *ἐν* stands (as often) before the *Dative of condition*, i. e., the Dative of a noun designating state or condition.

The design of the writer is plain. Abraham's *faith was imputed to him for righteousness*, i. e., he was gratuitously justified, *before* the covenant of circumcision was made with him, and of course before he was a partaker in this rite. Consequently the privilege in question

is not limited to those who are circumcised, and therefore does not depend on circumcision.

(11) Καὶ σημείον . . . ἐν ἀκροβυστίᾳ, and he received the sign of circumcision as a seal of the righteousness by faith, which [he obtained] while in a state of uncircumcision. That is, circumcision was not the cause or ground of his faith being counted for righteousness, or of his being gratuitously justified; it was merely a *seal*, i. e., a token of confirmation (for such is σφραγίς, 1 Cor. ix. 2. 2 Tim. ii. 19) in respect to the blessing which he had before obtained. The allusion in the language is to the practice of confirming written instruments, by seals placed on them in token of ratification. τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως, might here be rendered *of the justification which is by faith*; but the idiom of this chapter rather points us to a different version. There is, however, no ground for mistake here inasmuch as the qualifying words τῆς πίστεως, in connection with what had before been said, sufficiently guard against it.

We might naturally expect the *article* here, viz., τὸ σημεῖον τῆς περιτομῆς, inasmuch as the thing is specific and monadic; but for this very reason also, the article may be omitted, because there is no danger of mistake; see N. Test. Gramm. § 89, 2 a. b.

Σημεῖον means *a symbol, a token, an external visible mark*. In τῆς ἐν ἀκροβυστίᾳ the τῆς is referred by many to πίστεως; but the nature of the case seems plainly to demand, that it should be referred to the compound idea designated by τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως.

The circumstance here related is fatal to the claims of the bigoted Jew, with respect to circumcision. But the apostle is not satisfied with simply repelling the enemy. He advances into his camp, and takes entire possession. 'Abraham was not only justified before he was circumcised, but this was done for the very purpose of confirming the truth which I am proclaiming. He was justified before the covenant of circumcision, εἰς τὸ εἶναι . . . δικαιοσύνην, in order that he might be the father of all those who believe in a state of uncircumcision, so that righteousness might also be imputed to them.' That is; God, in justifying Abraham before he was circumcised, did intend to make him a father, i. e., an eminent leader, pattern, or example, to Gentile as well as Jewish believers, and to show that righteousness might be imputed to the uncircumcised as well as to the circumcised. Δι' ἀκροβυστίας is an example of *διά conditionis*, i. e., of *διά* before a noun in the Genitive which designates state or condition.

It is of the same import, when thus employed, as the Dative with *iv* as used above, and is here evidently commuted for it. The meaning of the whole verse is, that Abraham received the sign of circumcision as a confirmation of his justification by faith in an uncircumcised state; and this was thus solemnly confirmed in order that he might be a spiritual father, *i. e.*, an eminent pattern or example, to Gentiles who would also be gratuitously justified in an uncircumcised state.

Εἰς τὸ λογισθῆναι κ. τ. λ., designates the consequence, or the object in respect to which *paternity* and *sonship* existed, viz., that of being gratuitously justified, *i. e.*, of having righteousness imputed to them, which means the same thing. The *καί* in this clause is omitted in A., B., several MSS. minusc., and some versions. It is unnecessary; but still it does not mar the sense, as may be seen in the version.

(12) In all this, moreover, the apostle admits that there was another object in view, viz., that Abraham should be the spiritual father of the *circumcised*, as well as of the uncircumcised, *i. e.*, that he should be an eminent example to all, both Jews and Gentiles, of that gratuitous justification which God bestows on men, and which is universally proffered under the gospel dispensation. So the sequel: *Καὶ πατέρα. . . Ἀβραάμ*, and the father of those who are circumcised, who are not only of the circumcision, but walk in the steps of that faith which our father Abraham had while in a state of *uncircumcision*. The ellipsis in the construction of this part of the sentence must be filled up thus; [*εἰς τὸ εἶναι*] αὐτὸν πατέρα κ. τ. λ., which the mind spontaneously carries forward from the preceding clause; this second clause being *co-ordinate* with the preceding one which begins with *εἰς τὸ εἶναι*. The connection requires us to understand the apostle as asserting, that the sign of circumcision which Abraham received, as a seal of the righteousness of faith or a token of confirmation in respect to his gratuitous justification, was received by him in order that he might be the spiritual father of such Jews as imitated his example, as well as of Gentiles. The writer clearly makes the same distinction here, that he does in chap. ii. 28, 29. Not the literal posterity only of Abraham, or only his descendants by natural generation who received the external sign of circumcision in their flesh, were the children of this patriarch in the sense here intended. *To walk in the steps of Abraham's faith*, means to follow the example

of Abraham, to possess and exercise a faith like his. It is to such and only to such, that Abraham is a *spiritual* father.

This last clause of the verse renders very plain what is meant, when Abraham is called the *father* of both Gentile and Jewish believers. The word ܐܬܪ , *πατήρ*, employed in this way, designates (as before remarked) an *exemplar*, a *pattern*, a *leading and eminent example* after which others copy; comp. for such a sense, Gen. iv. 20, 21. John viii. 38, 41, 44, where the devil is called the *father* of the wicked Jews, comp. also 1 Macc. ii. 54. So in the verse before us, the *children* of Abraham are those *who walk in the steps of his faith* i. e., imitate his example.

One difficulty remains in respect to *τοῖς στοιχοῦσι*. The repetition of the article before it here seems as if the writer intended to distinguish those whom it designates, from the *τοῖς οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον* which (by placing the *οὐκ* before *τοῖς*) would mean, *not only to those of the circumcision*; and then *ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς κ. τ. λ.* would mean, *but also to those who walk, &c.*, i. e., but also to Gentiles who imitate Abraham's faith. To this purpose the Syriac version, the Vulgate, Theodoret, Anselm, Castalio, Grotius, Koppe, and others. But the objection to this is, that heathen believers have already been mentioned in the preceding verse; and that the writer seems plainly here intending to characterize such Jews, and only such, as were the spiritual children of Abraham, i. e., to whom he was a spiritual father. The repetition of the article before *στοιχοῦσι* in this case is indeed peculiar; Tholuck calls it a *solecism*, and Rückert says it is not to be tolerated. I regard it, however, as a *resumption* of the sentence begun with the preceding *τοῖς*, and interrupted by the *οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ*, the former part of which has the sense of an adjective qualifying the *τοῖς*; but inasmuch as the resumption gives a new characteristic, it was necessary that the part. *στοιχοῦσι* should have the article; as in other like cases. In this view Reiche fully concurs.

CHAP. IV. 13—18.

THE apostle now proceeds to another illustration and confirmation of his assertions respecting gratuitous justification. The Jew gloried in belonging to a nation to whom God had given a revealed law, and looked upon the pre-eminence which this gave him, as a proof that God would treat him with special favour in a spiritual respect. The reader has only to look back, and re-peruse chapter ii. 17—24, in order to see what dependence the Jews were prone to place upon the knowledge which they possessed of the Holy Scriptures, and their superiority in this respect over the Gentiles. In order to take away all ground of glorying in this manner, the apostle here proceeds distinctly to remind them, that Abraham was not justified by any such privilege, the law having been given more than four hundred years after the time in which he lived. Such, then, as are his spiritual children, *i. e.*, such as are justified on grounds like those on which he was justified, cannot regard the law as the ground of their justification.

The proof of the writer's position is very striking, and could not fail to make a deep impression on the mind of a serious Jew. The manner in which it is exhibited, is well adapted to make such an impression. 'Abraham,' says the apostle, 'did not receive promises for himself and his seed, on account of the law or by means of the law, but gratuitously, *i. e.*, by the righteousness of faith, verse 13. Now if the possession of the law, or obedience to it, were necessary to constitute Abraham and his seed heirs of the promises, then heirship by faith, and the promises connected with this, would be annulled, because these were granted to Abraham before the giving of the law, verse 14. The law, moreover, is so far from being the ground of such promises, that it is a means of indignation on the part of God towards sinners, *i. e.*, means of their punishment: for it is the prohibitions of the law which constitute and define transgressions, and if there were no law, there could be no transgression, verse 15. Such being the case, the promises are not made on the ground of law, but through the instrumentality of faith, *i. e.*, gratuitously, in order that all the seed might be assured respecting them, both Gentiles who have not the law, and Jews who have it, provided they have like faith with Abraham, the spiritual father of all, verse 16. The Scripture points out such a relation of Abraham to all true believers, and he is regarded as sustaining such an one, by him who raises the dead to life, and calls things out of nothing into existence, verse 17. Such was the faith of the father of believers, that he put entire confidence in the divine declarations, when, to all human appearance, there was no ground to hope that they could be carried into execution; so that he became the spiritual father of many nations, Gentiles as well as Jews, according to the tenor of the Scripture promise: *So shall thy seed be*, verse 18.

(13) Οὐ γὰρ . . . σπείραται αὐτοῦ, *for not by the law was the promise made to Abraham, or to his seed.* Γὰρ is fixed to a sentence, the object of which is to confirm the preceding declaration, that Abraham was the *spiritual* father of both Jews and Gentiles, not by any external rite or privilege, but through faith.—Διὰ νόμου *through law, by means of the law.* The writer designs by it either to designate the *possession* of the law, the privilege of living under it, and being the depositary of it, or else he means *obedience* to it. Δὲν inclined to give it the former sense here, on account of the οὐ ἐκ νόμου

in verse 14, which rather designates such as live under the law than those who fulfil it.

What the *promise* made to Abraham and his seed was, the writer proceeds to tell us, viz., τὸ κληρονόμουν . . . κόσμου, *that he should be heir or possessor of the world*. This expression is found literally in none of the passages which contain the promises made to Abraham, Gen. xii. 1—3. xv. 1—6. xvii. 1—8. But in Gen. xv. 5 is a promise, that the seed of Abraham should be like the stars of heaven for multitude; and in Gen. xvii. 5 it is said: "A father of many nations have I made thee." That the apostle had his mind intent upon this text, is plain from ver. 17 in the sequel. When he says, then, that *the promise was that Abraham should be heir of the world*, his meaning evidently is, that the seed of Abraham (in the sense here meant, viz., his spiritual seed), should be co-extensive with the world, or (to use the phraseology employed in another of the promises made to Abraham), "in him should all the families of the earth be blessed." Taken in the sense now adverted to, the phrase before us would imply, that the spiritual seed of Abraham should be co-extensive with the world, *i. e.*, should be of all nations. But there is a somewhat more figurative way of understanding the phrase *to be heir of the world*, viz., to take it as an expression that designates the receiving of great and important blessings. In such a way most clearly are יְרֵשׁ הָעוֹלָם κληρονομεῖν τὴν γῆν to be taken, Psalms xxv. 13. xxxvii. 9, 11, 22, 29. Prov. ii. 21. Matt. v. 5. The former method of exegesis, however, is here to be preferred, on the ground, that ver. 17 develops the fact, that Paul here had a *special* meaning in reference to the *extent* of Abraham's spiritual seed.

In regard to that *seed* of Abraham to whom the promise was specially made; who can this be but the Messiah? Who else of Abraham's seed was to be possessor of all the earth, particularly in a *spiritual* sense? That Paul himself had such a view of this subject, is made quite certain by Gal. iii. 16. It is true, indeed, that in respect to the promises of a *temporal* nature made to Abraham, his *literal* descendants were the partakers and heirs of them; see Gen. xvii. 8. xv. 18. So also were they, that is, some of them, heirs of spiritual promises. But the specific promise to which the apostle alludes in our text, seems to have been made with reference to Christ, at least it seems to have been entirely fulfilled only in him, Gal. iii. 16. Reiche construes the promise here as having respect to a *new world*, like that which the Millenarians expect, after the end

of the present order of things; which implies a method of interpreting the *Messianic* prophecies that cannot be defended on the ground of rational exegesis.

The promise in question was not διὰ νόμου, *i. e.*, on account of any privileges connected with the giving of the law, for the law was not yet given; but it was διὰ δικαιοσύνης πίστεως, *through the righteousness of faith, i. e.*, it was gratuitously given in consequence of his faith; see on iii. 22.

(14) Εἰ γὰρ . . . κληρονόμοι, *if now they who are of the law, are heirs; i. e.*, if they who live under the law and enjoy its privileges, are heirs of the promise made to Abraham and his seed. γὰρ here is prefixed to an additional clause designed to confirm the preceding one—γὰρ confirmantis. Οἱ ἐκ νόμου may mean, either those who rest upon the law, *i. e.*, make their boast of having fulfilled it and so expect justification from it (in which way Tholuck and many others have understood it); or it may mean, those who enjoy the privileges and the distinction which a revelation confers. I prefer the latter sense as being more consonant with the special object of the apostle; which here is, to prove that no external rites or privileges can be the ground of justification before God.

Κεῖνεται . . . ἐπαγγελία, *faith is rendered of no effect, and the promise is made void.* The reason of this is, that the promise was made to Abraham and his seed in consequence of faith, and therefore gratuitously; but if those only who enjoy the privilege of living under the law are heirs of the promise, and are so without walking in the steps of Abraham as to faith, then the ground of the promises to Abraham is done away. Neither his faith, nor the promise connected with it, is of any avail; because neither of them stands on law-ground, and neither depends on the privilege of possessing the law or on the merit of obeying it. In a word, the ground of justification taken by those who plead for it ἐκ νόμου, is entirely diverse from and opposed to that by which Abraham was justified, and on which the promises were made to him; and if they are in the right, the promises made to Abraham are of course null, because a new condition unknown to him and different from that under which he obtained blessings, would thus be introduced.

(15) Ὁ γὰρ νόμος . . . παράβασις, *for the law is the occasion of wrath; for where there is no law, there is no transgression.* In verse 15, a reason is assigned why the promise would be made void, on the ground suggested; and this is, that the law was actually the

occasion of bringing upon the Jews divine displeasure, by reason of their offences against its precepts. It is on this account that the verse is introduced by γὰρ *causal*. If there were no law, then there would be no transgression or sin. All sin is, ἀνομία, *i. e.*, want of conformity to the law of God, either as to omission or commission. Now as all men do sin, the law against which they offend (inasmuch as it prohibits and condemns sin) is the instrument of their *condemnation*, not of their justification. This is indeed no fault of the law, which is of itself "holy and just and good" (Rom. vii. 12): the fault lies with the transgressor. But when such transgressor appeals to the law as the ground of his justification, he must be told (as he is here told) that the law, instead of delivering him from death or justifying him, condemns him to death; nay, that its precepts, although holy and just and good in themselves and worthy of all respect and obedience, are nevertheless the occasion (the innocent occasion indeed) of the sinner's guilt and ruin. The fault lies in him; but still, if there had been no precepts to transgress and no penalty connected with transgression, then he would not have been a transgressor. It is on such ground that the apostle (chap. vii. 7—13) declares most explicitly, that "he had not known sin, except by the law;" that "sin, taking occasion by the law, wrought in him all manner of concupiscence;" that "without the law sin was dead," *i. e.*, the power of sin was inefficacious; but still, that "the law is holy and just and good," and all the fault lies in the transgressor. Chap. vii. 7, seq., is indeed an ample commentary on the sentiment expressed in the verse before us.

Admitting the truth of the apostle's representation, it follows, that those who have no knowledge of law, *i. e.*, no moral sense of any moral precept, cannot be transgressors. This is plainly and palpably the doctrine which he teaches; a doctrine which is sanctioned by the fundamental principles of our moral nature, and essential to the idea of right and wrong. In common cases, we never pronounce any man to be an offender against a moral law, unless he is an *intelligent, rational, moral, free agent*. Any one of these qualifications being found wanting, we absolve him from guilt. And does not Paul the same? But this does not settle the question *when* men begin to be such agents; for plainly they may be moral and free agents before they can read the Scriptures. The question as to the *time when sinning begins*, in each individual case, can be settled only by

Omniscience. Why should we not be content to leave it with 'the Judge of all the earth, WHO WILL DO RIGHT?'

The second γάρ in ver. 15 is placed at the head of a reason or ground of the assertion immediately preceding; which is, that the law is the occasion or instrument of condemnation. How does this appear? In this way, viz., because that where there is no law, there is no transgression. The γάρ here introduces, then, that which serves to confirm the expression immediately antecedent.

(16) Because then the law does in fact never justify, but only condemn, it follows that if justification be at all bestowed on sinners, it must come in some other way than by law. Διὰ τοῦτο . . . χάριν, *on this account it was of faith, so that it must be of grace; i. e., the promise is through the medium of faith, so that it must be gratuitous; there being no way left in which it could be bestowed on the ground of merit.* See the notes on verses 4, 5 above. We must of course suppose ἡ ἐπαγγελία γίνεσθαι to be implied before ἐκ πίστεως; in which case the mind reverts to the idea at the close of ver. 14. The ἵνα before κατὰ χάριν is doubtless to be taken in the *ecbatic* sense, *ita ut, so that*, indicating *event* not *purpose*. The reasoning then stands thus: 'The promise was of *faith* as the condition, so that it must of course be gratuitous.' Εἰς τὸ εἶναι . . . σίγῃ, *in order that the promise might be sure to all the seed.* On any other ground than that of *grace* or *gratuity*, the promise could not be sure either to Abraham or to his seed; for if it were to be fulfilled only on condition of entire obedience to the law, then would it never have a fulfilment, inasmuch as no mere man ever did or will exhibit perfect obedience. Διὰ τοῦτο in this verse extends to the whole of the reasoning which precedes, and which goes to show that justification or the promises of pardon and acceptance must be on *gratuitous*, and not on meritorious grounds.

Ὁὐ τῷ . . . Ἀβραάμ, *not only to him who is under the law, but to him who is of the faith of Abraham; i. e., the promise is given on gratuitous grounds in order that it may not fail of being carried into execution, and that the blessings which it proffers may be bestowed on both Jew and Greek, that is, on all men without distinction, on all τοῖς στοιχοῦσι τοῖς ἔχουσιν τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀκροβυστίᾳ πίστεως τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἀβραάμ.* The reader should note, that μένον belongs to οὐ τῷ, not to ἐκ τοῦ νόμου.

(17) This last idea, viz., that Abraham is the spiritual father of

both Jews and Gentiles, the apostle now takes occasion farther to illustrate and confirm, by a reference to the Jewish Scriptures. *Ὁς ἐστὶ . . . τῶν πατέρων ἡμεῶν, ὃς ἐστὶν ὁ πατήρ πάντων ἡμῶν*, *who is the father of us all; (as it is written: A father of many nations have I made thee.)* *Τῶν πατέρων ἡμεῶν* is the Septuagint rendering of אֲבוֹתֵינוּ, the Hebrew אָב frequently meaning *to put, place, or constitute*; in which meaning it is frequently followed by the Septuagint and New Testament, by the use of *τίθημι*. In respect to the original in Gen. xvii. 5, the only question is, whether the passage there means any thing more than that the *literal* posterity of Abraham should be very numerous. Tholuck and many commentators so construe it; but it seems clear to me, that the apostle puts a different interpretation upon it, and that he viewed it as having reference to a *spiritual* seed. That such was his opinion, is made quite clear by comparing Gal. iii. 7. Rom. ii. 28, 29. iv. 11, 12, 16, 18. The embarrassment as to the interpretation of Gen. xvii. 1—8, seems to arise principally from the fact, that promises of both a temporal and spiritual nature are there made. A *double paternity* (so to speak) is assigned to Abraham; many nations are to descend from him *literally*; his literal seed are to possess the land of Canaan. But he is also to become the *spiritual* father of ‘many nations,’ (*i. e.*, an eminent pattern or exemplar in regard to faith, and justification by it, see verse 12 above), and in him are ‘*all the families* of the earth to be blessed,’ Gen. xii. 3. How can it be satisfactorily shown, that both a *natural* and *spiritual* seed were not promised to Abraham? Or what should hinder us from supposing that both temporal and spiritual blessings were promised to him and his seed? Reiche, as usual, resorts to mere *accommodation* here. What force this could have on Jewish minds prejudiced against Paul’s views of the gospel, it would be difficult to tell.

Such a father he was κατέναντι οὗ . . . Θεοῦ, *in the sight of God, whom he confided in or believed.* Κατέναντι is equivalent to the Hebrew בְּעֵינֵי, לִפְנֵי, לְנֶגְדִּי, *in the sight of, in the view of, before.* The sentiment is this: ‘Abraham is the father of many nations, in the sight of that God in whom he trusted, or whose word he believed;’ *i. e.*, God views him and has constituted him the spiritual father of many nations. The construction of the verse is difficult, at first view, and has given rise to many critical doubts. I regard the real sense of it as being the same, as if the arrangement in Greek were thus: Κατέναντι Θεοῦ οὗ [= φ] ἐπίστευσε. The οὗ is to be considered as a case of *attraction*, as grammarians say. See instances

of this nature in John ii. 22. Mark vii. 13. Luke ii. 20. Acts vii. 17, 45. 1 Pet. iv. 11. John xv. 20, &c. ; but in all these cases, the noun *precedes* the pronoun which conforms to it. Examples, however, of the like nature with the present, are the following, viz., Mark vi. 16, ὃν ἐγὼ ἀνακεφάλισα Ἰωάννην, οὗτός ἐστι Acts xxi. 16. ἄγοντες παρ' ᾧ ξενισθῶμεν Μνάσωνι Rom. vi. 17, εἰς ὃν παραδόθητε τύπον διδαχῆς in which examples, indeed, the noun conforms to the pronoun as to its case; but this makes no important difference, inasmuch as the conformity may be of either kind, *i. e.*, of the noun to the pronoun, or the pronoun to the noun; see New Test. Gramm. § 113. 2, 3. The older grammarians limited *attraction* to cases where the verb governs the Acc.; but this is a manifest error, and is now generally abandoned. If we regard οὗ ἐπίστευσε as a circumstance throw in, and to be mentally included in a parenthesis, the difficulty of the sentence will be removed. The present construction is somewhat anomalous as to the order of words; for the usual order would be thus: Κατέναντι Θεοῦ οὗ ἐπίστευσε κ. τ. λ.

Τοῦ ζωοποιούντος . . . ὄντα, *who giveth life to the dead, and calleth the things which are not, as if they were.* Another contested passage. To express the idea of divine, almighty power, is plainly the object of it. This it does by asserting that God raises the dead, and exercises creative and controlling power. In regard to τοῦ ζωοποιούντος τοὺς νεκρούς, it may mean generally, that God has the power to raise the dead, and that he exercises it; or it may have a special reference to God's promises to raise up a numerous progeny from Abraham, who was dead as to the power of procreation; comp. Heb. xi. 17—19, and verse 19 below. In either case the meaning is good. In the first it is more energetic: in the second, more appropriate to the special object of the writer.

Καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα is Hebraistic in its manner. Καλέω is sometimes employed like the Hebrew קָרָא, *i. e.*, to designate the idea of *commanding a thing to be or exist*, which did not before exist; *e. g.*, Is. xli. 4. xlviii. 13; comp. 2 Kings viii. 1. Isaiah xxii. 12. Comp. also 2 Macc. vii. 28, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ ὁ Θεός, which resembles in sense the phrase before us; also Philo de Creat. p. 728, τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἐκάλεσεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι. The reference in the mind of the writer, when he used the phrase before us, no doubt was to Gen. i. 3, seq. *The calling of things that are not*, is to command that they shall exist, in order to fulfil the purposes which the Creator has in view by bringing them into existence. This latter circumstance seems to

have been overlooked; and thus has arisen great perplexity among interpreters. 'How,' it has been asked, 'could God call into existence things that are not, as if they were?' A seeming paradox, indeed, if literally interpreted; for things that already are, cannot be called into existence. After all, the meaning of the apostle is not simply *bidding to exist* (καλοῦντος), but also *directing, disposing of, commanding* in any way and for any purpose, the things called. 'God,' says he, 'can call into existence things that now have no existence, and employ them for his purposes, just as he directs and disposes of things that already exist; God calls τὰ μὴ ὄντα just as he does τὰ ὄντα; things that do not now exist, are at his disposal as really and truly as things that do exist, i. e., they can be made to exist and to subserve his purpose, in the same manner as things do which now already exist.' Is there any room for real difficulty in respect to such a meaning as this? If any one feels a difficulty still, he may solve the sentence in this simple way, viz., καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς [ἐκάλεισεν] ὄντα, i. e., calling into existence (Gen. i. 2. Ps. xxxiii. 6) things that are not, as [he called into existence] things that are. The sense would be for substance the same.

CHAP. IV. 18—25.

THE apostle having thus shown that the doctrine of gratuitous justification by faith does not at all impugn the Scriptures of the Old Testament, by appealing to the example of Abraham, and to the declarations of David; and having more particularly insisted on the justification of Abraham, previously to the covenant of circumcision, and independently of it; and this, in order that Abraham might be the spiritual father of all believers, both Jews and Gentiles; he now concludes the whole by an animated description and communication of Abraham's faith, and by pointing out the happy consequences of imitating it to all who profess to be the disciples of Christ. First, Abraham hoped, when to all human appearance there was no ground of hope, that he might become the father of many nations through the birth of a son, ver. 18. His strong faith led him to overlook his own extreme old age and that of Sarah, ver. 19; to trust with full confidence in the simple promise of God respecting a son, thus giving glory to God by reposing in him such an unlimited trust, and by being so fully persuaded that he would perform what he had promised, verses 20, 21. On this account he was justified through his faith, ver. 22; nor was this fact recorded merely for his sake, but also for our sake, that we may be inspired with the hope of attaining to the like justification, provided we believe in the declarations of him who raised up Jesus from the dead, and proposed him to the world as the object of saving belief, inasmuch as he died for our offences, and rose again in order that we might be justified.

(18) "Ὁς παρ' ἐλπίδα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι ἐπίστευσεν, *who against* [all apparent] *ground of hope, believed in hope that he should become the father, &c.* The δς, κ. τ. λ. here is co-ordinate with the δς, κ. τ. λ. in ver. 16. But though co-ordinate as to construction, it is not merely expegetical, but adds some new declarations respecting the strength of Abraham's faith. The expression παρ' ἐλπίδα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, is what the Greeks call ὀξύμωρον [oxymoron], i. e., a sharp, pointed saying, which to appearance exhibits a kind of contradiction; like the Latin *spes insperata, ignavia strenua*, &c. The παρ' ἐλπίδα, *beyond or against hope*, in this case, refers to the circumstances recounted in ver. 19. For the like sense of παρά, see Acts xviii. 13.

Κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, viz., in Gen. xv. 5.—Ὅτως, *so*, viz., like the stars in respect to number, to which Abraham had just been pointed, i. e., innumerable; comp. Ps. cxlvii. 4.

(19) Μὴ ἀσθενήσας, *not being weak*, i. e., being strong: the negative form of declaration being used, where an affirmative sense is meant. In like manner; "He confessed, *and denied not*, but confessed," John i. 20. The Greeks call this mode of expression λιτότης, *smallness, slenderness*, or μείωσις, *diminution*; because it seemingly diminishes from the full strength of the *positive* form. Often however (as here) it is equivalent to the affirmative or positive form. The reason of choosing the word ἀσθενήσας here seems to be, a reference to the state of the patriarchal pair, who were weak in body. Their faith was in an *opposite* condition, μὴ ἀσθενήσας. These words begin a third co-ordinate clause, both the others beginning with δς, as already noted.

Τῇ πίστει, Dative of condition, being strong in faith, or in respect to faith, i. e., having strong confidence.

Ὁὐ κατενόησε, *he did not regard*.—Ἡδὴ νενεκρωμένον, *already dead*, i. e., inefficient with regard to procreation; comp. Heb. xi. 12. Gen. xvii. 17. Που, *about* (adv.) which sense it has when it is *enclitic*, as here; ἑκατονταίτης που, *about 100 years of age*.—Καί, *nor*, inasmuch as it follows οὐ in the preceding clause. So in Hebrew, ! following נֹכַח means *nor*, Heb. Gramm. § 358. Note.—Τὴν νέκρωσιν τῆς μητρὸς = τὴν μῆτραν τὴν νενεκρωμένην. Comp. the age of Sarah (90) at this time, Gen. xvii. 17.

(20) Οὐ διεκρίθη, *he did not doubt, did not hesitate*; comp. Rom. xiv. 23. James i. 6. ii. 4. Mutt. xxi. 21. Mark xi. 23.—Εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν . . . ἀπιστία, *still he did not doubt respecting the promise of God, through, or by reason of an unbelieving spirit*. The δὲ here is

adversative in respect to the preceding circumstances, and may be translated, *still, but, or however*. The Dat. of ἀπιστία is construed agreeably to idiom; see New Test. Gramm. § 106. 5.

Ἄλλ' ἐνδυναμώθη τῇ πίστει, the opposite of the preceding expression, *but he firmly and confidently believed, or he was confident through faith*; τῇ πίστει, being the Dative of manner or means; see New Test. Gramm. ut supra.

Δοὺς δόξαν τῷ Θεῷ, *giving glory to God*. The Hebrew עָשָׂה הַתְּהִלָּה לַיהוָה means, to show by our actions that we acknowledge any attribute of God; which is ascribing to him what belongs or is due to him. So here, Abraham, by the strength of his confidence, did in the highest manner ascribe to God omnipotence and veracity. Comp. John ix. 24. Josh. vii. 19. The meaning of the phrase as here employed by the writer, is given in the next verse.

(21) Καὶ πληροφορηθεὶς ὅτι κ. τ. λ., a repetition or epexegetis of what the preceding clause asserts. "Being strong in faith" there, is equivalent to πληροφορηθεὶς here, which means, *being fully persuaded*: comp. Heb. x. 22.—Ὁ ἐπηγγέλται, *that which had been promised, or rather, what he had promised*. This last rendering can be retained, because the Perf. pass. not unfrequently has an *active* sense, inasmuch as it serves for the Perf. Middle as well as Passive, (New Testament Gramm. § 61. 2.) So in Acts xiii. 2, προσέκλημαι, *I have invited*. Acts xvi. 10. 1 Pet. iv. 1. John ix. 22.—Καὶ ποιῆσαι *also to perform*, καὶ in the sense of *etiam, quoque*, as it often is, i. e., καί, *intensive*.

(22) Διὸ . . . εἰς δικαιοσύνην, *wherefore [his belief] was counted to him as righteousness*; in other words, through his faith he was counted or treated as righteous, he was admitted to the divine favour. See on verse 5 above. The καὶ before ἐλογίσθη I have interpreted as *intensive*. If otherwise taken, it may be solved thus: *Wherefore, also, it was imputed, &c.*

(23, 24) Nor was this method of justification and acceptance limited to Abraham. The history of it is recorded as an example, for the encouragement and imitation of all others down to the latest period of time. Those who believe in him who raised up Jesus from the dead (comp. ver. 17 above), i. e., those who believe in what God has done and said with respect to the Messiah, the only foundation of the sinner's hope, will be justified through their faith, in like manner as Abraham was by his.

(25) Παρέδθη, *was given up, was delivered up, viz. to death*, Matt. xxvi. 2.—Διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν, *comp. Is. liii. 12, 5, 6, 8. Gal. i. 4. ii. 20. Tit. ii. 14. 1 Pet. ii. 24.*

Διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν, *on account of our justification, i. e., our acceptance with God.* Christ rose from the dead, in order that this great and glorious work might be completed. The *primary* object of his death is here stated as being *expiatory, i. e.,* as having a special influence on that part of *justification* which has respect to remitting the penalty of the divine law. But as justification, in its *full* sense, comprehends not only forgiveness, but the accepting and treating of any one as righteous, it implies of course the advancement of the pardoned sinner to a state of glory. The resurrection of Christ was connected with this; for if “Christ be not risen, then our faith is vain.” His resurrection was preparatory to his receiving the kingdom given him of the Father, and thus was necessary in order to complete the redemption of those who believe in him.

Reiche maintains, that the whole work of Christ, viz., his active and passive obedience, is to be considered as *one*; and this in such a sense, that we are at liberty to ascribe no more efficacy to his death than to any of the actions of his life. Of course he disallows the idea of a *vicarious sacrifice*, in any proper sense of these words; and he maintains that God, for Christ's sake and for some reason not stated by the sacred writers, forgives and accepts the sinner. But, although I fully concede that the incarnation and obedience of Christ constitute a part of his mediatorial work, and by no means exclude them from an important place in the great scheme of redemption, still I must regard it as a perfectly clear case, that the New Test. ascribes *peculiar* efficacy to the sufferings and death of Christ; and to my mind, the doctrine of the *atonement* or the *vicarious sufferings and death* of Christ, is fundamental to the very essence of Christianity as distinguished from other systems of religion.

CHAP. V. 1—21.

THE apostle having thus shown, (a) That all men, Jews and Gentiles, are sinners; (b) That they are therefore under the condemning sentence of the divine law; (c) That the only method of escape from the execution of this sentence, is by gratuitous pardon, *i. e.,* by justification obtained through the death of Christ; and (d) That all this is no new doctrine, but

one inculcated in the old Testament both by declaration and example; he next proceeds, in chap. v., to exhibit the blessed fruits of this pardon or justification. (1) We have peace with God (with whom we were before in a state of enmity, being alienated from him, comp. vers. 6—10), and we enjoy, through Christ, free access to a state of favour with God, and thus are led to rejoice in the hope of future glory, vers. 1, 2. (2) We are supported and comforted in all our afflictions during the present life; nay, we may even rejoice in them as the instruments of spiritual good to us, vers. 3—5. (3) All this good is rendered certain, and the hope of it sure, by the fact that Christ, having died for us while in a state of enmity and alienation, and having thus reconciled us to God, will not fail to carry on and complete the work which he has thus begun, vers. 6—10. (4) We may now therefore rejoice in God (who is as truly *our* covenant God as he has been that of the Jews), on account of the reconciliation which Christ has effected, ver. 11.

(5) This state of reconciliation or filial relation to God, is *extended to all men, &c.*, in some respects actually bestowed on all, and in others proffered to all, laid open for all, rendered accessible to all, in like manner as the evils occasioned by the sin of our first ancestor have in some respects extended to all, and in others are liable to be incurred or suffered by all; yea, such is the *greatness* of Christ's redemption, that the blessings procured by his death far exceed the evils occasioned by the sin of Adam (vers. 12—19), they even exceed all the evils consequent upon the sins of men, who live under the light of revelation (vers. 20, 21). The *certainty* of salvation, then, under such a dispensation as this, would seem to be made quite evident.

Such appears to me the sum of what is taught in chap. v. The difficulties attending the interpretation of this passage, I readily acknowledge, and have long and deeply felt. To the study of them I have devoted much more time, than to any other equal portion of the Holy Scriptures. I do not persuade myself, however, that I have succeeded in all respects with regard to the solution of them; much less do I expect that what I shall propose will be satisfactory to the minds of all others. What I could do, I have done; if others succeed better, it will be matter of sincere joy to me. One thing I cannot help remarking here; which is, that any exegesis of vers. 12—21, which represents the contents as irrelevant to the tenor of the context both before and after these verses, must wear the air, of course, of being an improbable one. Never have I found more difficulty, however, than in satisfying myself of the relation which vers. 12—23 do in fact hold toward the context; and in particular how they bear upon the theme discussed in vers. 1—11. The result of all my investigations is given, as to substance, under No. 5 above.

Tholuck states his result a little differently: "To render more conspicuous the fruits obtained by redemption, the apostle contrasts the state of mankind *as a whole*, and as being in the misery of their unredeemed condition, with the state of mankind *as a whole*, in their happiness as partakers of the benefits of redemption. By a striking parallel, he exhibits mankind in Adam the head and source of our race as sinful; and in Christ the head and source of it, as redeemed; and he so represents this, that redemption appears to be the greatest and most important occurrence which has taken place with regard to mankind—the central point of all spiritual life and all happiness." (Comm. über Rom. p. 158. edit. 2). Whether this summary comes nearer than my own to the true exhibition of the contents of vers. 12—21; in particular, whether it harmonizes better with the context; I submit to the reader to decide, when he shall have carefully studied the whole. In the mean time, I acknowledge with gratitude the important aid that I have received from the Commentary of the above named excellent writer.

The reader will find a more detailed statement of the contents of vers. 12—19, at the commencement of the commentary on this passage, and before its several parts.

(1) *Oiv, then*, concessive and continuative. It does not here ex-

press the force simply of *syllogistic* conclusion, but resumes and alludes to the preceding arguments and illustrations, and takes for granted the fact stated by *δικαιωθέντες*. This last word has here peculiar reference to *pardon of sin*, and does not mean *mundati a peccato*, or *beatificati*, as some have construed it; for these things are further asserted in the sequel.

Ἐκ πίστεως, i. e., *gratuitously*, through *belief* instead of perfect obedience; see on chap. iv. 5 above.

Εἰρήνην ἔχομεν, *we have peace*; here in opposition to a state of enmity to God, or a state of alienation from him; see verse 10. Several important MSS., A., C., D., 71., al., and some versions and fathers, read ἔχωμεν (Subj.); but Paul does not mean to say merely that *we may have peace*, but that we are in actual possession of it.

Διὰ τοῦ Κ. Ι. Χριστοῦ, viz., by the reconciliation which he has effected, see verse 11.

(2) Δι' οὗ καί, *by whom also*.—Τὴν προσαγωγὴν, *access*, as well as reconciliation; comp. Eph. ii. 18. iii. 12. We have obtained access εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην, i. e., either *to this state of favour or grace*, in which we now stand or are; or, as Tholuck, Reiche, and some others: 'We have obtained access [to God] by belief (τῇ πίστει) in that grace in which we continue.' The former seems to be the most facile sense; the latter, most conformed to idiom. Προσαγωγή seems to imply that God is the object of access; so it is expressed in Eph. ii. 18. 1 Pet. iii. 18, and *implied* (as here) in Eph. iii. 12. Besides, the *object* of belief is generally indicated by εἰς; which would favour the view of Tholuck.—Ἐσχήκαμεν, *we have become possessed of, we have obtained*. As the *Perf.* is here employed (and not *Pres.* as above), it would seem that the *access* here spoken of must refer to the pardoned sinner's *first access* to God, after his forgiveness.—

Ἐστήκαμεν, *we stand*, the *Perf.* being used in this verb, because the Present has not a *neuter* sense. See N. Test. Gramm. § 50. 3, Note 2.

Καὶ καυχώμεθα, *and we rejoice*; i. e., in addition to a state of peace with God and access to him, we are filled with joy, *in the hope of that glory which God will bestow*. Θεοῦ is here *Genitivus auctoris*.

(3) Οὐ μόνον δὲ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καυχώμεθα κ. τ. λ., *and not only so, but we also rejoice, &c.* This is a formula of transition, or of enumerating particulars, answering to our numerical divisions in a discourse; comp. ver. 11. Δί continuative and discretive. The ellipsis after

οὐ μόνον δὲ is plain; i. e., 'not only [do we rejoice in hope of future glory], but,' &c. Glöckler contends earnestly, that there is another ellipsis after καυχώμεθα which he supplies by ἐπ' ἐλπίδι κ. τ. λ. from verse 2. Yet this is not only needless, but contrary to what idiom admits; for ἐν after καυχάομαι not unfrequently stands before the object of the verb; e. g., in Rom. ii. 17. Gal. vi. 13, &c. The apostle does not mean to say, that the Christian exults in pain and sorrow as such; but that as a means of spiritual good he exults in them, and is enabled by divine grace to triumph over them.

Εἰδότες, *knowing, having assurance*; viz., from our relation to God, and from his gracious purposes toward us. Confidence in him gives assurance.

*Οτι . . . κατεργάζεται, *produces patience or perseverance*. Neither of these virtues can be exercised without sufferings and trials. *Patience* is steadfast and submissive endurance of evils. Afflictions are essential to the cultivation of this virtue. They are not, indeed, the direct and efficient cause of patience; but they are at least an occasion or instrumental cause.

(4) Δοκιμήν, *trial or approbation*. Either rendering is correct; for perseverance or patience in the enduring of afflictions makes thorough *trial*; and the same virtue secures *approbation*. I prefer the second meaning, viz., *approbation*; because it more naturally connects itself with the ἐλπίς that follows. Comp. δοκιμάζω, which means *to try*, and also *to approve*.

Ἐλπίδα, *hope*, which springs of course from the approbation bestowed on patient endurance of suffering for virtue's sake.

(5) Οὐ καταισχύνει, *will not disappoint*; as the sequel shows. So the Hebrew, וְלֹא יִבְזֶה. The δὲ before this clause and two others in verse 4, is continuative and discretive.

*Οτι ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ κ. τ. λ. The *first* reason given why the Christian's hope will not disappoint him, is that *the love of God is diffused (ἐκκίχεται) in his heart or mind*; and this, by that Holy Spirit which is imparted to him, i. e., by the gracious influence of that Spirit who dwells in the hearts of believers; 1 Cor. vi. 19. iii. 16. 2 Cor. vi. 16. 2 Cor. i. 22, where the spirit which is in the hearts of believers is called their ἀρραβὼν, *the pledge of their future happiness*, the pledge that their salvation is secure. Compare also Eph. i. 13, 14, where the same sentiment is fully expressed. The *love of God* here evidently means *his love toward us*; as verse 8 plainly shows. His love *shed abroad* in the hearts of Christians

means, that a full and satisfactory conviction respecting his love is bestowed; and the manner of bestowing or giving such a sense of his love is here designated, viz., by the influence of the Holy Spirit imparted to Christians.

CHAP. V. 6—10.

VERSES 6—10 constitute a kind of episode (if I may so speak), and contain an illustration and confirmation of the sentiment expressed in ver. 5, viz., that *the Christian's hope will not disappoint him*. To show that this is truly the case, the writer goes on to produce an illustration, which exhibits an argument of the kind called *a majori ad minus*; i. e., 'If Christ has already done the greater thing for you, viz., reconciled you to God, when you were in your sinful state, how much more will he *complete* the work, the greatest and most difficult part of which has already been accomplished?'

In this view the passage before us seems to be more direct, in respect to *the perseverance of the saints*, than almost any other passage in the Scriptures which I can find. The sentiment here is not dependent on the *form* of a particular expression (as it appears to be in some other passages); but it is fundamentally connected with the very nature of the argument.

(6) *Εἰ γὰρ Χριστὸς ὄντων ἡμῶν, a singular *metathesis* or transposition of the particle εἰ, which belongs to ὄντων and plainly qualifies it. On account of this unusual location of εἰ, suspicions of its genuineness would seem to have arisen, and the variety of readings is here considerable; e. g., εἴ γε, B., Syr., Erp., Copt.; εἰ γὰρ, Isid., Pelus., August.; εἰ τι, F., G.; τίς τί, (ut quid), Ital., Vulg., Iren., Ambros., Pelag. All these varieties probably originated either from the unusual location of εἰ, as before mentioned, or else from an apprehension that εἰ in ver. 8 rendered it unnecessary or improbable here. In like manner many MSS. and Versions have an εἰ after ἀσθενῶν here; which Griesbach and Koppe admit into the text, but Knapp and Vater reject. It probably arose from some of the *lections*, which begun with this verse, and transposed the εἰ, for convenience' sake in reading, as it would not appear seemly at the beginning of a lection. The transposition seems to be designed for the sake of giving emphasis to εἰ; comp. Matt. xii. 46. xvii. 5. Mark v. 35. xii. 6, and specially Heb. ix. 6, εἰ τῆς πρώτης σκηνῆς ἰχούσης στάσι, where εἰ belongs to ἰχούσης.—Γὰρ *confirmantis* here, i. e., stands before a paragraph which assigns a cause or ground of the assertion in the preceding sentence, viz., that the hope of the Christian would not disappoint him.

*Εἰ ὄντων ἡμῶν, *while we were yet, or we yet being*.—'Ασθενῶν, literally

destitute of strength; here, as generally expounded, in a *moral* sense, i. e., destitute of moral vigour, without holy energy, in a state of moral indisposition or infirmity. So Prov. xxiv. 16, οἱ ἀσεβεῖς ἀσθενήσουσιν ἐν κακοῖς, the ungodly *are weak* in their evil ways, i. e., they are *morally weak*, for physical strength and resolution they lack not. Various modifications of the word ἀσθένεια may be found in Gal. iv. 9. Heb. iv. 15. v. 2. vii. 18. In Heb. iv. 15, the nature of the appeal seems to show, that the writer supposes Jesus himself to have possessed ἀσθένεια like our own; but he takes care to add, χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας; so that while he had the susceptibility of being tempted and tried (πεπειρασμένον κατὰ πάντα καθ' ὁμοίότητα) in all respects as we are, which seems to be the ἀσθένεια here characterised, he still remained "holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners." It is not susceptibility of being tempted, then, which makes any one a sinner. However, in our text, ἀσθενῶν seems to be used in a more emphatic sense than in Heb. iv. 15. v. 2; for it is immediately exchanged for ἀσεβῶν, and in verse 8 for ἁμαρτωλῶν. This shows that actual development of character by some kind of voluntary action is meant, and not merely *vitiositas* or *peccabilitas*; for ἀσεχῆς and ἁμαρτωλός are not applied to mark these qualities, but to mark character that is developed.

After all, however, the doubt forces itself on my mind in reconsidering this passage, whether ἀσθενῶν does not here characterise *weakness* or *inability* of the sinner as to saving himself, having once come under the condemning sentence of the law. In Heb. vii. 18, the law is asserted to be ἀσθενής, because it can afford no help to the sinner who is condemned by it. What now if we suppose the apostle to mean here, that 'when we were under the curse, and *unable* to save ourselves, Christ then interposed?' The sense is surely good, and the apparent *tautology* made by ἀσεβῶν, when it is construed in the usual way, is avoided.

Κατὰ καιρὸν, *in due time, at an appointed or set time*, viz., that fixed upon in the counsels of God. Comp. Sept. in Job v. 26. Isa. lx. 22; comp. also Luke xxi. 24, 8. Heb. xi. 11. Comp. τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου in Gal. iv. 4.

Ἵπὲρ ἀσεβῶν, i. e., ἱπὲρ ἀσεβῶν [ἡμῶν], *for [us] who are ungodly*. It is plain that ἀσεβῶν here characterises the same class of persons who were called ἀσθενῶν in the preceding clause. It means *impious, those who do not reverence or fear God*.—Ἵπὲρ, *for, on account of, instead of*, i. e., in our room or stead.—So the comparison in the next verse, where dying ἱπὲρ ἀγαθοῦ and ἱπὲρ δικαίου is mentioned, obliges

us to interpret this. Even Rückert concedes that the meaning here must be *loco nostro, vice nostrâ*. Reiche admits that this is the *symbolical costume* of the language; but that the idea of *vicarious sacrifice* is to be *objectively* admitted, he deems to be entirely out of question. But what is this, except to make a new gospel, according to our conception of what it ought to be?

(7) *Γὰρ illustrantis*; for the sequel is designed to illustrate the great benevolence which the death of Christ displayed, and which is proposed to our view in verses 5, 6. *δικαίου* is here used in distinction from *ἀγαθοῦ*. Often these words are *synonymous*; yet they are capable of distinct use, and in classic usage they are not unfrequently distinguished from each other. *E. g.*, Cicero: "Recte *justum virum, bonum non facillè reperiemus*;" de Offic. III. 15. Again: "Jupiter *Optimus dictus est, id est, beneficentissimus*." So in the Talmud (Pirke Abhoth, 5, 10) it is said: "There are four kinds of men; (1) Those who say: What is mine is mine, and what is thine is thine; these are the *middling men*. (2) Those who say; What is mine is thine, and what is thine is mine; these are the common people. (3) Those who say; What is mine is thine, and what is thine is thine; these are the *דִּיכְתִּיךְ*, *i. e.*, *ἀγαθοί*. (4) Those who say: What is mine is mine, and what is thine is mine; these are the *דִּיכְתִּיךְ*." So (by the Seventy) *דִּיכְתִּיךְ* is usually distinguished from *דִּיכְתִּיךְ*; inasmuch as the former is usually rendered *δίκαιος*, while the latter is translated by *δικαίος*. *Δικαίος* may be used (and not unfrequently is used) to designate a person who is *innocent* merely; so in the Septuagint, Ex. xxiii. 7. Gen. xviii. 23, seq. So in the New Testament, Matt. xxvii. 9, 24. It corresponds also to the Hebrew *צַדִּיק* Prov. i. 11. vi. 17. Joel iii. 19. In using *δικαίος*, therefore, as designating a character somewhat different from *ἀγαθός* and inferior to it, the apostle has not varied from sacred and classic usage. *Δικαίος* clearly means here, *one who is just* in the common sense of the word, *one who is free from crimes* cognizable by law, *one who does not defraud, &c.* For such an one, the apostle says, it would be rare to find any person willing to volunteer the sacrifice of his life.

Although for the *ἀγαθός*, *i. e.*, the benevolent or rather the beneficent man, (the *דִּיכְתִּיךְ*), some one perhaps might venture even to lay down his life. This has in fact not unfrequently been done. The difference between the readiness of men to hazard their lives for a man of peculiar and overflowing benevolence of heart, and for a man who

merely pays a nice regard to *meum* and *tuum*, is very plain to every observer who has a feeling heart. Reiche and Tholuck suppose ἀγαθός here to designate a *kind benefactor*, in distinction from a simple δίκαιος. To this I see no objection; for it makes the contrast between δίκαιος and ἀγαθός, the more striking; and is well founded in the nature of the idiom. I may add, that the sequel is rendered the more striking by it. Besides, the use of the *article* here before ἀγαθοῦ shows that a *specific* benefactor is thought of by the writer. The article is here = to the pronominal adjective *his*.

The γάρ in this second clause is a matter of some difficulty, which critics have generally passed over. It does not appear what the corresponding sentiment is, for which it here would seem to assign a ground or reason. It may there (as usual in such cases) be taken as *affirmative* (ja, allerdings, Passow), and we might translate thus: *Perhaps, indeed, for the benefactor, &c.* I have rendered it *although* in the version; not because γάρ of itself means *although*, but because the relation of the sentiment demands such a rendering, in order to make the sense explicit to us. The καί before τολμᾷ, Tholuck explains as giving this verb an intensive meaning. It undoubtedly is καί *intensivum*; but standing before such a connection as τολμᾷ ἀποθανεῖν, it may be joined with either verb, as the sense requires. Here the better sense seems to be given by joining καί with ἀποθανεῖν—*would venture even to die*. What he had just said was: 'Scarcely will any one die for a just man;' now he says: 'Still it may be, that some one will venture *even to die* for a benefactor.' *Will even venture* does not put the emphasis in the right place.

(8) Yet the grace of the gospel has far surpassed any exhibition of human benevolence. Συνίστημι, *commends, sets forth, displays*,—'Αγάπην, *benevolence, kind feeling*, ὀψιμεῖς *compassionate kindness*.—'Ἰπὲρ ἡμῶν, *in our stead, or on our account*. In either way of rendering the sense here must be, that the death of Christ saved us from that which we as ἀμαρτωλοί deserved. 'Αμαρτωλοί means *those who err* in heart and life.

(9) Πολλῷ οὖν . . . ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς, *much more, then, being justified*, i. e., acquitted, pardoned as to our past offences, *by his blood*, i. e., the sufferings and death of Christ, *shall we be saved by him from* [future] *indignation*. In other words: 'If Christ by his death has accomplished our reconciliation, while we were in a state of enmity; *a fortiori* we may expect that the great work, thus begun and accomplished as to the most difficult part, will be completed.' That αἰματι αὐτοῦ

means the same thing as the death of Christ, *i. e.*, that it here directly refers to the preceding *ἀπέθανε*, does not admit of any reasonable doubt.

(10) A repetition of the same general ideas, in which the sentiment of the whole is compressed and rendered prominent. *Γὰρ confirmantis*, in relation to the preceding assertion. *Θανάτου κ. τ. λ.* here corresponds to *τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ* in the preceding verse.—'Εν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ, the antithesis of *θανάτου αὐτοῦ*. Meaning: 'If we were reconciled to God, when enemies, by a *dying* Saviour; *a fortiori* shall we, when thus reconciled, attain salvation through a *living* one;' *i. e.*, if Christ in his humble and suffering state reconciled us to God, much more in his exalted and glorified state (*ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ*) will he complete the work thus begun; comp. Rom. iv. 21, where is the same sentiment. 'Ε before ζωῇ is evidently used in a different sense from *διὰ* before *θανάτου*.

The scriptural view of *reconciliation* is, that the *offending* party becomes reconciled to the other. The verb *καταλλάσσω* properly means *to change, exchange*; and it is here employed to designate the change of the sinner's mind, who was "at enmity with God," to that state in which he comes to love and reverence him.

(11) Οὐ μόνον δι, ἀλλὰ καὶ κ. τ. λ., *and not only* [do we rejoice in afflictions, verse 3, as tending to produce a hope of glory which the death of Christ has rendered *sure and certain*], *but we rejoice, καυχώμενοι [ἴσμεν] in God*, viz., as our God, our covenant God, our supreme and eternal joy; comp. Rev. xxi. 3. Heb. viii. 10. Zech. viii. 8. Jer. iv. 2; also John viii. 41, 54. Rom. ii. 17, which last passage shows the claims of the Jews in respect to their covenant relation with God. The apostle means to intimate in our text, that all which the Jews boasted of, is in reality secured to Christians. The use of *καυχώμενοι* here, instead of a proper verb as in verse 3, is substantially *Hebraistic*; for in Hebrew the changing of the construction from a verb to a participle, and *vice versa*, is very common.

The verse before us is a *summary* or *consummation* of all the grounds of rejoicing; for to rejoice in God as our God, expresses the consummation of all the Christian's happiness. In respect to form or mode of expression, it constitutes a diverse head; and it is one which in fact is really diverse in this respect, viz., that it is more *generic* than the preceding declarations. The phrases in verses 1, 3, and 11, viz., *καυχώμεθα—οὐ μόνον δι ἀλλὰ καὶ—οὐ μόνον δι ἀλλὰ καὶ—* present the natural division of the apostle's discourse, and correspond

to our 1st, 2nd, 3rd, in English. Some critics, however, think that verse 11 refers merely to the *καταλλαγέντες σωτηρόμεθα* of the preceding verse, and construe thus: 'But we are not only reconciled and saved, but also rejoice,' &c. So Reiche. The sense is good; but the method above stated seems to me, on the whole, to be preferable.

Τὴν καταλλαγὴν ἐλάβομεν receives its form from the expression in verse 10, *κατηλλάγημεν* κ. τ. λ. The word means *reconciliation*; and such is the sense in which our English translators here used the word *atonement* (*quasi at-one-ment*).

CHAP. V. 12—19.

THAT this is one of the most difficult passages in all the New Testament, will be conceded, I believe, by all sober and reflecting critics. I have bestowed repeated and long-continued efforts upon the study of it; but not with results as satisfactory to my own mind as in some other cases. I do not speak of my efforts as affording even a presumptive proof that I have at last attained to a right understanding of the passage; but only to show that I have felt, and in some measure, as I trust, rightly estimated, the difficulties attendant upon the nature of an undertaking to explain it, and have not neglected any efforts within my power to overcome them.

The main design of the passage seems, indeed, to be plain. It lies, one may say, upon the very face of it. It is this, viz., to impress on our minds the *certainly* of salvation through redeeming blood, and to exalt our views respecting the *greatness* of the blessings which Christ has procured for us, by a comparison of them with the evil consequences which ensued upon the fall of our first ancestor, and by showing that the blessings in question not only extend to the removal of those evils, but even far beyond this; so that the grace of the gospel has not only abounded but *super-abounded*. These objects appear also to be united with the intention, to exhibit the *extent* to which the blessings in question are actually diffused or proffered.

The intelligent and discerning reader can hardly fail to perceive the general object, as thus stated. But the *detail* is attended with difficulties; and these have been greatly augmented on account of the numerous theories formed by speculative minds, relative to the various topics on which the paragraph before us has been supposed to touch.

A *synopsis* of what is particularly taught in verses 12—19, may be comprised in the following particulars; viz., (a) Sin entered into the world [commenced] by the offence of Adam; and death i. e., misery or loss of happiness, came in as the necessary result of it. In like manner death came upon all men, because that all have sinned, verse 12.

(b) It is indeed true, that all men have been subjected to death; for that even those who did not live under the light of revelation, nor were made acquainted with any *express* commands of God, have been so, is proved from the fact, that all those who lived between Adam and Moses were sinners, and therefore lay under sentence of death, verses 13, 14.

(c) Adam, who was the occasion of introducing sin into the world, and of bringing sin and death upon all men, may be considered as a *τύπος* of Christ, in respect to the influence which

he has had on others ; (but not as to the *kind* of influence, or as to the *degree* of it, for here is a wide diversity :) ver. 14, last clause.

(d) That the *kind* and *degree* of influence which Adam had on all men is not like that which Christ has on them, or that Adam when regarded as a *representative* of Christ is not to be so regarded in these respects, is plain, (1) *As to the kind of influence*; from the fact that Adam occasioned the *condemnation* of all men, but Christ delivers mankind from condemnation, and bestows eternal happiness on them, ver. 16. (2) *As to the degree of influence*; because the condemnation of which Adam was the occasion has respect only to *one* offence, while the pardon which Christ procured extends to *many* offences, ver. 16. Hence (3) If death reigned over men because of one offence, much more shall they reign in life who through Christ receive pardon for *many* offences and a title to future blessedness, ver. 17. In other words; if *evils* through *one* offence spread so wide, then *blessings* through the pardon of *many* offences more than counterbalance them.

Having thus guarded his readers against extending the idea of *representative* to points of which it cannot properly be predicated; and having shown that the influence of Christ on the human race is exactly the *reverse* of that of Adam, in respect to its *kind* or *nature*, and also that it far surpasses it in *degree*; the apostle now comes to the consideration of the real points of similitude between Adam and Christ, viz., the *universality* or *extent* of influence as exerted through the act of one, *i. e.*, by what one individual has done. This he states as follows.

(c) As the consequences of Adam's sin were extended to all men, so the consequences of Christ's obedience [viz. unto death] are extended to all; *i. e.*, Jews and Gentiles may all come on an equal footing into the kingdom of Christ, or the blessings which the gospel proffers are in some respects actually bestowed on all men without exception, and in others made equally accessible to all men, and to all on the same terms or conditions; vers. 18, 19. All this was accomplished respectively by the act of one individual.

Such appear to be the principal contents of this contested and celebrated passage. The sequel will present many specific and particular illustrations, which cannot properly find a place in a general synopsis such as I have now endeavoured to give.

It may be a matter of interest to the reader, to be made acquainted with some other summaries of the doctrine contained in the passage before us, by writers of distinction who differ in theological sentiment. Koppe: "That Jesus Christ alone is the author of that divine grace by which we return to God, and of that eternal happiness which is connected with it. — This sentiment the apostle does not so much establish in the way of acute argument, as illustrate in a kind of popular way; making use for this purpose of the example and similitude of Adam, who, in a certain sense, may be called and regarded as the sole author of sin, and of the punishments to be feared on account of sin: nor is any thing more to be sought for, in the whole passage, than a kind of slight similitude between Adam and Christ." This is making light work of the whole matter. Meyer: "The apostle intends to show in a very lucid manner, that the beneficent consequences of redemption are much more widely extended than the mischief occasioned by Adam's offence;" Paul, Lehrbeg. p. 376. This seems to be correct, so far as it goes. But thus much is only one of the objects designed. To show the certainty of salvation and exceedingly to magnify the riches of gospel-grace, is also designed. Barnes: "Wide as the evil is which was brought upon the human race by Adam, equally wide is the blessing of sins forgiven through Christ;" p. 376. This again is the part only of what the apostle has accomplished. Flatt: "[The object of the apostle is,] to explain the manner of redemption, and in particular so far to explain it as it has been accomplished by one, *i. e.*, Jesus Christ." Altogether too limited a view. Rückert in his recent commentary; [The apostle designs] "to comprise the whole doctrine of sin and redemption in one grand summary." Too general and indefinite. Tholuck's view the reader will find above at the head of chap. v.

It seems to be plain, that the particular object of the writer is developed in vers. 15—17, and 20, 21; and from these his object would appear mainly to be (as before stated,) 'to impress our minds with the *certainty* of salvation which is by grace, and to *magnify* the *riches* of that grace which is bestowed through Jesus Christ.' This the writer undertakes to accomplish by a comparison of the evils removed by Christ and the blessings bestowed, with the mischiefs occasioned by the fall

of our first parents. I have no doubt, moreover, that inasmuch as all men have been injured by the fall, so it is a merciful and proper and benevolent arrangement on the part of God, that the blessings procured by Christ should be bestowed on all, or at least proffered to all; and in this way, the fact that he is the God of the Gentiles as well as the Jews, and that salvation is and ought to be accessible to the former as well as to the latter—a truth for which Paul so often and earnestly contends (see iii. 29—31. iv. 1—25)—is more fully illustrated and more satisfactorily and triumphantly evinced. We have then, according to this view of the matter, three objects to be accomplished by vers. 12—21; viz., to display and more fully evince the CERTAINTY, the GREATNESS, and the EXTENSIVE NATURE of that salvation which Christ wrought. In this general statement Rückert agrees, in his recent Commentary.

(12) *Διὰ τοῦτο*, *wherefore, therefore*. So it is usually translated, viz., as *illative*, and as showing that what follows is a *consequence* or *deduction* from what has gone before. But in what sense can this be here asserted? How are the sentiments in the sequel here *deduced* from that which precedes them?

This is a question that has greatly perplexed critics and commentators. Some have converted the words *διὰ τοῦτο*, into a mere *formula of transition*; e. g., Schleusner makes them so here; and Wahl represents *διὰ τοῦτο* as having such a sense in Matt. xiii. 52. If this were admissible, these words might then be rendered, *moreover, further*. But such a meaning cannot be supported by reasoning which is strictly philological.

Schott understands *διὰ τοῦτο*, in his able Essay on Rom. v. 12—14 (*Opusc.* vol. i. p. 318. seq.) as indicating an *occasion*, in reference to what had already been said, of making the remarks which follow. But Tholuck, Reiche, Glöckler, and many others, represent *διὰ τοῦτο* here as *illative*; although none of them seem to me to have satisfactorily shown *how* the sequel is a *deduction* from what precedes. At least no writer with whom I am acquainted, seems to have done this, so as to render clear the point *how* these words are *illative* here in a *logical* sense.

That *διὰ τοῦτο* is not always employed in an *illative* sense, as Reiche and others assert, will appear from a particular examination of Matt. xiii. 52. Mark xii. 24. Rom. xiii. 6; to which other doubtful passages might be added. On the whole, however, a minute and extensive review of this subject has brought me to the conviction, that *διὰ τοῦτο* here is employed in a kind of *illative* sense, although

not in one which is strictly of *logical* illation. I do not now view it as having relation in particular to ver. 11, but to what precedes this, and particularly to the great points brought to view and established from chap. iii. 28 to ver. 11, viz., the extent, the greatness, and the certainty of salvation by Christ. These being shown, the apostle now says, that he may conclude from them that what he is going to state is true and worthy of reception. What he does state we have seen to be these very points, with an illustration of them by a new and striking comparison which he introduces. The *comparison*, beyond all doubt, is not the *main* object of the writer; it merely subserves his main design, viz., the confirmation and illustration of the great points already stated.

The course of thought and the connection of it seems to me to be this: 'The extent, the greatness, the certainty of salvation, I have now exhibited to you, *therefore* (*διὰ τοῦτο*) it is worthy of all reception, or *therefore* it is true, that *as by one man's sin,*' &c. Instead of repeating a simple deduction, the apostle makes out one accompanied by illustrations and remarks which serve very much to strengthen the impression that he intends to make. He who fully recognizes this last circumstance, will probably be relieved in his mind from the main part of the difficulty occasioned by the use of *διὰ τοῦτο*, in this connection.

On any other ground than this, or what is substantially like to this, I do not see how the *appropriateness* of *διὰ τοῦτο* can be made out. If we suppose that the *main* point in vers. 12—21, is to exhibit the relation of Adam to us, or the influence of his offence upon us, then it is quite impossible to make out in reality and propriety an *illative* sense of *διὰ τοῦτο* here. In what part of the epistle which *precedes*, has the apostle discussed the subject of Adam's offence or influence? Surely in no part. It is men's *own personal* sins which he has thus far represented as the cause of their guilt and danger before God. How then must his reasoning stand, on the ground which I am opposing? Simply thus; 'All men have brought themselves under the curse of the law by their sins. God is the common father of Jews and Gentiles, and has the same designs of pardoning mercy towards both, and has *promised* to bestow it; the death of Christ has assured the promised salvation; the riches of his grace are exceedingly great and wonderful; **THEREFORE** (*διὰ τοῦτο*) *as Adam by one offence ruined all men, so Christ by his obedience has procured salvation for all.*' That this is a fair statement of the course of thought

will not be denied by any; and the last particular must be admitted by those whom I am now opposing. But how the *logical illation* is to be made out by them, if we subjoin the last particular in its present shape is (after all that has often, and recently with great confidence been uttered in relation to this subject, as though it did not present the least difficulty,) a problem that my powers of reasoning are not adequate to solve.

We must change the shape, then, of the last member of this series of propositions, and say: '*therefore, i. e.,* because of the arguments produced and reasons already given to show the extent, the greatness, and the certainty of salvation by Christ—*therefore, it is true, that, &c.*; or *therefore* we must admit, that as Adam introduced sin and misery into the world in such a way that they became universal, and certain, and abounding, so Christ has become the author of salvation universal, certain, and abounding, or great.' The main object of course is the latter one, and it is for the very purpose of heightening the intensity of the picture given of this, that the antithesis and similitude of Adam's case is introduced.

ὥσπερ, *as*, of course introduces a comparison; ὥσπερ standing before the *protasis*, which seems to extend through the verse. But where is the *apodosis*? The form of the sentence completed would be: ὥσπερ κ. τ. λ.—οὕτως καὶ κ. τ. λ. But the latter appears to be here wanting. This is supplied, however, in different ways, or is differently constructed, by different critics.

(a) Διὰ τοῦτο [τὴν καταλλαγὴν ἑλάβομεν], ὥσπερ δι' ἐνός κ. τ. λ.; making ὥσπερ κ. τ. λ. itself an *apodosis* instead of a *protasis*. So Cocceius, Elsner, Koppe, Cramer, Rosenmüller, Stolz, and some others.

(b) By inverting καὶ οὕτως, and writing it οὕτως καὶ κ. τ. λ.; and so making the rest of the verse which follows, to be the *apodosis* of the sentence. So Le Clerc, Wolf, Homberg, and others.

(c) Καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας κ. τ. λ. is made the beginning of the *apodosis* by Erasmus and Beza; which of course they must translate thus: *so also by sin, &c.*

(d) Calvin, Gomer, Tholuck, Schmid, and some others, find the *apodosis* in verse 14, viz., ὅς ἐστιν τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος.

(e) Others find it concealed in verse 15; and some make it out from the whole of the sequel after verse 12.

But all these methods come short of fully and definitely exhibiting the *contrast* here, which the apostle designs to make between the one man (Adam) who sinned, and Christ; which contrast appears

fully and plainly in verses 18, 19. With the majority of interpreters, therefore, I hesitate not to regard verses 13—17 as substantially a parenthesis (thrown in to illustrate a sentiment brought to view in the protasis, verse 12); and I find a full apodosis only in verses 18, 19, where the sentiment of verse 12 is virtually resumed and repeated, and where the apodosis regularly follows, after an οὕτω καί. (I admit, however, that *ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μελλόντος* in verse 14 conveys a general sentiment, which may make a kind of apodosis in the way of hint.) In this manner, and only in this, can I find the real antithesis or comparison as fully made out, which the apostle designs to make. This method of writing, too, where the protasis is suspended for the sake of explanations thrown in, is altogether consonant with the usual method of the apostle Paul; comp. Rom. i. 3—7. ii. 6—16. Eph. ii. 1—5. iii. 1—13. 1 Tim. i. 3, 4. Rom. ix. 10, seq. Rom. ix. 22, seq. Rom. viii. 3. Heb. iv. 6—9. v. 6—10. v. 10. vii. 1. ix. 7—12. All that is necessary to be noted is, that the apodosis in verses 18, 19, is given in language that takes its hue from the intermediate parenthesis of verses 13—17. The simple apodosis independently of this would be: οὕτω καὶ διὰ ἑνὸς δικαιοσύνη εἰς κόσμον ἐσθλῆ, καὶ εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους διήλθε.

Δι' ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου, *by one man, i. e., by Adam*, as appears from verse 14; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, 45. The apostle cannot design that this should be strictly construed; for he himself has told us, that "Adam was not deceived; but the *woman*, being deceived, was in the transgression." (1 Tim. ii. 14. 2 Cor. xi. 3), *i. e.*, Eve first transgressed; which, moreover, Paul assigns as a reason why she should not usurp authority and have precedence in the church. In the like way the son of Sirach represents Eve as the first transgressor, xxv. 24. If now it was a principal object with the apostle here, to point out specifically and with exactness the *first* author of transgression, how could he omit mentioning Eve? Or if his main design was to point out a corrupt nature propagated by ordinary generation, then why should he neglect to mention Eve along with Adam; for both parents surely were concerned in this? In respect to these questions it may be remarked further, that either the apostle, in making mention of Adam, trusted that his readers would spontaneously call to mind the primitive pair, the woman being comprehended along with the man; or that he designed merely to compare the origin itself and extent of sin and misery (without particularizing the manner), with the origin and extent of the deliverance from

them as wrought by Christ. In respect to the first of these suppositions, the rule *a potiori nomen fit* seems to be applicable to the sentiment of it. Adam, as the constituted superior, who was first formed and made lord of the inferior creation: Adam, who by consenting to the sin of his wife and participating in it made himself a full partaker of it; is named here from the fact of his precedence. It seems probable, also, that he *only* is named, because it is the particular design of the writer to make a comparison between the *second Adam* (Christ) and the *first*. The congruity of the representation and comparison would be marred, by naming more than one author of sin and misery. Nor can any importance be here attached to the fact itself, that *two* were concerned in the primitive transgression: for "they twain were one flesh;" they were one also in guilt, *i. e.*, they were both partakers of the same criminality. The question is not concerning the exact *manner* in which the first transgression came to be committed (for this is not here any object of investigation with Paul); but the question is: What influence had the primitive sin, in which Adam was the most conspicuous, responsible, and important actor, on the race of men, as to introducing and occasioning sin and misery?

It may also be remarked, that had Adam refused to unite with his wife in her transgression, the consequences must inevitably have been altogether different from what they have now been. His act, then, *completed* the mischief which was begun by Eve; and so the apostle names him here as the cause of all the evils which followed. This, however, does not prove that he considered Eve as less blameworthy than Adam, or more inexcusable; for 1 Tim. ii. 14 is directly opposed to such a notion: but it results, I apprehend, merely from a desire of *congruity* in respect to the comparison which he is to make, *i. e.*, the congruity of comparing *one* person with *one*, one *man* (*i. e.*, the first Adam) with one *man* (*i. e.*, the second Adam). How would it strike readers, if Eve had been here substituted for Adam? And this suggestion leads, at once, to a perception of what *congruity* demands in the case before us.

As to *ἀπὸ* in this phrase, it designates here, as often elsewhere, the *causa principalis*, not the mere secondary, instrumental, or occasional cause. In the Sept. and New Test., such a usage is beyond all doubt a frequent one, as any good lexicon will show.

Ἡ ἁμαρτία, *sin*. The *sin* would mean, in English, something different from what the Greek here means, although the article is pre-

fixed to the word. Whenever any thing is named which is generic in its nature, but *unique* or single in its kind, the Greeks usually prefix the article to it; *e. g.*, ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἡ ἀρετή, ἡ ἀλήθεια, τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, &c. In such cases, ἡ δικαιοσύνη (for example) as an entire *genus*, is *unique*, *i. e.*, it differs from all other qualities of moral beings; and so it has the article prefixed in order to denote this. But still, δικαιοσύνη may at another time be regarded by the mind as a *genus* comprehending *several subordinate species*, such as commutative justice, penal justice, integrity, &c.; in which case the article would naturally be omitted. Agreeably to these principles, ἡ ἁμαρτία here appears with the article, because it appears in its simple *generic* nature, *i. e.*, as single or monadic. That it is generic here, *i. e.*, that it comprehends both sinful actions and affections, seems to be clear from the nature of the case, and from what follows. If Adam was created so as to be upright, and was purely holy until his fall, then sin commenced with his fall: sin of any kind; sin either in *affection* or *action*. That such a *generic* meaning must here be given to ἡ ἁμαρτία, is evident, from the simple fact, that Adam's desire of the forbidden fruit inordinately indulged, was a sin of the *affections*, and his actually eating it was a sin of external action.

Bretschneider remarks (Dogmatik. II. 48, edit. 3), that the article is used before ἁμαρτία in the verse before us, because it designates *vitiositas*, but not *peccata actualia*. But surely the sequel here will not justify his remark; for the ἡ ἁμαρτία of Adam is called (verse 14) his παράστασις; in verses 15, 17, and 18, his παράπτωμα; in verse 19, his παρακοή; all of which implies *peccatum actuale*, *viz.*, the unlawful desiring and eating of the forbidden fruit.

The simple scriptural idea of ἁμαρτία is ἀνομία, *i. e.*, lawlessness, violation of law. *To miss the mark, to err, to fail*, is the primitive meaning of ἁμαρτάνω; and ἁμαρτία always has reference to some rule or law which is violated by it; as the apostolic definition of it by ἀνομία clearly shows. At all events nothing but sin as an *act* can be here designated; for Adam's sin was such. He had no previous *vitiositas*; and if *vitiositas* were here meant by ἁμαρτία, the assertion could not be true: for if *vitiositas* had been a part of the *original* constitution of man, Adam surely could not have been the *author* of this. The meaning must be, as afterwards asserted, that sin commenced with Adam's παράστασις or παράπτωμα or παρακοή, neither of which is *vitiositas* but *vitium*.

Εἰς τὸν κόσμον, *into the world, i. e.*, among men, into the world of

human beings; comp. Matt. xxvi. 13. 2 Pet. ii. 5. iii. 6. Matt. xiii. 38. John i. 10. iii. 16, 17. xvi. 33. 2 Cor. i. 12. Comp. also *ἔρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, John vi. 14, ix. 39. xi. 27. xii. 46, Heb. x. 5. 2 John ii. 7. That the right explanation of *κόσμος* is given above, is confirmed by verse 18, where *εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους* is a substitute for it, and one of equivalent report.

Εἰσῆλθε, *entered into, invaded*. The first entrance or the commencement of sin is here designated; as is plain from the sequel, where *διῆλθε* is used to designate the further and universal progress of sin. Compare Wisd. ii. 24, *φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰς ἡλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον* xiv. 14, *κενοδοξία γὰρ ἀνθρώπων [εἰδωλολατρεία] εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον*.

Καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, *and by sin, i. e., through the instrumentality of sin; or rather, by reason of sin, in consequence of sin, on account of sin; διὰ* being usually employed in this sense, when put before the Genitive.

Θάνατος, *death*. But what death? That of the body, or of the soul, or of both? In other words: Is *temporal* evil only here meant, or *eternal*, or both?

The answer must be sought for, first of all, in the *usus loquendi* of the author himself. In the context we have his own explanation of *θάνατος*. In ver. 15, *death*, (*ἀπίθανον*) stands opposed to *χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι*. In ver. 17, it stands opposed to *τὴν περισσεύαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης*. In ver. 21, it stands opposed to *ζωὴν αἰώνιον*. In chap. vi. 23, *θάνατος* is directly contrasted with *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*. That *θάνατος*, then, by the *usus loquendi* of Paul, does sometimes mean *a death* which is the *opposite* of *eternal life* or happiness, is here made certain.

In the like sense, *i. e.*, as used to designate *the penalty of sin*, the reader may find *θάνατος* in other writings of Paul; viz. in Rom. i. 32. vi. 21. vi. 16. vii. 5. vii. 10. vii. 13. vii. 24. viii. 2. viii. 6. 2 Cor. ii. 16. vii. 10. 2 Tim. i. 10. Heb. ii. 14. Nor is this peculiar to Paul alone, for it agrees with that of other sacred writers in the New Testament; *e. g.*, John viii. 51. v. 24. James i. 15. 1 John iii. 14. Rev. ii. 11. xx. 6. xx. 14.

In like manner we find the word *death* to be used in the Old Testament; *e. g.*, Deut. xxx. 15. Jer. xxi. 8 (comp. Sirach xv. 7). Prov. v. 5. viii. 36. xi. 19. xii. 28. Ezek. xxxiii. 11. And in the same way the verb *to die* is employed; *e. g.*, by Paul, Rom. viii. 13; by John vi. 50. xi. 26. viii. 21. So in the Old Testament; *e. g.*, Ezek.

xviii. 4. xviii. 20. xviii. 17. xviii. 21. xviii. 24. xviii. 28. xviii. 32. Prov. xv. 10. Ezek. xxxiii. 8. xxxiii. 11. xxxiii. 14. xxxiii. 15. Prov. xxxiii. 13. Must not this be the sense, also, in Gen. ii. 17. iii. 3, 4?

If any one now will carefully investigate all these examples, he will find that in many cases it is quite impossible to limit the words *death*, *die*, so as to make them signify no more than the dissolution of the body, or temporal death. *E. g.* John viii. 51, 'If any man shall keep my saying, *he shall never see death.*' John v. 24, 'He that heareth my words . . . *is passed from death unto life.*' John xi. 26, 'Whosoever . . . believeth in me, *shall never die.*' Ezek. xviii. 28, 'He . . . that turneth away from his transgressions . . . shall surely live, *he shall not die;*' and to the same effect, in many of the other passages quoted. The biblical usage is very definitely and specifically set forth in Deut. xxx. 5; 'See, I have set before thee this day, *LIFE and GOOD, and DEATH and EVIL.*' No better explanation can be given. *Life* is the image of all good, and therefore is employed to express it; *death* is the consummation of all evil, and so it is used as a strong expression in order to designate every kind of evil, whether temporal or eternal.

That the *usus loquendi*, then, permits θάνατος to be construed as designating the *penalty of sin*, yea the *whole* penalty, there can be no good ground to doubt. The only question now is: Whether θάνατος is employed in this sense in the passage before us?

The antithesis in verses 15, 17, 21, and vi. 23, as produced above, would seem to go far toward a final settlement of this question. Indeed, there is no *philological* escape from the conclusion, that *death* in the sense of *penalty for sin*, must be regarded as the meaning of the writer here.

Is there any thing now in the *nature of the case*, which goes to show that death should here have a *limited* meaning given to it, or (in other words) that it should be construed as meaning only the *death of the body*?

What then is the nature of the case? It is this, viz., that as condemnation [κατάκριμα] came upon all men by the offence of one man (Adam), so by the obedience of one (Christ), all men have access to δικαίωσις εἰς ζωὴν, verse 18. Now as ζωὴ is here plainly the antithesis of θάνατος [κατάκριμα], we have only to inquire what must be the meaning of ζωὴ in order to obtain that of θάνατος. But in respect to this there can be no doubt. Ζωή means the blessings or

happiness procured by a Saviour's death, *i. e.*, it designates all the holiness and happiness which this introduces. But certainly these blessings are not limited to *the resurrection of the body*. I do not deny that such a resurrection is a blessing to the righteous (for so the apostle plainly considers it in 1 Cor. xv). I would rather say however, that the resurrection is something preparatory to the bestowment of blessings. But it must be remembered, that the wicked will be raised from the dead as truly as the righteous; yet surely no one will count this a *blessing* to them. It is only a preparation for augmented misery.

It cannot be, then, that the simple resurrection from the dead, in itself considered, should be called *δικαίωσις ζωῆς*, and therefore a state of temporal death is not a direct and full antithesis to life, *i. e.*, in the sense given to this word by the apostle, temporal death is not principally the evil from which it is the main object of Christ to deliver us; for resurrection from this is a *good* or an *evil*, just as the case may be in regard to the moral character of him who is the subject of such resurrection.

Does Christ then deliver from the *suffering itself* of temporal death? A formal answer to this is unnecessary, since all men without distinction, are mortal and die. One thing, however, should be said in reference to this; which is, that 'the sting of death' is taken away as to believers, through the hopes inspired by a Saviour's blood; and that in this way the evil is greatly mitigated in respect to those who have true hope in Christ.

Once more; the penalty of *all* sin is *evil*, *i. e.*, evil as to both body and soul. "The soul that sinneth shall die." Evil to the *body* those of course will admit, who hold that temporal death is here meant. Evil to the *soul* they must also admit; for how is it possible that any one should sin, without defiling, polluting, and rendering unhappy the soul? The primary elements of the *moral* universe must be changed, before this can take place. It is impossible in the case of Adam, or in any other case, that sin should be committed without injury to the *soul*. It would follow with certainty, then, that if Adam's first sin was a *real* sin, and *a fortiori* if it was one of the greatest of all sins (as we surely have much reason to conclude when we consider its consequences), then death in its *extensive* sense must have been the penalty attached to it. What reason can be given, why other sins less than his are punishable with *death* in the

enlarged sense of this word, and yet that the sin of Adam was not punishable in the like way? Was he not even the more culpable, who fell from a state of entire holiness?

Finally, the apostle, when he comes to point out the dissimilitude between Adam's offence and its consequences, and the obedience of Christ and its consequences (as he does in verses 15—17), opposes the *παράπτωμα* occasioned by Adam to the *δικαίωμα* effected by Christ, verse 16; and the *θάνατος* introduced by the former, to the *βασίλειαν* in *ζωῇ* accomplished by the latter, verse 17. Now as *δικαίωμα* is not, in its more important sense, a deliverance from temporal death merely, nor *the reigning in life* merely a deliverance from mortality; so *temporal death* cannot with any good appearance of reason, be understood here as the only and essential meaning of *θάνατος*. That *θάνατος* includes this among other evils, I would not by any means be understood to deny; for 1 Cor. xv. 22 shows, that Paul clearly held the death of the body to have been introduced by Adam. But that this was the *prominent* evil in his mind, so much so as to be here named as the principal thing which constituted the penalty threatened to our first parents, is, I trust, rendered sufficiently improbable by the considerations above stated. See Excursus III. for further remarks.

Καὶ οὕτως, and thus, and so, or and in like manner. An important inquiry may be here raised, viz., Does the apostle mean to say: 'In consequence of sin's entering the world and death by sin, through the transgression of Adam—as the natural and necessary, or at least as the established consequence of this—sin and death came upon all other men;' in other words, does he mean to say, that 'the coming of sin and death upon all other men, was occasioned by Adam's committing sin and incurring death? Or does he mean thus: 'As it was with Adam, when he sinned and death came upon him in consequence of it, so it is with all other men, i. e., they sin and death in like manner comes upon them?'

The former meaning implies a *special* connection between Adam and his posterity, and a *special* influence of his crime and condemnation upon their sin and condemnation; the latter contains no such implication, but merely avers, that all who sin, whether Adam or his posterity, fall under sentence of condemnation. The word *οὕτως* is capable of either interpretation; as it means either *hoc modo*, *hac ratione*, or *similiter*, *simili modo*. Which of these is the sense that the writer here means to express, we shall be better enabled to in-

quire into, when we have gone through with the remaining words of the verse.

Ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, BECAUSE THAT *all have sinned*. Another method of rendering this has often been urged, viz., IN WHOM *all have sinned*. So the Vulgate; and so, in conformity to this, Augustine, Beza, Calixtus, E. Schmidt, Calovius, Quenstedt, Raphel, et alii. But the objections to translating ἰφ' ᾧ by *in quo, in whom*, are weighty; for, (1) If ᾧ be made a masc. *relative* pronoun here, there is no antecedent for it within any probable limits. Ἀνθρώπου lies too far back; and Θάνατος as an antecedent, would make no tolerable sense; for what meaning could be conveyed, by saying, 'in *which* death all have sinned?' (2) Ἐπὶ ᾧ (ἰφ' ᾧ) does not, by Greek usage, mean *in whom*: ἐν ᾧ would of course be the proper expression for this. So Thomas Magister and Phavorinus: ἰφ' ᾧ, ἀντὶ τοῦ θανάτου. Comp. 2 Cor. v. 4, ἰφ' ᾧ οὐ θίλομεν, *because we will not*. (3) The assertion ἰφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, is dwelt upon and explained in verses 13, 14; and in these verses, men's own *personal* sins appear to be spoken of (as we shall hereafter see), not those of another which are laid to their charge; and if this explanation be admitted, then ἰφ' ᾧ cannot here mean *in whom*. (4) If ἰφ' ᾧ could be properly taken as equivalent to ἐν ᾧ (and so much is true, viz., that ἐπὶ and ἐν are beyond all doubt frequently commuted as to sense in some cases that occur in the New Testament), yet the whole phrase, viz., ἁμαρτάνειν ἐπὶ τινί, meaning *to sin in some one* or *by one*, is, so far as I know, without any example to support it. How can it then be here adopted, against the usual idiom of the Greek language, and against another and preferable sense? If the apostle had designed to express such an unusual idea, would he not of course have shunned all ambiguity of phraseology, and made the form of his expression so definite that no doubt could remain? As it is, we must follow the usual laws or interpretation; and there can be no doubt that we are authorized by these to translate ἰφ' ᾧ *because, for that, &c.* Thus in the examples adduced by Phavorinus: ἰφ' ᾧ τὴν κλοπὴν ἐργάσω, BECAUSE *thou hast committed theft*; ἰφ' οὗτος [plur.] τὸν νόμον οὐ τηρεῖς, BECAUSE *thou dost not obey the law*. So in the example of Thomas Magister. ἰφ' ᾧ Γεννάδιον ἐγγραφεῖ, BECAUSE *he has given a sketch of Gennadius*. So Marcus Aurelius says: ἰφ' οὗτος ὁρᾷτέ με διακείμενον, BECAUSE *ye see me determined*, in Herod. 1. 4. Theophilus (ad Autol. 2) says: ἰφ' ᾧ οὐκ ἴσχυσε θανατῶσαι αὐτούς, BECAUSE *he could not kill them*; Plutarch (de Pyth.extr.) ἰφ' οὗτος ἰγνέμεν . . . πρόθυμος, BECAUSE *I was ready*.

In fact, *ἐν ᾧ* is a well known elliptical phrase, employed in the same sense as *ἐν τούτῳ ὅτι*, or our English *in that, because*. And in this rendering agree Theodoret, Photius, Pelagius, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Pet. Martyr, our Eng. Version, Gerhard, Piscator, Paræus, Buddæus, Raphel, Wetstein, Carpzov, Koppe, Flatt, Schott, Vatablus, Schmid, Steudel, Tholuck, Rückert, Reiche, and many others. If the apostle had meant here to say *in whom*, i. e., to communicate the idea which would seem to be conveyed by this, how could he avoid saying: 'Death has come upon all men, *ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ* i. e., [in the one man] all have sinned?'

Other translations of *ἐν ᾧ* have also been defended; *per eum* (Grotius); *propter quem* (Elsner); *secundum quem* (Photius, Œcumenius, Bretsch.); *cum quo* (Cocceius); but it is enough to say of these, that if Paul had meant to express such a sense, we can hardly suppose that he would not have employed *διὰ*, or *ὅν*, or *μετά*, or *κατά*, instead of using *ἐν*. Even *post quem* has been proposed as a version of *ἐν ᾧ* i. e., AFTER whom. But what would be the sense of Paul's saying, that Adam's posterity sinned *after* he did? Did his readers need to be told this?

One other explanation deserves notice, inasmuch as it is patronized by Homberg, Venema, Schmid, Glöckler, and some others, and has more the appearance of probability and of *usus loquendi* in its favour. This is, *ἐν ᾧ* UNTO which, viz., unto which death or punishment; thus making *ἐν* to mark the *end* or *consequence* to which sinning came. In the classics we find *νοσήν ἐν θανάτῳ*, to be sick UNTO death (Ælian), and *δήσαι ἐν θανάτῳ*, to bind UNTO death (Herod.), and other like phrases. But after all, a conclusive objection against this interpretation is, that the apostle has just said the very thing that this interpretation makes him to say over again, and said it more strongly. Besides to understand the apostle here as saying that *all have sinned* UNTO death, would seem to imply, that they might have sinned to a certain extent without incurring such a penalty. Different from this is the case where another apostle says, "there is a sin unto death;" for he is there discussing the subject of an *unpardonable* sin.

Finally: to render *ἐν ᾧ*, on account of which, for the sake of which, would be little short of nonsense: for how could the apostle say, that all men sinned *for the sake of* bringing death upon themselves?

When Origen, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, and some other

fathers, adopt the sense of *in quo*, this appears to be the result of their *theology* rather than of their philology. Augustine has given us the explanation of his views: "Fuerunt enim omnes *ratione seminis* in lumbis Adam quando damnatus est: et ideo sine illis damnatus non est: quemadmodum fuerunt Israelitæ in lumbis Abrahæ, quando decimatus est," [Heb. VII. 9, 10]; contra Jul. Pelag. V. 12. And again: "In Adam omnes tunc peccaverunt, quando in ejus natura, illâ insitâ vi quâ eos gignere poterat, adhuc *omnes ille unus fuerunt*," De pecc. Merit. et Rem. III. 7. The same *unity* with Adam has Pres. Edwards laboured to establish in Part IV. chapter 3 of his work on Original sin; where he has argued, that the identity of one and the same individual is merely an effect of "arbitrary divine constitution;" and that the *unity* of each individual of the human race with Adam their common ancestor may as well be asserted, as the unity of any individual with himself at different points of time; unity in both cases being merely a matter of "sovereign and arbitrary appointment." The schoolmen have speculated *ad nauseam* on this subject.

Πατρις ἡμαρτον, *all have sinned*. But how? In their *own proper* persons? Or in Adam? Or is it merely the meaning of ἡμαρτον here, that all men *are treated* as sinners?

This last opinion Storr maintains; and he appeals to Gen. xliv. 32, יְהִי חַטָּאתִי then *I will bear the blame*, i. e., *I will be treated* as a sinner, as he construes it. But the meaning is, 'I will consent to be regarded as a sinner by my father.' He also refers to Job ix. 29, אֲנִי חַטָּאתִי; which however does not support the appeal. Grotius also appeals to Gen. xxxi. 27, and Job vi. 24 (?) for the like purpose; but without ground. And although, if an exigency of the passage demanded it, ἡμαρτον might be rendered, *are treated as sinners* (comp. 1 K. i. 21, where, however, the meaning is 'I and my son shall be sinners in the view of the reigning prince'); yet no such exigency occurs here, as vers. 13, 14, show; for in these (which are plainly built upon the latter part of verse 12), the writer labours to show that men are themselves *actual* sinners; as we shall see in the sequel. Besides, it is a good rule of interpretation, never to depart from the *usual* sense of words unless there is an imperious reason for it; and usually ἀμαρτάνω does not mean, *to be treated as a sinner*. It is surely a *doubtful* case, whether it ever has this meaning.

There remain, then, only the other two methods of construing ἡμαρτον, which are adverted to in the first and second questions

above. But the second method, viz., that *all men have sinned in Adam*, cannot be adopted here, because it is founded merely in the mode of expression, i. e., in the phrase *ἐφ' ᾧ*. The reasons for rejecting this opinion have already been stated above. It can be admitted only in case of *philological* necessity, which does not occur here. There remains, therefore, only the first plain and simple method of interpretation, viz., all men have sinned in their own persons; all men have themselves incurred the guilt of sin, and so subjected themselves to its penalty; or at least, all men are themselves sinners, and so are liable to death.

The word *ἡμᾶς* which the apostle here employs, is not fairly susceptible of a different interpretation. It contains in itself an *active* sense throughout; and must therefore imply *sin in an active sense*. Accordingly, the word *ἁμαρτάνω* has neither passive nor middle voice; which is a striking evidence that the word is, from its very nature, susceptible of only an *active* sense. Besides, in the case before us the *Aorist* is employed; which, as Rückert and Reiche have well observed, designates what was matter of *fact*, not mere state or condition. The connection strongly impresses the same idea. The sin of Adam, mentioned in the first clause of the verse, was one of fact, deed, action, not of state or condition; and the implication is, that the *πάντες* have sinned as he did, although not against the same law; or precept, ver. 14. Moreover, the assertion of universal sinfulness has an evident reference to the apostle's previous declaration and conclusion, in iii. 19—23. All his proof in chaps. i.—iii. of universal sin, consists in appeal to *facts*, i. e., to sins actually committed.

I am aware that a different sense has been given to *πάντες ἡμᾶς* here, by some of the most respectable commentators. They regard it as meaning that all have sinned in Adam, or at least, that through him they have become sinners; and they appeal to vers. 17—19 in support of this sentiment. And it must be confessed, that there is no more ground for objection to the *sentiment* which the expression thus construed would convey, than there is to the sentiment in vers. 17—19. It is not on this ground, that I hesitate to receive this interpretation. It is because there are philological difficulties involved in such an exegesis, which I see no way of satisfactorily removing. Vers. 13 and 14 seem plainly to recognise such sin as that of which men are *personally* and *actually* guilty; yea a sin different in some important respects from that of Adam's first transgression, . . . ἐπὶ

τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας ἐν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ. This is a sin moreover, on account of which "death reigned over them." But if this sin were the very sin of Adam imputed to them, and not their own actual sin; if it were merely his sin propagated to them (as the usual sentiment respecting original sin is); then how could it be that death came upon them, although they had *not* sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression? So far from this must it be, that Adam's sin is their very sin, and the very ground here alleged by the apostle why death reigns over them.

This consideration, united with the principle that the ordinary meaning of ἡμαρτον should be received, unless there is a solid reason for departing from it; and all this added to the consideration that verses 13, 14 are clearly expegetical of the latter part of vers. 12; seem to make it unavoidable that πάντες ἡμαρτον should be here construed, *all have sinned in their own persons or actually.*

I know, indeed, that such distinguished men as Calvin, Edwards, Flatt, Tholuck, and others, explain the phrase in question by referring to ver. 19; and some of them allege as a ground of this, that the design of the apostle requires us so to understand πάντες ἡμαρτον here, because he is evidently intent upon representing the evils which Adam occasioned. But because ver. 19 asserts an influence of Adam upon the sinfulness of men, it does not follow that the same sentiment must therefore be of course affirmed in ver. 12; certainly not that it should be directly asserted in the same manner. It appears quite probable, I readily concede, that Paul, in making the declarations contained in ver. 12, had in his own mind a view of the connection between the first offence of Adam and the sinfulness of his posterity. It seems to me quite probable, indeed, that καὶ οὕτως implies this; which (with Erasmus, Tholuck, and others) we might construe, *et ita factum est*, i. e., *and so it happened*, or *and thus it was brought about*, viz., brought about that all men became sinners, and thus fell under sentence of death; in other words, Adam's offence was the occasion of, or brought, sin and condemnation upon all men. I readily concede that there is no good reason to deny that Paul did entertain the idea, when he made the declarations in ver. 12, that the fact of all men's becoming sinners and being subjected to the dominion of death, was connected with the first transgression of Adam (comp. verses 17—19); yet that the apostle has asserted this sentiment *explicitly* and *directly* in ver. 12, cannot, I think, be made out from the language by any just rules of interpretation. Nay, for

reasons already given, and yet to be stated, I cannot but regard the case as quite clear, that no more is here *explicitly* and *directly* asserted, than that all men are themselves actual sinners, and therefore come under condemnation. But in the preceding ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθε, and in the καὶ οὕτως . . . διῆλθε, I think we may without any forced construction, say that we must, discover an *indirect* intimation of what is directly asserted in verses 17—19, viz., that the first offence of Adam was connected with the sin and misery of his posterity, and in some sense or other causal of it. At the outset, then, Paul may have had this sentiment in his mind; yet in ver. 12 he seems to intimate it only in the expressions just cited. Construed in this way, the sense of the verse would be as follows: ‘By means of Adam’s first offence sin and death invaded the world of mankind; and having thus invaded it, they have been marching through it (διῆλθε) and carrying on their conquests ever since; all men have become sinners, all have come under condemnation.’

While the clause before us, then, asserts the fact that all have become sinners and have therefore come under condemnation, it may be regarded as intimating, by implication, that the whole of what has come upon men stands connected with the introduction by Adam of sin and death into the world. I cannot, therefore, agree with those commentators, who find in our verse *no* intimation of such a connection of all men with Adam; less still can I assent to those, who find in it no charge at all upon Adam’s posterity of *actual* sin in *propria* personâ.

The objection made by Flatt against construing the clause before us as having respect to *actual* sin, seems to be destitute of any good ground of support. ‘In this way,’ says he, ‘*infants* must be included among *actual* sinners; which is not true.’ But how can any more difficulty arise from saying that *all are sinners* here, than from the apostle’s saying the very same thing so often in the previous part of his epistle, *e. g.*, iii. 9—18, 19, 23? Of course the writer of such declarations must be understood (if he means to designate *actual* sinners in the passage just adverted to, as it is agreed that he does), to designate such as are capable of being so; just as when it is said; “He that believeth not shall be damned,” we understand the Saviour to speak of *such as are capable of belief or unbelief*. There is surely no more difficulty in the one case than in the other. That the apostle had his eye on the case of *infants*, in particular, any where in this whole paragraph, may be justly regarded as doubtful; particularly

must we doubt this, when we bring Rom. ix. 11 into the account, which surely implies a state of infants quite different from that which the charge in Rom. v. 17—19 would imply, in case we suppose them to be purposely included in this charge.

In truth, I do not see on what ground the reasoning here can be supposed to embrace *infants* and *idiots*, without assuming a principle that almost every one disclaims with a kind of horror in other cases of a like nature. Take the case above presented with several others; viz., “He that believeth not, shall be damned; Except ye repent, ye shall all perish; Without faith it is impossible to please God; He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of those who diligently seek him; Make to yourselves a new heart, for why will you die.” To these might be added almost an unlimited number of like cases. Now in what sense do *infants* and *idiots* ever *understand* and *obey* these and the like commands and principles? This question, one might properly insist, should be answered by those who strongly assert that infants were *designedly* included by the apostle here. Are we not, on every rational ground of interpretation, just as much entitled to say, that the Saviour purposely consigns over to damnation all infants because they do not and cannot believe? To *believe* what we do not understand, is out of the question; and that infants and idiots should understand the gospel method of salvation, is equally so. By general consent, then, we omit to include infants and idiots in the threatening, “He that believeth not shall be damned.” We suppose this is applicable to those only, who are physiologically and psychologically *capable* of understanding and believing.

Let us be consistent. When the apostle speaks of those who have sinned and come under the penalty of death, he must mean those who were capable of sin in the *actual* sense; *i. e.*, he must mean so, if the word *ἡμαρτον* characterises such. And that it does, has, as it seems to me, been already shown above. But to suppose all this, does not involve the idea, that the apostle means to disclaim any participation by infants and idiots in any of the evils brought on Adam’s posterity by his fall. By no means. It no more involves this, than the assertion, that “without faith it is impossible to please God,” involves the idea that no infants or idiots can ever find favour in his sight. It is *facts*, it is the real state of things, it is these compared with the explicit declarations respecting infants that are made in the Scriptures, which are to be our guide in the formation of opinions

relative to their condition. How can we with propriety elicit from the text of the apostle then, a decision respecting a case that he evidently had not in view?

Again; should it be objected, that the parallel between the effects of Adam's sin and the grace of Christ would lose its meaning, in case we suppose that men's own *actual* sins are designated in the passage before us; my answer would be, that this is by no means the case, if Adam be regarded as the original cause of introducing sin into the world, and his offence as in some way the cause or occasion of all the offences that followed. Indeed this is the only ground on which a *true* parallelism can be maintained. Does the grace of Christ save any sinner who does not *repent* and *believe*? Surely not. Then of course the grace of Christ is not the only thing requisite to the salvation of sinners. There must be *some act of their own*, as well as the provisions which grace has made, in order that they should be saved. Turn now the tables and look at the counterpart. Must there not be something on the part of the sinner himself, as well as on the part of Adam, to complete his full and final destruction? Must there not be a true and real πάντες ἡμᾶς? This argument, then, although so often and so strenuously urged, would seem to be a kind of *felo de se*. The very nature of the parallelism before us would seem to demand a different conclusion, and in some respects one opposite to that which is often drawn.

Once more; the evils occasioned by Adam surely are not, as many suppose, limited by the apostle, and by the nature of the case are not to be limited, to that part only of suffering which comes upon our race by reason of *original* sin (as it is called), whatever this sin may be. Verse 14 speaks of 'death as reigning over those *who had NOT sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression*'; and of course it speaks of a sin committed by Adam's posterity, different from that of Adam; and verse 16 speaks of the *many* offences which the free gift of Christ takes away or causes to be pardoned, in distinction from the *one* offence only of Adam's that is concerned with our sin and condemnation. It follows of course, and we are thus assured, that the apostle does not limit himself to the *one* offence of Adam and its consequences in the alleged way of *imputation*, when he exhibits the contrast between Adam and Christ. Why should he do so? If *actual* sin in any way proceeds from, is connected with, or is occasioned by, the sin of Adam; then does it follow, that actual sin should enter into the contrast presented by the apostle, between the

sin and misery occasioned by the first Adam, and the justification and happiness introduced by the second.

On the whole, then, there seems to be no valid reason why we may not construe πάντες ἡμάρτον, as I have done above.

Let us now return to the καὶ οὕτως, the interpretation of which was left unfinished. Does it mean: "*And in like manner* with Adam did his posterity sin, and like him come under sentence of death? Or is this the meaning: 'As death followed sin in the case of Adam, so did it in the case of his posterity?' Or does the apostle intend to say, 'Since Adam introduced sin and misery into the world, his sin has been imputed to all his posterity, and all of them have been subjected to death thereby?' Not the first; because ver. 14 tells us that death came on many of Adam's posterity, who had NOT sinned in the manner that he did, i. e., against a revealed and express law. Not the third; for the reasons already given above, reasons why we must accede to the idea, that πάντες ἡμάρτον here means *actual sin in propria personâ*. Shall we conclude then, that the meaning of καὶ οὕτως must be substantially what is implied in the *second* of the above questions, viz., 'As sin entered the world, and death was inseparably connected with it, so death has passed through the world, and come upon all men, because it was inseparably connected with the sin which all men have committed?' Even this statement does not appear to me to convey the whole truth. The whole verse seems to contain an intimation, as has already been stated above, that both the *sins* of men and their *condemnation* stand connected, in some way or other, with the first offence by Adam. Καὶ οὕτως then must mean: 'And the matter being thus,' or 'circumstances being such,' viz., Adam having thus introduced sin and death, 'it passed on through all his race,' i. e., all have sinned, and all have come under condemnation in these circumstances. If we look at verses 18, 19, we shall surely find that the *introduction* of sin and death was considered by Paul as having some important connection with the diffusion of them in after ages. Καὶ οὕτως then may mean here, *et hac conditione, et ita factum est, et rebus sic constitutis*.

CHAP. V. 13, 14.

THE apostle having thus declared that sin and death were introduced into the world by one man, and had become universal, in order to complete the comparison which he designs, and which is intimated by ὥστερ at the beginning of ver. 12, he would have naturally filled out the sentence by adding, at the end of this verse, οὕτως καὶ δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ζωὴ εἰς τὸν κόσμον [εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους] εἰσῆλθε, comp. vers. 17, 18. But he suspends his *apodosis* here, for the sake of elucidating and confirming what he had already said. This confirmation is made by the verses now under consideration; as the γάρ *confirmantis* with which they are introduced, very clearly shows. What has he said? That *all* have sinned, and that *all* are under sentence of death. How is this elucidated and confirmed? By taking a case in respect to which one might be disposed to think that it would be difficult to prove that men are sinners, since the apostle himself had already explicitly declared it to be the law which occasions punishment: *for where there is no law, there is no transgression*, iv. 15. To meet this difficulty, which might easily arise, he avers that men were sinners (ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ) before the giving of the Mosaic law; although they are not themselves prone to acknowledge their guilt in such circumstances, or they make but little account of it. Yet it is a fact that they were sinners, and that death therefore prevailed over them all, even all who had not sinned against revealed law as Adam did.

Such I take to be the *confirmation* of what was asserted at the close of ver. 12. To explain and establish this *exegesis*, is of course the next object of attention.

ἄχρι νόμου *until the law*; i. e., the law of Moses, as ver. 14 plainly leads us to construe it. Some commentators (Origen, Chrysostom, Erasmus, Coppe, and others) construe ἄχρι νόμου not as designating the *commencement* of the Mosaic economy, but as extending *through the whole period of it*. In defence of such an interpretation, we are referred to ἄχρι in Acts iii. 21, and its synonyme ἕως ἄρ' in Acts ii. 35. Gen. xxviii. 15, &c. That these words are sometimes employed in such a manner as not to indicate a cessation of any thing that is, or is done, at the time which is mentioned in connection with ἄχρι or ἕως, is true. In other words, the *terminus ad quem* does not limit the thing affirmed *universally*; it only expresses a limit for a certain purpose. For example: in Acts iii. 21 it is said, that 'the heavens must receive Jesus ἄχρι χρόνων ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων, *until the restoration of all things*; by which is not meant, that he is no longer to dwell in heaven, but that he will certainly dwell there until the time specified. In like manner ἄχρι, it is said, may here admit the whole time of the Mosaic law to be *included*.

But whatever may be true in regard to the possible meaning of ἀχρὶ in some cases, ver. 14 clearly shows that here it means only *until* the commencement of the laws of Moses, *i. e.*, the time when these laws were given.

‘But how can this be? Was sin in the world no longer than until that period? Did it cease when the law was introduced? This would be a direct contradiction of ver. 20, and of many other passages.’ The answer is brief. It is no part of the apostle’s object, to aver that sin did not exist *after* this period; but to declare that it existed *before* it. What he had already said, once and again, necessarily involved the idea, that where law was there sin was. But he had also said, that “where there is no law, there is no transgression,” iv. 15. Now some of his readers might suggest, and this not unnaturally; ‘Since you say that where there is no law, there is no transgression, how then were men sinners *before the law was given?*’ I allow that no intelligent and candid man could have good ground to put such a question, after all which the apostle had already said on this subject. But surely we are not to suppose, that Paul had to do only with men of this character. The objections answered throughout the epistle show a state of things quite different from this.

To the question as above suggested, then, I suppose the apostle to answer in our verse. ‘Sin,’ says he, ‘was in the world until the law of Moses, *i. e.*, men were sinners between the time of Adam and Moses, for death reigned during all this period,’ ver. 13. In other words; it is not necessary that there should be a law *expressly* revealed, in order that men should be sinners; for “the heathen who have no law, are a law unto themselves,” ii. 14.

That ἀμαρτία here means something different from *original* sin, or *imputed* sin, seems to be clear from the reference which the apostle tacitly makes to a law of nature that had been *transgressed*. A *revealed* law there was not for men in general, antecedently to the time of Moses; yet men were sinners. How? By sinning against the law “written on their hearts” (ii. 15); and sinning in despite of the penalty of death, i. 32. But if such was their sin, it was *actual* sin, not merely *imputed* guilt.

Very different views of ἀμαρτία here, however, are entertained by some, who state the whole of the apostle’s reasoning in the following manner: viz., ‘Men’s own sins were not imputed to them on the ground of their transgressing any law, until the law of Moses was given; yet they were counted sinners (ἀμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ); conse-

quently, it must have been by reason of Adam's sin being imputed to them, inasmuch as their own offences were not imputed.'

Although this mode of exegesis is supported by names of high respectability, I cannot accede to it for the following reasons : 1. To aver that men's *own* sins were not imputed to them by God (so they construe ἀμαρτία δι' οὐκ ἰλλογεῖται μὴ ὄντος νόμου), is directly to contradict the whole tenor of the Old Testament history and declarations ; and also what Paul has, in the most explicit manner, asserted in the preceding part of his epistle. As evidence in favour of the first assertion I appeal to the case of Cain ; of the antediluvians who perished in the flood ; of Sodom and Gomorrha ; and to all the declarations of divine displeasure made against the *actual thoughts* and *deeds* of the wicked, not against their *original* or *imputed* sin. In respect to the second, I appeal to the whole of what Paul has said in Rom. i. 19—32. ii. 12, 14, 15. iii. 9, 19, 23, 25. All these charges are made against *actual* sins ; and it is impossible to suppose that the apostle means here to say, that those who are ἄνομοι (without revelation), are, or ever have been, counted by God as being without sin, actual sin ; for both ἄνομοι and ἔννομοι, according to Paul, are ALL UNDER SIN, *under ACTUAL sin*. To admit the contrary, would be to overturn the very foundation the apostle had taken so much pains to lay, in chapters i.—iii., in order to make the conclusion entirely evident and unavoidable, that all men need gratuitous justification.

2. To aver that men's sins are not imputed to them, when they do not live under a revealed law, would be to contradict what the immediate context itself must be considered as asserting. Who are those that have *not* sinned after the manner of Adam ? The answer of those whom I am now opposing, is : ' They are those, who have only *original* sin or *imputed* sin charged to their account.' But then I find great difficulty in this answer. By the supposition of many who make it, Adam's first sin does become really and truly that of all his posterity, inasmuch as it is propagated to them in the way of natural generation. Yea, Augustine, Pres. Edwards, and many others, maintain a real *physical* unity of Adam with all his posterity ; and hence they derive to all his posterity a participation in his sin. But if his sin be theirs in any proper sense, *i. e.*, be really theirs by such a unity as is asserted ; or even if it be theirs by mere imputation without this ; then how is it that the sin of the ἄνομοι is (as Paul asserts) NOT like that of Adam ? How can it be unlike it, when it

is the very same ; either the very same in reality (as Augustine and his followers hold), or the very same *putatively*, as others suppose ? But,

3. There is another difficulty. How can the sins of Adam be here asserted to be imputed to all his posterity, and yet their own personal sins be not at all reckoned ? By the exegesis of those whose opinion I am now endeavouring to controvert, Paul is made to say, that God did not count to men their own personal and actual sins, *i. e.* to those who lived before the Mosaic law. By a parity of reason, then, the Gentiles at all times and every where, who are *ἄνομοι*, are freed from the imputation of their own transgressions ; which would directly contradict the declarations of Paul.

From this conclusion, however, Schott and Tholuck, who defend for substance the exegesis which I am calling in question, do in some measure revolt, and say to οὐκ ἠλλογίσθη must be assigned only a *comparative* sense ; that although the *guilt* of men who sinned against the law of nature, was not taken away absolutely, yet their *accountability* for it was in a good measure superseded. To illustrate this, Tholuck refers us to ἀνοχῇ in Rom. iii. 26, and to ὑπεριδὼν ὁ Θεός in Acts xvii. 30. Both of these instances, however, relate to *deferring* punishment, not to a remission of accountability ; comp. 2 Pet. iii. 8, 9. Such a remission of punishment would directly contradict what Paul has fully and strongly asserted, in Rom. ii. 6—16.

And to what purpose is it to say, that men who were *ἄνομοι*, were in a *comparative* sense not accountable to God for their own personal sins ? This can mean neither more nor less, than that they were accountable in some degree, although not as highly so as those who were *ἔνομοι*. But accountability being admitted (how can it be denied after reading Rom. ii. 6—16 ?), then the argument is marred which those whom I am opposing deduce from the verses in question. They make these verses to say, that ‘the *ἄνομοι* are not accountable for their own sins ; but inasmuch as they are still *treated* as sinners, it must be because of *imputed* sin only.’ But while we admit accountability *in some degree* for the sins of the *ἄνομοι*, it forecloses such an argument from the passage ; for it leaves it fully liable to the following construction, *viz.*, ‘Although men were held less accountable and criminal, who lived before the Mosaic law, than those who lived under this law, yet that they were still sinners, and were regarded as such, is true ; for all were subjected to death.’ That they were sinners in their own person, or actual offenders in a way different from that

of Adam, is clear from what is said in ver. 14 respecting them. How then can Adam's sin be here asserted to be theirs, and, by implication, to be the only sin for which death came upon them?

In such an interpretation, moreover, as that which I am now considering, a very different sense is given to *ἐλλογισθῆναι* from that which it will here consistently bear; as we shall see in the sequel.

Reiche states the argument thus: 'Positive punishment (like death) can be inflicted only for breach of positive law. Now no positive law threatening death, except in the case of Adam, was given before the Mosaic law. Therefore all men who died during this interval, must have died by reason of punishment threatened to Adam being extended to them.' And in consonance with this view he construes vers. 13, 14, in general; although he seems to me far from maintaining consistency. To this statement we may easily reply, and say (1) That the major proposition directly contradicts what the apostle has said in Rom. i. 32. ii. 14, 15. iii. 19. The apostle plainly makes no other difference between Jew and Gentile, than what is made by the respective degree of light which each enjoyed. The Jew is the *more* guilty, because he enjoyed better advantages and abused them. But all, both Jew and Gentile, he pronounces to be *ἄλλοι θανάτου* and *ὑπόδικοι τῷ Θεῷ*. How then can we assume that death is *not* threatened to any, except in consequence of a *positive*, *i. e.*, a revealed law? It is the very opposite of the apostle's argument and of his explicit and repeated declarations. In Rom. v. 14, moreover, Paul directly asserts that the penalty of death was incurred by those who had *not* sinned in the manner of Adam, *i. e.*, against express and positive precept. But Reiche makes the apostle here to mean, that they suffered on account of Adam's transgression and not their own; although he had just before strongly contended that *πάντες ἥμαρτον* must have an *active* sense, and mean that all had voluntarily and in fact sinned. (2) The minor proposition is equally untrue, in respect to its real and essential meaning; for of what importance is it, whether the law was *positive* or *natural*, so long as the declarations in Rom. i. 32. ii. 14, 15. iii. 19, and the like remain? How shall we admit positions which the apostle himself expressly contradicts? (3) It follows, of course, that the conclusion from such premises must be erroneous, *viz.*, 'That all men from Adam to Moses, died merely because of the penalty threatened to Adam, and not by reason of their own sins.' The reader will observe, that I do not here deny that in *some* sense the doctrine of this conclusion may be

true; but only that in the sense alleged it cannot possibly be made out satisfactorily from such premises. Of course the exegesis of vers. 13, 14 by Reiche, which is made in general to conform to such views, must be very questionable.

Reiche himself earnestly remonstrates against the sentiment of Tholuck here, viz., that 'death came upon men living between Adam and Moses, because of the *vitiositas* of which they partook, and which they derived from Adam.' He asks in the way of remonstrance: 'Where is there one word here which says that death was the consequence of a sin *inherited* from Adam, and how is this here shown? But how much does he relieve the difficulty, by making death come upon all men without any other reason than that it does come? According to him, Adam set it in motion, and it kept on, from the momentum which he gave it, down to the time of Moses, irrespective of sin either original or actual?

After all, this very limitation of the period, viz., *from Adam to Moses*, lies hard against the usual modes of exegesis here, which represent the apostle as labouring to show, not that men *sinned* and therefore perished (as he had just asserted in ver. 12), but that they perished merely because of their relation to Adam, either in consequence of *propagated vitiosity*, or else without any specific assignable reason, as Reiche avers. Why should the apostle stop within these narrow limits? When the Mosaic Law was given, was it given to *all* men, or only to about three millions out of six or seven hundred millions of our race? Even from that time down to the present moment, has not immeasurably the greater portion of the human race been destitute of any *revelation*? How does their case differ, then, from that of those between Adam and Moses? Not at all, so far as we can see. Why then should the apostle confine his assertion merely to those between Adam and Moses? If his object be the *general* one supposed by the commentators in question, no good reason can be given for such a procedure.

Indeed, such a method of illustration makes verses 13, 14, inapposite, in case we allow that πάντες ἡμᾶς means, that all men did of themselves sin. The γὰρ at the beginning of ver. 14 shows, that what follows is designed to illustrate and confirm what had just been asserted; and this is *not* that all men die because of inherited vitiosity, but *because all have sinned*. How Reiche then could strenuously defend this latter sentiment, and yet interpret verses 13, 14 as

he has done, I am unable to see. It appears plainly to be in opposition to the laws of philology and the nature of the case.

I must regard the apostle then as designing, in verses 14, 15, to illustrate and confirm the proposition that 'all men have sinned and perished,' by the introduction of a case that might be deemed doubtful by some of his readers, or be called in question. If he could show that no valid objection could be made to this, he of course might take it for granted that no objection would be made to the plainer parts of his position. And I regard him as referring to the period between Adam and Moses, because it presented an obvious and striking case adapted to his purpose. But if his object was to establish the proposition, that all men without revelation have died because of *inherited corruption*, or died merely because Adam introduced a fatal disease (as Reiche maintains), why should he make such a limitation? Or rather, we may well ask, why should he make any limitation at all? We may well ask also: 'Whether, on the ground of the common theory, those who have a revelation do not partake of *original sin* as well as others? Whether they do not stand in the same relation to Adam as others? And if so, we may again inquire: What can be the object of Paul in *limiting* his remarks to those who lived between Adam and Moses? It cannot be, then, that his design here is, to prove the connection between *imputed* sin and death (as so many have assumed); for that connection is the same, if it exist at all, in all ages, nations, and circumstances; and one portion of time would be just as apposite as another to establish it, inasmuch as the development is represented to be uniform and constant. There was no more reason, surely, for Paul's readers to doubt of imputed sin between Adam and Moses, than there was to doubt of it between Moses and Paul; nay, in some respects there was less, inasmuch as the evils suffered during the former period were very great, and yet the *actual* sins were less, because there was less light. One might more naturally be inclined, then, in such a case to admit *imputed* sin, than in the case of men under the law. Yet, if the more usual exegesis be true, the apostle has selected the former period as the very one about which he expected there would be the most doubt. Can this be so? The nature of the case would seem to decide in the negative.

But suppose now the question to be, as I have stated, whether men can sin and perish without law (a question very naturally raised after Paul's declaration in iv. 15); then the period which Paul has selected for his purpose, is altogether apposite and striking. For this very

reason we may well suppose he chose it. On every side difficulties start up against the other view—difficulties philological and theological—difficulties arising from incongruity, ineptness, and contradiction of previously avowed sentiment and the nature of accountability. That the sinning of men had a connection with the offence of Adam, and that this was in some way the cause or occasion of their sinning, is what (as I have before stated) I do not doubt the apostle here admits. But as he has asserted in verse 12 that *death passed on all*, BECAUSE ALL SINNED, so here he confirms what he has said; as the γὰρ plainly shows.

If one asks, as Reiche does, why we should suppose the apostle here to assert again what he had so often asserted before, viz., that all men are sinners, the answer is easy. The subject here comes up in a new light, viz., the connection between *death* and *sin*. It is therefore a new and forcible addition to the arguments already employed. That death is *universal*, cannot be denied; at least this is certain in regard to the death of the body; and that the apostle has this part of the penalty against sin here particularly in his eye, will hardly be doubted, because it is of so plain and palpable a nature that none can deny the truth of his allegation. Yet this does not oblige us to suppose that other parts of the penalty are designedly excluded, because this plain and palpable part of it is here specifically made prominent. By no means. If then death is universal, does it not follow that the cause of it, i. e., sin, is universal too? Of course the argument relates to all who can and do sin, and thus come under the penalty in question. Thus both the guilt and misery of our race are here brought into the account, and placed in opposition to the grace and salvation of the gospel; and thus the contrast designed to be made by the whole representation is greatly heightened. But put the case, that no proper sin of Adam's posterity is here in question, as Reiche maintains; or that only *imputed* sin is in question; then what follows? Surely that Christ delivers us from no sin, or from only imputed sin and the death which that brings; but nothing further; at least nothing further can here be made out from the words of the apostle, on their ground of interpretation. Yet in ver. 16 Paul asserts, that our deliverance is from πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων; which disproves entirely that mode of exegesis, which confines ἀμαρτία here to *imputed* sin or to mere *vitiositas*.

I have only to add that the supposition of men's own personal sins *not* being reckoned to them, while they are considered as perishing

for ever by the mere imputation of another's sin, is a position so revolting with respect to the justice, and goodness, and impartiality of the sovereign Judge, "who will render to every man according to his works," that it should not be made out from *constructive* evidence; it requires most ample and satisfactory evidence and argument to support it.

The phrase ἀχρη νόμου ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ, appears on the whole, then, to be only an affirmation respecting a particular class of men (whom some might think it difficult to prove to be sinners), of something which in the preceding clause had been affirmed of *all men*, πάντες ἡμαρτον. I must consider it as illustrating and confirming this latter expression, by showing that even that class of men are sinners, whom one might be prone to exempt from such a charge, and especially so, after what the apostle had just said in iv. 15. Any other mode of expounding this makes the γάρ irrelative and out of place, when it is once admitted that πάντες ἡμαρτον affirms the proper sin of Adam's posterity. And to construe verses 13, 14 as having relation only to *imputed* sin, comes virtually to the representation of Christ's death as a salvation only from *imputed* sin; which would amount to a virtual contradiction of ver. 16.

Ἐμαρτία δὲ . . . νόμου, *although sin is not made account of where there is no law*; an expression which has given occasion to great perplexity and difficulty. This has arisen, however, in a great measure, from construing ἐλλογεῖται as though it were connected with Θεός, as the agent by whom the *counting* or *imputing* is to be done. The difficulties of such an interpretation have already been stated, in the considerations presented above. Bretschneider (Dogmatik. II. 49. edit. 3) seems to have suggested the true solution of the phraseology; "Ἐλλογεῖται is not *imputatur a Deo*, but *refertur ab hominibus ad peccata*, i. e., *habetur, agnoscitur peccatum*." The like views did Calvin and Luther entertain relative to the expression. The former says, that [homines] sibi nihil imputarent in peccatum, nisi [legē] coacti . . . sine legis stimulis in socordiam se demergunt; i. e., 'men do not count themselves as sinners, and are not alarmed for their guilt, unless the law first excites and quickens their consciences.' So Luther renders ἐλλογεῖται by *achten*, to regard, to have respect to. To the like purpose Heumann, Camerarius, Photius (in Œcumenius), Schoettgen, Koppe. The words of Photius deserve to be recited. "When [the apostle] says ἵψ' ὃ πάντες ἡμαρτον, lest some one should reply and ask: 'How then could men sin where there was no law?

For thou thyself hast said above, that *where there is no law there is no transgression*; and if no transgression, then surely no sin. How then could death pass upon all men, *because all have sinned*? Lest therefore some one might make such an objection, Paul anticipates and solves the doubt, and says *ὅτι ἦν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ νόμου*; for sin was committed, and what is committed must have an existence." To which remarks of Photius, Œcumenius after citing them adds: "See the exactness of the apostle. That we might not think ourselves to be wronged because we die on account of another, he says *ἀμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ* although it was disregarded (*εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐλογίζετο*); therefore we die not only because of Adam, but also because of sin." Tholuck says, that 'to construe *ἐλλογέσθαι* in such a way, is doing violence to the word;' but he acknowledges very frankly on a preceding page, that 'nothing can be objected to such an interpretation as that of Photius on the score of language; and that the thought itself is not foreign to the circle of Pauline ideas.' Surely when *ἐλλογέσθαι* is rendered (as by Bretschneider) *habetur, imputatur* [ut peccatum] *ab hominibus*, this is no more a departure from the meaning of *ἐλλογέσθαι*, than to render it *imputatur a Deo*. Whether *εἰς* or *ἀνθρώπων* is to be understood here, must be decided of course by the nature of the sentiment. And as to *ἐλλογέσθαι*, why should attributing to it the sense of *regarding, accounting, esteeming, &c.*, be called strange? inasmuch as this word accords as to both sense and origin altogether with *λογίζομαι*, which often occurs with such a meaning; *e. g.*, Acts xix. 27. Rom. ii. 26. vi. 11. viii. 36. ix. 8. xiv. 14. 1 Cor. iv. 1 2 Cor. x. 2. xi. 5, et sæpe. So *נָשָׂא*, Gen. xxxi. 15. 1 Sam. i. 13. Job xli. 27 (19). The ellipses after *ἐλλογέσθαι* may be supplied by *εἰς ἀμαρτίαν* or *ὡς ἀμαρτία*, both methods of construction being common after *λογίζομαι*, as any one may see by consulting the above instances. That *ἐλλογέω* occurs (Philem. ver. 18) in the sense of *impute*, is no more a reason why it should have that particular meaning in the verse before us, than it is that *λογίζομαι* should *always* have the sense of *impute*, because, as we readily concede, it often means *to impute*; but we know also, that oftener still it means *to compute, to regard, to make account of*. And even in Phil. verse 18, the sense is altogether good when we translate *τοῦτό μοι ἐλλόγει*, *reckon that to me, or put that to my account*; which conveys exactly the idea intended, viz., that the writer would be responsible for the wrong done by Onesimus.

"What views," exclaims Glöckler in his recent Commentary,

"must men have of God, in order to say that *sin* is not *reckoned by him*? Can God regard it as a trifle, and unworthy of notice? It is erroneous interpretation, which has led men to explain *ἐλλογεῖται* in a way so contrary to its meaning here and to the nature of Christianity. It is men only who hold or can hold sin as not worthy to be made account of." Indeed it must be conceded, that the explanation which he rejects contains something very opposite to the tenor of Paul's reasoning in Rom. i.—iii.

That the sentiment derived from such an exegesis as that which I have adopted, is not foreign to the writings of Paul, is quite clear from comparing Rom. vii. 7—11 and iii. 20. In the former of these passages, the law is represented as greatly exciting and aggravating the unholy desires of the carnal heart by its restraints and disclosures; so that "without the law sin is death," *i. e.*, it is little estimated and felt. In the latter, Paul declares that "by the law is the knowledge of sin." How well this accords with *ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται μὴ ὄντος νόμου*, needs hardly to be suggested.

I admit that a *modified* sense of the expression is to be regarded as the true one, *viz.*, that it is not to be considered so absolute as to convey the idea that *no* sense of sin existed among the heathen in any measure; for this would contradict fact, and contradict what Paul says in chap. ii. 14, 15. But then the modification is of just the same nature as is to be received in respect to Rom. vii. 7—11, iii. 30, and also of John xv. 22—24, where the Saviour says, that if he had not come and spoken to the Jews, "they would not have had sin." But the sense of *ἐλλογεῖται*, as maintained by Tholuck and others, *i. e.*, a modified sense in respect to the account which God makes of sin, does not answer the purpose at all for which it is intended by them. If God made *any* account of men's own sins before the law, then *imputed* sin is not the only thing for which men die. Of course the argument that they labour to establish, is given up. The assertion considered as absolute, *viz.*, that God made no account at all of men's own sins, who were not under the law, is contradicted by all the preceding part of the epistle.

Pres. Edwards has given the verse before us a peculiar turn: "For *before* the law of Moses was given, mankind were all looked upon by the great Judge as sinners, by corruption, and guilt derived from Adam's violation of the original law of works; which shows that the original *universal* rule of righteousness is not the law of Moses; for if so, there would have been no sin imputed before that was

given, because sin is not imputed where there is no law," (*Orig. Sin*, p. 275. Worces. edit.). He supposes that the main design of the apostle is here to show, that the Jews could not claim their law as the only criterion of right and wrong; and in order to do this, Paul shows that men were condemned on account of *imputed* sin, before the giving of the law. But besides the forced construction which this introduces, it also obliges us to bring in here a subject of consideration that the apostle seems for the present to have dismissed from his mind, viz., the confident reliance of the Jews on their law and their boasting of it. In order to make out the interpretation of Edwards, it must be shown that the apostle here asserts the existence of another law antecedent to that of Moses, to which men were accountable. This he had done in chap. ii. 14, 15; but here it is not to his purpose to repeat it. He says merely, that men were sinners antecedently to the law of Moses, although in a state of nature they made but little account of sin; they were sinners, notwithstanding they made light of it; and they incurred the sentence of death, although they had not, like Adam, sinned against a revealed and express law. Now this goes to confirm the assertion in ver. 12, viz., πάντες ἡμάρτον; inasmuch as it serves to show that a part of mankind were actually under sentence of death, about whom doubts might most easily arise. And as it seems to be spoken for this very purpose, so we may acquiesce in such an interpretation of the language as shows that it is directly subservient to the purposes of the writer.

(14) Ἀλλ' ἐβασίλευσεν Μουσίως, yet or nevertheless death reigned from Adam unto Moses. Ἀλλὰ, tamen, attamen—ἐβασίλευσε, reigned, means was predominant, exercised uncontrolled sway or power. The writer designs by this word to express, in a strong manner, the universal dominion of death among men. But what death? The same, I would answer, as before; but still, I should be disposed to believe, as has been remarked above, that he had in his eye here a particular part of what is comprehended under the generic term death; in other words, that temporal death was the special object to which he here adverts. The reason, as before stated, for this is, that temporal death is a palpable part of the execution of the sentence, so palpable that all must admit it: and to some such undeniable evidence does the writer seem to appeal, for he appears to regard what he states as a thing that will not be denied. I do not look upon this sense of θάνατος here as a departure from the preceding one, in any important respect; for should it be construed as referring

to a *palpable* part of the death threatened, this, by its relations to the other parts of the same, involves or implies them also. So Tholuck, Comp. p. 187. 2 edit.

Kai isai . . . 'Αδάμ, even over those who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression.

A part of the text itself is here a matter of dispute. Some Latin Codices, also Origen, Cyril, Rufin, Tertullian, Victorinus, Sedulius, and Ambrosiaster, omit the *μή* here. Semler, Mill, and some others, have done the same. But nearly all the Greek manuscripts (three only, and these *a secunda manu*, excepted), the Syriac version, the Vulgate, and many of the most conspicuous Greek and Latin fathers, *e. g.*, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophilus, Irenæus, Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, and others, insert it. The weight of authority on the side of inserting it seems, therefore, to be quite conclusive. Moreover, there is internal evidence of its genuineness. Toellner, Koppe, and Schott, have well remarked, that the use of *kai* here before *ἀμαρτήσαντας*, intimates that something unusual or unexpected was designed on the part of the writer. Accordingly while one would expect to find him saying simply (which would apparently make a much more facile and seemingly unexceptionable sense) *ἰβασίλευσε . . . ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀμαρτήσαντας*, we find him saying, *ἰβασίλευσε . . . καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀμαρτήσαντας*. Besides all this, the proof that *all have sinned* requires *μή*; otherwise, those who had no *positive* precepts might, in the minds of some, be exempted. But now, those who have sinned like Adam, *i. e.*, against *positive* precept, and those who have sinned against the *internal* law, make up the *all men*.

Ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι is like the Hebrew *בְּצֶלְמֵהוּ* (*confidenter*); *i. e.*, a noun with a preposition is employed instead of an adverb. So the Hebrew *בְּצֶלְמֵהוּ*, Dan. x. 16, is rendered in the Septuagint *ὡς ὁμοίωσις υἱοῦ ἀνθρώπου*. In all respects *ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι* is equivalent to *ὁμοίως*; so that *ὁμοίως τῷ Ἀδὰμ παραβάντι* would express the sense; as would *ὡς τῷ Ἀδὰμ παρίβῃ*. Comp. *ὁμοίωμα* in Rom. i. 23. viii. 3. Phil. ii. 7.

As to the sense of the passage; by mentioning those who lived before the law of Moses as *not* having sinned after the manner of Adam, there is a plain implication that those who lived under the law *did* sin after the manner, or *in the likeness* of Adam. But the *likeness* in question did not consist in this, that the very *same* precepts were given to them and were transgressed by them; it con-

sisted plainly in the fact that they, like Adam, had *positive* or *revealed* precepts as the rule of duty. Consequently those who sinned, but yet did not sin in the like way (and such are described in verses 13, 14), must have sinned without positive revealed precepts. Such are described also in ii. 14, 15.

Reiche construes this assertion as having respect only to the different mode of punishment; viz., 'Adam sinned against express precept and therefore died; but his posterity die without having so done.' But if this were the sentiment, the apostle must have said, *καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀποθανόντας . . . ὅτι θανάτῳ κ. τ. λ.*

Origen, Augustine, Melancthon, Beza, Pres. Edwards, and others, have construed the clause *μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας κ. τ. λ.*, as having respect to *infants* only. But Calvin rejects this interpretation: "Malo . . . interpretari de iis qui sine lege peccaverunt." Nevertheless he thinks infants may be included. But the ground of this is, that he construes *πάντες ἡμαρτον* and *ἁμαρτία ἥ ἐν κόσμῳ* as referring to the sinning of all men in and by Adam. The remark of J. A. Turretin is directly to the point: "Ex scopo apostoli serieque sermonis patet, hic agi etiam de *adultis* omnibus qui ab Adamo usque ad Mosem vixerunt. Etenim si de solis infantibus ageretur, cur intra id spatium se contineret, quod inter Adamum et Mosem fuit? Nam infantium omnium, et ante et post legem, eadem est ratio." Accordingly, the interpretation of Augustine is generally rejected, so far as I know, by distinguished critics of all parties at the present day.

I am aware that it has been sometimes alleged, in regard to *μὴ ἁμαρτήσαντας κ. τ. λ.*, that the *dissimilitude* here affirmed consists in the fact that Adam was an *actual* sinner, and others (to whom reference is here made) sinners *only by imputation*. But such an interpretation has been shown above, as it seems to my mind, to be inconsistent with the tenor of the passage, and with the declarations of the Old and New Testament in relation to this subject. How can it be in any way rendered probable, or even plausible, that men from the time of Adam to that of Moses were sinners only by imputation? It is fairly out of question. An attempt to establish such an interpretation must surely fail. For if such an imputation be made out, by virtue of the *unity* of Adam's posterity with himself (and this is the ground on which it is asserted), then it would follow, of course, that their sin is *NOT different* from his, but the *very same*; for if they were *in* him, and sinned *in* and *with* him, surely their sin is not *different from*, but the *same with* his: which is what the apostle here

denies. Or if his sin is merely imputed to them without their actually participating at all in it, then we may ask, in the first place, how it can be said of them that they "all sinned?" And secondly, if it be said that they sinned *in, by, and through* Adam, then, so far as their sin is concerned, how does it differ from his? There is but one act of sin but the guilt of it is divided among countless millions; or if this statement be rejected, then the alternative must be taken, viz., that the guilt of it is multiplied and repeated as often as there are individuals belonging to the human race. In either case there remains only the actual sin of Adam, and so far as this belongs to his posterity in any sense, either real or putative, so far the sin is not different from that of Adam, but the same. It is only when we construe the passage as referring to men's own *personal* sins, that the difficulty can be removed.

Ὁς ἐστὶ τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος, *who is a type of him that was to come.* Τύπος signifies, (1) in its original and most literal acceptation, *an impress, a note or mark* made by impression, sculpture, beating, &c.; inasmuch as it comes from τέτυκται the second Perfect of τύπτω. In this sense it is employed in John xx. 25. Hence, (2) It means *example, pattern, model*; as in Acts vii. 44. Heb. viii. 5. Ex. xxv. (where the Hebrew has תִּבְנִית). (3) It means *example, model*, in a good sense; e. g., Phil. iii. 17. 1 Thess. i. 7. 2 Thess. iii. 9. 1 Tim. iv. 12. Tit. ii. 7. 1 Pet. v. 3; but sometimes an example for the sake of warning, not of imitation, as in 1 Cor. x. 6, comp. verse 11. (4) It means *image, something which is a resemblance* of some other thing supposed or real; as in Acts vii. 43. Amos v. 26 (Heb. דָּגוּל). In this last sense, i. e., that of *image or resemblance*, not in a physical sense but in a *causal* one (if I may so speak), is Adam called a τύπος of Christ. The appropriate scriptural sense of *type* is, a person or thing, which by special appointment or design of an overruling Providence, is intended to symbolize, or present a likeness of some other and future person or thing. I understand the word τύπος in such a sense here; i. e., I understand it as implying, that it was by special divine arrangement and appointment, that Adam was made in particular respects to present an antithetic image of what Christ was to be.

That Christ is meant by τοῦ μέλλοντος, is clear from verse 15, seq. where he is by name brought into comparison with Adam. The ellipsis after μέλλοντος, i. e., the noun with which this participle agrees

by implication, seems to be 'Αδάμ, viz., the *second Adam* or ἰσχαρὸς 'Αδάμ, as he is called in 1 Cor. xv. 45.

But in what sense, *i. e.*, how far, is the first Adam here considered as an image of the second. A question of no small importance, inasmuch as by the answer to it must, in no small measure, our views of the general meaning of verses 12—19 be regulated.

An answer somewhat in detail, would occupy too much space to be inserted here. I have therefore thrown it into the form of an Excursus, which the reader may consult, in respect to the illustration, and support of the following sentiments, which contain the principal results of what I have there exhibited; viz.

I. The τύπος asserted of Adam, in respect to Christ, is *not* to be taken in the widest and fullest sense that the word itself might be capable of, but in a sense which has many important limitations. For, (1) The whole is *contrast*; *i. e.*, the τύπος is *antithetic*. In many cases, a τύπος in the Old Testament is of the *same* nature with the ἀντιτύπος in the New Testament. But here, the whole is most plainly *antithetic*; on the one hand are the evils done and occasioned, and on the other are the good done and the blessings procured. (2) The *degree* or *measure* of the evils occasioned by Adam, is not the point of τύπος in respect to Christ; for this measure is declared to be far exceeded by the blessings which Christ has procured; "grace superabounds." "Many offences are forgiven," ver. 16. (3) It is not the *person* of Adam as such, which is compared with the *person* of Christ as such, in order to point out any personal resemblances. It is the *ACTS* of each and the *CONSEQUENCES* of what each has done, that are the objects of a comparison by the apostle; it is the παρακοή or παράπτωμα and κατάνχημα of Adam, and the effects of the same, which are compared with the ὑπακοή and δικαίωμα of Christ and the effects of these. (4) *One* sin of one individual, viz., Adam, was the occasion of *evil* to all men; while, on the other hand, *many* sins are forgiven on account of one individual, viz. the Lord Jesus Christ.

We have seen the *antithetic* nature of the τύπος here, and the points of *dissimilitude* between Adam and Christ; let us now see what are the points of actual similitude.

II. The actual and principal point of *similitude* is, that each individual respectively, viz., Adam and Christ, was the cause or occasion, in consequence of what he did, of greatly affecting the whole human race; although in an opposite way. Adam introduced sin and misery

into the world ; and in consequence of this all men are, even without their own concurrence, subjected to many evils here ; *they are born entirely destitute of a disposition to holiness ; and this condition and their circumstances render it certain that they will sin, and will always sin* IN ALL THEIR ACTS OF A MORAL NATURE, until their hearts are renewed by the Spirit of God ; and of course, all men are born in a state in which they are greatly exposed to the second death, or death in the highest sense of the term, and in which this death will certainly come upon them, unless there be an interposition of mercy through Christ. On the other hand ; Christ introduced righteousness or justification, and all the blessings spiritual and temporal which are connected with a probationary state under a dispensation of grace and with the pardoning mercy of God. A multitude of blessings, such as the day and means of grace, the common bounties of Providence, the forbearance of God to punish, the calls and warnings of mercy, the proffers of pardon, &c., are procured by Christ for all men without exception, and without any act of concurrence on their part ; while the higher blessings of grace, actual pardon and everlasting life, are indeed proffered to all, but are actually bestowed only upon those who repent and believe.

In this way we see, quite plainly, that Adam was a *τύπος* of Christ because what he did affected the whole of the human race, to a certain extent, even without any concurrence or act of their own ; it brought upon them more or less of the evils threatened to sin, and put them all in imminent hazard of the highest measure of the penalty, even that of everlasting death. As the antithesis of this, Christ is represented as procuring blessings for all the human race, to a certain extent, even without any concurrence or act of their own ; and he has also procured by his blood, and proffers fully and freely to all eternal redemption from the highest evils which the divine law would inflict upon sinners. The *extent* of the influence of Adam, is therefore a proper *τύπος* of that of Christ. Each of these individuals, by what he did, affected our whole race without any concurrence of theirs, to a certain degree ; the one has placed them in a condition, in which they actually suffer many evils, and in which, by their own voluntary acts, they are peculiarly exposed to the most awful of all evils ; the other has actually bestowed many and important blessings on all without exception, and proffers to all the opportunity to secure the greatest of all blessings. Here then is antithetic *τύπος* of the like *extent*, in both cases.

The *superabounding* of gospel grace, which is insisted on so emphatically in vers. 15—17, consists (as is stated in ver. 16) in the fact, that the death of Christ procures pardon for the numerous offences which we commit (πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων), i. e., the death of Christ had respect to a multitude of offences; while the effects of Adam's sin have respect only to one offence, viz., that of eating the forbidden fruit. In other words; the death of Christ as a remedy, is far more powerful and efficacious than the sin of Adam was as a means of corruption and misery.

For additional considerations which may serve to explain and confirm the views here given of τύπος, I must refer the reader to Excursus IV.

One more remark on the phrase ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος. Calvin and Tholuck regard this expression as the *apodosis* of ver. 12, Calvin; "Hæc particula posita est vice alterius membri . . . perinde ergo accipias ac si scriptum esset: Sicut per unum hominem intravit peccatum in universum mundum, et per peccatum mors; ita per unum hominem rediit justitia, et per justitiam vita." To the same purpose Tholuck in his Commentary. And indeed it cannot be denied that there is some ground for this. The apostle had said, that sin and death entered the world by Adam; he now says, that Adam is a τύπος of Christ (an antithetic τύπος is of course meant); by which must be intimated, that Christ is in like manner the author of justification and happiness. This idea, virtually and by way of implication, contains what is expressed in the *apodosis*; which however is fully and formally given out only in verses 18, 19.

CHAP. V. 15—17.

THE general object of these three verses is to magnify the greatness of gospel grace, by contrasting it with the evils occasioned by Adam's sin (ver. 16); to show that while all men are sufferers on account of Adam, it is only to that degree in which *one* sin could affect them, while, on the other hand, the free gift of Christ extends to the pardoning of a *multitude* of offences (ver. 18). Nor is pardon of many offences all which the gospel achieves; for if Adam's offence did bring death on all his posterity, or subject them all to more or less of evil, then it is surely more credible still, that the grace of Christ will bestow blessings on all, and especially that it will perfect the work of pardon, and secure the blessings of eternal life to all who have obtained it. There is then plainly a *gradation* of sentiment in these three verses. In ver. 15 we have the general idea that grace abounds beyond any evil brought upon us by Adam. In ver. 16 it is specifically declared, that the evil inflicted is only such as corresponds to *one* offence, while the good bestowed consists in pardon extended to *many* offences. In ver. 17 we have the assurance, that pardon shall be crowned with everlasting life. All these points of *dissimilitude* or *antithesis*, the reader will easily see have a direct bearing on the first part of the present and the last part of the fourth chapter, and go to illustrate and enforce the idea of the *greatness*, the *certainly*, and the *extent* of gospel blessings, in some form or other. These verses of course must serve to correct any apprehension that the reader might have from the mention of *τῶν*, that *equality* or *similitude* in all respects was intended to be asserted, in regard to the respective influence of Adam and Christ. In pointing out the particulars of *dissimilitude* and *inequality*, the apostle has limited the signification of *τῶν*, and guarded his readers against excess in the application of the word; while, at the same time, he co-operates with the design of the preceding context, and helps to confirm the faith and hope of the believer.

It follows, that we must exclude the particulars named by the apostle in these verses, from the idea of *similitude* or *equality*, as indicated by *τῶν*, on the present occasion. How often the *οὐκ ἔστι* here has been forgotten, in the parallels which have been drawn between the first and second Adam, no one who has read theology extensively needs to be reminded. It should also be here particularly remarked, that the sentiment which attributes to the grace of Christ *good* which is far *greater* than the evil occasioned by Adam's offence, lies upon the very face of verses 15—17, and should never be overlooked. What we should be in ourselves, as the fall of Adam has left us, is one thing; what our condition now is, through the grace of Christ, is another and very different one. When we maintain, then, that our present state, depraved and ruined as in itself it is, *is more eligible as to securing final salvation*, than that of Adam was while on his first probation, let it not be said that we deny or extenuate the evil consequences of the fall. By no means; but let this be said, viz., that after the example of Paul we represent grace as *superabounding* over all the evils introduced by the apostasy. And is not this true? Yea, is it not strongly and repeatedly asserted in the chapter before us?

One point more deserves special notice here. Paul undertakes *ex professo* to point out in these verses, as has been observed, the principal features of *dissimilitude* or *inequality* between the type and antitype. If now it be true, as some confidently maintain, that *the many* on whom blessings are bestowed, means only the *elect* in Christ; and *the many* who suffer on account of Adam's sin, means *all mankind without exception*; then how can we suppose that the apostle would have here neglected to mention this *οὐκ ἔστι*, i. e., this point of *dissimilitude*? A point surely of not less magnitude, interest, or importance, than any one which he has mentioned. So far is he, however, from pointing out such a prominent feature of *dissimilitude*, that he has taken a course directly the reverse of this, as it would seem; such an one, at any rate, as could scarcely fail to mislead more or less of his readers, provided his design be in reality that which is alleged. Does he name the mass of men who are injuriously affected by the sin of Adam *οἱ πολλοί* in ver. 15? In the very same verse he calls those on whom Christ bestows favours *τοὺς πολλοὺς*. Does he again call the first class (in ver. 18) *πάντες ἄνθρωποι*? In the same verse he names the second class *πάντες ἄνθρωποι*. Does he again call the first class *οἱ πολλοί*, in ver. 19? The very same designation he there again applies to the second. No common principle of philology, then, can of itself justify us in making an immeasurable distinction here as to *numbers*, while the apostle (whose specific object here is to point out the *dissimilitudes* of the two cases), has not given us any intimation by the language which he employs, that such a distinction is here intended to be designated by him.

That we are embarrassed in our theological system, unless we introduce such a distinction here, is surely no legitimate proof that the apostle must have argued as we do. Assumption of what we may think he *ought* to say in a case like this, where *ex professo* he is pointing out *dissimilitudes*, and where he has omitted to say what we may expect he would have said, may possibly satisfy the minds of some who are disposed to reason *a priori* on this subject; but how can this answer the demands of philological and hermeneutical investigation?

In a word, had Paul meant what some ascribe to him here, how could he do otherwise than say, 'And not as the number affected by the sin of Adam, is the number affected by the grace of Christ; for all men without exception, were condemned through the sin of Adam, while the elect only were the subject of blessings through the grace of Christ?' This, or something which would be in effect like to this, we must naturally suppose that the apostle would have said, if he meant what is ascribed to him. But then, if he had thus spoken, his assertion would amount to a declaration that *sin superabounds over grace*; directly contrary to what he is labouring to establish, viz., the *superabounding of grace over sin*. Can any thing be plainer, then, than that the sentiment here attributed to Paul, viz., *universality of meaning* as to οἱ πολλοί in the first case, and *partial extent only* in the second, is incongruous with the evident design of the writer?

The difficulty that seems to arise in respect to *universal* salvation, by the natural exposition of Paul's language, is only an apparent not a real one. It is only when, on the one hand, we view all mankind as absolutely and unconditionally given over to the *whole extent* of the penalty of death on account of Adam, instead of considering them as actually incurring a part, and as exposed to and in imminent danger of the whole; and then on the other, regard Christ as having actually bestowed eternal life on all thus exposed, instead of having bestowed more or less of the blessings procured by him on all, and eternal life only on all who actually believe; it is only in such a case, I say, that anything of consequence can be made out to favour the doctrine of *universal* salvation. But no rules of interpretation oblige us to embrace such an exegesis. *THE NATURE of gospel-grace*, as contrasted with the evil effects of Adam's sin, is the grand theme. Why is not the great object of the writer answered, when he has shown, that all men have gained more by the grace of the gospel, than they have lost by the offence of Adam? Or why, because the writer particularizes (as usual) some of the highest blessings and evils on both sides, should all inferior blessings and evils be excluded from his meaning? When it is an actual fact that the grace of Christ does confer many important favours on all men without exception, why should we, why need we, limit the declarations of the apostle to only a small part of men? The interpretation which I defend has the manifest advantage, as it seems to me, of comporting with *fact*, as well as with the philology of the passage. It is no more true that all men suffer the whole of *everlasting* death, than it is that all men obtain the whole of *everlasting* life. But all suffer more or less of the sentence, in the first case; they enjoy more or less of the blessings in the second. Beyond this, all are in imminent peril, in the first case; to all salvation is proffered in the second. Why are not the demands of the passage answered, when the *nature* of the two things is fully and respectively disclosed? But in case we resort to what *actually happens*, we may then advance to a certain extent, both as to evil inflicted and good bestowed. If we look beyond, and take a general survey of the *nature* of each dispensation, we find that the pit is open on the one hand, and heaven on the other. It depends now on the choice of men, whether they will advance to the right or to the left. The universality, the greatness, the certainty of gospel-salvation to all who will accept the proffered good, i. e., the *true nature and principle* of all this, is altogether and strikingly illustrated and confirmed by the passage before us.

It belongs to those who defend the *limitation* of οἱ πολλοί in regard to blessings, to show how the great point which the apostle urges throughout the passage before us, viz., the *superabounding of grace*, is made out by him on the ground which they assume. This they have a right to insist on, who are of the opinion that οἱ πολλοί must mean the same in both cases. If the former should say, 'It is made out as to the *elect*;' then the question will be whether the elect are the *predominant* party, the great mass? I do not undertake to say that they will not eventually be so; but when the apostle wrote (and even down to the present time), all might say as Jesus did, 'Strait is the gate and narrow the way, and few there be that find it.' Besides, if a *superabounding of grace over sin* as to the *elect only*, is here the question, then, to be consistent, only the elect can be taken in the counterpart, i. e., the apostle must be supposed to speak only of the elect here as injured by the sin of Adam. And this, difficult as it

would be to render it probable, would be a more eligible and *consistent* interpretation than the other. How can the two respective members of a comparison or similitude, or (if one pleases) dissimilitude or antithesis, be so immeasurably disproportionate as the exegesis that I have been examining makes them? Even if we can get no satisfaction from this passage, without assuming such premises, I do not see how we can bring ourselves to assume them. Whenever the mind is thus forced upon conclusions contrary to the nature of the language, and against the tenor of the surrounding context and the apparent aim of the writer, it must after all remain in a wavering, uncertain, conjectural state. It is much better to give up the expectation of finding the true sense, than thus to do violence to the laws of interpretation.

One remark more should be made. This is, that the *superabounding* of the grace now in question, is its *superabounding* over the evils occasioned by Adam's fall. It goes far beyond these. It embraces the *πολλὰ παραπτώματα* of men, verse 16. It exceeds even the sins that are committed under the law (verse 20), great and grievous as they are.

(15) Παράπτωμα, *offence, fall*, viz., the *first* sin of Adam. That only *one* sin, and this altogether peculiar as to its effects, is here taken into view by the apostle, seems clear from verses 16, 17, 18.—*Χάρισμα, favour, benefit, good bestowed on us or done for us.*

Εἰ γάρ, *for if*, does not imply *uncertainty* here, but *concession*. The shape of the argument stands thus: 'Granting (as we must do) that the many [all] die [come under sentence of death] through Adam or by means of him; much more must we allow,' &c. The *conditional* sentence here, preceded by *εἰ*, is what grammarians name the *absolute conditional*, viz., that in which the Indic. stands in the protasis and apodosis. So here, ἀπέθανον—ἐπερίσσευσεν. In such cases the protasis is assumed as being *conceded*; New Testament Gramm. § 129. 3. *a.* Γάρ is here obviously γάρ *confirmantis*,—'Ενός refers of course to Ἀδάμ.

Οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον, *the many died, i. e.*, all men came under sentence of death. Πολλοί here is exchanged in verse 18 for πάντας ἀνθρώπους; this therefore is doubtless the meaning of πολλοί. The reason why the apostle employs this word seems plainly to be, because he had just said τοῦ ενός, of which οἱ πολλοί is the direct *antithesis*, and as such would designate all men in distinction from Adam. In regard to ἀπέθανον, I must refer the reader to what is said on θάνατος under verse 12. I would merely remark, that if θάνατος means, as I have there stated it to mean, *evil of any kind* in this world or in the next, then it is true that Adam did by his offence cause θάνατος to come on all without exception, inasmuch as all his race are born destitute of a disposition to holiness, and in such a state that their natural passions, whenever they come to act as moral agents, will lead them to sin. All too are the heirs of more or less suffering. It is true, then, that *all* suffer on Adam's account; that all are brought under

more or less of the sentence of death; in a word, that *οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον*; but still it need not be maintained because of this, that all, without any distinction and without any voluntary act of their own, are equally exposed to θάνατος in its fullest and highest and most awful sense. This I can no more regard as true, than that all men partake of the χάρισμα of Christ in its highest sense, without any act of their own, *i. e.*, without repentance and faith. To say that *οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον διὰ Ἀδάμ*, is not to say that all have the sentence *executed* on them in its highest sense (which is contradicted by fact); but it is to say, that in some respect or other, all are involved in it; that as to more or less of it, all are subjected to it; and that all are *exposed* to the whole of the evil which death includes, and this evil their own individual sin will consummate. In like manner, all receive some important benefits from Christ, even without any concurrence of their own; the most important favours moreover are proffered to every individual, but still these can be actually enjoyed only through penitence and faith.

In a word, it appears to be one design of the apostle to say, that all the human race, without exception, are involved, by the offence of Adam, in more or less of *evil*, *i. e.*, in θάνατος of some kind or other and as the antithetic τύπος of this, to affirm that all, without exception, partake of blessings which Christ has procured. Here is an essential point of the τύπος. As to the detail; it certainly is not necessary to suppose, that those who never had any knowledge or duty, and never arrived at a state in which they were capable of moral agency; in a word, that infants and idiots—are liable to the same θάνατος in *all* respects, as those who have πολλὰ παραπτώματα (ver. 16) of their own to answer for. It is enough for the apostle's purpose, that all, even without any act or concurrence of their own, do in some degree partake both of the evil and the good, while the good ἐπερίσσειαι; at the same time, all by their own acts may either bring on themselves θάνατος in its ultimate and highest sense on the one hand, or by penitence and faith they may obtain ζωή in its highest sense on the other.

Πολλῷ μᾶλλον, *much more*; in sense just what the old logicians call an *a fortiori* in argument.—Ἡ χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι, *the grace of God and the gift which is by grace*, some regard as a Hendiadys, and that the meaning is *the gracious gift of God*, *viz.*, that gift which the gospel proffers, or those blessings which Christ has procured. But viewing the design of the writer as I do, I pre-

fer a different interpretation, and construe each clause separately. *Χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ* should, in this way of interpretation, be regarded as designating the favours which God bestows on all men without distinction for Christ's sake, and without any act on their part which is the condition of their being bestowed. See the same distinction made by the phraseology of ver. 17—*τὴν περισσείαν τῆς χάριτος, καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης*. But the more usual way of interpreting these expressions by the strenuous advocates of imputation, gives no special significancy to this double enunciation. The repetition of this duplication in ver. 17, however, seems to import that there is some speciality of design in it. If so, what is it, except it be that which has been suggested?

Ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι, if I am right in the suggestion above, must mean the special blessings which are actually bestowed on some, through Christ, or on account of what he has done and suffered, and which are proffered to all. While all without distinction participate in some of the blessings which Christ has procured, and further blessings are in their full extent freely proffered to all, yet those who believe and actually receive pardon, do in this way become *de facto* participators of these further blessings in their highest sense. If any one should incline to interpret *χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ* and ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι *κ. τ. λ.* as a repetition of the idea for the sake of *intensity*, he should even in this case, refer *χάρις Θεοῦ* to the gracious or benevolent feeling or intention of the divine mind, and ἡ δωρεὰ *κ. τ. λ.* to this design as developed in the actual execution of such intention.

Τῇ τοῦ ἐνὸς . . . Χριστοῦ, *which is of one man Jesus Christ*. Τῇ has *χάριτι* for its antecedent. The Genitive τοῦ ἐνὸς *κ. τ. λ.* may be construed in different ways. If it be taken as Gen. *objecti*, then it will mark the favour bestowed on Christ, *i. e.*, of which he was the recipient; which does not seem here to be the object of assertion. If it be construed as Gen. *auctoris*, then it will designate the grace of which Christ is the cause or author. Paul has just said *χάρις Θεοῦ*, where Θεοῦ plainly denotes the author; here therefore it is more probable, that τοῦ ἐνὸς *κ. τ. λ.* is Gen. *auctoris*, *i. e.*, it signifies here, that the blessings bestowed upon men come by or through Christ, as their *immediate* cause or author. Such is the economy of the gospel, that we may ascribe all its blessings to God, and call them *χάρις Θεοῦ*; we may also, with equal correctness, say, that Christ is the author or bestower of all the peculiar blessings of gospel grace.

"Of his fulness have we all received, even grace for grace," John i. 16.

Εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπερίσσευσε, *hath abounded toward the many*. Τοὺς πολλοὺς with the article, has a different meaning from πολλοὺς without it; just as οἱ πολλοί, in the preceding clause, differs from πολλοί. The latter would signify *many* in distinction from a *few*; but οἱ πολλοί signifies *the many*, i. e., the mass of men, as we say in English; or in German, *die Gesamtheit der Menschen*; in Hebrew, עַם רַב. Rightly has Augustine said (on ver. 19): 'Ἀμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί, *multi constituti sunt peccatores*, i. e., *omnes*, qui revera sunt *multi*. So in ver. 18, the synonyme is πάντας ἀνθρώπους. Indeed the laws of language here seem to place the meaning as thus given beyond the reach of fair controversy. When the apostle wished, as he did here (certainly in the first clause of ver. 15), to divide all men into two classes, if the ὁ εἷς be put in the one, then οἱ πολλοί must designate the other. Πάντες would not here answer his purpose, for this would make but one class, which would of course include the ὁ εἷς; for the opposition of πάντες is οὐδεὶς, *no one, none*. Moreover πολλοί (without the article) would not answer his purpose; for this is in opposition to *some*, not to *one*. Just so in the second member of ver. 15, where Christ (*the one*) is put in opposition to, or in distinction from, οἱ πολλοί, i. e., all others besides himself. If it be asked, How then could the apostle employ πάντας ἀνθρώπους in ver. 18? The answer is easy. In ver. 18 there is no antithesis of ὁ εἷς, *one person*, but only of ἐν παράπτωμα; which of course leaves the apostle at liberty to exchange οἱ πολλοί for πάντες.

The reader will observe, that the statement made in this verse is simple declaration; a declaration, however, in which the appeal is tacitly made to that sense of the divine goodness, which the apostle seems to have taken for granted, dwelt in the breast of all his readers. 'If it be true,' says he, 'that the sin of Adam occasioned so much evil; then surely we may regard it as true, that the goodness of God has abounded so as to counterbalance it.' He needed no argument to make his readers inclined to receive this.

As to any further question, how much ἡ χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ and ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι here mean, and how these are bestowed on all men, I must refer the reader to the remarks made in Excursus IV. Let us court in what manner we please, if we make a right estimate, the blessings of the gospel will be found to be more than sufficient to counterbal-

ance the mischiefs of the fall; and this must be true, even when we take into view the full extent of those mischiefs.

(16) Καί, *imo, immo, yea*; or it may well be rendered *moreover, or again*. The preceding verse exhibits the diverse nature or kind of influence upon men, through Adam and Christ respectively. The one *condemns or destroys*; the other *forgives and saves*. The present verse exhibits a diversity of influence in another respect, viz., as to the *degree* in which it exists or is exercised. On the one side is the mischievous influence of *one* offence only; on the other is forgiveness extended to *many* offences. The comparison begins with the general assertion of *dissimilarity* (οὐχ ὥς) as in verse 15, and then continues with a γάρ *causal* as before. After οὐχ ὥς, we should mentally insert κατάκριμα in order to fill out the ellipsis; as is clear from the next clause, viz., τὸ μὲν γάρ κρῖμα εἰς κατάκριμα. Comp. οὐχ ὥς, τὸ παράπτωμα, in verse 15.

Ἀμαρτήσαντος. Several important Codices read ἀμαρτήσαντος, viz., D., E., F., G., Cant., Germ., Boern., Harl.; also the Syriac, Vulgate, and old Latin versions, with Theodoret (not uniformly), Aug., Rufin. Pelag., Ambrosiast., Sedul., which Griesbach has received into the text. But the present reading has, on the whole, a decided weight of evidence in its favour; and it is attended with no serious difficulty. One need only insert κατάκριμα after ὥς, and the comparison is obvious; and that this should be done is plain, as has already been hinted, from the clause immediately following, viz., τὸ μὲν γάρ κρῖμα κ. τ. λ. The whole would then read thus, ‘Moreover [the condemnation] on account of one who sinned, is not like the free gift; for the sentence by reason of *one* [offence] was unto condemnation [was a condemning sentence]; but the free gift [pardon] is of *many* offences unto justification, i. e., is a sentence of acquittal from condemnation for many offences.’

After δώρημα we must supply ἐγένετο or ἐξῆλθε.—Τὸ μὲν γάρ κρῖμα ἐξ ἑνός, i. e., ἐξ ἑνός [παραπτώματος]; for the antithesis, χάρισμα ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων, shows very clearly that παραπτώματος is to be supplied after ἑνός. Flatt observes that the mention of *one* offence, viz., the *first* one of Adam, does not exclude the idea that his other and subsequent offences might have contributed to the evils of his posterity, as well as this; “much less,” he adds, “can we conclude that this one sin was the *only* cause of corruption.” But I cannot accede to this sentiment in the shape in which it is here presented. It is clear throughout this passage (verses 12—19), that το παραπτωμα, ἡ ταρα-

βασίς, ἡ παρακοή, all have a specific relation to Adam's *first* sin. Equally clear is it, that 1 Tim. ii. 14. 2 Cor. xi. 3. 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, favour this opinion. And in the verse before us, ἐξ ἑνός [παραπτώματος] is plainly and directly opposed to πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων. But how could this be, unless Paul considered the *first* offence of Adam, and (I may say) this only, as having occasioned the evils which he here contrasts with the blessings bestowed by Christ? It must be granted, indeed, that this was a peculiar dispensation of the Most High, one which displayed his sovereignty in a special manner. But so was the dispensation of grace. It was *the one act of obedience unto death*, by which Christ procured justification (δικαίωμα) for us. All the obedience of his life did, no doubt, contribute to the perfection of his character, and thus fitted him to become an *acceptable* propitiatory sacrifice; but his *obedience unto the death of the cross*, was the grand act by which our salvation was ensured; comp. Phil. ii. 8. Matt. xxvi. 39, 42. John x. 18. Heb. x. 7—10. In this respect, therefore, the *obedience* of the second Adam may be compared with the *disobedience* of the first; and so, indeed, does the apostle make the comparison in verse 19.

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ κῆρυμα κ. τ. λ. The word κῆρυμα, as here employed, probably has reference to the formal threatening recorded in Gen. ii. 17, in accordance with which *sentence* was passed upon Adam. This sentence was [ἐγγίνετο] εἰς κατὰκρυμα of his posterity, all of whom were subjected to evil, i. e., to death, on his account. Κῆρυμα then has reference to *him*, and κατὰκρυμα to his posterity, as they are here employed. The words are often synonymous; and are substantially so here; but the two forms are used for the sake of variety and making distinction.

Χάρισμα is here the opposite of κῆρυμα or κατὰκρυμα, i. e., *forgiveness* or the bestowment of favours on the one side, and *condemnation* or infliction of evil on the other. The preposition *ex* is not strictly accommodated to the connection with χάρισμα, for the simple Genitive would be more exact, according to the usual mode of expression. Its use here seems to have been occasioned by its use in the preceding clause, viz., in ἐξ ἑνός, where it is employed in the sense of *propter*, *because of*, *on account of*, as in John iv. 6. Acts xxviii. 3. Rev. viii. 13. xvi. 10, 11. Sept. Gen. xvi. 5. al.; see Bretsch. Lex. *ex*, 2. d. But there *ex* seems to denote the *occasional* cause, i. e., forgiveness could not be exercised unless there existed offence or sin. In this sense χάρισμα proceeds from offences. The πολλῶν is introduced to qualify παραπτωμάτων, but does not alter the nature of the construc-

tion. The use of *ix* in these two different relations and shades of sense, is here a kind of *paronomasiac* employment of it.

Πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων cannot be rendered (as Süskind and Flatt translate it), *sins of many*. This must have been expressed here, as it is in all the cases where πολλῶν is applied to designate the mass of men in this passage, by the use of the article, viz., τῶν πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων.—Δικαίωμα differs from χάρισμα, only as the *act* differs from the *intention*. Χάρισμα is favour as exhibited in the gracious intention of him who forgives. Δικαίωμα is actual pardon or gratuitous justification. For δικαίωμα, Cod. D., Clar., Æth. have δικαιοῦμα ζωῆς, which is favoured by δικαίωσιν ζωῆς in ver. 18, and seems to be by no means an improbable reading.

The verse thus interpreted shows the ground of the περισσεία—the *abounding* of the grace of the gospel—over the κατ' ἄκριμα occasioned by the sin of Adam. This *abounding* was generically asserted, or rather *implied*, in ver. 15, but not particularly explained. Here it is particularized. Whatever were the evils brought upon the posterity of Adam by his fall, they were only such as *one* offence occasioned. But, on the other hand, the blessings procured by Christ are not merely commensurate with these evils, they extend not only to counterbalancing the consequences of the fall, but also to the removing of the consequences of the πολλὰ παραπτώματα of men.

As to the sentiment of this verse, it is quite evident, that whether the κατάκριμα in question be considered as the loss of the righteousness of man's original state, and the being born in a condition in which it is certain that our passions will get the better of our reason and bring us under condemnation; or whether it be considered as matter of fact, that the sin of Adam causes all men to be born with a disposition which is in itself positive sin, and thus necessarily brings us into condemnation: it is still true, in either case, that the evil inflicted or suffered is of such a nature as to lead to, or to prepare the way for κατάκριμα, *condemnation*, i. e., θάνατος.

But are *all* men without exception brought into κατάκριμα? In the like sense, I reply, as they are all made the partakers of the χάρισμα. Many blessings are bestowed, for Christ's sake, on all men without exception, whether with or without their voluntary concurrence. Forbearance to punish, temporal blessings, probationary opportunities to secure eternal happiness, &c., come to all. So temporal evils, trials, suffering, loss of the original state of righteousness, peculiar exposure to temptations, predominating sensual appetites,

&c., come upon all, even without their concurrence. Beyond these, we may say that some *voluntary* act on the part of each individual (as has once and again been stated), is essential to *final* death or life; certainly it is essential in order to receive the *δικαίωμα* in its *full* sense, for without repentance and faith it is impossible that actual and ultimate forgiveness should be in fact bestowed. If now the comparison of the apostle will fully hold here, (and who will deny that he means to make the impression that it will?) how can it any more be shown, that the *one sinner* has directly and absolutely and unconditionally brought *κατάκριμα* in its highest sense on all men without any act of their own, than it can be shown that *δικαίωμα* in its full sense is actually conferred by the *one righteous* on all without any act of their own? The latter certainly is not true; and if so, how then can the former be made out; or, at least, how can it be made out from analogy? That the fall of Adam has *had an influence* on the guilt and condemnation of all who perish, in some way or other; that it is one of the *causes* of these, in the sense of being the *special occasion of*, or of being peculiarly *accessory to*, a state or condition preparatory to the guilt that brings on *κατάκριμα* in its highest sense, I do most fully believe and freely admit. I see no good ground to deny that the apostle had so much in view. More than this, however, the language which he employs does not oblige us to admit, nor (so far as I can see) the usual laws of interpretation permit us to admit, in case we hold ourselves bound to construe his various assertions so as to make them accord with each other, and with the first principles of moral consciousness. More than this, the nature of his comparisons does not seem to allow. The analogy, moreover, of other parts of Scripture seems to speak for such an interpretation; as we shall see in the sequel. See Excursus on this verse.

(17) Re-examination of this verse has led me to views of its construction and immediate object in the apostle's discourse, somewhat different from those stated in the first edition of this work. The *γὰρ* at the commencement of it makes some difficulty, at first view: for verse 17 does not seem to be designed as a confirmation of the leading idea in verse 16, which is, the contrast between the evils occasioned by *one sin*, and the good bestowed by the forgiveness of *many sins*. But in verse 17 the reigning idea is, that if God inflicted so much evil as the consequence of the one sin of one man, *a fortiori* he will secure the greater good where his grace *abounds* through one,

Now this same idea, for substance, is conveyed by verse 15; where, indeed, the very same hypothetical form of assertion (εἰ γάρ κ. τ. λ.) is used, and the same nouns (χάρις and δωρεά) are employed. There we have χάρις καὶ δωρεά . . . ἐπιτίσσει, and here we have τὴν περισσείαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ δωρεᾶς . . . λαμβάνοντες, which is altogether equivalent. All the difference that I can perceive between the two verses is, that the expressions in verse 17 are *more intense*: e. g., verse 15 οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπείθανον, but in verse 17 ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσεν; in verse 15 χάρις καὶ δωρεά . . . εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπιτίσσει, in verse 17 οἱ λαμβάνοντες περισσείαν . . . ἐν ζωῇ βασιλεύσουσι. Verse 17, then, may be regarded as being more intense and specific in its form of expression; but it does not seem to enlarge the actual circle of the ideas. I must therefore regard it in the light of repetition, for the sake of *intensity* or *emphasis*, of the reigning idea of the whole passage, viz., the abounding of grace over sin. In this view the reader may connect it with the οὕτως ὡς τὸ παράπτωμα οὕτως τὸ χάρισμα of verse 15, or with the equivalent expression at the commencement of verse 16. The latter is preferable for its facility. The general idea that runs through the three verses is, *the abounding of grace over sin*. Verse 15 declares that we may naturally expect this, viz., from the well-known character of God (for such seems to be the writer's view); verse 16 shows that it must be so, because *many* sins are forgiven by grace, while *one* sin comes into the account as the cause of the evils in question. Verse 17 then repeats the main idea in language more strong and specific than had before been used. The γάρ seems therefore to be referrible to an οὕτως ἰστί, or something of the like nature here in the apostle's mind, in reference to the *greatness* and the *certainly* of the salvation bestowed through Christ, which he has so strongly insisted on in verses 1—11 of the present chapter. As if he would say, 'Salvation is sure and certain; our hope will not make us ashamed or disappoint us (verse 5); we may rejoice confidently in God as our covenant God (verse 11); *for, because, (γάρ),* it is certain that if sin has done great mischief in bringing all into a state of condemnation, grace will do much more good as dispensed through Jesus Christ.' Or if the reader is not satisfied with the *causal* relation as thus indicated, because he may deem it too remote, we may state it thus; 'The dissimilarities between the nature and operations of the sin of Adam and the beneficence of Christ, are not only great in some important respects, but they are such as lead us

to believe with the greater certainty that salvation is secure. This is so; *FOR if by the offence of one, &c.*

The attentive reader will not fail to observe, that the *conclusion* drawn in this verse (for such it is when considered in a logical point of view), is apparently drawn in part from premises indirectly asserted or implied, and in part from the nature of the case, which the writer might presume would be understood and assented to by all his readers. What is indirectly asserted, is, that there is *περίσσεια τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῇ δωρεᾷ τῆς δικαιοσύνης*. The consequence of this is, the bestowment of life in Christ. Then, moreover, the idea that is brought to view in verse 15, viz., that we may well expect from the nature of the case and the character of God, that the effects of the beneficence of Christ will predominate over the effects of Adam's sin, seems to be here conjoined with the sentiment assumed respecting the *abundance* of grace. The 17th verse, then, is properly an *enthymeme*, i. e., a syllogism whose form is not fully made out.

Διὰ τοῦ ενός may be regarded as *emphatic*. The apostle had already said, *τῷ τοῦ ενός παραπτώματι*; and when he says again, *ἡβασίλευσε διὰ τοῦ ενός*, he renders emphatic two things, viz., the predominance of death, and the fact that this predominance was occasioned by *one* individual, viz., Adam.

Πολλῶν, . . . *Χριστοῦ*. It seems evident to me that *πολλῶν μᾶλλον* here should be referred to the *greater credibility* that the happiness of the pardoned will be secure, and not that it should be taken (as Süskind, Flatt, and Tholuck maintain) as qualifying *βασιλεύσουσι*. In ver. 15, the same words may qualify *ἐπερίσσευσε*, and so they are construed by some; and here they may be construed with *βασιλεύσουσι*; but in both cases the most simple and obvious method is to construe them as referring to the *greater credibility* of super-abounding grace. They stand too far from the respective verbs, to be *naturally* joined with them.

In respect to the phrases *τὴν περίσσειαν τῆς χάριτος* and *τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης*, see remarks on ver. 15. I would merely add here, that if we construe the first as pertaining to those blessings of the gospel which are bestowed on all men without exception and without distinction, and the second as designating the peculiar blessings bestowed on the penitent and believing, then both conjoined would here indicate, that they *who reign in life* must be partakers of both; in which case their salvation must be altogether certain. Of those who think

that there is no ground for any distinction of meaning between the two phrases, some adopt the exegesis here which represents Christ as the author of blessings *only to the elect*, and some that which makes *actual* redemption co-extensive with the human race. But how can the first method of exegesis be correct, when the laws of philology and interpretation here will not warrant it, and when indeed the fact itself contradicts it? And how can the second be true, which contradicts the context and innumerable declarations in various parts of the Scriptures? Yet, on another ground, viz., that a simple and essential *principle* merely of the gospel dispensation is here stated, both of the expressions here employed *may* be regarded as equivalent, without any serious difficulty; for then the declaration is, that '*the gospel, taken as a system of grace in opposition to the evils of sin, PROFFERS blessings far more abundant than the evils which the sin of Adam has introduced. It proffers abundant pardon and eternal glory.*' And in this case, *the reigning in life* would seem to indicate a higher measure of happiness than men would have attained, had they continued obedient under a system of mere law. Respecting this we can only say: 'O the depth of the riches of gospel-grace.' With men this may be unexpected and even improbable; but—'God will be greatly glorified in his Son.'

While I am fully persuaded, however, that *the principal design of the apostle in the whole passage, is to state the nature and tendencies of the two different dispensations under Adam and Christ*, yet this last method of interpreting his language does not *oblige* us to maintain, that the two expressions above quoted, and employed in vers. 15, 17, were designed to be mere parallelisms or synonymes. Still I would concede, that we may regard them so, and construe them in accordance with such a view, without doing any violence to the laws of interpretation.

Tholuck refers *δικαιοσύνη* here to internal sanctification, or to the life of God in the soul of man, *i. e.*, subjective holiness. But it seems to me quite clear, that *δικαιοσύνη* conveys the same meaning here as *δικαιωθέντες* in vers. 1, 9. Certainly this makes the antithesis to the state of condemnation, designated by *ἡ θάνατος ἡ βασιλεία* in the preceding clause.

As to *βασιλεύσουσι ἐν ζωῇ*, it is well known that *ζωή* is the common word to indicate *happiness*, and therefore it needs not to be here proved. That *to reign* means *to be exalted to an elevated and glorious condition*, the reader may see by comparing Rev. ii. 26, 27. iii.

21. Matt. xix. 28. Luke xxii. 30. 1 Cor. vi. 2. 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12.
Rev. xx. 4. Dan. vii. 22. Ps. xlix. 14. Ex. xix. 6, comp. 1 Pet. ii. 9.

CHAP. V. 18, 19.

WE have already seen, that ver. 12 contains a *protasis* without a corresponding *apodosis*. We have also seen, that ὅς ἐστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος (ver. 14) may be regarded as comprising in the way of hint, but not formally, a kind of *apodosis*. No sooner was τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος uttered by the apostle, than his mind was turned to the comparison thus proposed to the mind by the use of these words, and he proceeds to guard his readers against misconstruing τύπος, by carrying too far the resemblance which it indicates. Accordingly he does this, as we have seen, in verses 15—17, which exhibits the *epanorthosis* (ἐπανόρθωσις) in question; for so grammarians call that form of speech which is designed to guard against mistakes. This being completed, he now proceeds fully to exhibit his *apodosis* or main conclusion, in verses 18, 19. But the reader should not consider these verses as a simple resumption of the subject as left unfinished in verse 12; for it is evident that the manner of expression in them is built upon what is said or declared in the intermediate verses. This will be made evident in the explanation of the phraseology.

(18) Ἄρα οὖν . . . κατὰ κρίμα, *wherefore, as by the offence of one* [sentence came] *upon all men unto condemnation.* Ἄρα and ἄρα οὖν are commonly *illative*, according to New Testament usage; e. g., Matt. vii. 20. Gal. iv. 31. Rom. vii. 3, 25. viii. 12. ix. 16, 18. xiv. 12, 19, et alibi. Nor does this make any serious difficulty here. The apostle had already averred, that Adam was τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος. He had already shown, that the mischiefs resulting to our race from the fall of Adam, were more than repaired by the grace of Christ. Ἄρα οὖν, then, would by no means be inapposite. It is as much as to say: 'Matters being as I have already declared, it follows or results from them, that the comparison begun in verse 12 will hold, viz., that as all have been introduced to sin and death by Adam, so righteousness and life are provided for all by Christ.' While ἄρα οὖν may be admitted then (as Tholuck urges), to be *illative*, this does not hinder these words from standing at the head of a sentence which is in substance a resumption of what had been said in verse 12, although the form of it is *illative* in respect to what had been said in the intermediate verses.

That δι' ἑνὸς παραπτώματος means *by the offence of one* [man], has been strenuously argued by some, from the antithesis δι' ἑνὸς δικαιοῦμα-

τες; which naturally (as they aver) cannot mean any thing but *the righteousness of one* (not *one righteousness*). This seems, at first view, to be conclusive; yet the idiom of the whole passage makes strongly against it. When Paul wishes to make such a distinction, he says τῷ τοῦ ἑνὸς παραπτώματι, using the Dative of παράπτωμα and the Genitive of ἑός, with the article τοῦ before it; see verse 15, and the same again in verse 17. In verse 16, where he employs ἑνός without the article, he uses a participle (ἀμαρτήσαντος) with it, in order to prevent mistake; while in the antithetic part, he employs ἀνθρώπου (verse 15), and ἱ. Χριστοῦ (verse 17), so as effectually to guard against any misconception of his meaning by the general reader. But in verse 18 neither of these methods of designation is employed. I see not, therefore, how we can well avoid the conclusion, that δι' ἑνὸς παραπτώματος means *by one offence*; and so, that δι' ἑνὸς δικαιοῦματος must mean *by one righteousness*. If the latter expression appears somewhat unusual or strange, the reader should call to mind, that Paul's frequent antithesis occasions, in not a few instances, unusual expressions to be employed, which carry out a kind of paronomasia and render the diction on the whole the more striking. All difficulty about δικαίωμα here however, is removed by verse 19, where ὑπακοή is employed in its stead. Both the δικαίωμα and the ὑπακοή refer, no doubt, more specifically to his great act of "obedience unto death," on account of which God highly exalted the Saviour and gave him the fruits of his obedience, viz., sinners justified and accepted. Δικαίωμα, here taken as the antithesis of παράπτωμα, must mean the obedient fulfilling of what was required of Christ as our substitute.

That κρῆμα is implied after παραπτώματος, is suggested by Calvin, and is clear from the manifestly elliptical condition of the sentence as it now stands, as well as from a comparison of it with the middle clause in verse 16.

Εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους is twice employed in this verse, instead of the οἱ πολλοί used in the preceding verse and in verse 19. The reason of this seems to be, that the ἑνός here employed does not designate one *man*, but one *offence*, one *righteousness* or act of obedience. If ἑνός here meant one *man*, then οἱ πολλοί must have been employed as the natural antithesis of it; for πάντας would include that one, and πολλοί would not. It should be noted also, that if the apostle had designed here to designate only the *elect* by πάντας ἀνθρώπους in the second case, he could hardly have avoided subjoining to πάντας some other word than ἀνθρώπους, which is the very word he had already

employed in the antithetic member of the sentence, and which the reader would naturally and indeed spontaneously understand in the same way in both cases. Where else in all the Bible is *ἐκλεκτοὶ* employed as the designation of *the elect only*? How can we feel ourselves at liberty here, then, to construe it in a manner contrary to the plain and obvious sense of the words as usually employed, and contrary to the very nature and object of the antithesis in this case? So Calvin, strenuous as he was in his views respecting original sin, did not construe this passage. Let us hear him: "Communem omnium gratiam facit, *quia omnibus exposita est, non quod ad omnes extendatur re ipsâ*; nam etsi passus est Christus PRO PECCATIS TOTIUS MUNDI, *atque OMNIBUS INDIFFERENTER Dei benignitate offeratur*; non tamen omnes apprehendunt." So do such men speak, when they look away from system and have thoroughly studied the scriptures, as Calvin had done when he wrote this. In his early work entitled *Institutiones*, he has sometimes exhibited sentiments which appear to differ from these. I only add, that no words can more exactly express what I suppose the apostle to mean, than those of Calvin; for it is manifest, that he here considers the object of Paul to be a statement of what the gospel-plan of salvation is, considered as it is in its own proper nature, and not as giving the simple history of what has actually taken place in all respects. On the one hand is a state of imminent exposure to everlasting death, together with many other actual evils; on the other hand is free access for all to everlasting life, with the bestowment of many actual blessings. Could Calvin, if he were consistent with himself, view the subject in any other light than this? Does matter of *fact* justify us in extending it beyond this, if the parallel of the two cases is to be made out?

Οὕτω καὶ . . . ζῶντες, so [the free gift came] *upon all men unto justification of life*. That χάρισμα is here to be supplied, is manifest from the nature of the case, from the elliptical state of the phrase, and from a comparison with the latter clause of verse 16. Οὕτω καὶ is the sign of the *apodosis*, which stands in antithesis both to verse 12, and to the first clause in the present verse, which is in substance a resumption or repetition of that verse.

Δικαίωσιν ζῶντες, *justification of life*, means that justification which is connected with eternal life or happiness. So Calvin; and so the nature of the case requires. It is plain that δικαίωμα in verse 16, δικαιοσύνη in verse 17, and δικαίωσις here, are all used substantially in

the same sense; as indeed they all may be, consistently with the practice of the New Testament writers. These different words seem to be chosen by the writer, for the sake of avoiding uniformity of diction. On the other hand, the one *δικαίωμα* ascribed to Christ in the preceding phrase, must mean either his "obedience unto death," or his *incarnation* as preparatory and essential to this; comp. Heb. x. 5—10.

(19) Most interpreters have considered this verse to be little, if any thing, more than a repetition of ver. 18. So Theophylact, Œcumenius, Semler, and even Tholuck and Rückert, Rosenmüller, in a manner characteristic of the superficial views which he frequently exhibits respecting the logical connection of discourse and the special structure of it, says: *Hic eadem fere quantâ vice [Paulus] dicit.* Still, the *γάρ* at the beginning of the verse shows, that the writer meant to assign some reason or ground for what he had just asserted in the preceding verse, either in the way of explanation or confirmation. Verse 18 asserts *fully*, having both a protasis and an apodosis, what ver. 12 begins to assert but leaves unfinished, viz., that as by the offence of Adam all men were brought into a state of condemnation, so by the *δικαίωμα* of Christ all were brought into a state of justification. In ver. 18, then, the simple fact that men are brought into such a state is declared, but nothing is directly said in this verse which accounts or assigns a specific reason for such consequences.

In ver. 19 therefore, the apostle adds the ground or reason why all men have come into a state of condemnation and of justification, viz., it is because they have become sinners through the disobedience of Adam on the one hand, and righteous through the obedience of Christ on the other; i. e., the disobedience of Adam was a cause or ground why all men became sinners and therefore came into a state of condemnation, and the obedience of Christ is in like manner a cause or ground why all are come into a state of justification. It seems to have been generally overlooked here, that the course of thought in vers. 18, 19 is substantially the same as that in ver. 12, with the exception that what is there merely *hinted*, is here fully and explicitly declared. There the sentiment is, that by the offence of one man sin entered the world and death followed, and followed so as to extend itself over all the human family, inasmuch as all became sinners, *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*. There too, as we have seen above, the *καὶ οὕτως* intimates, that the entrance of sin and death into the world being brought about by the offence of Adam, the spread also of these

was in some way connected with or occasioned by this offence. But in vers. 18, 19, these thoughts are fully and explicitly unfolded; for ver. 18 declares explicitly that condemnation and justification are connected with or occasioned by the offence of Adam and the righteousness of Christ, and ver. 19 shows that the ground or reason of this is, that on the one hand men are made sinners by the disobedience of Adam, and on the other are made righteous through the obedience of Christ. The second part or apodosis in each of these verses is merely *implied* in ver. 12, and not at all expressed; but *ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί* of ver. 19, is evidently intended by the apostle to correspond with the *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον* in ver. 12. What is added in ver. 19, to the former statement is, that '*by the disobedience of one man, the many became sinners*;' a thing not explicitly declared but merely hinted in the *καὶ οὕτως* of ver. 12.

It is allowed by nearly all commentators, that vers. 18, 19 resume and complete the statement begun at verse 12. If then, as seems to be quite clear, *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον* in ver. 12 and *ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί* in ver. 19 correspond, it is plain that in the latter case *actual sinners* are denoted as well as *actual sin* in the former case. The fact, that Adam's sin was a cause or ground of men's becoming sinners in reality (not putatively so), and that Christ's obedience was a ground of men's becoming righteous, *i. e.*, of their being justified in reality (not merely in a putative or fictitious manner), constitutes the substance of the declaration in ver. 19; and all this is a fuller and more explicit declaration of the sentiment implied in verse 12, while at the same time it stands related to verse 18 as assigning a ground or reason of the condemnation and justification there asserted.

That *παρακοή* here is the same as *παράβασις* in verse 14, and as *παράπτωμα* in verses 15, 17, 18, needs hardly to be mentioned. In none of these cases is reference made to other offences of Adam besides the first, but specifically to the first and to that only. See on verse 16 above. In other words; it is not the *παρακοή* of Adam's whole life to which the apostle here refers, but only to the *first* act of his disobedience.

Every thing peculiar in this verse depends, as will readily be seen, on *ἁμαρτωλοί, δίκαιοι, and καθίστημι*. In what sense then does scriptural usage entitle us to take the first of these words? In all other places except this, I cannot hesitate for a moment to say, it is taken as designating a *sinner in heart and life*, or (in other words) an actual sinner. The very form and limitations of the verb *ἁμαρτάνω*, which

has only an *active* voice, confirm this idea. If ἁμαρτωλός is ever employed in order to designate those who are *guilty*, in the sense of *being obnoxious to punishment*; like the word *guilty* itself, in such cases, it implies at the same time moral turpitude and ill desert as the ground of this obnoxiousness. To designate one who has merely the susceptibility of receiving impressions that will lead him to sin (Adam had this before his fall); or one who has (as we say) merely an original disposition to sin, *i. e.*, such a disposition as is native and not superinduced; or one who is beset with temptations to sin, and is in great danger from them; to designate one who is simply exposed to evil, or is merely unhappy or wretched; the word ἁμαρτωλός is never used in the Scriptures, unless it be so employed here. The proofs of this lie open to every one, in any good Concordance: and indeed the nature of the case is sufficient to satisfy most persons. Why then should we introduce a new sense of the word here? In ver. 12, when the apostle had said, that ‘by one man sin entered the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men,’ he meant by these last words (as we have seen above), that his readers should understand him to hint, that the passing of death upon all men had some connection with Adam’s offence. But still he subjoins immediately, as the specific and immediate reason or ground of this death, ἰφ’ ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον. Why not recognize the same connection and the same sentiment here? Adam’s sin was a *cause* or *ground* why all men are constituted sinners; yet Adam’s sin is not affirmed to be their sin; they are not said to be ἐν αὐτῷ ἁμαρτωλοί, nor τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἁμαρτωλοί, nor yet τῷ κατακρίματι αὐτοῦ καταδικασμένοι; but they are ἁμαρτωλοί in, by, and for themselves. A ground or cause of this, was Adam’s offence. Such is the relation of all men to him, and such the relation between parents and children, and such the laws of our propagated nature, that evils are entailed on all the posterity of Adam by his disobedience and fall. But natural evil, and disadvantage, and degeneracy of nature is one thing, and *sin*, is another. A man’s *sin* is and must be his *own act*, either internal or external, or both; and for men to be ἁμαρτωλοί, they must be actively and voluntarily so. Another man’s sin can no more be mine, than his soul can be mine; no more than his consciousness, will, affections, or disposition, can be mine. To impute them to me, then, must be to impute to me what in fact does not belong to me, what never did, and what never can. The candid advocates of imputation in its highest sense, concede this. But how much progress do we make in

the knowledge of *things*, and in the explanation of important *principles* in theology, when we affirm that God counts that as existing which does not in reality exist, and which is in itself an impossibility?

To avoid the difficulty of such imputation (which indeed such men as Calvin, and Edwards, and Stapfer pointedly rejected) some, *e. g.*, Edwards and others, have assumed an absolute unity or oneness of Adam and all his posterity. But this method of explanation is fraught with difficulties both physiological and moral. It is physiologically untrue. A separate consciousness, will, affections, desires, &c., make separate beings; or else there is but one being material or immaterial, in the universe. Consciousness contradicts this theory. Individual *accountability* renders it incredible. If Adam and his posterity are indeed all *one*, then all their sins are just as much his, as his is theirs; and his penitence is as much theirs, as his offences. Or is it true, that God, a being of boundless benevolence and love of holiness, has made such a world that nothing but sin can be propagated in it?

The simple statement of fact seems to be, after all, that God has such an utter aversion to sin, that he has testified his displeasure by an appalling exhibition of the woful consequences to which it leads. Sin is a violation of the order and harmony of the universe, and consequently productive of evil, because it disturbs those laws and tendencies all of which are in themselves productive of good. The greatest mischief of all is, that sin, in this way, brings suffering and sorrow upon the innocent as well as the guilty. But in this very way, too, the odious and abominable nature of sin is most fully and completely exhibited. The earth cursed for man's sake; the brute creation subjected to innumerable evils on his account; the posterity of Adam born heirs of suffering, and despoiled of the disposition to obedience which our primitive ancestors possessed; are all striking and melancholy evidences of the evil of sin. But for the evils to which Adam's posterity are subjected and exposed, God has provided a remedy; or rather, he has prepared the way for redemption from them. The two things, therefore, now go together, *viz.*, the exhibition of the dreadful effects of sin on the one hand, and of abounding mercy and benevolence on the other. The constitution of the universe, by which sin was made to appear so dreadful in its bitter fruits, is doubtless ordained to serve great and wise purposes, sooner or later, in the scheme of the divine moral government and discipline. Nqr

is the case of Adam's sin the only one, and altogether singular in its kind. The same *principle* in the constitution of the world every where developes itself. Parents by their vices ruin their children; wicked men corrupt their neighbourhood; bad rulers affect whole nations with evil, the innocent as well as the guilty. Nothing can be more untire, than that the mischiefs occasioned by sin light only upon the guilty. The horrible evil of sin is, that according to the constitution of the universe, it often involves the innocent as well as the guilty in its consequences. Nor could "the exceeding sinfulness of sin" be fully displayed and held forth in its odious light to the abhorrence of all benevolent beings, unless such were the case. Still, after all is attributed to the first sin which belongs to it, it would be difficult to see how Adam's first offence differed from other sins, as to the consequences which it superinduced, excepting that his condition and his relations to the *whole* human race differed greatly from those of any of his posterity. The consequences of his sin, therefore, were peculiar and awfully deleterious.

It is then one thing to be made a *sufferer* on account of the sin of others, and another thing to be *constituted a sinner* by something that he has done. So far as it respects the manner in which Adam's sin has affected us, both of these consequences have flowed from it. This leads us to consider next the word,

καταθήσθαι. The primary and literal sense of this word, as *actively* used, seems to be *to lay down, put down, deposit*; as its composition (*κατά* and *τίθημι*) would plainly denote. In a secondary sense, the word means *to establish, ordain, settle, introduce, arrange, determine, decide or decree, constitute, to cause* that any person or thing should be this or that, possess this or that quality, or fill this or that place or office, &c. Besides these active *transitive* senses, it has also *neuter* or *intransitive* meanings, *e. g.*, *to subsist, to be extant, to be stable or established, to stand firm or unmoved*. This latter class of meanings would be quite inappropriate to the passage before us, and it is therefore plainly out of question. The form *καταθήσθαι* is *passive* Aor. 1; which tense is frequently employed, in many verbs, in the sense of the *middle voice* (see New Test. Gramm. § 61. 4). where there is no Aor. middle. But as here there is a middle Aor. 1, the sense of the verb must be regarded as being *passive*, and passive as to some of its *transitive* meanings; for it is only the Perf., Pluperf., Aor. 2 act., and Fut. 3 pass., that have a *neuter* or *intransitive* sense, excepting that the Pres., Imp., and Fut. middle may have either sense.

We come then to the conclusion, that *κατεσθάνησαν* must mean *were constituted, were made to be, were caused to be*; for standing in connection as it does with *παρακοή* as designating a *cause* or *means*, it would hardly seem susceptible of any of the other transitive meanings which the verb *καθίστημι* has. Reiche has laboured, with much learning, to prove that *καθίστημι* may mean *to show, exhibit, publicly demonstrate any thing to be* this or that; and that the Pass. voice may of course mean *to be shown, &c.* He admits, however, that classic examples of this usage are not at hand, excepting *αἴτιον καθιστάνειν* (to show cause) as employed by Lucian. But in Hellenistic Greek he thinks this to be more common; e. g., 3 Macc. iii. 5, *ἀπασιν ἀνθρώποις εὐδόκιμοι καθεστήκεισαν*; where, however, the neuter sense (*became permanently*) is better than the one he proposes, and indeed the only one that can well be given to *καθεστήκεισαν*, because the tense is Pluperfect. So in Josephus, (Ant. VI. 5, 6,) *τὸν Θεὸν αὐτοῖς εὐμενῆ καταστήσαι* may mean *to render the Divinity propitious to them*, not (as Reiche proposes) *exhibit him as propitious*. It does not seem clear, therefore, that we can regard *κατεσθάνησαν* here as equivalent to *ἐφανερώθησαν*, and render it *declarati sunt esse*, with Koppe, C. Flatt, and Reiche. Nor can we, with Grotius, Limborch, Whitby, Storr, Süskind, Flatt, and others, render *κατεσθάνησαν* merely by the phrase *were treated as sinners*; for the apostle has told us in versē 12 that death has passed upon all men *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*; and how, moreover, could a just and unerring God treat men as sinners unless they were so? Evil, i. e., natural evil, he might indeed bring on the innocent, because of the sins of others; for nothing is farther from truth, than that sin and suffering in the present world are in all cases co-extensive and correspondent. The horrible evil of sin is, that it affects the innocent as well as the guilty. But in the case before us the apostle means to say, not that men are treated as being what they are not; nor yet that the guilty involve the innocent in suffering; but that men through the *παρακοή* of Adam, did become or were constituted *actual sinners*, and so came (as the preceding verse asserts) *εἰς κατάκριμα*.

Διὰ ὑπακοῆς has doubtless the same meaning for substance here, which *δι' ἰνός δικαιώματος* has in verse 18. See the remarks under this verse, and also on verse 16; and compare attentively the passages in Matt. xxvi. 39, 42. John x. 18. Phil. ii. 8. Heb. x. 7—10. But although I can scarcely entertain a doubt that the *obedience* of Christ, in this connection of thought, means in particular his obe-

dience in assuming our nature and his suffering an expiatory death in it, yet I would not exclude the idea that the *active* (as well as *passive*) obedience of his whole life did contribute, yea was necessary, to the perfection of his character as a Mediator and a great High Priest who should make atonement for us. Without such an obedience, he would have needed an atonement for himself, instead of being able to make it for others. But in respect to the specific allegation, that 'Christ's obedience (*ὑπακοή*) is imputed to us;' this Paul does not here nor elsewhere say, nor any other sacred writer. This is a phraseology superinduced upon the Bible, many years since the Reformation, from human systems and methods of explanation; and not one which is taken from the Scriptures and transferred into Symbols. *In all the Bible there occurs NOT such a declaration, as that one man's sin or righteousness is IMPUTED to another.* The thing for substance aimed at, by many who employ such phraseology, is doubtless a doctrine of the Bible, viz., that the obedience of Christ, above all his obedience unto death, did contribute to constitute him an all-glorious and all-sufficient Mediator. As to the rest, *that God FOR CHRIST'S SAKE forgives sinners, not imputing their trespasses to them,* is the very sum and substance of what is appropriately called THE GOSPEL, and all which can be exegetically made out from the simple interpretation of the Scriptures. For in what part of the Bible is it said that *Christ obeyed for us?* Or where, that *his obedience is imputed to us?* And yet, that *on our account or in our behalf,* he obeyed and suffered, I deem to be a great and fundamental doctrine of the gospel.

Δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται οἱ πολλοί the many shall be made righteous. Several difficulties present themselves here. Is *δίκαιος* to be taken in an *active* or *passive* sense? That is, does it mean one who is *pious*, *fearing God and obeying his commands*, *justus, pius, probus*; or does it mean *justificatus*, a *justified person*, one forgiven or delivered from the curse of the law? In all cases excepting the present one and *ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*, I think it must be conceded that *δίκαιος* is employed in the *active* sense; that is, it means either one who obeys the whole law, i. e., it has a *legal* sense, or else it means one who obeys in such a manner as proves him to be a sanctified, holy, devout person, i. e., it has an *evangelical* sense. As to the case of *δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως*, I do not see any good reason for departing from the common *usus loquendi* in respect to *δίκαιος*; for the declaration amounts simply to this, viz., that a man is *pious*, *holy*, of an obedient spirit, through faith, or in

the way of exercising faith in the Lord Jesus, and has thus been graciously sanctified, so that he now fears God and keeps his commandments in a Christian sense. As to the case before us, I doubt on several accounts, whether we can translate or explain *δίκαιος* by the word *justified*; for this would merely designate a *passive* sense, and be descriptive of what Christ has done for sinners, without exhibiting the active sense in which they are *holy* or *obedient*, *δίκαιοι*. No other certain or satisfactory example of such a usage can be shown, in respect to this word, so far as I have been able to discover. *Δικαιωθεῖς, δικαιωθέντες* is employed by Paul, when he wishes to designate simply the *passive* idea; *e. g.*, Rom. v. 1, al. *Δίκαιοι*, moreover, must have an *active* sense here, in order to make out the antithesis to *ἀμαρτωλοί*, which clearly bears only an *active* sense, if the *usus loquendi* may decide this point; at least it does so wherever else it is employed.

How then is the *obedience* of Christ to make many *just* or *righteous*? In the like manner, we may answer, as the disobedience of Adam made many sinners, *i. e.*, was a cause or ground of their becoming sinners. Christ, by what he has done and suffered, has opened a new and living way of access to God, in which sinners may hope for pardon, and grace to become humble and obedient, *i. e.*, to become *δίκαιοι*, or *δίκαιοι ἐκ πίστεως*. He is the procuring and meritorious cause or ground of such an acceptance, and through him that grace is dispensed which is requisite to make men *δίκαιοι* in the evangelical sense. But in this case, abundant as the provision is which he has made for sinners, yet penitence and faith are a *conditio sine qua non* to the bestowment of the higher blessings of the gospel. And so in the opposite case; some voluntary act of sin, which is properly one's own, would seem to be necessary in order to make sure the final and eternal damnation of any one of Adam's posterity. Before this they are indeed in a *damnable* state, *i. e.*, in imminent hazard of damnation (if I may so express it); and it is also true, that before repentance and faith sinners are in a state of peculiar probation, and in a *salvable* state, *i. e.*, a state in which they may be saved.

The reader will note, that the future tense (*κατασθῆσονται*) is employed in this apodosis. This corresponds to the sentiment implied in the *δικαίωσιν ζωῆς* of ver. 18. The affirmation of Paul then is, that the efficacy of Christ's obedience will bring *the many* to be righteous, holy, or devoted in heart and life to the service of God.

If this were already done in the sense in which he expected it to be done, and in the sense which the idea of *imputed* righteousness would render necessary, why should he here employ the *future* tense? The fact that he does so, appears to afford evidence that the whole paragraph is intended to disclose the virtue and efficacy of the two dispensations, under the first and second Adam, in and by themselves considered and agreeably to their true nature respectively, rather than to detail *facts* merely as such, or to give us a simple *historical* picture. Thus considered, there is no difficulty as to any of the apostle's declarations. What he declares concerning the influence of Adam's offence, discloses what would be the certain result of that, if all men were left to themselves in the condition into which that offence brought them; while what he declares respecting the obedience of Christ, discloses to us the true nature of gospel grace, its all-sufficiency, the certainty of its accomplishing its ends, and its adaptedness to the wants and woes of all our race. The apodosis here, then, is not so much a narration of mere historical occurrences in this case, as it is a declaration of the nature of that which Christ's obedience is adapted to accomplish. Or may it and must it be construed (the tense being *future*) of the millennial day of glory—the future and universal prevalence of the Christian religion? It strikes me that this would be rather a forced construction, and that the *δίκαιοι* here described are those which the work of Christ will be efficient in constituting, either in this world, or in the next, or in both. *Δίκαιοι* those are called, who at the last day appear before the throne of the final Judge, and meet with acceptance through the mercy of a Saviour; see Matt. xxv. 37. The appellation in this last passage is doubtless given, in reference to the character which they sustain as the subjects of sanctifying grace. The meaning of Paul seems therefore to be, that as Adam's offence had been the cause of ruining the many, the obedience of Christ should be the cause why the many should be justified. In a word, as actual suffering and a dangerous and ruinous condition are the lot of all through Adam; so, on the other hand, a state of renewed and peculiar probation, attended with many privileges and blessings, even such as exceed all that were lost by the fall, with the proffer of eternal life and glory, is procured for our guilty race by the Lord Jesus Christ. More than this, must make the text speak the language of universal *actual* redemption, and thus contradict other parts of the Bible; or else it must limit the blessings procured by Christ to the elect only, which, as we have

seen above, is inadmissible on the ground of philology, or even of fact. For further remarks, see Excursus on Rom. v. 19.

CHAP. V. 20, 21.

THE reader will observe, that in all which the apostle has said in verses 12—19, respecting the evils occasioned by Adam and the blessings procured by Christ, he has uttered nothing respecting any good achieved by the Jewish dispensation as a remedy for these evils. It is very natural to suppose that the Jew, ever jealous for the honour of the Mosaic economy, would feel a strong objection to the representation which the apostle had made; inasmuch as deliverance from evils seems to be wholly attributed by Paul to Christ and his gospel, and nothing of this great work to be attributed to the law. I regard verses 20, 21, as designed to answer such an objection which the apostle would very readily anticipate. The substance of the answer may be thus expressed: 'As to the Mosaic law, it was so far from delivering men from sin and its fearful consequences, that the result of it was just the contrary, viz., the abounding of sin, or at least the more conspicuous and striking exhibition of it. Both of these sentiments, indeed, we may suppose to be included in the assertion made in ver. 20. If the reader is surprised at this, or doubts it, let him study attentively Rom. vii. 5—13, where he will find that Paul fully maintains these views, and comments at large upon them. The facts simply considered are, that the restraints which the law puts upon the evil passions of men, make them more violent in their opposition; the light which the law sheds on the path of duty, makes the men more guilty and inexcusable when they sin; and the holiness, justness, and goodness of the law (Rom. vii. 12), renders sin altogether more conspicuous than it otherwise would be (Rom. vii. 13). In all these respects, then, the entrance of the law was followed by the abounding of sin; and what is said in chap. vii. 5—13 seems to render clear the meaning of the apostle in ver. 20.

Moreover in vers. 20, 21, the apostle plainly designs to show, that the gospel, instead of being superseded by the law in any important respect, was rendered (so to speak) the more necessary. The law, instead of diminishing the sins of men, did, on account of their abusing it (Rom. vii. 11), render them more guilty; and consequently it increased their need of a new dispensation of pardoning mercy. And such is the rich provision for mercy under this new dispensation, that not only the sins which men committed before the law of Moses was published (vers. 13, 14) may be forgiven, but even the more aggravated guilt which they incur who sin against the precepts of revelation, may be pardoned. In a word; the law, instead of superseding the gospel, rendered it more necessary; and the gospel is fully adequate to every case of need, however great this may be; for the sins of men, even of men enlightened by express revelation, great as they are, may now be forgiven by that mercy which abounds through Jesus Christ.

Considered in the point of view now presented, the verses under consideration are pregnant with highly important meaning.

(20) *Νόμος*, *revelation, the Mosaic law*.—*Παρεῖσθλθεν* is rendered by some, *came in unawares*; but this makes no tolerable sense here, and moreover it contradicts fact, for the law was introduced with awful pomp and solemnity; Ex. xx. Gal. iii. 19. Heb. xii. 18—21, 26,

We must therefore translate: *supervened, came in the way of addition, præterea introiit* (as Beza renders it); i. e., it supervened upon the state which preceded Moses, when men were living without a revelation. The word *παρισύρχομαι*, in the classics, not only means to *come in privily or unawares*, but also to *come in, to make an entrance*, especially with another or in addition to another. Philo uses the word *παρεῖσθαι*, in the same sense as *εἰσῆλθεν* (see Bretsch. Lex.); but I regard the second meaning above given to the word, as the best in this passage.

ἵνα is said by Chrysostom to be *οὐκ αἰτιολογίας ἀλλ' ἐκβάσεως*, q. d. not *causal*, i. e., not introducing a reason or cause *why* the law came in, but *ecbatic* (*ἐκβατικός*),* i. e., showing the effect or consequence; so that we may translate; *the law supervened SO THAT offences abounded*.

The *telic* sense of *ἵνα*, however, might be retained in the verse under examination, by construing *πλεονάσῃ* as we do *ἐπερίσσειεν* in iii. 2, which there means *may appear to abound, may exhibit or display its abounding* (like the Piel and Hiphil conjugations of Hebrew verbs); and in the like way is *περισσύνῃ* used in 2 Cor. iv. 15. In this way the sense will be: 'The law came in order that sin might be abundantly exhibited, or that a full display of sin might be made;' according with Rom. vii. 13, comp. vii. 5—12. iii. 12. In this way it is construed by Tholuck, Flatt, and others; and it scarcely needs to be said, that the end or design of the law itself was not the *increase* of sin, but the *restraint* of it. My objection, however, to the explanation of these interpreters is, that ver. 21 evidently demands a sense of *πλεονάσῃ* different from that which they give. If we say: 'The law entered in order that the odious nature of sin might be more fully and plainly exposed and known;' then what shall we make of ver. 21? It must be this: 'Where sin was more fully displayed, grace superabounded,' viz., above the display. But clearly the apostle does not mean to say this, (for what can be the meaning of such a declaration?) but that where sin *actually abounded*, there grace *actually superabounded*.

* When *ἵνα* is employed in the sense of *in order that, to the end that, &c.*, i. e., when it is *causal*, it is called by the Greeks *τελεολόγος*, (from *τέλος*), q. d., *indicative of the end or reason why a thing is, or is done*. When it is used in the sense of *so that*, i. e., used in such a way as to denote the effect or event of a thing, it is called *ἐκβατικός*, or in Latin *effectivum*, i. e., showing the effect or event of a thing. See a masterly representation of the force of this particle by Tittmann, in the Bib. Repository, No. 1 for 1835. Bretsch. Lex. *ἵνα* No. 2.

We must return then to the *ecbatic* use of *ἵνα* here, which Chrysostom has proposed. The meaning of the verse may be thus given; 'The Mosaic law which was introduced, instead of diminishing the guilt and sins of men, served only to increase them; for although in itself holy, and just, and good, yet being abused and resisted by the evil passions of men, it was made the occasion of increasing their guilt, because the light which it shed on them, both aggravated their offences and rendered them more conspicuous.' Chap. vii. 5—13, as before suggested, is a full and satisfactory comment on these sentiments. Thus understood, it is easy to see that the apostle has a deep design in saying what he does, viz., it was his purpose not only to convince the Jew that the Mosaic law afforded him no prospect of deliverance from the power and penalty of sin, but that it had become the occasion of his contracting deeper stains of guilt than he otherwise would have had, and therefore of plunging him into a more hopeless condition. The necessity of deliverance through the pardoning mercy of the gospel, does, in this way, become truly conspicuous; and the need of its *superabounding* grace is thus placed in a strong light by the apostle. I observe that Turretin, perceiving the difficulties of the other explanations, has for substance adopted the same which I have now given; as do Reiche, Glöckler, Barnes, and others.

(21) *But where sin abounded, grace did superabound; i. e., the pardoning mercy of the gospel has triumphed even over the sins of the Jews, which were greatly aggravated by reason of the light they enjoyed.*

ἵνα ὡςπερ κ. τ. λ., so that as sin reigned by death, i. e., brought sentence of death or condemnation upon all men, in like manner also grace might reign by justification unto eternal life, through Christ Jesus our Lord, i. e., grace might reign or have an influence widely extended, in the bestowment of justification or pardoning mercy, which confers eternal life or happiness on all men who will accept it, through Jesus Christ our Lord.—After δικαιοσύνης here, one must supply τῆς οὐσίας (*which is*) εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον. In this verse, ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ is the Dative of *means* or *manner*; and it stands in antithesis with διὰ δικαιοσύνης εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον. Of course δικαιοσύνης does not here mean *righteousness* in the sense of holiness or conformity to the divine law, but in the sense of *justification*, i. e., *God's righteousness*, viz., that which he gives or bestows; in the like sense as δικαίωμα, δικαιοσύνης, and δικαίωσις, in vers. 16—18 above. The meaning is, that as sin

exercised its sway over men in occasioning their condemnation (*θάνατον*), so grace, which superabounds, has exercised its sway in procuring a remission of the sentence of condemnation, and bestowing that justification which is connected with eternal life. Turretin makes *δικαιοσύνης* here mean both *justification* and *sanctification*; which is unnecessary, and indeed incapable of being defended. The antithesis of *δικαιοσύνη*, viz., *θάνατος*, does not mean both *sin* and *condemnation* at the same time; of course, then, *δικαιοσύνη* should be interpreted in such a manner as to have a *single* and not a double sense.

The reader will not fail to remark, also, that as *θάνατος* is the direct antithesis of *ζωὴ αἰώνος* here, so it must mean more than temporal death merely; nay, more than any limited term of misery in a future world; unless, indeed, it can be shown that the happiness of the righteous is *limited*. But this none will attempt to show. How then can the misery of the wicked be shown to be *temporary*? That *θάνατος* is here employed in the same sense as in vers. 12—19, impresses itself, as it seems to me, spontaneously on the mind of every reader not misled by *a priori* reasonings.

It should also be noted, that *ὑπερπερίσσευσεν ἡ χάρις* of course cannot be applied to the *number* of its subjects here; for how could grace *superabound* in this respect, when *all* men were sinners? It plainly has reference, therefore, to *abounding sin* which existed after the law was introduced. What the apostle means to affirm, is, that however much sin was aggravated under this new order of things, yet such was the greatness of gospel grace that it triumphed even over this aggravated guilt. In other words, the salvation of the gospel is so ample, that it may be extended to all men however depraved and deserving of punishment they may be; and those who are under the law and have transgressed it, do of all men most need the salvation of the gospel.

CHAP. VI.—VIII.

WHEN the apostle (chap. i.—ii.) had shown the guilt of all men, both Jews and Gentiles, and that none could escape the wrath to come except by the mercy of God through Christ, he represents the Jew as objecting to such a sentiment, on the ground that the fidelity of God, in respect to the promise made to Abraham and *his seed* would be called in question by it. To this the apostle replies, that no such objection could be made; for God is to be regarded as faithful to his promises, even if all men are thereby convicted of being unfaithful to their engagements. The faithfulness of God is in fact the more conspicuous, when he treats those who have sinned, and who continue impenitent, according to their real desert.

The Jew, however, not satisfied with this, objects that there would in this way be encouragement for men to sin; inasmuch as the divine glory would be the more conspicuous, in consequence of the display of pardoning mercy. But this objection the apostle repels, with strong language of disapprobation, iii. 5—8. He does not, however, proceed to canvass it, because he has other things which he is desirous to say, before he enters particularly into the consideration of such an objection.

These he exhibits in chap. iii. 9, to v. 21. After all which he here says, and especially after such an exhibition of *superabounding grace* as is made in chap. v. 12—21, it is natural to expect that the Jew would renew, at least in his own mind, the same objection as before; and this, with more appearance of reason than he then had. Accordingly, we find the apostle representing him as immediately objecting to the views of gospel grace which he had expressed, in the following words: "Shall we continue, then, in sin, that grace may abound? Chaps. vi. vii. viii. are designed to canvass the great subject which this objection brings forward, and fully to illustrate it. The course of thought appears to be as follows:

1. The very profession and nature of the Christian religion are directly opposed to continuance in sin; for he who is "baptized into the death of Christ," if sincere in his professions, must renounce sin and mortify his carnal appetites, vi. 2—11.

2. The remainder of chap. vi. forms a peculiar argument, if I may so call it, with respect to the subject under the apostle's consideration, viz., whether a dispensation of grace allows its subjects to sin. Vers. 12, 13, are an *exhortation* to guard against sin; which is occasioned by the preceding considerations that the writer has proffered. But in ver. 14 Paul places his subject in a new attitude. He had before shown that Christianity, from its very nature, stands opposed to sin, and implies the subduing and mortifying of all evil passions and desires. He now ventures to suggest, not only that there is no good ground for the allegation of the objector, viz., that the doctrine of grace would encourage men to continue in sin, but that this very doctrine furnishes powerful motives, yea, more powerful ones than those which a dispensation of law furnishes, to excite men to the practice of holiness. He begins by saying, that 'sin will not have dominion over Christians, for they are not under law, but under grace.' This is as much as to say, that if

they were still under the law (in the sense here meant) sin would have dominion over them; but inasmuch as they are under grace, this will not be the case, verse 14. By being *under the law*, he means being subjected to it and devoted to it in the sense in which the Jews (as *legalists*) were, viz., confidently expecting sanctification from it. *Being under grace* means, being servants of grace, i. e., subject to its influence and obedient to its requisitions. Verses 16—19 necessarily lead us to such an explanation.

The subject thus introduced is one of vast magnitude and importance. If it be true, that *a system of grace is the only one which now proffers adequate means of sanctification as well as pardon*, then is the importance of the gospel rendered doubly conspicuous. This is what the apostle intimates in verse 14, and what he goes on through the remainder of chapter vi., and also through chapters vii. viii. to confirm and illustrate. That this essential circumstance has been so often overlooked by commentators, has been the occasion of much that is irrelevant and unsatisfactory in their remarks upon this passage.

The first illustration of the power of gospel grace to subdue sin, is drawn from the relation which the Christian sustains toward the gospel or *χάρις*. He has become *the servant of grace*; consequently, he must yield it his obedience; and by becoming the servant of grace, he has renounced his subjection to sin; consequently, he must act in a manner that accords with the relation which he sustains, i. e., he should live in a holy manner, verses 16—20. And thus the Christian must be led to act, also, on the ground that the consequences of obeying sin and of obeying grace are so unspeakably different and important, verses 21—23.

Thus far the apostle has employed comparison, in order to illustrate and enforce his sentiment. I mean, that under the figure of Christians being the *servants of grace*, he has signified their obligation to yield obedience. This is laying a good foundation; for obligation to be holy surely lies at the basis of the Christian's duty. In the next place, he brings into view the *consequences of obedience to sin and holiness*. Thus much then (he would seem to say, by all this,) belongs to a system of grace; and in respect to *obligation and penalty*, it is in no wise behind a system of law. It holds forth both the obligation to duty, and the encouragement to it; while the awful penalty of the divine law for the neglect of it, i. e., for sin, remains in full force under the gospel.

This, however, is negative argument; if I may so speak. I mean, that it does not *directly* prove what is intimated in verse 14, viz., the superiority of grace to law in influencing us to lead a holy life. But it proves, that even in those respects in which the law might seem to claim a high pre-eminence, it has none. The gospel confers as high obligation and threatens as high penalties. In both respects it is opposed to sin; its obligations are directly contrary to sin; its consequences are just the reverse of those which follow sin. In all these respects, then, we may truly affirm of the gospel as much as could be affirmed of the law.

3. Thus much in order to show that a system of grace is not behind a system of law, either in regard to obligations or penalties. All this prepares the way to accomplish the subsequent part of the apostle's design; which is to show that *the law* (in the sense to which Jewish legalists adhered to it) is *virtually and substantially renounced*, by giving ourselves to Christ in the way of the gospel, vii. 1—4. This is an important point, and a great advance toward the attainment of the apostle's design.

But he does not stop even here. He goes on (vii. 5, 6) to assert that the law, instead of being an effectual means of sanctifying men and making them truly holy, is in reality the occasion of their plunging into deeper guilt; while grace produces just the contrary effect. This is the ultimate and highest point at which Paul aims, in order to wean *legalists* from their unwarrantable attachment to the law. That he may fully accomplish his object, he shows, first, how the law, instead of delivering us from sin, is the occasion of our being plunged deeper into it, vii. 7—12. Secondly, he removes the objections which one might naturally raise against the law on such a ground, vii. 13—25.

4. He next goes on to show that grace operates upon men in a manner entirely different from that of law, viii. 1—11.

5. In the remainder of chapter viii., he insists on the duties and privileges that result from such a state of grace.

If the reader will now look back, for a moment, he will see a regular series of thought, all per-

taining to the same great subject, from the commencement of chap. vi. to the end of chap. viii. To the apostle's plan of justification by grace alone, the natural and most formidable objection at first view would be, that such a doctrine would lay no restraint upon sin, but rather encourage it. Already had he adverted to this objection, in chap. iii. 5—8. But with chap. vi. the formal discussion of the subject which is introduced by it commences. The simple outlines of the argument and illustration are, (1) The very profession and nature of Christianity imply a renunciation of sin, vi. 1—11. (2) The gospel lays more effectual constraint upon us to abstain from sin than the law can do, vi. 14; for, (a) By becoming servants of it, we must yield our obedience to it, vi. 16—20. (b) It sets before us the highest possible rewards, and renders them attainable, vi. 21—23. (3) We renounce our *legality*, i. e., our dependence on the law as the effectual means of sanctification, when we become affianced to Christ. We sustain a new relation in consequence of this, and are laid under new obligations which are of a more forcible nature, vii. 1—4. (4) The law, instead of restraining and subduing our sins, is even the occasion of their being aggravated, of plunging us into deeper condemnation, vii. 5—11; yet this is not chargeable upon the nature of the law, which in itself is holy and just and good, but on our evil passions which abuse it, while our consciences testify to the excellence and purity of the law itself, vii. 12—25. Consequently *sanctification*, as well as justification, can be expected not from the law, but only from a dispensation of grace. (5) Such is the *actual* effect of grace; it subdues and mortifies the principles of sin within us, and affords us the effectual guidance and aid of the Spirit of God in the discharge of our duty, viii. 1—11. Consequently, (6) The obligation to live in a holy manner may now be urged on Christians with the hope of success, for they have aid which is adequate for every time of need; yea, which will make them to triumph over all the troubles, and sorrows, and trials of life, and to persevere even unto the end in the way of holiness and truth, viii. 12—39.

I hope the reader will pardon this partial repetition of this course of thought in chap. vi.—viii.; which I have indulged in merely for the sake of being explicitly understood. The attainment of correct views in regard to this course, is a *sine qua non* to a right exegesis of the whole. How can we correctly explain a writer, unless we rightly apprehend his aim and the scope of his discourse? It is impossible; and therefore it is of fundamental importance that we should obtain correct views of the apostle's design in the chapters above-named, before we can safely advance to the particular explanation of their several parts. All form one harmonious whole; all resolve themselves, at last, into the simple design of showing, not only that the grace of the gospel is not justly liable to the charge of encouraging sin, but that *it does in fact proffer to sinners the only hopeful and effectual means of SANCTIFICATION*, as well as justification; yea, that it assures them of these means being effectual even to the end, so that their hopes can never be disappointed.

If it be asked why *sanctification* is here so much insisted on, rather than justification; the answer is, that the apostle had before most fully shown, in chap. i.—iv., that justification by the law is impossible. The question now with him is, whether this plan of salvation, viz., gratuitous justification, encourages the sinner to continue in sin. This question he treats in the manner stated above; and thus shows, that the grace of the gospel is as necessary to us in respect to our sanctification, as it is in respect to our justification. A noble triumph indeed of true Christian principles over all opposition and objections! One too which shows, that a system of law strictly adhered to, can only end in the aggravated ruin of sinners; and that therefore our only hope of salvation is in him, "who hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us."

If the reader has still any doubt, whether I have correctly stated the general outlines of the apostle's design and argument, let him look back on chaps i.—iv., and see that the great discussion concerning gratuitous justification is there terminated; as is evident from chap. v., which is designed to point out the sequel or consequences of such justification. Let him look at the nature of the subject proposed by the question in vi. 1, and the arguments and illustrations which follow. Let him duly consider the assertion in vi. 14, with the sequel in verses 15—20. Let him then see, in verses 21—23, that *καρπὸς εἰς ἀγιασμόν* is still before the writer's mind. In passing to vii. 1—3, 4, let him note, that verse 4 sums up the object of all by *ἵνα καρποφύωμεν τῷ Θεῷ*. In reading verses 5, 6, he must observe, that the law is set forth as being even the occasion of aggravating our carnal desires, instead of mortifying and subduing them; all of which shows the insufficiency of it as a means of sanctification. Verses

7—11 only expand and enforce this idea; while verses 12—23 defend it from abuse. Chap. vii. opens as if the subject of justification were a prominent object of the writer's attention; but verses 2—4 show that this is only in consequence of justification being connected with sanctification. The special object of God's sending his Son, as considered in verses 2, 4, is *κατακρίνει τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρτί*, and *ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ ἐν ἡμῖν*. And so the sequel shows that *sanctifying* grace subdues sin, and secures filial obedience. Hence, in verses 12—17, the exhortation subjoined to the preceding context is, that Christians "should not live *κατὰ σάρκα*." And finally, it is the sanctified, filial, obedient spirit, inspired by the gospel and given by the Spirit of God in connection with it, which supports us under all sorrows and trials, and will end in complete and everlasting triumph. On the face of all this course of thought, then, there lies what has already been attributed to it.

There is another circumstance still, which affords no small ground for confirming what has been stated above. Let the reader look back once more to chap. vi. and see that the apostle, after having finished his discussion with regard to the subject of justification by grace, goes on to declare the happy fruits of this, viz., cheering support under all the sorrows of life, and assurance of final happiness in the kingdom of glory, through the redemption of Christ. Just so in chap. viii. 14—39. When Paul has completed the discussion of his second grand theme, viz., *the sanctifying nature of gospel grace*, he goes on to show, first, how it triumphs over sufferings and sorrows, inspiring a joyful hope; and, secondly, that it will assuredly bring the believer, at last, safe to glory. The parallelism, as to the general course of thought, is so exact between chap. vi. and viii. 14—39, that no one can help perceiving it. There is then good ground to believe, from this circumstance, in addition to the other evidence produced above, that the apostle had, in his own view, here completed a second prominent topic of discussion; just as, at the end of chap. iv., he had completed his first one. The rest of his epistle is employed in canvassing various objections raised by Judaizing opponents; and in delivering various precepts and exhortations suited to the condition of the church at Rome.

If the general course of thought is now before us in an intelligible manner, we are prepared to advance once more to the consideration of particulars.

(1) *τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν*; words of the objector; viz., 'What shall be said, now, as to such a sentiment as that just uttered, viz., that *where sin abounded, grace did superabound*? Does it not follow that one may well say: Let us continue in sin, that grace may abound?' The meaning of the question is: Since God is glorified in the abounding of his grace; and since this abounds in proportion to the sin which is committed: then why should we not go on to sin, as the glory of God will in this way be made to abound?

Ἐπιμεινοῦμεν, shall we continue? But all the uncial Codd., many Codd. minusc., Copt., Codd. Lat., Damasc., Augustine; and after these, Grotius, Hammond, Wetstein, Griesbach, Lachmann, Reiche, prefer *ἰσμιμένωμεν* (Subj.) which would mean, *must* or *should we continue*, &c.? The latter seems to be the preferable reading.

(2) *Ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ*, *dead to sin*, means, to renounce sin, to become, as it were, insensible to its exciting power or influence (as a dead person is incapable of sensibility); or, as Chrysostom well expresses it, *μήκειτι ὑπακούειν [τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ], ἀλλὰ μένειν ἀκίνητον ὥσπερ τὸν περὶ*

Comp. the phraseology in Gal. ii. 19. 1 Pet. ii. 24. Rom. vii. 4. The Greek and Latin writers employed the like phraseology; *e. g.*, *τίθνημί μοι* (Libanius); *mortuus tibi sum*, Plautus. So of the anti-thetic expression: *e. g.*, *ἰμοὶ ζῆν* (Alciph'r.); *ζῆν τῇ γαστρὶ* (Diony. Halic.). In all such cases, a sense of such a nature as that given above was attached to this phraseology.

Πῶς ἔτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῷ; *how shall we any longer live in it? i. e.*, how shall we who have renounced sin, and profess to be insensible to its influence, any more continue to practise it, or to be influenced by it? The Fut. tense here expresses not simply what is declarative but what has relation to *duty*, viz., what *can* or *ought* to be done; N. Test. Gramm. § 125. Note 5.

There has been not a little discussion and controversy, in respect to the meaning and design of the apostle's language here. To me it appears not at all to be involved in obscurity. When the objector asks (ver. 1), *whether we should continue in sin*, he means, beyond all doubt: 'May we go on to sin? May we then still continue the practice of it?' To this question the apostle answers in the negative; and this negative he expresses by the phrase ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ. This must therefore mean, 'to refrain from the practice of sin, no longer to continue in it, no more to be guided or influenced by it.' In a word, it means just the opposite of ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ the signification of which is, to continue in the practice of it, or to find our pleasure in it. *To become dead to sin* or *to die to sin* plainly means, then, to become insensible to its influence, to be unmoved by it; in other words, to renounce it and refrain from the practice of it. That such is the condition of true Christians, the apostle now proceeds to show, in suggesting what is implied by the very nature of a Christian profession with its initiatory rites.

(3) Ἐβαπτίσθημεν εἰς τὸν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν. The sense of this depends on the meaning of the formula βαπτίζειν εἰς τίνα—or βαπτίζειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τινός. (a) In regard to βαπτίζειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα the noun ὄνομα is, no doubt, to be regarded as *expletive*; as עַם in Hebrew often is. So in the Jewish formula of baptizing proselytes, if the proselyte was a servant, the master, at his baptism, made a declaration whether he intended to make the servant free as a proselyte, or to have him still remain a servant. This declaration was made thus: סָבַל לְשֵׁם בֶּן חוֹרֵן, *he is baptized into the name of a freeman*; or סָבַל לְשֵׁם עֶבֶר, *he is baptized into the name of a servant*. So Matt. xxviii. 19, *baptized εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Πατρὸς, καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος Ἁγίου*; which is the same

as *baptized* εἰς τὸν Πατέρα, καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν, καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον. Accordingly we find *ὄνομα* omitted in our text, as also in 1 Cor. x. 2. Gal. iii. 27; it is used, however, in Acts viii. 16. xix. 5. 1 Cor. i. 13, 15.

(b) The sense of the *whole* formula is more difficult to be ascertained. Most commentators, after Vitringa (Obs. Sac. III. 22), explain εἰς as meaning *INTO the acknowledgment of*; with an implication of affiance, subjection, discipleship, &c. But the formula in 1 Cor. xii. 13, πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἡβαπτίσθημεν, seems not to accord with such an explanation. Here εἰς plainly designates *participation*, and the meaning of the phrase is, that by baptism we come to belong to *one* body, to participate in one body, to be members of one body. In like manner we may say: By baptism we come to belong (in a special and peculiar sense), to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. So the apostle speaks of being baptized into (and so of belonging to) Moses, 1 Cor. x. 2; to Paul, 1 Cor. i. 13. In this way all the passages of this nature may be construed alike, and the sense in all will be good. The idea is, for substance, that 'by baptism we become consecrated to any person or thing, appropriated (as it were) to any person or thing, so as to belong to him or to it, in a manner peculiar and involving a special relation, and consequent special duties and obligations.'

This sense is such an one as fits the passage under examination. Thus interpreted it would mean: 'As many of us as have become devoted to Christ by baptism; or as many of us as have been consecrated to Christ by baptism, or have been laid under peculiar obligations, or have taken upon us a peculiar relation to him, by being baptized.' The word *ὅσοι* is employed by the Greeks to designate the meaning *whoever*, &c., i. e., all without any exception.

Εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἡβαπτίσθημεν, *we have been baptized into his death*, i. e., we have, as it were, been made partakers of his death by baptism; we have come under a special relation to his death; we have engaged to die *unto* sin, as he died *for* it; we have a certain communion or participation in death to sin; comp. Rom. vi. 6. Gal. ii. 19. *The being baptized into his death*, therefore, is an internal, moral, spiritual thing; of which the external rite of baptism is only a symbol; for the relation symbolized by baptism is in its own nature *spiritual* and *moral*. *The participation in the death of Christ*, of which Paul here speaks, is surely something more than what is external; it is therefore of a *moral* or *spiritual* nature, of which the external rite can be regarded only as a symbol. Glöckler finds in

the whole verse, indeed, an assertion of a real transcendental union to Christ; by being 'plunged as it were into him.' And *being baptized into his death*, is "versenken ganz und gar in den Tod," i. e., to plunge entirely into his death! What the meaning can be of such *semi-literal* expressions, remains for those who 'traverse regions transcendental,' to explain.

(4) Συνετάφημεν οὖν κ. τ. λ., *we have been buried with him, then, by baptism into his death*, i. e., we are (by being baptized into his death) buried as he was, σὺν ἐτάφημεν; where σὺν means *like, in like manner with*; comp. ver. 6; also Rom. viii. 17. Col. iii. 1, where any other sense of σὺν is out of question; 2 Tim. vii. 11, to which the same remark will apply.

Most commentators have maintained, that συνετάφημεν has here a necessary reference to the mode of *literal* baptism, which, they say, was by *immersion*; and this, they think, affords ground for the employment of the image used by the apostle, because *immersion* under water may be compared to *burial* under the earth. It is difficult, perhaps, to procure a patient re-hearing for this subject, so long regarded by some as being out of fair dispute. Nevertheless, as my own conviction is not, after protracted and repeated examinations, accordant here with that of commentators in general, I feel constrained briefly to state my reasons for it.

The first is, that in the verse before us there is a plain *antithesis*; one so plain that it is impossible to overlook it. If now συνετάφημεν is to be interpreted in a *physical* way, i. e., as meaning burial in the water in a physical sense, where is the corresponding *physical* burial, in the opposite part of the antithesis or comparison? Plainly there is no such *physical* idea or reference in this other part. The *resurrection* here spoken of is entirely *moral* and *spiritual*, for it is one which Christians have already experienced during their present life; as may be fully seen by comparing vers. 5—11, below. I take it for granted, that after ἡμεῖς in ver. 4, ἐγέρθητες is implied: since the nature of the comparison, the preceding ὡς ἐγέρθη Χριστός, and also ver. 5, make this entirely plain.

If we turn now to the passage in Col. ii. 12 (which is altogether parallel with the verse under examination, and has very often been agitated by polemic writers on the subject of baptism), we shall there find more conclusive reason still, to argue as above respecting the nature of the *antithesis* presented. "We have been buried with him [Christ] by baptism." What now is the *opposite* of this? What

is the kind of *resurrection* from this grave in which Christians have been buried? The apostle tells us; "We have risen with him [Christ], by faith wrought by the power of God [τῆς ἐνεργείας τοῦ Θεοῦ], who raised him [Christ] from the dead." Here, then, there is a *resurrection by faith*, i. e., a *spiritual* and *moral* one. Why then should we look for a *physical* meaning in the antithesis? If one part of the antithesis is to be construed in a manner entirely *moral* or *spiritual*, why should we not construe the other in like manner, provided it is susceptible of such an interpretation? To understand *συνετάφημεν* as designating a *literal* burial under water, is to understand it in a manner which the laws of interpretation appear to forbid.

(b) Nothing can be plainer, than that the word *συνετάφημεν*, in Rom. vi. 4, is equivalent in sense to the word *ἀπεθάνομεν* in ver. 8. It seems to be adopted merely for the sake of rendering more striking the image of a *resurrection*, which the apostle applies in the other part of the antithesis. 'A resurrection *from the grave*,' is a natural phrase when one is speaking with respect to the subject of a *resurrection*; see John v. 28, 29; comp. Dan. xii. 2. In accordance with this statement the context does most plainly speak, both in respect to Rom. vi. 4 and Col. ii. 12. For in respect to Rom. vi. 4, the apostle goes on in the very next verse (as is usual with him), to present the same idea which is contained in ver. 4, in a different costume. Ver. 5 (which is a mere exegesis of ver. 4) says, *If we have been homogeneous* (σύνφυτοι, i. e., like, of the same kind) *with Christ in his death*, then shall we be in his resurrection. The same idea and explanation is repeated in ver. 8—*ἀπεθάνομεν—συχύσομεν*; and the whole is summarily explained in ver. 11; *So reckon ye yourselves to be νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ζῶντας δὲ τῷ Θεῷ*.

Exactly in the same manner has the apostle gone on to explain *συνταφέντες* in Col. ii. 12. In ver. 13 he adds, "You νεκροὶ ἐν ταῖς ὀφείtais . . . συνεζωοποίησε, has he [God] made alive with him [Christ], having forgiven us all our offences."

There can be no real ground for question, then, that by *συνετάφημεν*, in both cases, is meant for substance neither more nor less than by *ἀπεθάνομεν*, *νεκροί*, &c. The exegesis, added in both cases, seems to make this quite plain. The reason why *συνετάφημεν* is used in Rom. vi. 4 and in Col. ii. 12 seems to be, that the language employed may be a full antithesis of the word *resurrection*, which is used in the corresponding part of the comparison. "You who were buried

with Christ," gives energy to the expression. A *dead body* would indicate that life had departed; but a body *dead and buried*, would indicate more thoroughly the entire removal of it. Such is the strong language, evidently to be taken in a figurative sense, which the apostle has here employed.

(c) But my principal difficulty in respect to the usual exegesis of *συνετάφημεν* is, that the image or figure of *immersion, baptism*, is, so far as I know, nowhere else in Scripture employed as a symbol of *burial* in the grave. Nor can I think that it is a very natural symbol of burial. The obvious import of washing with water, or immersing in water, is, that it is symbolical of purity, cleansing, purification. But how will this aptly signify *burying* in the grave, the place of corruption, loathsomeness, and destruction?

(d) Lastly, the reader can scarcely fail to remark, that the comparison, as continued by the apostle through verses 5—9, is built wholly upon the idea of a *death* like to that of Christ, and not of a *burial*. The *unity* of the allegory or continued figure would be destroyed, then, by supposing that the principal circumstance in the mind of the apostle was the *burial* and not the death of Christ.

For these reasons I feel inclined to doubt the usual exegesis of the passage before us, and to believe that the apostle had in view only a burying which is *moral* and *spiritual*; for the same reasons that he had a *moral* and *spiritual* (not a *physical*) resurrection in view, in the corresponding part of the antithesis. Indeed, what else but a *moral* burying can be meant, when the apostle goes on to say, *We are buried with him* [not by baptism only, but] *by baptism INTO HIS DEATH*? Of course it will not be contended, that a literal *physical* burying is here meant, but only a *moral* one. And although the words *into his death*, are not inserted in Col. ii. 12; yet as the following verse there shows, they are implied. In fact, it is plain that reference is here made to *baptism*, because, when that rite was performed, the Christian promised to renounce sin, and to mortify all his evil desires, and thus to die unto sin that he might live unto God. I cannot see, therefore, that there is any more necessary reference here to the *modus* of baptism, than there is to the *modus* of the resurrection. The one may as well be maintained as the other.

I am aware, however, that some one may say; 'I admit that *burial with Christ* has a *moral* sense, and only such an one; but then the language in which this idea is conveyed (*συνετάφημεν*), is evidently borrowed from the custom of immersion.' In reply to this, I must

refer such an one to the considerations under (c) above. The possibility of the usage I admit; but to show that the image is natural and obvious, and that it is a part of Scripture usage elsewhere, is what seems to be necessary in order to produce entire satisfaction to the mind of a philological inquirer. At any rate, I cannot at present think the case to be clear enough to entitle any one to employ this passage, with confidence, in a contest respecting the mode of baptism. In this general view of the subject I find Reiche to concur.

**ἵνα, in order that, to the intent that;* which may refer to the intention of mind in the individual who took baptism on himself, or the end which the nature of the case required to be kept in view.—*Διὰ τῆς δόξης* (= *דְּבָרָא*) *glorious presence, i. e., glorious display of power, might, or majesty.* The Hebrew *וְ*, *might, power*, is sometimes rendered *δόξα* by the Seventy; *e. g.*, Ps. lxxviii. 35 (lxxvii. 34). Is. xii. 2. The idea really conveyed by *διὰ τῆς δόξης* here, can be satisfactorily explained, however, only by a reference to the Hebrew *דְּבָרָא*, which was employed to designate *the divine presence* as being attended with a supernatural *brightness* or *splendour*. In the same sense *דְּבָרָא* was employed by the Rabbinic writers; comp. Matt. xxviii. 3. Luke xxiv. 4, which seem to disclose that to which *διὰ τῆς δόξης* here refers. Bretschneider (Lex.) has rendered the phrase *in Dei gloriam*; by a liberty which *διὰ* before the Genitive does not seem to allow. *Διὰ* signifying *on account of, for the sake of*, as an end or object, must have the Accusative after it; at least I have not been satisfied with any proof which I have seen, that it admits the Genitive in such a sense. Compare, as to sentiment, Col. ii. 12. Eph. i. 19.

**ἡμεῖς, i. e., ἡμετέρις*, for this latter word plainly must be added here, in order to make good the comparison commenced with *ἡγέρθη* above.—*Ἐν καινότητι τῆς ζωῆς περιπατήσωμεν, we* [being raised from the dead] *should live a new life; i. e., as we have been made like unto Christ in his death, so must we also in his resurrection, i. e., we must, like him, live a new life after our resurrection.* *καινότητι τῆς ζωῆς* I regard as a Hebraistic form, in which the *first* noun supplies the place of the adjective. See Heb. Gramm. § 440. *b.* See further explanations given in ver. 11.

It will occur to the distinguishing reader, at once, that the comparison here instituted by the apostle, is not one in all respects of *like with like*. Christ died *FOR sin, i. e., on account of it*, in order to make expiation for it; the believer dies *TO sin*, that is, he mor-

tifies and subdues it, he becomes more or less insensible to its influence, or at least he successfully resists it. Christ had no sin of his own to mortify; the believer's *dying* consists in the mortification of his own sins. Even so it is with the resurrection. Christ rose *physically* from the dead: the believer, in the present life, rises *spiritually* from a state of moral death. Christ lived physically and naturally a new life; the believer lives spiritually and morally a new life.

On the whole, this is one of those cases of comparison, which, not affording strict analogies throughout, can be brought to bear only in a *general* way, and will not stand the test of being urged into particulars. It were easy to bring many instances of the like nature from the Scriptures; but the attentive reader will of course observe them. Those who insist, in all cases, on exact similitudes throughout in comparisons, will find difficulty enough here; for nothing can be more evident, than that merely some general traits of similitude exist between the two cases. Christ died for sin—a painful death; the believer in dying to sin suffers pain and distress, he ‘crucifies the old man with his deeds:’ Christ died in order to destroy the power of sin; the believer, in becoming dead to sin, destroys its power or influence; Christ rose from the dead to live in wholly a new state; the believer who is quickened, must also live in a new state. Here the similitude ends: and here it should end, for the writer evidently did not design to push it any farther. Turretin, in speaking of ver. 4, says truly and forcibly: “Non tam est argumentum directum . . . quam vivida atque elegans hujus argumenti illustratio, et quasi pictura pro more orientalium hominum ac specialiter Judæorum, qui ejusmodi figuris atque emblematis plurimum delectabantur.”

CHAP. VI. 5—11.

THE main idea or essential features of the apostle's comparison being thus introduced, he now proceeds to expand the thought, and to present it in a variety of costume appropriate to the nature of the case, and serving to impress the whole upon the mind of the reader. (1) We have been intimately connected (*σύνθετοι*, lit. *grown unitedly*), with Christ as to his death, i. e., we have died in respect to sin, as he died on account of it; and consequently we must be like him as to rising from a state of death to a new life, ver. 5. (2) Our old man, i. e., our sinful passions and desires, is crucified, for the very purpose, that our bodies which incline

us to sin, should no more be subject to the power of sin; for (to carry the figure through), he who is dead, is freed from sin; consequently we, being dead to sin, should be freed from its power, vers. 6, 7. (3) If then we are in fact dead with Christ, *i. e.*, if we have died to sin as he died for it, we must believe of course that we shall live with him, *i. e.*, live a new life, as he lived a new one; for as Christ, when once risen from the dead, could no more be subject to the dominion of death (since he could die on account of sin but once), and as he now lives for ever a divine and heavenly life, so Christians must die once for all to sin, *i. e.*, renounce it for ever, and live continually unto God, *i. e.*, live a holy and heavenly life, vers. 8—11.

The reader will see that the same idea for substance is kept before the mind, through verses 5—11. But he will also see, that there are shades of difference in the diction and method of illustration. Verse 5, for example, presents the simple idea in a *generic* way of being connected with Christ as to his death and resurrection. Verses 6, 7, present the *specific* idea of crucifying our old man (as Christ was crucified), in order that being put to death, he might no more lead us to sin. Verses 8—11 present the general notion of dying and living with Christ, *i. e.*, as he did, but with the accessory idea, that as he died once for all, and can never die again, but lives for ever a new life, so we must, in dying to sin, die once for all, *i. e.*, renounce it for ever, and ever live a new life.—How, then, (for such is the question implied at the close of all this), can Christians continue in sin that grace may abound? There is no foundation for such an objection to the doctrines of grace.

(5) *Ἐὰν γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν*, *if we have become homogeneous, if we have become cognate*. So *σύμφυτοι* must be explained, if philology is to be our guide. *Σύμφυτος* and *συμψύχης* appear to be synonymous; and both mean *grown up together, sprung up together*, and so (secondarily) *intimately connected together, cognate, &c.* Of the whole grain, growing together in one field, the Greeks would say, It is *σύμφυτος*. The evident meaning here is for substance the same as *ὁμοιος*, *like, homogeneous, i. e.*, participating in, or intimately connected with, as to something. Therefore we may render, *If we have become connected or homogeneous by a likeness in respect to his death*, τοῦ θανάτου being the Gen. *objecti*, *i. e.*, the object in respect to which we have become like to Christ; or we may translate; *if we have become cognate in the likeness of his death*, the latter clause showing that in respect to which we have become cognate. The meaning is: If we have become dead to sin, as he died for sin; then shall we in like manner live a new life, when risen from our [moral] death, as he lived a new one after his resurrection.' There is no good foundation for the translation *planted*, as *φύω* does not mean *to plant*, but *to grow, spring up, become nascent, &c.* Besides, the nature of the imagery here employed is obscured by such a version.

Γεγόναμεν, *we have become and still are*; the Perfect often has, as here, a *continuative* sense, New Test. Gramm. § 125. Note 3. *a.* The reader will observe, that the sentence is conditional (*εἰ γὰρ*); but as the Indic. Perf. is here used in the protasis, and the Ind. Fut.

in the apodosis, it is what is called a *simple* or *absolute* conditional proposition, in which the condition stated in the protasis is taken for granted, and the apodosis is then stated as designating a thing that is necessarily consequent; New Test. Gramm. § 129. a.

'Αλλὰ καί, *then surely*. 'Αλλὰ is *concessive*, i. e., it implies that what precedes it is conceded; and in this way it comes to stand in *hypothetical* sentences like the present, where deductions are made; although in mere simple conclusions of a logical nature, ἀλλὰ is not employed. The real fact seems to be, that this formula implies an οὐ μόνον δέ before it, or some declaration which involves what amounts to this. So here, 'If . . . [then not so only] . . . but also, &c.' 'Αλλὰ of itself does not mean *surely*; but standing in such a connection as has just been pointed out, we may convey the meaning of ἀλλὰ καί by *then surely*, or *then at least* or *certainly*.—The Fut. ἰσόμεθα may be regarded here as expressive of *obligation*; for so the Fut. is not unfrequently employed; e. g., Matt. iv. 10. Luke iii. 10, 12, 14. Judg. xiii. 13, 14 (Sept.) Deut. vi. 5 (Sept.) Matt. xxii. 37, 39. Lev. xix. 17, 18 (Heb. and Sept.); New Test. Gramm. § 125. Note 5. a. That the apostle does not mean here to argue merely that Christians should at some future period become alive to God, is clear from ver. 11; he means to inculcate the sentiment, that from and after their spiritual resurrection they are bound to be so.

Τῆς ἀναστάσεως depends on ὁμοιωματι implied. We should naturally expect the article τῷ before τῆς ἀναστάσεως; and usually it is inserted in such cases; but it is also often omitted; see New Test. Gramm. § 92. 1. b.

(6) Τοῦτο γινώσκοντες, *knowing this*, i. e., we acknowledge, concede, or consider as established, thus much, viz., what is immediately mentioned in the sequel. It is equivalent to γινώσκουμεν γάρ.

'Ο παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος, *our old man*, a phrase of Jewish origin, no doubt. Thus in the Talmud it is said of proselytes, that "they became as little children," (Jemavoth. fol. 62. 1;) and they are also called a *new creation* הַיְּצִיר הַחֲדָשׁ. This serves to show, that when our Saviour spoke to Nicodemus of the necessity of being born again, and when Paul spake of him who is in Christ as being a *new creature* (καὶνὴ κτίσις), there is no probability that the language employed by them was unusual or strange among the Jews. The παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος here seems plainly to mean *the internal man*, i. e., the sinful desires and propensities which belong to us in a natural or unrenewed state. The epithet παλαιός (old) is given, as designating

something in opposition to the new spiritual man which is put on in Christ Jesus.

Συνεσταυρώθη is crucified as he [Christ] was, literally, is crucified with him. On the comparative meaning of *συν* in composition, see on *συνεράφημεν* under verse 4. Meaning: 'The sinful desires and propensities of the natural man are mortified and subdued in the Christian, so that they will no longer have a predominant influence over his conduct.' Not improbably the apostle, in choosing the word *συνεσταυρώθη* here, might have an allusion in his mind to the painful and protracted struggle which every Christian must go through, in subduing his carnal desires. Certainly, the word is very significant, when viewed in this light.

Καταργηθῇ, might be deprived of efficiency, might be destroyed, i. e., might be deprived of sinful vigour, power, life; might be rendered inefficacious as to sin, or be disabled from causing sin any more.

Τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, (*locus vexatus*), is explained by Hammond, Schoettgen, Glass, Tholuck, and others, by referring it to the Hebrew idiom; in which *נפש* and *גוף* (*substance* and *body*) are often employed either in a kind of superfluous manner, or (which is the more usual fact) in order to add *intensity* to the expression. Explained in this manner the whole runs thus: 'Our old man, i. e., our carnal or natural man, is crucified as Christ was, in order that the substance or essence of our sinful passions might be destroyed.'

A more simple method still of interpreting *τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, is that followed by many of the fathers, and not a few distinguished modern interpreters, viz., Hammond, Paræus, Hombergk, Wolf, Heumann, Koppe, Flatt, Benecke, Reiche, &c. Theodoret says: *τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, περιφραστικῶς, αὐτὴ ἡ ἁμαρτία*, i. e., periphrastically used for *sin itself*. So Œcumenius. The reason why *σῶμα* is employed seems to be, that the apostle wishes to carry through the metaphor that he had begun, by speaking of *the crucifixion of our old man*. A *body* only can be literally crucified; in a representation where the language is to be figuratively interpreted, congruity of representation requires that this image should be preserved. Sin is personified, and represented as a monster with a body. Comp. the same figure of speech again in Col. ii. 11. As to any particular points of resemblance between a *body* and sin, such as that a body is made up of many particular parts, and sin is in like manner very

various, &c., the nature of the comparison and its design do not admit them; and they are but poor conceits at the best.

Beza, Semler, Böhme, Bretschneider, Wahl, Tholuck, Rückert, and some others, retain the *literal* sense of *σῶμα*, and construe *ἁμαρτίας* as qualifying it = sinful body, i. e., body practising sin, or causing sin, source of sin, &c. Such was the sense which I formerly gave it. And although this seems to be a justifiable meaning, if we compare Rom. vi. 12. viii. 13. vii. 23—25; yet I now view the other meaning as given above to be the more simple and obvious. Reiche contends strongly, that Paul *never* teaches the doctrine that the body is the seat or cause of sin; which, he moreover avers, must be metaphysically untrue. But I am not able to make any important distinction between *σάρεξ* and *σῶμα* as used by him in respect to things of a moral nature; and that Paul every where uses *σάρεξ* as characterizing *animal* passions and desires, admits of no doubt. Moreover, how can we refuse to concede, that, *ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ* (sc. *σώματος*) in Rom. vi. 12, *σώματος τοῦ θανάτου* in Rom. vii. 24, and *πράξεις τοῦ σώματος* in Rom. viii. 13, afford evidence that *σῶμα* may be employed in the same way as *σάρεξ*? Nor can I see why it may not be true, that our bodies, by their appetites and passions, may be the cause or means of our sinning as well and as truly as that the external world may be so. Sin, in a strict sense, is doubtless an act of the spirit or soul only: but the exciting cause need not be spiritual; and the body is often the instrument of acting out sin.

The sense of *totality*, *entirety*, *τὸ πᾶν*, has also been given to *σῶμα* here; but very ineptly. Carpzov renders it *slave*; and he appeals to similar usage among the Greeks, e. g., in Rev. xviii. 13. But there seems no good reason why the word here should bear such a sense.

Τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, that we should no more be servants to sin. *Τοῦ . . . δουλεύειν*, instead of *ὥστε δουλεύειν*; for in this latter way the Greeks usually express themselves. There are, indeed, examples of such a use of *τοῦ* before the Infinitive, even in classic Greek authors: see Buttmann's Gr. Gramm. § 127. b. Anm. 1. But the frequency of this usage in the New Testament and Septuagint in the sense of *that*, *in order that*, which must be assigned to *τοῦ* in some of these cases, seems to have its basis in the use of *ל* before the Infinitive in Hebrew, where it may signify either *design*, *object*, or *end*, *event*, *consequence*. For a full exhibition of this subject, with abundance of examples of all the different shades of usage,

see New Test. Gramm. § 138. 8. *a.* Winer's Gramm. § 45. 4.—Τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ is still personified here. The meaning of the apostle is, that we should no longer obey our passions and appetites which lead us to sin.

(7) This verse may be regarded as a kind of general maxim or truth, in regard to all such as die physically or naturally. The object of the writer is, to draw a comparison between the effects of *natural* death, and those of *spiritual* death; the first causes men to cease from all actions, and of course from their transgressions; and by analogy we may conclude that the second, which is a *death unto sin*, will do as much. The maxim, in its *physical* sense, was probably a *proverbial* one among the Jews. Thus in the Talmud, it is said; "When a man dies, he is freed from the commands," *Tract. Nidda*. Now what is said by the common proverb adduced by the apostle, in a *physical* respect (and correctly said in the sense intended to be conveyed), the apostle means to intimate will apply, in a *spiritual* respect, to one who is *spiritually* dead as to sin, *i. e.*, he must become free from its influence. His great object is to illustrate and enforce this point. The γὰρ with which the proverb is introduced, is γὰρ *illustrantis vel confirmantis*.

Bretschneider (Lex. δικαιώω) has proposed a singular exegesis: "Qui mortuus est, absolutus habendus est a pœnâ mortis, nimirum quum pœnam peccati (*i. e.*, descensum in Haden) jam tulerit." How he who has gone down to Hades, and is there still, is freed *a pœna mortis*, I do not perceive; nor is this exegesis applicable to the case in hand, for the question here is not about freeing from the *penalty* of sin, but from its *power*; the apostle is now treating of *sanctification*, not of *justification*. On this last ground, moreover, the exposition of Alting, Wolf, Carpzov, and others, which gives to ἀποθανών here the sense of an *expiatory* death (by virtue of being like to Christ in his death, or else in accordance with the Jewish opinion that death is an expiation of all offences), and so makes διδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας mean, 'is acquitted from the penalty of sin,' must be rejected; although other reasons might be urged against it.

We may understand διδικαίωται, therefore, in the sense already intimated above, *viz.*, *freed, delivered from*. Nothing is more common in the writings of Paul than the use of δικαιώω in the sense of *acquitting, freeing*, *viz.*, from the sentence or penalty of the law, &c. But here the idea seems to be more general, and is equivalent to that

conveyed by *ἐλευθερίῳ*, which is substituted in its room in verse 18 below. Compare 1 Pet. iv. 1, *ὁ παθὼν ἐν σαρκί, πίπταται ἁμαρτίας*. In Sirach xxvi. 29, we read: *οὐ δικαιωθήσεται κάπηλος ἀπὸ ἁμαρτίας*, a *pedlar will not be free from sin*, meaning that in the course of his business he will almost of course be led to contract guilt. Reiche, however, retains the meaning of *judicially acquitted* or *declared free*, for *δεδικαίωται*. But he himself opposes the notion, that Paul here declares the *ὁ ἀποθανών* to be acquitted of the *penalty* of sin; for it is not the penalty here which is the question, but the *power* of sin. I do not understand, therefore, how he can adapt this sense of the word to the passage.

Thus explained, verse 6 asserts the fact, that in case the old man is crucified, Christians can no more be engaged in the service of sin. Verse 7 enforces this declaration by a simile drawn from natural or physical death; viz., as he who is physically dead ceases from all action, and therefore from sin, so he who is dead to sin (for this apodosis is implied) ceases from the practice of it. What is said *literally* of the one literal death, is said *morally* or *spiritually* of the other death which is of a moral nature. It hardly needs to be added here, that when the apostle speaks of natural death as freeing us from sin, he means from sinning here, in our present state and condition. What may be the condition of the soul in a future world, is not here an object either of inquiry or of assertion.

Glöckler proposes a more simple interpretation and construction than the preceding. He reads thus: *ὁ ἀποθανὼν [τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ] δεδικαίωται κ. τ. λ.*; supplying *ἁμαρτία* from verse 2, and from what is implied in *συνεσταυρώθη* and *καταργηθῇ* in verse 6. But he explains *δεδικαίωται* of *justification* from sin; which is wholly inapposite here, as the question respects the *power* and not the *penalty* of sin. But if (with Chrysostom) we understand *δεδικαίωται* here as equivalent to *ἀπὸ ἁλλαπται* (is freed), then the mode of exegesis in question may well be admitted. The reasoning then would stand thus: "We know that our old man must be put to death, in order that the power of sin may be destroyed, so that we may no longer be in subjection to it; for he who dies in this manner, *i. e.*, dies unto sin by crucifying the old man, will be freed of course from the power of sin." This is not mere *tautology* (as it has been called) but only appealing to the fact, that crucifying sin so as to become dead to it, must from the nature of the case free us from slavishly obeying it. In any

way of construing the passage, ἁμαρτία must here mean sin in its active sense, as personified and exercising power. It cannot mean *penalty of sin*; for that is not here the subject of discussion.

(8) In order to understand the nicer shades of the apostle's discourse here, the reader must cast his eye back upon verse 5—7, and re-survey the course of thought, which is this: 'We are dead with Christ, and we shall live with him [in the sense explained above]; for if we are made like him in the first respect, then we must be in the second. That such must be the case, follows from the fact that our *old man* is crucified, and we are thus freed from the power of sin and can no longer serve it.' Vers. 5—7 are therefore merely an illustration or confirmation of ver. 4; and accordingly εἰ γάρ and ὁ γάρ, the usual signs of clauses added for such a purpose, here make their appearance. But ver. 8 commences with an εἰ δέ, the latter of which here developes one of the nicer shades of meaning. Δέ is not unfrequently employed as a *continuative* of the discourse; and particularly where the theme before introduced is resumed, and something added by way of illustration or confirmation; in which case we may call it *δέ resumptionis*. Here the apostle resumes the sentiment of ver. 4 (Turretin and Tholuck say of ver. 5, overlooking the γάρ confirmantis of ver. 5), for the sake of adding a new circumstance by way of establishing his position, viz., that as Christ died but once and thenceforth lives for ever a new life, so the believer dies once for all to sin when he truly dies to it; consequently he must ever after live a new life, and no more practise sin as he once did.

Εἰ δὲ ἀποθάνομεν κ. τ. λ.; i. e., if we die unto sin, as he died for it; for so vers. 4, 5 seq. lead us of course to interpret this.—Συζήσομεν αὐτῷ, *we shall live with him*, or rather, *like him we also shall live*. See on σύν in composition, in the remarks on ver. 4. Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Grotius, Heumann, Semler, Flatt, and others, have contended that συζήσομεν refers to *future glory* in another world; and Reiche contends strongly for this exegesis. But the latter part of vers. 4, 5, 11, makes conclusively against it. The simple sentiment is as before, viz., that 'as Christ died and rose again, so the Christian (in a moral sense) dies and rises again; as Christ lives a new life, so does he.' If it be objected that this is *repetition* or *tautology*, the answer is, that the sentiment of the preceding verses is indeed *resumed* here, but it is for the purpose of adding a new circumstance as evidence of what had been affirmed, viz., that Christ died

once for all, and so the Christian must die once for all to sin, *i. e.*, he can no more resume the practice of it.

(9) Εἰδότες ὅτι is employed here in the same way as τοῦτο γινώσκοντες in ver. 6, and for the same purpose, viz., as prefatory to the introduction of matter that was confessedly obvious and true. This form of speech is equivalent to saying: 'What I have now asserted must be true, inasmuch as you know this or that to be true from which my position is a plain and necessary deduction.'

Οὐκέτι ἀποθνήσκει, *dies no more, i. e.*, will never more die. The whole force of the illustration hangs on these two words; for in these consists the *additional* matter which the apostle introduces.—Θάνατος . . . κυριεύει, *death has no more dominion over him*; a repetition of the preceding thought in different language, in order to give it intensity. It is as much as to say, 'Christ will die no more, for death has no longer any power over him.' As to the sentiment here and in ver. 10, comp. Heb. ix. 25—28. x. 11—14. One is strongly tempted to believe, that the same hand traced all these passages, from the peculiar shade of sentiment which is found in them. They mutually illustrate and confirm each other.

(10) ὁ γὰρ . . . ἐπάπαξ, *for in that he died on account of sin once for all, or only once*. The construction of ὁ (neuter pronoun here) is rather unusual in the New Testament; comp. Gal. ii. 20 for an example of a somewhat similar nature. For its use in the classics, see Matth. Gramm. II. 894. Like the corresponding Latin *quod* thus placed, it means *in respect to this*, viz., in respect to that which is immediately subjoined; which here is ἀπέθανε. The sense ὁ thus absolutely used is the same as καθ' ὃ.—Γὰρ *illustrantis vel confirmantis*, the verse being designed to confirm the preceding affirmation.

Τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν, *he died to sin*. But "he who knew no sin," could not die to sin in the sense that sinful men do. The use of the Dative, in order to signify *on account of, for the sake of*, is not strange; Eurip. Androm. v. 334, τίθνηκα τῇ σῇ θυγατρὶ *I die for the sake of your daughter*. The *Dativus causæ vel occasionis* also is not unfrequent, *e. g.*, Rom. xi. 20, 30 (see N. T. Gramm. § 106. 5). This might be applied to the expression before us, in case it stood alone, in the following way, viz., Christ died *on account of* the sins of men, *i. e.*, they were the occasion of his death, and he died in order to expiate them. But then we could not well interpret ζῆν τῷ Θεῷ which follows, in like manner; and therefore we cannot admit this

solution. The true solution, after all, seems to be the general principle of the Dative, which is designed to express an object to which the action of the verb stands related, but not the object on which it *directly* terminates. This last is marked by the Accusative case after transitive verbs. Here the *dying* expressed by ἀπέθανεν bears a relation to τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ. This is designated by the Dative of this noun. But what the kind of relation is, the Dative does not of itself designate. This must be gathered from the context, or from the nature of the case. And here the sense requires us to construe Christ's dying to sin, as meaning that he died in order to diminish its power or influence (*Dat. incommodi* as the grammarians express themselves in such a case).—Ἐπὶ πᾶσι, lit. *for once*; but the meaning is, as we say in English, *once for all*; comp. Heb. ix. 12. x. 10.

Ὁ δὲ ζῇ. ζῇ τῷ Θεῷ, *but in respect to his living, he lives to God*. As this clause is an antithesis of the former, so the Dative here is an antithesis of the one there employed; for here it is a species of the *Dativus commodi* (as grammarians call it), the meaning being evidently that 'Christ lives to the honour and glory of God.' This indeed he always did; but not in that high and peculiar sense which is meant in reference to his state of exaltation. For such a sense of the Dative, and in a like case, comp. Rom. xiv. 6—8. See also 2 Cor. v. 13. Matt. iii. 16. Luke i. 55. xix. 21. The case in Luke xx. 38, πάντες γὰρ αὐτῷ ζῶσιν, resembles the present one in form, but not in sense, inasmuch as αὐτῷ (sc. Θεῷ) appears to mean *by him*. The δ (neuter pronoun) is construed here as in the first clause of the verse.

Chrysostom and Theophylact paraphrase τῷ Θεῷ by ἐν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ Θεοῦ; which spoils the sense in the present connection. Cæcumenius says: "He lives by his divine nature;" which is equally inapposite. The *Dativus commodi* is, therefore, the preferable principle. So Demosthenes: οὐκ αἰσχύνονται Φιλίππῳ ζῶντες, *they are not ashamed, who live for the advantage of Philip*. Quinctil. (IX. 2), Mater . . . quæ mihi vixit.

(11) Now follows the comparison of the *members* with the *head*. Οὔτω καὶ . . . Θεῷ, *in like manner you also must count yourselves dead to sin, but alive to God*. For the sense of νεκροὺς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, see on verse 2 above.—Ζῶντας τῷ Θεῷ, has here a meaning like to that in the preceding verse. Comp. Eph. ii. 5. Col. iii. 1. Eph. iii. 20.

The principal difficulties in respect to verses 1—11, are (1) That the comparison in verses 10, 11, between Christ and believers, will

not hold in the *same* sense. But on this I have already remarked under verse 4. (2) That Christ *lived to God*, in the sense here supposed to be asserted, *before* his resurrection as well as *after* it. 'How then,' it is asked, 'can the apostle be supposed to assert what would imply that it was only *after* his resurrection that he lived to God?' The answer to this is virtually exhibited in the context. The apostle has said that *Christ died to sin, once for all; death has no more dominion over him*. Now as his living to God is placed in antithesis to this, the necessary implication is, that he lives to him in such a way as to have no more concern with suffering and sorrow on account of sin, he lives to him in a state that is new, and the happiness of which is not interrupted by sin. In like manner believers are to become dead to sin, *i. e.*, to be unaffected by its solicitations, and to be alive to God, *i. e.* devoted in heart and life to the honour and glory of God, or to live in a state in which God (and not sin) shall be the chief object of all their regard. All this is to be attained *in* X. 'Ἰησοῦ, *through Jesus Christ*, for this is the only name given under heaven among men, whereby we can attain to such a happy condition. Or the sense may be, and from the well known idiom of Paul probably is: 'you, being in Christ Jesus must count yourselves as living to God, &c.'—Τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν is considered by Knapp, Griesbach, and Koppe, as being spurious. It matters nothing to the sense of the passage in general, whether it be received or rejected.

(12) Οὖν, *therefore, i. e.*, all this being true which I have said, it follows that sin ought not to reign, &c.—Βασιλεύτω, *reign, predominate, have rule*; see on verse 17.—Τῷ θνητῷ ὑμῶν σώματι, *in your mortal body*. The word θνητῷ has given occasion here to a variety of exegeses. The reason why the apostle calls the body θνητόν, *mortal, exposed to death*, seems to be, that he may present in an impressive manner the sin and folly of permitting the lusts and passions of a *frail, perishable* body, to have dominion over the soul. The ground why he speaks of the body as the seat of reigning sin, is that its passions and lusts have great influence in leading men to sin. It is evident that σῶμα θνητόν here is equivalent to *ἑαυτούς* in verse 13, and to ὑμῶν in verses 14, 16; excepting that the representation is, as has been suggested, rendered more impressive by this designation. Σῶμα is often employed in Greek, as a designation of the *whole person*, e. g., γυναικῶν καὶ παιδῶν σώματα, *Jos. Antiq. XI. 3. 10*; so κατὰ σῶμα, *man by man*; and so the Latin *corpus*. But in the passage

before us I cannot doubt that the apostle means to designate the *body* as the seat of carnal passions and lusts. Comp. with the sentiment here, Rom. vii. 5, 23, 24. viii. 3, 6, 7. See also the remarks on τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, verse 6 above.

Εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν . . . αὐτοῦ, i. e., let sin not have such predominance as to yield obedience to its dictates. There seems to be a tacit acknowledgment in the form of this expression, that sinful appetites are not *extinguished* in the believer; he must keep them in subjection, but he does not wholly extinguish them. Fact accords with this. The enemy is taken captive, but not absolutely slain.

The text varies in the latter part of this verse; the Receptus reading αὐτῷ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ; which is wholly omitted in Clar., Germ., Ambros., Faustin.; rejected by Griesbach, Koppe, and Tholuck: and suspected by Vater and Flatt. Ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ is supported by many MSS., versions, and fathers, and received by Bengel, Knapp, Lachmann, and others. Αὐτῇ simply, in the place of this, is supported by several MSS., D., E., F., G., Clar., and some of the fathers, and admitted by Mill. There are some other varieties of reading; e. g., αὐτῷ, αὐτοῦ, αὐτῇ, ἐν αὐτῇ, and αὐτῆς. Reiche thinks the whole clause was *originally* omitted, and that the varieties have arisen from efforts to supply a seeming deficiency by conjecture. It is a mere question of lower criticism. The sense is not materially varied by any of the readings.

(13) Παριστάνετε, *proffer, give us, devote, afford*. Μέλη means literally, *the members of the body*; which, however, here designate the *whole man*. This verse, then, is only a virtual repetition of the preceding one, in different language and for the sake of intensity.—ὅπλα here, as Reiche thinks, should be rendered (as usual) *armour*; because *sin* is represented as a king, and compelling us to his service. But idea of *contest* is not the predominating one here; and therefore ὅπλα may more appropriately be rendered *instruments*. The article is omitted before it, although in apposition with τὰ μέλη; see N. T. Gramm. § 89. 6. Or it may be construed as following εἶναι understood.—τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ connects with μὴ παριστάνετε *give not up to sin*, i. e., to sinful lust or desire, or to the service of sin, *your members as instruments of iniquity*, i. e., as instruments of doing that which is sinful.

Τῷ Θεῷ being arranged immediately after παραστήσατε here, shows that τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ in the clause above is to be construed in like manner.—ὧς ἐκ νεκρῶν ζῶντας, *as alive from the dead*, i. e., as raised from the

dead ; comp. Eph. ii. 1, 5. The ground of this figurative language is easily discovered in verses 3—11. That *moral* life and death are here meant, the reader scarcely needs to be reminded.

Καὶ τὰ μέλη [παραστήσατε] . . . τῷ Θεῷ, [give up] to God your members as instruments of righteousness; viz. as instruments of doing that which is lawful and right. Τῷ Θεῷ is construed here by some as a *Dativus commodi*, in the following manner, viz., for God, i. e., for the glory and honour of God. Tholuck prefers this construction. But analogy with the preceding clause seems plainly to require a different one, viz., such as I have given in the translation above.

(14) Ἀμαρτία γὰρ . . . κυριεύσει, for sin shall not have dominion over us. The γὰρ here makes no little difficulty ; yet commentators in general have passed it by, without even noticing it. The most simple method of accounting for it is, that the apostle assigns that which is said in ver. 14, as a reasonable and proper ground of the commands given in verses 12, 13. If it be true that Christians are *under grace*, and that therefore they will be enabled to subdue sin, then is this a good reason why they are exhorted and commanded to do so. That the sense of the verse is *prediction*, *promise* (and not simply command or obligation), I must believe, with the great body of commentators, *i. g.*, Origen, Chrysostom, Augustine, Theodoret, Melancthon, Erasmus, Calvin, Tholuck, Rückert, Reiche, &c. It was as true *under the law* as it is *under grace*, that men were obligated not to sin ; and therefore an expression of mere obligation here seems to be fairly out of question. So far as the Fut. tense is itself concerned it is susceptible of such an interpretation ; for the Fut. may *predict*, or express *obligation* ; but it never can express mere *physical* possibility. *Prediction* is here the only consistent sense for it.

Οὐ γὰρ ἵστε . . . χάριν, for ye are not under law but under grace ; an expression much contested, and not unfrequently misunderstood. The simple meaning seems to me plainly to be : ‘ Ye are not under a *legal* dispensation, but a *gracious* one.’ This is a general proposition and one which the reader will hardly be able to understand, without reading the remainder of this chapter and also chapters vii. viii. By so doing he will see, that the apostle means to assert the incompetency of the law to furnish the requisite means for the sanctification of the sinner in his present condition. See in particular vii. 1—5, 9—11. viii. 3, 4. The confidence of Paul that sin would not have

dominion over Christians, was wholly reposed in the grace proffered by the gospel. He well knew that no strictness of precept, no authority of law, no sanctions of it however awful, would effectually deter men from sin. He has shown in chap. vii., that the law, instead of doing this, is even the occasion of the sinner's being plunged into deeper guilt and condemnation than he would otherwise be. How then can it deliver either from the *power* and *penalty* of sin? It can do neither. The latter of these he has abundantly shown, in chaps. i.—iv. The former is what he now designs to assert, and what he goes on to illustrate and confirm.

To say, with some commentators, that ὑπὸ νόμον refers only to the *ceremonial* law, would be to give the passage a sense frigid and inept. Where, in all the sequel down to the end of chap. viii. is there any thing which reminds us that the discussion here has relation merely to the ceremonial law? Does not chap. vii. 5—25 most fully contradict such a view of the subject? The law there discussed is not only “holy and just and good,” but it is the internal moral law, the νόμος τοῦ νοῦς (verse 23), it is a νόμος πνευματικός (verse 14).

‘But how can it be true, that Christians are not *under the law*? The Saviour did not come to abolish the moral law; nay, he came that it might be fulfilled (Matt. v. 17, 18); how then can it be said that we are not under the moral law?’

My answer is, that this is not designed to be said. Every expression of such a nature as the one under examination, is of course to be understood according to the circumstances and intention of the writer. Paul had to do with Jewish *legalists*. And what was their doctrine? It was, that salvation was attainable by legal obedience, not in theory only, but in an actual and practical way, i. e., as a matter of fact. It was, moreover, that the law, by its precepts, its restraints, and its penalties, was an adequate and effectual means of sanctification. The first part of this scheme the apostle has overthrown in chaps. i.—iv.; the last part he is now employed in overthrowing.—How he does this the reader may see, by reperusing the illustration of the general course of thought prefixed to the present chapter.

Now that Christians are not under the law, either as an actual, effectual, adequate means of justification or sanctification, is true. If they are so, their case is utterly hopeless; for ruin must inevitably ensue. That they are not so, the apostle asserts in the verse under consideration. And from the sequel of his remarks (vi. 15—viii. 39), it is plain that this is all which he means. What can be plainer, than

that the moral law as *precept*, is altogether approved and recognized by him? See chap. vii. 12—14. Nay, so far is the apostle from pleading for abolition or repeal of moral precept, that he asserts directly (viii. 3, 4), that the gospel is designed to secure obedience to these precepts; which the law itself was unable to do.

It is then from the law viewed in this light, and this only, viz., as inadequate to effect the sanctification and secure the obedience of sinners, that the apostle here declares us to be free. Who can object to this? Or if any one should object, how is he to answer the arguments which the apostle has adduced in the sequel, in order to confirm his declaration?

Let no one, then, abuse this declaration, by imagining that it in any measure affords ground to believe, that Christians are freed from obligation to obey the precepts of the *moral* law. What is the divine law but a transcript of the divine will? And are not Christians to be conformed to this? Is not all the law summed up in these two declarations: "Thou shalt love the Lord with all thine heart; and thy neighbour as thyself!" And are Christians absolved from loving God and their neighbour? If not, then this part of the subject stands unembarrassed by any thing which the apostle has said in our text or context. Indeed, when rightly viewed, there is no ground at all for embarrassment.

I will only suggest in addition, that *ἐν χάριτι* implies that Christians are placed in a condition or under a dispensation of which *grace* is the prominent feature; grace to sanctify as well as renew the heart; grace to purify the evil affections; grace to forgive offences though often repeated, and thus to save from despair, and to excite to new efforts of obedience. Viewed in this light, there is abundant reason for asserting, that Christians, under a system of grace, will much more effectually throw off the dominion of sin, than they would do if under a mere law dispensation.

(15) *Τί οὖν . . . χάριτι*; *What then? Shall we sin, because we are not under the law but under grace? i. e.,* What shall we say to this? viz., to what he had been declaring. Shall we conclude that one may sin, &c.? The first impression made by the declaration of the apostle, we might easily suppose, would lead the legalists to such a conclusion. 'Is not the law,' he would ask, 'holy? Does it not forbid all sin? And does not grace forgive sin? How then can grace restrain sin?' That is, why may we not sin, if we are under grace merely and not under the law? But this question the apostle fol-

lows with a *μη γένοιτο*; and he then goes on to illustrate and confirm the important truth which he had uttered in verse 14. Comp. verse 1.

(16) *Οὐκ ᾔδατε*; *Know ye not?* i. e., I take it for granted that ye know and believe. The reader will not fail to mark how often the apostle introduces this and the like expressions, as a preface to matter which he knows is well understood, and to which he expects assent will be given by those whom he addresses; see *τοῦτο γινώσκοντες* verse 6, and *εἰδότες* verse 9.

Ὅτι ᾧ . . . ὑπακούετε, *that to whomsoever ye give up yourselves as servants bound to obey, ye are the servants of him whom ye obey.* *Δούλους εἰς ὑπακοήν* means *servants unto obedience*, i. e., servants bound to obey, devoted to obedience; *εἰς* before the Accusative denotes purpose, object, intention, obligation. *Δούλοί ἐστε*, i. e., when you have once given up yourselves to any one as *δούλους εἰς ὑπακοήν*, you are no longer your own masters or at your own disposal; you have put yourselves within the power and at the disposal of another master. If the reader will call to mind the extent of a master's power over his slave or servant in the days of Paul, he will perceive the unusual strength of the expressions here.

ἢ ἡμετέρας . . . δικαιοσύνην, *whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto justification*; i. e., ye are servants when once ye have given yourselves up either to sin or to righteousness. If ye give up yourselves as servants of sin, then you must expect the consequence to be death: for "the wages of sin is death," ver. 23. Once devoted to sin, and continuing to be so, you cannot avoid the end of it, which is death. But if you are the servants of that *obedience which is unto justification*, i. e., which is connected with justification, which ends in it, then you may expect eternal life (*ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, ver. 22). The argument intended to be urged by these representations is, that when the Christian has once given himself up as the servant of grace he will of course, if sincere, yield obedience to its dictates; and these are such as will lead *εἰς δικαιοσύνην*, *to justification*. That such is the meaning of the last phrase here, seems to me quite clear from its being the antithesis of *εἰς θάνατον*. Why the construction of these passages should have been a matter of so much dissension and doubt among commentators as it has been, I do not see. When I compare the very explicit exegesis of the whole in vers. 21, 22, where *ζωὴν αἰώνιον* is substituted for *δικαιοσύνην* in ver. 16, all seems to be plain and easy. Yet if the reader will consult even the commentaries of Tholuck

and Flatt, he will find himself unable (at least I have been so), to make out an explicit opinion from either. There is, indeed, a little doubt about the *genuineness* of the reading *εἰς θάνατον*, inasmuch as Codd. D., E., the Syriac version, and two or three Codd. minusc. omit it. Yet, on the whole, no substantial doubt remains that we should admit it. Then what is there so strange and difficult in the contrast here? Paul says we must be the servants of him to whom we devote ourselves, we must go where and when he bids; and this holds true, he adds, whether we apply it to our being the servants of sin, which will lead us to death, *i. e.*, condemnation, or to our being the servants of that obedience which is connected with or leads to justification, *i. e.*, pardon, acquittal from the penalty of the law. How can *δικαιοσύνη* here mean *holiness, uprightness*, when *ὑπακοή* itself necessarily implies this very idea? What is an obedience which *leads to righteousness*? Or how does it differ from righteousness itself, inasmuch as it is the very act of obedience which constitutes righteousness in the sense now contemplated? Then, moreover, the contrast here with *θάνατον* does not seem to leave any room for doubt, what the meaning must be. The sentiment is 'Fearful as the consequences of sin are, when you are its servants you must follow its dictates. But on the other hand, the obedience which you yield to grace, is a joyful, glorious service, ending in eternal life.' How Reiche can maintain that nothing more than *physical* death with its terrors is meant, when it is placed in opposition to *δικαιοσύνη* here and to *ζωὴν αἰώνιον* in ver. 22, I am unable to see. But having once taken this ground in regard to v. 12, he seems to feel the inconsistency of retreating here. *Θάνατον* means *condemnation or sentence of death*; and *δικαιοσύνη*, *acquittal, justification, sentence of acquittal*. How Reiche could render the latter *holiness*, when he compared verse 22, I do not perceive.

(17) *Χάρις δι' . . . διδασχῆς*, but thanks be unto God that ye were the servants of sin, but have become obedient from the heart to that model of doctrine in which ye have been instructed. Such is the literal translation. But the nature of the case is sufficient to show, that the apostle's thanks to God are not designed to have a special bearing on *ἦτε δοῦλοι τῆς ἁμαρτίας*. In view of the *whole* case, *viz.*, that they once were the servants of sin, but now are devoted to Christian obedience, Paul thanks God, as well he might, for 'there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth.' But to say that he thanks God with special reference to the fact that they were sinners, and

because they were so, would be saying what contradicts not only the whole strain of Paul's epistles, but all the Bible. Besides, the meaning of ἦτε here plainly is, that 'ye once were but no longer are,' i. e., that having once been so they have ceased to be so. Thus in Latin: Fuit Ilium; fuimus Troes.

It has been proposed here to render ὅτι *although*; but, first, there is no adequate authority for such a translation; secondly, the present construction of the sentence requires ὅτι as *rationem reddens* in respect to χάρις τῷ Θεῷ; and the δέ (but) after ὑπακούσατε indicates that ὅτι in the preceding clause retains its usual sense. The true solution of the difficulty consists in taking the whole phrase together; for then a meaning is conveyed, which might well excite the mind of the apostle to gratitude.

Ἰσχυρόσατε δὲ ἐκ καρδίας, *but ye have heartily or sincerely become obedient.* The apostle means to express his cheering confidence in the reality of their devotedness to the cause of Christ, which they professed to love; and this seems to me to be all that he here means to express. Tholuck says, however, that ὑπακούσατε joined with ἐκ καρδίας, 'is designed to render conspicuous the idea of the free will with which the sinner first came to Jesus and received pardon.' Was it true, then, that Jesus first sought the sinner, or the sinner him? Do we "love him because he first loved us;" or is it the reverse? That the sinner was "willing," I doubt not; but that he was "made willing in the day of God's power," seems to be equally plain. Does not "God work in us both to will and to do?"

Εἰς ὃν . . . διδασκῆς. The construction here has given much trouble to critics. It need not have done so; for ὑπακούω may govern the Accusative as well as the Dative; see examples of the Accusative in Prov. xxix. 12. Deut. xxi. 18. It may also govern the Genitive; e. g., Deut. xxi. 20. xxvi. 14, 17, et al. sæpe. The Dative after it, however, is most common. We may then construe thus: ὑπακούσατε τῷ πονοῦ διδασκῆς . . . εἰς ὃν παραδόθητε. Εἰς with the Accusative very frequently follows παραδίδομι, although the simple Dative is the most usual. But here the Dative would not give the sense—*into which ye have been initiated, or in respect to which ye have been instructed.*

A second way of solving the grammatical construction, is by *attraction*. The noun, as all grammarians of course know, is almost as often *attracted* to the case of the pronoun, as the pronoun is to that of the noun. The former we may suppose to be the case here, so that τῷ πονοῦ is written for τῷ πονοῦ, which latter would be the more

usual construction after ὑπακούω. Why Tholuck, Flatt, and others, should prefer the forced construction here, ὑπακούσατε εἰς τύπον ὃς παρεδόθη ὑμῖν, I do not see. They do not seem to have adverted to the fact, that ὑπακούω may take the simple Accusative after it, as shown above. Even Reiche has overlooked this.

That ὑπακούσατε, in the second clause here, corresponds to ἦτε δοῦλοι in the first, is plain. The apostle might have used ἰδουλώθητε in the room of it; but ὑπακούσατε corresponds better to the phraseology of the preceding verse.

Τύπον διδαχῆς, *model of doctrine*; τύπος, *model, form, example, &c.* Comp. Rom. ii. 20, μόρφωσις τῆς γνώσεως; 2 Tim. i. 13, ὑποτύπωσις ὑγιαίνοντων λόγων. In the classics also such expressions occur; *e. g.*, Jambl. Vita Pythag. c. 16. He had τῆς παιδείσεως ὁ τύπος τοιοῦτος, *such a model of instruction*, and looking to this, &c.; Ib. c. 23, "For the sake of rendering more conspicuous τὸν τύπον τῆς διδασκαλίας." Bretschneider (Lex. τύπος) gives the meaning of τύπον διδαχῆς here, by *doctrina animis vestris insculpta*, meaning that τύπον should be rendered *impression*; a sense which might receive some countenance from ἐμφυτον λόγον in James i. 21, but which, however, cannot be maintained as Pauline, after weighing the examples in Rom. ii. 20. 2 Tim. i. 13.—Ἐκ καρδίας means *willingly, heartily, sincerely*. Παρεδόθητε refers to the fact that they had been taught of God, or taught of the apostles. I see no good reason, however, why the idea may not include both, and so generally designate all the right teaching which they had received.

(18) Ἐλευθερωθέντες . . . ἁμαρτίας, *being freed from sin, i. e., from a state of bondage to sin, from being the servants of sin*. This was effected, when they "passed from death unto life," from "the bondage of Satan to enjoy the liberty of the children of God." Then it was also, that they became the Lord's; they became so ἐκ καρδίας. Being "bought with a price," they held themselves, in their new state, to be under obligation to "glorify God with their bodies and with their spirits which are his;" which is expressed by ἰδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ.—The δὲ in this verse is *continuative, i. e., it means then or moreover*.

It is easy to see, that verses 17, 18, do not advance the argument of the apostle. They are not designed for this purpose; but only for the sake of making an impression on the minds of his readers. He intends to show them, that they have a personal interest in what he says, and indeed that they are themselves examples of what he is

declaring. To the like purpose are the declarations in verses 19, 20. Verse 18 may indeed be viewed as an appeal *ad hominem*: 'Ye, brethren, are no more the servants of sin; how then can you any longer continue to obey its dictates? Ye have become the servants of righteousness; and of course you must obey its dictates, i. e., live a life of holiness.'

(19) 'Ἀνθρώπων λέγω seems to be equivalent to κατ' ἄνθρωπον λέγω, iii. 5; i. e., *I speak as men are accustomed to speak*, viz., I use such language as they usually employ in regard to the affairs of common life. So the classic Greek authors say in the like sense, ἀνθρωπίνως λέγω or ἀνθρωπείως λέγω; see Aristoph. *Ranæ*, 1090. *Vespæ*, 1174. Strato in Athenæus, *Deipnos*. Tom. III. lib. IX. 29. So also the Latins; as Petronius, *Satyr.* c. 50, *Sæpius poetice quam humane locutus es*. Cicero, *de Divinat.* II. 64, *hominum more dicere*. The apostle means to say, that in speaking of the subject under consideration, he uses language borrowed from common life, which may be easily understood. The reason of this he now proceeds to assign. I consider the declaration in ἀνθρώπων λέγω as referring to what precedes and also to what follows; and consequently only as a parenthesis thrown in between the members of a sentence; for in reality verses 18, 19 make but one sentence, as the causal particle γὰρ shows.

Διὰ τὴν . . . ὑμῶν, *because of the weakness of your flesh*, i. e., because of the feebleness or imperfection of your spiritual knowledge, or of your ability to comprehend me, which is occasioned by the flesh, i. e., the carnal part, having so great an influence. Or τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν may, like the Hebrew לְבָבְךָ, be used by way of periphrasis, merely to indicate *your own selves*. Or ἀσθενίαι may be used here (as ἀσθενῶν is in Romans v. 6) for *moral weakness*. So Beza and others; but this is an improbable sense; for the apostle does not here speak in the tone of *chiding*. The expression in 1 Cor. iii. 1, seems to afford aid sufficient to make the matter plain: "I could not speak to you as πνευματικοῖς but as σαρκικοῖς;" which latter word is immediately explained by the exegetical clause, ὡς νηπιῶσι ἐν Χριστῷ. So then the ἀσθενία τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν may be regarded as indicating (if I may thus speak) the feeble or infantile state of spiritual knowledge among the Romans; and to adapt himself to this, the apostle had made use of the familiar phraseology which the context exhibits. In giving this construction to ἀσθενίαι τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν, we must regard τῆς σαρκὸς as Gen. *causæ vel auctoris*; so that the sense is: 'The

weakness which the flesh or carnal part occasions, viz., the inability to comprehend language of a higher and more difficult nature, which had been occasioned by their fleshly passions and appetites.

Ὅσπερ γάρ . . . ἀνομίαν, *for as ye have given up your members to be the servants of impurity and iniquity, for the sake of iniquity.* The γάρ here may seem, at first view, to be rather difficult of explanation. But the simple ground of it is to be found in the implied sentiment: 'Ye must now be the servants of righteousness, *for as, &c.*' That is, 'Ye must be servants of righteousness, if you would act consistently; for when you served sin you engaged actively in its service, and so it must be when you serve righteousness.'

Τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν is equivalent to σῶμα θνητόν in verse 12. It is resuming the diction of verse 13. The ground of the usage is, that *our members* are the instruments actually employed either in the service of sin or righteousness. They are our instrumental agents.—Δούλα is here an adjective, δούλος -η -ον, comp. Wisd. xv. 7.—Τῇ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἀνομίᾳ, Dat. *commodi*, at least a species of it.—Εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν *for the purpose of iniquity, i. e., of doing iniquity, of committing sin.*

Οὕτω νῦν . . . ἁγιασμέν, *so now give up your members to be the servants of righteousness, for the sake of holiness.*—Εἰς ἁγιασμέν stands here without the article, although we have in the antithesis εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν. But this is one of those cases in which the writer may insert or omit the article, without any important difference of meaning in his discourse. Abstract and monadic nouns allow this liberty; N. Test. Gramm. § 89. 2.

(20) Ὅτε γάρ . . . δικαιοσύνη, *for when ye were the servants of sin ye were free in respect to righteousness.* The expression in itself is not difficult, excepting perhaps the last clause of it; but the connection and object of the verse are somewhat difficult. Tholuck says that γάρ points to verse 22, in respect to the reward of Christians; but this is a liberty with γάρ which it would be no easy task to justify. I must connect it with what *precedes*, in this case, not with what follows. What says the apostle? 'As you once served sin, so now you must serve holiness. [Your present relation admits of no other conclusion]; *for* when you served sin, you deemed yourselves free from all obligation to righteousness, [so now, serving holiness, count yourselves free from all obligation to sin].' I cannot see in what other way ὅτε γάρ κ. τ. λ. is here connected. As γάρ *confirmantis vel illustrantis*, we must take the particle here; and if so,

then I cannot make out the object of the verse in any other way than as above. There is, indeed, an *anacoluthon* in this case; but how often Paul admits this into his epistles, the distinguishing reader of them needs not to be informed.

Bretschneider (Lex. ἐλεύθερος) renders ἐλεύθεροι, *destituti*; and so many others have done; but this is a sense which it would be difficult to vindicate, and which is unnecessary. When the apostle says, that they, being the servants of sin, were ἐλεύθεροι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, he cannot mean that in fact they were free from all obligation to holiness (for this can never be true of any moral being whatever); he must mean, then, that in their own estimation, or according to the tenor of their own reasonings, they were absolved from obligation to pursue holiness; or he means, that in *fact* they lived as those who are absolved from obligation to holiness. I understand him here to be making an appeal *ad hominem*, as in the preceding verse, and to say in effect: 'Since you formerly, when in the service of sin, counted yourselves free from the dominion of holiness; so now, as the servants of righteousness, count yourselves free from all obligation to obey sin.' The Dative here (τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ) belongs to that class of Datives whose office it is to designate *relation to, respect to*, a particular thing, *i. e.*, the noun is put in the Dative, which limits to a particular thing a predicate which in its own nature is general. So here ἐλεύθεροι—a general idea—but τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ limits it to this particular thing. See New Test. Gramm. § 106. 1; and comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 20. Acts vii. 51. xx. 22. 1 Cor. vii. 34. Heb. v. 11.

(21) τίνα οὖν . . . ἐπαισχύνεσθε; *What fruit, moreover, had ye then, in respect to those things [of which] ye are now ashamed?* There are various ways of pointing and constructing this sentence. Some put the interrogation point after τότε, and make the answer to be: 'Such fruit as ye are now ashamed of.' So Koppe; with whom Flatt and Tholuck agree. I prefer the division of Knapp, who points as above. οὖν, "*orationi continuandæ inservit.*" (Bretschn. Lex.). There seems to me plainly to be a *transition* in the discourse here to another topic, *viz.*, from the topic of *obligation* of which the writer had been speaking, to that of *consequence*, *i. e.*, either penalty or reward. This makes the second point of comparison, between being under the law and under grace. The *end* or *event* of the two states is unspeakably different. The writer, however, assumes the position here, that while under the law men will continue to sin, and thus bring death

upon themselves. It is only in the sequel (chap. vii. 5—25), that he fully illustrates the reason or ground of this.

Καρπὸν εἶχετε κ. τ. λ., must here mean; *What reward had ye? What benefit did ye experience?* Comp. Rom. i. 13. xv. 28. Heb. xii. 11. Ἐχέιν καρπὸν has a different meaning from φέρειν καρπὸν. To make the construction full, ἐπεινῶν must be understood before ἐφ' οὗ. Such an ellipsis is very frequent; see Bretschn. Lex. ὅς, c. β. Ἐπαίσχυνμαι usually governs the Accusative, but is here constructed with ἐπί after it.

Τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἐπεινῶν θάνατος, *for the end of those things is death; viz., of such things as they formerly practised, but are now ashamed of.* Τέλος retains here a sense which is very common, viz., the consequence, final event, *fata ultima, exitus rei.* Γὰρ confirmantis; as if the writer had said: 'What solid good could result from your former course of life, since the end of this course must be death?' For the sense of θάνατος, see chap. v. 12.

(22) Νυνὶ δὲ . . . ἁγιασμέν, *but now, being freed from sin, and having become servants to God, ye have your fruit in respect to holiness.* The preceding context explains ἰλευθερωθέντες . . . Θεῷ. Ἐχέτε τὸν καρπὸν must mean the same as in verse 21, viz., *you have your benefit or reward.*—Εἰς . . . ἁγιασμέν, *in respect to holiness or sanctification* (Bretschn. Lex. εἰς, 4); not (with Flatt and others) *unto holiness* i. e., the consequences are, that ye are holy. It is not the writer's object here to represent the consequence of serving God as being the attainment of holiness; for *serving God* implies that holiness already exists. It is the *fruits, i. e., the consequences of serving God*, which Paul here brings into view; for nothing else would make out the antithesis to the preceding verse; a circumstance overlooked by many commentators. I understand the apostle as saying: 'You already enjoy important benefits, in respect to a holy course of life; and you hope for more important benefits still, viz., ζωὴν αἰώνιον.'

Τὸ δὲ . . . αἰώνιον, *and the end [is to possess] eternal life.* The reader will observe, that the Acc. (ζωὴν αἰώνιον) renders it necessary here to supply some verb in order to complete the construction; and some verb which is different from that in verse 21 (ἔστί), where θάνατος is in the Nom. The sentence may be filled out in two ways; viz., (1) Τὸ δὲ τέλος [ἔχειν or ἔξειν] ζωὴν αἰώνιον. (2) Τὸ δὲ τέλος [ἔξει] ζωὴν αἰώνιον. The sense is the same in both cases. In the latter case, ζωὴν αἰώνιον is put in apposition with τὸ τέλος, and is explanatory of it.

In the former case, the construction is thus : 'The end or event will be, that you shall obtain everlasting happiness.' One or the other of these constructions, the context and the form of the words compel us to adopt.

The reader cannot help remarking here the antithesis between ζῶναι αἰώνιον and θάνατος. How can the latter be temporal only? What comparison would this make, between the two members of the antithesis?

(23) Such consequences must follow from the established rules of the divine government, respecting the fruits of sin and of holiness.

Τὰ γὰρ θάνατος, *for the reward (wages) of sin is death*; comp. on Rom. v. 12.—Γὰρ *confirmantis*; for what is said in the sequel confirms vers. 21, 22.—'Οψώνια, properly the *rations of soldiers*, i. e., their wages, which at first were paid in grain, meat, fruit, &c., but afterwards in money. Observe that the apostle employs this term in order to designate something which was really the *proper due* of sin, viz., for the service of it; as the wages which a soldier earns by his hard military service, are properly his due. But on the other hand the reward of Christians is all of *grace*, not of *debt*; and so it is designated in the sequel by χάρισμα.

'Εν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν, i. e., through the redemption or atonement of Christ, iii. 23—26. v. 1, 8, 11, 17—19, 21.

CHAP. VII. 1—4.

THE variety of opinion respecting the first four verses in this chapter, is so great, and so many difficulties present themselves in the way of almost every exegesis which has hitherto been proposed, that one is strongly tempted to abandon the hope, that any thing can be offered which will be satisfactory to an enlightened and inquiring mind. After long and often-repeated study of these verses, however, I have come to the persuasion, that the difficulty with most commentators, lies principally in their insisting upon too minute comparison between the conjugal connection here mentioned, and the connection of Christians with the law. A minute and exact comparison cannot be made; for, (1) The apostle represents the *husband* as dying, and the *wife* as becoming *free* in consequence of his death. Then, (2) Christians are said to *die to the law* (not the law to them), and they are thus prepared to be affianced to Christ; i. e., the party who *dies* is, in this last case, represented as married to another; while, in respect to the literal conjugal union, it is of course only the party who *lives* that can be joined to another. This apparent *dissimilitude* between the two cases, has given great trouble to commentators; and in fact it appears inexplicable, unless we acquiesce in a mere general point of similitude as to the things compared, without insisting on minute and circumstantial resemblances.

Let us inquire first of all: What is the *object* of the writer in presenting the comparison before us? The answer is, to illustrate and defend the sentiment avowed in chap. vi. 14; viz. "For we are not under the law, but under grace." Those Christians who were inclined to be legalists, and to look for justification or sanctification (the latter is here the subject of the writer) by the law, and therefore to hold fast to the law as an adequate means of accomplishing this end, would easily take offence at such a declaration. 'What!' they would naturally say, 'does the gospel then absolve us from our relation to the law? Shall we throw by the ancient Scriptures as of no more use to us, because we now come under a new dispensation of grace?'

The apostle has prepared the way in chap. vi. 16—21, for the declaration which he is now about to make relative to this subject. He has there shown, as we have already seen, that a state of grace diminishes nothing of our obligation to refrain from sin; for by this very state are we made servants to righteousness; and the practice of holiness is at the same time urged upon us, by the prospect of a glorious reward, while the neglect of it is followed by endless misery. He now advances another step, and declares that we are "dead to the law," i. e., that the law is an *efficient means* of sanctification (which the legalist holds it to be), has been renounced by true Christians; for the death of Christ "who is the end of the law for righteousness to every one who believes," in whom, moreover, we profess to trust as the ground of our sanctification as well as justification, has placed us in a new relation as to adequate means of being sanctified, and freed us from the vain and deceptive hopes of legalists, who were leaning upon the law as the ground of sanctification and justification.

I have already stated reasons for supposing that the apostle is here speaking in particular of the law as an adequate means of *sanctification*; see the introduction to chap. vi. I merely remark here, that the close of ver. 4 shows very explicitly, that the special object which the apostle now considers as attainable by becoming dead to the law and affianced to Christ, is *ἐν ἡμῶν καρποφύσιν* τῇ θεῷ. Sanctification then, not justification (as many commentators suppose), is here the particular subject of the writer's attention.

Vers. 1—4 may rather be called an *illustration* of what the apostle had avowed in vi. 14. than an argument to establish the declaration there made. The simple basis of the whole comparison I understand thus: 'Brethren, you are aware that death, in all cases, dissolves the relation which exists between an individual and a law by which he was personally bound. For example: the conjugal law ceases to be in force, by the death of one of the parties. So it is in the case of Christians. They not only die to sin, i. e., renounce it, when they are baptized into the death of Christ, vi. 2—11; but they also die to the law at the same time, i. e., they renounce all their hopes and expectations of being sanctified by the law, so that sin will no more have dominion over them. They do, by the very fact of becoming real Christians, profess to receive Christ as their "wisdom, and justification, and sanctification" (δικαιοσύνη) and redemption, 1 Cor. 1. 30.

Let the reader consider, for a moment, the true nature of the declaration just quoted. Christ is our *wisdom*, i. e., our teacher, he who communicates the spiritual knowledge and light which we

need, "the light of the world." Christ is our *justification* (*δικαιοσύνη*); i. e., the meritorious cause, ground or author of it; comp. Rom. iii. 21—28. Christ is our *sanctification*; i. e., the author, cause, or ground of our sanctification, by what he has done in our behalf in order to ensure it. Christ is our *redemption* (*ἀπολύτρωσις*): i. e., he is (to sum up all in one word) the cause of our deliverance from the penalty and power of sin, and of our being brought to enjoy the glorious liberty of the children of God. The last word makes the climax of the whole sentence.

Christ then is as really and truly our *sanctification*, as he is our *justification*. If now, in despair of being justified by the law (for so we must be if we rightly view the subject), we go to Christ for justification, and receive him as our only Saviour, renouncing all merit of our own, and all hope of being saved by the law—If, I say, we feel and do all this, when we do renounce the law for ever as the ground of justification, and accept the gratuitous salvation which is proffered by Christ. In the same manner, when the sinner comes to an adequate and proper view of the strictness and purity of the divine law, and also to right views of the state of his own heart while in a natural condition, he will utterly abandon all hope of being sanctified by the law; for he will see, what Paul has so fully asserted in chap. vii. 5—11, 'that the law brings him (through his own fault indeed, but not the less surely because of this), into a state of deeper guilt and condemnation.' How then can the law be an adequate means of his *sanctification*? It is impossible; and the truly convicted sinner renounces all hope of this, and betakes himself to Christ and his salvation as the only ground of hope in this respect.

Here is the great difficulty, and here the solution of the whole passage must come in. Consider, for a moment, the true nature of the apostle's assertion, and no alarm need be felt as to the tendency of his sentiments. For what is it which he affirms in chap. vi. 14? It is, that "sin shall not have dominion over Christians, because they are not under the law but under grace." The *dominion or power* which sin is to have over Christians, is then the subject of his inquiry and of his assertions. So indeed the preceding context teaches; and so the subsequent context also. That we are *not under the law*, then, must of course mean, in this connection, that we are not under it as an efficacious or successful means of deliverance from the power of sin; for this it has never been, and cannot be, as chap. vii. 5—25 most fully shows. Christians are dead to the law, then, in this respect, viz., they renounce all hope of deliverance from the power of sin, through the law. It convinces, and condemns, and keeps up a continual struggle in the sinner's breast by awakening his conscience; but does not deliver, vii. 14—25, comp. viii. 3, 4. Consequently the true penitent, coming to feel its impotence as the means of delivering from the power of sin, renounces all hope of deliverance in this way, and gives himself up to Christ, as his *sanctification*, as well as his wisdom, justification, and redemption.

Now what is there in all this, which infringes on the obligation of moral precept contained in the law? Surely nothing. "The law is holy, and just, and good;" it is all summed up in the requisition, 'to love God with all our heart, and our neighbour as ourselves.' Will any one assert that Paul contends against this, after all that he has said in chaps. vi.—viii., relative to the Christian's obligation to renounce sin and live a holy life? Nothing can be farther from his intention. The only question that needs to be solved, in order to remove all difficulty is: In what sense does Paul say that we are *dead to the law*? This I have endeavoured to answer, by making the apostle his own expositor. The sum of the answer is, that as Christians renounce the law as an effectual means of *justification* (chaps. i.—iii.), so they must renounce it as an effectual means of *sanctification*. Christ is our only hope in this respect, as well as in the other. The grace of the gospel is the only effectual means by which we can hope successfully to resist sin and persevere in holiness.

And is not this true? Just as true as that Christ is the ground of our justification? I appeal, to chap. viii. 3, 4 for an exhibition of the sum of this sentiment; and to the whole of chaps. vi.—viii., and also to the experience and feelings of every truly enlightened and humble Christian on earth,—in confirmation of the same sentiment.

I acknowledge it is a truth often overlooked. Many a time have I read the epistle to the Romans, without obtaining scarcely a glimpse of it. When I ask the reason of this, I find it in neglect to look after the *general* object and course of thought in the writer. Special interpretation stood in the way of general views; the explanation of words hindered the discerning of the course of thought. And so I suppose it may be with many others. But now the whole matter appears

to me so plain, that I can only wonder that I have ever been in the dark respecting it. Luther and other Reformers saw what was so long hidden from me; and of late, Knapp, Tholuck, and many other commentators have explained the chapters in question in like manner as I now do. Reiche indeed has recently disclaimed and opposed this view; but I cannot think him to be in the right.

Having already given what I consider as the only defensible exposition of the similitude which the apostle employs in vers. 1—4, I merely advert to different expositions, ancient and modern. Augustine (Prop. 36): *Tria sint; anima tanquam mulier, passionem peccatorum tanquam vir, et lex tanquam lex viri*. Beza: "The old man is the wife, sinful desire the husband, sins the children." Origen, Chrysostom, Calvin, and others: "Men are the wife, the law the former husband, Christ the new one." This last explanation seems to accord substantially with ver. 4, in which Christians are represented as having become dead to their former husband, and affianced to a new one. In order to carry the figure regularly through, it would seem as if the law (the former husband) must be represented as dead, by which Christians would be at liberty to be joined to a new husband. But this the apostle does not say; probably because he thought the expression would give offence to the Jews. Yet he says what is tantamount to it; for if either of the parties in a conjugal union die, then each is dead to the law, and the law to them, i. e., the conjugal law has no more application or relation to them, it is annulled as to them. It matters not which party dies, so far as the law is concerned; for the law no longer controls him who dies. So in the case before us; one of the parties being dead, the conjugal relation ceases. A new connection, therefore, may be formed. But this last conclusion can be made out only on the ground, that 'dying to the law' is a figurative expression; which, indeed, no one will deny. If it is to be expounded by analogy with chap. vi. 1—11, we must construe it as meaning, 'the renunciation of all trust in the law as the efficient means of sanctifying the sinner.' When the awakened sinner comes to feel this sincerely and thoroughly, he is then prepared to be affianced to Christ, i. e., to receive him as his *sanctification* as well as his justification.

(1) **Ἡ ἀγνοίᾳ*; in sense the same as *οὐκ οἶδατε* in vi. 16; which see. **Ἡ*, *num*, *an*, merely a sign of interrogation here. Here, as in vi. 16, the writer means to say, that they well know, or that they will readily acknowledge, viz., that which he is about to state.—*Γινώσκουσιν* . . . *λαλῶ*, for *I address those who are acquainted with the law*, viz., the Mosaic law. The apostle may mean here, that he addresses the Jewish part of the Church at Rome, in a particular manner, in relation to what he is about to say; or what he says may imply, that the whole church had some acquaintance with the Old Testament Scriptures. In regard to this latter fact it may be said, that as the Old Testament was every where and continually appealed to by the primitive teachers of Christianity, and was moreover extant in the Greek language which was very generally understood at Rome, so it is altogether probable that the Roman Christians in general had an acquaintance with at least the leading features of the Mosaic system. However, I should consider it to be most probable, that he is here particularly addressing the Hebrew Christians. The reader will notice that the article is here omitted before *γινώσκουσιν*, where we should naturally expect it, and where it is usual to insert it. But it is not unfrequently omitted in these cases; N. Test. Gramin. § 144.

2. *Γὰρ, "rationem reddens,"* for if they were acquainted with the law they could not be ignorant of what the apostle supposes them to know.

**Ὅτι ὁ νόμος . . . ζῇ, that the law exercises control over a man as long as he lives.* The apostle means the Mosaic law here; but what he says is equally true of other laws of a permanent nature.—*Κυρίως, performs the office of κύριος, i. e., controls, is valid in respect to.* Not improbably the choice of this word was dictated by the *τῷ Κυρίῳ* of the preceding verse. It is as much as to say, that so long as we are affianced to the law, the law is our *κύριος*, and not Christ.—*Τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, THE man, i. e., the man who lives under it, not any man in general, but only one who holds such a relation.* Some interpreters here take *ἀνθρώπου* in the same sense as *ἀνδρός, i. e., husband.* But besides the want of *usus loquendi* in its favour, it may be said, that the proposition is evidently of a *general* nature, in respect to such individuals as lived under the Mosaic law.—*ζῇ* is rendered by Flatt and others, *IT lives, viz., the law.* But first how could this be? If the man dies, the law still lives as to others; it becomes inefficacious as to him, only by means of *his* death. It cannot die in any other way. Then secondly, what a tautology; The law is in force (*κυρίως*), as long as it is in force (*ζῇ*)! Is this the manner of Paul? Thirdly, the *ἀντὶς ζῶν* and *ἀποθανών* of verses 2, 3, clearly shows, that in ver. 1 *ἀνθρώπος* is the Nominative to *ζῇ*.

(2) *Ἡ γὰρ . . . νόμος, for the married woman is bound to her husband by the law, so long as he liveth.*—*ὑπανδρός*, a very expressive word, classical as well as Hellenistic, and like the Hebrew *תחת חמיו*, Num. v. 29. In the East, *ὑπανδρός* denotes a higher degree of disparity between husband and wife, than is admitted in the western world.—*Δίδεται νόμος* has a force also here, which commentators have generally overlooked. Under the Mosaic economy, the husband could divorce the wife almost at pleasure; but where is the precept giving the like liberty to the wife? This would have been contrary to the genius of eastern manners and customs. This seems to be the reason why the apostle has chosen the *woman*, in this case, in order to exhibit an example of obligation while the life of the parties continues.—*Γὰρ illustrantis*; and it might, as to sense, be well translated *for example.* The instance in verses 2, 3, seems to me very plainly to be a mere illustration of the general principle in ver. 1. Reiche has argued against this, but not in a satisfactory manner

Ἐὰν δὲ . . . ἀνδρός, but if her husband die, she ceases to be under the

conjugal law.—Κατήργηται when followed by ἀπό (as in the present case), means *to cease to belong to any one, to cease to be subject to his control*; comp. ver. 6 below, and Gal. v. 4. In the next verse we find ἐλευθέρᾳ ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, in the same sense as κατήργηται ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου in this. Œcumenius: κατήργηται ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπολείνεται, ἐλευθέρωνται. So the Hebrew מִן לְבַד is used.—Τοῦ ἀνδρός, Gen. of relation, viz., the law which related to her husband, i. e., the conjugal law which gave him power and right as a husband.

(3) Ἄρα οὖν . . . ἐτίθει, *therefore if she marry another, during her husband's life, she shall be called an adulteress*; i. e., it follows from the nature of her obligation, that she cannot be united with another man while her husband is living. Ἄρα οὖν, *so then*; an intensive form of particles designating conclusion.—Χρηματίσει, *she shall bear the name of, she shall receive the appellation of*. This usage of the word belongs to later classics; in which the verb puts the name called into the Nominative after it; ἐχρημάτιζε βασιλεύς, Diod. Sic. XX. 54.

Τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αὐτήν, *so that she shall not be*. The classic Greek would usually express this by ὥστε μὴ εἶναι αὐτήν. But Infinitives with τοῦ are very frequent in the Septuagint and in the New Testament; even in cases where, like the present, the *end* or *event* is designated by the article. In this respect τοῦ before the Infinitive resembles the Hebrew לְ, which expresses either *purpose, design*, or else *end, event*. N. Test. Gramm. § 138. 8.

(4) ὥστε (compounded of ὡς and τε) standing at the *beginning* of a sentence, must, according to Bretschneider, be rendered *igitur, quare*, i. e., *therefore, wherefore*. The true sense here indicated by it, however, seems to be *thus, or so that*; i. e., these things being so, you also have become dead to the law, in order that you might be affianced to Christ, &c. In other words; allowing that a new connection may be lawfully formed, after the death of one of the parties in the conjugal union, it follows that you, who have become dead to the law, i. e., wholly renounced it as an adequate means of sanctification, may be affianced solely to Christ, &c.—Καὶ ὑμεῖς, *you also*, i. e., you having become dead to the law may be affianced to another.

Τῷ νόμῳ, the Dative of *specification*, i. e., designating the particular thing in respect to which Christians have become dead; N. Test. Gramm. § 106. 1. The declaration that *they had become dead to the law*, is new in respect to *form*. *Dead to sin* the apostle has asserted them to be, in chap. vi.; he has also asserted that they are not ἡμῶς

νόμον, vi. 14. But that they were *dead* to the law, is a new expression and one which of course would need some explanation. The writer immediately subjoins one: *διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. He must of course mean the body of Christ as crucified, as having suffered in order to redeem us from the curse of the law; comp. Heb. x. 5—10. Col. i. 22. ii. 14. 1 Pet. ii. 24. Eph. ii. 15, which do not seem to leave any doubt with respect to the meaning of *σῶμα Χριστοῦ* here. As Christ, by his death, is made unto us “righteousness and sanctification, and redemption;” so it is his death which has opened such new prospects for perishing sinners, that they are enabled to look away from the law, and to renounce it as an effectual means of sanctification. Hence the apostle says: “Ye have become dead to the law, by the body of Christ.”

Εἰς τὸ γένεσθαι . . . ἡγεθῆντι, in order that ye should be [affianced] to another, who has risen from the dead; i. e., Christ has called you away from your vain hopes and expectations respecting what the law could accomplish as to purifying and saving you, and admitted you to participate in the blessed fruits of his death, viz., the gift of a sanctifying Spirit. But although by his *death* you are freed from the relation in which you once stood to the law as a means of sanctification, yet you are not affianced to him as being *dead*, but as being *risen from the dead*, as a conqueror who has burst the bars of death, and ascended to glory at the right hand of God the Father.

ἵνα . . . ὁσῶ, so that we may bring forth fruit to God; i. e., such fruit as God will accept. *ὁσῶ*, Dat. *commodi*. The reader will observe, that the last circumstance noted here is the climax of the figurative language used by the apostle. First, there is an annulling of a former marriage contract by the death of one of the parties; next, there is a new union; and lastly the fruits of this, and also the object of it, are designated. *To bring forth fruit for God* or *unto God*, is to live a holy life, to yield obedience unto his precepts, to act in such a manner as to do honour to him. Reiche says, that the whole of vers. 1—4 affords nothing more than a *subjective* argument; not an *objective* one; i. e., that the representations made are merely in the way of accommodation to Jewish views, and not as founded in the nature of things. But he seems to have mistaken the nature of the apostle's design. *Argument* in a strict sense, the passage does not contain, but merely *illustration*. The similarity between the two cases presented, rests partly on the nature of them, and partly on his own declarations. The case in regard to husband and wife, he

takes it for granted his readers will admit; the similarity of the Christian's case to this, rests in part on his own declaration or authority. Does this never supply the place of *formal* argument? Or are we to concede no *authority* to the apostle as to the determination of matters in religion? It is too true, alas, that Reiche does not appear to make any concessions of this nature.

CHAP. VII. 5, 6.

'BUT what if we are dead to the law?' the objector might here reply; 'what if, in our new relation, we are affianced in a peculiar manner to Christ; does it follow from this that the law was so inefficacious in itself for our sanctification, as you represent it to be? Nay, what you say implies even more; it implies that it is only in our new state of alliance to Christ, that we can *bring forth fruit to God*; and that, while under the law, no fruit but such as is of a contrary nature can be produced.'

At this crisis of the discussion, the apostle comes out with his last, highest, and boldest assertion concerning the law, as to its efficacy with respect to the point under consideration, viz., its efficacy to sanctify the hearts of sinners. His course of thought seems to be in substance as follows: 'I have said that you must be freed from the law and united to Christ, in order that you may bring forth fruit to God. This is true; for the law is so far from accomplishing the great end of subduing and sanctifying the hearts of sinners, that it occasions just the opposite effect, i. e., it is the occasion of their becoming more deeply involved in guilt, and of bringing them into more aggravated condemnation. It is the occasion of their *bringing forth fruit unto death*, and not unto God. But when we are freed from all reliance upon it as a means of subduing and sanctifying us, and with a becoming sense of our guilt and helplessness have betaken ourselves to Christ, and relied on him only as our "sanctification and redemption," then we are enabled to serve God with a new spirit, and not in the old way of only a literal and external obedience

These were propositions of a bold and startling nature to the Jewish legalist. Some formidable objections would at once rise up in his mind against them. The apostle fully anticipates this; and as we shall see in the sequel, occupies the remainder of chapter vii. in canvassing and answering them.

In the mean time let it be noted, that ver. 5 here is the theme of discussion through vers. 7—25 in the sequel; while ver. 6 (the antithesis of ver. 5) constitutes the theme of chap. viii. 1—11, which is in all important respects the antithesis of vii. 7—25. Knapp, Tholuck, Flatt, and other distinguished commentators, have seen and noted this; and in fact it lies on the face of the whole discussion, if the reader will only lay aside for a moment his attention to particular words and phrases, and look simply after the course of thought and reasoning which the apostle pursues.

(5) "Ὁτι γὰρ . . . σαρκί, for when we were in the flesh; i. e., when we were in our natural or carnal state. That such is the meaning of this expression, and that it is not to be *literally* taken here, is clear

from the *usus loquendi*; and from the nature of the case. From the first; because they who are *in the flesh*, as contrasted with τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, in chap. viii. 1—11, where vers. 7—9 put beyond all question what ἐν σαρκὶ εἶναι means. From the second; because the contrast in vers. 5, 6, is between the character which those whom the apostle addresses sustained *before* they became affianced to Christ, and that which they sustained *after* they were affianced to him. Of course ἐν σαρκὶ εἶναι must mean *to be in a natural or unregenerate state*, i. e., to be in that state in which men not yet united to Christ are.

Τὰ παθήματα . . . νόμου, *our sinful passions which were by the law; i. e., our sinful passions which were occasioned by the law*, ver. 11. —Τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, Gen. of attribute, *our passions which lead us to sin, our sinful passions*.—Τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου [sc. ὄντα or γεγονότα], *which were by the law*; not, as Chrysostom and Carpov, τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου [φανόμενα or γνωστά], *which were shown or disclosed by the law*; and not as Locke (Comm. on Romans), *that remained in us under the law*, who construes διὰ νόμου as διὰ conditionis, viz., we being in a law state. To both of these methods of commentary ver. 12 is an unanswerable objection, as it is the author's commentary upon his own words. Moreover, the laws of language forbid the exegesis of Mr. Locke; for to make the sense which he gives, the Greek must be; ἡμεῖς διὰ τοῦ νόμου ὄντες, not τὰ [παθήματα] διὰ τοῦ νόμου.

Ἐνεργεῖτο . . . θανάτῳ, *put forth their energy in our members, to bring forth fruit unto death*. Ἐνεργεῖτο, vim suam exerebat, *efficax fuit*. We must refer it to the Middle voice in order to make out the proper sense, which is *active*.—Ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν, the same in sense as σῶμα θνητόν in vi. 12, as may be seen by comparing ver. 23 below. Μίλη is used as an equivalent for σῶμα, because the *members* of the body are its efficient agents in doing any thing.

Such was the influence of our *sinful passions*, τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου, that the consequences were fatal. Our fruit was *unto death*, i. e., was such as turned to the account of death, such as brought us under its power or subjected us to it. The Dat. τῷ θανάτῳ is a kind of Dat. *commodi*; as expressed in the paraphrase above. Θάνατος is here used in the way of personification, and put in antithesis to Θεῷ in ver. 4.

(6) Thus much, then, for the influence of the law upon us in our natural state. It was utterly unable to effect our renewal and sanctification; nay, it did but aggravate our guilt and condemnation, instead of delivering us from them. It is only in our new state and

under our new affiance, that we are enabled to bring forth fruit of a different kind.

Νυνὶ δὲ . . . νόμου, *but now being freed from the law*; i. e., no longer placing our reliance on it as a means of subduing and sanctifying our sinful natures. For the sense of κατηγγήθημεν, compare κατήγγηται ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου in ver. 2 above.

Ἀποθανόντες is a controverted reading; and there are some variations in the manuscripts. But the weight of external evidence is greatly in its favour; and the internal evidence seems to be quite conclusive. The sentiment of it is exactly the same, as that of θανάτωθητε τῷ νόμῳ in ver. 4 above. Here the *first* person plural is used, —and there the *second*; but this changes not the nature of the sentiment. The full construction here would seem to be: ἀποθανόντες [ἐκείνῳ] ἐν ᾧ κατεχόμεθα. A goodly number of authorities, viz., D., E., F., G., Vulg., It., Codd. apud Rufin., read τοῦ θανάτου here instead of ἀποθανόντες. R. Simon and Reiche prefer this reading.—The verb κατέχω means *to hold back, to retain, to hold firmly, &c.* Here κατεχόμεθα must mean, the holding as it were in a state of bondage, from which the gospel frees. Ἐν ᾧ, i. e., ἐν ᾧ νόμῳ.

The sense of the whole may be made more facile by a different arrangement: *but now being dead [to the law], we are freed from the law by which we were held in bondage.*

Ὡστε . . . γράμματος, *so that we may now serve [God] in a new and spiritual manner, and not in the old and literal one.* That Θεῷ is to be understood after δουλεύειν, seems certain from the nature of the antithesis, and from comparing vers. 4, 5.—Πνεύματος I take to be the Gen. of attribute or explanation. Ἐν καινότητι πνεύματος, *in a newness of a spiritual kind, i. e., in a new and spiritual manner.* So παλαιότητι γράμματος designates the former method of *literal external obedience*, which the Jews endeavoured to render to the law while ἐν σαρκί. There was no heart in it. *God is a Spirit*; and he must be worshipped ἐν πνεύματι. But this command is obeyed, only when there is a “new heart and a right spirit” in men; and this is not until they become affianced to Christ. “The law,” says Calvin, “puts a check upon our external actions; but it does not in the least restrain the fury of our concupiscence.”

CHAP. VII. 7—12.

We must expect the legalist to rise up with not a little excitement against the declaration of the apostle, viz., τὰ καθήματα τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου. 'What! then,' he would at once say, 'are we to believe that the holy and perfect law of God is not only incompetent to sanctify us, but that it is even the occasion of our being greater sinners than we should otherwise be? Can it be lawful or proper to make such an insinuation as this? Is the law sin?'

To this objection the apostle now replies; and replies in such a way as to show, that while he fully maintains his ground, viz., that the law is the occasion of greatly aggravating our guilt and condemnation, still the fault lies in us, and not in the law; for this is altogether worthy of approbation and obedience, because it is "holy, just, and good." This is at once a delicate and difficult part of the apostle's discourse, and it is managed with great skill and effect. How often it has been misunderstood, and construed so as to be irrelevant to the object which the writer has in view, will be better seen in the sequel. In the mean time, I must beg the reader to dismiss every thing from his mind but the simple desire to know what the verses before us mean, when explained by the object of the writer, the nature of the connection in which they stand, and the language which is employed.

(7) Τί οὖν . . . ἀμαρτία; *What shall we say then? Is the law sin?* Language of the objector, in opposition to what the apostle has said in verse 5.—'Αμαρτία, from the necessity of the case must here mean, *the cause of sin*. So Mic. i. 5, "What is the *transgression* of Jacob? Is it not Samaria?" i. e., what is the cause of Jacob's transgression, &c.? Eph. ii. 16, "having slain the *enmity* thereby," i. e. the cause of enmity. To give ἀμαρτία a different sense here, would be inept.

Μὴ γένοιτο is the answer of the apostle. He means by it wholly to deny the charge involved in the previous question, in the sense in which the legalist supposed the charge might be made, viz., that the law was the efficient cause or the sinful cause of our sin, and that our guilt might be justly put to the account of the law. So much is plain from the sequel. But he does not mean to deny, that there is a sense in which the law is connected with our sins, and that it is the occasion of their being aggravated, rather than the efficient means of our being sanctified. Ἀλλὰ intimates, that the apostle allows of some exceptions to the universal sense of μὴ γένοιτο. It is frequently employed, as here, after negative assertions, in order to indicate that there is some limitation or qualification of them to be made. The course of thought runs thus: 'The law is not the sinful or efficient cause of sin, in the sense that you suppose; but still there is a sense in which the law is the occasion of sin.' What this is, the writer goes on to describe.

Τὴν ἁμαρτίαν . . . νόμῳ, *I had not known sin except by the law.* By what law? As a general proposition, it would be true as to the law of nature or of revelation. "Where there is no law, there is no transgression," Rom. iv. 15. When the apostle (Rom. i.—ii.) speaks of the Gentiles as sinners, he makes them offenders against the law of nature written upon their hearts, Rom. ii. 14, 15; and when he convicts the Jews of guilt, he represents them as offending against revelation. What is said in the verse before us, if understood in a general way, might be explained and defended, then, on general principles. But plainly this is not the object of the writer here. He is controverting the *legalists*. And who are they? *Jews*, not Gentiles: at least, they usually were not Gentiles. It is the *Jewish* law, then, to which he here adverts.

But in what sense would he *not have known sin, except by the law*? Surely the Gentiles were sinners, who had no revelation; as he has abundantly shown in chaps. i. ii. This consideration leads us of course to say, that the meaning of *known* (ἐγνων) is a *qualified* and *comparative* one, in the present passage. The meaning must be that he would not have known sin in any such manner and measure as he then actually did, had it not been for the law. In this idea is included, not a mere theoretical and as it were scientific knowledge of it, but that knowledge which is derived from experience, and experience in a high degree. The explanation subjoined in verse 8, appears to leave no room to doubt this exegesis. The simple explanation of the whole seems to be this: 'Unless the law had put restraint upon sinning, I should never have known how great my wickedness is, or how much propensity to evil I have. The restraints of the law galled my evil passions, and they broke out with redoubled violence; and in this way I have come, from bitter experience, to know much more of the nature and extent of my sinfulness. I should never have known to what extent I was capable of going had not the restraints of the law brought me to a full development of myself. I was excited by the check which they put upon me; and I acted out myself in such a manner as I never should have otherwise done; and in this way I have come to know my sinfulness, through the law. In this way πᾶσα ἐπιθυμία (verse 8) was wrought in me, so that I have a knowledge of sin such as I never should have acquired in any other way.'

In this compound sense of fuller development and (through this) of more complete means of knowledge, does the apostle appear to

affirm that he has acquired a knowledge of sin by the law. Verses 7 and 8 taken together (and so they should be), can leave no room to doubt, that it is not merely the instruction which the law gives concerning the nature of sin, which the apostle aims here to describe; but a knowledge which is acquired (as described in verse 8), by an experimental acquaintance with sin; which had been heightened to so great a degree by the restraints of law, as to place the subject of it in such a condition as to practical knowledge with regard to his own sinfulness, as nothing else could have brought about.

On any other ground of exegesis, the connection between verses 7 and 8 must be virtually broken up. The connection is thus: 'I had not known sin, as I now do, except by the law; but now I do so know it, because the law has brought out all my sinful nature in opposition to it, which would otherwise have never so developed itself.' But if we understand verse 7 as a mere eulogy of the law, on account of the light which it gives (as not a few commentators have deemed it to be); then in what respect is verse 8 the antithesis of verse 7? That antithesis or distinction is intended, the *δέ* in verse 8 here clearly shows. The true nature of the antithesis seems to be this: 'I had not well known sin, except by the law; but now I do so know it on account of the law.' Verse 8 shows how and why the sinner comes thus to know it, and that it is in an experimental way.

Τὴν τε γὰρ . . . ἐπιθυμίαις, for *I had not known even lust, unless the law had said: Thou shalt not lust.* *Γὰρ confirmantis* here; i. e., it is placed at the head of a clause designed to confirm and strengthen the preceding assertion. The second clause is an assertion of the same general nature with the first, excepting merely that it is in emphasis more intense. *Ἐπιθυμία* is a word for which we have no equivalent in our language, when it means, as it here does, *unlawful* or *sinful desire* in general, i. e., desire of what would be in any way injurious to our neighbour. The reference in the mind of the writer appears plainly to have been to Ex. xxix. 14, *לֹא תִחְמֹד* &c.; which is well rendered: *Thou shalt not covet*, i. e., *shalt not inordinately desire*; but which is rendered in Greek by *ὅχι ἐπιθυμίαις*, *thou shalt not desire inordinately, thou shalt not lust after or covet.* The misfortune is, that we have no English noun that corresponds well to the *generic* sense of the verb *covet*; for *covetousness* means a *greedy appetite for wealth*; and *lust* means (at least as now employed), *impure desire*. We must then paraphrase *ἐπιθυμία* and render it *inordinate desire*,

forbidden desire. The word, it is true, sometimes means *unlawful sensual desire*; but plainly it is not here limited to a meaning so circumscribed. The reference to Ex. xx. 14, forbids this supposition, as well as the nature of the case.

Τί has given trouble to the critics here. How it differs from καί may be seen in Bretschn. Lex. τί. When employed alone (as here), it is used to join those things which in their own nature are united and naturally follow each other; or those which, for some other reasons, must be associated together. It is also employed in clauses annexed (as here) for the sake of illustration or confirmation. Here the last of these reasons seems to apply. Ἐπιθυμία, in the sense which it here has, is a *species* under the *genus* ἁμαρτία. The general principle is illustrated, then, by this particular sin which the law inhibits. The genius of our language does not permit us to translate τί here, without doing injury to the mode of expression, if not to the sense. In Greek it affords a sign to the reader, that he is to connect the clause in which it stands with the preceding one.

That the whole is here to be understood in a *comparative* sense, is a clear case. If no revelation had ever been given to the Jews, then, like the Gentiles, they would have had the law of nature to guide and check them, Rom. ii. 14, 15. In the *absolute* sense, then, the apostle cannot be supposed to speak. The writer means: 'I had not so known sin as I now know it, except by the law.' A complete and full illustration and vindication of such a comparative sense, may be found in John xv. 22—24; which the reader is desired attentively to consult.

(8) This verse explains *how* the law has been the occasion of promoting the knowledge of sin, in the sense which the writer here means to convey. Ἀφορμὴν δὲ . . . ἐπιθυμίαν, *but sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought out in me all manner of inordinate desire.*—Κατεργάσατο, *wrought out*; it is more than εἰργάσατο, and means *more fully to complete, develope, or accomplish.*—ἁμαρτία is here *personified*. It cannot mean simply *sinful desires or affections*; for these are affirmed to be the *effect* of its influence or operation. Nor can it be what is called *actual sin*; for this again is the *effect* of its operations. It would seem, therefore, that the *personification* of sin in this case must answer to the ἐγὼ σαρκίος and πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν of verse 14 seq.; in other words, that it stands for the *carnal man*, as such, who is opposed to the divine law, and who is roused by its prohibitions and threatenings to more active engagement in

the commission of sin. Accordingly, while *ἀμαρτία* is employed in the way of personification in verses 8—13, in the sequel *ἐγὼ σαρκικός*, for the most part takes its place. If the reader feels that there is any incongruity in such a use of *ἀμαρτία* here, and that it will be difficult to adjust all which is affirmed of it to the supposition that it stands for *ἐγὼ σαρκικός*, he must call to mind, that something must of course be allowed to the liberty and congruity of *prosopopeia*. It is in fact the *carnal I* which rouses up the passions, and which is the cause of all the evil that follows. And if the whole passage relates to the experience of *Christians* (as some suppose), even then it is the remains of the *carnal I* in them, which occasions all the evil. But how or why did sin take occasion by the commandment to produce all manner of inordinate desires? The apostle does not definitely answer this question, but leaves it to be supplied, as a matter of course, by his readers. What then is the principle in human nature, which he seems to consider so obvious as to need no mention? It is the one, I answer, to which I have already more than once adverted; viz., that opposition to the desires and passions of unsanctified men, inflames them and renders them more intense and unyielding. So most of the commentators. Calvin: *Neque inficior quum acrius a lege exstimuletur caro ad concupiscendum.—Per legem inestigatur cupiditas nostra, ut in majorem ebulliat insaniam.—Vitiosa hominum natura, cujus perversitas ac libido, quo magis justitiæ repagulis coerceretur, eo furiosius erumpit* (in ver. 5). Chrysostom: *Ὅταν γὰρ τις ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, εἴτα κωλυόμεθα, αἴρεται μᾶλλον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἡ φλόξ, when we covet any thing, and are hindered from obtaining it, the flame of our inordinate desire is the more augmented.* Erasmus: *Universa cupiditatum cohors irritata, prohibitione cœpit acrius ad peccandum sollicitare.* A most striking and melancholy example in point is, that prohibition and penalty were not sufficient, even in paradise, to prevent our first parents from ruining themselves and all their posterity.

The very heathen fully acknowledged the principle in question; so plainly is it a part of our nature. Thus Cato (*Liv. xxxiv. 4*) says of *luxury*, *Non mota, tolerabilior esset quam erit nunc; ipsis vinculis, sicut fera bestia, irritata deinde emissa.* Seneca: *Parricidæ cum lege cœperunt, de Clem. I. 23.* Horace: *Audax omnia perpeti, gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas, Carm. I. 3.* Ovid: *Nitimur in vetitum semper cupimusque negata, Amor. III. 4.* To the like purpose is *Prov. ix. 17*: *Stolen waters are sweet, and bread eaten in*

secret is pleasure. Now as this is an obvious principle of a corrupt natural state, and will account for the fact which the apostle has asserted in the text, we may adopt the conclusion that it lies at the ground of his assertion. Ἀμαρτία, therefore, as here employed in the way of personification, designates the ἐγὼ σαρκικός.

Observe the strength of the expression, διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς . . . ἐπιθυμίαν; as much as to say, 'Sin, i. e., my disposition to sin, did not simply produce ἐπιθυμίαν, i. e., some inordinate desire that would lead to the commission of evil—but πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν, every kind of inordinate desire, a great variety of evil passions.' To account for this, we must resort to the principle already stated. It should be noted here, also, that in this way it was, that the law became the occasion of his obtaining a knowledge of sin, which he would otherwise never have acquired. So the sequel intimates:

Χωρὶς γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία νεκρά, *for without the law sin is dead; i. e., comparatively sluggish and inoperative; comp. James ii. 17, 26, τίς τις νεκρά.* Χωρὶς νόμου is equivalent to μὴ ὄντος νόμου, i. e., there being no law. That such must be the sense, the preceding declaration shows; the amount of which is, that 'sin did by the commandment produce all kinds of inordinate desire in him.' Now if this be correct, then sin, without such commandment, i. e., without such an occasion of producing πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν, would be comparatively inoperative. For the comparative sense of the whole passage the reader is again referred to John xv. 22—24. That the apostle could not mean to be understood in the absolute sense, is plain from chap. i. ii., where the Gentiles are charged with sin, who nevertheless are without the particular law here spoken of, i. e., without a revelation. In the absolute sense, the time never has been, and never can be, when men are *without the law*. "The heathen, who have no [written] law, are a law unto themselves." No individual, at any period of his life when he is capable of moral action, can be said to be without law in the absolute sense; for the law always exists, independently of this or that individual. The meaning of Paul, then, according to the views which he himself inculcates, must be this, viz., that before an individual has any particular and definite views of the nature and extent of the divine law as to its prohibitions and penalties. When these first come home to his mind with power, then it is that he, through enmity and opposition to them, plunges deeper than ever into sin, and becomes at the same time more consciously guilty.

Reiche places the law here, *i.e.*, the Mosaic law, in opposition to the *patriarchal* state before the law was given; and throughout this whole comparison, he makes the *ἡὺς ἀσεβείς* to be the *wicked* portion of the Jewish community, and the *ἡ ἰσὺ ἀνθρώπου* to mean the *good* part of it; a supposition that must be involved in many serious difficulties, and one which seems to me liable to overwhelming objections. One only of these appears to be sufficient; which is, that in this way, the argument of the apostle is rendered nerveless and inapposite. For what is his object? Plainly to show, that the law is utterly inadequate of itself to the sanctification and salvation of men, inasmuch as it in fact (such is the perverted use they make and will make of it) only serves to plunge them into deeper guilt, and to aggravate their offences. Now how can this be illustrated and enforced by saying, that sinners in ancient times made a bad use of the law, and saints approved of it and consented to it? It can be shown only by an exhibition of the fact, that no man, *simply under the law*, has escaped or will be delivered from the power and penalty of sin. Why? Because the disposition he has to sin is roused up into greater activity by the restrictions of the law, to the holy nature of which he is opposed; and, notwithstanding all the remonstrances of reason and conscience against this course of conduct, and in spite of the testimony which they bear in favour of the holiness and justice and goodness of the law, he who is under the law merely, goes on in sin, and will do so, until *grace* arrests his course, and “frees him from the law of sin and death,” viii. 2. How all this can be shown, by averring merely that sinners of old were rendered more sinful by the Mosaic law, while saints approved it and consented to it, I do not see. It is plainly a contest in the breast of the same individual which the apostle designs to represent; and he shows that, with all which reason and conscience aided by the law can do for him, there is no hope of salvation except through the grace of the gospel. How can a matter so plain and apposite to the apostle’s purpose be overlooked?

It is singular, also, that not only Reiche, but Glöckler likewise, represents *ἀμαρτία* in this verse as meaning *actual sin*, and not a disposition to sin or *vitiositas*. Actual sin, they say, produces sinful desires; and these again produce sinful actions in their full development; and thus comes the train of evils which the apostle here adverts to. But whence the *mother sin*? we may well ask; and this of course is a question which renders the whole of this theory quite

improbable. It is true, beyond all doubt, that sins of action do beget various lusts, and nearly always do this; and these in their turn develop themselves in action. But the apostle is speaking here of something in us which is roused up by the law to produce *inordinate desires*, which then bring forth death. Now what is that *originally*, if it be not the native disposition that we have to be excited by sinful objects, and to oppose holy ones; and which we, since the fall of Adam, possess in a measure that is sure to triumph over all the restraints of the divine law, and of reason and conscience, which testify in its favour, and remonstrate against our evil passions? I must believe, with the great mass of commentators, that *ἀμαρτία* here is a personification of the disposition. The theory of Reiche and Glöckler, in this case, seems to me to involve a real ὁστέρον πρότερον.

(9) Ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων . . . πρὶν for *I was alive once, without the law.* A difficult and much controverted phrase. The δὲ presents obstacles in the first place. Is it δὲ *orationi continuandæ inserviens*, or δὲ *discretiva* vel *disjunctiva*? The first, I answer; but it belongs to that species of usage which inserts δὲ before an additional *explanation*; "accuratius definit," Bretsch. Lex. In such a case δὲ may be rendered *moreover, besides*. Δὲ might be rendered *for*, inasmuch as the connection in which it stands often entitles us so to render it (see Passow's Lex.); yet here I have the impression that verse 9 is not *subordinate* to the last clause in verse 8, but *co-ordinate*. The last clause in verse 8 asserts, that *sin is dead without the law*, while verse 9 declares that when the law came, sin developed itself with power; with which declaration it also connects other additional circumstances.

The ἐγὼ here must of course mean *another self* different from the one which ἀμαρτία designates in the verse above. I hesitate, however, whether we should here construe it as designating merely *self*, i. e., I myself as a person or individual, taken in the usual sense and without reference to another and different self; or whether the ὁ ἰσὼ ἄνθρωπος (verse 22) should be here regarded as constituting the ἐγὼ. On the whole I incline to the former, for two reasons; (1) Because the antithetic ἐγὼ seems not to be introduced until verse 14 seq. (2) What is said in the sequel of the verse would seem rather to belong to the whole person, to the man as man, than merely to the ὁ ἰσὼ ἄνθρωπος in the limited sense in which Paul uses this phrase in the sequel.

Ἐζων is plainly used here in a *comparative* sense; and moreover

used *figuratively* not literally. It seems clear that the occasion of employing it is the preceding *νεκρά*, to which *ἔζων* of course is the direct antithesis. To find out the full meaning of this antithesis, then, we must revert to *ἀμαρτία νεκρά*. This, we have seen, must be taken in the *comparative* sense, viz., as indicating the comparatively inactive power and influence of sin, before an individual has a definite apprehension of the prohibitions and penalties of the divine law. *ἔζων*, then, characterises the state of such a man, by affirming that of him which is opposite to that which is affirmed of *ἀμαρτία*. Now as sin is declared in the condition supposed, to be comparatively inoperative or dead, so the man himself is comparatively without sin, or (in other words) alive; just as when our Saviour says of the Jews, 'If I had not come and spoken to them, *they had not had sin.*' To say that sin is *dead*, and to say that the man is *alive* evidently means for substance one and the same thing. So the sequel leads us plainly to interpret this passage; for the apostle immediately asserts, that as soon as sin *gathered new life* (*ἀνέζησεν*) the man died (*ἐγὼ ἀπέθανον*.) Now what was this *death*, except to come under the active and predominating power and penalty of sin? What then must be the *life*, (*ἔζων*), in this case, but to be free from such a state? But then—the whole is beyond all doubt to be taken in a *comparative* sense. For what is the apostle labouring to prove? Not that a man must be under the Jewish or revealed law (for that is the law here designated), in order that he should be a sinner; for how could this agree with chap. i. ii., where he labours to convict the Gentiles of sin? He is labouring here to show, that the law, instead of sanctifying and saving men, is, through their abuse of it, the means of plunging them deeper in guilt. In other words; the Jewish law, to which so many are prone to look as the means of safety and sanctification, does actually serve, under the present circumstances and condition of men, to render them more guilty than they would otherwise have been. Of course then the *ἔζων* here must have a sense which is comparative, and is fitted for the object and aim of the writer; and this can be nothing more nor less than to say, that before an individual has a distinct and vivid perception of the nature and spirituality and extent of the divine law, he is less active and desperate in his sin and guilt than after he comes to such a knowledge. And thus explained, all is easy, natural, and coherent. The reader cannot fail to observe, also, how exactly this sentiment parallelises with that in chap. iii. 20, where Paul declares, that "the law entered so that sin

would or should abound." It is the *unabounding* state of it, then, which is described in our text by ἐγὼ ἐζῶν.

The various solutions given by commentators may now be briefly subjected to the reader's view. Calvin, Augustine, and others, have advanced the opinion, that ἐζῶν here means : 'I deemed myself alive once,' i. e., before I understood the spirituality and extent of the law. But in such a case, if we will go through with the exegesis, we shall see at once the insuperable difficulty which attends it. For example : 'I once deemed myself spiritually alive ; but when I came under conviction by the law, a sense of sin revived and I was brought to deem myself spiritually dead (so far all seems well) ; 'and the commandment which was designed to give life, proved to be deadly (εἰς θάνατον) to me ;' it was deadly to me, because it brought me under real and true conviction as to my desperate spiritual condition ! Is this then the way in which the law of God proves *fatal* to the sinner, viz., by convincing him of the true and deadly nature of sin ?*

Bretschneider and others understand ἐζῶν here in the simple sense of *degere vitam*, to exist or be for any length of time. But the nature of the antithetic language here does not seem to permit this ; for in the sequel ἀπέθανον is plainly opposed to ἐζῶν here ; but ἀπέθανον cannot be the antithesis of ἐζῶν taken in the sense of *vitam degerebam*, for then ἀπέθανον must mean *physical* death ; which surely is not the sense of it there.

* Mr. Barnes in his recent Commentary, agrees with Calvin in construing ἐγὼ ἐζῶν as meaning, 'I deemed myself alive ;' yet in giving the exegesis of ἐγὼ ἀπέθανον which immediately follows, he says : "I was by it involved in additional guilt and misery." At the same time he remarks in the very next sentence, that ἐγὼ ἀπέθανον "stands opposed to ἐγὼ ἐζῶν." In this last particular he is beyond all doubt correct ; but then, if ἐγὼ ἐζῶν means only a *putative* living, or 'I thought myself to be alive,' of course ἐγὼ ἀπέθανον, on his own ground, must mean a *putative* death, or 'I thought or deemed myself to be dead.' I see no escape from this on the ground of philology and exegesis. And this admitted, we must come to the singular conclusion, that the law ruins sinners by bringing them under a sense of their guilt and condemnation. Indeed, he himself suggests that ἐγὼ ἀπέθανον may include the sentiment, that 'the converted sinner is humbled, subdued, melancholy, helpless,' i. e., that he is brought to a feeling and proper sense of all this by the law. But if this be true, how can the commandment be εἰς θάνατον ? How could the apostle say, that "he was slain διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς ?" Are men led εἰς θάνατον by being "humbled and subdued ?" A mind so lucid and powerful as that of this excellent writer, cannot fail to perceive that there are incongruities in such a mode of interpretation ; while, by the exegesis as given above, the antithesis is made out in the most simple way, and all is plain and easy. At all events, I am unable to hesitate, in a case which seems to be so obvious ; and the phraseology here in question, is that which must give a hue to the interpretation of all the rest of this chapter.

As to the question, *When* was the period of being *χωρὶς νόμου*? Augustine, Origen, Ernesti, Morus, and others, suppose that the apostle means the period of *infancy*; Luther, Ammon, and others, the period before he was taught by Gamaliel; Theodoret supposes he alludes to his pre-existence in Adam! Calvin and Beza seem plainly to have hit nearest to the point; “Intellige legem venisse, cum ab eo cœpit intelligi.” It seems plain, that Paul must mean some application of the law to himself in a new manner, or in a way different from any which he had before experienced. *When* this was, he does not say. We may suppose it to be in childhood, or in riper years. The principle is the same. Whenever the law of God was pressed on his mind and conscience with such a weight and power that he could not dismiss attention to its demands, then began his active and increased opposition to it. Before this, sin was comparatively dead. Now it revived in all its strength, and brought him into deeper guilt and more aggravated condemnation.

The *δέ* after *ἐλθούσης* is *discretive*; for that part of the sentence which follows is placed in antithesis with the preceding clause.—‘*ἁμαρτία ἀνίζησι*, *sin revived or flourished*. ‘*Ἀναζέω* means *to gather new life, to show additional vigour*; and such is clearly the sense here, as it does not mean merely a *renewal* of a life which had before existed. The expression itself is plainly one which the writer uses as equivalent to *ἁμαρτία . . . κατεργάσατο ἐν ἐμοὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν*, in the preceding verse. As there ‘all manner of inordinate desire is said to have wrought *διὰ τῆς ἐπιτολῆς*,’ so here the consequence of *ἐλθούσης τῆς ἐπιτολῆς*, is, that *sin becomes more vigorous*.

(10) ‘*Εγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον*, *but I died*. The *δέ* may be here regarded as *discretive*, *i. e.*, = *but*, because *ἀπέθανον* is the antithesis of *ἀνίζησι*; yet I am rather inclined to consider it as simply the sign of adding another circumstance to the one which precedes it.—‘*Ἀπέθανον*, *I died*, *i. e.*, I fell under sentence of death or came into a state of death; for “the soul that sinneth shall die,” “the wages of sin is death.” So plainly the next clause explains it, where the death incurred is placed in opposition to the life which obedience to the whole law would ensure. But then there is plainly an intensive sense to be attached here to the word *ἀπέθανον*; just as there is to the word *ἀνίζησθαι*. The apostle means to say (as ver. 8 shows), that sin put forth fresh vigour when the commandment came; consequently he incurred *aggravated* guilt; and aggravated condemnation must necessarily follow. It also lies on the face of the whole, that the writer designs

to convey the idea, that the law, instead of affording sanctification and deliverance from sin, is the occasion of aggravating both guilt and condemnation. So he had intimated in vi. 14; and so he here proves the fact to be.

Καὶ εὐρέθη . . . εἰς θάνατον, and the commandment which was designed [to bestow] life, the same was found to be unto death—Καὶ εὐρέθη κ. τ. λ. is evidently a clause added for the sake of intensity and variety of expression—an epexegetical of ἀπέθανον, with the addition of a new circumstance. In saying ἐντολὴ εἰς ζωὴν, there was a reference in the mind of the writer to such passages of the Old Testament as the following: "My statutes . . . which if a man do he shall even live by them," Ezek. xx. 11, 13, 21. Lev. xviii. 5, et alibi. Μοί is, in point of sense, to be construed after θάνατον, and is a Dat. *incommodi*; comp. verse 13, and see N. Test. Gramm. § 104. 2. Note 1.

(11) A repetition of the same sentiment verses 8, 9, with some characteristic of the manner in which sin performed its deadly work.—Ἡ γὰρ . . . ἀπίκτεινε, for sin taking occasion by the commandment deceived me, and by it slew me. Γάρ confirmantis; for the sequel shows how the commandment came εἰς θάνατον to him. In respect to ἀφορμὴν λαβοῦσα, see ver. 18. The occasion afforded, was the circumstance that the law restrained evil passions; which, in a graceless state of the heart, aggravates opposition to it.—Διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς must mean, through the law as an *occasional* instrument or cause; not by it as the *efficient* cause of sin, which the sequel denies the law to be.—Ἐξήπατησέ με seems to mean the deceit which our sinful passions practise upon us, by leading us to regard all restraint of them as unreasonable and oppressive, and to feel that we are in the right when we resist such restraint. The consequences of such a feeling will be, to obey our passions and not the law. Of course *we are slain* by such deceit; it leads us to plunge into ruin.—Δι' αὐτῆς must mean δι' ἐντολῆς. In what sense sin slays through the commandment, has been once and again stated.

(12) Ὡστε ὁ μὲν . . . ἀγαθὴ, so that the law is holy, and the commandment holy and just and good. Ὡστε at the beginning of a sentence, is rendered *quare, itaque, igitur*, by Bretschneider, (Lex.) The true force of it seems to be *so that, i. e.*, things being as I have said, it follows, that, &c. In consequence of such a connection, ὥστε may be rendered *wherefore, therefore*; for it is, in the classics, not unfrequently employed as an *intensive* particle of conclusion.—Μὲν is difficult of

grammatical solution here. Taken as the usual sign of *protasis*, where (we may ask) is the *apodosis*? Καὶ ἡ ἐντολὴ κ. τ. λ. will not make one, for it is merely expegetical of ὁ νόμος ἅγιος. Bretschneider (Lex.) says, that μέν here cannot be translated. Be it so; it must be true, I think, that the writer had some apodosis in his mind when he employed it. I know it is often the case, in the Greek classics, that μέν is employed without any subsequent apodosis being expressed. But is it used unless one is *implied*? I think not. What then is the implied apodosis here? We may probably supply it from verse 13; and if so, it would seem to be this: ἀμαρτία δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ κατεργαζομένη θάνατον διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νόμου. Rückert makes the implied apodosis to be, ὁ δὲ Ἰουδαῖος κακὸς καὶ ἄδικος.

It will be perceived, that the present verse is not a regular *logical* deduction from the preceding verses. The writer means to say, that the view which he has taken of the case is such, on the whole, that the excellence and purity of the law stand entirely unimpeached. The law is indeed the *occasion*, but it is the *innocent* occasion, of sin. It is the abuse of it which makes men sinners. It is their evil passions which convert what in its own nature tends to life, into an instrument of death. The reason of repeating both νόμος and ἐντολὴ here, seems to be, that both had been employed in the preceding illustration; see verses 7—10. If there be any difference between the two words, it must be this, viz., that νόμος is the generic appellation of the divine law, $\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$: while ἐντολὴ corresponds to $\epsilon\pi\iota\lambda\eta$, i. e., any particular precept. As used by the writer, however, no difference seems to be here intended. Ἁγία means *holy*, free from all moral defect, free from sin, opposed to sin. Δικαία, agreeable to δίκη, i. e., promoting justice and punishing sin. Ἀγαθή, good in its object and end, tending to secure the ends of benevolence. The most appropriate to the apostle's purpose here of all the qualities which he mentions, is that of *holiness*. Hence, ὁ νόμος ἅγιος and ἡ ἐντολὴ ἁγία.

Thus much in vindication of the sentiment, that the law is the occasion of our guilt being aggravated instead of delivering us from it. The vindication of that character of the law as now stated in verse 12, follows next. But before we proceed to consider this, we must endeavour to solve some questions which naturally arise here.

The reader has doubtless perceived, that I suppose the apostle to be here speaking of himself when in a *legal* state or under the law, and before he was spiritually united to Christ. This I must, on the

whole, believe to be the case. In support of this view many reasons may be offered; but some of them I must defer to the close of the whole chapter. It is sufficient for my present purpose to state, that verses 7—11 plainly appear to be a defence and confirmation of the obnoxious expression (obnoxious to the legalist) contained in verse 5. It is this verse, surely, which gives occasion to the objection expressed at the beginning of verse 7; and it is of course the same, therefore, which is the theme of verses 7—11. But on looking back to verse 5, we find ἡμεν ἐν τῇ σαρκί to be the condition of the person, on whom the law of God produced the unhappy effect stated in the sequel. Indeed the case of itself determines this; for surely the law of God is not the object of the *believer's* hatred, nor does it enkindle his passions and aggravate his offences; it reproves, restrains, moderates, subdues, his evil affections and desires. To prove this, would be as superfluous as to prove that the renewed heart loves and approves of holiness. It is surely none but an *unsanctified* heart which can make such a use of the law of God as is stated in verses 7—11.

Moreover, the difficulties attending the usual exegesis (usual in modern times and among a certain class of writers) of this passage, are truly appalling. *E. g.*, vers. 9, 10, are thus explained: 'I thought myself alive, *i. e.*, holy or good, before I was brought under conviction by the law; but when this conviction took place, a penitential sense of sin became strong and active; I was then fully persuaded that I deserved condemnation (ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπίθανον); and I found that instead of keeping the commandment, I had only brought myself under its penalty.' Now all this would do well, in itself considered; the sentiment is evangelical and correct. But the difficulty in obtaining this sentiment from the passage before us, is, (1) That one must violate the *usus loquendi*. (2) He must bring contradiction and inextricable difficulty into the context. (3) He must make the writer assert what is irrelevant to his present purpose.

First, to construe ἀμαρτία ἀνέζησεν as meaning a *penitential sense of sin revived* or *became strong*, has no parallel in Scripture. 'Αμαρτία cannot be shown ever to mean *penitential sense of sin*. As little too can ἐζῶν be shown to mean, *I thought myself alive, i. e., righteous*. Both renderings are discrepant from all *usus loquendi*.

Secondly, if we take this meaning of ἀμαρτία, viz., *penitential sense of sin*, and carry it on through ver. 11, which is indissolubly connected with verse 10, (as a comparison of vers. 7, 8, and the γὰρ in verse 11,

show), it will make a sense utterly inadmissible. *E. g.*, 'A penitential sense of sin (*ἁμαρτία*), taking occasion by the law, *deceived me and slew me!*' And is this an exegesis to be admitted? I trust not. Sorrow for sin neither *deceives* nor *slays*, but just the opposite. Yet such a carrying forward of the sense given to *ἁμαρτία* in verse 10, is fairly inevitable, unless one renounces the principles by which a writer's thoughts are connected together.

Thirdly, such a sentiment as is given to verse 10, is irrelevant to the writer's purpose. His object is to show that he has not rashly said, *τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου*, verse 5. How will it prove this, if he declares merely that the law undoes the false hopes of the sinner, and brings him under true conviction? This would seem, at least, to be proving just the opposite of what he designs to show. Nor will it help the matter in the least, if you suppose him to be speaking of the experience of Christians; for surely it would not illustrate the declaration, that the law is the occasion of our evil passions being aggravated, to assert that Christians are convinced of sin by it, and brought to true penitence. The whole interpretation, therefore, which assigns such a meaning to verse 10, appears to be inept, and destitute of any adequate support whatever. The sentiment which it brings forward is indeed in itself correct; but whether it is the sentiment of the passage under examination—is a very different question.

I must proceed, therefore, in explaining the remainder of the chapter, on the ground that a person in a *law-state*, and not in a state of grace, is described. To some of the reasons for this method of interpretation I have just adverted; and to some more I must advert, in the course of my exposition. But the more ample defence of this principle of exegesis, and the answer to the principal objections, I reserve to the close of the chapter, because they will then be better understood than if they should now be introduced.

It is proper, however, to say a few words here, respecting the use of the *first person singular*, throughout verses 7—25. Does the apostle mean to designate himself specially and peculiarly, or does he include others with himself? Others certainly are included, understand him as you please. If he speaks of himself while under the law, he means by a parity of reasoning to include all others who are in the same condition. If he speaks of himself as a Christian, he means in the same manner to include all other Christians, who of course must have similar experience. So that Ambrose very appro-

privately and truly says : Sub suâ personâ quasi generalem causam agit. The use sometimes of the plural and sometimes of the singular number, favours this supposition ; comp. verses 5, 7, 14, seq. and viii. 1, seq. The apostle often employs the first person singular, where he is discussing general principles ; *e. g.*, 1 Cor. vi. 12. x. 23, 29, 30. xiii. 11—13 ; Gal. ii. 18, et al. sæpe. That it is not unusual for the apostles to include themselves, even where they are saying things which convey sharp reproof, is also true ; *e. g.*, James iii. 1, 2, 9. Whatever ground of exegesis one takes as to chap. vii. in general, the principle that Paul speaks of himself only as an example of what others are in like circumstances, must of course be admitted. Comp. 1 Cor. iv. 6, where he explicitly asserts such a principle. Even Reiche, who represents the *ἐγὼ σαρκικός* as the commonwealth of the Jews under the law, and the *better I* as the ideal Jew without sin, is still obliged to concede that Paul uses *μετασχηματισμός* here, *i. e.*, that he appropriates to himself what belongs to others, or represents them in his own person.

CHAP. VII. 13—25.

THE Jew would very naturally ask, on hearing such a declaration as is contained in verse 12 ; ‘What! then, is that which is good the cause of sin?’ This the apostle represents him as doing; and to this question he replies, that it is not the law itself which is the cause of sin, but the *abuse* of it by the sinner which renders him guilty; and that in this way the odious deformity of sin is peculiarly and strikingly exhibited. In the sequel, the apostle proceeds to exhibit in a very forcible manner, the fact that the law can in no way be involved in the charge of being the efficient cause of sin, for it stands in direct and perpetual opposition to all the sinful desires of men in an unsanctified and carnal state. That it is holy and just and good, is evinced by the fact, that the conscience and moral sense spontaneously take sides with it or approve of its precepts. Yet, notwithstanding all this, such is the force of sinful desires and lusts, that they triumph over the precepts of the law, and lead the unsanctified man to continual opposition and transgression. Even against the voice of reason and conscience, *i. e.*, of an internal moral nature, as well as against the divine precepts, does carnal desire prevail; we yield the *moral self* to the power of the *carnal self*, and plunge deep into ruin, while the voice of God’s law is thundering in our ears, and the voice of our own consciences is loudly remonstrating against our conduct. ‘Wretched men that we are!’ Truly wretched while out of Christ, while under the law, while destitute of that spirit of adoption, which subdues the carnal man, and leads us to walk *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, and furnishes us with grace to do so!

The purpose of all this illustration or representation, on the part of the apostle, is very plain. If such is the state of those who are under the law, that all its prohibitions,

penalties, and commands, will produce no decisive influence in reforming and sanctifying them; if such is the wickedness of unsanctified men, that they refuse to hearken to the voice of conscience even as well as of the divine law; then is the condition of the legalist, who places his hopes in the sanctifying power of that law, desperate indeed. Well may he exclaim, *ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος! τίς με ρύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου;* Who can refrain, now, from perceiving all this is much to the purpose of the apostle, whose object it is to show, that to be *under grace*, (and not under the law) affords the only hope for the sinner? Accordingly, in chap. viii. 1—17, he shows that the opposite of all which he has been before describing takes place in the regenerate, and that a filial spirit subdues carnal affections, overcomes the world, and enables Christians *to walk according to the Spirit*; nothing of which is accomplished, while men are in the condition described in vii. 14—25.

Now to what special end of the apostle would it be here subservient, if we suppose him to be describing a *state of grace* in chap. vii? How does the contest in the breast of Christians against sin, prove the inefficacy of the *law* to sanctify them? For to prove such an inefficacy, it must be admitted, is the general object of the present discourse. The fact is that such a statement would prove too much. It would show that *grace* is wanting in efficacy, as well as the *law*; for the Christian, being a subject of grace, and still keeping up such a contest, one might of course be tempted to say, 'It appears, then, that *grace* is no more competent than law, to subdue sin and sanctify the heart.' And indeed why might he not say this, if the ground of those who construe all this of the *regenerate* man be correct? For what is the real state of the whole matter as represented by the apostle? It is, that in every contest here between the flesh and the spirit (the moral man), the former comes off victorious. And can this be a *regenerate* state? Is this "the victory which is of God, and overcometh the world?" "He that is born of God sinneth not;" those that love his law "do no iniquity;" he that loveth Christ "keepeth his commandments;" i. e., an habitual and voluntary offender such an one is not; he gives not himself up to any course of sin; it is his habitual study and effort to subdue his passions, and obey the commandments of God. But what of all this is there, in the case which the apostle represents in vii. 14—25? Read now chap. viii. 1—17, and then ask, Is the man described in vii. 14—25, who yields in every instance to the assault of his passions, and suffers them continually to triumph over law, conscience, and every other consideration, such a man or the same man as is described in viii. 1—17? In this latter passage the man is described, "who walks *not* after the flesh but after the Spirit." Can this then be the same man who does walk after the flesh, and always does this, even when the voice of God and conscience is thundering in his ears, and his own internal moral nature is warning him against the course he pursues? Impossible. Light and darkness are not more diverse than these two cases.

The transition which is represented as taking place, at the close of chap. vii. and the commencement of chap. viii. most fully exhibits this. Here is indeed a wonderful transition; one from a state of captivity to the law of sin and death to a state of freedom from both, to the enjoyment of the glorious liberty of the children of God. But if the contest in chap. vii. 14—25 is meant for one which is only in the breast of the *regenerate*; then into what state does he go, or what is the condition of him, who makes the transition represented in chap. viii.? The only answer which can be made, seems to be, that it is from a state of struggle with sin, to a state in which there is no struggle with it. And does the Christian, then, attain to this state in the present life? I will not deny the possibility of it; but as a matter of fact, who will bring adequate proof, that he does truly "love God with all his heart and his neighbour as himself," without variation, and to the highest extent of which he is capable? "If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." Such a transition, then, in this case, is utterly improbable; and therefore cannot be admitted.

But put the case which I have supposed above, and which accords with the design of the apostle and the language employed, viz., that the transition is from a state in which the carnal passions were uniformly victorious, to one in which the holy principle becomes predominantly so, and then you have not only a possible but an actual case; yea, thousands and millions of actual cases. Can we hesitate then, as to what the object of the writer is, in the passage before us?

(13) Τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν . . . θάνατος; *Has then that which is good become death to me? i. e., 'You call the commandment ἀγαθὴ, kind, beneficent, productive of happiness; how can that which is beneficent, be fatal to me? Is not this a contradiction?' The answer is, μὴ γίνωτο! i. e., it is not true that the ἐντολὴ ἀγαθὴ was of itself fatal or deadly to you, ἀλλὰ ἡ ἁμαρτία, but sin [was death to you]; for that σοι γέγονε θάνατος is implied after ἁμαρτία, is very plain from the nature of the sentence.—'Αλλά here, as often elsewhere, stands before a clause designed to give a true account of a thing in opposition to an erroneous one.—Γέγονε is wanting in F., G.; and in A., B., C., D., E., ἐγένετο stands in its room. The sense is the same in all the cases, and hermeneutically the reading is a matter of indifference.*

"Ἴνα φανῇ . . . θάνατον, so that sin might exhibit itself as causing death to me by that which is good.—Φανῇ is 2 Aor. pass. Subj., but is employed (as the Aorists pass. often are) in the sense of the Middle voice. The meaning is; 'Sin became the cause of death to me, by leading me to abuse the law which was altogether good; and so it exhibited, in a true light, its own deadly and odious nature.' The μοί here and the ἐμοί above are the Dative *incommodi*.

"Ἴνα γένηται . . . ἐντολῆς, so that sin, through the commandment, might be exceedingly sinful; i. e., so that sin, by abuse of the commandment which was good, and by making it the occasion of death to the sinner, and by its opposition to a commandment in its own nature holy and just and good, might thus appear to be exceedingly aggravated and detestable. Reiche refers the clause to the actual increase of sin, after the giving of the law; but γένηται ἁμαρτωλὸς must characterize the *heinousness* of sin, not the increase as to quantity. For καθ' ὑπερβολήν, used adverbially instead of ὑπερβαλλόντως, comp. 1 Cor. xii. 31. 2 Cor. i. 8. iv. 17. I take the two phrases in these verses beginning with ἵνα, to be *co-ordinate*; and both of them I regard as suspended on ἀλλὰ ἡ ἁμαρτία [θάνατος γέγονε]. One of the phrases declares that sin developed itself according to its true nature, by perverting the holy law of God; the other, that the exceedingly odious nature of it was thus made the more manifest.

(14) Οἶδμεν γάρ some critics divide thus: οἶδα μὲν γάρ. But the general usage of Paul is against this; for in appeals of this nature he generally uses the *plural* number and not the singular.—Γάρ *illustrantis et confirmantis* for the sequel is designed to illustrate and confirm what he has said in respect to the law and sin, in ver. 13.

Ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστί, the law is spiritual, i. e., the law enjoins

those things which are agreeable to the nature and mind of the Spirit. *Flesh* and *spirit* are often opposed to each other in a variety of senses; viz., (1) As *flesh* is weak and perishable (Gen. vi. 3. Ps. lxxviii. 39. lvi. 4. Jer. xvii. 5. Is. xl. 6), so *spirit* (πνῦμα), the animating and invigorating principle, is sometimes placed in opposition to it with the meaning of strength and permanence; e.g., Is. xxxi. 3. But, (2) The most common usage in the New Testament is the *tropical* one; where σὰρξ is viewed as the seat of carnal desires and affections, and is often employed to designate them, sometimes simply, and sometimes with φρόνημα added to it; while πνεῦμα, when employed in the way of antithesis to it, means *a new and holy disposition*, which is τὸ πνευματικόν, i. e., something produced by the influence of the Spirit of God and guided by this influence. Hence Christians are πνευματικοί and unsanctified men are σαρκικοί, because the former are under the influence of the Spirit, and the latter are guided by their carnal appetites and desires. All this is quite plain, when one reads Rom. viii. 1—17, where the antithesis is fully and explicitly stated.

To say then that the *law* is πνευματικός, is to affirm that its nature is *pneumatic*, i. e., agreeable to the mind or will of the Spirit. The antithesis therefore is plain, viz., ἐγὼ δὲ σαρκικός εἰμι, *but I am carnal*, i. e., I am under the influence of carnal desires and affections. Even such desires as do not spring directly from the flesh, are sometimes named *carnal*; and thus, it would seem, because most of our sinful propensities are in some way connected with the flesh, and those which are not, are similar in regard to their moral character. For example; in Gal. v. 19—22, the apostle names *hatred, envy, anger, &c.*, as ἔργα σαρκός; and so in Rom. viii. 5—9, κατὰ σάρκα εἶναι or περιπατεῖν, includes every kind of vicious conduct. And in the passage before us, σαρκικός εἰμι is explained by a clause which the writer immediately adds; viz.

Πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, *sold under sin*, i. e., the bondsman of sin δοῦλος τῆς ἁμαρτίας; for so the sequel shows him to be, inasmuch as he obeys sin in every case, whatever opposition is made to it on the part of conscience or the divine law. The language is borrowed from the practice of selling captives, who have been taken in war, as slaves. They were viewed as having forfeited their lives; and so they were sold into a state of the most absolute despotism. In allusion to this, the apostle represents the person who is still under the law, and therefore unredeemed, as being the bond slave of sin.

Stronger language than this he could not employ ; and it will be important, in the sequel, to look back on this expression in order to solve some of the doubts which may arise from ὁ μισῶ ὃ οὐ θέλω ἐγώ, τὸ θέλῃ παρῄκειται μοι, συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ, &c. Let the reader who wishes to consult the writer's own exposition of σαρκικός, carefully compare chap. viii. 5—9.

The law then is good, for it is πνευματικός, i. e., agreeable to the dictates of the Spirit. It is not this, therefore, which is the efficient cause of men's sins ; it is that they are σαρκικοί, devoted to the desires of the flesh, following the dictates of its desires.

(15) That the law does sustain such a character, must be well known to the sinner himself. His own reason and conscience take sides with the law and approve of its precepts. Yet still so *carnally inclined* is he, that he listens not to these, but acts directly against them. In other words, he is actually the slave of sin.

ῥά in this verse would seem to have direct relation to the declaration just repeated. Observe the tenor of it : 'He does that which he dislikes, he is as it were forced by his slavish condition to do that which is hateful to his better self.' In this way, the idea that he is πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, becomes very prominent.

In order to express the sentiment which he intends to convey in the most striking manner, the apostle divides the person thus in bondage into *two selves* (if I may thus speak), viz., the νοῦς or ὁ ἰσὼ ἄνθρωπος (vers. 22, 23), and the σῶμα, σὰρξ, or carnal part of his nature. In the latter dwell the passions and affections which sway the ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός ; in the former is still a portion of the image of God (James iii. 9 ; 1 Cor. xi. 7), which discerns and cannot but approve the holy and perfect law of God that is merely a transcript of his own nature. If the reader has any question, whether this last statement is in accordance with the apostle's views of unsanctified human nature, he needs but to turn back and read Rom. ii. 14, 15, in order to dissipate his doubts. That the unregenerate have reason and conscience, which approve and must approve the divine law, shows nothing more than that they are *rational* and *moral* beings with faculties adapted to a state of moral probation, and that they are made in the image of God so far as a rational and moral nature is concerned. This is merely saying that they are *men*, and not brutes. The faculty to discern what is good, the power to approve of it, is in itself no more holy or sinful, than the faculty of ratiocination is, or of seeing or hearing. Nothing can be more unfounded, than the

supposition that *moral good* is put to the account of the sinner, merely because one assigns to him reason to discern its nature and conscience to approve it. Without these he could not be a rational and moral being. They are mere *pura naturalia*, to speak in the language of the old theology.

The reader need not be in any degree alarmed, then, for the doctrine of human depravity, when he finds the sinner here represented as seeing something of the nature of the divine law and testifying in its favour. It is on such ground as this, that the ways of God toward men may be vindicated; for allowing it to be true, that our physical nature is the peculiarly exciting cause of most of our sins, we may still ask: 'Is there not an ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, which opposes all inordinate desires, and warns us to avoid sin and cleave to duty!' And on this ground it is, that God regards the heathen as being without excuse; as is clear from Rom. i. ii., especially ii. 14, 15.

*Ὁ γὰρ . . . γινώσκω, *for that which I do, I disapprove.* Κατεργάζεμαι means more than the simple ἐργάζομαι; it designates the *habitual doing* or *practising* of any thing.—Ὁ γινώσκω is rendered by Chrysostom, Theodoret, Tholuck, and others, *I know not*, i. e., my mind is so darkened by sin that I do not perceive the true nature of what I am doing; but the explanation which Paul immediately subjoins seems to forbid this exegesis, viz., οὐ γὰρ ὁ θεῶν κ. τ. λ. Besides, the very height of the criminality here depicted is, that the sin is against light, and knowledge, and conscience. On the other hand, that γινώσκω in Greek, as well as the Hebrew יָדָע, not unfrequently means to *know* in the sense of *acknowledging* or *approving* may be seen in the lexicons; see Matt. vii. 23. xxv. 12. Luke xiii. 27. Ps. i. 6. Hos. viii. 4. That *knowledge* speculatively considered is not here meant, i. e., that οὐ γινώσκω does not mean *I am ignorant, insciens sum*, is clear from the sequel, where the apostle speaks of his neglecting to do that *which he wills*. Now what he *wills*, must be an object of *perception* with him; so that οὐ γινώσκω cannot be understood of mere intellectual ignorance.

Ὁ γὰρ ὁ θεῶν, τοῦτο πράσσω, *for not that which I approve, do I perform.* Γὰρ confirmantis, i. e., the clause of the sentence that follows, confirms the preceding statement. First, we have a general declaration. *What I do, I disapprove.* Next follows a specific one which illustrates and confirms it: *Not that which I approve do I perform, but I do that which I hate.* If there be any thing paradoxical here (and the first view of the case may seem to present a paradox), it is

occasioned entirely by the plan of the writer to represent the two contrary selves in one and the same person. Κατεργάζομαι belongs to the *carnal* self, and γινώσκω to the νοῦς or ἔσω ἄνθρωπος; and thus in succession it is the conscience and reason, i. e., the internal moral man, which disapproves (οὐ θέλω) and hates (μισῶ), while the carnal man *practises* (πράσσω, ποιῶ) the thing which is disapproved and hated.

All speculative metaphysical questions would here be entirely out of place. One might ask: 'Is it true, then, that a man does what he is unwilling to do, and hates to do? This would be not only to represent him as acting against predominant motives, but as a machine who could not follow his own inclination.' And on the ground of some systems of metaphysical philosophy, the whole would indeed be an unaccountable affair, as it is here represented by the apostle; although such philosophy is not unfrequently insisted on, and urged as being all-important in theology. But still the apostle might make the appeal, for his own triumphant vindication, to the breast of every man on earth, where the moral warfare has been carried on as he describes it, between conscience and passion. And a most exact and striking picture it is too. The demonstration of its correctness is *internal*, in the very consciousness of the soul; it depends not on metaphysics or ratiocination.

It is not true, indeed, that a man does that which *on the whole* he is unwilling to do; nor is this what the apostle means to affirm. But it is true, that men often do what reason and conscience disapprove; and which he here expresses in the strong language of οὐ θέλω and μισῶ, i. e., it is the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος of whom this is predicated. And even this, in a contrast like the present, is not to be urged to its highest point of possible meaning. Thus, for example, μισῶ does not always mean *positive* hatred, but a *not loving* or merely a *comparatively* not loving, i. e., a less loving; for so the examples in Matt. vi. 24. Luke xvi. 13. xiv. 26, teach us. The last example here is perfectly in point, to show that μισῶ may mean (as it certainly does here) merely a *less loving* of some than others; comp. as exegetical of it, Matt. x. 37. That θέλω and μισῶ, then, can both be affirmed of the conscience enlightened by the divine law (comp. verse 9), when they are understood in this qualified sense (and on any ground of exegesis a qualified sense is absolutely necessary), is sufficiently manifest. Any one who undertakes to urge the sense of words employed in such a contrast as is here presented, to the highest mean-

ing of which they are capable, must involve himself at least in difficulties that are absolutely inextricable.

There is a striking passage in Xenophon (Cyp. VI. 1), in which Araspe the Persian says, by way of excusing his treasonable designs:

“Certainly I must have two souls . . . for plainly it is not one and the same which is both evil and good, nor which loves honourable and base conduct, and at the same time wishes to do a thing and not to do it. Plainly then there are two souls; and when the good one prevails, then it does good; and when the evil one predominates, then it does evil.” Similar to this is the sentiment in Euripides, *Medea*, 1077,

Μανθάνω μὲν, οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά·
Θύμος δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων.

I know, indeed, that such things as I am about to do, are evil; but my mind is better than my inclinations.

The same poet (as quoted by Clemens Alex. Strom. II. 15) says:

Λέληθεν οὐδὲν τῶνδε μ' ὧν σὺ νοουῖς τεῖς·
Γνώμην δ' ἔχοντά μ' ἡ φύσις βιάζεται.

I have forgotten none of the things respecting which you have admonished me; but although I have a desire to do them, nature forces me another way.

To the same purpose, and in a manner very much like that of Paul, Epictetus says (Enchirid. II. 26). ‘Ο ἀμαρτάνων, ὃ μὲν θίλει οὐ ποιεῖ καὶ ὃ μὴ θίλει, ποιεῖ. So Plautus, (Trinummus, Act. IV. Scen. 2, verse 31): Scibam ut esse me deceret, facere non quibam miser; *I knew that it was becoming, but, me miserable! I could not do it.* Seneca (Ep. III): Quid est . . . quod nos alio tendentes, alio trahit, et eo unde recedere cupimus repellit? Quid colluctatur cum animo nostro, nec permittit nobis quidquam semel velle? Ovid (Metamorph. VII. 19): Aliudque cupido, mens aliud suadet; *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.* Seneca (Hippol. verse 604): Vos testor . . . hoc quod volo, me nolle.

So Lactantius also represents a heathen as saying: Volo equidem non peccare, sed vincor; indutus enim sum carne fragili. Itaque ducor incertus, et pecco non quia volo, sed quia cogor.

These quotations (for which I am indebted to Prof. Tholuck) show how clear and distinct the impression is upon the human mind, in all countries, that there is a struggle in the breast between con-

science and carnal inclination. They also show how much alike men, enlightened or unenlightened by revelation, express themselves in relation to the struggle in question. They answer still another purpose, viz., to show that language of this nature is used and is to be understood in the *popular* sense, and in this only.

I add only, that *Θέλω* is here to be taken in the sense of *approve*, and not in the physiological sense as a mere act of the faculty of the will, is sufficiently plain from the fact, that *ὃ μισῶ*, *that which I hate*, is made the antithesis of *ὃ Θέλω*; and of course this latter must be considered as meaning *that which I desire, wish, or approve*. No room is left, then, for objections of a metaphysical or physiological nature.

(16) *Εἰ δὲ καλῶς, if then I do that which I do not approve, I consent to the law as good; i. e., if my reason and conscience disapprove that which I do, then my inward man bears testimony in favour of the law, gives assent to the goodness of it.* Δεῖ “orationi continuandæ inservit.” *Σύμφημι*, lit. *to speak with, to confess, to acknowledge*. The appeal here in favour of the law is very strong; for even those who habitually violate it, are represented as testifying in its favour. In one point of view, this is stronger testimony than that of Christians; for if the real enemies themselves of the law feel obliged to confess its excellence, we may well expect that the friends of the law will do the same; as indeed they of course do. The reader will notice, that when the apostle says that *he does that which he disapproves*, he represents the *ἰσὼ ἀνθρώπου*, in thus disapproving, as giving its testimony in favour (*σύμφημι*) of what the law decides. It is not then the *physiological* exercise of the will here which is designated by *Θέλω* (for this of course determines the outward actions): but it is the *approbation* of the reason and conscience, *i. e.*, of the internal man, which is meant.

(17) *Νυνὶ δὲ ἀμαρτία, but now it is no longer I who do this, but sin which dwells in me.* *Νυνί*, properly a particle of time, *now*, is also employed (as *now* in English) very frequently as a mere *continuative* of argument, denoting that what follows is connected with and grows out of what goes before. It is as much as to say: ‘In these or in such circumstances, the case being as represented, then it follows, &c.’ Δεῖ *discretive*, “*accuratius definit.*” The apostle means to guard against the possibility of confounding the *two selves*, which he has here introduced, and to aver strongly that the *internal* man does not participate in approving the course which the carnal passions

pursue, but take sides with the divine law, and continues to give its assent to its sanctions, even amid all the predominant opposition of the carnal self. For it is plain that two consequences follow from the principle asserted in ver. 15; viz., first, that the internal man assents to the goodness of the divine law; secondly, that it is not reason and conscience which of themselves unperturbed lead men to sin, but their own carnal desires. The latter sentiment is fully and strongly asserted in ver. 17. 'Εγώ therefore is the moral self, the νοῦς or ἰσὼ ἄνθρωπος here; while ἡ ἡμαρτία (here personified) means, the sinful passions and affections of men, or the disposition to indulge them. The distinction here made between the higher moral self of *reason* and *conscience*, and the lower one of *carnal passions* and *appetites*, is very striking. In like manner Seneca says: Mens cujusque is est quisque, non ea figura quæ digito monstrari potest; *the MIND of a man is HIMSELF, not that part which may be pointed out with one's finger, i. e., not the body.* So Augustine: Magis ego in eo quod in me approbaram, quam in eo quod in me improbabam, Confess. VIII. 5. The higher moral self has the better claim to the title of ἐγώ.

There is some difficulty of rather a serious nature here, as to the *ἐν ἑμοί* in which sin dwells, i. e., reigns or is predominant, or at least is an inmate that has great influence. It is either of the *two selves* in and by themselves considered, i. e., the ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός or the ἰσὼ ἄνθρωπος? 'Not the first,' some one may say; 'for to suppose this, would be to suppose that the apostle represents sin as dwelling in itself; for what is sin here but the *carnal* man? Not the second; for the ἰσὼ ἄνθρωπος is opposed to sin and takes sides with the divine law, as the whole passage abundantly testifies.' 'The *ἐμοί* then,' he might say, 'must here designate the whole person, and be employed in its usual sense. And although this might seem to be plausible, at first view, yet as the apostle has *personified* sin here, the mode of expression must be in accordance with this figure of speech. For the moment, sin is spoken of as a *separate* agent, and as dwelling and acting in the man who obeys its dictates. But it is in the carnal man, i. e., the carnal self in this case, that it dwells. The ἰσὼ ἄνθρωπος disapproves and condemns what the other self, in which sin dwells, approves and practises. Metaphysically examined, it is easy to find or make difficulties with this representation; but surely this is not the light in which we are to examine it. It is plainly a popular and allegorical mode of representation.—But more must

be said in respect to the difficulty before us, in explaining the next verse.

(18) *οἶδα γὰρ . . . ἁγαθόν*. The *γὰρ* here shows that the writer is going to say something which will confirm the declaration that he has just made, viz., that *indwelling sin* leads him to thwart the promptings of reason and conscience and the commands of God's holy law. This is altogether clear from the conclusion which he draws in express words in ver. 20. The intervening matter, then, is designed to illustrate and confirm the position just mentioned. First of all, therefore, he avers that he is conscious (*οἶδα*) that no *good thing* dwells in him, i. e., in his carnal part.—'Ἀγαθόν, without the article, means *any good thing*, i. e., any thing *morally* good, or inclining to moral good; for not *natural* but moral good and evil are here the subject of consideration. That *σαρκί μου* must mean *the carnal man*, and not mere flesh and blood, is evident enough from the nature of the case, and from ver. 5, where *ἐν τῇ σαρκί* surely does not mean flesh *physiologically* considered.

Τὸ γὰρ θέλειν, παράκειται μοι, for to will is present with me, i. e., is in my power, is accessible to me, is in readiness, is what I can readily and easily come at or accomplish; for such is the meaning which *παράκειται μοι* conveys. The *γὰρ* here is again *causal*, i. e., it introduces a reason or proof of the fact, that no good dwells in the *carnal* man, and that he is conscious of this; for experience tells him, that while the inner man, the reason and conscience, approves of and consents to that which is good, the carnal man has no power or inclination or readiness to accomplish it. As to *οὐχ εὕρισκω*, *I do not find*, it is plainly an elliptical expression. The complement here would seem to be thus: *Οὐχ εὕρισκω [παράκειμένον μοι]*, i. e., I do not find it in my power. But not metaphysical nicety of expression is here intended. The writer evidently means to say, that the carnal part is altogether the predominant self; just in the same manner as he says, that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God . . . neither can he know them." So again: "The carnal mind is enmity against God, and is not subject to the law of God nor indeed *can it be*," Rom. viii. 7. As *σαρκικός*, i. e., as swayed and directed by carnal desires and affections, the sinner finds no power to do good. The assertion of the apostle does not respect the ability of men in a mere psychological or physiological point of view, with simple reference to the powers and attributes of their nature as men; but it respects them as *σαρκικοί*, as *ἐν σαρκί*, and as acting agreeably to

this predominating part of themselves. So long as they are in this state of servitude, and under such masters, they cannot serve another master. But this does not decide that they have no power, in any sense of this word, to quit the service of a bad master, and go over to a good one.

(19) Οὐ γὰρ ὁ θείω κ. τ. λ., appears to be a repetition of verse 15. It is so as to substance; but still it is not designed to be merely a repetition. First, the form is a little varied; for here we have ἀγαθόν and κακόν. But secondly, the sentence here commences with a γὰρ *confirmantis*, and it appears to be designed to confirm the preceding declaration. What is it which shows that my reason and conscience approve that which is good, and that I find myself unable or indisposed to effect it? It is this, viz., that I in fact leave undone the good which I approve, and do the evil which I disapprove.

(20) Εἰ δὲ κ. τ. λ. Here δὲ marks the *continuation* of the discourse, while it is *discretive* as to the matter to be added. In effect this verse is a conclusion drawn from the matter suggested in vers. 18, 19, serving to confirm the position in verse 17; for a part of verse 19 is repeated here, and also the latter part of the sentence in verse 17. The form is *hypothetical*; which is a favourite mode of Paul in making out conclusions. The amount of it is thus: 'If what I have said in verses 18, 19, be true [and clearly it is], then what I have affirmed in verse 17 must be true.'

Οὐ θείω is related, as before, to the *internal* moral man; and τοῦτο τοῦ κατὰ τὴν σαρκὶν to the *carnal* man. So the οὐκ ἐστὶ ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι refers to the former, and the ἐν ἡμῶς to the latter.

(21) Next follows a general deduction from the preceding representations, of which ἄρα, *then, therefore*, is the sign.

The grammatical construction of the verse is difficult, and has been a matter of contest among critics. Only two methods of explanation seem to me worth discussing. (a) 'I find τὸν νόμον, a *law* or *constitution*, viz., of my nature, that when I would do good, evil is near at hand.' So Calvin, Venema, Limborch, Michaelis, Bolten, Ammon, &c. It is charged as a difficulty upon this mode of interpretation, that the article in τὸν νόμον cannot well be accounted for; for νόμος in verse 23 has it not. But this objection has little weight, for νόμος in verse 21 is surely a *particular* and *specific* νόμος; but in verse 23, τὸν ἑτέρον νόμον (*i. e.*, adding the article) would give a sense which the writer does not intend, for he means here only to say that there is another law, *i. e.*, some other law, in opposition to the law of his mind.

Ἐν τούτοις μέλεσι does indeed specificate the νόμος in question; but in such a case the article may be either inserted or omitted. A comparison moreover of verse 21 with verse 23 seems to render it quite plain, that τὸν νόμον in the former is the same as the ἕτερον νόμον in the latter. I take the meaning of the writer to be, that he finds it to be a *custom* or *law* with him, resulting from his carnal nature, that when his reason and conscience decide in favour of doing good, evil comes in and prevents it; i. e., his carnal affections and desires interpose and hinder his doing good; in other words, he finds the doing of evil so habitual with himself, that he must regard it as a controlling law of his carnal nature.

(b) The second method puts a comma after ἄρα, and construes the intermediate clause thus: Ἐμοὶ τῷ θελοντι ποιεῖν τὸν νόμον, [sc. ποιεῖν] τὸ καλόν; thus making τὸ καλόν a synonyme with τὸν νόμον, and supposing ποιεῖν to be virtually repeated before it. So Tholuck, Knapp, et al. This explanation is a possible one; but I can hardly bring myself to feel that it is probable. In sense it does not differ materially from the other; and therefore it offers no special inducement to adopt it.

As to the method of interpretation adopted by Glöckler and some others, which makes νόμον Acc. absolute and renders thus: 'I find, then, as to the law for me wishing to do good, that evil is present, &c.,' this is too forced and arbitrary to commend itself to most men.

Ἐμοὶ τὸ κακὸν παράκειται, *evil is at hand, evil is near or in readiness.* The meaning here is, as verse 23 shows, that evil stands ready to usurp the place of good, and does in fact usurp it. This last clause, beginning with εἰ, &c., is epexegetical of τὸν νόμον. That νόμος in this case does not mean the *Mosaic law* (as Reiche maintains), seems to me quite certain from the two different senses given to νόμος in verse 23.

(22) Συνήδομαι γὰρ . . . ἀνθρώπων, *for I delight in the law of God, as it respects the internal man.* γὰρ *illustrantis.* The sentiment is, for substance, the same as in verses 15—17; but the costume in which it appears, is diverse. That the sentiment, moreover, is epexegetical of verse 21, is quite plain. Hence the γὰρ with which it is introduced.

In regard to the words; συνήδομαι here corresponds to σύμφημι in verse 16; and ἰσω ἀνθρώπων, here, corresponds to ἰγώ in verse 17. If any one is disposed to urge here the strength of the expression συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ, as being inconsistent with an unregenerate state, he will do well to look back on ver. 14, and ask, whether the expression

there, on the other side, is not still stronger. The truth is, in a contrast like this, where the mind of the writer is wrought up to a high pitch of feeling, the mere *forms* of expression cannot in themselves go very far toward establishing any principle of doctrine. It is to the object at which the writer is aiming, that we must look; and this object has been already brought to view. But if any one insists on urging the *form* of expression, I must ask him first to construe ver. 14 by the rule which he himself here adopts; and then to compare Mark vi. 20 ἡδέως αὐτοῦ ἤκουε, i. e., Herod heard John ἡδέως; John v. 35. Matt. xiii. 20. John ii. 23—25. Acts viii. 13, comp. ver. 20—23. Isa. lviii. 2, where it is said of the wicked, that “they delight to know my ways,” and “they take delight in approaching to God.” Comp. also 2 K. xxi. 27—29. 1 John iii. 9. Ps. cxix. 3. Many other passages of the like tenor could be adduced, in order to show that a *qualified* sense is to be put on such expressions. Above all, John xv. 22—24. Matt. vi. 24. Luke xvi. 13 and xiv. 26, show that very strong expressions of this kind are to be modified according to the nature of the case which is under consideration.

With such examples before us, and with the whole context (at least so it plainly appears to me) to remind us of the necessity of taking συνήδομαι in a *qualified* sense, I cannot hesitate to say, that ver. 22 only expresses in a more intense form and with more feeling, what is simply expressed in ver. 16, σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ. The approbation, complacency (so to speak), which reason and conscience yield to the divine law as holy and good, is the truth intended to be expressed. It is strongly expressed indeed; but not more so than in the cases to which the reader is referred above, and about the exegesis of which there can be no disagreement. In fact the very next verse shows that the apostle cannot here be understood to mean the pleasure which a regenerate and filial spirit takes in the divine law; for this, as chap. viii. 1—17 most clearly shows, would lead the person who might possess it to “walk after the Spirit” and not “after the flesh;” while here, the very individual who “delights in the law of God after the inner man,” is at the same time represented as being under the actual dominion of the law of sin and death, and led to destruction by it. Is this the real state of a child of God? Comp. viii. 9—14.

(23) Βλέπω δι . . . μου, but I perceive another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind. Δι adversative or disjunctive; i. e., notwithstanding my reason and conscience strongly approve of the divine law, yet I do not obey it; for there is another

law directly opposed to it, viz., the law dictated by my carnal passions and desires.—*Νόμος* must of course mean something here which is different from *law* in the sense of *precepts*. It must have a kind of figurative or secondary sense, kindred to the meaning which we often give it, in speaking of *the laws of nature, the laws of fluids, the laws of organized or animal bodies, &c.* ‘A predominating tendency,’ seems to be clearly the meaning of *νόμος* here; and as to *μέλει* it is only another designation of *σῶμα, σάρξ,* or *ἄνθρωπος σαρκικός*; comp. ver. 5. The ground of employing *νόμος*, in this case, is paronomasia; for it stands at the offset to another kind of *νόμος* mentioned in the preceding clause.—As to *νόος* (Gen. of *νοῦς*), it evidently means the same thing as the *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος* above.—This law not only *wars against* the law of the inner man, but actually overcomes it—*αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με . . . μου*, lit. *making me a captive to the law of sin which is in my members, i. e.,* reducing me to entire subjection unto, placing me altogether at the disposal of, the law of sin or carnal self. *Αἰχμαλωτίζοντα* comes from *αἰχμή* a spear and *ἀλώω* to take, seize upon. It is a word of the later Greek, but formed in a regular way. Captives taken in war were put to death, or kept or sold as slaves, at the pleasure of the victor. The meaning therefore is, that the law of sin had entire rule or control, notwithstanding the *inner man* decided against it. And can such be the *habitual* state of any real Christian?

If the reader is in any measure perplexed with the question, How could the *other law* in his members bring him into captivity to the law of sin, when the law of sin, *i. e.,* a predominating sinful propensity is the very thing designated by both expressions? The obvious answer is, that here, as in vers. 17, 20, sin is *personified*, and the carnal man is represented as being ruled over or subdued and made captive by it. The difficulty is merely of a rhetorical nature, and belongs only to the *mode* of representation. To scan this by our metaphysical philosophy, would be altogether out of place.

(24) *Ταλαίπωρος . . . τούτου, Wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body which occasions this death or condemnation?* No wonder that the sinner, whose conscience has been awakened by the law of God, and who has been brought by bitter experience to see that all which reason and conscience do for him proves ineffectual as to the actual control of his lusts and passions—no wonder that he should be constrained, in view of the dreadful condemnation which seems to await him, to exclaim, “Wretched man

that I am !” Well may he express a wish, too, for deliverance from the predominating power of his bodily carnal lusts and inclinations; which, in spite of all the remonstrances that his awakened conscience makes, continue to expose him to the curse of the divine law, yea to its aggravated penalty.

Τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανέοντος τοῦτου is construed by some as being equivalent to σῶμα θνητόν, *i. e.*, *frail, dying body*. The sentiment would then be : ‘Oh, that I might die, or be liberated from this mortal body!’ This would, in the connection here presented, be the language of despair; like that of Job when in deep distress, iii. 3—11. x. 18. But although this is a *possible* sense, it does not seem to be a probable one; as the comparison of it with chap. viii. 2 shows. Σῶμα I understand here (so not unfrequently elsewhere) as equivalent to σάρεξ, *i. e.*, as designating the seat of *carnal* desires. In such a sense σάρεξ stands opposed to πνεῦμα, in John iii. 6. Rom. viii. 9, 5, 6. Θανάτου is the Genitive of *effect*, as grammarians say, *i. e.*, it is a Genitive which marks or designates the effect produced by σῶμα; and this latter word designates the agent, *viz.*, *carnal desire* in natural men, which leads to death or condemnation; comp. viii. 6. Comp. ver. 13, where ἀμαρτία is said to *work death*; which *sin* is only a personification of the carnal appetites, and dwells in the carnal man; see verses 17, 20, and comp. ver. 18. So here it is intimated of the body, which is the abode of this ἀμαρτία, that it is the cause of death.

(25) Εὐχαριστῶ . . . ἡμῶν, *I thank God, through Jesus Christ, our Lord*, *viz.*, that there is deliverance; an exclamation from sympathy for the guilty and wretched sufferer, who had just been described. It should be read as in a *parenthesis*; for to parenthesis it clearly belongs, inasmuch as it breaks in altogether upon the thread of discourse, and is simply an anticipation of what is about to follow in chap. viii. Reiche holds the whole clause to be merely a gloss from the margin, which has crept into the text, and disturbs and deforms it. But to resort to this whenever we meet with any special difficulty of explanation, does not seem to be a safe principle of criticism.

Ἄρα οὖν . . . ἀμαρτίας, *wherefore I the same person serve with the mind the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin*. A summary of the whole preceding representation, as ἄρα οὖν denotes, in respect to the contest which he had been describing. The sum of all is : ‘While my *mind*, *i. e.*, reason and conscience, takes part with the law of God and approves its sanctions, my carnal part obtains the actual predominance, and brings me into a state of condemnation and ruin.’

Why should the apostle prefer *νοῦς* here and in ver. 23, to *πνεῦμα* the natural and usual antithesis of *σάρξ*? The obvious answer seems to be, that he especially designs to characterize the intellectual, rational, and moral *ἐγώ* of man, as being that part of him which approves the law of God.—*Αὐτὸς ἐγώ*, *I myself*; so designated here, as it would seem, in order to distinguish the *ἐγώ* now introduced (*self* in the usual and comprehensive sense), from the *ἐγώ* carnal and internal which he had all along been employing, i. e., the *two selves* which he had been representing. The *ἐγώ αὐτός*, then, is the same person (as we say), who has, while in a law-state, two minds or inclinations in him. I do not perceive any need of the difficulties which some commentators have made here.

But what follows from all this? Just what the writer set out to prove, viz., (1) That the law of God, which has reason and conscience on its side, is not to be accused as being the efficient cause of sin; but that the indulgence of the sinner's own evil passions is the direct cause of his guilt and misery. (2) That the law, with all its holiness and justice, and goodness, and even with reason and conscience on its side, is unable to control the person who is yet under it, and is destitute of the grace of the gospel. From all this follows the grand deduction which the apostle intends to make, viz., that we must be "under grace," in order to subdue our sinful passions and desires. In other words: "Christ is our *ἀγιασμός*, as well as our *δικαιοσύνη*."

And now, at the close of this whole representation we may well ask: What stronger proof could the apostle produce, than that which he has brought forward, in order to show that the law is ineffectual as the means of subduing the power of sin and of sanctifying sinners? The law with all its terrors and strictness, even when reason and conscience are on its side, cannot deliver *ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*. On the contrary, its very restraints are the occasion of the sinner's guilt being aggravated, because his passions are excited by them to more vehement opposition. Does not all this fully and satisfactorily establish the assertion implied in ver. 5. *τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου*? And yet, with what admirable caution and prudence is the whole of this nice and difficult discussion conducted? The law stands fully vindicated. Even the sinner himself, who abuses it to his own aggravated guilt and ruin, is obliged to concede that it is holy, and just, and good. But with all its excellence and glory, with all its promises and threatenings, it never did and never can redeem

one soul from death, nor "hide a multitude of sins." Christ is, after all, our only and all-sufficient Saviour; his is "the only name given under heaven among men whereby we can be saved." He is "our wisdom, our *justification*, our *sanctification*, and our redemption." What then becomes of all the vain and selfish hopes of the legalist? The apostle has scattered them to the winds, and showed that 'no man can come unto the Father, except by the Son.'

That there is, after all, adequate help for the poor perishing sinner, the apostle next proceeds to show. What the law could not accomplish, Christ has effected. That control over the carnal passions and desires, which no legal penalties and no remonstrances of reason and conscience would give to him, the grace of the Holy Spirit given through the gospel, does impart. No longer does he live to the flesh; no more does sin have a habitual and supreme control over him. Such is the happy state to which the perishing sinner comes, by being brought *ὑπὸ χάριν*; and this, he has abundant assurance, will be a permanent state, *i. e.*, his 'grace will be crowned with glory.' Such is the theme of the next chapter; but before we proceed to the consideration of it, I must solicit the attention of the reader to some additional hints respecting the grounds on which chap. vii. 5—25 has been interpreted, as having respect to a person who is *under the law* and *not under grace*. But for these, I must refer him to the *Excursus* upon this chapter.

CHAP. VIII. 1—11.

IN the preceding chapter (verses 7—25), the apostle has illustrated and enforced the proposition made in chap. vii. 5, *viz.*, that while in a carnal state, our sinful passions are not only exercised, but that they are even rendered more vigorous or energetic by reason of the restraints which the divine law puts upon them; and consequently, that they 'bring forth fruit unto death.' The law, then, being thus abused by our unholy inclinations and desires, and made the occasion of increasing our sin and enhancing our condemnation, can never be the means of our salvation or deliverance from that very penalty which itself pronounces on all transgressors.

The present chapter exhibits the *antithesis* of all this. It is a commentary upon vii. 6, or at least an enlargement and illustration of the sentiment there exhibited. As verse 6 there is the *antithesis* of verse 5; so here viii. 1—11 is the *antithesis* of vii. 7—25.

(1) **Ἀγα νῦν*, *now then*, *i. e.*, now agreeably to this, or in accordance with 'what has been said. **Ἀγα* is usually *illative*, but not always. It is so here, at least in part. But it does not stand connected with the next preceding sentence. The reader must go back beyond the illustration in vii. 7—25, to vii. 6, and vii. 4, in order to find the connection of the *ἄγα νῦν* here. The course of the sentiment is thus: 'Since ye have been absolved from your legal state, *i. e.*, since ye have quit your hope of being sanctified and saved by the law, and have become united to Christ in order that you may bring forth fruit unto God and serve him in newness of spirit, there is no condemnation to you in your present state.' This of course implies that there would have been condemnation to them, had they remained under the law.

Οὐδὲν κατὰκριμα here means, of course, *no condemnation* which is to be carried into execution, *no penalty* actually to be inflicted. The gospel condemns all sin either in believers or others, with even more strictness than the law (see Matt. v.); but under it a way of pardon is provided, by which the condemned may obtain remission of the penalty that they have incurred.

The reason why the apostle here mentions the subject of condemnation is, because he had just called the attention of the reader to it, by the exclamation: *Τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*; Besides, sin and condemnation are inseparably connected; and hence it is, that in verse 2 the apostle speaks of "deliverance from sin and death" by the power and grace of the gospel. The subject of *death* or *condemnation* is, however, merely *secondary* here; for chaps. i.—v. fully treat of this. It is *sanctification*, and not justification which, as has been repeatedly remarked, is the main subject of discussion here. This is made quite plain by verse 3, seq.

Τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, *i. e.*, to those who are truly and spiritually united to Christ; comp. 2 Cor. v. 17. Rom. xvi. 7—11. Phil. i. 1. 1 Cor. i. 2. Erasmus rightly: *Qui in Christo insiti sunt*. The ground of this idiom, is the *spiritual* union which exists between the Head of the church and its members; comp. Eph. v. 30. 1 Cor. vi. 15. xii. 27. Eph. iv. 15, 16. John xvii. 11, 21, 23, xiv. 20. 1 John iv. 13. iii. 24.

Μὴ κατὰ πνεῦμα is marked by Knapp as spurious, and is omitted by Mill, Semler, Bengel, Griesbach, Vater, Lachmann, and Rückert. Many critics regard it as being spurious. It is omitted in manuscripts C., D., F., G.; also in many versions and fathers.

Only the last clause, however, *i. e.*, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα, is omitted in manuscripts A., B.; also in the Vulgate, Syriac, and Armenian versions; likewise in Basil, Chrysostom, and many of the fathers. It is a matter of little or no importance whether the words are received or rejected, either in whole or in part, so far as the sense of the whole passage is concerned. Besides, the very same words occur again in verse 4; which is the reason why many critics have supposed that they are not genuine here. But this argument cannot be of much weight; or if it is, then we may as well prove the spuriousness of verse 4 by assuming that it is a mere repetition of this, as the spuriousness of this by assuming it to be a repetition of verse 4. On the whole it is quite clear, that there exists, in the connection of the discourse here, no imperious reason for rejecting the clause in question. Only the *external* evidence makes the genuineness of it doubtful.

If the clause be retained, the sense of it is: 'Who do not live in such a manner as to gratify the desires of the flesh, but walk in such a manner as accords with the desires which the spirit imparts.' The whole clause is to be regarded as an *exegesis*, added in order to characterize those who are in *Christ Jesus*.

(2) Ὁ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος κ. τ. λ. The word νόμος here will be best understood by referring back to vii. 21, 23, 25, where, in νόμον, ἔτιον νόμον, and νόμῳ ἀμαρτίας, the word means *dictate* (as we say), *dominatio*, *jussum*, *præceptum*. As νόμος ἀμαρτίας means *dictate of sin*, so νόμος Πνεύματος (the opposite of νόμος ἀμαρτίας) must mean *dictate of the Spirit*, *i. e.*, the influences of the Spirit which direct or control our inclination.

Πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, *of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus*, *i. e.*, of the Spirit which imparts true, quickening, Christian influence or a Christian disposition; comp. as to the influences of the Spirit, verses 9, 11 below; also 1 Cor. ii. 10, 12, xii. 4, 7, 11, 13. That something different from the natural powers or the natural conscience of men is meant, seems to be quite plain, from comparing the antithesis here with what is asserted of the natural conscience in vii. 15—25. In this latter passage, we see how inefficacious natural conscience is to control the passions and to free the sinner from the condemning sentence of God's holy law. I take ζωῆς to be *abstract* for *concrete*, *i. e.*, a noun designating quality and holding the place of an adjective; the meaning of which is *life-giving*, *quicken*ing. ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ means the same as in verse 1. The sentiment then is this; 'The dictate of or the inclination imparted by the Spirit, who quickens those that once were dead in trespasses and sins, and gives

them the predominant inclination to live in Christ." To construe νόμος here as meaning *rule, precept*, viz., of the gospel, as many have done, is to lose sight of the antithesis to νόμος ἁμαρτίας, which is evidently intended. Much controversy has been excited by this verse, viz., whether law means rule, prescription, inclination, or the new spiritual economy. To me it seems so plain, that νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος is here used in opposition to the ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι in vii. 23 above, that I do not see any occasion for controversy. *The law of the new man which results from the influences of the Spirit who imparts life in Christ Jesus or true Christian life*, is a plain and obvious sense, and one which accords with Christian experience.

This influence of the Spirit, Paul goes on to say, *freed them from the law of sin and [from] death*. Here (as this is the antithesis of the former clause of the verse), *the law of sin* means *the dictate [jussum or impetus] of sin*, which leads to death or condemnation. To suppose ἀπό to be repeated or implied before τοῦ θανάτου, seems to be the most correct method of explaining the phrases. The *law, i. e., dictate of death* would hardly make a tolerable sense here. Yet, if any one prefers, he may construe it thus: 'The law, viz., impetus, which leads to sin and condemnation.' The apostle does not mean to say, that Christians who are under the influences of 'the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,' are perfectly sinless; but they are freed from the *predominating* power of sinful inclinations, such as is described in the preceding chapter, verses 7—23, and such as subjects them to the penalty of the divine law. More than this need not be attached to his words; and more than this cannot properly be attached to them, when the antithesis in the preceding chapter is taken into the account, or when facts themselves are regarded.

∴ (3) Τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου, *for that which the law could not effect, or that which was impossible for the law*, viz., that which the law of works could not effect or accomplish. What that is, is designated by the sequel, viz., the subjugation of sin or the sinful affections and lusts of men, the slaying of the *carnal* man. This, as the preceding chapter abundantly shows, could not be effected by the law; which served rather to irritate and rouse up the carnal man than to subjugate and destroy him. γὰρ is prefixed to a clause introduced for the sake of illustration or confirmation.

Ἐν ᾧ ἡσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός, *because it was weak through the flesh*, i. e., because, through the strength of our carnal inclinations and desires, it was unable to regulate our lives so that we should be per-

fect or entirely free from sin ; comp. vii. 14—25. *Σάρξ* here, as often elsewhere, designates carnal appetites or inclinations.

What the law of works could not effect, *ὁ Θεὸς . . . ἁμαρτίας*, *God sending his own Son in the likeness of our sinful flesh*, i. e., God, sending his Son, clothed with a body like that of corrupt and sinful men or having a nature like to theirs [did accomplish]. That some verb is here implied, the nature of the sentence seems necessarily to indicate. *Ἐποίησε*, therefore, or some verb of an equivalent meaning, should be supplied. Another method of solving the difficulty here is to translate thus: 'As to the impossibility of the law, &c.' But the idea in this case seems to be left in an imperfect state. The simple meaning is: 'What the law could not accomplish, God by the mission of his Son did accomplish.' As to *ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, comp. John i. 14. Rom. i. 3. Heb. ii. 14, 17. iv. 15. Phil. ii. 7. Gal. iv. 4. 1 John iv. 2, 3. 1 Tim. iii. 16. The phrase *ἐν ὁμοιώματι* does not mean, as the Docetæ construed it, merely an *apparent* likeness of human nature and not a real one; for in Heb. ii. 17, Christ is said *ὁμοιωθῆναι κατὰ πάντα*, in respect to his brethren, i. e., men. That Jesus possessed a nature *really* and *truly* like our own, is established beyond all doubt by the passages above quoted, and others of the like tenor. Equally certain is it, that although he took on him the *likeness* of sinful flesh, yet he did not on that account become a sinner; see Heb. iv. 15. 2 Cor. v. 21. Heb. vii. 26. The amount therefore of the expression before us, is, that Christ participated in our common nature. He took on him such a *physical* nature as sinful men possess; and with this also he assumed those powers, faculties, and susceptibilities, which belong to human nature as consisting of *soul* and *body*. In other words, all the *pura naturalia* necessary to constitute a real and proper man, belonging to him. Accordingly the apostle represents him as having the *sympathies* of our nature, and as feeling the power of temptation in like manner with us, although without sin; Heb. iv. 15. It is not *susceptibility* of being excited by sinful objects, then, which makes men sinners, but it is the *yielding* to this excitement. This Jesus did not.

Καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας, i. e., *καὶ προσφορὰ περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, *and by an offering for sin*. *Ἀμαρτία* itself, in Hebrew-Greek, often corresponds to *חַטָּאת* *sin-offering*. The phrase *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* may be taken here as elliptical. The full form would be (as above) *προσφορὰ περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, *by an offering for sin*; but the *elliptical* phrase, *περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, is frequently used instead of the entire one; comp. Heb. x. 10, with x. 8,

6. Lev. iv. 3. Num. viii. 8. Ps. xxxix. 6 (Sept.) There can be no serious difficulty in regard to such an ellipsis. Moreover, that ἁμαρτία alone is sometimes used for *sin-offering* (ἡμῶν), seems to be altogether probable from 2 Cor. v. 21, ἁμαρτίαν ἱστοῖσσι; also from Heb. ix. 28, χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας. In this way περὶ ἁμαρτίας would be construed as designating the way or means by which Christ condemned or destroyed sin, viz., by giving himself an *offering for sin*, and so procuring sanctifying grace for sinners.

But although I adopted this interpretation in the former edition of this work, there seems to be some ground of difficulty in respect to the sense of περὶ. This preposition has, indeed, quite a *generic* meaning, and is capable of designating a considerable number of *specific* relations. The general notion of it, when used before the Genitive, as here, is to express the relation toward an object (which the Genitive of the noun designates) of some action or active energy, which is designated by a verb standing in connection with it. It may mean, therefore, *in respect to*, *on account of*, *for the sake of*, *for*, *concerning*, *respecting*, *because of*, *from* or *out of*, and (in a local sense) *around*, *about*, *near by*. In significations so multiform and generic as these, it is easy to perceive that the latitude in which περὶ is used must be very great. But we will confine our inquiries to its usage in connection with *expiations*, *sacrifices*, &c., in the New Testament; which obviously has a direct bearing on the present case. Mark i. 44, 'Offer what is commanded, περὶ τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ,' i. e., *for the sake of* accomplishing or effecting the requisite legal purification; so also in Luke v. 14. In Luke ii. 27, the parents of Jesus are represented as going into the temple 'to do as the law required, i. e., to present oblation, περὶ αὐτοῦ, *in his behalf*, *on his account*, *for him*.' So in Heb. v. 3, 'offerings περὶ τοῦ λαοῦ, *for the people*, i. e., *in their behalf*.' But when ἁμαρτία follows περὶ, there must of necessity be a different shade of sense. Thus in Heb. x. 18 προσφορὰ περὶ ἁμαρτίας, Heb. x. 26 θυσία περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν, Heb. x. 6, 8 περὶ ἁμαρτίας (elliptically for προσφορὰ περὶ ἁμαρτίας, comp. v. 18), 1 Peter iii. 18 περὶ ἁμαρτίας ἵπαδε, 1 John ii. 2. iv. 10 ἱλασμὸς περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, it must be understood that the sacrifice was *occasioned by* sin, and that it is offered *in relation to* sin, i. e., in order to make atonement for it. The idea that sin occasioned the sacrifice, or the suffering of Christ (1 Pet. iii. 18), or the propitiatory act (ἱλασμὸς), lies plainly upon the surface of the phraseology. *For sin*, i. e., *on account of sin*, *because of sin*, we must in such cases translate περὶ

ἀμαρτίας; and it is quite plain, that the design of a writer who uses such an expression, is to show that the effects or evil consequences of sin are to be removed by sacrifice or suffering or a propitiatory act on account of it.

The way is now open to construe *περὶ ἀμαρτίας* in the verse before us. I would connect it mentally with *πίμψας τὸν ἑαυτοῦ Υἱόν*, and make two affirmations of the apostle, viz., (a) God sent his Son in the likeness of men, i. e., with the nature of those whom he was to redeem. (b) God sent him *καὶ περὶ ἀμαρτίας*, also on account of sin, i. e., to make atonement for it, to prevent its evil effects. If one should ask, 'why the prepositions are changed and with them the mode of construction, *ἐν* being first employed and then *περὶ*;' the simple and satisfactory answer is, that the nature of the sentiment required it, and such changes in construction are frequent in the writings of Paul. The reason why the apostle employs *περὶ ἀμαρτίας* here, rather than some other equivalent expression, seems plainly to be of a *paronomasiac* nature, i. e., because he had just said, *ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἀμαρτίας*. And for a like reason, and in reference to the two last words of this clause, he says immediately afterwards, *κατέκρινε τὴν ἀμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί*, i. e., the sin already mentioned (the article before *ἀμαρτίαν* is used here, but not before), and the sin which has its seat in the flesh, i. e., in our carnal passions and appetites, *τῷ σαρκί* (with the article) being here employed. The whole phraseology is *paronomasiac* in a peculiar degree.

Κατέκρινε . . . σαρκί, condemned sin in the flesh, i. e., (as many explain) condemned the sin which fleshly appetites occasion, condemned our carnal appetites and desires. The word *κατέκρινε* has occasioned much difficulty among critics. The reason why it is employed here, seems to be, that the writer had just used *κατάκριμα* in verse 1. The antithesis stands thus: 'There is now no *κατάκριμα* for Christians; but there is a *κατάκριμα* of their carnal appetites and desires;' i. e., Christians are indeed delivered from the penalty of death, but their sinful lusts are condemned to death or slain, in consequence of the provision made by Jesus Christ for their deliverance. This antithesis seems to have escaped the notice of most commentators; and thus much perplexity has attended the exegesis of *κατέκρινε*. In such a *paronomasiac* use of words, we are not to feel obliged to remain by the mere literal and usual meaning, but to give the latitude which the nature of the connection requires. The meaning of the apostle evidently is, that instead of being condemned themselves,

Christians experience, through the grace of Christ, the condemnation of the sin within them which works their ruin. The very same idea is substantially taught here, which is insisted on at large in chap. vi. 2—11, where the *old man* is represented as *crucified, mortified, &c.* The difference of language is merely accidental, being occasioned by paronomasia; the expected consequence of *κατέκρινε ἁμαρτίαν* here is plainly that Christians should yield obedience to the divine precepts; ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα κ. τ. λ., verse 4. And so according to chap. vi. 11 seq., he whose *old man is crucified* lives henceforth to God. Such of course is the consequence of the carnal affections *being put to death*, or (to use the language of our text) *condemned, i. e., to death*, *κτείνε* not *ἔκρινε*). All this is effected by the mission of Christ, who came to save his people from the *power* as well as from the penalty of sin.

The words *ἐν σαρκί* here may be joined with *ἁμαρτίαν*, and so indicate what Paul has so often declared in the preceding context, viz., that sin is occasioned by *fleshly* appetites and desires, or that the *carnal* man is a sinful one; and so the majority of expositors understand it. In such a case *τὸ ἐν σαρκί* would be the usual and full mode of expression; but the article is often omitted without any change of the sense; New Test. Gramm. § 92. *b.* But *ἐν σαρκί* may be joined in sense with *κατέκρινε*, and so indicate the manner or means in or by which Christ condemned sin or put to death the sinful principle, viz. that he did so by assuming our fleshly nature (*ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*). Reiche and others prefer this construction as the more apposite and congruous. Either sense is good, and allowed by the idiom of the apostle.

The course of thought, which is somewhat obscured by the arrangement of the words, may be made plain to the reader by a somewhat different position of some parts of the sentence. *E. g.*, ‘God sent his own Son, in the likeness of men and on account of their sins, and destroyed the power of sin in their carnal nature, (which the law could not possibly effect because it was bereaved of its energy through the strength of the carnal affections), in order that the precepts of the law which demands holiness of life, might be obeyed by those who walk according to the dictates of his spirit.’ In this way the whole is freed from embarrassment.

(4) Τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου, *the precept of the law*. So in the Septuagint *δικαίωμα* is used to translate דִּבְרֵי, מִצְוָה, and חֻקִּים. Πληρωθῇ ἐν ἡμῖν, *might be accomplished or done by us*; viz., that we might be

obedient to divine precepts requiring holiness of life, and no longer devoted to the lusts of the flesh, who are influenced and guided by the Spirit.

Here then we have a view of the end which is accomplished by the death of Christ; not only the end, but one great end, viz., the sanctification of believers. This is one of the passages, which shows the whole drift of the discourse in chap. vii. and viii. 1—11. Ἐν ἡμῖν may be rendered *by us* or *in us*. In the latter case it would designate the internal spiritual influence of the death of Christ upon believers, inasmuch as it causes a conformity of spirit or heart to him; and this is the most probable meaning.

Some understand this verse as having respect to an *imputed* and *vicarious* fulfilling of the law, or the imputation of Christ's obedience to believers. But the context shows plainly, that their *actual* sanctification is here the subject of discussion; it is the mortification or death of sin in them, which he is treating of.

(5) Οἱ γὰρ . . . φρονῶσι, *for they who are in a carnal state, have regard to carnal things.* Γὰρ *illustrantis*. Κατὰ σὰρκα is here used, because the same phrase stands in the preceding verse. εἶναι κατὰ σὰρκα, *to be according to the flesh*, does not differ in sense from εἶναι σαρκικοί, or from *in σαρκὶ εἶναι*, when taken in the figurative sense. The meaning plainly is, 'to act in accordance with carnal desires and affections.'

Οἱ δὲ . . . πνεύματος, *but they who are in a spiritual state, have regard to spiritual things.* Comp. verses 2 and 9—11. Οἱ κατὰ πνεῦμα being the antithesis of οἱ κατὰ σὰρκα, is easily understood.

(6) Τὸ γὰρ . . . θάνατος, *for the carnal mind is death.* Γὰρ *illustrantis* again, where we might naturally expect δὲ. However, I take verse 6 to be co-ordinate with verse 5, and the γὰρ here to indicate an illustration of what is said in verse 4. So Rückert. The connection seems to be thus: 'The precepts of the law are obeyed by those who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit; but carnal men will not give heed to spiritual things, and their pursuits lead to death; while the *spiritual mind*, i. e., a mind conformed to the dictates of the Spirit, stands connected with life and peace; or life and peace, i. e., eternal happiness, are the consequence or fruits of it.' This is not *direct* confirmation of what is asserted in verse 4, but is an illustration of the condition there described, by showing its connections and results, and also those of the opposite condition.

Φρόνημα σαρκός means a mind or will conformed to carnal passions and appetites.

(7) Next follows the ground or reason why this is and will be so. Διότι . . . εἰς Θεόν, *because the carnal mind is enmity toward God, i. e., is inimical to God, or (in plain terms) hates him, dislikes his precepts, his character, and his ways.* So the sequel, τῷ γὰρ κ. τ. λ. The abstract noun ἐχθρὰ, is here used for the adjective ἐχθρὰ (with accent on the ultimate), *inimical, unfriendly.* The proof that the sentiment just uttered is correct, follows in the next clause.

Τῷ γὰρ . . . δύναται, *for it is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can be; i. e., it does not obey the precepts of God's law, nor can it obey them.* The very nature of a carnal mind consists in gratifying carnal and sinful desires, viz., those desires which the law of God prohibits. Of course this mind or disposition, so far as it prevails, leads to the very opposite of subjection to God's law, i. e., leads to disobedience. From its very nature this cannot be otherwise; for when it is otherwise, the mind is no longer carnal.

The first γὰρ here, in τῷ γὰρ νόμῳ, is γὰρ *illustrantis vel confirmantis*, i. e., it stands before a clause designed to illustrate and confirm the preceding declaration. If the carnal mind does not subject itself to the law of God, then it must be *enmity* to him; for his law is merely an expression of his will and character. A want of subjection then to this law, is a plain indication that the carnal mind dislikes it, i. e., hates it. But why? The *fact* is plainly asserted; and the fact, as plainly, is evidence of what had been before asserted. But how shall this fact be accounted for, viz., that the carnal mind is not subject to the law of God? The apostle gives the ground of it: οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται ὑποτάσσεσθαι κ. τ. λ.. Here then is a passage on which the advocates of metaphysical reasoning with respect to *ability* in men have speculated, and about which they have disputed not a little. What is the *cannot*? One answers: It is a *will not*; another, that it is to be literally understood, without any abatement. So Luther, *de Servo Arbitrio*; and so many others. That the phrase stands in the way of Pelagianism, and indeed of all *unqualified* asserions of ability in the carnal man; at least, that it may be easily and naturally so construed; it is not difficult to see. After all, however, nothing can be farther from correct principles of interpretation, than to suppose that the apostle had here any reference in his own mind to the psychological metaphysics of the present day. What the

natural and physiological powers of the sinner are, is not here the subject of discussion. Thus much the writer appears to say, and no more, viz., that the *φρόνημα σαρκός* is not subject to God's law, and cannot be subject to it. And is not this plainly and obviously true? So far as *φρόνημα σαρκός* goes, it is directly the opposite of subjection in its very nature. "How," says Augustine (and much to the point), "can snow be warmed? For when it is melted and becomes warm, it is no longer snow." And so it is with the carnal mind. Just so long as it exists, and in just such proportion as it exists, it is and will be enmity against God and disobey his law. But whether the sinner who cherishes this *φρόνημα σαρκός* is not actuated by other principles also, and urged by other motives, and possessed of ability to turn from his evil ways—ability arising from other sources—does not seem to be satisfactorily determined by this expression. What Chrysostom says, deserves very serious attention: "He does not affirm that the bad man cannot become a good one; but that, while he continues to be bad, he cannot possibly obey God. When converted, however, it is easy to be good and to obey God." So much, then, seems to be decided by this passage, viz., that so long as this *φρόνημα σαρκός* is the *predominant* principle within him, so long he will continually disobey the law of God. Such a disposition is in itself utterly incompatible with obedience.

(8) *Οἱ δὲ . . . δύνανται, those then who are in the flesh, cannot please God.* The particle *δέ* creates some difficulty here. One use of it is, to introduce clauses *continuative* of the narrative or reasoning, which clauses may add some new circumstance, or may resume a declaration before made but now stated in somewhat different terms, &c.; comp. *δέ* in Rom. viii. 28. Mark xvi. 8. Acts xxiii. 13. Rom. iii. 22. 1 Cor. x. 11. xv. 56. James ii. 15. So here *οἱ δὲ ἐν σαρκί* *κ. τ. λ.* resumes the sentiment contained in *τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς ἔχθρα* *κ. τ. λ.* and repeats it in another form. Moreover, this latter form has special reference to vii. 5, 18.

But who are those that are *ἐν σαρκί*? They are those, "who are not led by the Spirit of God," comp. verses 9, 13, 14; who follow fleshly desires and appetites. In other words, all men who are not regenerated or sanctified, who are in a natural state, are *ἐν σαρκί*, *carnal*, and therefore are influenced and guided by their carnal desires and affections; comp. John iii. 6. 1 Cor. ii. 14. Eph. ii. 1—3. Col. ii. 13. Consequently, as may well be supposed, *Θεῷ ἀρέσαι οὐ δύνανται* they cannot please God; i. e., while they live in such a state,

and are led on by such carnal desires, they can do nothing which is pleasing to God. The οὐ δύνασται here is to be understood in the same way as the οὐ δύνασται in the preceding verse.

(9) The opposite character is now brought into view, in order to render the sentiment more striking. Ἔμεις δὲ . . . ὑμεῖς, *you, however, are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, provided the Spirit of God dwells in you.* The δὲ here is *distinctive*. If the Spirit of God dwells in any one, he cannot be in a carnal state; for the Spirit dwells in and guides only those who are *the sons of God* (verse 14), and therefore his friends, verse 17. Such cannot be at enmity with God.

The πνεῦμα Θεοῦ which is here mentioned, is the same as that to which the writer has all along referred. In the next verse it is called πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ. As to the *dwelling* of the Spirit in Christians, comp. 1 Cor. iii. 16, 17. vi. 19. 2 Cor. vi. 16; and with these texts comp. John xvii. 23. xiv. 23—36.

Πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ is the Spirit which Christ imparts, or the Spirit which makes us like to Christ. Either sense is good here. The first is perhaps the more probable meaning; at least a comparison with John xiv. 15—18, 26. xv. 26, would seem to render it so. It is remarkable that in this short paragraph (verses 9—11), πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ, Χριστός, and τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἐγγεραντος Ἰησοῦν (i.e., πνεῦμα Θεοῦ Πατρὸς), should be exchanged for each other, and plainly stand for one and the same thing. Is not this evidence, that the apostle saw and felt no inconsistency in speaking of Christ, and of the Spirit of God or of Christ, as *in some respects* distinct, and yet in others as constituting a unity of nature? There seems to me to be an entire simplicity in the mode in which Paul has treated this subject; a subject which has unhappily been made so complex and intricate, by the subtilties of the schools. The simple *facts*, that Christ and the Spirit are *divine*, are one in nature with God, and yet in some respect distinct from the Father, seem to be the basis of the apostle's language here and elsewhere; while all speculation on the subject, all attempts to make out nice distinctions or metaphysical definitions, are entirely neglected. Whenever the time shall come, that Christians are content with simple facts relative to this great subject, much that has proved to be injurious to the prosperity of religion, will be done away.

Οὐκ ἔχει, *possesseth not; i. e., if the Spirit of Christ does not habitually dwell in and influence any one.*—Οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ, *he is not*

his, *i. e.*, he is no Christian, he is not a true disciple or follower of Christ. The *δε* at the beginning of the clause seems to be *continuative*, and therefore may be translated *now*. If any choose they may render it as *adversative*, *but*.

(10) *Εἰ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν*, *but if Christ be in you, i. e.*, if he dwell in you by his Spirit, if ye have the Spirit of Christ, if ye are habitually influenced by him in your lives and conversation. The *δε* here is plainly *adversative*.

Τὸ μὲν σῶμα . . . δικαιοσύνη, *the body indeed is mortified on account of sin, but the spirit lives on account of righteousness*; a passage about which (including ver. 11) critics have been greatly divided. There are three methods in which it has been interpreted; each of which must be briefly noticed.

(a) *νεκρὸν* means *spiritually dead* (as often elsewhere); and the general sentiment will then be: 'If the Spirit of Christ dwell in you, then, although your bodies (*i. e.*, you) are spiritually dead, that is, are still the seat of divers carnal affections and lusts (verse 10), yet you shall spiritually live; for the Spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the dead will subdue these forbidden affections and desires, and gradually make you entirely conformed to his will, ver. 11.' To this effect, Chrysostom, Erasmus, Piscator, Locke, C. Schmid, and others.

The objection made to this exegesis, is, that in ver. 11 the apostle speaks of the quickening of those bodies which are *θνητὸς*; *mortal, frail, dying*; an epithet that seems to be given to our frail, *physical* body as such, and not given to it merely as the corrupt seat of lusts. As it does not appear that *θνητός* of itself ever has the same figurative sense which *νεκρός* often has, *i. e.*, *morally dead or corrupt*; so one might be prone to conclude, that *ζωοποίησι* in this case does not indicate the *spiritual* vivification which the exegesis already mentioned assigns to it, but rather the restoration of the body to life at the period of the resurrection. I shall take farther notice of this exegesis in the sequel.

(b) Another class of interpreters explain thus: 'The body is dead *in respect to sin, i. e.*, sin has no more power to excite its evil appetites and desires. The soul has, moreover, the principle of spiritual life; and he who raised up Jesus will also give to your bodies [*viz.*, at the resurrection], a new principle of spiritual life or animation.' So for substance, Origen, Theodoret, Clarius, Grotius, Raphael, Taylor, Melancthon, Bucer, and others.

The objection to this is, that it renders it necessary to construe

διὰ before the Accusative as meaning *in respect to, in reference to*; which can hardly be admitted. Moreover it destroys the antithesis in ver. 10. It renders quite insipid, also, the antithesis between *σῶμα νεκρόν* in ver. 10, and *ζωοποιήσῃ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα* in ver. 11.

(c) Another method of interpreting the phrase in question is this: 'The body must die [physically] because of sin; but the spiritual part lives; and even the body itself will be made to live at the period of the resurrection, i. e., it will be raised up and become like Christ's own glorious body.' So Tholuck, Flatt, Calvin, Augustine, Beza, and others.

Understood in this way, the passage may be regarded as designed to foreclose an objection which would arise in the mind of some reader, who might ask: 'Are *all* the consequences of sin, then, removed by the death of Christ?' To this the apostle may be viewed as replying in the verse before us: 'No, not absolutely and entirely all. Natural death still remains. But a glorious resurrection will follow this; so that in the end all its consequences will be done away.'

But there are weighty objections against this mode of interpretation. If *νεκρόν* is to be understood in its *literal* sense, then of course the following *ζωή* must be understood literally also; and what sense would it make to say, that 'the soul has *natural life* because of righteousness,' when all know that the wicked are as immortal as the righteous? But if *νεκρόν* means *dead* in the sense of having our carnal passions *mortified*, then *ζωή* would of course designate the peace and happiness of the soul or spirit.

The view which I entertain of the passage agrees substantially with the first of the above interpretations. I understand *σῶμα νεκρόν* in ver. 10, as not indicating [physical] death; nor yet as meaning *death* in the sense of being *dead in trespasses and sins*, i. e., destitute of spiritual life, or in a state of death or condemnation. I take it to be used in the same sense as *θάνατος* in vi. 4, 5; as expressing an idea exactly kindred with *συνσταυρώθη* and *καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, in vi. 6; the same with *ἀποθανών* in vi. 7; *ἀπεθάνομεν* in vi. 8; and *νεκρούς* in vi. 11. That the writer did connect viii. 10, 11, in his own mind with vi. 4—13, appears quite plain from his diction and general course of thought. In vi. 12 he calls the body *θνητόν*, just as in viii. 11; and in the former passage he evidently means to designate by it a corporeal, material, perishable body; which is also the sense, for substance, in viii. 11.

But all the words above mentioned, in chap. vi., serve merely to characterize what we call *the mortification* [the putting to death] *of the body*, i. e., the subduing and mortifying our carnal desires and affections, which are cherished by or originate from the body. I understand νεκρόν in viii. 10 (as I do νεκρός in vi. 11), to designate this state or condition, viz., a state in which *the old man is crucified*, in which the carnal desires of the body are mortified and subdued. This exegesis has, at least, plain analogy on its side.

Interpreted in this way the sentiment of the whole passage would run thus: 'If the Spirit of Christ dwells in any one, his body is indeed dead on account of sin, i. e., the old man is crucified, or he undergoes mortification as to his bodily and sinful appetites; but his *spirit* is rendered *happy on account of righteousness*, i. e., because of conformity to the requisitions of the gospel. Yea, if the Spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the dead dwells in any man, that same Spirit will quicken, i. e., impart life to, his mortal body;' in other words, he will not suffer it to remain a mere σῶμα νεκρόν, but make it an instrument of righteousness (vi. 12, 13, 19), and give it a power of being subservient to the glory of God.

By degrees the Christian "brings under his body," and keeps it in subjection. At first it is, as it were *crucifying the old man*; but in the sequel, the grace of God makes conquest easy and even delightful. It is such a quickening of our bodies, a converting of them into "instruments of righteousness," to which the apostle seems to me here to refer. One circumstance appears to be conclusive in regard to this exegesis; this is, that the apostle here describes the Spirit which "quickens the bodies" of Christians, as being the Spirit which *dwells in them*, ἐνοικοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν. Where is the resurrection of our physical bodies, at the last day, attributed to the *sanctifying* Spirit in believers? Very different is the statement in Col. ii. 12, 13. Eph. i. 19, 20. ii. 5, 6. Rom. vi. 4. It is, then, the Spirit who dwells in believers that is to quicken them in the sense which is here meant; and what can this be, except the one designated in vi. 12, 13, 19?

The body is often the occasion of sin and sorrow, it is a σῶμα σαράνου. It requires to be mortified, and crucified. But the Spirit of God in believers, by degrees brings them to yield their members as instruments of righteousness. Then is the old man, the body of sin, dead; and the body itself, like the spirit, is *quicken*ed in the service of God. Verse 13 seems clearly to indicate that the present

passage is to be thus understood; for there, τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος σαυροῦς appears plainly to convey the same meaning as σῶμα νεκρόν. The object of the writer, as I apprehend it, is to show Christians, that although mortification and self-denial must be practised in order to subjugate carnal desires, yet even here they may expect relief in due time. Victory repeated becomes easier. The enemy often vanquished, becomes weaker. The Spirit of Christ, in fine, brings the believer at last fully and freely to dedicate all that he has and is to the service of his Lord and Master; so that no discouragement should be felt, because the way is at first rough and difficult. It is a path which conducts to life.

(11) Εἰ δὲ τὸ . . . ὑμῶν. *The Spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the dead, is the Spirit of God the Father, or the Spirit of God; comp. ver. 9, also Col. ii. 12, 13. Eph. i. 19, 20. ii. 5, 6. Rom. vi. 4. Δέ here is a continuative; εἰ δὲ if also, if moreover. Ζωοποιεῖς, will give life to, will animate, i. e., will make them active instruments. Διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν . . . ὑμῶν, i. e., the same Spirit who dwells in you, will enable you to quicken the θνητὸν σῶμα or σῶμα σαυάτου, which now occasions so much pain and mortification, and to make it a willing instrument of righteousness. But if verses 10, 11, be construed of literal death and life, then all the promise that is made to Christians here would be, that their bodies shall be raised up at the last day; and the inference would seem to be, that the wicked will not be raised up; which we know to be contrary to the doctrine of Paul and other N. Test. writers. Such an exegesis, then, although it is the most common, seems to reduce the whole passage to comparative insignificance, or else makes it speak that which is contradictory to Christian doctrine.*

It is worthy of particular remark, that the last clause of ver. 11, viz., διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν . . . ὑμῶν has been the subject of much critical conjecture and variation in its reading. The MSS. A., B., C., (which has αὐτῷ for αὐτοῦ,) 12 Codd. minusc., and many of the fathers, exhibit the common reading, viz., διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος; while διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν αὐτῷ πνεῦμα is the reading of D., E., F., G., the majority of MSS. minusc., Syr., Erp., Sahid., Vul., Ital., Origen, Ephiph., Phot., Chrys., (usually,) Method., Theod., Maxim., Theoph., Œcum., Iren., Tertul., Hilar., Ruf., Sedulius. This seems to be best supported, and is preferred by Erasmus, Stephens, Mill, Bengel, Griesbach, Knapp, Koppe, and many recent critics. The internal probability is strong against the first reading in the Genitive;

for *διὰ* with the Gen. would denote the agent by whom the change in the bodies of Christians is to be made; whereas that agent has been already named, viz., *ὁ ὑψίστος τὸν Χριστόν*. The reading *διὰ τὸ . . . πνεῦμα*, in the Accus., of course obliges us to translate, *BECAUSE OF the Spirit which dwelleth in you*. In this way the last clause assigns a reason or ground why he who raised up Jesus from the dead, will quicken his true followers; it is because he has given them his Spirit; and having done thus much for them, he will complete the work which he has begun.

On the whole, amid the almost endless diversities of explanation which have been exhibited here, it seems to me that very little regard has been paid to the analogy of the course of thought and diction in chapter vi., which corresponds so nearly as to remove all serious difficulty. There Christians are represented as *dead* to sin; their old man as *crucified*; and there, as Christ was raised from the dead by the glorious power of the Father, so are they quickened in like manner, in order that *they may live unto God*. If therefore it should be said (as it has been), that 'inasmuch as the raising of Christ from the dead was an act of *physical* power (so to speak), in like manner the raising up of believers here must be regarded in the same light; the obvious answer is, that Paul goes through an extended comparison of the like nature in chap. vi., where the death of Christ and his resurrection are all along taken in the natural and *physiological* sense, while the death of believers and their resurrection are taken throughout in a *moral* sense. What hinders us then from regarding the present passage in the same light? Indeed, after all which the apostle has said in chapter vi. in relation to this subject, I think there should be strong and plain reasons given for a *physiological* sense of his words here, before we can adopt it. It is contrary to his own analogy, and inapposite to his present purpose.

Nor are the objections of Reiche to the adoption of the *moral* sense, of any considerable weight. He says, (1) That '*σώματα* (plural) cannot be employed in the same *figurative* sense as *σὰρξ*.' But why not? *σὰρξ* is not used in the plural, merely because it has no plural. *Σῶμα* in the singular is clearly exchanged with *σὰρξ* (see ver. 13); and *σώματα* in the plural as applied not to one but to *all* believers, is altogether appropriate. (2) '*Θνητός* has only a *physiological* sense.' But although this is usually true, it is manifestly employed here as the mere substitute for *νεκρόν* in ver. 10; and this

latter word confessedly has very often a figurative or *moral* sense. (3) 'Ζωοποιήσει must have a *future* meaning; but believers are *already* quickened in a moral sense.' The answer to this is, they are indeed alive as to the spirit and temper of the mind; but the process of sanctification, until all the bodily appetites are thoroughly subdued and mortified, is usually a long one, and the apostle might well employ Ζωοποιήσει. (4) 'As God raised Christ physically, so the resurrection of believers must be here taken as physical.' But this has already been answered above.

CHAP. VIII. 12—17.

In the preceding verses, the apostle has consummated his argument to prove that Christians, who are under grace, are the only persons who possess means adequate and ample of living devoted to the service of God, and of renouncing sin and mortifying all their sinful desires. What those under the law could not do, God, sending his Son on account of sin, and pouring out his Spirit, and giving a filial and obedient temper of mind, has accomplished. The mind is thus filled with desires of conformity to Christ, and even the body, the seat of carnal appetites and sinful desires, will be so quickened as to become an instrument of righteousness.

And what now follows? Just that which we should expect from an apostle so zealous of good works as Paul, and so grateful for the blessings of redemption, viz., an animated exhortation to live in a manner accordant with Christian obligation, and a view of the consequences which will ensue from the believer's being united to Christ.

(12) "Ἀρα οὖν . . . Ζῆν, *therefore, brethren, we are not under obligation to the flesh, to live in a carnal manner; i. e., since the Spirit is given to us, and we have such privileges, we must not obey the lusts of the flesh. The manner of expression is what rhetoricians call λιτότης, i. e., where less is said than is meant. The writer means that we are bound not to obey the dictates of carnal appetites and desires. —Τοῦ . . . Ζῆν shows the object of obligation: 'We are under no obligation—to live, &c.' Τοῦ with the Inf. has a various and widely extended usage; see N. Test. Gramm. § 138. 8.*

(13) Εἰ γὰρ . . . ἀποθνήσκειν, *for if ye live in a carnal manner, ye shall die; i. e., if ye live carnally, ye shall come under the penalty of the divine law, which threatens death to the soul that sins. See on θάνατος, in chap. v. 12. Reiche, who all along understands θάνατος as designating temporal death, concedes that here it must have a more extended sense. How could he have avoided such a conces-*

sion? For if the death of the body only is threatened, then there is no distinction between those who live in a carnal manner, and those who do not, which would deprive the apostle's words of all meaning.

Εἰ δὲ . . . ζήσεσθε, *but if through the Spirit ye mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live*; i. e., if, yielding to the influence of the Spirit which dwelleth in you, ye crucify the old man with his lusts, if you suppress those deeds to which your carnal affections would lead, then ye shall live, i. e., enjoy the spiritual blessedness which the gospel promises to the obedient.

The exchange of *σῶμα* for *σὰρξ*, in the phrase *τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος* is plain. D., E., F., G., and many of the fathers read *σαρκός* for *σώματος*; which only shows that they understood both in the same sense here. The efforts of Reiche to show that *σῶμα* means 'body as a composite organization,' and *σὰρξ*, 'body as an animated, active, and excitable substance,' are here to no purpose: nor indeed is this in conformity with *Pauline* usage.

(14) The *γάρ* at the beginning of this verse, shows that what follows is *illustration* or *confirmation* of the declaration just made. The apostle has just said, that those who mortify their sinful appetites and desires, *shall live*, i. e., shall enjoy the happiness which the gospel proffers. What is the proof of this? One convincing evidence is, that such persons are led by the Spirit of God; consequently they must be the children of God; and if so, he will give them the portion which belongs to children, viz., the heavenly inheritance. Such is the course of thought that follows in the sequel of *γάρ*, and such the confirmation of the promise implied in *ζήσεσθε*.

"Ὅσοι γάρ . . . Θεοῦ, *for so many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God*. That a *special* divine influence is here implied in *ἄγονται*, would seem to be plain; for if nothing but the simple means of moral suasion by objective truth is employed in guiding the children of God, how do they differ from others who enjoy the same means? If you say: 'The difference is that the former *obey* the suasion, while the latter *resist* it;' I answer: The fact is true; but then it does not reach the point of difficulty. How comes the one to *obey* the suasion, and the other to *resist* it! What is the *first* occasion of this? If you say: 'A corrupt nature leads the impenitent to resist;' then I ask: Had not the regenerate the like corrupt nature before their change? What then is the *efficient* cause why one obeys and the other disobeys? The passage before us ascribes it to the influence of the Spirit of God. That this influence

is *special*, follows from the fact, that if we suppose it to be common in the same degree to all men, it would be difficult to account for it why all men under the influence of truth are not converted. Since, however, the fact is that they are not, it would seem to follow that where they do become converted, the influence of the Spirit is *special*.

Ἰσὶ Θεοῦ, *sons of God*, a term of endearment; comp. Matt. v. 9, 45. Luke vi. 35. xx. 36. Rom. viii. 19. 2 Cor. vi. 18. Gal. iii. 26. iv. 6, 7, et alib. comp. Hosea xi. 1. Ex. iv. 22, 23. See also the remarks on υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ in Rom. i. 3, with the Excursus.

(15) Οὐ γὰρ εἰς φόβον, *for ye have not received a servile spirit, that ye should again be afraid; i. e., ye have not the spirit of slaves, who, being in bondage, are fearing and trembling before the dreaded severity of a master; in other words, ye are not, through fear of condemnation or death, all your life time ἐνοχοὶ δουλείας*, Heb. ii. 15. ῥὰς *illustrantis et confirmantis*; for the object of the writer is, to show that they are *sons* and not *slaves*.

Πνεῦμα δουλείας, and πνεῦμα υιοθεσίας is such a spirit as slavery is wont to produce, i. e., such a temper or disposition of mind as is appropriate to it, and such a spirit or temper of mind as belongs to affectionate children.

Ἀλλὰ . . . ὁ πατήρ! *but ye have received a filial spirit, by which ye cry: Abba, Father!* That is, instead of the timid and cowering spirit of *slaves*, who tremble before their masters, we are endowed with the spirit of *children*, so that we may approach God with affection and confidence. The word Ἀββᾶ is the Chaldee אבא, sc. πατήρ! Augustine and Calvin think that the design of using both Ἀββᾶ and ὁ πατήρ here, is to show that both Jews and Greeks, each in their own respective language, would call on God as a Father. But the objection to this is, that the same idiom is exhibited in Mark xiv. 36 and Gal. iv. 6, where such a distinction is out of question; at any rate, in the first of these two cases it is out of question. If ὁ πατήρ here be designed for any thing more than a translation of Ἀββᾶ, we may suppose the repetition to be designed for expressing intensity of child-like feeling, for this naturally prompts to a repetition of the name of a parent. So Theodoret. Ὁ πατήρ is the Nom. used instead of the Vocative; New Test. Gramm. § 21. Note 3.

(16) Αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα . . . Θεοῦ, *this same Spirit testifies to our minds that we are the children of God; i. e., (as many interpret the passage) this filial, confiding, affectionate spirit, imparted by the Spirit of*

God who dwells in us, affords satisfactory evidence to our minds that we are the children of God. Συμμαρτυρεῖ here may mean no more than the simple verb μαρτυρεῖν; for so συμμαρτυρεῖω is employed in Rom. ii. 15. ix. 1, al. The sentiment of the passage thus construed would be, that the affectionate spirit which the children of God possess, is an evidence to their minds of their standing in a filial relation to him. τῷ πνεύματι ἡμῶν means *to our minds, animis nostris*. On any ground of exegesis, this sense (for substance) is here to be attributed to this expression.

There is, however, another method of interpreting this verse, which makes αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα to mean *the Spirit of God*, the Spirit mentioned in vers. 9, 14. This is certainly not an improbable exegesis; and many distinguished interpreters have followed it. Very recently, Flatt and Tholuck have both defended it.

On the whole I am persuaded, that αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα is the same as πνεῦμα Θεοῦ in ver. 14. And if the question be urged, as it is natural that it should be: ‘How then does the Spirit bear witness to our minds or souls, that we are the children of God?’ The answer is, by imparting the *spirit of adoption* or a *filial spirit* to us. It is this, then, which affords the evidence to our minds of being in a state of *filiation*, i. e., of bearing the relation to God of spiritual children. And as this spirit comes from the Spirit of God, so he may be said in this case *to bear witness*, because he is the author of that spirit which affords the evidence of our *filiation*. Those who adopt the first method of interpretation, refer αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα to the πνεῦμα νοθεσίας of the preceding clause; and compare this with vers. 26, 27, which they construe in the like way.

That the world deny any such testimony in the hearts of believers, and that they look on it with scorn or treat it with derision, proves only that they are unacquainted with it; not that it is an illusion. It was a sensible and true remark of the French philosopher, Hemsterhuys, in regard to certain sensations which he was discussing: “Those who are so unhappy as never to have had such sensations, either through weakness of the natural organ, or because they have never cultivated them, will not comprehend me.” Œuvres, I. p. 208. Paul has, on another occasion, expressed himself, relative to the point in question with still more power: “The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him,” 1 Cor. ii. 14.

(17) Εἰ δὲ τέκνα καὶ κληρονόμοι, i. e., if we sustain the relation of sons,

then shall we be treated as such, *i. e.*, we shall be *heirs*. After *ρίσνα* the verb *ισμίν* is of course implied, and before *κληρονόμοι* the reader must supply *ισόμεθα*. *Κληρονόμοι Θεοῦ*, *heirs of God*, means, possessors of that inheritance which God bestows. *Δί* *continuative*.—*συγκληρονόμοι Χριστοῦ*, *joint heirs with Christ*; *i. e.*, as Christ endured sufferings and was advanced to glory, in like manner shall we also be advanced to glory. We shall be made like him, be united to him, be with him, in possession of the heavenly inheritance. For the manner in which Christ obtained this heritage, see and comp. Phil. ii. 8, 9. Heb. ii. 9, 10. v. 7—9; and for the comparison of believers to Christ, see 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12. Heb. xii. 2. Rev. iii. 21. John xvii. 22—24. These texts sufficiently explain the sequel of the verse, *ἵνατε κ. τ. λ.* which may be rendered: ‘In case we suffer as he did [in the cause of truth], in order that we may be glorified with him.’

CHAP. VIII. 18—25.

THESE verses constitute one of those passages which the critics call *loci exantistimi*. The general object of the passage, however, cannot fail to be evident to every considerate reader. In ver. 19 the apostle asserts, that the sufferings of the present life are not to be regarded in comparison with the glory which is to be revealed, *i. e.*, future glory is great beyond all comparison or expression. Such is the proposition to be illustrated or confirmed. But how is this effected? I answer, that the theme being thus introduced by the apostle, he proceeds in the following manner: ‘Now that such a glory is yet to be revealed (in other words that there is a world of surpassing glory beyond the grave), the whole condition of things or rather of mankind, in the present world, abundantly proves. Here a frail and perishable nature serves to show, that no stable source of happiness can be found on earth. From the commencement of the world down to the present time, it has always been thus. In the midst of the sufferings and sorrows to which their earthly existence exposes them, mankind naturally look forward to another and better world, where happiness without alloy and without end may be enjoyed. Even Christians themselves, joyful as their hopes should make them, find themselves still compelled by sufferings and sorrows to sigh and groan, and to expect a state of real and permanent enjoyment only in heaven; so that they can only say, for the present, that they are *saved* because they hope or expect salvation in another and better world. The very fact that here they, like all others around them, are in a state of trial, and that they only hope for glory, shows that the present fruition of it is not to be expected.

The practical conclusion from all this the apostle now proceeds to draw, *viz.*, ‘that Christians, in the midst of sufferings and trials, ought not to faint or to be discouraged inasmuch as a glory to be revealed is in prospect, which should make them regard their present temporary sufferings as altogether unworthy to be accounted of.’

(18) *λογίζομαι* here means *I count, reckon, regard, estimate*. The classical Greek writers employed this word rather in the sense of

computing or reckoning, e. g., a sum of numbers, or of estimating a conclusion drawn from premises by the act of reasoning.

It is difficult at first sight to account for the γάρ here, which, in nearly every instance where it is employed (if not always and necessarily), has reference to a preceding sentiment, fact, &c. I construe here in this simple manner, viz., ‘We shall be glorified with Christ, i. e., obtain great and eternal glory, *for* (γάρ) all the sufferings and sorrows of the present state are only temporary. Every thing shows that they are so, and that they only prepare us for a happiness that is to come which is great and glorious. All things do, and must, work together for good to those who love God.’

Παθήματα τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ means suffering such as Christians were then called to endure, or sufferings such as all men are exposed to endure in the present life. The latter seems to be the preferable sense; because the reasoning of the apostle, in the context, has respect not to time then present only, but to the whole period of our present life down to its close, when a glorious reward succeeds a life of sorrow. The latitude in which the Genitive case is employed should be noted from the phrase before us. *The sufferings of the present time* surely does not mean the sufferings which time endures as the subject of them, but those which Christians endure while they continue in the present world. The Genitive here, as often elsewhere, is the *Genitivus temporis*, i. e., it marks the time belonging to the noun which precedes it, the designation of which is intended to qualify that noun. See N. Test. Gramm. § 99. 1. h.

Οὐκ ἄξια, *non æquiparanda sunt, are not to be put on a level, or are not to be reputed, not to be counted or regarded.* If the first sense be adopted, then πρὸς which follows in the construction, may be rendered in its usual sense, *with*. But if the second sense be preferred (and it seems to be preferable), viz., *reputed, regarded*, then πρὸς must be rendered *compared with, in comparison of*. So this preposition is sometimes used; e. g., Ecclus. xxv. 19, *Every evil is small πρὸς κακίαν γυναικὸς, compared with the malignity of a woman.* Joseph. cont. Apion. II. 22, *All matter is worthless πρὸς εἰκότι τῆν τοῦτον compared with the image of this [god].* To construe ἄξια in such a way as to make the apostle affirm, that the present sufferings of Christians are not to be deemed *equally* desirable with the glory which is to be revealed, would be making him to say what no man of common sense would think it necessary to affirm. But to say, that when we look at future glory we should make but little account of these sufferings,

is supposing him to utter a sentiment worthy of the noblest of all Christian philosophers.

The phrase *τὴν μέλλουσάν δόξαν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι*, is equivalent to *ἀποκαλυφθησομένην*. The Greek could use his regular future without a helping verb; or he could, as here, use the verb *μέλλω* and the Infinitive instead of a regular future. The employment of *μέλλουσάν* here indicates the confident expectation not only of future glory, but of its *speedy* revelation. *Μέλλω* is employed by the Greeks to designate a *proximate* future. The word *δόξα*, which here signifies *future happiness*, is used by the New Testament writers in a sense quite different from the classic one; for this is *opinion, fame, reputation*, &c. But the New Testament meaning of *δόξα* is borrowed from the Hebrew *כְּבוֹד* or *הֵדָר*, *splendour, magnificence, excellence*. The idea of *δόξα* in the presence of God, seems to be founded upon being there in the *light* or *splendour* of his presence. Hence light is used so often in the Bible as the image of happiness. Hence too we may see something of the plenary meaning which *δόξα* has, when used to describe a state of future happiness. In the present world, "eye hath not seen;" but when another world bursts upon the vision of Christians, after death shall have rent away the veil of mortality, there 'in God's light they will see light;' there too they shall enjoy "everlasting light, for God will be their glory."

19) Here we have another *γάρ* which sustains a relation to the preceding verse, like that which *γάρ* in ver. 18 sustains to ver. 17. The apostle in ver. 18 has introduced, as an object of attention *the glory which is to be revealed*. That there is such a glory he now proceeds to show, or at least to adduce reasons why Christians should confidently expect it. *Γάρ*, therefore, is in ver. 19 prefixed to a clause added by way of confirming the sentiment of the preceding assertion.

Ἀποκαταδοκία, *earnest expectation*, the German *Ahndung*. The etymology favours this meaning; for the word comes from *ἀπό* (prep.), *κάρα* *head*, and *δοκέω* *to observe, look after*. The Etymologicum Magnum explains it by *τῇ κεφαλῇ προβλέπειν*, *to thrust forward the head and see, i. e., to look with anxiety or eagerness*; like the Hebrew *לְהִתְבַּחֵךְ*. The same sense the word has in Phil. i. 20. Ernesti observes, that the word is not intensive in the New Testament (Inst. Interpr. 1. § 2); but in this he seems to be plainly mistaken, if we may judge either from the composition of the word itself, or from the nature of the passages in which it stands.

We come now to the principal word, viz., *κρίσις*, on which very much of the difficulty of the passage before us turns. In order to proceed in a satisfactory manner with the investigation of it, let us first consider its meaning in the other passages of the New Testament where it occurs, and this as compared with the corresponding Hebrew words; and secondly examine in order the various meanings which have been assigned to the word in this place, and endeavour to vindicate that sense to which the preference seems to belong.

I. In regard to the meaning of *κρίσις*, in all the other passages of the New Testament where it is found, excepting the one before us, they may be distributed into two classes; viz.

1. It means *the act of creation, creating*. In such a sense it is generally conceded that it is employed in Mark x. 6. xiii. 19. Rom. i. 20. 2 Pet. iii. 4. Yet all of these significations might be referred to No. 2, which follows, as the sense would be equally good. But this first sense is the *proper* and *primary* meaning of the word, according to the usual principles of the Greek language, in which words of this class commonly denote the *act* of doing any thing, they being what grammarians call *nomina actionis*. So in the Greek classics, the sense of *making, constructing, building, creating, &c.*, is the one attached to this form of the word. But in the examples of *κρίσις* in the New Testament, the meaning is for the most part different from this.

2. It means *creature, created thing, any product of creating power, creation* as an existing thing. Such a deflexion from the primary meaning of a word is very common, not only in the Greek, but in all other languages; the *abstract* (nomen actionis) passing, as grammarians say, into the *concrete* sense; i. e., the word which denoted action, being also used to denote the consequences or effects of that action. So here, *κρίσις* (*the act of creating*), is more commonly employed in the New Testament to signify the effects of this action, viz., *a thing created, res creata*. But this second signification being in its own nature generic, it may either be used *generically*, or it may be employed to designate any of the several *species* of meanings that constitute a part of the generic one.

(a) It is used in its generic sense, i. e., as meaning *created things, creation, any created thing*, in Rom. i. 25. viii. 39. Col. i. 15. Heb. iv. 13. Rev. iii. 14, perhaps also in Mark x. 6. xiii. 19. Rom. i. 20. and 2 Pet. iii. 4. In a sense very nearly allied to this, it is used in Heb. ix. 11 to designate the *material* creation as such, in distinction

from the *spiritual* one. This distinction, however, results rather from the exigency of the passage, and it seems to be made here rather by the word *ταύτης* than from the force of *κρίσις*.

(b) *Κρίσις* is also used in a specific sense, and means the *rational creation, man, men, the world of mankind*. Thus in Mark xvi. 15, 'Go preach the gospel *πάσῃ τῇ κρίσει*, to all men, to every man.' Col. i. 23, 'which [gospel] has been preached *ἐν πάσῃ τῇ κρίσει*, among all nations.' 1 Pet. ii. 13, 'Be subject, then, *πᾶσιν ἀνθρώπων κρίσει*, to every man, to every human being, for the Lord's sake, i. e., out of regard to the Lord Christ. What the meaning of this is, the explanation immediately subjoined informs us, viz., *εἴτε βασιλεῖ, ὡς ὑπερέχοντι εἴτε ἡγεμόσιν, ὡς δι' αὐτοῦ κ. τ. λ.*; 'be subject to every man placed in authority, whether he be a king who has pre-eminence, or a governor appointed,' &c. These examples make it clear, that *κρίσις* is employed to designate a *specific* class of created beings, as well as created things in general.

(c) The word is sometimes employed in a more specific and limited sense still, viz., to designate the *new rational creation, those who are created anew in Christ Jesus, Christians*. Such is the meaning in 2 Cor. v. 17, 'If any one be in Christ, he is *καὶνὴ κτίσις*, a new creature.' Gal. vi. 15, 'In Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision avails any thing, but *καὶνὴ κτίσις*.' This, however, may mean a *new act of creating*, i. e., the power of the Spirit in renovating the soul. But in both of these cases, the *special* meaning it must be confessed, depends rather on *καὶνή* than upon *κρίσις*.

These are all the cases in which *κρίσις* occurs in the New Testament, excepting those in the passage under examination. From these we gather the conclusion, that the *usus loquendi* allows us to assign to *κρίσις* either of the three meanings ranked under No. 2, i. e., it may be interpreted as meaning *things created* or the *natural creation, men or mankind*, or *Christians* who are a new *spiritual* creation; yet this last meaning is plainly uncertain, unless some qualifying word (e. g., *καὶνή*) is joined with *κρίσις*.

I have only to add here, as a confirmation of the above meanings assigned to *κρίσις* (which however are not altogether peculiar to the New Testament, see Judith ix. 12. xi. 14. Wisd. ii. 6. xvi. 24. xix. 6), that the Chaldee and the Rabbinic Hebrew coincide with the usage just exhibited. The words in these languages which correspond to *κρίσις*, are *בְּרִיאָה, בְּרִיתָא, בְּרִיאָה, בְּרִיתָא*, which all mean *creatio, creatura, res creata*, i. e., the act of creating, and the thing created,

just in the same way as *κρίσις* does. Moreover, in Rabbinic Hebrew the plural form *בְּרִיּוֹת* sometimes means *homines, men, specially the heathen*. All this, we see, corresponds with the New Testament use of *κρίσις*, and explains it when a reference to the Greek classics would not. In regard to the last particular of all, viz., that *בְּרִיּוֹת* sometimes means the heathen, by way of degradation or contempt; it is singular that we have adopted, into vulgar English, the very same meaning of the word *creature*, and applied it in a derogatory sense to human beings; *e. g.*, ‘the creature refused to obey.’

II. We have seen what meanings are assigned to *κρίσις* by the writers of the New Testament, and what belonged to the corresponding Chaldee and Hebrew words. Which of these, now, shall be applied to *κρίσις* in the passage before us?

That the reader may see how variously this question has been answered, I will lay before him the different interpretations given to it. There are, 1. the Angels. 2. The souls (the animating principle) of the planetary worlds. 3. Adam and Eve, because they were the immediate work of creative power. 4. The souls of believers, in distinction from their bodies. 5. The bodies of believers, *i. e.*, their dead bodies, in distinction from their souls. 6. Christians in general. 7. Christians in particular, *i. e.*, either Jewish Christians, or Gentile Christians. 8. Unconverted men in general. 9. Unconverted men in particular, *i. e.*, either unconverted Jews or unconverted heathen. 10. The material creation, inanimate and animate, exclusive of rational beings. 11. The rational creation or men in general, mankind.

All these supposed meanings I have canvassed in an exegesis of vers. 18—25, printed in the Biblical Repository, Vol. I. pp. 363, seq. I deem the first five too improbable to need discussion here; and therefore proceed with the others.

The *sixth* and *seventh* opinions may be both ranked under one head, viz., that of Christians. Can *κρίσις*, then, here mean Christians, either in general or in particular?

(a) The *usus loquendi* is wanting, to render this probable. The word *κρίσις* in 2 Cor. v. 17 and Gal. vi. 15, does not, as I have already remarked, of itself mean Christians. In both these cases it is connected with *καὶνή*.

(b) In vers. 19, 21, the word *κρίσις* seems to designate those who are distinguished from the children of God, and who belong not to

such as are *now* entitled to their privileges. But I do not consider this argument to be decisive; for the expressions in vers. 19, 21, are not much unlike that in verse 23, where Christians are represented as groaning within themselves and waiting for their filiation (*υιοθεσίαν*) i. e., for the consequences of it, viz., the redemption of their bodies from their present frail, painful, and dying state.

(c) A more conclusive argument is deducible from the form of ver. 23, where *αὐτοὶ τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ Πνεύματος ἔχοντες* seems plainly to mean *Christians*, as I shall in the sequel endeavour to show. Conceding this, then, it is quite plain that *κρίσις* in the preceding verses cannot mean *Christians*, because the class of men designated in verse 23, is very clearly distinguished from the preceding class in vers. 19—21, who are there designated by *κρίσις*.

On the same ground, viz., that *κρίσις* cannot be regarded as meaning Christians in general, it must be excluded from meaning Christians in particular, i. e., either Jewish Christians or Gentile Christians. How are these to be distinguished from "those who had the first-fruits of the Spirit?" Even supposing that *ἀπαρχή* means here *special miraculous gifts* (as some believe), we may ask: Were there no *Jewish* Christians who possessed these? Surely they above all others possessed them. But still, were there no *Gentile* Christians who possessed them? This will not be denied. If we look into the first epistle to the Corinthians, we find there a graphic account of the special gifts of the Spirit, which leaves no room to doubt that they were distributed to Gentile as well as to Jewish Christians. Still stronger is the argument, if we suppose (as I shall endeavour hereafter to show that we must suppose) *ἀπαρχήν* here to mean *the prelibation, the foretaste, the earnest of future glory*, which is common to all Christians. For as those who have this *ἀπαρχήν*, are here plainly and explicitly distinguished from those denominated *κρίσις* above; so, if these are Christians in general (as they clearly seem to be), it follows that *κρίσις* above is not used to designate either Christians in general, or Jewish or Gentile Christians in particular. Neither of these classes were distinguished from other Christians, by the exclusive possession of miraculous gifts or the exclusive possession of the earnest of the heavenly inheritance; and there seems, therefore, to be no ground for making a distinction of such a nature. It must necessarily follow, that if *κρίσις* means either Jewish Christians or Gentile Christians as such, then this class of Christians did not partake of the *ἀπαρχήν τοῦ Πνεύματος*; for those who did partake of it,

are clearly distinguished from those indicated by *κρίσις*. But inasmuch as both these classes of Christians did partake of the gift in question, so neither of them can be specifically designated here by *κρίσις*. Le Clerc, Nösselt, Schleusner, and others have defended the exegesis in question; but it will not bear examination.

The *eighth* and *ninth* opinions may also be classed under one head. These are, that *κρίσις* means either unconverted men in general as such, or unconverted men in particular, viz., Jews or Gentiles. In regard to the specific meaning here assigned to *κρίσις*, I cannot see any tolerable ground of support for it. Why should unconverted Jews be represented as peculiarly exposed to a frail and dying state? Or why should unconverted Gentiles be so represented? Surely there is no good reason for any distinction here, as all are equally exposed to the miseries of life. We cannot therefore admit the exegesis which here gives a *specific* meaning to *κρίσις*, limiting it either to unconverted Jews or to unconverted Gentiles.

More probable is the interpretation, which assigns to *κρίσις* the meaning of *unconverted men in general*. In this case it is easy to make a plain and evident distinction between *κρίσις* in vers. 19—22, and *οἱ τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες* in ver. 23. I think this to be substantially the right meaning. But I would not assign to it the signification simply of *unconverted men*. I apprehend the meaning to be the same as in Mark xvi. 15. Col. i. 23. 1 Pet. ii. 13, i. e., *man, men, mankind in general*. But of this, and of the objections urged against it, I shall say more in the sequel.

On the whole, then, we have reduced our multiplex interpretations down to two, viz., *the material creation in general* animate and inanimate, and *the rational creation or mankind in general*. These remain to be carefully examined. Critics of high rank and great abilities are divided between these two interpretations.

We may commence with the first of these two meanings, that of *the material creation, the world in general, or the universe* exclusive of rational beings. This has had many defenders both in ancient and modern times. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Ecumenius, Jerome, Ambrose, Luther, Koppe, Doddridge, Flatt, Tholuck, Reiche, and a multitude of others have been its advocates. Flatt, Tholuck, and Reiche, in their recent commentaries, have collected all which has been said in its favour, besides advancing some things peculiar to themselves. What they have brought forward deserves a serious examination.

That *κτίσις* might be employed to indicate the natural creation around us, consisting of things animate and inanimate, may be seen by examining the *usus loquendi* of the word under No. 2. *a*, above. On this part of the subject, there can be no just ground of controversy among philologists. But is it so employed in the passage before us? This is the only question that affords any room for dispute.

I have satisfied my own mind, that *κτίσις* means here, as in Mark xvi. 15. Col. i. 23 (and for substance in 1 Pet. ii. 13), *mankind in general, gens humana*, in distinction from, but not in opposition to, Christians as such. The reasons of this as detailed at length, and the examination of different views, I have thought it most proper to exhibit in an EXCURSUS on Rom. viii. 19, inasmuch as they would occupy too much room in the body of the Commentary.

Τῇ ἀποκάλυψιν τῶν υἱῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀπεκδέχεται, *expects or waits for the revelation of the sons of God; i. e.*, the period when the sons of God, in their ultimate state and endowed with all their honours and privileges, shall be fully disclosed. This will be at the general judgment; when the Father who seeth in secret will reward them openly. Here they are in obscurity; the world knoweth them not. They are like to the seven thousand of old who had not bowed the knee to Baal, but who were unknown even to the prophet Elijah. However, it will not always be so. The day is coming when they will shine forth as the sun in his strength and as the stars for ever and ever, in the kingdom of their God and Father.

In what sense the *κτίσις ἀπεκδέχεται*, *expects or waits for* such a revelation, is stated in the Excursus on this verse, and therefore it need not to be repeated. I take the *generic* idea of happiness in a future and better state, to be the main design of the writer in this case.

(20) Τῇ γὰρ ματαιότητι ἡ κτίσις ὑπέταγῃ, *for the creature, i. e.*, mankind, *was subjected to a frail and dying state*. That *ματαιότης* here has the sense thus assigned to it, is clear from the *exegesis* of it in ver. 21, viz., *δουλεία τῆς φθορᾶς*, which is there used instead of repeating *ματαιότης*. Such as wish for further confirmation as to this sense of the word, may consult in the Sept. Ps. lxi. 9. xxxviii. 5. Ecc. i. 2, 14.

As the Hebrew *בָּצָר* *vanity*, to which *ματαιότης* in the Septuagint corresponds, sometimes designates *an idol*; so some commentators have here interpreted *ματαιότης* in a corresponding manner, viz., mankind became subjected to idolatry, or the natural world was employ-

ed as the object of idolatry. So Tertullian, Luther, Marck, Baumgarten, and others. Consequently they interpreted the succeeding clause, *not voluntarily but through him who subjected it*, as having reference either to Satan, or to Adam as concerned in the original fall of man. But δουλεία τῆς φθορᾶς (ver. 21) seems to remove all probability from this interpretation of ματαιότης; and of course υποτάξαντα can be applied only to God the Creator of man. Compare Gen. iii. 17—19.

Οὐχ ἰκεῦσα, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν υποτάξαντα, *not voluntarily, but by him who put it in subjection*, to a frail and dying state. That is, the creature did not voluntarily choose its present condition of sorrow and pain, for this cannot well be imagined; but God the Creator has placed it in this condition; it is by his sovereign will, by the arrangements of his holy providence, that man is placed in a frail and dying state. It seems quite probable, that Paul here referred in his own mind to the effects of the *fall*, as described in v. 12 seq. This state of ματαιότης was not original, but superinduced by sin. The use of the Aorist, ὑπετάγη seems to indicate some specific fact of this nature which happened in past time. Had the apostle's design been merely *general*, i. e., merely to say that *man has been and is frail*, he would most naturally have employed ὑποτίνακται, Perf. passive. But still, this frail condition is not to be considered as an irretrievable misfortune or evil. Distressing and frail as the state of man is, it is still a state of *hope*. So we are assured in the next verse.

Διὰ τὸν υποτάξαντα is adduced by some to show that διὰ, *on account of* or *because of*, may be understood of an *efficient* cause, although employed with the *Accusative*. Bretschneider (Lex.) has given many examples of this nature, some of which, however, need to be stricken out. If we render διὰ by *per*, Germ. *durch*; i. e., *through, by means of*, this will naturally refer the noun which follows the preposition to the class of *efficient* causes; and that such a rendering is lawful, many critics contend, and most concede.

(21) Ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, *in hope*. Here the Dative designates the state or condition in which the κρίσις is, although subjected to ματαιότητι. It is a state in which a hope of deliverance can be indulged. It is not a state of despair. Ἐπ' ἐλπίδι may be connected either with ὑπετάγη or υποτάξαντα.

Let the reader now ask, whether it is not doing violence to the word κρίσις, to construe it here as meaning *natural world*, and then to predicate of it ἰκεῦσα and ἐπ' ἐλπίδι? It would be an example of

prosopopeia, which I believe even the most animated poetical parts of the Scriptures no where present.

But what is the hope in which the creature is permitted to indulge? It is, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις ἐλευθερωθήσεται ἀπὸ τῆς δουλείας τῆς φθορᾶς, *that this very same creature, viz., the one which is subjected to a frail and dying state, shall be freed from the bondage of a perishing condition.* Φθορά comes from φθείρω, *to corrupt, to destroy.* Here it plainly means *a state of corruption, i. e., a frail and dying state.* Such a state the apostle calls δουλεία, *bondage*; first, because the creature was *not willingly* subjected to it; secondly, because it is not only a state of pain and misery, but it places us at the disposal of masters, who inflict upon us suffering and sorrow while we cannot resist or control them. The word ἐλευθερωθήσεται is fitly chosen as the antithetic correlative of δουλεία.

Εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῆς δόξης τῶν τέκνων τοῦ Θεοῦ, [and shall be introduced, καὶ εἰσαχθήσεται] *into the glorious liberty of the children of God.* Εἰς, put before the Accusative here, shows the state in which the creature is to be brought, after being freed from bondage, *i. e., εἰς* stands before the object unto which the creature is to attain, by being delivered from the bondage of a frail and dying state. That *εἰς* very often stands before nouns designating the event or effect of any thing, is a well-known Greek idiom; and the proofs of it may be seen at large in the various lexicons. The phrase, however, I take here to be a *constructio prægna*ns, as the grammarians call it, *i. e., an elliptical expression, which implies some verb before it, and probably the one which I have supplied above.* Most plainly ἀπὸ stands before that from which the creature is delivered, and εἰς before that into which it is introduced or brought; but the diction is elliptical, or at least we must admit *brachylogy* here. Δόξα is used in this place as an adjective qualifying the preceding noun, by an idiom which is very common throughout the Scriptures. In what sense men in general may be said to hope for this state, has been already explained above. If there be any objection to predicate this of *men* in general, is there not a still stronger one to predicating it of the *natural* world?

Verses 20, 21, thus explained, render a reason why the creature looks with ἀποκαταδοκία to another and better state; which is, because men are born with an instinctive and unquenchable thirst for happiness, and cannot find what they desire in this frail and perishing condition. This explains the reason why γάρ is prefixed to ver. 20; “γάρ orationi rationem reddenti præfigitur.”

(22) *Οἶδαμεν γὰρ . . . ἅξει τοῦ νῦν, for we know that every creature, i. e., the whole human race, has sighed and sorrowed together, until the present time.* In other words, it has been the lot of man, from the beginning down to the present time, to be subject to a frail and dying state which has cost much sighing and sorrow. *Οἶδαμεν* means as much as to say, *no one can have any doubt, we are well assured, no one will call it in question.* Of course it seems to take for granted, that the thing to which it refers is well and familiarly known to all. But suppose, now, that the *natural* world is here represented as sighing and sorrowing, from the beginning of the world down to the time then present, and this because it waited for its renovation, which will take place only at the end of the world, or after the general resurrection; was this a thing so *familiar* to all, that the apostle could appeal to it by saying *οἶδαμεν*? I cannot but think that the advocates themselves of this interpretation must hesitate here. *Γὰρ* is prefixed, in the present case, to a clause which confirms what the writer has said, in verse 21, of our frail and dying state. The mind must supply the immediate antecedent thus: 'I say *bondage of a perishing state*, for (*γὰρ*) the whole creation exhibits abundant evidence of this.'

The verbs *συστηνέζει* and *συνωδίνει* denote the *mutual* and *universal* sighing and sorrowing of mankind. No one part is exempt; there is a *mutual* correspondence between them all, in regard to the subject in question. Those who construe *κρίσις* of the natural world, of course lay an emphasis on the *σύν* here compounded with the verbs, as indicating the correspondence of the natural world with the rational one. But the difficulty with this interpretation is, that it leaves a great part of *rational* beings wholly out of the account; a thing exceedingly incredible, to say the least. The verbs *σπένδει* and *ωδίνω* are appropriate, especially the latter, to the sighs and pains of a travailing woman. The language is therefore exceedingly appropriate to the apostle's purpose, inasmuch as it not only indicates a great degree of sorrow and distress, but that this is indicative of a new birth, i. e., a new state of things, or (in other words) that a change for the better is to be looked for. The prep. *σύν*, here joined with these two verbs, serves to indicate a mutual participation on all sides in the sorrows mentioned.

(23) *Yet not only so, but we ourselves who have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we groan within ourselves; i. e., not only have mankind in all ages, down to the present hour, been in a frail and suffer-*

ing state, but even we, who are permitted to cherish the hopes of a better world which the gospel inspires, we who have within us an earnest of future glory and a pledge that we are the children of God, who are to receive the inheritance of his beloved,—even we, who, as one might naturally suppose, would on account of our privileges be exempted from the common lot of sinful men, we also, like all others, are in distress and sigh for deliverance from it.

The phrase *καὶ αὐτοὶ τῇ ἀπαρχῇ τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες*, has been very diversely understood. Some interpret it of *special* and *supernatural* gifts, limiting it to the apostles only; while others explain it in the like way, but extend it to all Christians who were endowed with such gifts. Others regard *ἀπαρχή* as meaning *gift* or *present* merely, in a general way; while most interpret it as meaning the *earnest*, or *first fruits*, or *pledge*, of that which is afterward to be given in a more complete manner.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to investigate the word *ἀπαρχή* with special care. I can find but one meaning of it throughout the New Testament; and this is, *that which is first of its kind*, or *that which is first in order of time*, *πρῶτος*. It is applied both to persons and things, in a sense compounded of both of these, viz., *first in respect to kind and time also*; e. g., Rom. xvi. 5. 1 Cor. xvi. 15. James i. 18. 1 Cor. xv. 20, 23. Rev. xiv. 4. Bretschneider suggests, in his lexicon, that in this last passage it may have the general sense of *sacrifice* or *offering*, inasmuch as the Septuagint puts it for the Hebrew *תְּרוּמָה* which conveys such a meaning. This is possible; but on the whole I prefer the other sense. I take the meaning of the writer in Rev. xiv. 4 to be, that the persons there named may be considered in a light resembling that of the *ἀπαρχή* in ancient times, as the first-fruits of a glorious Christian harvest.

I understand *ἀπαρχή* to have the same sense as the Hebrew *רִאשִׁית*, for which it so often stands; *caput*, *princeps*, *first in its kind*, *first in point of time*, &c. Comp. *רִאשִׁית* in Gen. xlix. 3. Prov. viii. 22. Lev. ii. 12. xxiii. 10. Deut. xviii. 4. xxvi. 10. xxxiii. 21. Num. xxiv. 20. Amos vi. 6. In the passage before us, all the Greek fathers appear to have attached one and the same meaning to *ἀπαρχή*, viz., that of *first fruits*, in the sense of *earnest*, *pledge*, *foretaste*, of joys to come. So Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Basil. The apostle represents Christians as the habitation of God by his Spirit, Eph. ii. 22, comp. 1 Cor. iii. 16. vi. 19; the Spirit of God dwells in them, 1 John iii. 24. iv. 13; and this Spirit, thus conferred on them, is

the ἀπαβών, *the pledge of future glory*, 2 Cor. v. 5. Eph. i. 14. What hinders, then, that we should understand ἀπαρχή as meaning *foretaste* or *first fruits* of future glory which the Spirit who dwells in Christians imparts? The *usus loquendi* of the word does not seem to admit of any other exegesis. Nor do we need any other; as this is congruous with the nature and design of the passage.

With Keil, then, in his admirable explanation of this passage (Opusc. p. 294 seq.), I would interpret it in the manner exhibited above. And if this be correct, then it follows that the ἀπαρχή here spoken of is common to all true Christians; and that the interpretation which limits this verse to the apostles, or to a few of the primitive Christians endowed with miraculous gifts, has no stable foundation.

That Christians were subject to sorrows, needs not to be proved. That they were exposed to more than ordinary ones, may be seen in 2 Cor. v. 2, 3. 1 Cor. xv. 19. That they longed and sighed for deliverance, followed from their very nature. That even the *earnest* of future glory did not exempt them from sufferings, is certain. But there is a peculiar energy and delicacy in the expression which marks the consequences of their sufferings; *we GROAN within ourselves, i. e., internally*, not externally. We suppress the rising sigh; we bow with submission to the will of God which afflicts us; we receive his chastisement as children; our frail nature feels it, and we sigh or groan inwardly; but no mourning word escapes us; we suppress the outward demonstrations of pain, lest we should even seem to complain.

Is this imaginary on my part? Or did the writer mean to convey what I have attributed to him? So much at least we can say, viz., that such a sentiment was worthy of Paul, and of all Christians who suffered with him. It is worthy of being carried into practice at the present hour; it commends itself to the conscience of every one who thoroughly believes in the holy, just, and benevolent providence of God.

Τιθεσθίαν ἀπεδεχόμενοι, *waiting for [our] adoption or filiation*. There is a twofold *filiation* spoken of in the New Testament. The first is that which takes place when believers are born again, John i. 12, 13. iii. 3—5. Rom. viii. 14, 15 represents believers as possessing πνεῦμα υιοθεσίας; see also 1 John iii. 1, 2. But there is another and higher sense in which believers are to become the children of God, viz., they are to be so, when they shall be perfected in the world of

glory, when they become "the children of the resurrection," when they are made "like to the angels," Luke xx. 36. Their first adoption or filiation is secret, in regard to the world; their second is the ἀποκάλυψις τῶν υἱῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ, when, "he who seeth in secret, shall reward them openly." It is probably because the word *υιοθεσίας* here used is in itself dubious, that the apostle adds an explanatory or epexegetical clause, which he places in apposition with it, viz., τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν, *the redemption of our body, i. e., its redemption from a state of frailty, disease, and death.* It is, at the resurrection, to be like to Christ's glorious body, Phil. iii. 21; it is to be a σῶμα πνευματικόν, 1 Cor. xv. 44; this mortal is to put on immortality, this σῶμα φθαρτόν is to become a σῶμα ἀφθαρτόν, 1 Cor. xv. 53, 54. Such is the ἀπολύτρωσις of this frail and dying body, which believers now inhabit. Comp. ἀπολύτρωσις in Luke xxi. 28. Eph. i. 14. iv. 30. Heb. xi. 35.

The reader will note, as I have had occasion already to intimate, that the expression ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος here is equivalent to the ἀποκάλυψιν τῶν υἱῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ in ver. 12, and to the ἐλευθερίαν τῶν τέκνων τοῦ Θεοῦ in ver. 21. It therefore serves to show what those expressions mean, in the connection in which they stand.

Christians, then, in their present state, must long and wait for their second and final adoption or filiation. They must wait with confidence; yea, with assurance: "for he who cometh will come, and will not tarry." But let them not regard the present world as their home. It is not the Canaan in which they are to rest. They must "seek a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God." Then the agitated breast, the heaving sigh, the groaning within, will no more annoy or distress them. Let not the child of God complain, then, that his final reward is not anticipated and distributed to him here in the present world, while he is in a state of trial. He must wait until he comes to the goal, before he can wear the crown of him who has been victor in the race. He must defer his expected laurels until his combat is over. Then he shall receive a crown of glory that fadeth not away.

(24) That the Christian cannot expect a full reward here, the apostle goes on most explicitly to declare. Τῇ γὰρ ἐλπίδι ἐσώθημεν, *for we are saved in hope, i. e., we have obtained salvation, but a part of it is only in hope; we have attained a condition in which we indulge the hope of a glory that is yet future.* This is all which can be rationally expected or accomplished in the present life. He had said in the

preceding verse, that Christians are in the attitude of *waiting* for their filiation. Verse 24 is designed to confirm this; hence the γάρ at the beginning of it. The reader should observe, that the Aor. ἰσώθημεν is qualified in its sense by τῇ ἰλπίδι. *We are saved or have attained to a state of salvation*, says the apostle, yet it is not fully and completely so, but is so τῇ ἰλπίδι, i. e., it is a salvation of which *hope* is at present a leading constituent.

Ἐλπὶς δὲ . . . ἰλπίς, *now hope which is seen, is no longer hope*; i. e., the object of hope (ἰλπίς in the first instance here means this) is no longer such, when one attains the actual possession of it. Δι' orationi continuandæ inservit, i. e., it stands before a clause which is designed to continue and illustrate the subject already introduced.

Ὅ γάρ . . . ἰλπίζει; *for what one sees, how does he still hope for it?* That is, what a man has actually attained or come to the enjoyment of, how can he be said to look forward to it with *hope* or anticipation? Γάρ rationem rei dictæ reddīt, i. e., it stands in a clause designed to explain or confirm the preceding assertion; for such is the nature of the present clause.

(25) Εἰ δὲ . . . ἀπεκδεχόμεθα, *but if we hope for that which we do not enjoy, then we patiently wait for it.* That is, if it be true, as all will concede, that in the present life we attain not to our final reward, but can be called *the heirs of salvation* only because we have obtained a well-grounded hope of it; if it be so that we cannot rationally expect an exemption from trials and troubles here, but must take our part in them with all around us; if it be true, also, that a great and glorious reward is reserved in heaven for all who endure patiently until the end of their probation (and that this is true, the very nature that God has given to men, which is here so imperfectly developed, and which therefore points to a state of greater perfection, satisfactorily shows); then it becomes Christians to endure with all patience and meekness the trials and sufferings of the present life. Time is short; eternity is long. Our sufferings are slight and momentary, when viewed in a comparative light. Who can place them beside that glory, "which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, and of which it hath not entered into the heart of man to conceive," and which is to endure as long as the God who bestows it, and yet make any serious account of them? *Christian brethren*, says the apostle, *let us patiently wait the appointed time of our deliverance.*

The διά before ὑπομένης is διά conditionis, i. e., it stands before a noun marking the state or condition of those of whom it is said, ἀπεκδεχόμεθα.

CHAP. VIII. 26, 27.

In this our weak and suffering condition, we are greatly aided by the Spirit who dwells in us; so that even when we are so much perplexed and distressed that we know not what to ask for or what to say in our prayers, our internal sighs which are not uttered by words, and which arise from his influence on our souls, are noticed and understood by the Searcher of hearts, whose ears will be open to them. Such is the course of thought in these verses; the natural inference from it is: 'Christians, be not discouraged, even in your deepest distresses. He who sees in secret, counts every groan, hears every sigh, and will be a very present help in time of need.'

(26) Such is the general sentiment of the passage. Particular words, however, present some difficulties. 'ὡσαύτως, *in like manner, in the very same way*. But in what way? Like to what? A difficult question. Some critics (Grotius, Koppe, Flatt, and others) render ὡσαύτως by *præterea, überdiess, i. e., moreover, besides*. This would do well, if philology would allow it. It seems, however, to be rather making a new meaning for the word, than explaining the usual one. The true answer to the question, 'Like to what?' seems to be this; 'In like manner as hope supports, strengthens, cheers us, and renders us patient, so do the influences of the Spirit aid us, in all our distresses;' *i. e., as hope aids us amidst all our sufferings and sorrows, so does the Spirit likewise*. 'ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ, *and in like manner also, or and in like manner moreover*.

τὸ πνεῦμα, *the Spirit*. But what spirit? Our own mind? A filial spirit? Or the Spirit of God? Each of these methods of exegesis has been defended. I was formerly inclined to regard the second meaning as the most probable; principally on account of the 27th verse. It is natural to ask: Does not the phrase ὁ ἰσχυρὸς τὰς καρδίας, designate him who knows the secrets of the *human* breast? And as this same Searcher of hearts is said to know φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος, *i. e., the mind or will of the spirit*, does not this mean the same thing as τὰς καρδίας, and therefore designate the *human* mind? One may also ask: Where in all the Scriptures is the Spirit of God represented as *making intercession* (ἐντυγχάνει) for the saints? These difficulties have led many to construe πνεῦμα throughout the passage as meaning πνεῦμα νοθεσίας, comp. verse 15. But at present I doubt of this exegesis; the reasons for this doubt will be specified in the sequel.

Let the reader now, in the first place, compare πνεῦμα in verses 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 13, 14, 23, where it clearly and certainly means the

Spirit of God or of Christ: he will then feel the probability, that the writer here uses πνεῦμα in the like sense. That Spirit which sanctifies Christians, which subdues their fleshly appetites, which gives them a filial temper, which bestows a foretaste of future glory, —this same Spirit aids Christians in all their sufferings and sorrows; and consequently they ought to endure them with patience. It cannot be denied, that *intensity* of meaning is given to the whole passage by this exegesis.

Συναντιλαμβάνεται, *helps*; but in the Greek σύν augments the signification, so that one might translate, *greatly assists, affords much help*. The σύν in composition not only denotes *con, with, together with, &c.*, but also marks the *completeness* or *entirety* of an action; *e. g.*, συμπληρώ, *to fill entirely full*; συνάγνυμι, *to dash in pieces*; συμπατίω, *to crush by treading upon*; συντέμνω, *to cut in pieces, &c.*—'Ασθενείαις ἡμῶν, *our infirmities*, seems to mean our frail, infirm, afflicted, troubled state; and this accords entirely with the context. A., B., C., D., many Codd. minusc., with many versions and fathers, read τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ, in the Dat. singular. Indeed the weight of authority seems to be in favour of this reading.

Τὸ γάρ κ. τ. λ. γάρ *illustrantis* again; for the sequel shows what our condition is, and how the Spirit aids us. Τὸ γάρ . . . οὐκ οἶδαμεν, *for we know not that which we should pray for as we ought*; *i. e.*, in our perplexities, weaknesses, ignorance, and distresses, we are often at a loss what would be best for us, or most agreeable to the will of God respecting us. Καθὸ δεῖ the apostle means, that the object for which we should pray καθὸ δεῖ *i. e.*, in accordance with duty, κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ (comp. 1 John v. 14), or in a becoming manner, is frequently unknown to us. Καθὸ δεῖ belongs to or qualifies προσευξώμεθα.

In this state, *the same Spirit*, αὐτὸ τὸ Πνεῦμα, the same who sanctifies us, dwells in us, and helps our infirmities—this same Spirit *earnestly intercedes for us*, ὑπερεντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν; where ὑπὲρ in composition with the verb augments the force of it, which I have endeavoured to express.

Prayer or supplication, however, made by the Spirit, *i. e.*, by the Spirit of God as such and by himself, is not here intended. So the sequel clearly shows; viz., *the Spirit makes intercession for us σπασμασμοῖς ἀλαλήτοις*, in sighs or groans which are unutterable, *i. e.*, the full meaning of which cannot be spoken in words. Or ἀλαλήτοις may mean, *that which is not uttered*, that which is internal, *i. e.*, sup-

pressed sighs ; for *verbals* in *-ρός* may have either a *passive* meaning, as in this case, or they may designate what *may* or *can be done*, as in the other meaning ; New Test. Gramm. § 82. Note 1. Either sense is good ; and either gives an intense meaning. In this way then the Spirit intercedes for the *saints*, viz., by exciting within them such longing and high *desires* for conformity to God, for *deliverance from evil*, and for the enjoyment of future blessedness, that *these desires* become unutterable, *i. e.*, no language can adequately express them. What is thus done in the souls of believers through the influence of the Spirit, is here attributed to him ; *i. e.*, he is said to do what they do under his special influence. In accordance with the idiom of the sacred writers, that is often attributed to God, which human agents perform under his oversight, government, or aid.

In accordance with such a sentiment, Fenelon, in his Essay entitled, *Que l'Esprit de Dieu enseigne en dedans* [That the Spirit of God teaches internally], says in a very striking manner : "The Spirit of God is the soul of our soul." So Augustine, with equal correctness and concinnity : "Non Spiritus Sanctus in semetipso apud semetipsum in illa Trinitate gemit ; sed *in nobis gemit, quia gemere nos facit* (Tract. VI. in Johan. § 2) ; that is, the Divine Spirit does not groan or intercede in and by himself, as God and belonging to the Trinity ; but he intercedes by his influence upon us, and by leading us to aspirations which language cannot express ;' a sentiment equally true and striking.

(27) 'Ο δὲ ἐρευνῶν τὰς καρδίας, a common appellation of God who is omniscient ; comp. vii. 9 (10). Jer. xi. 20. Acts i. 14—ὁὗτ' τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ Πνεύματος, *knoweth the desire of the Spirit or the mind of the Spirit*, *i. e.*, what is sought after, willed, or desired, when these στεναγμοὶ ἀλάλητοι excited by him arise. In other words : "The Searcher of hearts does not need that desires should be clothed or expressed in language, in order perfectly to understand them and to listen to them." It is not the *mind* of the Spirit of God, in himself considered and as belonging to the Godhead, that the Searcher of hearts is here represented as knowing. It is the mind or desire of the Spirit as disclosed ἐν στεναγμοῖς ἀλαλήτοις τῶν ἁγίων, that the writer means to designate. In this way, there is no difficulty in applying πνεῦμα to the Spirit of God. The sense is, that God knows the mind or desire of the saints, which is prompted or excited by his Spirit.

ὅτι κατὰ . . . ἀγίων, *because, or that he intercedes for saints agreeably to the will of God.* "Ὅτι may be translated *because*, so far as the word itself is concerned. But the sense is better if we construe the clause ὅτι κ. τ. λ. as *explicative* of the preceding assertion. Paul frequently adds explicative clauses which begin with ὅτι; e. g., 1 Cor. iii. 20 al. Meaning: 'God knows what the unutterable sighs mean which the Spirit excites in the bosoms of his saints; he knows, that aided by his Spirit they make intercession κατὰ Θεόν, i. e., κατὰ θεόν—To construe κατὰ Θεόν, *to God*, as if it were πρὸς Θεόν, here, the *usus loquendi* of the language forbids, for ἐντυγχάνει κατὰ . . . means *to accuse*; in which case, also, κατὰ must be followed by the Genitive. Κατὰ Θεόν, then, must mean *secundum Deum*, i. e., κατὰ τὸ δέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ, comp. 1 John v. 14. So the Syriac version, Chrysostom, Tholuck, Flatt, and others. Comp. for this sense of κατὰ, Rom. viii. 4. 2 Cor. xi. 17. Rom. ii. 2. Luke ii. 22, 24, 27, 29, et al. sæpe.—The word ἀγίων is here without the *article*; and being employed as a *noun* we might naturally expect the article. But where particular emphasis or specification is not intended, the article may be omitted; N. Test. Gramm. § 90. 4. Note 1.

In the mode of exegesis adopted above, all difficulties seem to be removed, and one is enabled to maintain a uniform and consistent meaning of πνεῦμα throughout the whole chapter.

The Christian who reads this passage with a spirit that responds to the sentiment which it discloses, cannot avoid lifting up his soul to God with overflowing gratitude for his mercies. Here we are "poor and wretched and miserable and blind and naked," and in want of all things; we are crushed before the moth; "we all do fade as a leaf, and the wind taketh us away;" we are often in distress, in darkness, in perplexity, in straits from which we can see no escape, no issue; even in far the greater number of cases, we know not what will be for our ultimate and highest good, and so "know not what we should pray for *as we ought*;" but then, the Spirit of the living God is present with all the true followers of the Saviour; he excites desires in their souls of liberation from sin and present evil, of heavenly blessedness and holiness, greater than words can express. The soul can only vent itself in sighs, the meaning of which language is too feeble to express. Often we do not know enough of the consequences or designs of present trials and sufferings, even to venture on making a definite request with regard to them; because we do not know whether relief from them is best or not. The humbl:

Christian, who feels his need of chastisement, will very often be brought to such a state. Then what a high and precious privilege it is, that our "unutterable sighs" should be heard and understood by Him who searches our hearts! Who can read this without emotion? Such are the blessings purchased for sinners by redeeming blood! Such the consolations which flow from the throne of God, for a groaning and dying world!

CHAP. VIII. 28—39.

To crown the whole, the apostle now goes on to assure those to whom he is writing, that *all things*, i. e., all the sufferings and sorrows and trials of the present life, will prove to be instruments, in the hand of a wise and powerful God and merciful Redeemer, of promoting the final and greatest happiness and glory of all true saints. The accomplishment of this end cannot fail. The purpose of God in respect to the saints can never be disappointed. Nothing can ever separate them from the care and kindness and affection of the Saviour, who has redeemed them. The inference to be drawn from all this, is, that Christians have no reason to despond or to be discouraged, while suffering the evils and trials of life. Their hopes and expectations should be elevated above the world, and be in accordance with the glorious inheritance that awaits them.

(28) Οἶδαμεν δὲ *we know moreover*. Δι' orationi continuandæ *in-servit*. What follows here, is in addition to what is like in kind or relating to the same subject in the preceding context.

Πάντα συνεργεῖ *all sufferings, sorrows, trials, &c., shall co-operate*, i. e., mutually contribute or each contributes, *for the good*, for the final and highest good, *of those who love God*, i. e., of the saints, of true Christians. So the sequel describes them. Augustine and some other fathers suppose sin to be here included in the πάντα. But plainly this was not here in the apostle's mind.

Τῶς . . . οὖσαν, *to those who are called according to his purpose or design*. Κλητοῖς, in the New Testament, is used *twice* in the sense of *invited, bidden*, viz., Matt. xx. 16. xxii. 14. In all other cases it means not only such as have been *invited*, but such as have *accepted* the invitation; e. g., 1 Cor. i. 2, 24. Jude ver. 1. Rom. i. 6. Rev. xvii. 14. It seems, therefore, to be employed as the equivalent of ἐκλεκτός, and means a *true Christian*. Plainly this is the sense in the verse before us; for the persons here designated are *those who love God*.—Κατὰ πρόθεσιν, *those who are called or chosen in conformity with the*

purpose [of God]. This *πρόθεσις* is κατ' ἐκλογήν, Romans ix. 11, i. e., free, without any merit or desert on the part of the sinner, or of obligation (strictly speaking) on the part of God; it is the *πρόθεσις* of him who worketh all things after the counsels of his own will, and hath before ordained that Christians should have a heavenly inheritance, Eph. i. 11: it is a *πρόθεσις τῶν αἰώνων*, an *eternal purpose*, Eph. iii. 11; or it is a *πρόθεσις . . . πρὸ χρόνων αἰώνων*, a *purpose before the ancient ages*, i. e., before the world began, 2 Tim. i. 9. That the *purpose of God* is here meant, and not the purpose or will of man (as Chrysostom, Theophylact, Cyril, Pelagius, Suidas, Hammond, Le Clerc, and others, have maintained), is rendered entirely clear by the sequel, verse 29, seq. See the *Excursus* on this passage.

(29) Ὅτι οὕς *πρόέγνω*. The course of thought seems to be thus: 'All things must work together for good to Christians—to such as are called to the privileges of a filial relation, and were chosen before the world began, to be conformed to the image of God and to be advanced to a state of glory. The everlasting love and purpose of God cannot be disappointed.' Ὅτι κ. τ. λ. introduces the reasons, why it is certain that all things will work together for the good of true Christians.

Πρόέγνω, *foreknew*, or *before decreed* or *constituted* or *determined*, (viz., as *κλητοί*, *elect*, *saints*, *chosen*, see on ver. 28), a word endlessly disputed. But whether *theology* or *philology* has been the predominating element in the dispute, it is not difficult for an impartial reader to decide. The object and argument of an expositor here should be *philological*; he should seek for what the apostle *does say*, not for what he may conjecture he ought to say.

Πρό (in composition) gives the additional signification of *previous time*, *formerly*; the action designated by the verb remaining the same as is signified by the simple form of the word. What then does *γινώσκω* mean? It means, (1) *To know* in any manner generally; *to know* by the aid of any of the bodily senses, by hearing, &c., or by experience, trial; Lat. *cognoscere*, *sentire*. (2) *To be acquainted with*, *to perceive so as fully to apprehend*, *to take knowledge of*, *to make one's self acquainted with*. (3) *To recognise one as a known friend*, *a familiar acquaintance*; Matt. vii. 23. Mark vii. 24. 1 Cor. viii. 3. Gal. iv. 9. 2 Tim. ii. 19. Heb. xiii. 23. To the same purpose is the corresponding Hebrew *יָדָע* employed, i. e., it means *to regard with affection*, *to treat with favour*; e. g., it is said of God in respect to the saints, Ps. i. 6. cxliv. 3. Amos. iii. 2. Nah. i. 7; of

That προγινώσκω may have the like sense, is clear from 1 Pet. i. 20; where προεγνωσμένου πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου (said of Christ) means plainly *before decreed, before constituted or determined*. In the like sense (as many think) it is used in Rom. xi. 2, *God hath not cast away his people ὃν προέγνω*, whom *he chose* to be his or constituted his, viz., before the foundation of the world; comp. 1 Pet. i. 20. Eph. iii. 11. 2 Tim. i. 9. And in accordance with this προέγνωσις is used; e. g., Acts ii. 24, where it is the equivalent of ὠρισμένη βουλὴ. So also in 1 Pet. i. 2; and it is the same as πρόθεσις, in 2 Tim. i. 9. Eph. iii. 11.

In this view of the subject, ὃν προέγνω is to be regarded as a *resumption* of the idea expressed by κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοῦς in ver. 28, i. e., those who by his purpose were κλητοί, those whom προέγνω, i. e., whom *he had before resolved or determined* should be his κλητοί—those προώρισις κ. τ. λ. That πρὸ in composition here means *before* the foundation of the world, may be seen by comparing 1 Pet. i. 20. 2 Tim. i. 9. Eph. iii. 11.

The objections to this view of the subject do not seem to be weighty; and they lie equally against translating προέγνω, *he foreknew* or *he loved before*. If God did actually *foreknow* who were to be his κλητοί, then it was not *uncertain* whether they would be or not. If he *LOVED* them *before* the foundation of the world, then it must have been that he did *foreknow* that they would be his κλητοί, and this again makes the same *certainty*. If he *determined* before the foundation of the world that they should be his κλητοί, then again the same *certainty* existed, and no more. Nay even if we could abstract God and his purposes from the whole, and suppose the order of the universe to move on without him in its constituted way, the same certainty would still have existed. I do not see, therefore, in what way we can avoid the conclusion, that *certainty* must exist, by the divine purpose and counsel, in regard to the κλητοί—a certainty not merely that they will be saved, provided they believe and obey and persevere in so doing, but a certainty that the κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοί will be brought to believe and obey and persevere, and will therefore obtain salvation; for such is the manifest tenor of the whole passage.

Still, all those of any party in theology who draw from προέγνω the conclusion that God *fore-ordained* or *chose* or *loved*, out of his *mere good pleasure*, on the one hand; or from his foresight of *faith* and *good works* on the other; deduce from the text what is not in it, for it says neither the one nor the other. It avers merely that the καὶ

πρόθεσιν κλητοί were *fore-known*, or *fore-loved*, or *fore-determined*. Construe this in whatever way you will, if there be any objection against the one, there is the same against the other, unless you remove it by adding a condition which the apostle has not added. It lies on the face of the whole paragraph, that *certainly* of future glory to all the κλητοί Θεοῦ, is what the writer means to affirm; and to affirm it *by showing that it is a part of the everlasting purposes of God*.

Καὶ προώρισεν, *he also fore-ordained, predestinated, decreed before*, viz., before the foundation of the world. So, clearly, the word is used in Acts iv. 28. 1 Cor. ii. 7, expressly πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων. I take the πρὸ in composition with the several verbs here, to have the same meaning as in πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων. It does not mean simply that God determined or decreed this or that *before* men individually came into existence, but *before the world began*. Eph. i. 5, 11. Bretschneider (Lex.) says, that the *decree* here has respect merely to the *external privileges* of the gospel, and not to *eternal salvation*; which is directly contradicted by 1 Cor. ii. 7—*εἰς δόξαν ἡμῶν*; by Eph. i. 5—*εἰς υἰοθεσίαν διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* . . . ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν . . . and verse 11, *ἵν' ἡμεῖς ὡς ἡμεῖς, προορισθέντες κατὰ πρόθεσιν κ. τ. λ.* In like manner, the whole tenor of the passage before us clearly contradicts this; for here the subject is *final* and *future glory*, not merely present opportunities and external advantages for acquiring Christian knowledge. The only remaining passage where the word is used (Acts iv. 28), employs it in an entirely different connection, but with the plain sense of *before decreed*. The sense of the whole is: 'Those who are κλητοί according to the purpose of God, those whom he determined from everlasting to save, he did at the same time *predestinate to be conformed to the image*, &c.'

Συμμόρφους is here used as a noun, having the Gen. after it; if employed as an adjective, it would require the Dative; συμμόρφους . . . αὐτοῦ, *to be of the like form with the image of his own Son*, i. e., to be like him, to resemble him in a moral respect. God has not then (as is often objected to the doctrine of predestination) decreed that men should be saved whether they be sinful or holy, i. e., without any regard to the character which they may have; but he has determined that all who are conducted to glory, must resemble *in a moral respect* him who leads them to glory, i. e., the great Captain of their salvation. To construe συμμόρφους as Erasmus and many other commentators have done, viz., as the *subjective Acc.*, i. e., as designating only those whom

God fore-ordained and the character which they possessed, instead of designating by *συμμέρους* the *predicate* Acc., i. e., the character *which God designed they should sustain*, is an evident violation of the laws of language here; for the inquiry of course arises, To what did he fore-ordain the *συμμέρους*? To which no answer is then given. We must therefore make the *predicate* Accusative here, and understand the phrase as meaning *συμμέρους εἶναι*.

Εἰς τὸ εἶναι . . . ἀδελφοῦς, that he [the Son] should be the first-born among many brethren; i. e., that the Saviour should, in his office as Lord of all and Head over all things for his church, still sustain a fraternal relation to those whose leader he is, they being made to resemble him by being made partakers of the like qualities or affections; comp. Heb. ii. 11—18. The point of likeness, however, is not here stated; for the apostle does not say, whether believers are to resemble the Saviour in their moral qualities, their sufferings, or their glorification. But nothing forbids our extending the idea to all these particulars; and the context invites us to do so. For the sense of *πρωτότοκος*, comp. Ps. lxxxix. 27, (28). Ex. iv. 22. Heb. i. 6, Col. i. 15.

(30) *Οὓς δὲ προώρισε*, and whom he fore-ordained or predestinated, viz., to be conformed to the image of his Son. In other words, whom he before determined to regenerate and sanctify, to purify from sin, and to make holy in some measure as the Saviour is holy.

Τούτους καὶ ἐκάλεσε, the same did he also call. Is this the so named *effectual calling*; or does it mean nothing more than the *external invitation* of the gospel, the moral suasion of it addressed to the heart and understanding of sinners? That the external call is sometimes designated by the word *καλῶ*, is clear from such passages as Matt. ix. 13. Mark ii. 17. Luke v. 32. But the word *καλῶ* is usually applied to *effectual calling*, i. e., such a calling as ensures acceptance. In such a way *κλησις* and *κλητός* are, beyond all doubt, commonly applied to *effectual calling* or *election*. So here *ἐκάλεσε* manifestly means such a calling as proceeds from the *πρόβεισις*, from the *fore-knowledge* and from the *predetermination* of God in respect to the objects of it, and which is followed by justification or pardon of sin and final glory. If this be not *effectual calling*, what is? Such a call as proceeds from the everlasting purpose and love of God, and ends in heavenly glory, is something more than mere external motive or suasive argument simply addressed to the mind.

Τούτους καὶ ἰδικαίωσεν, the same he also justified, i. e., pardoned,

acquitted, absolved from the penalty of the divine law, accepted and treated as righteous.—Οὓς δὲ . . . ἰδοῖξας, *and those whom he justified, the same he also glorified*; the work, begun in accordance with his everlasting love and purpose, he carries through and consummates by bestowing endless glory in heaven upon the κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοί.

How then can the mere *external* invitations and privileges of the gospel be here meant? Is it indeed true, that *all* to whom these are extended are κλητοί in the higher sense here meant? Whether it be true that all who *hear* the gospel will be saved, may be determined from such texts as John xv. 22—24. ix. 41. iii. 19. Heb. ii. 1—3. iii. 18, 19. vi. 4—6. x. 26—30. Mark xvi. 16. It may with equal certainty be determined from verses 1—11 of the present chapter, where the distinction between σαρκικοί and πνευματικοί is broad and clear. If now all who enjoy the external privileges of the gospel, are not κλητοί or κεκλημένοι in the sense of the present passage, then must it be true, that such only as are *conformed to the image of Christ* will be saved. And that all who enjoy the external privileges of the gospel are conformed to the image of Christ, will not, I trust, be asserted by any considerate person. See EXCURSUS on this passage.

It should be noted also, that Paul uses the Aorist here in all cases; as well in respect to future glorification (ἰδοῖξας), as in regard to predestination and justification. This is altogether in the manner of the Hebrew prophets, who usually speak of future events that are certain, as events which have already past. The obvious solution of this is, that in the knowledge and purpose of God, things future are like those which are past as to the certainty that they will take place. The use of the Aorist indicates the certainty of the writer's mind in regard to such things.

(31) Τί . . . ταῦτα; *what shall we say in respect to these things?* i. e., what shall we say, now, in reference to the facts and principles which I have just mentioned, viz., the purposes of God in respect to the κλητοί, and the manner in which he deals with them? The sequel answers this question; the sum of which is, that, 'such being the purposes of God, none of the sorrows or troubles of life, yea none of the spiritual enemies and opposers of the children of God, will be able to disappoint or frustrate their hopes.'

Εἰ ὁ Θεὸς . . . ἡμῶν; If God be on our side, i. e., espouse our cause. who can contend with success against him?

(32) Ὁς γὰρ κ. τ. λ., *even he who spared not his own son.* Τί qui-

dem, German *eben*; “*γῆ . . . vim verbi auget, i. e., intensiva est.*” — *Ἰδίου*, *his own, his genuine*, in opposition to or in distinction from *υιοῦ θεοῦ*, *an adopted son*, for such *believers* are; *e. g.*, Abraham prepared to offer up *his own son* as a sacrifice, instead of selecting a supposititious or adopted heir. Yet by *own* we are not here to understand a son *more humano*, but a Son *μονογενῆς* in a sense stated by Luke i. 35; *Son* being evidently used here not for the divine Logos as such, but for the Messiah clothed with our nature; as the sequel plainly shows.

Οὐκ ἰψίστατο, *he spared not, i. e.*, he did not withhold; a *λιτότης*, *i. e.*, a negative form of expression which has an affirmative meaning, equivalent to *ἱχαρίσατο*, *he gave*. So the sequel; *ἀλλ’ . . . αὐτόν*, *but gave him up for us all, i. e.*, gave him up to suffering and death, devoted him to be a sacrifice for our sins; comp. John iii. 16. Luke xxii. 19. Gal i. 4. The word *παρίδωκεν* is stronger than *ἰδωκεν*, which is used in these cited passages. It means *delivered over*, viz., to death. *πάντων* is plainly the same here as *ἡμεῖς*, *i. e.*, all Christians.

Πῶς οὐχί . . . χαρίσεται, *how [can it be] that with him he will not also bestow all things upon us?* That is: ‘How can we possibly suppose, that, after having bestowed the greatest of all gifts upon us, viz., his own Son, he will refuse to bestow those gifts which are smaller and less costly?’

Tholuck says here, that “the apostle has assured Christians [in the paragraph before us], that nothing shall hurt them unless they injure themselves.” And again: “If the Calvinistic idea [of perseverance] had been intended to be conveyed [by the apostle], he must also have said, that neither *apostasy* nor *sin* would, under any circumstances, have rendered their *calling* uncertain or disappointed it.” That this may be rendered uncertain, he thinks is shown by 2 Pet. i. 10.

But if exhortations, commands, and threatenings of a most awful nature, addressed to Christians, are to be considered as implying an uncertainty whether the work which God has begun in Christians will be completed; then the Bible is indeed full of proof that they may fall away and finally perish; for it is filled with passages of such a nature. Above all does the epistle to the Hebrews abound in them. But while it is impossible to deny this, or even to deny that if Christians were left to themselves they would fall away every day and hour of their lives, one may still, without any just cause of reproach,

be permitted to believe with the apostle, that "*whom God calls, he justifies and glorifies*;" he may believe, with the same apostle, that "if Christ died for us while we were yet sinners, while we were ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἀσβεστοί, MUCH MORE, being justified [*i. e.*, obtaining pardon through his blood], shall we be saved from wrath," Rom. v. 6—10. How can we then put a construction so frigid on this most animated and energetic passage which is now before us? 'The purposes of God,' says the apostle, 'will not be disappointed in bringing his elect to glory.' Why? 'Because, since God hath given us his own Son—the greatest possible gift—to redeem them from sin, therefore their redemption remaineth not uncertain, but will be accomplished.' This reasoning we can see and feel. But how is it with the exegesis of Tholuck? 'God will save you from the power of *external* causes of disappointment, if you only take care yourselves of the *internal* ones.' Indeed! But I have great difficulty in finding the consolation or assurance which I need, in such a declaration as this. It is offering me only a single drop of water, when I am ready to faint with thirst and need a copious draught. Ten thousand thousand enemies *without* are not half so strong as the one *within*; and if God's gift of his own Son has not secured *sanctifying* and *restraining* grace for his children, which shall enable them to 'crucify the old man with his lusts and to put on the new man,' then is the work not only incomplete, but it will most certainly fail of being finally accomplished. The world and the devil would have little influence over us, indeed, were our hearts altogether right toward God; and certain it is, that all other combats are mere skirmishes, compared with the warfare that is going on within us by reason of our *internal* enemy, *i. e.*, a corrupt heart. But did not Christ die to redeem us from the dangers of this most powerful of all enemies, as well as from other dangers? If not, then we may abandon all hopes which the gospel inspires, and give ourselves up, after all, for lost. But no, NO! This exegesis does not meet the object which the apostle has in view. It is and must be true, that "if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, MUCH MORE, being reconciled, *we shall be saved by his life.*" Rom. v. 10.

But all this purpose (which belongs only to the counsels and mercy of God) does not hinder Paul, nor any other sacred writer, from reproving, warning, and threatening Christians, just as if they were liable, every day and hour of their lives, to fall away and to lose the glorious reward of the saints. *In themselves considered* they are

liable to this; and God employs the very means in question in order to preserve them against apostasy. Thus, while we admit that the promises of Christ will not fail, nor the efficacy of atoning blood be frustrated; while we believe that "where God has begun a good work, he will carry it into execution (*ἰσπελίσσει*) until the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. i. 6); we admit in the fullest manner the importance and duty of warning, reproving, exhorting, and threatening Christians, just as we should do were there no direct assurances that "whom God calls he justifies, and whom he justifies he glorifies." We admit all this, because the sacred writers evidently admit it, and write constantly in a manner that accords with this admission.

(33) *Τίς . . . Θεοῦ; Who shall bring an accusation against the elect of God?* That is: 'Who shall prefer an accusation against them, of crimes that would occasion their condemnation, when they come before the tribunal of God?' *Ἐκλεκτῶν*, Heb. בְּדוּר, נִבְחָר, בָּחִיר, *chosen, dear, beloved, precious*; comp. 1 Pet. ii. 9; Luke xxiii. 35. 1 Pet. i. 1. Matt. xxiv. 22. 31. Mark xiii. 20. Luke xviii. 7. Col. iii. 12. Tit. i. 1. Rev. xvii. 14; also Matt. xx. 16. xxii. 14 (where *ἐκλεκτοί* is used in distinction from *κλητοί*). That *ἐκλεκτῶν*, however, here means something more than merely *ἀγαπητοί*, may be seen from comparing ver. 28 above—*κατὰ πρόθεσιν . . . κλητοί* and 1 Pet. i. 1, 2, *ἐκλεκτοῖς . . . κατὰ πρόγνωσιν Θεοῦ Πατρός*.

Θεὸς ὁ δικαίων, *it is God who justifieth*. So I prefer to render and to point it, viz., by making this phrase answer to the preceding question. So Luther, Tholuck, our English version, and most commentators. On the other hand, Augustine, Erasmus, Locke, Schöttgen, Griesbach, Knapp, Reiche, and others, put an interrogation point after *δικαίων*, and likewise after all the succeeding clauses; with diminished emphasis, as it seems to me, and certainly with no great probability; for how can we well suppose that *seventeen* successive questions are here put, without any answer or intervening matter? as Dr. Knapp's and Griesbach's pointing represents them to be. *Θεὸς ὁ δικαίων* means, *it is God who acquits, pardons, forgives* the sins *τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν*. Now as God is the supreme and final judge, how can any accusation against them occasion their condemnation?

(34) *Τίς ὁ κατακρίνων; Who shall condemn or be the condemner?* i. e., who shall pass sentence of condemnation? God acquits; can any besides him condemn? No; Christ has prevented all condemnation by his death: *Χριστὸς ὁ ἀποθανών*, i. e., his death having made expiation for the sins of believers, no sentence of condemnation can

now be passed. I construe *Χριστός ὁ ἀποθανών* as an answer to the preceding question; so Tholuck and Flatt.

Μάλλον δὲ . . . ἡμῶν, *yea rather, who is also risen, who moreover is at the right hand of God, and maketh intercession for us*; i. e., Christ not only died to make atonement for our sins, but he is risen from the dead, and is exalted to the throne of Majesty in the heavens, in order that he may complete the glorious work which he began by his death. In regard to the phrase *ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, see my Comm. on Heb. i. 3.—*Ἐντυγχάνει* conveys the general sense of *aiding, assisting, managing one's concerns for his advantage, &c.*; comp. Heb. vii. 25. ix. 24. 1 John ii. 1. In construing the passage in this way, one must remove the interrogation points after the respective clauses, and substitute a comma after the first and second, and a period after the third.

(35) *τίς . . . Χριστοῦ*; *Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?* i. e., from that love which he cherishes for us: for so the tenor of the passage plainly demands that we should construe it. Calvin remarks on *τίς* here (instead of *τί*), that the apostle uses *τίς* because he considers all creatures and trials here as so many *athleta*, striving against the efforts of Christians.

Θλίψις, ἡ *στενοχωρία*, ἡ *διωγμός*; i. e., shall *vexation* from without, or *anxiety* from within, or *persecution* by the enemies of the Christian religion, effect a separation from the love of Christ? *Θλίψις* is strictly applicable to any strait or pressure which comes from *circumstances*, i. e., from external causes; *στενοχωρία* (lit. *narrowness of place*) is applied more especially to *anxiety of mind*; *διωγμός* is sufficiently plain, as it obviously designates distresses arising from the rage and malice of persecutors. All three words together designate intensely the general idea of trouble or distress.

Bodily sufferings and dangers next follow; for Christians, who live in periods of persecution, must of course be peculiarly exposed to these. *Famine* and *nakedness* are the natural result of being driven from home, and made to wander in deserts and desolate places. *Peril* and *sword* are necessarily connected with the bitter hostility of persecution.

(36) The quotation here comes from Ps. xliv. 23 (Sept. xliii. 22), and is applied to the state of Christians in the apostle's times, as it was originally to those whom the Psalmist describes; in other words, the apostle describes the state of suffering Christians, by the terms

which were employed in ancient days to describe the suffering people of God.—'Ολην τὴν ἡμέραν, *δι' ἡμέρας*, continually, unremittingly.

'Ελογίσθημεν ὡς τέθνητα σφαγῆς, *we are counted, i. e., we are reckoned, regarded, dealt with, as sheep for the slaughter*, or we are killed as *slaughter-sheep, i. e., unremittingly and without mercy.*

(37) Ἀλλά, *but, still, i. e., notwithstanding these severe pressures and trials.*—'Εν τοῦτοις πάσιν, *in all these, viz., all these sufferings and sorrows.*—'Υπερικήμεν, *we are more than conquerors*, an intensive and powerful form of expression, used with great appropriateness and significancy here.—Διὰ . . . ἡμᾶς, *i. e., through Christ who loved us, viz., in consequence of the strength and courage which he imparts :* comp. Phil. iv. 13.

(38) The γάρ here stands as a *reason* for the assertion that we are *more than conquerors*. 'It must be so,' says Paul, 'for nothing can separate us from the love of Christ.' Θάνατος . . . Ζωή, *death*, here seems plainly to mean, *a violent death* by the hands of persecutors. Ζωή, on the other hand, seems to be *life* on condition of recanting a profession of the Christian religion. It was customary with persecutors, in order to win Christians over to heathenism, to terrify with threats of death in case they persevered in their profession; and also to allure with promises of life, in case they abjured it. To this usage the words Θάνατος and Ζωή here very naturally refer. If any one choose to give the words a more extensive meaning, and to regard them as equivalent to saying, that there is nothing in death itself or in life, which will separate, &c., there can be no valid objection to this.

Οὔτε ἄγγελοι, οὔτε ἀρχαί . . . οὔτε δυνάμεις, *neither angels nor principalities, nor powers.* The separation of δυνάμεις here from ἀρχαί, by an intervening clause, has been a matter of difficulty among critics of all ages. But as this separation does in fact exist in the best manuscripts, and in the Coptic, Armenian, and Syriac versions, we are obliged, as critics, to receive it as it stands, and to interpret it in the best manner we can.

The principal difficulty has arisen from the supposition, that δυνάμεις must have been intended by the writer here to designate an *order of angels*, either good or bad. This supposition was natural, because we find words of the same and the like kind, elsewhere ranged together to designate such classes or orders; *e. g.*, Eph. i. 21, . . . ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας καὶ δυνάμεως. Col. i. 16, εἴτε θρόνοι, εἴτε κυριότητες,

ring, that neither *angels* nor *archangels* with whom we are contesting, *i. e.*, neither the inferior evil spirits, nor Satan himself (or it may be, Satan and others of similar rank), shall be able, by all their assaults and machinations, to separate true Christians from the love of their Saviour. Tholuck supposes the *good angels* to be meant here; but how can those, "who are sent forth to minister to such as are the heirs of salvation" (Heb. i. 14), be well supposed to be the *opposers* and *enemies* of Christians? Accordingly, with Flatt, I understand ἄγγελοι and ἀρχαί of *evil spirits*.

Δυνάμεις appears not to be associated in meaning with ἄγγελοι and ἀρχαί, because it is not associated with them by juxta-position; for it has juxta-position in all other instances where it means *angels*. I must interpret it, therefore, as designating *magistrates, civil powers*, viz., persecuting kings and princes. That δύναμις means *auctoritas, imperium*, is beyond all doubt; see Luke iv. 36. Acts iv. 7. 1 Cor. v. 4. Rev. xiii. 2; also Rev. iv. 11. v. 12. vii. 12. xii. 10. And that the *abstract* sense may become *concrete, i. e.*, that δύναμις may designate those *persons* who are clothed with civil power, is clear from 1 Cor. xv. 24. Eph. i. 21, as also from comparing its synonyme ἰξουσαί, in Rom. xiii. 1—4.

Οὔτι ἰσotῶτα οὔτι μίλλοντα, *neither the present nor the future; i. e.*, neither any objects of the present time nor of the future. The apostle, after having mentioned particular things in the preceding context, here comes to the generic ideas of *time*, including of course all occurrences that take place in it; and in the next clause he seems to predicate that of *space* or *place*, which he here asserts of time.

(39) Οὔτι ὕψος οὔτι βάθος, *lit. neither height nor depth*. But a great variety of explanations have been given to these words; *e. g.*, Origen: 'Evil spirits in the air and in hades.' Ambrose: 'Neither high and haughty speculation [in doctrine], nor deep sins.' Augustine: 'Idle curiosity about things above us and below us.' Melancthon: 'Heretical speculation of the learned, and gross superstition of the vulgar, &c.' So likewise: 'Honour and dishonour,' 'high place and low place,' 'happiness and misery,' 'the elevation of Christians on the cross, and the submersion of them in the sea,' have all had their advocates. The meaning *happiness or misery, honour or dishonour*, is a possible one; but the animated and glowing spirit of the whole passage naturally leads the mind to expect something more elevated than this. ὕψος may mean *heaven*; so βάθος, and so ὕψος in Luke i. 78. Eph. iv. 8. As to βάθος, it has been taken to mean

the earth, and Eph. iv. 9 is appealed to as sustaining this interpretation. But Ps. cxxxix. 15, $\text{רָחֹק מִן־בְּרִיתִי}$, *the lower parts of the earth*, $\tauὰ βάθη τῆς γῆς$ (comp. Eph. iv. 9), would be a more apposite appeal, inasmuch as here the meaning plainly is, *earth* or *secret recesses of the earth*. On the whole, however, $\betaάθος$ (as the antithesis of $\psiψωμα$) would more appropriately designate *the under-world*, הַשְׁתַּיִם , $\alphaἰδης$, $\alphaἰβυσσος$. Thus understood, the sentiment of the apostle ends in a climax; viz., neither heaven, nor hell, i. e., neither the world above, nor the world below, $\alphaὐτὴ τις κτίσις ἑτέρα$, *nor any other created thing*. The whole summed up together, and understood after the Hebrew manner of speaking, stands thus: 'The universe shall not be able to separate Christians from the love of Jesus, who died for them;' heaven above and Sheol below, and other created things constituting, in the language of Scripture, *the universe*. I prefer, however, the simple meaning *above* and *below*, i. e., no time and no space can separate us, &c.; or no period of time and no place can occasion the disappointment of our hopes.

This is, indeed, "an anchor sure and stedfast, entering into that within the vail;" A BLESSED, CHEERING, GLORIOUS HOPE, WHICH ONLY THE GOSPEL AND ATONING BLOOD CAN INSPIRE.

CHAP. IX. 1—33.

WITH the eighth chapter concludes what may be appropriately termed the *doctrinal* part of our epistle. What follows, is either by way of forestalling or of removing objections, or of justifying what has been said; or else in the way of practical exhortation and caution. In previous and different parts of the epistle, the apostle had already advanced sentiments on the subject of salvation by grace—a salvation proffered in the same manner and on the same terms to Gentile as well as Jew—which he well knew would be very obnoxious to many of his kinsmen after the flesh, not excepting some of those who by profession were converts to the Christian religion. In chapters ii. and iii., he had formally and at length laboured to show, that the Jews were not only in a state of condemnation by the divine law, but even more guilty than the Gentiles; and this, because they had enjoyed greater religious privileges. At the close of chap. iii. he had come out fully and plainly with the declaration, that God is the God of the Gentiles as really and truly as of the Jews; and in the succeeding chapter, he had laboured to show that such was the principle or doctrine which is taught in the Old Testament Scriptures themselves. "The seed of

Abraham," in the highest, and noblest, and only really important sense of the phrase, means his *spiritual seed*; which comprises all who imitate the faith of Abraham, and like him believe implicitly in the divine declarations.

In chap. v. the apostle had implicitly justified the extension of the gospel privileges and blessings to all men indiscriminately, inasmuch as all were affected by the fall of Adam their common progenitor. Then, in chapters vi.—viii. he had shown that Christ and his grace are the only effectual ground of our *sanctification* as well as justification; that all objection to the scheme of grace on the ground that it will encourage sin, not only is destitute of foundation, but that the sinner has no hope of resisting sin with success, but through the grace of the gospel; and, finally that the *sanctification* of believers will issue in their *salvation*, with the same certainty as their justification does.

But how could the Jew, accustomed as he was to pride himself in his descent from Abraham, to regard God as his peculiar and covenant God, and to expect acceptance in consequence of his lineage and of the peculiar favours which had been shown to the Hebrew nation—how could he receive with approbation a doctrine, which not only went to prostrate all the hopes that he had cherished of pre-eminence in this world, and of happiness in the world to come, and to place the very heathen on a level with himself, but which even advanced still farther, and made him more guilty than the heathen, and consequently involved him in higher condemnation, because he had sinned against peculiar light and love? Nay, the very privileges, which had been the ground of his greatest confidence that he must be regarded with divine approbation and entitled to the favour of God, had become, according to the representation of the apostle, the occasion of his peculiar and aggravated condemnation.

The apostle well knew, that the haughty spirit of his countrymen could not easily brook all this. He expected they would accuse him of having become alienated from his kinsmen after the flesh, and partial to the Gentiles, since he was an apostle to them. It is evidently with such anticipations, that he wrote the chapter now before us. For he begins this by a most solemn profession or declaration of his sincere and ardent affection for his own nation. He protests against the idea, that in declaring God to be the God of the Gentiles, as well as the Jews, he has therefore shunned every kind of pre-eminence to his own people. He allows that they have enjoyed special and distinguished *external* privileges; above all, that the Messiah himself has come from the midst of them, verses 2—5. He then proceeds to shew, that God in selecting the heirs of his grace where he pleases, *i. e.*, making the Gentiles the *κατα πρόθεσιν κλητοί* as well as Jews—in doing all this, he had violated no promise. His word *οὐκ ἐκέκρωκε* (ver. 6), *i. e.*, his promise made to Abraham and *his seed* is not frustrated or annulled, because he has given up unbelieving Jews to perish, and granted to believing Gentiles the privilege of being called the sons of God. God has always exercised the right of choosing the recipients of his favours, when and where he pleases; as the Jewish Scriptures themselves do testify. Abraham, for example, had several children; but in Isaac only was his seed called, verses 7—9. To Isaac two sons were born, Esau and Jacob; yet Esau was rejected and Jacob received; and the decision respecting this was made even before they were born, vers. 10, 14. God's declaration to Moses, and his dealings with Pharaoh, exhibit the same truth in a striking manner, verses 15—18. All objection to this on the ground of partiality or injustice, is without any good support; inasmuch as the sovereign Lord of the universe has a perfect right to dispose of his own as seems good in his sight, verses 19, 20. He does injustice to none; for those whom he passes by, are left to the course of justice and equity, vers. 21—23. The Hebrew Scriptures have not only displayed, in this way, God's sovereignty in his dealings with his people, but they also contain express declarations that the Gentiles shall be brought into the church and become the children of God, vers. 24—26. Equally certain is it, that they predict the unbelief and rejection of the natural descendants of Abraham, verses 27—29. Finally, the apostle sums up the whole matter in discussion, by declaring that 'the Gentiles are admitted to the gospel privilege of justification by faith, but that the Jews in general remain in a state of unbelief and rejection, because Christ crucified is to them a stumbling-block, and none but believers on him can be saved,' vers. 30—33.

It is in this way that the apostle justifies what he had already advanced respecting the Jews and Gentiles; and in particular what he had said, in the eighth chapter, about the highest blessings of the gospel being bestowed on the *κατα πρόθεσιν κλητοί*. The amount of the justification is this: 'God has always dealt in the like manner by his people. The Old Testament

is full of the same doctrine, or it exhibits facts which illustrate and confirm it. It contains predictions concerning the very things of which the Jews now complain.'

Viewed in this light (I am unable to see in what other light it can be fairly viewed), there can be no great difficulty in deciding the question: What is the *object* of the chapter before us? Plainly the object is to illustrate and defend against objections, the affirmations which the apostle had been making. What were these? The consummation of the whole is, that 'the *κατὰ πρόθεσιν ἄλῃτοι* are predestined, called, justified, and *glorified*; and these, both Jews and Gentiles.' But the Jew objects, that this amounts to a breach of the promises made to Abraham and *his seed*. The apostle denies this. He states that the *natural* seed, as such, are not the specific objects of this promise; and that God has always, in times past, as now under the gospel, chosen the objects of his favour where he pleased, without regard to any external privileges, advantages, or relations.

What then has the apostle in reality been asserting in the eighth chapter, which he justifies and defends in the ninth? Surely the question in the eighth chapter is not one of *external* privileges or advantages; it is one of *calling, justification, and glorification*. It is one which respects the everlasting and inseparable love of Christ. Defence, therefore, of the sentiments inculcated in respect to these topics, occupies the ninth chapter. In itself, it contains not the great doctrine in question, that is, it does not *directly* reveal or inculcate it. The *examples* of God's sovereignty produced in it are of various kinds, some of them having respect to temporal advantages or disadvantages; and some to both spiritual and temporal. But the *principle* illustrated and confirmed by all these is the main and all-important question; and the principle is that which is avowed in the eighth chapter, viz., that the *κατὰ πρόθεσιν ἄλῃτοι* are the certain heirs of *future glory*. It is the eighth chapter, then, which is the key of the ninth; and without keeping this in view, one may look in vain for the object of the various examples and illustrations which the ninth chapter exhibits. In a word, the apostle shows in the ninth chapter 'that *God in calling, justifying, and glorifying οὐκ ἐκ προτέρου, does not only what he has a perfect right to do, what is analogous to examples of his dealings as exhibited by the Jewish Scriptures, and what accords with the doctrines and predictions which they contain. In this way, and in this only, can we fully see the scope, object, and connection of the ninth chapter.*

CHAP. IX. 1—5.

(1) First of all, the apostle proceeds to the most solemn assurances of his affectionate regard for his own nation, in order to prevent the apprehension that he believed and taught as he had done respecting the Gentiles, on account of being alienated in his affections from the Jews. The expression of his feelings is made in glowing terms.

Ἀλήθειαν . . . Χριστῶ, *I speak the truth in Christ*. Most interpreters regard *ἐν Χριστῶ* as the formula of an oath; and they appeal to the Hebrew form of an oath, which prefixes אֵל (iv) to the object or person by whom any one swears. So also *ἐν* in the New Testament, c. g., Matt. v. 34—36. Rev. x. 6. So Dan. xii. 7. (in Theodotion's Greek version); and so Flatt interprets it in his commentary. But

Tholuck has made this interpretation very doubtful. Compare, for example, *ἐν Κυρίῳ* in Eph. iv. 17, where it follows μαρτυροῦμαι, and where the formula of an oath is out of question. It is only solemn declaration, such as Christ or the Spirit of Christ prompts or suggests. In like manner we have *χαρὰ ἐν Χριστῷ, ἀγάπη ἐν Χριστῷ, κ. τ. λ.*, where an oath is of course out of all question. Indeed the phrase *ἐν Κυρίῳ, ἐν Χριστῷ, &c.*, occurs so often, that abundant analogies are at hand to justify the exegesis which is given to *ἐν Χριστῷ*, here, when we construe it as meaning *agreeably to what becomes one who is in Christ or who belongs to him; i. e.*, as a Christian, or one who is spiritually united to Christ, I speak the truth, &c.

Οὐ ψεύδομαι repeats the affirmation and strengthens it, although the negative form or λισότης is used. Comp. John i. 21. Eph. iv. 25. 1 Sam. iii. 18, for the negative form of the expression; 1 Tim. ii. 7, for the like words.

Συμμεμαρτυροῦσθες . . . ἁγίῳ, *my conscience bearing me witness, in the Holy Spirit*. I must connect these words together, in the method of exegesis which is here preferred, and not join οὐ ψεύδομαι with ἐν Πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, as Dr. Knapp and some other critics have done, making the latter phrase a part of the formula of an oath. The repetition of an oath here, would seem rather unlooked for and excessive; besides that no example elsewhere of Christians swearing by the Holy Ghost can be produced. Conscience is the voice of God in man; or at least the faculty on which the influence of the Spirit of God seems to be specially exerted. It was a conscience moved and enlightened by this Spirit, which, the apostle here solemnly declares, testified his affectionate regard for the Jewish nation; *ἐν Πνεύματι ἁγίῳ* meaning, I who am moved *by the Holy Spirit*, or *am in the Spirit*; comp. Rev. i. 10, *ἰδενόμην ἐν πνεύματι*.

(2) Ὅτι . . . μου, *that I have great sorrow and continual anguish in my heart*. For the like expressions of sympathy and affection towards others, comp. 1 Cor. i. 4. Phil. i. 3, 4. Eph. i. 16. 1 Thes. i. 2. Rom. i. 9, 10. Philem. ver. 4. 2 Tim. i. 3, 4. 2 Cor. xi. 29. xii. 15.

(3) A much controverted verse, and which therefore needs particular illustration. Nearly every word has been the subject of different and contested exegesis.

Ἡυχόμεν γὰρ αὐτὸς, *for I myself could wish*. Compare Acts xxv. 22, *ἰβουλόμεν, I could wish*; Gal. iv. 29 *ἤθελον, I could desire*. But why not translate, *I did wish, i. e.*, when I was an unconverted Jew I did

wish? Because, (1) The apostle designs to show his *present* love to the Jews. Who questioned this strong attachment to them, when he persecuted Stephen and others before his conversion? Or to what purpose could it be now to exhibit this, when his love to them since he became a Christian is the only thing that is called in question? Then, (2) Neither the present *ἐύχομαι*, nor the Optative *ἐυχόμην*, would accurately express what the apostle means here. *Εύχομαι* (Ind. present) would mean, *I wish* by way of direct and positive affirmation, and with the implication that the thing wished might take place; *ἐυχόμην* (Opt.) *I am wishing with desire*, implying the *possibility* that the thing wished for would take place. On the other hand, *ἠύχόμην* as here employed (*I could wish*) implies, that whatever his desires may be, after all the thing wished for is impossible or it cannot take place; which is doubtless the very shade of thought that the writer would design to express. See New Test. Gramm. § 126. Note 1. If the apostle had designed here merely to describe what he once felt or desired, *i. e.*, before his conversion, he would of course have employed the *Aorist* of narration, and not the Imperfect.

Ἀνάθεμα εἶναι, to be an anathema, to be devoted to destruction, or to be excommunicated. This difficult and controverted word needs a full and satisfactory illustration. In classical Greek *ἀνάθεμα* and *ἀνάθημα* were originally altogether equivalent or synonymous; just as *εὔρεμα* and *εὔρημα* were, and also *ἐπίθεμα* and *ἐπίθημα*, &c. (1) The proper and original meaning of *ἀνάθεμα* or *ἀνάθημα*, was a *setting out* or *setting up* of any thing consecrated to the gods, in their temples, such as tripods, images, statues, inscriptions, &c. The *exposure* of such things in the temples, in any way, whether they hung up, stood up, or lay down, was *ἀνάθεμα*; the action of exposing them, or the exposure itself, was called *ἀνάθεμα*. Hence, (2) *The thing itself exposed, the thing consecrated or devoted* to the gods, was called *ἀνάθεμα*, by a very common principle of language applicable to a great multitude of words. Then, (3) As any thing devoted or consecrated to the gods was irrevocably given up to them, and was no more subject to common use; so when any *living* thing, beast or man, became an *ἀνάθεμα*, it was of course to be slain in sacrifice, and offered to the gods mostly as a peculiar victim. In like manner, under the Levitical law, every *קָדָשׁ* or *ἀνάθεμα* devoted to God, was incapable of redemption; Lev. xxvii. 28, 29, *πάν ἀνάθεμα . . . ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπου ἰως κτήνους . . . οὐ λυτρωθήσεται, ἀλλὰ θανάτῳ θανατωθήσεται*;

comp. Judg. xi. 30, 31 and 39 ; which, however, is the only instance on record in the Scriptures of a *human* ἀνάθεμα, and which at all events is not encouraged by the laws of Moses. And in consequence of such a custom or law, cities, edifices, and their inhabitants, which were devoted to *excision* or *entire destruction*, were called חָרֵם, i. e., ἀνάθεμα as the Seventy have rendered it. So Jericho was חָרֵם, Josh. vi. 17. comp. verse 21 ; and so the cities of the Canaanites that were *utterly destroyed* by Israel, were named חָרֵם, *destruction*. Any thing in fact, whether man, beast, or any species of property or ornament, *which was to be utterly destroyed*, was called חָרֵם (ἀνάθεμα) by the Hebrews ; see Lev. xxvii. 28, 29. Deut. xiii. 15—17, and comp. 1 Kings xx. 42. Is. xxxiv. 5. Zech. xiv. 11.

The Greek words ἀναθεματίζω and ἀνατίθημι correspond, in like manner, to the Heb. חָרַם (Hiph. of חָרַם), and mean *to pronounce to be an ἀνάθεμα, to give up as an ἀνάθεμα, i. e., to set apart or deliver over to destruction*.

But to what destruction ? To natural death or spiritual, i. e., to sufferings in the present world, or those of everlasting death ? Those who construe the word in the first way, say, that ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ means *by Christ* ; in which case the whole sentiment would seem to be ; ‘I could wish to suffer temporal death inflicted by Christ, provided this would exempt my countrymen from it.’ But there are some weighty objections to this ; for the apostle is not here discussing the subject of the Jews’ *temporal* punishment or excision, but of their excision from the blessings of a future world by reason of their unbelief ; comp. ix. 25—33. It is the fearful doom then which unbelief is to bring on the Jews, that the apostle wishes could be averted ; and it is his deep concern for them in respect to this, which he desires to testify. It is a חָרֵם of this kind, therefore, that he would consent to take upon himself, could they be saved by it. That ἀνάθεμα may be used to signify the *second* death, is clear from 1 Cor. xvi. 22. The whole tenor of the passage makes clearly against the supposition, that *temporal* excision merely is meant.

In respect to ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ (if the whole be construed as I have here supposed, it must be in order to follow the strict principles of exegesis), it may mean *by Christ* ; i. e., it is equivalent to ἐκ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. So clearly ἀπὸ may be used, and is often employed ; e. g., Mark viii. 31. Luke ix. 22. xvii. 25. Matt. xi. 19. Luke xii. 58. Acts ii. 22. x. 17, et sæpe ; see Bretschn. in verbum. Still, as the idea of being an *anathema* involves the idea of separation or banish-

ment from Christ, ἀπὸ may be rendered *from*, without any important variation of the sense.

In regard to *κατὰ τὸν σάρκα*, *on account of or in the room of my brethren, my kinsmen after the flesh*, it plainly means, for the sake of my natural brethren; my kinsmen by natural descent or generation, i. e., the Jews.

Tholuck gives a little different turn to the passage, but the same sense in substance. He compares ἀνάθεμα to אָנָה in the later Heb.; which was used to denote *excommunication*, separation from the Jewish community or אָנָה. The Rabbins make *three* gradations of excommunication, which they call, (a) אָנָה *seclusion*, which lasted a month, and obliged a man to keep four ells distant from all his household. (b) The אָנָה, which forbade all intercourse, action, eating, drinking, &c., with any one, and all approach on the part of the excommunicated person to the synagogue. (c) The אָנָה (from אָנָה, *excludere*), which designated utter exclusion on the part of God and man, and the being given up to destruction. A tremendous example of the Rabbinic אָנָה is produced by Buxtorf, Lex. Rabb. p. 828. I subjoin it below, for the information of the curious reader.*

* "By the authority of the Lord of lords, let A. B. be an *anathema* (אָנָה) in both houses of judgment, in that above and that beneath; let him be *anathema* by the holy beings on high, by the Seraphim and Ophanim (אֲפֹנִיִּם, *wheels*, see Ezek. i. 10, seq., a superior order of angels); let him be *anathema* by the whole church, great and small. Let plagues great and real be upon him; diseases great and horrible. Let his habitation be that of dragons; let his star be darkened with clouds. Let him be an object of wrath, indignation, and anger; let his corpse be given to wild beasts and serpents. Let his enemies and adversaries exult over him; let his silver and gold be given to others; let his children be exposed at the door of his enemies; and let posterity be astonished at his fate. Let him be cursed by the mouth of Addirion and Achtiel, by the mouth of Sandalphon and Hadraniel, by the mouth of Hansasiel and Patchiel, by the mouth of Seraphiel and Sagansiel, by the mouth of Michael and Gabriel, by the mouth of Raphael and Mesharetiel. [These are the names of angels.] Let him be cursed by the mouth of Zabzabib, and by the mouth of Habbabib, who is the great God [these names are Cabbalistic ones of the Divinity]; and by the mouth of the seventy names of the great King [Jehovah]; and on the part of Tsorkak the great chancellor [another mysterious name]. Let him be swallowed up, like Korah and his company; with terror and trembling let his breath depart. May the rebuke of Jehovah slay him; may he be strangled, like Ahithophel, by his own counsel! May his leprosy be like that of Gehazi; and may there be no resurrection of his remains! Let not his sepulchre be with that of Israel. Let his wife be given to others; let them embrace her, while he is giving up the ghost.—In this *anathema* let A. B. remain; and let this be his inheritance. But on me, and on all Israel, may God bestow peace with his blessing!"

In this way, ἀνάθεμα ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ would mean, *one banished, cut off, separated from Christ*; which would involve, however, all the consequences that are involved in the preceding exegesis.

But on the whole, as the preceding sense is most consonant with Scriptural and classical usage, I should give it the preference. The sentiment then is: ‘Such is my love for my kinsmen after the flesh, that were it possible, I would devote myself to the destruction; which threatens them, could they but escape by such means.

In respect to the objections urged against this sentiment, they do not seem to be weighty. It is asked: ‘How could the apostle be willing to be for ever cast off and separated from Christ? How could he be willing to become a sinner and to be miserable for ever?’ I answer, (1) The possibility that such could or would be the case, is not at all implied in what he says; no more than the possibility that “an angel from heaven should preach another gospel,” is implied by what is said in Gal. i. 8. It is merely a case supposed or stated, for the sake of illustrating or expressing a feeling or sentiment. (2) Even supposing the actual possibility of the exchange in question was believed by the apostle, it would not imply that in itself he was willing to be a sinner, or to be for ever miserable. When the apostle says that Christ *was made a CURSE for us*, does he mean to say, that Christ took on him the temper of mind which they have who are accursed? “Quid mirum,” says Origen, “si, cum Dominus pro servis maledictum sit factum, servus pro fratribus anathema fiat?” It would imply merely, then, that Paul would be willing, in case he could save the whole nation, to take on himself the *miseries* to which they were hastening. And a sentiment like this, is surely capable of a rational and sober defence. If benevolence would lead Paul to undergo any assignable degree of suffering, in the present life, in order to promote the everlasting welfare of the Jewish nation; would not the like benevolence lead him to undergo any assignable degree of misery in a future world for the same purpose, provided such a purpose could be answered by it? Who can draw the line where benevolence would stop short; except it be, where the evil suffered was to be equal to the good accomplished, or even greater? Could Paul have the genuine spirit of his Lord and Master, unless he could truly say what he has said in the passage before us? But, (3) The inference that Paul “was willing to be damned,” or that Christians must come to such a state of willingness, is made without any ground from the verse in question. If Paul’s being cast off by the Saviour

could occasion the reception and salvation of the whole Jewish people, this apostle expresses his readiness to submit to it. But as such a thing was impossible; and as he really knew it to be so; all that we can well suppose the passage teaches, is, that the apostle possessed such a feeling of benevolence toward the Jewish nation, that he was ready to do or suffer any thing whatever, provided their salvation might be secured by it. In other words, this is a high and glowing expression, springing from an excited state of feeling, which the use of common language could not at all satisfy. And in making use of such an expression, Paul did not depart from a mode of speaking which is still very common in the East. The Arabians, for example, very commonly, in order to testify strong affection, say, *let my soul be a ransom for thee*. So Maimonides (Sanhed. fol. 18. 1), in explaining the Talmudic expression *הָרַנִּי בְּפָרְתְךָ*, see *I am thy ransom* states, that this was a common expression of strong affection.

So in the verse before us, the whole is evidently and necessarily designed to express *strong affection*. But what expression of this would be uttered, if we suppose the apostle merely to say (as not a few critics maintain), that he once was desirous of being cut off from Christ, viz., before his conversion and when he persecuted the church? But how could he be *cut off* from Christ, who never had been joined to him? And what evidence was this of Paul's *present* affection? Or if it be construed as meaning, 'cut off, destroyed, *i. e.*, put to death by Christ;' did the apostle actually wish this before he was converted? And if he did, what had this to do with the salvation of his brethren and kinsmen?

It is possible, indeed, to construe *ἀνάσσεια* as implying *temporal death* or *destruction*; and to suppose the apostle to say: 'I could wish that I might suffer the punishment which Christ is about to inflict on the Jews, in their stead.' The emphasis would not be wholly destroyed by this interpretation. But it would be greatly diminished. And then, the context no where leads us to consider the subject of *temporal* destruction, as being here agitated in the mind of the apostle. It is only the 'wrath of God which is revealed from heaven, against the impenitent and unbelieving,' to which he considers them in this place as exposed. He is writing to Jews at *Rome*, not in *Palestine*.

I must adopt then the exegesis above given of the verse before us, viz. 'Such is my affection for my Jewish brethren after the flesh, that could I put myself in their stead, and take on me the conse-

quences of unbelief to which they are exposed, I would willingly do it in order that they might be saved." Truly "a love stronger than death, which many waters could not quench nor floods drown!"

(4) Ἰσραηλῖται, *Israelites, i. e.,* who bear the honourable or far-famed name of Israelites; comp. Gen. xxxii. 28. 2 Cor. xi. 22. Phil. iii. 5. This however is only an *external* privilege; for they are not all Israelites in truth, who are of Israelitish descent, Rom. ix. 6. comp. iii. 28, 29.

Ὦν ἡ υἰοθεσία, *whose is the sonship, i. e.,* the relation of sons or children; comp. Ex. iv. 22, 23. Deut. xxxii. 5, 6. xiv. 1. Hos. xi. 1. The meaning is, that God bore a special relation to Israel; or rather, that Israel stood in a special relation to him, and was treated with distinguished and peculiar affection. This last circumstance forms the special ground of the *υἰοθεσία*. But this *υἰοθεσία* was *external*, and consisted with the Jewish nation's being in a very imperfect state; comp. Gal. iv. 1—3. 2 Cor. iii. 6—18. For a sonship of a much higher nature than this, comp. Gal. iv. 4—7. Rom. viii. 14—17.

Δόξα may have the sense here of *glory*, and be joined with *υἰοθεσία* in the way of Hendiadys or as explicative, so that the meaning would be for substance *glorious adoption* or *sonship, i. e.,* one which is worthy of praise, which deserves to be mentioned with honour. And this method Tholuck prefers. But the objection to this is, that the epithet *δόξα* appears to be too strong for a mere external *υἰοθεσία*; and besides all this, all the other nouns which precede and follow stand single. On this account I must prefer giving to *δόξα* the sense of כְּבוֹד, and regard it here as designating the visible splendour which was the symbol of Jehovah's presence, and which was peculiarly manifested in the *sanctum sanctorum* of the temple; comp. Ex. xxv. 22. xl. 34, 35. Lev. ix. 6. Ezek. i. 28. iii. 23. viii. 4. It is true, indeed, that in all these passages we have כְּבוֹד יְהוָה (*δόξα Θεοῦ*), and not simply כְּבוֹד. But the Targum, which employs יְהוָה שְׁכִינָתָא for כְּבוֹד, יְהוָה also employs שְׁכִינָתָא (*Shechinah*) alone in the same sense. Paul then may have here used *δόξα* elliptically, in a corresponding manner; and so (with Beza, Turretin, Vitringa, Heumann, Rückert, Reiche, and others) I suppose that he has employed it. The sentiment then is: 'To the Israelites belonged the *visible splendour* or *glory*, which was indicative of the immediate presence of Jehovah.'

Διαθήκαι seems here to indicate the covenants made at different times with Abraham, Jacob, Moses, &c.—*Νομοθεσία, legislation* or *system of laws, viz.,* the Mosaic legislation or laws; as to the distin-

guished privilege of these, comp. Deut. iv. 5—8. Ps. cxlvii. 19, 20. Rom. ii. 18, 19.—*Λατρεία*, *service*, עֲבוּדָה, *rites of the temple, priesthood, &c.*—*Ἐπαγγελίαι*, *the promises*, viz., those which had respect to the Messiah: comp. Gal. iii. 16. Rom. xv. 8. Heb. xi. 17.

(5) Ὡν οἱ πατέρες, *whose are the fathers, i. e., whose progenitors were the fathers, Abraham, &c., to whom so many promises (ἐπαγγελίαι) were made, and who are so distinguished in sacred history.*

Ἐξ ὧν . . . σάρκα, *from whom [descended] Christ, in respect to the flesh, i. e., in respect to his human or inferior nature, or so far as he was man; comp. Rom. i. 3 and ὁμοίωμα σαρκός in viii. 3. But if he had no other nature, why should such a distinction as is implied by κατὰ σάρκα, be here designated? Would a sacred writer say of David, for example, that he was descended from Abraham κατὰ σάρκα? If this should be said, it would imply that κατὰ πνεῦμα he was not descended from Abraham, but from some one else. But here, the other nature of Christ appears to be designated by the succeeding phrase ὁ ὧν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός.*

Ὁ ὧν . . . ἀμήν, *who is God over all, blessed for ever, Amen.* Ὁ ὧν is equivalent to or the same as ὅς ἐστι, *who is*; for so the article followed by a participle is often employed in the Greek language; see John i. 18. iii. 13. xii. 17. 2 Cor. xi. 31, ὁ Θεός . . . ὁ ὧν εὐλογητός κ. τ. λ.—Ἐπὶ πάντων, being placed here between the article ὁ and the noun Θεός to which this article belongs, is of course an *adjective* as to meaning, and designates the idea of *supreme*. Some indeed have understood ἐπὶ πάντων as meaning ἐπὶ πάντων πατέρων; but this is plainly a forced and frigid exegesis. In Hebrew, אֱלֹהֵי יְצֻרָא and יְשֻׁרִי are epithets of Jehovah, the supreme God; and to these παντοκράτωρ in the Septuagint corresponds; *e. g.*, 2 Sam. v. 10. 1 Chron. xi. 9. Jer. v. 14. Amos iii. 13. Zech. i. 3, seq., et alibi. So in the Apocalypse, παντοκράτωρ often appears as an epithet of Jehovah, *e. g.*, Rev. i. 8. iv. 8. xi. 17. xv. 3, &c. Now παντοκράτωρ is for substance the equivalent of ἐπὶ πάντων as to meaning; so that ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός must be altogether equivalent to ὁ Θεός ὁ παντοκράτωρ.

Εὐλογητός is equivalent to the Hebrew בָּרֵךְ. The Jewish Rab- bins from time immemorial have been accustomed, whenever the name of God is mentioned, to add בָּרֵךְ הוּא, *blessed is he*. So Paul here, after calling Christ ὁ ὧν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός, adds εὐλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, *i. e., forever*, בָּרֵךְ לְעוֹלָם וָעֶד. Compare now the same appellation given to God in Mark xiv. 61. Whether an ascription of divine honour to Christ is intended by applying to him here the word

εὐλογητός, the reader may satisfy himself by comparing the use of this word in 2 Cor. i. 3. xi. 31. Eph. i. 3. 1 Pet. i. 3. Luke i. 68. That divine honour is ascribed to Christ by the heavenly hosts (and the same too which is rendered to the Father), appears from Rev. v. 13, 14. Nor can it be objected that it is contrary to the usage of Paul, to name Christ Θεός; for so he is called in Tit. i. 3, and *the great God* in Tit. ii. 13; moreover he is represented as *Ἰσα Θεῶν* in Phil. ii. 6; and as Θεός in John i. 1; not to mention the controverted but seemingly well authenticated reading (Θεός) in 1 Tim. iii. 16. Nor is it any objection to this, that in 1 Cor. xv. 24—28, the apostle represents the Son as renouncing or laying aside his supremacy or dominion, at the final consummation of all things; for the office of the Messiah, and *the dominion of the Messiah, as such*, must of course cease, when all the objects of that office and that dominion shall have been fully accomplished. In reference to this kind of dominion, Christ is called Κύριος in 1 Cor. viii. 6; and it is such a dominion which is represented as bestowed on him in Phil. ii. 9—11. Col. i. 17, 18. Heb. i. 3. ii. 5—9. viii. 1.

Neither the grammatical arrangement of the text, then, nor the sentiments of the apostle elsewhere, require us, or (may I not say?) permit us, to give a different interpretation to the words of the verse in question. Nor do any various readings of the verse occur, which are of any authority at all. It has been conjectured, indeed, that we should read *ὅν ὁ x. τ. λ.*, i. e., *whose is the God over all, &c.*; so Whitby, Crellius, Taylor, and others. But not to say, that taking such liberties with the text is fairly out of question (which surely must be granted), it will be enough to compare the sentiment which the passage thus modified would give, with Rom. iii. 29, 30. This then is one of the cases, in which Paul has directly asserted Christ to be *supreme God*, and has accordingly rendered to him the sacred doxology.

The efforts to evade this conclusion have been many and strenuous. The interpretations which have resulted from them may be divided into two classes, viz.

I. Those which put a full period after *σάρα*, and make the remainder of the verse a doxology to God the Father. So Erasmus, in the enlarged edition of his Notes; so Enjeddin, Whiston, Semler, and others. Even Glöckler, who is a *Nicenian*, does the same; which of course, moreover, we might expect from Reiche, who is apparently a high Arian. But, (a) It was long ago noted by Bengel (with

whom Faustus Socinus also agrees, that in all classes of doxology, בָּרַךְ in Hebrew and εὐλογητός in Greek *precede* the name of God who is blessed. So the laws of grammar beyond all doubt demand; for בָּרַךְ יְהוָה would mean, *the blessed Jehovah, i. e., the blessed Jehovah does this or that*; for both words (thus arranged) make out merely the *subject* of a sentence. On the contrary, יְהוָה בָּרַךְ means *blessed is* or *blessed be Jehovah*; Jehovah being the *subject* of the sentence, and בָּרַךְ the *predicate*. So, more than *thirty* times, the words בָּרַךְ in Hebrew and εὐλογητός in Greek are placed in the Old Testament; as any one may see by consulting Tromm's Concordance under εὐλογητός. The same is the case with all the examples in the New Testament. Only *one* can I find in all the Bible, that differs from this; and this is Ps. lxxvii. 19 (Sept.), where however the repetition of εὐλογητός is plainly an error of the scribes, as it has no corresponding repetition in the Hebrew, and is against all analogy; I mean in respect to the *first* instance in which it here occurs. Even Eichhorn (Einlet. ins. A. T. § 320) concedes that the reading in the Sept. is a doubtful one. (b) Construed in this way, ὦν is entirely useless and destitute of meaning, and the addition of it is altogether unaccountable. The natural and simple order of the text would be; Εὐλογητός ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός κ. τ. λ. (c) In this mode of interpretation there is no antithesis to κατὰ σάρκα, which plainly requires one; as the natural inquiry is: If Christ be descended from David only κατὰ σάρκα, what is he as to his higher nature? Comp. Rom. i. 1, 3.

II. Another class of critics viz., Locke, Clark, Justi, Ammon, and others, put a full period after πάντων, and then make a doxology of the sequel. In this way the difficulty last suggested with regard to the interpretation No. I, is in a measure removed, as a kind of antithesis is made out by ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων, sc. πάντων πατέρων, i. e., Christ in his human nature was a descendant of David, but still was a personage of exalted dignity, being elevated above all the Jewish fathers, who are objects of so much encomium in sacred history and of so much veneration among the Jewish people. But still there are weighty objections against this mode of pointing and explaining the text; for (a) The difficulty in regard to the *position* of εὐλογητός, is the same here as has been already described above, under No. I. a. If it were doxology, it must be written εὐλογητός ὁ Θεός κ. τ. λ. But as there are no authorities, either of manuscripts or versions, for such an arrangement, so we are not at liberty to make it; and if we do so, we must do it arbitrarily. (b) In such a case the noun Θεός

must have the article, as being the *subject* of the sentence, and in its own nature customarily requiring it. So uniformly in the Sept. and in the New Testament, where Θεός is the subject of a doxology made by εὐλογητός it takes the article; *e.g.*, Gen. ix. 26. xiv. 20. xxiv. 27. 1 Sam. xxv. 32. 2 Sam. xviii. 28. 1 K. i. 48. v. 7. viii. 15. 2 Chron. ii. 12. vi. 4. Ez. vii. 46. Ps. xvii. 50. xl. 14. lxxv. 19. lxxvii. 20, 38. lxxi. 19. cv. 47. cxliii. 1. Dan. iii. 29. Luke i. 68. 2 Cor. i. 3. Eph. i. 3. 1 Pet. 1. 3. In regard to Κύριος, the usage of the Sept. varies; *e.g.*, 1 Sam. xxv. 39, εὐλογητός ὁ Κύριος, according with the usage of Θεός; but in other passages the article is omitted, *e.g.*, Ex. xviii. 10. Ruth iv. 14. Ps. cxxiii. 5. cxxxiv. 21. But no instance of the like variation can I find, in respect to Θεός. The example in our text must stand *alone*, if it be one, of Θεός in a doxology with εὐλογητός, and yet without the article. (c) To break off a sentence with ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων, seems at least to make it very abrupt and incomplete. To what can πάντων refer, in such a connection, except to the *fathers*? And to say that the Messiah was exalted above the Jewish patriarchs, although it might be saying something, would not seem to be saying very much, considering the efficacy which Paul had been ascribing to his love and sufferings, and death, and the greatness which he had ascribed to his power. (d) There is something incongruous in a doxology here to God the Father; which even Crellius himself suggests (Artemon. Init. Evang. Johan.). The apostle is here expressing the deepest and most unfeigned regret of his soul, that notwithstanding the exalted and peculiar privileges of the Jewish nation, they had by their unbelief forfeited them all, and made themselves obnoxious to a most terrible condemnation. To break out into a doxology here, would be (as Flatt suggests) like saying: 'These special privileges have, by being abused, contributed greatly to enhance the guilt and punishment of the Jewish nation; God be thanked that he has given them such privileges!' It is a duty, indeed, to be grateful for blessings which are bestowed; but—all in its proper place. Doxologies are not appropriate to paragraphs, which give an account of mercies abused and deep guilt contracted. (e) Besides all this, the abruptness of a doxology here, which could contain no reference to God as mentioned in the preceding context (for he is not there mentioned), is plain and striking: and also, as Nösselt, Flatt, Koppe, and Ewald have observed, it would be without example. Comp. Rom. i. 25. xi. 36.

The remark of Eckermann and Justi, that εὐλογητός is required to

stand *before* Θεός in a doxology, only when this doxology stands at the *beginning* of a sentence, is not true in point of fact; *e. g.*, Gen. xiv. 29, where καί shows that εὐλογητός is not at the *beginning* of a sentence; 2 Sam. xxii. 47. Ps. xvii. 46. lxvii. 35. In the *last* case, one might contend and say, that εὐλογητός begins a *new* sentence; but then where does it not, on the same ground? The burden of proof lies on those, who assert that εὐλογητός need *not* be *prefixed* except it stand at the *beginning* of a sentence; yet where are the instances in which it is not prefixed? The only one (except an instance of a manifestly corrupt text, Ps. lxvii. 19), is the very verse before us. To assume the principle in question, then, is to take for granted the very point in dispute.

The remark of Döderlein, that ἀμήν necessarily implies an *Optative* doxology (sc. εὐλογητός εἴη Θεός), is disproved by Rom. i. 25, where ὅς ἐστιν εὐλογητός . . . ἀμήν, are the words of Paul, *i. e.*, the apostle speaks in the *Indicative* mode, and not in the *Optative*. The same is the case in 1 Pet. iv. 11, ᾧ [sc. Θεῷ vel Χριστῷ] ἵσταν ἡ δόξα κ. τ. λ. And in other cases where no verb is supplied, *e. g.*, Rom. xvi. 27. Gal. i. 5. 1 Tim. i. 17. vi. 16. 2 Tim. vi. 18, &c., it is not by any means certain (as the above explicit instances of *Indicative* usage show), that the *Optative* εἴη, rather than the *Indicative* ἵστί, is to be supplied.

Nor does the remark of Erasmus, that in some of the manuscripts of Cyprian, Hilary, and Chrysostom, *Deus* or Θεός is wanting in the citations of Rom. ix. 5, prove any thing; for these are evidently omissions of copyists, since all the best manuscripts of these fathers insert *Deus* or Θεός.

Grotius is still more unsuccessful, in asserting that the Syriac version (the *Peschito*), omits Θεός; for this version has words translated *Deus super omnia*. Stolz, in his celebrated German version, has left out Θεός; whether on the authority of Grotius as above, or because he thought it a disagreeable appendage to the text, does not appear. After all these proposed changes, however, of punctuation, of the order of the text, and of the substance of it, the text, as it now stands, remains in reality untouched by any criticism which can have any considerable weight with men of ingenuous and candid minds. That those who deny the divinity of Christ should be solicitous to avoid the force of this text, is not unnatural; for while it remains in the records of the New Testament, it stands an irrefragable evidence of what Paul believed, asserted, and taught, relative to this subject.

The only way in which any avoiding of its force is practicable, seems to be, to assert that ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός is meant to designate merely the *supremacy of Christ as Mediator*, in which capacity he is *quasi Deus*, and in the like capacity is styled דִּי הָאֵל in Ps. xlv. In pursuing this course, more probability than is now exhibited in the various evasions that I have above noticed, and also more ingenuousness, might be shown. But still, the general and spontaneous feeling of an unprejudiced reader must always be (at least so it seems to me), that *God over all* means SUPREME GOD, and that εὐλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, ἀμήν, can be applied only to him who is *truly* divine. A Θεός δεύτερος, in a real and veritable sense, seems to oppose the fundamental principle of the Scriptures.

Rückert and Usteri, the first in his Commentary and the second in his *Lehrbegriff Pauli*, both acknowledge that there is no avoiding the usual exegesis of this text on the common principles of philology. Both of them doubt or impugn the *divinity* of Christ; yet they yield to the laws of grammar and philology here. But both assert that this is a ἀπαξ λεγόμενον on the part of Paul (which I would by no means admit), and Usteri says, that ‘he cannot divest himself of the suspicion, that there must be some error in the text or in the interpretation.’ But Reiche is made of sterner stuff. He yields nothing to the laws of grammar, or to the position of εὐλογητός, &c.; he makes a period at σάρκα and constructs the rest as a *doxology*. Both proceed upon the ground, so far as their *feeling* of objection is concerned, that Christ is only a *derived* God, and therefore cannot have *supreme* divinity ascribed to him. This is indeed a legitimate inference from the Nicene creed; but still it is not what the Nicene fathers meant to teach in a direct way. *Real* divinity, although not *supreme* divinity, they undoubtedly meant to ascribe to Christ.

CHAP. IX. 6—13.

THE apostle, having expressed his strong affection toward his own nation, and described the claims to pre-eminence which they had hitherto enjoyed, now proceeds to show that all these do not make out any good grounds of preference in a *spiritual* respect. He teaches them clearly, that it is not the simple fact of natural descent from Abraham, which makes them his children in the higher and scriptural sense of this word. 'They are not all Israel, who are of Israel;' and even among the *natural* descendants of Abraham, God did in ancient times make a wide distinction. Consequently, the mere fact of natural descent can prove nothing as to the point of spiritual rights or claims, verses 6—13.

(6) Οὐχ ὅλον δέ, a controverted expression; which however may be rendered plain in two ways; either (1) ὅλον may be taken adverbially, as ὡς or ὥσπερ to which it is very often equivalent (see Passow on ὅλος, No. 6); and then we may translate: *It is not so that, &c.*; just as we translate *ὡς ὅτι*, 2 Thess. ii. 2. (2) ὅλον in classic Greek often implies a preceding *τοῦν*. The whole phrase would be: οὐ τοῦν ἵστι, ὅλον ὅτι κ. τ. λ.; i. e., 'it is no such thing as that, &c.,' in which case we may render: There is no such thing as that *ἐκπίπτωκεν* κ. τ. λ. The former method is most simple, perhaps, but not the most probable; for ὅλον used *adverbially* is generally employed in a merely *comparative* way. The meaning is; 'But what I have said in respect to the defection of Israel, does not at all imply that the promises of God are not sure and certain.' Δέ, *but*, continuative and adversative.

Tholuck is mistaken, when, in objecting to ὅλον δέ being here used as equivalent to ὅλον τε, he says the latter must always have the Infinitive after it. Ὅλος τε with an Infinitive has indeed the meaning *possibile est*, &c.; but ὅλος τε is often employed *without* an Infinitive, and in the sense of *so as, such as, like*; and even without an Infinitive it sometimes means *possible*; see Passow on ὅλος No. 2. e. No. 3. c. However, I do not find ὅλον δέ employed in the sense of ὅλον τε, *possible*. Consequently I must prefer the rendering given above.

Λόγος, *promise, word*, in the sense of *something promised*; often so in English, e. g., *he has given his word*.—*ἐκπίπτωκεν*, *failed, been frustrated, irritum factum est*. So the Hebrew ^{כִּשְׁלָה}, which corresponds in sense with *ἐκπίπτωκεν*; e. g., in Josh. xxi. 45. 1 K. viii. 56. 2 K. x. 10.

Οὐ γὰρ . . . Ἰσραήλ, *for not all who are of Israel, are Israel*; i. e.,

not all the natural descendants of Abraham, are Israelites in the true, spiritual, scriptural sense of the word. The Talmud (Tract. Sanhed. cap. 11) expresses the feelings and views of the Jews, relative to their claims of pre-eminence: $\text{כָּפָה לְעוֹלָם קָלָה שֶׁ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל}$, *i. e.*, all Israel have their portion in the world to come. But such claims are rejected by our text and the sequel; as well as by Rom. iii. John viii. 39. Matt. iii. 9, Gal. iii. 9, 28, 29. $\Gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ here shows, that what follows is designed for illustration and confirmation. The apostle proceeds to give a reason why the promise has not been broken; and that is, that all the natural descendants of Abraham are not, as such, the heirs of the promise.

(7) $\Sigma\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\mu\alpha$, *natural descendant*.— $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\eta\alpha$, *children*, here in the higher spiritual sense, like that of Ἰσραήλ above in the second instance.— $\text{Ἄλλ' ἐν Ἰσαὰκ . . . σπέρμα}$, *but*, “*In Isaac shall thy seed be called* ;” *i. e.*, (as most explain it) in the person of Isaac, thy seed, *viz.*, thy descendants who are to stand in a covenant relation to me, shall be chosen or selected. But a more probable and efficient sense is given to the passage, by taking $\kappa\lambda\eta\theta\acute{\eta}\sigma\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\iota$ here in the sense which it has in iv. 17; and then the meaning will be: ‘In Isaac or through Isaac shall thy seed (the seed here promised), be called into being.’ Καλῶ , used like the Hebrew קָרָא , means *to call out of nothing into being*; as Rom. iv. 17 shows. After $\alpha\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ and before ἐν κ. τ. λ. either οὕτως ἐβְּרָθָה or ἐβְּרָθָה is implied.—As to $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\eta\alpha$, these are, in the next verse, called $\tau\acute{\alpha} \tau\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\eta\alpha \tau\eta\varsigma \epsilon\pi\alpha\gamma\gamma\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$. In verse 5 above, $\epsilon\pi\alpha\gamma\gamma\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota$ (תְּרֵיבָּ) are reckoned among the *external* privileges which the Israelites enjoyed. But even these, only a *part* of Abraham’s natural descendants enjoyed. Ishmael, Abraham’s eldest son, was excluded from the covenant relation; and so were Abraham’s six sons by Keturah, Gen. xxv. 1—5.

Ἐπαγγελίας in verse 8, however, refers to the promises in Gen. xv. 4, 5. xvii. 15, 16, 19, 21 (see verse 9). Isaac was in a special sense the son of promise; and his natural descendants, therefore, may be styled $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\eta\alpha \tau\eta\varsigma \epsilon\pi\alpha\gamma\gamma\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$.

(8) Τοῦτ' ἔστιν , *that is*, *i. e.*, which signifies, which means. But does Paul intend to say, that the explanation which follows exhibits the sense of the original promise? Or does he mean to intimate merely, that he gives to the subject under consideration a meaning *analogous* to that ancient promise? That it is capable of a satisfactory explanation on the former ground, may be shown from the considerations suggested in the sequel.— $\text{Ὁὕ τ\acute{\alpha} . . . Οὐοῦ}$, *the natural*

descendants [of Abraham] *are not the children of God.* Τὰ τέκνα τῆς σαρκός plainly means *physical* or *natural descendants*, children in the first and literal sense. But the sense of τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ is not so obvious. Is it here used to designate the children of God in the highest *spiritual* sense of this term? I think not; for it is Isaac and his descendants as such, who are here contradistinguished from Ishmael and the other six sons of Abraham and their descendants. The point here insisted on is, that *natural* descent from Abraham did not of itself entitle any one to the high *spiritual* privileges of the gospel; that the Jew had no more right than the Gentile, to expect any peculiar favour to himself merely on such a ground. But how does the apostle illustrate and confirm this principle? By showing that in ancient times, the promise of a numerous seed who should stand in a covenant relation to God, and enjoy peculiar external privileges on this account, was not made to the natural descendants of Abraham as such, but only to those natural descendants who would spring from Isaac the son of peculiar promise. In other words; Ishmael and the sons of Abraham by Keturah, had no share in the covenant-engagements made with the promised seed.

The deduction from all this is, that God does not dispense his blessings or favours according to claims grounded on mere natural descent or external privileges, but according to his own infinite wisdom and pleasure. In other words, the claims of men on the ground of birth, or external privilege, or merit of their own, are not the ground of decision on the part of God, with respect to the blessings which he may bestow upon them. The first two of these constitute no ground at all of claim; and the last also has no foundation, inasmuch as all men are sinners and are deserving of the divine displeasure. Of course the reasons why God gives to these and withholds from those, are with himself; they are not grounded on our claims or merits. Reasons he doubtless has, and these of the best kind; for who will venture to tax infinite wisdom and goodness with doing any thing without good and sufficient reason? But then these reasons God has kept to himself; he has not revealed them to us. When this is the case, the apostle speaks of him as acting κατὰ τὴν πρόβουλον αὐτοῦ—κατὰ τὴν ὠρισμένην βουλήν καὶ πρόγινωσεν αὐτοῦ, &c. But nothing can be farther from truth, than to suppose that a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness ever acts *arbitrarily*, or without the best of reasons; although they may be, and often are, unknown to us.

That τέκνα Θεοῦ τοῦ mean, “the children of promise in respect

to the external privileges and blessings of the ancient covenant or dispensation," is clear from the manner in which *τίκνα* (טִּנְיָ) is applied to the whole body of Israelites, in Deut. xxxii. 5, 6. xiv. 1. Hos. xi. 1. Ex. iv. 22, 23. Of the same nature is τὰ *τίκνα* τῆς *ἰσαγγελίας*. It designates those on whom the promised blessings were bestowed, which are mentioned above in verses 4, 5; or else those who were the descendants of Isaac, himself a *τίκνον* τῆς *ἰσαγγελίας*. In the same manner *σπίγμα*, at the close of the verse, is to be understood, i. e., as equivalent to *τίκνα* Θεοῦ in the sense just explained, or as טִּנְיָ in Gen. xvii. 8. It should be noted here, also, as a matter of some interest, that Θεοῦ is omitted in F. G. 37. 67 ex emend. 70. Matt. c. k., Chrysostom. Probably the copyists were stumbled with the appellation *τίκνα* Θεοῦ as applied to the posterity of Isaac in general. But the texts cited above show that they need no have been; for the meaning of *τίκνα* Θεοῦ is, such children as God according to the special promise to Abraham would raise up for his posterity, who should enjoy covenant privileges.

The argument and illustration of the apostle, according to this explanation, stand thus: 'All claims of the Jews to the spiritual privileges and blessings of Christ's kingdom, on the ground of natural descent from Abraham, are futile. Even in ancient times, God did not confer the blessings and privileges of his ancient dispensation on such a ground. Only one of Abraham's sons was selected as the object of God's peculiar covenant. Consequently it is no strange thing that God should deal in like manner with Abraham's natural descendants, at the present time.'

The question is not, whether the distinction made in ancient times among the natural descendants of Abraham, and to which the apostle here refers, was one which had direct respect to their condition in a future world, i. e., to the highest spiritual blessings; for most clearly this is not the case. Surely all the natural descendants of Isaac were not *called* in this sense. The distinction adverted to here, must be that which had respect to the *external* covenant-relation of the Israelites as a nation, to God. But the essential question in respect to the meaning of the whole passage, is: Why does the apostle adduce such an example here of God's bestowing blessings *κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ*? The answer to this must be, that he adduces it in order to justify the principle which is concerned with the *fore-ordaining, calling, justifying, and glorifying* the *κλητοί* as described in chapter viii. But

surely this does not pertain to *external* privileges only, as enjoyed in the present world.

Another view of this whole subject may be taken. We may suppose Paul by τοῦτ' ἴστω to mean, that the promise concerning Isaac was typical of a future and spiritual seed, to be chosen on like principles. In other words; as not all the *literal* posterity of Abraham were selected to be heirs of the special covenant-promise made to the patriarch, but only Isaac was selected, so it is in respect to the new covenant. God does not select merely the *literal* seed of Abraham, but he chooses a *spiritual* seed of the father of the faithful to be the heirs of gospel blessings. In a word, *selection, choice*, was a *principle* of action in respect to the patriarch's posterity; choice or selection is still equally visible in dispensing the blessings of the new covenant. In this way Paul would be understood as saying, by τοῦτ' ἴστω, that the ancient promise was as much as to say or equivalent to saying what follows, which contains an exhibition of the same principle.

The amount of the whole in either way of explanation, is, that Paul, in order to illustrate and defend God's proceedings in respect to bestowing spiritual blessings of the highest kind, adduces examples from the Old Test. Scriptures, where the *principle* concerned is exactly the same as that which is concerned with the calling and glorifying of the κλητοί, viz., where the blessings bestowed are not conferred on the ground of being a natural descendant of Abraham, nor on the ground of merit or desert, but κατὰ πρόθεσιν Θεοῦ. Now certainly God can be no more unjust in great things than in small ones; and if he was not unjust in selecting the objects of his temporal favours κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ, why should we regard him as unjust in selecting the objects of his highest spiritual favours in the same way; that is, not according to *claim* or *merit* on the part of men (for these belong not to them), but according to reasons, good and sufficient ones, known only to himself? Such as are inclined to feel that this would be wrong on the part of God, and that it is in any measure proper for us to complain of this, will do well to read the sequel of this chapter with a candid, humble, inquiring mind.

(9) Ἐπαγγελίας γὰρ . . . νῦν, for this was the word of the promise: "According to this time will I come, and Sarah shall have a son," Gen. xviii. 10, 14. This shows who the children of the promise were, that are described in the preceding verse, viz., the descendants of Isaac the son thus promised. Hence the γὰρ at the beginning of the verse.

κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον, according to this time. In Hebrew the whole phrase runs thus : שׁוּב אֲשׁוּב אֵלֶיךָ בְּעֵת חַיָּה, *I will surely return or come back to thee, when the time shall be renewed*, Gen. xviii. 10. The word חַיָּה seems to be simply an adjective, as the text now stands, and to mean *living again*, in the sense of being *renewed*. So Saadias, Tremellius, Rosenmüller, Gesenius, Winer, and Tholuck; comp. Gen. xvii. 21 and xviii. 14, מוֹעֵד. The Sept. reads in this last case, εἰς τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἀναστροφῶς πρὸς σὲ εἰς ὥρα. What is meant by εἰς ὥρα, unless it be *exactly, at the very hour*, I am unable to conjecture. In regard to τοῦτον (which seems to be put for חַיָּה), one almost spontaneously falls upon the conjecture, that the Sept. and Paul must have read חַיָּה in Gen. xviii. 10, 14, instead of חַיָּה; which is by no means improbable, considering that the ancient manuscripts were destitute of vowel points, and that the two words חַיָּה and חַיָּה are so nearly alike. Fritsche and others compare חַיָּה with the ζῶν χρόνος of Sophocles (Trach. 3.1159) where καὶ πάγων ὤν is added (as they aver) in the way of explanation. Thus construed the sense would be *present time, i. e., when this time shall be again present*. Reiche accepts this explanation as satisfactory; but Tholuck (Beiträge, &c. p. 68, seq.), in answer to Fritsche, has shown good reason to doubt the correctness of it. ζῶν χρόνος appears to mean *flourishing age*.—I would suggest another interpretation still, viz, *as at life-giving time*; in which case the meaning would be, that God would again address her as a mother who gives life to, i. e., bears children. Comp. the sense of חַיָּה and ζῶν, in the lexicons.

(10) The apostle having thus shown that the promised seed was not *all* the natural descendants of Abraham, but only a *select* part of them, he now advances a step farther, and goes on to show that not only did God make a distinction κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ among the natural descendants of Abraham, but that even among the descendants of him who was “the Son of promise,” he made a like distinction; and this too, in a case where the respective merit or desert of the parties could not possibly be the ground of the distinction. Thus in respect to the descendants of Isaac, Jacob his younger son was chosen as the object of favour, and Esau the elder son, who according to the custom of the patriarchs had higher rights, was rejected. Yea, this reception of the one to special favour and the rejection of the other were determined on before the children were born, i. e., before they could have done either good or evil, or (in other words) before they could have possessed any merit or demerit. Consequently the πρόθεσις of

God was according to his *ἐκλογὴ* and not *ἐξ ἰσχύος* or on the ground of merit.

The reason why the apostle adds this example of God's *selecting* the objects of his favour, to the one which he had already produced, seems to be this, viz., in order to prevent the objections which might be made in respect to the force of that example. The Jews might say: 'As to Ishmael, he was only the son of a bond-woman, and therefore had no good title to be an heir of promise; and as to the sons of Keturah, they were much younger than Isaac, who of course was entitled to the rights of primogeniture. On these grounds we may suppose the preference was given to Isaac.' But in order to foreclose every thing of this nature, the apostle now produces an example of *ἡ κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις*. This effectually accomplishes his object. Esau was not only the son of Rebecca, the lawful, proper, and only wife of Isaac, but he was the *elder* son, and therefore entitled by usage to the rights of primogeniture. Yet notwithstanding all this, Jacob was preferred to him, and was chosen as the *εἰκον* *τῆς ἰσαγγελίας*.

The bearing which all this has on the main subject of the apostle, is plain. 'If God did, *κατ' ἐκλογὴν*, make such distinctions among the legitimate and proper children of Isaac, the *son of promise*, then the same God may choose, call, justify, and glorify those who are *κλητοί* in respect to the heavenly inheritance. If it is not unjust or improper, in one case, to distribute favours *κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ*, then it is not in another.'

Οὐ μόνον δέ, and *not only*; an elliptical expression in itself, which has been filled out in different ways by different critics. The most natural supplement seems to be *τοῦτο*. Then the sentiment is: 'Not only was such the case with Abraham, but also in respect to Rebecca, &c.' The use of *οὐ μόνον δέ* denotes advance to more cogent reasons still. *Οὐ μόνον δέ, καὶ ἀλλὰ* means, *but not only* is that true which I have already said, *but also*, &c. Reiche and some other critics, with some versions, make the supplement after *μόνον δέ* to be thus: 'Not only did Sarah obtain a special promise respecting her son, but Rebecca also.' This is allowable; but the other mode seems to me more facile and more fraught with meaning.

Ῥεβέκκα forms here a kind of *anacoluthon*, i. e., the beginning of a sentence, the construction of which is afterwards changed, or (in other words) the sentence is not finished in the same manner in which it was begun. Here the natural grammatical construction would be,

ου μόνον [δὲ τοῦτο,] ἀλλὰ καὶ 'Ρεβέκκα, ἐξ ἑνὸς κοίτην ἔχουσα . . . ἐρρήθη . . . ὅτι κ. τ. λ. Instead however of 'Ρεβέκκα (Dat.), we have in the text 'Ρεβέκκα (Nom.) with which ἔχουσα agrees. But the construction thus begun in the Nominative, is not carried through. Instead of associating the Nom. 'Ρεβέκκα with some following verb of which it might be the subject, the verb ἐρρήθη is afterwards employed, and the Dative required by it is made by a pronoun referring to 'Ρεβέκκα, viz., by αὐτῇ. This mode of construction is frequent in Hebrew, where what is called the Nom. absolute is employed, to which a pronoun in the sequel refers; which pronoun is put in the case in which the verb or the nature of the sentence requires it to stand. Comp. Acts vii. 40, ὁ Μωυσῆς ὁδοῦς τί γέγονον αὐτῷ.

'Εξ ἑνὸς κοίτην ἔχουσα, *accipiens semen unius viri*. Literally κοίτην means *cubile, bed*; figuratively however it is employed to designate *concubitus*; compare the Hebrew עָרַבְתָּ, *concubitus seminis*, (Gesen. *effusio seminis*), Lev. xv. 16, 32. xviii. 20, 23. xxii. 4. In Lev. xviii. 23. עָרַבְתָּ alone is employed to designate the same idea. A clear case of such a usage, is in Num. v. 20 (Sept.). Κοίτην ἔχουσα there appears to mean literally, *concubitum habens*; but the idea is *conceiving*.—'Εξ ἑνός, designates appropriately by whom, *i. e., by one*, viz. Isaac; which last word immediately follows in the context.

(11) Γὰρ *illustrantis*.—Γεννηθέντων, *sc. παίδων*, which the mind spontaneously supplies, by recurring back to ἐξ ἑνὸς κοίτην ἔχουσα. The whole phrase in the verse is a construction with the Genitive absolute; which is a species of *anacoluthon*; see N. Test. Gramm. § 102.

Μηδὲ κακόν, *neither having done any thing good or evil*; a very important declaration in respect to its bearing on some of the controverted questions about hereditary depravity or original sin. It appears that when the words related in the next verse were spoken to Rebecca, the children in her womb had arrived to such a state or growth as that life and motion in them were perceived by the mother, Gen. xxv. 22, 23, *i. e.,* to the age of some five months, comp. Luke i. 24. At this period, then, the apostle declares that they *had done neither good nor evil, i. e.,* they had as yet no positive moral character or (in other words) that there was as yet no development of their moral powers. The assertion is so clear and direct here, that I see not how the force of it can be fairly evaded. And with the principle here developed, the tenor of other texts agrees; *e. g.,* Is. vii. 15, 16, comp. viii. 4. Deut. i. 39. Jonah iv. 11. That some knowledge of law and its obligations should exist in order that positive sin can be com-

mitted, seems to be clearly decided by Rom. iv. 15, and to be plainly implied by James iv. 17. John ix. 41. 1 John iii. 4. Every man's consciousness of the nature of moral guilt, moreover, seems spontaneously to decide in accordance with these texts. But *when* children do arrive at such a growth of moral nature that they begin positively to sin, the Scripture does not seem to have decided; I mean, that I have yet discovered no text where this point is fixed. The poetic and intensive expressions in Ps. li. 5, when compared with Ps. lviii. 3, will hardly establish the doctrine which many have supposed it to establish. Gen. viii. 21 decides no more, than that men begin *very early* to commit sin; and John iii. 6. Eph. ii. 3, and other texts of the like nature, decide only that men in a *natural* state, *i. e.*, in an unregenerate or unsanctified state, are children of wrath and carnal; which must be true, since they actually need regeneration. But no texts of this class can be properly interpreted as definitely fixing the time when children begin to sin.

The apostle, however, has here told us *when sinning had NOT begun*, in respect to Jacob and Esau. That they possessed *powers* or *faculties*, even in the womb, which were afterwards employed in committing sin when they were more fully developed, is undoubtedly true. But the *power* or *faculty* of sinning is one thing; the commission of sin another. Adam in paradise, before his fall, certainly possessed the power or faculty of sinning, (else how could he sin as he did?) yet he was not guilty of sin because he *possessed* such a power, but for the *abuse* of it. It is not therefore the power which the Creator has given us, which makes us sinners; it is the abuse of it. God may be, and is, the author of our *power* to sin; but he is not therefore the author of our sins. So young children may have all the powers adapted to sinning, without having yet sinned; for it will not be denied, that Jacob and Esau had the embryo of such powers in their early state, at the period when the apostle says that they had not committed any sin. And in the like way I should readily grant, that Jacob and Esau, even in their uterine state, had as a constituent part of their human nature an embryo susceptibility of feeling the power of sinful enticements; which in due time, and in the natural course of things, would be so developed as certainly to lead them to sin. But susceptibility of excitement to sin, is not real and actual sin. Adam in Paradise, before his fall, had this susceptibility in some degree; otherwise he never could have been tempted. But his fallen posterity possess this in a much higher degree, so that

before regeneration, all their moral *acts* are sinful. Yet the apostle has decided in our text, that such acts do not take place before birth. Excitability in respect to forbidden objects must be yielded to before it becomes actual sin; or rather, the sin itself is in the yielding, and not in the original disposition which God himself has given us. Disposition to sin, so far as it is created by our indulgence in it, may fairly be put to our account and reckoned as sin. But to count that as sin, which the Maker of heaven and earth himself gave us, before all voluntary moral action, involves consequences that are of fearful aspect. If a constituent part of our original nature be *sin*, then who is the author of our nature? Is sin predicable of the *body*, or of the *soul*? And who is the "Father of our spirits?" But I must refer the reader to what is said relative to these topics, in my Excursus on Rom. v. 12—19.

The object of the apostle, in here saying that *the children had done neither good nor evil*, is very plain, viz., to cast light on or to confirm the truths which he had disclosed in viii. 28—39. There all things are represented as contributing to the good of the *κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοί*, ver. 28, seq. Now if the Jew should object to this as being unaccountable, or as evincing partiality on the part of God, the apostle could of course foreclose this objection, by showing him that instances of the like nature (so far as the *principle* of them was concerned) are recorded in the Old Testament. In the case before us, the decision of God in respect to the future lot and privileges of Jacob and Esau, was not made by reason of any claims of merit or any grounds of demerit; for it was made before the children were born, and before they had done either good or evil.

It should be noted that *ἡ* here is less in accordance with the usual idiom than *μηδὲ* (New Test. Grammar § 151. 2); which the Text. Recept. has. It is, however, well supported by authority.

"*Ἰνα . . . ἐκ καλοῦντος*, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth. 'Ἡ κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις means, a purpose which proceeds from one's own free choice, one to which he is moved by *internal*, and not merely by *external* causes or motives. It means here, a purpose which God did not entertain because he was moved to it by any thing which Jacob or Esau had done, or would do (*οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων*), but for reasons which he has not disclosed, and which pertain merely to himself. But let the reader beware, how he represents or even imagines these reasons to be *arbitrary* or *ungrounded*. This would be to represent the

divine conduct as utterly inconsistent with infinite wisdom and goodness.

Ὀὐκ ἐξ ἔργων, *not of works, i. e.,* not because of merit, not because of obedience yielded to the law of works, *i. e.,* the law requiring good works.—'ΑΛΛ' ἐκ καλοῦντος, *but of him that calleth; i. e.,* the admission of the one to privileges, and the rejection of the other from them, proceed not from their personal desert, but from him who *calls, i. e.,* chooses or selects men to be the objects of his special favour for reasons within himself. That such is the sentiment here, seems very plain; for the apostle has just asserted, that the decision of God in respect to the future condition and privileges of Jacob and Esau, was made before they were born, and before they had done either good or evil; and that it was so made, in order that God's *κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις* might be *stable, μίμη, Heb. נִצָּח.*

(12) But what is the thing decided in this case? 'Ο μείζων . . . ἐλάσσων, *the elder shall serve the younger; or rather the first-born shall serve the younger, i. e.,* he who by right of primogeniture would take the precedence, he shall in fact be inferior or take the lower place. The *precedence* then of Jacob is established by this declaration; but in what respect?

(13) In a *temporal* one, it would seem, so far as this instance is concerned. Τὸν . . . ἐμίσησα, *Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated; i. e.,* on Jacob have I bestowed privileges and blessings, such as are the proofs of affection; I have treated him as one treats a friend whom he loves; but from Esau have I withheld these privileges and blessings, and therefore treated him as one is wont to treat those whom he dislikes; comp. Mal. i. 2, 3, from which the quotation here is made, and where the prophet adds to the last clause ('Ησαῦ ἐμίσησα) the following words, *and laid his mountains and his heritage waste.* That the whole refers to the bestowment of temporal blessings and the withholding of them, is clear not only from this passage, but from comparing Gen. xxv. 23. xxvii. 27—29, 37—40. As to ἐμίσησα, its meaning here is rather *privative* than *positive*. When the Hebrews compared a stronger affection with a weaker one, they called the first *love* and the other *hatred*; comp. Gen. xxix. 30, 31. Deut. xxi. 15. Prov. xiii. 24. Matt. vi. 24. Luke xiv. 26 comp. with Matt. x. 37. Glass. Rhet. Sac. lib. III. tr. 3. can. 19.

After all, this does not answer the question: What is the ultimate object of the apostle in making his appeal to such an instance of *κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις*? Must not this answer be, that he does so in order

to justify and support what he had said in chap. viii. 28—39? And surely what he has there said does not relate merely to *temporal* condition or privileges, but to *effectual calling*, to *justifying* and *glorifying*. All however which is decided is, that God, in either case, does not bestow his blessings on the ground of merit, (for how can any sinner be blessed on such a ground?) but for reasons known only to himself, and which are *ab intra*, not *ab extra*.

Those who contend against this sentiment, contend against what is every day exhibited before their eyes. Why was this man born white, and that one black? Why is this child born and nurtured in the bosom of a pious family, and that one in the midst of robbers and murderers? The children had done neither "good nor evil," when their lot was decided. This no one can deny. Then, in the next place, is not their eternal condition connected with their means of grace, their pious nurture, their present condition and associations in life? And who placed them in their present condition?

How easy now to multiply such questions indefinitely; and the answer must at last resolve the whole into *divine sovereignty*. The world is full of that which teaches this doctrine. All nature speaks it, and speaks it loudly too; no less so than the Bible itself. Yet with all this, the Bible plainly recognizes the *freedom* of men, and attributes to themselves their own destruction. The world say that there is contradiction here; but if there be, the naturalist has as really to contend with its difficulties as the advocate for revelation. However, there can in reality be no contradiction or absurdity in two things which are *both true*. All the difficulty lies in us. Being ignorant of the *manner* in which predestination and free agency can be reconciled, we are prone to think that they are irreconcilable. When will men learn, that their ignorance is not the measure of truth!

One cannot but contemplate with regret the efforts of some critics to evade the plain, philological (and for my own part I must say, inevitable) meaning of the chapter on which we are commenting. It seems to me, however, that I perceive in some sober-minded and judicious men, a radical mistake in their conceptions respecting *predestination*. They transfer to it analogies from the *material* world; and then they seem to feel that it is but another name for *fate* or *destiny*. They conceive of a *decretum absolutum* as involved in it, which, as they view it, is neither more nor less than a decree without any reason, a mere *arbitrary* decision. With such views, they reject

the doctrine of predestination ; and rightly, if it does indeed involve all this. That this however is a very imperfect and erroneous view of the subject, is what I fully believe, and what I have endeavoured to show in the statements above.

Finally, I remark, that those who refer the preferences given to Jacob over Esau so exclusively to temporal blessings and privileges, as to maintain that the sentiment of the whole passage can prove at the most merely that such privileges and blessings are granted to Christians, and nothing more, by the election of God, would do well to read over again the first five verses of this chapter, where Jews, in possession of all these privileges, are counted as reprobates and as exposed to the anathema of the Lord Jesus Christ. Does the *election* of God then amount to nothing more, than to leave men after all to perish who are his chosen saints ?

CHAP. IX. 14—29.

THE sum of the sentiments advanced in verses 14—29, appears to be this: 'No one has any right to call in question the disposal which the Creator, Governor, and rightful Lord of all things makes of his creatures, or to charge him with injustice on account of it. It does not become the creature to find fault with his Maker, in respect to the manner in which he has been made. But not to make the appeal solely to the *right* as a sovereign, which God has over all his creatures ; what ground of objection can be alleged against the divine proceedings, when God endures with much long-suffering the rebellious and contumacious, not speedily cutting them off as they deserve, but waiting, and giving them space for repentance? Comp. Rev. ii. 21. 2 Pet. iii. 9. Ezek. xviii. 23, 32. xxxiii. 11. Lam. iii. 23. 1 Pet. iii. 20. Why should we complain, if God, in order to display his abounding mercy, chooses from among the perishing, both Jews and Gentiles, those on whom he will bestow his grace? The ancient Scriptures do repeatedly testify that he would do this.'

All this is in the way of answer to the objection made by the Jew against the assertions and arguments of the apostle. Paul affirms, that 'God is at liberty to choose, and does choose, the objects of his grace when and where he pleases ; that he selects these from among the Gentiles as well as the Jews ; that he is bound by no promises or covenant, to confine his goodness to the natural descendants of Abraham ; and that in abandoning some of the impenitent to the just reward of their deeds, in permitting them to become hardened under the dealings of his providence or his grace, and waiting with long-suffering for their amendment, God does nothing to which any one can justly object, or with which he can reasonably find fault.

All this, too, is plainly connected with the subject discussed in viii. 28, seq.; and it is designed as an illustration and defence of the principle there avowed, viz., the sovereignty of God in selecting the objects of his mercy, not his *arbitrary* choice of them, but a choice which rests on grounds unknown to us. Surely verse 23 here does not respect the mere *external* call or privilege of the saints; for how can ἀποστοιμασεν εἰς δὲ ἄλφα be so construed? If this is clear (and I cannot think any considerate and candid man will venture to deny that it is), then it follows of course, that the antithesis in verse 22 has respect, not to temporal ὑπὲρ merely, but to future misery also, i. e., to the whole penalty of sin. If all this be clear, then is it equally so, that the object of the apostle in this chapter, is not merely to vindicate the divine proceedings in regard to giving or withholding favours in the present world, but also in respect to the future lot of both saints and sinners. When saints are made the objects of grace, the exceeding richness of that grace is displayed; and when sinners are hardened and become prepared for destruction under the dealings of God's providence and grace with them, it is still true that the long-suffering of God is manifested in deferring their punishment. So the texts cited above lead us to conclude respecting God's dealings with them; and so all the views of his benevolent character which the Bible gives, would naturally lead us to conclude.

Whatever then may be the nature of his agency in regard to the hardening of sinners and fitting them for destruction, we are necessarily led to the conclusion, that it is not such as makes him chargeable with the guilt of their sins in any manner or measure; it is not such as detracts from their *free agency*, the *voluntariness* of their transgressions, the *moral guilt* which they incur, or the *responsibility* which follows it. The Scriptural doctrine of *reprobation* (as it is called) seems then to be this, viz., that God, for reasons not given to us, does bestow his special grace on some, i. e., *hath mercy on whom he will have mercy*, while he leaves others voluntarily to harden themselves and to become ripe for destruction, although he waits long to be gracious, and does not execute his judgments as speedily as they deserve them.

If any still decline to receive this as the sentiment of the present chapter, and maintain that the whole has reference merely to the distinctions made by Providence in the *present* world, it is incumbent on them to show that the context, e. g., chap. viii. 29, seq., leads to such a discussion. It is also incumbent on them to show, how God can any more be justified for such a distributing and withholding of his favours in respect to the *present* world, than in respect to the future world. The Saviour says (Luke xvi. 10): "He that is unjust in the least, is unjust in much." If the distributing and withholding favours in the manner stated by the apostle, be in itself unjust, God can no more be vindicated for so doing in respect to the present world, than in respect to the future world. Indeed we cannot separate the one from the other. In respect to those who deny that the present chapter has a reference to a *future* state, let me ask, whether the circumstances in which men are placed in the *present* world, have not a bearing on the *future* world? One is born and nurtured in the bosom of a pious family, and lives surrounded by pious influence, all of which is the ordering of Providence in respect to his lot; another is born in a family of thieves and murderers, and nurtured among them, and lives without God and without hope in the world. Has the eternal state of these individuals no intimate connection with such circumstances? One is born in a heathen land, and another in a Christian; surely their own act did not control the place or circumstances of their birth. Has this no bearing on their eternal condition? Is God *just* then, who makes such distinctions? It is a question we must meet; substantially we have to meet it, if we resort even to *Theism* for a refuge from difficulties. And when those who hold to the mere *temporal* relation of the chapter before us, can clear up the difficulties that attend this, even on their own principles; then it will be time to speak with more confidence than they can now with propriety feel, against the views of such as differ from them.

(14) τί οὖν ἐποῦμεν; language which Paul puts into the mouth of the objecting Jew.—Μὴ ἀδικία παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ; a very natural question for one whose mind is perplexed and offended with the doctrine of divine sovereignty, and the dispensation of favours on the part of God κατὰ

πρὸς αὐτοῦ. If God has dispensed them independently of any merits on the part of man, and for reasons known only to himself, it seems to an unhumiliated and carnal man that he has dispensed them in a merely arbitrary manner, without any regard to justice or propriety. How easy it is to feel difficulties and raise questions on this perplexing subject, fact shows. From the time of the apostle down to the present hour, the same questions have been repeated and the same difficulties felt. That some of those who have maintained the doctrine of divine sovereignty, have, at times, given occasion for their opponents to charge on them representations of such a nature as to make *predestination* amount to *fate* or *destiny*, and κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρὸς θεοῖς, to amount to *arbitrary* decision—is what I feel unable to deny. In some treatises on *reprobation*, enough that stands exposed to such a charge, or to something very much like it, may be found. But to argue from such expressions as τὸν Ἐσαῦ ἠμίσησα, an actual hatred, like that which men cherish toward one another, would be a great abuse indeed of the sound principles of exegesis. On the same ground, one might prove that it is our duty actually and positively to hate father, mother, wife, children, brethren, sisters, yea, and our own lives or ourselves also, and that we cannot be Christians without so doing, if he should urge the literal meaning of Luke xiv. 26, and other texts of the same tenor. God cannot hate *more humano* any thing which he has made, and therefore he cannot hate man, who is made in his own image. Consult for a moment, Rom. v. 8—10. John iii. 16, 17. Tit. iii. 4, 5. So the Wisdom of Solomon xi. 24: "Thou lovest all beings, and abhorrest nothing which thou hast made, neither hatest any thing which thou hast created." But still, God may and does hate sin; he may and will punish it; he may treat sinners therefore as if he hated them, *i. e.*, he may inflict evil or suffering upon them. In the future world, he never does this but in consequence of actual guilt, and in proportion to that guilt; but in the present world, trouble and sorrow may be brought on men as the instruments of trying them, of purifying them, of humbling them, and this without being proportioned by the simple principles of *retribution*; for sufferings and trials here are not always in the way of simple retribution. In all this God acts κατὰ πρὸς αὐτοῦ; yet certainly not in an *arbitrary* manner and without any good reason (therefore not on the ground of a *decretum absolutum* in the rigid sense of this phrase), but still, in a manner which we cannot explain, because his particular reasons are as yet unknown to us. But can

our want of knowledge establish against him a charge of injustice? Most surely not.

(15) That God does dispense his favours without being moved thereto by any *merit* on the part of him who receives them, is clearly established, and is designed to be confirmed, by the quotation which Paul makes from the Old Testament.—*Μὴ γένοιτο . . . οὐκ αἰσείρω, not at all; for he saith to Moses: "I will have mercy on whomsoever I will have mercy; and I will show compassion to whomsoever I will show compassion."* In other words: 'I choose the objects of favour where I please, for reasons known only to myself. None of the human race have merited my approbation and reward; and none being entitled to them on the ground of merit, I may properly bestow my favours where and when I please.' Why is not this both true and just? Is there any *ἀδικία* here? Out of a hundred criminals who have all deserved death, may not a wise and benevolent government, for reasons entirely within itself, choose some as the objects of pardon, while others are given up to the punishment which the law enjoins? I am fully aware of the opposition made by the natural heart to such a proceeding on the part of God; but I am not aware how the fact that God does this can be *reasonably* denied, nor how injustice can with any propriety be charged upon him because he does it.

The quotation is from Ex. xxxiii. 19. 'The reasoning of the apostle is simply this: 'God cannot be unjust because he distributes his favours *κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ*, and without reference to the merits of the individuals concerned. The Old Testament inculcates the same doctrine; and to the decisions of their own Scriptures the Jews surely will not object.' The *γὰρ* at the beginning of the verse intimates that the writer applies the quotation in this manner.

(16) **Ἄρα οὖν . . . Θεοῦ, consequently or it follows, therefore, [that ἐκλογὴ is not obtained] by him that willeth, or him that runneth, but through the mercy of God.* That *ἐκλογὴ* is here to be supplied, may be seen by looking back to verse 11. *The Gen. *Σείλοντος*, *κ. τ. λ.* is the Gen. of *agent* or *cause*.—*Θείλοντος* probably has reference to the wish of Abraham in Gen. xvii. 18. xxi. 11. *Τρέχοντος* seems to refer to Esau's *haste* to prepare food for Isaac; see Gen. xxvii. 1 seq. **Ἐλθοῦντος* refers to the quotation Paul had just made. The sentiment of the whole is, that God bestows his favours not because they are first merited or acquired by effort, either of strong desire or of strenuous action, but because he has mercy on those who are the objects of his favour. This does not imply (as it has frequently been thought

to imply), that let men merit ever so much, *i. e.*, desire salvation ever so much, or labour for it ever so strenuously, all this will be of no account with God; and that he will bestow mercy in a manner merely arbitrary, and irrespectively of all works or character on the part of the sinner. On the contrary it implies, that *before* sinners are made the objects of his special mercy, they are "dead in trespasses and sins," that they are "by nature children of wrath and disobedience," that "what is born of the flesh is flesh," that "the carnal mind is enmity against God, is not subject to his law, nor indeed can be;" consequently, that the case here supposed (of *previous* merit and effort) never exists. And in fact, it never does exist. It is God's mercy which *first* disposes sinners *to will and to do* (Phil. ii. 13. Eph. ii. 1. Rom. v. 6—10). How then can his mercy be bestowed *in consequence* of their previous merits? The thing is plainly beyond reasonable question; it is impossible.

All this, however, does not disprove the doctrine that good works will be rewarded; which is certainly and plainly a Scripture doctrine. But what are *good* works? Those which are done *before* conversion, or *after* it? Surely the latter. But in respect to the reward of Christians for *evangelical* good works, the apostle is not here speaking. What he says, has respect to the *fore-knowing, fore-ordaining, calling, justifying, and glorifying*, mentioned in viii. 29, seq. All this is not on the ground of merit, but of pure gratuity; and consequently it is τοῦ ἐλεοῦντος Θεοῦ. The fact that good works themselves are rewarded, is itself a part of this pure system or plan of grace; for it is only the works of those who are sanctified, which are reputed good in the Scripture sense, *i. e.*, holy, acceptable to God; and even the best of these are imperfect, so that they could not claim any reward on their own account and on principles of legal merit. The law allows of no imperfection. It requires us "to love God with *all* the heart, and our neighbour as ourselves." Now as no man on earth has ever done this (Jesus only excepted), so no man has ever been in a condition to advance a *claim* to reward *on the ground of law*, in any age or country of the world. Consequently, the fact that the good works of saints are rewarded, is a matter of *gratuity* and not of legal claim. But still, this part of the subject is not what the apostle is here discussing; and consequently what he says here, is not to be regarded as at all interfering with or contradicting what he says on the subject of good works being rewarded, in other parts of his writings.

As to the general sense of *θέλωντος*, it indicates *desire, wishing*. *τρίχοντος* is used to designate *strenuous effort*. In such a sense it often designates Christian efforts; *e. g.*, 1 Cor. ix. 24, 26. Heb. xii. 1. Phil. ii. 16. iii. 14. Gal. ii. 2. v. 7, &c. *ἑλεούντος* here is designed to convey the idea, that our blessings originate from God's compassion, love, and mercy, and are not bestowed on account of our own deserts. To construe this in such a manner as to exclude the idea of gratuitous reward for obedience and good works, in the sense above stated, would be to depart widely from the meaning of the writer; whose design is to affirm, that man's salvation is to be attributed solely to the *mercy* of God, and not to any merit of his own.

It may be proper to remark, that so plain is the sentiment above exhibited by the words of the apostle here, that some critics very far removed from belief in the doctrines of the Reformation, have felt compelled to acknowledge that Paul has here advanced the doctrine of election or decrees. So Ammon, Rückert, Usteri, and others.

(17) The preceding verse, although comprising a sentiment which is very disagreeable to the natural heart and to the pride of unsanctified men, is still more easily acquiesced in than the one now before us, which has been the theme of great contention, and the occasion of not a little unguarded and hazardous assertion. Let us first investigate the language

Λέγει γὰρ ἡ γραφή τῷ Φαραώ, for the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, instead of the formula for God saith to Pharaoh. So Gal. iii. 8, 22. iv. 30. What the Scripture says, God says, for *πάντα ἡ γραφή θεόπνευστος*, *i. e.*, it is the word of God. So the Rabbins frequently exchange the two formulas of quotation, *אמר ה' אלהינו*, the Name [God] says, and *אמר הכתוב*, the Scripture says; both of which are designated by the abbreviations *א"ל*—The *γὰρ* here stands before a quotation which is designed to confirm the doctrine of the divine sovereignty.

Ὅτι εἰς . . . δύναμιν μου, for this very purpose have I roused thee up, that I might exhibit my power. Paul has departed from the Septuagint version, which runs thus: *ἵνα ἐνδείξωμαι ἐν σοὶ τὴν ἰσχύν μου*; so that Paul substitutes *ἐξήγειρα* for *διετηρήθης*, *ὅπως* for *ἵνα*, and *δύναμιν* for *ισχύν*. The apostle seems plainly to have made a translation of his own, independently of the Septuagint; and one which, on the whole, was better adapted to the purpose of his argument here, and equally accordant with the original Hebrew, or rather, more strictly accordant with it.

For ascertaining the sense then of *ἐξήγειρα* (on which the tenor of

the whole passage depends), we must not take *διετηρήθη* for a commentary on it here, inasmuch as the apostle has rejected this verb and preferred another, for the sake (as it would seem) of a nearer accordance with the meaning of the original Hebrew in this particular passage. What then is the sense of *ἐξήγειρω*, as employed in Hellenistic Greek? Passow has not inserted this word in his classical lexicon; although it is certainly a *classical* word, for Xenophon employs it, *Cyrop.* VIII. 7. 2. In the Septuagint it is a very common word, being used some *seventy* times. In none of these cases does it mean to *create*, to *produce*, to *raise up*, in the sense of *bringing into being*, &c.; so that those who construe *ἐξήγειρά με*, *I have created thee or brought thee into existence* (Beza: *Feci ut existeres*), do that which is contrary to the Hellenistic *usus loquendi*. Augustine, Calvin, Gomar, Paræus, and even Reiche, defend the same opinion as Beza.

In the Septuagint, *ἐξήγειρω* is employed throughout in the sense of *arousing*, *exciting*, *rousing up*, *waking up*, *from*, &c., with slight shades of variation in meaning, according to the connection and the adjuncts of the verb. Accordingly it is employed by the Septuagint to translate the Hebrew *רָעַץ*, to *rouse up*, or to *wake up*, i. e., from sleep, Ps. iii. 5. lxxii. 20. cxxxviii. 18. Jer. xxxi. 26. li. 39. Dan. xii. 2. In the like manner it stands for *רָעַץ* to *wake up* or *rouse up* from sleep; Gen. xxviii. 16. xli. 22. Judg. xvi. 15, 21. Ps. lxxvii. 71. With these meanings it is used intransitively. But the principal use of it is transitive; in which case it is employed to designate the idea of *rousing up* one's self to action, *exciting* or *rousing up* others to action, *exciting* or *rousing up* any thing, animate or inanimate, to do this or that; e. g., Judges v. 12. Ps. vii. 7. xxxiv. 26. lvi. 11. lxxix. 3. cvii. 2. Cant. iv. 16. Jer. l. 41. Joel iii. 9. Zech. xiii. 7, &c.; and so in the like manner forty-two times; see Trommii Concord. in verbum, No. 11. In all these cases it corresponds to the Hebrew *עָרַר*, *עָרַר*, &c. In seven other cases it corresponds to *עָרַר*, when this word is used in a sense altogether synonymous with that of *עָרַר*, e. g., Num. x. 35. 2 Sam. xii. 11. 1 Kings xi. 14. Est. viii. 5. Ps. cxviii. 62. Hab. i. 6. Zech. xi. 16. Throughout all these, the idea is uniform, viz., that of *rousing*, *exciting*, *stirring up*, *rendering active*, *urging to activity*, in a word, in the sense of bringing out of a state of rest or inaction or inefficiency into a contrary state, i. e., in the sense of *exciting*.

Twice only have the Seventy employed *ἐξήγειρα*, where the mean-

ing might perhaps be thought doubtful. In Prov. xxv. 24, ἀνεμος . . . ἐξεγείρει νεφέην, *the wind raiseth up clouds*. The Hebrew verb is הִלָּח, *begetteth or bringeth forth*. But the sense of ἐξεγείρω here in the Septuagint, is plainly the usual one. So also in Ezek. xxi. 16. (Heb. xxi. 21), ἐξεγείρεται corresponds to מָעַר (from עָרָה); but still it has the sense of *excite*, and this meaning corresponds substantially with the Hebrew, although not literally.

In the New Testament we have only one example besides that before us, where ἐξεγείρω is used, viz., 1 Cor. vi. 14, where it is clearly used to designate the action of *rousing* from the sleep of death, *raising* or *exciting* from a state of inaction or death.

On the whole, then, the sense of the Greek word is altogether clear, and subject to no well grounded doubt. It means *to rouse up, to excite, to stir up*, in any manner or for any purpose. But does the Hebrew word in Ex. ix. 16, which corresponds to ἐξήγειρα, admit of such a sense.

The Hebrew word is הָעֲמִידָה, Hiphil of עָמַד; which usually means (in Kal) *to stand, to stand fast, to continue, to stand up, &c.* In Hiphil (הָעֲמִידָה), it means *to make to stand, to place, also to keep standing, to persevere or continue in standing*. Tholuck and others have laboured to show that הָעֲמִידָה has the *usual* Hiph. sense in Ex. ix. 16. That the Hebrew word *might* have such a sense, is sufficiently plain from 1 Kings xv. 4. 2 Chr. ix. 8. Prov. xxix. 4. 2 Chr. xxxv. 2. And so the Kal conjugation not unfrequently means *to continue, to remain in standing*: e. g., Ex. ix. 28. Lev. xiii. 5. Dan. x. 17. But although the Hebrew word הָעֲמִידָה might have the sense which Tholuck and others assign to it, yet the Greek word ἐξήγειρα, which Paul uses, can hardly have such a sense put upon it. I have been able to find no example of a *usus loquendi* that would justify this exegesis.

The principal question still remains: Has הָעֲמִידָה ever the sense of *exciting, arousing*, like the ἐξήγειρα of the apostle? If so, then we may presume the apostle chose this Greek word, in deliberate preference to the διεγερθεὶς of the Septuagint.

Instances of this nature are clear. So in Neh. vi. 7, הָעֲמִידָה, *thou hast roused up or excited the prophets, &c.* So Dan. xi. 11, 13, הָעֲמִידָה *and he shall excite or rouse up a great multitude, &c.* We can have little reason, then, to doubt that the apostle had such a meaning of הָעֲמִידָה in view, when he rendered it ἐξήγειρα; for this Greek word is fairly susceptible of no other meaning. In accord-

ance therefore with this result respecting the meaning of *ἐξεγείρω*, I have translated thus: *For this very purpose have I roused thee up.*

*Ὅπως . . . τῇ γῇ, *that I might show forth my power and declare my name in all the earth or in all the land, viz., of Egypt.* The consequence of Pharaoh's conduct was, that the Hebrews were brought out of Egypt by signal divine interposition, exhibited in the various plagues inflicted on Egypt after the declaration recorded here, *i. e.*, the hail, the locust, the extraordinary darkness, the smiting of the first born among the Egyptians, the drowning of Pharaoh and his host in the Red Sea, &c., Ex. ix. 16, seq. Such interpositions caused the power and glory of Jehovah to be known through all the land of Egypt. Or if *all the earth* be construed as having a still more extensive sense, one might justify this by observing, that the Scriptures themselves now diffused so widely through the world, the Koran read and revered by many millions, the Greek author Artapanus (Euseb. Præp. Evang. IX. 29), also Diodorus Siculus (Bibl. III. 39), and the Latin Trogus (Justin. Hist. XXXVI. 2), all speak of the wonders which were done in Egypt, and the overthrow of Pharaoh there.

(18) *Ἄγα οὖν . . . σκληρύνει, *therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.* A conclusion of the apostle's, and not the words of the objector, as some have intimated. This is clear from what is immediately subjoined by Paul: *Ἐπεὶ οὖν μοι, κ. τ. λ; which of course implies, that what precedes had been spoken by the apostle, and not by the objector.

On the nature and force of the conclusion here drawn, I have already remarked in commenting on verse 16. As to *σκληρύνει*, Rambach, Carpzov, and Ernesti have endeavoured to show that it means *here to deal hardly with.* They appeal to 2 Chron. x. 4, and Job xxxix. 16 in order to confirm this; but in the first instance the sense is *to make hard, to render grievous*; in the second, the Hebrew is חִשְׁדָּה and the Sept. ἀποσκληρύνω, and the sense harmonizes substantially with the obvious one in the verse before us. I see, therefore, no proper philological method of construing *σκληρύνει*, but in the way already intimated above.

(19) *Ἐπεὶ οὖν . . . ἀντίστης; *Thou wilt say to me, then: Why doth he still find fault, for who hath resisted his will?* The apostle expected, as a matter of course, that the principles which he had just asserted would be met with objections such as he now produces. On what ground did he expect this? It was doubtless because he had

said something which *seemed* to imply what the objector here intimates. "Whom he will, he hardeneth," says Paul. 'Then why blame men for being hardened? How is this inconsistent with what God wills?' is the reply of the objector; and this contains a sentiment, which has been repeated from the time when Paul wrote his epistle, down to the present hour. The objection *seems* to be formidable at first view; yet all its seeming importance is derived from carrying along to the consideration of the divine dealings towards us, analogies borrowed from cause and effect in respect to *material* things. It does not follow, because God by his infinite goodness and almighty power will convert the wicked deeds of the sinner into means of promoting his own glory, that the sinner may not be called to an account and punished for the evil which he intended. It does not follow because a wise and benevolent government may convert the crime of some individuals into a means of furthering the public good, that the criminals in question do not deserve punishment. Supposing then that there is a *sense*, in which sin is made even the instrument of accomplishing the wise and holy purposes of God and the greatest good of his creatures, it does not follow, that the sinner who had malignant purposes in view is not deserving of punishment, nor that there is not an *important* sense in which he has *resisted* the will of God.

(20) *Μενοῦντι*, *at vero, verum enimvero, but still, however*. This compound particle is found elsewhere in the New Testament only in Luke xi. 28. and Rom. x. 18. Suidas explains it by τὸ ἀληθές, or μάλλον μὲν οὖν, i. e., *verily or the rather then*. Here the sense seems to be *then rather*; and the construction or sense of the passage is thus: 'Then, i. e., in case you do thus say, I may *rather* say, i. e., I have a still better right to say, Who art thou, &c.?'—Σὺ τίς εἶ . . . Θεῷ; *who art thou that repliest against God, i. e., who sayest something that charges him with acting wrongly or improperly?* It will be observed here, that the apostle, in answer to the objector, does not endeavour at all to explain *how* it is that God should *harden* sinners, and yet sinners be guilty of their own ruin; in other words, he does not attempt any *metaphysical* conciliation of divine sovereignty and control with human freedom and moral responsibility. He evidently takes for granted that the facts which he had been stating were true, and could not be contradicted. Hence he finds fault with the objector, because he charges God rashly and irreverently with having dealt hardly or unjustly by his creatures. He continues this remonstrance in the sequel, by quoting from the Old

Testament and applying to the object before him passages, which serve strongly to confirm the right of the Creator on the one hand to dispose of his creatures, and the duty of his creatures on the other to bow in submission before him. Would it not be well for those who are to teach the doctrines of Paul, at the present time, to walk in his steps, and to deal with objectors in the same manner as he has, by showing them their *presumption* from the Scripture, rather than by appealing to metaphysical explanations in order to remove the difficulties suggested?

Μὴ ἰσὲρ . . . οὐτως; *shall the thing formed say to him who formed it, why hast thou made me thus?* A quotation *ad sensum* from the passage in Is. xlv. 9, or xxix. 16; for it does not literally follow the words of either. The design of this quotation is, to stop the mouth of the objector who inquires: "Why doth he find fault then, for who hath resisted his will?" The implication in this of wrong on the part of God, in bestowing blessings on some which he withholds from others, and in advancing some to glory while he leaves others to hardness of heart and to the punishment consequent upon it,—this implication the apostle meets by appeal to the language of the Scriptures, in regard to the sovereignty of God over the works of his hands: 'Has the creature a right to call in question the Creator, by whose power he was formed, and by whose goodness he is preserved and nurtured? Should he reproach his Creator, because he has endowed him with the nature which he possesses?' It is as much as to say: 'Even supposing there was some ground for the objection which you make, I might reply in the language of Scripture and ask, whether it is proper and becoming for a creature to summon the Creator before his tribunal, and to pass sentence of condemnation upon him.' Viewed in this light, it is a kind of *argumentum ad hominem*; applicable indeed to all who make the like objection in the like spirit, but specially adapted to stop the mouth of the haughty and presumptuous Jew, who, in Paul's time, was indignant that God should be represented as making the Gentiles the objects of his special favour. In appealing, however, to the *sovereignty* of God the Creator, Paul cannot with any propriety be considered as asserting or intimating, that God is *arbitrary* in any of his dealings with his creatures, or that he ever makes any arrangement in respect to them without wise, and good, and sufficient reasons. It would be altogether incongruous to suppose, that the apostle did ever think or assert, that a Being infinitely holy, and wise, and just, and good, would act without

the best of reasons for acting; although, indeed, these reasons might not be given to us. It should be remarked here, also, that it is only when a proud and contumacious spirit lifts up itself, like that of the Jew in the context, that an appeal to a direct and sovereign right of God, is made by the sacred writers, in order to abash and repress such arrogant assumption.

(21) But one quotation does not satisfy the apostle's ardour to repress the objector. He makes a second one (*ad sensum* again, not *ad literam*) from Jer. xviii. 6, comp. ver. 4, which by another image inculcates the same sentiment as before. Ἡ οὖν . . . ἀτιμίαν; *Hath not the potter power over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel to honour and another to dishonour? i. e., one vessel for a use which is deemed honourable, and another for one deemed dishonourable; comp. Jer. xviii. 4.* 'Even so (the apostle would say) are all men in the hands of God, and at his disposal;' comp. Jer. xviii. 6. In other words: 'Who can call in question his right to dispose of us as it seems good in his sight? The indecorum and contumacy of so doing must be apparent to all.'

The Jew, however, regarded his nation as the *φύραμα* from which none but *σκεύη τιμῆς* could be formed. But the apostle lets him know, that God could make, and had made, the Gentiles also a *φύραμα* from which the like vessels were formed. The same God also makes unbelievers among the Jews to be *σκεύη ὀργῆς*, as well as unbelievers among the Gentiles. He chooses the objects of his mercy or of his justice where he judges best, *not* arbitrarily, but still for reasons which are not revealed to us.—It is singular that Reiche should say here: "The occasion to make use of this comparison, the comparison itself, and the particular expressions made use of, permit us to think of nothing but the absolute, independent, and irresistible *moral* preparation of men [for destruction]; and render it impossible to explain the words as referring to any other kind of divine action, or to interpret them in the sense of co-operation." In other words, he leaves Paul here, on the spur of the occasion, to teach fully and directly the doctrine of *fatalism*, and to make but one real agent in the universe. Did Paul thus contradict himself?

(22) Εἰ δὲ θεῶν κ. τ. λ. It is evident to any one who will attentively read vers. 22—24, that the sense remains incomplete, *i. e.,* the sentence (or sentences) is unfinished; which form of writing the Greeks called *ἀνακάλυθον*. But what must be supplied in order to complete the sense of these verses, is not sufficiently plain to command the un-

animous consent of interpreters. Without delaying to recite different opinions, I would merely say, that at the end of vers. 22—24, it seems to me plain the question in ver. 20 is to be repeated, viz., οὐ τίς εἰ, ὁ ἀνταποκρινόμενος τῷ Θεῷ; Whether you repeat this question at the end of verse 22, or here and also at the end of verse 24, seems to be of little importance; for the sense in each case would be substantially the same. The sum of the sentiment thus explained is: 'If God, in order that he might exhibit his punitive justice and sovereign power, endures with much long-suffering the wickedness of the impenitent and rebellious who are worthy of divine indignation; and if he has determined to exhibit his rich grace toward the subjects of his mercy whom he has prepared for glory, even toward us, ([ἐπὶ] ἡμῶς) whom he has called (viii. 30), Gentiles as well as Jews; [who art thou, that repliest against the divine proceedings in respect to all this?'

The whole passage is elliptical; and besides this, there is an enallage of construction at the beginning of verse 23 (in καὶ ἵνα γνωρίσῃ) which will require further notice. I proceed from this general view, to examine the words.

Εἰ δέ, *if then, or if now*; i. e., since God is the supreme Lord of all things, and all his creatures are at his disposal by a sovereign and entire right (verses 20, 21); *if now*, determining to display his punitive justice and power, he has endured, &c. Δί 'orationi continuandæ inservit.' Reiche construes δέ as *adversative* here to verse 14. But this makes the connection much more obscure, and it seems to be quite unnecessary; I regard δέ as the sign of an additional illustration or confirmation of the sentiments just advanced. The connection of thought seems to be this: 'If the sovereign Lord of all creatures, who may dispose of them as he pleases, does still endure with much long-suffering the wickedness of some of them, and by all this determines to display his punitive justice, who can justly find fault with his proceedings?'

Θέλων, *willing, determining, designing, purposing*. It intimates, of course, that in 'enduring with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, God had a purpose or design of displaying his indignation against sin, i. e., his punitive justice and his power. Can it be a *reasonable* subject of complaint, that he is determined, or that he purposes (Θέλων), to bring good out of evil?'

Ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ὀργήν, *to manifest or exhibit his indignation or displeasure*; in other words to display his punitive justice with respect

to the wicked. Ὀργή is often employed to designate the idea of *punishment*, i. e., the consequences of indignation or anger; e. g., Rom. i. 18. iv. 15. xiii. 4, 5, al. So Demosthenes: οὐκ ἴσθην τὴν ὀργὴν ὃ νόμος ἱταξί, κ. τ. λ., *the law has not sanctioned equal punishment, &c.* Reiske, Demosth. p. 528.—Καὶ γνωρίζαι τὸ δύνασθαι αὐτοῦ, *and to make known, publish, declare, his power*; comp. δύναμις in verse 17, where *the power* of God has special reference to his miraculous interpositions in order to punish Pharaoh with the Egyptians, and to deliver the oppressed Hebrews. Δύνασθαι, therefore, in the connection in which it here stands, must be viewed as having a special relation to *the power of making retribution to sinners, the power of punitive justice*. But to understand and interpret this as done for purposes of revenge or vengeance *more humano*, or for the sake of display such as men make through pride and vain glory, would be to make God altogether like ourselves, and to represent him in a manner altogether reproachful and unworthy of his perfections. A being who is self-existent, immutable, and independent; who cannot even be imagined as depending in any manner or measure, for his own essential happiness or glory, on the creatures whom his power has formed and his bounty supports—such a being cannot have any purpose of revenge or vain glory to accomplish. Of what possible consequence could they be to him? Men are prone to revenge, from malignity and because of wounded pride; they are prone to display, because of vanity and vain glory. But the ever blessed God, who is *love*, and whose essential glory cannot be affected by the giving or refusing of homage by any of his creatures, and whose happiness cannot in any measure be affected by their opposition to him—such a God we cannot at all imagine as exhibiting his punitive justice and power for the purposes of revenge or display. He exhibits them only for the purposes of benevolence, i. e., for the sake of doing good to the subjects of his moral government; who, while they are allured to virtue, on the one hand, by all the glories of the upper world, are deterred from sin, on the other, by the judgments that are inflicted on the disobedient and rebellious.

Ἐνυχι, *endured, bore with*. The verb φέρω has generally the sense of *bearing or carrying away*, i. e., of *bearing accompanied by motion* in some way or other. But it is also employed in the sense of *fear, patior, to endure, to suffer*, Heb. xiii. 13; or of *tolero, sustineo, to tolerate, to bear with*, as Heb. xii. 20; in the Sept. Gen. xxxvi. 7. Num. xi. 14. Deut. i. 12. In this last sense it is clearly used here,

as the adjunct *ἡ πολλὴ μακροθυμία* shows.—*Μακροθυμία*, *long-suffering*, *longanimity*, *i. e.*, forbearance to punish, delay to enforce the strict claims of justice. The apostle seems to have his eye here on the case of Pharaoh in particular, who, after he had nine times resisted the mandate of Heaven to let the Hebrews go, was still spared and preserved in life, although he had long before forfeited all claim to forbearance. Still the design of Paul plainly is not to limit the case to Pharaoh only. He means to intimate, that God, in like manner, now (*i. e.*, at the time when he was writing) displays his long-suffering, by forbearing to punish those who deserve it. And what was true then, in respect to this matter, has been so ever since, and is so at the present moment.

Σκεύη ὀργῆς, *vessels of wrath*, means vessels in respect to which wrath should be displayed, *i. e.*, wicked men who deserve punishment. The reason why the writer here makes use of *σκεύη*, may be found in the verses immediately preceding, where he has spoken of *VESSELS fitted for honourable and dishonourable use*. The language literally employed there, is *figuratively* used here, *i. e.*, wicked men are called *σκεύη ὀργῆς*. So in Is. xiii. 5, the Persian army is called *הַיָּהוּדִים וְהַיִּזְרְעֵלִים*, *σκεύη ὀργῆς Κυρίου*; comp. Jer. l. 25. But in these examples of the Hebrew Scriptures, by *σκεύη ὀργῆς* is meant *instruments of executing the divine displeasure*; while in our text the meaning is *passive*, viz., persons on whom it ought to be or will be executed.

Κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν, *fitted for destruction*; another *offendiculum criticorum*. *Κατηρτισμένα fitted*; how? By whom? The text does not say. It simply designates the *actual condition* of the *σκεύη ὀργῆς*. Now whether they came to be fitted *merely* by their own act, or whether there was some agency on the part of God which brought him to be fitted, the text of itself does not here declare. The *passive* participle in such a case may be applied to designate what one has done for himself; *e. g.*, 2 Tim. ii. 21, *ἵνα οὖν τις ἑκκαθάρῃ ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τούτων, ἔσται σκεῦος εἰς τιμὴν . . . εἰς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἡτοίμασμένον*, where the *being prepared* for every good work is the consequence of the *ἐκκαθάρῃ ἑαυτὸν*. So in 2 Tim. iii. 17, *ἐξηρτισμένοις* denotes the *being prepared* or *fitted* for every good work, by the beneficial influence of the inspired Scriptures. But in our text, how can we avoid comparing *κατηρτισμένα* in ver. 22, with *ἡ προητοιμάσει* in verse 23? The two verses are counterparts and *antithetic*; and accordingly we have *σκεύη ὀργῆς*, to which *σκεύη ἰλίου* corresponds, and so *εἰς ἀπώλειαν* and *εἰς δόξαν*. How can we help concluding, then,

that *κατηρισμένα* and *ἡ προητόμασε* correspond in the way of antithesis.

The objections which can be made to such a sense of *κατηρισμένα* here, viz., a sense which makes it to designate *some agency of arrangement on the part of God*, by or in consequence of which, or under which, the *vessels of wrath* become fitted for destruction, are in all respects just the same as can be brought against the *ἐξήγεια* κ. τ. λ. of verse 17, which has been so fully discussed above. The question is not, whether God is, *in any sense*, the author of sin in such a way as throws the guilt, or any portion of it, upon him, and removes or diminishes the criminality of the sinner. The answer to this question is settled and certain from the tenor of the whole Bible, as well as from passages direct and express; *e. g.*, James i. 12. But the question is: Whether God, as the Sovereign of the universe, has a right to dispose of, and does so dispose of, his creatures who are moral and free agents, as to place them in circumstances in which he knows they will sin; and, supposing it to be certain that in such a case what he foreknows will come to pass, whether it is proper for him to exhibit his punitive justice and power? This is precisely the attitude of the question in verse 17; and it seems plain that the apostle has not let go the subject there discussed, but that he here presents it again in a somewhat different form, and in the way of direct antithesis. If any one is still stumbled at this, I must refer him to such texts as 1 Pet. ii. 8. 1 Thess. v. 9, *for God hath not appointed us to wrath*, οὐκ ἔθετο ἡμῖν κ. τ. λ., *i. e.*, the implication is, that he has appointed some others, but not *us*, to punishment, &c. Jude ver. 4. Prov. xvi. 4. Add to these, such as designate the antithesis to this meaning, viz., the appointment of some to life eternal; as in Acts xiii. 48. ii. 47. Eph. i. 4, 5, 11. 2 Tim. i. 9. Rom. viii. 29, 30. Eph. iii. 11, al. If now to all these he adds such texts as 2 Sam. xii. 11. xvi. 10. 1 Kings xxii. 22. Josh. xi. 20. Ps. cv. 25. 1 Kings xi. 23. 2 Sam. xxiv. 1. Ex. vii. 13. ix. 12. x. 1, 20, 27. xi. 10. xiv. 8. Rom. ix. 17, 18. Deut. ii. 30. Is. lxiii. 17. John xii. 40, he can no longer doubt that there is *some sense*, in which the sacred writers do declare that God is concerned with evil. In what sense, I have endeavoured to show above, on verse 17. In the same sense, and in no other, can we suppose God to be here concerned with *fitting the vessels of wrath for destruction*. At all events there can be nothing more difficult in this, than there is in all the texts just referred to; and especially in Prov. xvi. 4. Jude ver. 4. 1 Pet. ii. 8.

1 Thess. v. 9. It is of no use to explain away the force of one text, while so many others meet us which are of the very same tenor; and some of which, at least, admit of no explaining away. And even if we give up the Bible itself, so long as we acknowledge a God, who is *omnipotent* and *omniscient*, we cannot abate, in the least degree, from any of the difficulties which such texts make. The great problem is: *How* can entire free agency and accountability consist with entire dependence, and with the fact that our Creator has designs to accomplish even by our very wickedness? The *how* is the whole of the *nodus*; and, as has been repeatedly said, is plainly beyond the boundaries of human knowledge. In the meantime, as *sin is actually in the world*, and *men are actually accountable*,—would it be any relief to the difficulties of our question, to suppose God to be so impotent that he cannot bring good out of evil; or so deficient in foresight and wisdom, as to have made a plan for the world of intelligent moral beings, which is radically defective in regard to accomplishing the ends of benevolence, and which admits evil that was not foreseen, and which cannot be prevented, nor even turned to the accomplishment of good? I repeat it, would this be any relief for the difficulties of our question? I think every candid and sober man will answer in the negative. It is better, then, to let the subject rest where the Bible has placed it. He who admits a God supreme, omniscient, omnipotent, holy, and benevolent, must admit that this God will make sin the occasion of exhibiting his punitive justice and power, for the good of the rational universe; and this is enough. This is what our text, and what verse 17, plainly implies.

(23) *Kai ina γνωρίση*, an enallage of construction. Verse 22 begins with *ei δέλω* . . . *ἐνδείξασθαι* . . . *καὶ γνωρίσαι*, i. e., with a particle followed by the Infinitive mood. The same construction continued would here require [*ei δέλω*] *γνωρίσαι* τὸν πλοῦτον κ. τ. λ. But instead of this, we have *ina γνωρίση*. This usage of the Subj. with *ina*, instead of the Inf., is very frequent in the New Test.; see New Test. Gramm. § 138. 12. In the same manner the apostle might have said, *ei δὲ δέλω ὁ Θεός, ina ἐνδείξη . . . καὶ γνωρίση . . . ἥνεγκεν κ. τ. λ.* Now as both of these methods of expression amount to the same thing, and as both are equally good in respect to grammar, the apostle has used the one in verse 22, and the other in verse 23. The rules of modern rhetoric would indeed require, that the same construction should be carried forward with which the writer had commenced the sentence. But it will not be doubted that Paul fre-

quently departs from such rules. That *Θείω* may be followed by *ἵνα* with the Subjunctive (like *Θείων . . . ἵνα γνωρίσῃ*), as well as by the Infinitive, is clear from such examples as occur in Matt. vii. 12. xx. 32 (where *ἵνα* is implied); xxvi. 17 id. xxvii. 17 id. Mark vi. 25. ix. 30. x. 51 (*ἵνα* implied), et sæpe. That this may be so with the participle of *Θείω* as well as with the verb, appears from 2 Cor. xi. 12, *Θελόντων . . . ἵνα . . . εὐηθῶσι* κ. τ. λ. The full construction here then is, [*εἰ δὲ Θείων*] *ἵνα γνωρίσῃ* κ. τ. λ.

Τὸν πλοῦτον τῆς δόξης, his abundant glory, where the first noun stands as an adjective; comp. Heb. Gramm. § 440. b. *Σκεύη ἐλείους*, i. e., vessels toward which his mercy was to be displayed; the same as the *πλητοί* of viii. 28, and the antithesis here of *σκεύη ἐργῆς*—"A προητοίμασε, which he had before prepared; comp. Acts xiii. 48. ii. 47. Eph. i. 4, 5, 11. 2 Tim. i. 9. Rom. viii. 28, 29, 30. Eph. iii. 11, et al.—*Δόξαν*, glory, i. e., happiness, glory in heaven.—As to *πλοῦτος*, comp. Rom. ii. 4. Eph. i. 7, 18. ii. 7. Col. i. 27.

After *δόξαν* there is plainly something wanting, in order that the sentence may correspond with *ἤνεγκε* κ. τ. λ. in the verse above. The most appropriate verb to be supplied seems to be *ἠλίσσε*, had mercy upon, it being suggested by the phrase *σκεύη ἐλείους*. But supplying this, we read thus: "[And if desiring] that he [God] might make known his rich grace toward the vessels of mercy which he had before prepared for glory, [he showed mercy to] us whom he called, &c." In this way all runs on smoothly; and although I have not seen this exegesis of the passage in any commentator, I cannot help thinking that it is the most easy and obvious one. At all events, no one can read verse 23, with its *ἤνεγκε* κ. τ. λ., without feeling that some corresponding verb is wanting here. Tholuck has represented *ἐκάλει* as being this verb: but the *οὐς καί* seems to forbid this. And besides, *ἐκάλει* does not seem to complete the sense. Understood as above explained, the sentiment is plain, and the transition in verse 24 . . . *οὐς καί* κ. τ. λ., is facile.

The same thing is accomplished in another way, viz., by supposing the ellipsis to be completed from the former part of verse 23 thus: "God, desiring that he might make known his rich grace toward the vessels of mercy which he had before prepared for glory, [*ἐγνώρισε τὸν πλοῦτον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ*] ἡμᾶς, οὐς καὶ ἐκάλει κ. τ. λ." This evidently comes for substance to the same thing as the exegesis given above; and the whole of the ellipsis is in this way supplied from the context immediately preceding. That *ἡμᾶς* is governed by some verb implied,

seems to be plain; for *ἐκάλεισε* governs *οὓς*, not *ἡμᾶς*. 'Ἡμᾶς, viewed in this light, is synonymous with *σκέπη ἐλείους*, or is in apposition with it, and therefore may take the same preposition (*ἐπὶ*) implied before it. The phrase connected stands thus (according to the last proposed method of filling up the ellipsis): *He made known his rich grace toward or unto us*, [*ἐπὶ*] *ἡμᾶς*.

Reiche proposes a very different construction; viz., to connect *καὶ ἵνα* x. r. λ. with the preceding *ἡνεγκες*; and then he connects the whole thus: 'Endured with great longanimity, &c., and *this in order that* (*καὶ ἵνα*) he might make known the abundance of his glory in respect to the righteous, the chosen objects of his mercy, &c.' In defence of this he avers that all other constructions are forced ones, and against the grammar; and also that the sense here of *long-suffering* on the part of God toward the wicked, in order to promote the salvation of the righteous, is analogous to other Scriptures, e. g., Rom. ii. 4. Acts xvii. 27 seq. But here the long-suffering is for the good of the individuals toward whom it is exercised, not for the sake of others; so that the cases are not analogous. Nor am I aware of any direct analogy in the Scriptures. As to the grammar, anacoluthon in Paul is surely no unusual phenomenon. Besides; when Reiche proposes to render *καὶ ἵνα* as = *καὶ τοῦτο*, and thus to make the clause that follows exegetical or supplementary, is not this as far from *grammar* as the anacoluthon proposed? After all, the main difficulty with his exegesis is, that it does not correspond to the sentiment of the preceding verse, where two classes are described, who are widely diverse in their character and destiny; and each of these is at God's disposal. The prominence of this sentiment is destroyed by the interpretation which he proposes.

Προητοίμασι here seems to designate the determination in the divine mind to prepare the elect; for the *calling*, as a matter of *fact*, must of course precede the fact of preparation. What God intends to do, is here spoken of as done; a very common idiom of the Scriptures.

(24) *Οὓς καὶ ἐκάλεισε ἡμᾶς*, *even us also whom he called*, i. e., Gentiles as well as Jews. Comp. iii. 29, 30. i. 16. ii. 9, 10. iv. 9, 12.

(25) 'Ὡς καὶ . . . λέγει, *even so, or to the same purpose he saith by Hosea*. 'Ἐν 'Ὡσηί may mean *in Hosea*, i. e., in the book of Hosea; just as ἐν Δαβὶδ (Heb. iv. 7) may mean *in the book of David*. But in both cases, it is perhaps more probable that the meaning is *by Hosea, by David*; like the Hebrew עַל־הַנְּבִיאִים.

Καλίσω . . . ἡγαπημένην, *I will call him who was not my people,*

my people; and her who was not beloved, beloved; i. e., the Gentiles, who were deemed outcasts from God and were strangers to the covenant of his promise, will I bring into a covenant relation with me, and number among my beloved family; I will make them "sons and daughters of the Lord Almighty." The object of the quotation is to support the assertion just made, that the *vessels of mercy* were chosen from the Gentiles as well as the Jews, without any respect of persons. In regard to the *manner* of the quotation, the Hebrew runs thus: "I will love her, who was not beloved; and I will say to her who was not my people, My people art thou," Hos. ii. 23 (25). The Sept. have literally rendered this in the same order: ἀγαπήσω τὴν οὐκ ἀγαπημένην κ. τ. λ. The apostle has changed the order, and put καλίσω before both phrases instead of saying (with the Hebrew and Sept.) ἀγαπήσω . . . καὶ ἐγὼ κ. τ. λ. Of course he has quoted *ad sensum*, not *ad literam*.

(26) Καὶ ἔσται . . . ζῶντος, and it shall come to pass, in the place where it was said to them: *Ye are not my people, there shall they be called the sons of the living God*; another quotation from Hos. i. 10. (ii. 1), to the same purpose as the preceding one. In both cases the original Hebrew has reference to the reception and restoration to favour of Israel, who had been rejected on account of their transgressions. What was originally said of them, who were thus cast away and rejected, on occasion of their being again restored to favour, the apostle now applies to the receiving of the Gentiles, who had been "strangers to the covenant of promise, and aliens from the commonwealth of Israel." It is an accommodation of the words of the prophet, so as to express his own views on the present occasion. But at the same time it is still more; for the *principle* of God's dealing, which is disclosed in the original passages and applied to Israel who was rejected and cast off but eventually restored, is the same which is involved in the reception to favour of the Gentiles who had been *out-casts*.

In respect to the quotation, it accords exactly with the original Hebrew. The Sept., instead of the ἐκεῖ κληθήσονται of the apostle, has κληθήσονται καὶ αὐτοί.

(27) Thus much for the reception of the Gentiles. Next, as to the casting off of a great body of the Jews; a point the most difficult of all, to be maintained in a satisfactory manner. In order however to settle the question on this point, the apostle appeals to the declarations of the Hebrew prophets themselves. Ἡσαίας δὲ . . .

Ἰσραήλ, *Isaiah moreover says, in respect to Israel. Δι' continuative, i. e., it stands before an additional clause designed to illustrate and confirm the preceding declaration.*—Κράζει, *exclaims, speaks aloud or openly.*

Ἐάν, *although or if*; Hebrew here, אֲנִי, *although.*—ὅς ἡ ἄμμος τῆς θαλάσσης, *i. e., so great that it cannot be reckoned, exceedingly great. Τὸ κατάλειμμα σωθήσεται, a remnant [only] shall be saved. Κατάλειμμα here, and the corresponding Heb. מִסְפָּר means a small number, a residue only.* And correspondently with this the context obliges us to interpret the word, both here and in Is. x. 22 seq. from which it is quoted. This sense is the only one apposite to the apostle's purpose; which is to show that the Hebrew prophets had foretold the same thing which he affirms, viz., that *only a remnant* of Israel is to be saved. In the original Hebrew, the passage has probably the same sense as here, *i. e., it relates to the times of the Messiah*; as may be seen by comparing Is. x. 20, 21. The meaning of ver. 22 seems to be, that only a small remnant of them [small compared with those who had perished] will return to the Lord, so as to be received by him.

(28) Λόγον . . . γῆς, quoted *verbatim* from the Sept., Is. x. 22, 23, with the exception that γάρ is added by the apostle, to show that he continues quoting for the sake of confirmation. For ποιήσει Κύριος, the Sept. has Κύριος ποιήσει; and for ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, the Sept. has ἐν τῇ οἰκουμένῃ δλῃ. The original Hebrew runs somewhat differently: *destruction is decreed, it shall overflow in justice; yea, destruction is verily determined on; the Lord Jehovah will execute it in the midst of all the land.* The Sept. and the apostle both represent the *general* sense of the Hebrew, but do not follow the words. Λόγον συντελῶν means *accomplishing his word, i. e., his promise or threat of excision. Καὶ συντέμνων, deciding, bringing to an end, executing, viz., his λόγον, as before.*—Ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, carrying all this into execution so as to satisfy the demands of justice.

Ὅτι λόγον συντετεμμένον ποιήσει, *for [Jehovah] will execute his word decreed, i. e., his threatening determined on, or decisively made, decisively pronounced.*—Ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, *on the land of Israel.*

The object of the whole is only to show, that God of old threatened to destroy great multitudes of the Jews for contumacy; and that it is no strange thing now to say, that great numbers of them will perish.

(29) Καὶ . . . Ἰσαΐας, *yea, [it happens] as Isaiah had before said:*

καὶ affirmantis, imo, immo; for here it is equivalent to *καὶ γίνεται*. The object of this quotation is the same as that of the preceding one, viz., to show that it is no new or strange thing, that a part, yea a large portion of Israel should be rejected or cut off on account of their apostasy or unbelief. Consequently *καὶ* was followed, in the mind of the writer (and of course it should be in the mind of the reader), by *γίνεται* or *ἔγινετο*, *it happens* or *has happened*.—Προσηγνῆς here does not mean *predicted* (as it does in some cases), but *had before said*. The apostle had just cited one passage from Isaiah, viz., x. 22, 23, and here he adds: ‘To the same purpose had Isaiah spoken in a preceding part of his prophecy,’ viz., in i. 9, *καὶ καθὼς προσηγγαν Ἦσαίας*.

Κύριος Σαβαώθ, the Lord of Hosts. The Hebrew name *צְבָאוֹת* is often added to the title *יְהוָה* or *אֱלֹהִים* (*אֱלֹהֵי*), and designates the Supreme Being as Lord of the hosts of heaven, i. e., of the angels, &c., in heaven. There does not appear to be any good reason for the opinion of Von Cölln, which Tholuck adopts, that this title was first given to Jehovah because he was the *mighty defender* (*גִּבּוֹר*) of Israel; and afterwards because he was considered as the *Lord of the stars*; which are called the host of heaven. *The Lord of the heavenly hosts*, i. e., the angels, *יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת*, is more simple: and so Gesenius explains it in his lexicon; comp. Ps. lxxviii. 17, where the “chariots of God are said to be twenty thousand, even thousands of angels,” and “the Lord to be among them;” also Deut. xxxiii. 2, where he is said to come with *myriads of his holy ones* (*סִרְבָּבוֹת קֳדָשׁ*); comp. 2 K. vi. 16, 17. Dan. vii. 10, “thousand of thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him.” I add only that the appellation *צְבָאוֹת* does not occur in the Pentateuch, nor in the book of Judges, and that it is most frequent in Isaiah, Jeremiah, Zechariah, and Malachi. The apostle appears to have retained the Hebrew word untranslated, because it is so retained in the Septuagint version of Is. i. 9, which he here quotes.

Σπίγμα here corresponds to the Hebrew *שְׂרִיר*, the literal meaning of which is not *seed*, but *remnant*, i. e., that which is left or saved after a general overthrow or destruction. In Deut. iii. 3 and Is. i. 9, the Septuagint has *σπίγμα* for *שְׂרִיר*. *Σπίγμα* often means *posterity*, *those who come after one*. But I apprehend the ground of the usage in this case by the Seventy, is, that *σπίγμα* (*what is sown, seed*) denotes what remains of grain, after the consumption for the

year, until seed-time comes, which is then sown; so that, considered in this light, σπέρμα is equivalent to *residuum*, which is the sense of it here.

Ὡς Γομορρᾶ ἀνὶ ὁμοιωθήμεν, instead of Γομορρᾶ ἀνὶ ὁμοιωθήμεν, i. e., Γομορρᾶ in the Dative after ὁμοιωθήμεν. The Greeks could employ either construction; at least the Seventy have done so; see in Hos. iv. 6. Ezek. xxxii. 2, in which latter case both constructions are employed in the same sentence; λείοντι ἐνὼν ὁμοιωθῆς σὺ, καὶ ὡς δὲ ἄκων ἐν τῇ θάλασσῃ. The Hebrew is פֶּן־יִהְיֶה . *To be like Gomorrha*, is to be utterly destroyed as this city was. The sentiment therefore is: 'Isaiah said concerning the Jews, that only a small remnant should be rescued from utter destruction.'

It is true, that in Is. i. 9 the passage does not respect the *spiritual* but the *temporal* punishment of the Jews. But the ground of the apostle's reasoning here is *analogy*. His object is, as it all along through the chapter has been, to illustrate a *principle* of action. What God did at one time and in one respect, he may do at another time and in a different respect, *provided the PRINCIPLE concerned shall be the same*. And surely it is no more against his benevolence or his justice, to punish *spiritually* for transgressions of a spiritual nature, i. e., for continued impenitence and unbelief, than it is to punish *temporally* for sins against himself. His promises to Abraham and his seed, i. e., his *literal* descendants, are only and always *conditional*, either as to temporal or spiritual blessings. Of course the same *principle* of action applies to both, when God punishes. It is on this ground, then, that the apostle adduces instances of threatening *temporal* evil, in order to illustrate and confirm *spiritual* threats.

Overlooking this obvious principle of analogical reasoning, many commentators on Rom. ix. have very strenuously maintained, that all which is there said pertains only to the present world and to things of a merely temporal nature, or at most, only to the external privileges of religion; and all this, because the instances here produced are mostly of such a kind. But let any one look back first on chap. viii. 28—39, which most plainly gives rise to the whole discussion in chap. ix.; then contemplate the resumption of this theme in chap. ix. 6; and above all, let him view the summing up of the main object in chap. ix. 18—23, and then glance forward to verses 30—33; and it does seem to me, unless he has made up his mind to an *a priori* way before he comes to the study of the text,

that he cannot entertain any doubt what the object of the writer is. That extravagant positions have been advanced, on the ground of Rom. ix., which are revolting to piety and to right views of God and of human liberty, I should be among the last to deny. How easy it is for ardent polemics, when engaged in controversy and hardly pushed by subtle and able antagonists, to venture on extravagant positions—positions which depend on an exegesis *ad litteram* and not upon one *ad sensum*—need not be shown, when the melancholy examples of such facts stand out so boldly in relief. But why all this should be charged to Paul, and why those who differ in sentiment from speculative critics of this class, should go so far over in the opposite direction as to lose all sight of the apostle's object and aim, and make him discuss things of a merely *temporal* nature, when he begins, continues, and ends with a *spiritual* theme;—why all this is so frequently done, should be well looked to by those who are engaged in doing it. They may be very sincere in their opinions; and this I would by no means call in question. But a man may be *sincerely wrong*, as well as sincerely right; and when he is so through prejudice, through the heat of dispute, through reliance on mere human authority, through want of diligence and candour in studying the word of God, and judging with respect to its meaning; then it is but just, that his divine Lord and Master should consider him as accountable for his wrong judgment, and for the mischief which he does to others by it. If I am myself in the very predicament which I am here describing, may God in mercy open my eyes to see the truth as it in reality is, that I may not wander and perish myself, nor be the occasion that others should do the same!

Reiche, in answering the question, whether the apostle *has taught in this chapter* what we are to receive as a rule of faith? comes to the conclusion that Paul has contradicted what he has elsewhere maintained, in regard to human *liberty* and *accountability*; and, consequently, that we are to consider him as here employing a kind of *argumentum ad hominem* merely, or as assailing his opposers *γυμναστικῶς*, i. e., intending to hit them where he can, if he can but hit and disable them. What kind of reverence we can cherish for Paul, when we have come to a conclusion like this, it is not difficult to imagine.

CHAP. IX. 30—33.

HAVING thus completed the illustration and confirmation of his views respecting the sovereign dispensations of God, as to his mercy and his justice, the apostle now repeats in substance a leading sentiment of his epistle, viz., that justification being wholly gratuitous, and by faith in Christ, it is extended to all who receive it as such, and so brings the Gentiles within its reach: while the Jews, rejecting this method of salvation, have failed to obtain justification; for they have stumbled at the doctrine of the cross, and been unable to find acceptance with God on the ground of merit or by deeds of law. As no doctrine of the gospel was more repulsive to the Jews, than the truth that preference would be given to believing Gentiles over them, or at least a full admission to the same privileges in all respects; so Paul takes occasion frequently and solemnly to impress this important principle upon them.

(30) *Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν*; a preface or transition to a summary of what he had been inculcating in the preceding context. It is as much as to say: 'How then may all that has been said on the point under consideration be summed up? What in brief is the whole matter? The answer follows:

Ὅτι . . . ἐκ πίστεως, that the Gentiles who did not seek after justification, have obtained justification, and that justification which is by faith. That is, one principal thing which I have maintained (when I have averred that the Gentiles have become the children of Abraham by faith, and are received in the place of the unbelieving Jews), is that those who did not seek after justification, i. e., who were once estranged from God and his law, were enemies to all which is good, and utterly regardless of spiritual blessings—these have now obtained justification by faith, i. e., they are admitted by the mercy of God, without any merit on their part, to participate in the blessings of the gospel, even in the justification which Christ has procured. *Διόγω* is frequently used, even in the classic authors, in a sense like *ἐπεὶ*; and so in Hebrew דִּיּוּ for עַל. Reiche supposes that *ὅτι* is here designated to continue the question; i. e., [*Shall we say*] that, &c.? But the *διὰ* of verse 32 argues against this interpretation.

(31) *Ἰσραὴλ . . . οὐκ ἔφασι*, but Israel, who sought for a law of justification, have not attained to a law of justification. That is, Israel, who, confiding in their own merit and good works, betook themselves for justification to their supposed complete obedience to the divine law, or betook themselves to the law as a means of justification, have not found or attained to such a law as would justify them. In other words: 'The Jews, who trusted in their obedience and merit

as the ground of their acceptance with God, have failed in obtaining acceptance or justification in this way.' The reason or ground of this is fully stated in Rom. i—iii. The law demands *perfect* obedience to *all* its precepts, which no one ever did or ever will exhibit; and, consequently, no one can obtain acceptance on the ground of legal obedience, or by works of law. The apostle proceeds briefly to state the ground of what he had just asserted.

(32) *Διὰ τὸ ὅτι . . . νόμου* Why? because [they sought] not by faith, but by works of law; i. e., Israel did not seek for justification in a *gratuitous* way, but by legal, i. e., *meritorious* obedience. That *ἐκ πίστεως*, by faith, necessarily involved, in the mind of the writer, the idea of *gratuitous* justification, is certain from Rom. iv. 4, 5, and especially iv. 16. From a comparison of iii. 20—28, it is equally clear, that *ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* means *meritorious* obedience, i. e., a complete obedience to every precept of the law, in such a way that the reward consequent on perfect obedience can be claimed. Such a reward, the apostle maintains, it is now impossible for any one of the human race to obtain, "because all have sinned and come short of the glory of God." Now as the Jews were self-righteous and proud, they of course lacked that humility and sense of ill-desert which the gospel demands, and without which its salvation is not to be had. This pride and self-righteousness led them to reject the Saviour of lost sinners, and to refuse all trust or confidence in him. Here it was that they stumbled and fell, yea even to their own perdition; as the apostle goes on to say:

Προέκοψαν γὰρ . . . γέγραπται, for they stumbled on the stone of stumbling, as it is written. *Γὰρ* here is *causal*, i. e., standing before a clause which assigns the *cause* or reason why Israel had not obtained *δικαιοσύνην*. Yet A., B., D., E., F., G.; Syr. utr., Copt., Arm., Vulg., Ital.; Cyr., Chrys., Ruf., Aug., Ambrosiast., Pel., omit the *γὰρ*; and it is probably spurious. The connection is more facile without it. But supposing it to be genuine, we may thus explain the text; to the question, *διὰ τὸ, why?* viz., Why did not Israel obtain justification? the apostle answers, (1) 'Because they sought it by legal obedience and not by faith.' (2) As subordinate to this he says: 'They did not exercise faith, because they were offended with the Messiah as he appeared among them; they were stumbled at his character and claims.'

(33) *Ἰδοὺ . . . κατασχευθήσεται*, behold I lay in Zion a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence; but every one who believeth on him

shall not be ashamed. A peculiar quotation, made up of Is. xxviii. 16, and viii. 14. The former passage runs thus: "Behold, I have laid in Zion a stone, a corner stone, tried, precious, a firm foundation; he who confides in it shall not be afraid."—The latter passage thus: "And he shall be for a refuge, and for a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence, to both houses of Israel." It appears, then, that the *stone of stumbling and rock of offence*, in Rom. ix. 33, comes from Is. viii. 14, while the rest of the verse is taken from Is. xxviii. 16

It is a very common practice among the Jewish Rabbins, in citing the Scriptures, to mix passages together that are of the same tenor; and I may add, this is done by writers every day, without any consciousness of doing violence to the Scriptures, or of using an improper liberty; see Surcnhusius' *Βιβλος Καταλλάγης*, Par. V. p. 43. But however this may be, the fact that the apostle has done so, seems to be plain. The reader will observe, that in Is. xxviii. 16 the predicates of the *stone that was laid in Zion* are, that it is *tried, precious, a firm foundation*; but one of the predicates in Is. viii. 14 is, that it is *a stone of stumbling, or a rock of offence*. This is just what would coincide with the design of the apostle in the passage before us. He is describing the unbelief of the Jews, their rejection of the Messiah. Of course the *stone of stumbling* is best adapted to the description of their case.

It would seem to be clear, from the manner in which Paul cites both of these passages, that he applied them both to the Messiah; or at least that they were, in his view, capable of such an application in the way of analogy. Tholuck and many others understand them in the former way. The Chaldee Targum, on Is. xxviii. 16, translates thus: "See, I place in Zion a King, a mighty and a powerful King;" meaning the Messiah. Also the Babylonish Talmud (Tract. Sanhedrin. fol. 38. 1), the book of Zohar, and Jarchi. Kimchi also speaks of such an interpretation being given. In the New Testament, if the reader will compare Matt. xxi. 42, 44. Luke xx. 17, 18, and 1 Pet. ii. 5—7, he will find that Ps. cxviii. 22 ("the stone which the builders refused is become the headstone of the corner"), and Is. viii. 14 are joined together, on account of their resemblance and their reference to the same object. Peter has not only joined these two passages, but added a third, viz., Is. xxviii. 16, and referred them all to the Messiah. This casts light, therefore, on the intermingling of texts by Paul, in the passage under consideration.

In regard to the text in Is. viii. 14, it seems evident from Luke ii. 34, that the pious part of the Jews, to say the least, were accustomed to give it a *Messianic* interpretation; for thus does the aged Simeon, when he takes the child Jesus in his arms, and says: "This child is set for the fall and rise of many in Israel, a sign that shall be spoken against." So the Gemara (Tract. Sanhedrin) also interprets Is. viii. 14, of the Messiah. That the Messiah would be rejected by the Jews, is plainly enough predicated (as their own ancient Rabbies acknowledge), in Ps. xxii. Is. liii. Zech. xi. xii., &c. So the Bere-shith Rabba (a mystical commentary on Genesis, written about A.D. 300, by Rabbi Bar Nachmani), says: "One will sing no song, until the Messiah shall be treated with scorn; as it is written" [in Ps. lxxxix. 52].

The objection against the Messianic interpretation of Is. viii. 14. xxviii. 16, viz., that 'circumstances then present are referred to, the threatening of present punishment uttered, and excitement to present hopes and confidence then proffered,' cannot weigh much against such an interpretation. The prospect of the *future* was then held out by the prophet to the wicked as a matter of *dread*; to the pious, as a matter of *hope* and *joy*. Let us see, now, how this matter stood. The Jews looked forward to a great deliverer, to a period of great prosperity and glory in the days of their Messiah. What says the prophet? He says: 'The days of the Messiah himself shall bring no liberation of the *wicked* from evil; they shall be consolatory only to the *good*; for even the Messiah himself will be only a *stone of stumbling* and a *rock of offence* to the wicked.' This is both *prediction* and *preaching*. It threatens and consoles, while it discloses what is yet future.

Who can venture to say, now, that the prophet could not, or did not, entertain such views as these, and speak in such a manner? After the interpretation of Christ himself and of his apostles, in such a way as to support this view, we may venture to embrace it without any hazard.

Ὁ κατὰ σπουδὴν σπεύδει, in the Hebrew לֹא יָחִיץ. Paul seems to have read (and so the Seventy also), לֹא יִבְרַח or לֹא יִבְרַח. The present Hebrew text, לֹא יָחִיץ, means literally *he shall not make haste*; but a secondary and derived sense of the same verb, is *to be afraid, to be agitated with fear so as to betake one's self to flight*. In this latter sense, it comes in substance to the same meaning which κατὰ σπουδὴν σπεύδει expresses, viz., that of disappointed expectation and hope, failure of obtaining security and happiness. "Non refert verbum, sed res."

CHAP. X. 1—21.

Having thus shown that the casting off of Israel cannot be alleged as a wrong on the part of their Sovereign Lord and Ruler, and that the Scriptures contain many examples of the like dealing with individuals, as well as predictions respecting the rejection of the Jews; having also declared very explicitly that this rejection is because of their unbelief in respect to the Messiah, and their confidence in their own merits; the apostle now proceeds again to testify (as he has done in chap. ix. 1—5) his strong affection for his kinsmen after the flesh, and his ardent desires and prayers for their salvation. Nothing can be more appropriate than the expression of so much kind and deeply interested feeling, on his part, for the Jews, whom he is obliged to denounce and threaten because of their character and conduct. It serves to show, that he does not do this in the spirit of revenge, or because he loves denunciation; but that he does it with a sorrowful heart and eyes full of tears, that his bowels yearn over them, and that he retains for them all the affection which he once had when acting with them, yea, even more, and that too of a higher and better nature.

He had just said, that Israel was *διώκων νόμον δικαιοσύνης . . . και οὐκ ἔφθισε*. Here he resumes the theme, and explains himself more at large. He states the reason why they did not attain justification, verses 2, 3, and goes on to show, that Moses himself confirms the same ideas which he had disclosed to them relative to faith and works, verses 4—8. The sentiment that *belief in Christ is necessary for all*, both Jew and Greek, is still further confirmed by verses 9—12.

The apostle next presents the Jew as objecting thus: 'If we allow what you say as to the necessity of faith or belief in Christ, yet how are we to be blamed for rejecting him, in case he has never been preached or declared to us?' verses 13—15.

To this the apostle answers, (1) That not all who have heard the gospel, believe it; as Isaiah himself declares, verses 16, 17. (2) But further; the objection cannot be truly made, that the Jews have not heard the gospel, at least enjoyed the opportunity of hearing it; for one may apply to them, in this respect, the words of Ps. xix. 4; or the words of Moses, in Deut. xxxii. 21; or of Isaiah, in lxxv. 1, 2; so that they are left without any just apology for their unbelief, verses 18—21.

(1) *Ἡ μὲν εὐδοκία τῆς ἐμῆς καρδίας*, the benevolent or kind desire of my heart; i. e., his sincere and hearty wish (as we say) is, &c.—*Εἰς σωτηρίαν*, for salvation, i. e., for their salvation. Literally *my prayer to God for them [is] unto or in respect to salvation*. But *εἰς* is frequently used in the New Testament in the same sense as *ἵνα* in Hebrew; e. g., Rom. xvi. 6, *εἰς ἡμᾶς*, for us; 1 Cor. viii. 6, *εἰς αὐτόν*, for him, i. e., for his honour and glory; 2 Cor. viii. 6, *εἰς ὑμᾶς*, for your advantage; and so often. The phrase *ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν [ἵστιν] εἰς σωτηρίαν* is altogether equivalent, then, to *ἵνα σωθῶσι* or *ὑπὲρ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῶν*. The reading *ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν* which is sanctioned by A., B., D., F., G., is now generally admitted in critical editions, instead of the Receptus *ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἰσραήλ*. The sense is the same. The same MSS. omit *ἡ* before *τῆς*.

(2) *Μαρτυρῶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς*, for I bear them witness. *Γάρ* illustrantis,

i. e., standing before a clause that suggests some consideration which has a bearing on the preceding declaration. The apostle means to say, that he retains a strong affection for the Jews, and prays sincerely and ardently for their salvation; and specially so, as they have much feeling and zeal in respect to the subject of religion. *Αὐτοῖς* is the Dative after *μαρτυρῶ*; for this verb commonly takes the Dative of the person or thing *for* whom or which testimony is given.

* *Οὐκ ἔχον Θεοῦ ἐχουσι*, *that they have a zeal for God*; *Θεοῦ* being the Genitive of the object to which *ἐχον* stands related. So in John ii. 17, *ὁ ἐχλον τοῦ οἴκου σου*, *zeal for the honour of thine house*; comp. Ps. lxi. 10 (9), *יְהוָה מִן הַנֶּפֶשׁ*, also Acts xxii. 3, and John xvi. 2; comp. Gal. i. 14. Acts xxi. 20. The apostle means to say, that the Jews had much zeal for objects of a religious nature, for such objects as had a relation to God; or in other words, that they possessed strong feelings and sympathies of a religious nature. And with this representation all accounts of them agree. Philo, Josephus, and the various writers of the New Testament, by the facts which they disclose, most abundantly confirm the correctness of this declaration.

* *Ἄλλ' οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν*, *but not according to knowledge*; i. e., not an intelligent, discerning, enlightened zeal; not a zeal regulated by a proper understanding of what was really religious truth. They persecuted Christians, for example, unto death, and yet thought themselves to be doing service for God, *λατρείαν Θεῷ*, John xvi. 2. There may be *zeal without knowledge*, which is superstitious, persecuting, hostile to the peace and happiness of the community; and there may be *knowledge without zeal*, which is cold, sceptical, unfeeling, and which devils may possess as well as men. An actual union of both is accomplished only by sincere piety; and a high degree of this union, only by ardent piety.

(3) *Ἀγνοῦντες γὰρ . . . δικαιοσύνην*, *for being ignorant of that justification which is of God*. *Θεοῦ* here is *Gen. auctoris*, i. e., a Genitive designating the author of that which the preceding noun signifies, *τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην* is that method of justification, viz., gratuitous or by faith, which God has established, appointed, or revealed in the gospel. It stands opposed, here, to *τὴν ἰδίαν δικαιοσύνην*, i. e., justification on the ground of merit or by the works of law. *Γὰρ causal*, i. e., standing before a clause which gives the reason or ground of the assertion contained in *ἄλλ' οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν*, and consequently *γὰρ* may be rendered *for*.

The apostle does not mean by ἀγνοοῦντες, to imply that the Jews had enjoyed no opportunity to become acquainted with the δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ; for this would contradict what he says in the sequel, verse 18, seq. He means only to say, that whatever their opportunities of knowledge had been, they were in fact still ignorant, and criminally ignorant, of the gospel method of justification.

Καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν . . . στήσαι, and seeking to establish their own justification. Στήσαι means here to render valid, to make good one's claims. The Jews sought for and expected justification by their own merit, i. e., by obedience to their laws, specially the ceremonial ones. How defective their views were, on the subject of what is required by the law of God, particularly in a spiritual respect, is manifest from the whole of the New Testament, but specially so from the declarations of the Saviour in his *Sermon on the Mount*, Matt. v. seq. That justification in the way of merit is impossible, the apostle had before shown in chaps. ii. iii.

Ὁὐκ ὑπετάγησαν, they have not submitted themselves; in which rendering we give to the second Aor. of the Pass. voice, the reflexive sense of the Middle voice. So the Aorists of the Passive are frequently used; see Buttm. Gr. Gramm. § 123. 2; N. Test. Gramm. § 61. 4. But if we render οὐκ ὑπετάγησαν passively, they have not been subjected, the sense will be substantially the same.

Sentiment of the verse: 'Having no correct views of justification by grace, and being earnestly desirous of justification on the ground of their own merit, they reject the justification which God has proffered to them in the gospel.'

(4) Τέλος γὰρ νόμου Χριστός, for Christ is the end of the law; i. e., believing in Christ, receiving him by faith and thus attaining to δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ, accomplishes the end or object of what the law would accomplish, viz., which perfect obedience to the law would accomplish. In this simple way, and consonant with the context, I would interpret this long agitated and much controverted text. That τέλος has often the same meaning or substantially the same which is here given to it, may be abundantly shown. It is frequently used to denote *exitus rei*, the event, end, ultimate object or design of a thing; e. g., Matt. xxvi. 58, ἰδεὶ τὸ τέλος, to see the event, final end, Rom. vi. 21, τὸ τέλος, the end or final event of those things, is death; 2 Cor. xi. 15, ὃν τὸ τέλος, whose end, final state or condition, i. e., reward, shall be according to their works; Phil. iii. 19, ὃν τὸ τέλος, whose end or final state, shall be destruction; 1 Tim. i. 5, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς παραγ-

γεῖας, now the ultimate end, object, design, of the commandment, &c.; Heb. vi. 8, ἥς τὸ τέλος εἰς καῦσιν, whose end, or final reward is burning. See also James v. 11. 1 Pet. i. 5, τὸ τέλος, the end or event of your faith, is the salvation of your souls; iv. 17. So in other Greek writings; e. g., τὸ τέλος τοῦ πράγματος εἰς καλίαν ἄγει, Test. XII. Patriarch. p. 689; τὸ τούτου τέλος ἐν Θεῷ ἦν, the end or event of this matter was with the Divinity, Demosth. 292. 22. So in the phrases, τέλος λαμβάνειν, παρέρχεσθαι εἰς τέλος, ἐκ τοῦ τέλους γνωρισθέντα, κ. τ. λ.

From all this there remains no good reason to doubt, that τέλος may mean here *exitus*, the end, final object, the result; i. e., the end which the law was intended to accomplish or bring about, has been brought about or accomplished by Christ. Now the end of the law, was the justification of men, i. e., their advancement to happiness and glory in a future world. So the apostle himself states in the sequel: "The man that doeth these things shall live by them." But inasmuch as "all men have sinned and come short of the glory of God," so "no flesh can be justified by the deeds of the law;" in other words, legal justification on the ground of merit is now impossible. But what the law cannot accomplish, Christ does accomplish; for through him the justification of sinners is brought about, which would otherwise be impossible. Christ then is the end of the law, i. e., he accomplishes or brings about that which the law was designed to accomplish—the acceptance of men with God, and their admission to the happiness of the future world.

That ver. 4 is only expegetical of the last clause of the preceding verse, seems to me quite plain; and the γὰρ intimates this. Christ then is asserted, in ver. 4, to be the end of the law, i. e., to answer the same end which the law perfectly obeyed would answer, as to justification.

But τέλος has been very differently construed; viz., (a) As meaning end in the sense of ending or completion. In this case νόμος is interpreted as meaning the ceremonial law; so that the sentiment is: 'Christ has, by his coming, made an end of the ceremonial law.' But it is a sufficient objection to this interpretation, that it is wholly irrelevant to the subject now under discussion; which is, whether justification is by merit, as the Jews believed, or by grace. This interpretation, however, has been defended by Augustine, Gregory Thaum., Schlichting, Le Clerc, Limborch, and some others.

(b) Christ is the τελείωσις or πλήρωμα of the Jewish law, i. e., Christ perfectly fulfilled or obeyed it. But this explanation, although

defended by Origen, Pelagius, Ambrose, Melancthon, Vatablus, Calvin, &c., fails in being able to make out a *usus loquendi* in favour of such a sense of the word *τέλος*. And moreover; what is it to the purpose of the apostle? To say that Christ obeyed the whole law, ritual, or moral, or both, is saying what indeed is true; but then it has no direct or visible bearing upon the subject immediately before the mind of the writer. There are *two* supposable ways of justification, one *wrong* way and one *right* one; this it is his object to show. Now the Jews, having chosen the wrong one, viz. their own works of law, *i. e.*, their own merits, have of course missed the right one, viz. that by faith in Christ.

(c) Chrysostom, Theodoret, Beza, Bucer, S. Schmidt, Bengel, Turretin, Heumann, Tholuck, &c., understand *τέλος* in the sense of *end, design, final object*. Tholuck explains it thus: viz., that the law teaches us our sinfulness and our need of a Saviour, and this was what it was designed to accomplish; and thus it leads us *in the end* to Christ, or to Christ as its *final end*. He finds an exact parallel in Gal. iii. 24: "the law is our *παιδαγωγός* to bring us to Christ." But why we should give the passage this turn here, I cannot see; for the writer has expressly told us in what respect he means that Christ was the *end of the law*, viz. *εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. And in accordance with this, Flatt has expounded the passage thus: Christ is the *τέλος νόμου* in respect to *δικαιοσύνη*; *i. e.*, he has brought it about, that we should not be judged after the strictness of the law. He has removed the sentence of condemnation from all those who receive the gospel.—Well and truly.

Εἰς . . . πιστεύοντι, in respect to the justification of every believer. This designates, as I have before observed, the very respect in which Christ was *τέλος νόμου*. He is so to every *believer*; but not so to others, *i. e.*, not so while they remain unbelievers, although he is proffered to them as mighty and willing to save all who will come unto God through him. *Παντι κ. τ. λ.* in the Dative, as the person for whom.

(5) *Μωυσῆς γάρ κ. τ. λ.* Here is *γάρ illustrantis* again; for the whole of the quotations which follow, are plainly designed to illustrate the two different methods of justification which the apostle had just brought into view.—*Γράφει*, describeth, delineateth; often used in such a sense.—*Τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου*, legal justification, *i. e.*, meritorious justification, one which a man may claim as the proper reward of his own good deeds or obedience. The

apostle makes this appeal to Moses, both to confirm and illustrate his own declarations and to show also that he is inculcating no new doctrine.

*Οτι . . . ἐν αὐτοῖς, *that the man who doeth these things, shall live by them.* *Οτι is prefixed here to a quotation, as usual, and has the sense of our *viz.*, *namely*, or *as follows*. The Greek word itself, seems in reality to be the neuter of ὅστις, ὅτι=; τί, i. e., *this thing, videlicet.*

Ποίῃσα; αὐτά, viz., the thing spoken of in the preceding context. The quotation is from Lev. xviii. 5, which has a reference to preceding ordinances and statutes recorded in Leviticus. Ποίῃω is very frequently employed in the sense of *performing*, *obeying* a statute, ordinance, &c., or in *obeying* the will of another.—Ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς, he shall be rendered happy by them, i. e., by obedience to such statutes, &c. Obedience, i. e., entire obedience, shall render him happy, shall entitle him to the rewards that are proffered to the obedient. That the Jews understood something more than *happiness in the present life*, by the ἵπ (ζήσεται) in Lev. xviii. 5, seems probable from the version of Onkelos: "He shall live in eternal life by them." So the Targum of Pseudo-Jonathan: "He shall live in eternal life, and have a part with the righteous."

(6) Ἡ δὲ . . . λόγι, *but justification by faith speaketh thus.* Δὲ but, here in distinction from or in opposition to the preceding declaration. Δικαιοσύνην is here *personified*. The sense is the same as to say: 'One who preaches justification by faith, might say, &c.'

Μη . . . σου, *say not in thine heart, i. e., within thyself.* To say *within one's self*, is to think, imagine, suppose. So the Greek φημι is sometimes used for *internal saying*, i. e., thinking. Ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου, where לִבִּי (heart) is used like נַפְשִׁי (soul) for self; and so very often in the Hebrew language.

Τίς . . . οὐρανόν; *who shall ascend to heaven?* &c. The whole appeal and method of reasoning is in an analogical way. Moses, near the close of his life, in a general exhortation to obedience which he addressed to the Hebrew nation, assigns as one reason why they should obey, that the statutes of the Lord which he had given them were plain and intelligible; they "were not hidden from them, neither were they afar off," Deut. xxx. 11. In order to enforce this last thought the more effectually, he dwells upon it and illustrates it in several ways. "The commandment," says he, "is not in heaven, that thou shouldst say: Who shall go up for us to heaven and bring

it to us, that we may hear it and do it. Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say: Who shall go over the sea for us and bring it to us, that we may hear and do it?" That is: 'The law which you are required to obey, is plain and intelligible; it is accessible to all men, it is not difficult to be procured or understood. It needs no messenger to ascend the skies and bring it down from heaven; for it is already revealed. We need not send abroad for it, nor search after it in distant and inaccessible lands that lie beyond the ocean.' In other words: 'It is plain and easy of access.' Nay one may say: "The word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it." Deut. xxx. 14. That is: 'The commandment is in language which thou dost speak, and is such as thou canst comprehend with thine understanding;' which last circumstance is only repeating or amplifying, in another form, the idea that had preceded.

The whole may be summed up in one word, omitting all figurative expression; viz., *the commandment is plain and accessible*. You can have, therefore, no excuse for neglecting it.

So in the case before us. *Justification by faith in Christ* is a plain and intelligible doctrine. It is not shut up in mysterious language, nor concealed from the eyes of all but the *initiated*, like the heathen mysteries. It is like what Moses says of the statutes which he gave to Israel, plain, intelligible, accessible. It is not in the books of countries which lie beyond the impassable ocean; not in the mysterious book of God in heaven, and yet undisclosed; not in the world beneath, which no one can penetrate and return to disclose its secrets. It is brought before the mind and heart of every man; and thus he is without excuse for unbelief.

Such is the general nature and object of these quotations, and such the method of reasoning in respect to them. It is apparent, therefore, that *ne quid nimis* is very applicable here, in regard to commentary on the words which are employed. It is the *general* nature of the imagery, in the main, which is significant to the purpose of the writer. Paul means simply to affirm, that if Moses could truly say that his law was intelligible and accessible, the doctrine of justification by faith in Christ is even still more so.

τοῦτ' ἔστι . . . καταβάτω, *that is, to bring down Christ*. The τοῦτ' ἔστι here designates the reference which the apostle designs to make of the *sentiment* just quoted, viz., that he means to apply it to

Christ, and not to the law of Moses.—Χριστὸν here means *Christ* in the sense of verse 4, where he is called τίλος νόμου . . . εἰς δικαιοσύνην.

(7) Τίς . . . ἄβυσσον, *who shall go down into the abyss*. In the Hebrew, Deut. xviii. 3, the phrase is לֹא מֵעַבְרָ לִים הָיָא *not beyond the sea is it*. ✓ The expression differs from that of Paul as to *words* but not as to the general sense. 'To go beyond the sea, which was considered as of boundless width (Job xi. 9) and impassable, is employed by Moses as the image of what is difficult or impossible. In the same way Paul employs ἄβυσσον. No one returns from the *world* beneath לוֹאֵץ or דִּיהָ; (for לוֹאֵץ and דִּיהָ are occasionally synonymous, being the antithesis of מִצֵּץ, see Gen. xlix. 25. Ps. cvii. 26. Sirac. xvi. 18. xxiv. 5, and comp. Ps. cxxxix. 8. Amos ix. 2. Matt. xi. 23.) Here ἄβυσσον designates the לוֹאֵץ of the Hebrews, considered as the *abode of the dead*; as is evident from Χριστὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναγαγεῖν. The general idea conveyed by the expression is, 'Say not that an insuperable difficulty is to be overcome, in order to be a believer; such a difficulty as would be in the way if one must ascend to heaven in order to bring Christ down, or descend into the world beneath in order to bring him up.'

The quotations before us are clear examples of the liberty which Paul takes, of accommodating the *spirit* of the Old Testament to the objects and truths of the gospel, without any slavish subjection to the mere form of words.

(8) Ἀλλὰ τί λέγει; *i. e.*, what saith ἡ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη? It saith; Ἐγγύς σου . . . σου, *the word is nigh to thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart*. Πῆμα here means ἐῆμα πίστεως, *i. e.*, the gospel, as the sequel shows; comp. 1 Tim. iv. 6. *In thy mouth*, in thine own language, *i. e.*, a subject of conversation and teaching. *In thy heart*, *i. e.*, a subject of meditation and thought. Sentiment; 'The doctrine which I inculcate, is so far from being an obscure and inaccessible and forbidden mystery, that it is daily a subject of reflection and of conversation.' That the apostle means the doctrine of faith which he taught and preached, is clear from the following τοῦτ' ἐστὶ . . . κηρύσσομεν.

(9) Ὅτι, *because, i. e.*, say not in thine heart, &c., *because if, &c.*—Ἐὰν ὁμολογήσῃς . . . Ἰησοῦν, *if thou shalt openly profess with thy mouth, that Jesus is Lord*. The verb ὁμολογέω means literally *eadem loqui*, to speak what consents or agrees with something which others speak or maintain. But it is frequently used to denote *speaking* or *professing openly*, *i. e.*, proclaiming openly one's belief in Christ,

which was speaking in accordance with what other Christians had avowed. Ἐν τῷ στόματι, *by word of mouth*, in words, or by the use of language. Κύριον I take to be the *predicate* of the sentence in this case, *i. e.*, a true believer is to confess *that Jesus is Lord*; comp. Acts ii. 36. v. 31. Phil. ii. 9, 10, where the order of the words is Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός (the same as here), but where it is certain that Κύριον must be a *predicate*, viz., that Jesus Christ *is Lord*. The position of Κύριον before Ἰησοῦν, is for the sake of emphasis.

Καὶ πιστεύσῃς . . . νεκρῶν, *and shalt believe in thy heart that God hath raised him from the dead*; *i. e.*, shalt sincerely, *ex animo*, believe that God has raised him from the dead, and exalted him to the throne of universal dominion. It is not the simple fact of a resurrection of Jesus' body from the tomb, which in the apostle's view is the great and distinguishing feature of Christian belief; it is the exaltation, glory, and saving power that are consequent on the resurrection, which he evidently connects with this event. So in Phil. ii. 8—11. So in Acts ii. 24, 31—33, where the whole connection is very explicit; comp. also Heb. ii. 9. 2 Cor. iv. 14. Acts xvii. 31. Rom. iv. 25. 1 Cor. xv. 17—20.

Σωθήσῃ, *thou shalt be saved*; *i. e.*, a bold and open profession of the Christian faith, united with a sincere and hearty belief of it, will secure the salvation of him who makes such a profession; all which shows that the way of salvation is open and easy of access.

The reader will observe, that the apostle has here followed the *order* of the quotations which he had made from the law of Moses (verse 8) in stating the conditions of salvation. Independently of this, we might naturally expect that belief of the heart would be first mentioned, and then confession of the mouth, *i. e.*, by words; for this is the order of nature. And so, in the explanation immediately subjoined, the apostle does in fact arrange his declarations; viz.

(10) Καρδίᾳ γὰρ . . . σωτηρίαν, *for with the heart there is belief unto justification, and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation*. Πιστεύεται and ὁμολογείται, if regarded as being in the Mid. voice, may be rendered in an active sense; but both may be taken *passively* and rendered as above; or we may translate: *Belief is exercised, confession is made, &c.* Our English version takes the first verb *actively*, and the last *passively*; which does not seem to have been intended by the writer. ὥστε *illustrantis, i. e.*, before a clause which assigns a ground or reason for what had just been said. Εἰς δικαιοσύνην and εἰς σωτηρίαν mean, so that justification is attained

and so that salvation is attained. *Εἰς* here, as often, stands before a noun designating the object or end to be obtained, and may be called *εἰς telicum*.

The sentiment of the verse is the same as before; viz., sincere belief in Christ, and open profession of him, are essential conditions of salvation, and such as, being complied with, will certainly secure it. The design of the apostle in repeating it, is merely to make an appeal, respecting this point, to the feelings and convictions of those whom he addressed. This is an important point, in the course of his argumentation.

(11) This is still further confirmed by again bringing into view a text, to which he had before made an appeal in chap. ix. 33. *Πᾶς ὁ . . . κατασχευθήσεται*, *no one who believeth on him shall ever be disappointed*; i. e., salvation is certain to every true believer. *Πᾶς . . . ὃν* I have put together, and rendered *no one*. If the *ὃν* in this case had been connected with *πᾶς* by position, and not with the verb, the meaning would then have been, as in English, *not every one*, i. e., some but not all. See New Test. Gramm. § 116. 1. The form of the Greek is *Hebraistic*. The Hebrew had no method of saying *none*, except by using כָּל (every one) with a negative לֹא (not). *Κατασχευθήσεται, שׁוֹכֵן, none shall be put to shame* by a failure of his hopes, *none shall be disappointed*.

(12) The word *πᾶς*, which the above quotation from Is. xxviii. 16 exhibits, gives occasion here for the apostle to bring into view a point which he had often insisted upon in the previous parts of his epistle, particularly in chaps. iii. iv., viz., that the salvation of the gospel is proffered to all men without distinction, and on the same terms. *Οὐ γὰρ . . . Ἑλλήνης*, *for there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek, or there is no distinction of Jew and Greek*, i. e., no distinction as to the offers of salvation, and the terms on which it may be had. *Τί καί* is used here, as often elsewhere, between two members coupled together closely by the sentence, but diverse or antithetic in respect to meaning. *Γάρ illustrantis*, viz., illustrating the *πᾶς* of the preceding assertion. In fact, there is a singular succession here of clauses, arising one out of another, to all of which *γὰρ* is prefixed. Thus in verse 10, *καθὼς γὰρ κ. τ. λ.*, assigns a ground or confirmation of the preceding declaration; verse 11, *τίλει γὰρ κ. τ. λ.*, assigns a ground of confirmation, in respect to what had been advanced in verse 10, i. e., it appeals to the Scriptures in confirmation of it; verse 12, *ὃ γὰρ κ. τ. λ.*, is again a confirmation of the declara-

tion $\pi\alpha\varsigma \dots \text{o}\acute{\upsilon} \text{ἐπαίσχυνθήσεται}$, and this last declaration is, in its turn, confirmed by two succeeding ones, viz., $\delta \gammaὰρ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\varsigma \kappa. \tau. \lambda.$, and $\pi\alpha\varsigma \gammaὰρ \delta\varsigma \kappa. \tau. \lambda.$, the first of which contains a declaration of the apostle, and the second an appeal to the Scriptures confirming this declaration: so that here are no less than *five* clauses in immediate succession, all of which have a $\gammaὰρ$ prefixed, and in the same sense throughout, i. e., each $\gammaὰρ$ stands in a clause which serves to confirm or illustrate the preceding assertion. This is altogether characteristic of the manner of Paul; who in the course of making a single declaration, often throws out words which suggest whole trains of thought that are but indirectly connected with the main object of the declaration, but which the apostle stops in order to express; and in expressing them, he is often led again to other thoughts connected with these subordinate ones; and these other thoughts again lead to a third series (if they may be so named); and after expressing all these, the writer returns again, and resumes his main subject; compare for example Rom. i. 1—7, where vers. 1 and 7 belong together; Rom. v. 12—18, where ver. 18 is a resumption of the subject in ver. 12, and a *completion* of the comparison there begun. So in Eph. iii. 1—iv. 1. where iii. 1 is immediately connected with iv. 1, while there is a parenthesis (so to speak) of twenty verses between. It is this manner of unfolding his thoughts, which gives birth to so many instances of $\gammaὰρ$, whose proper use is, to stand before a clause that is added in order to assign a reason of what precedes, or to exhibit an illustration or confirmation of it. Now inasmuch as the apostle Paul often writes in the way above described, where one thought grows out of another in succession (as in the case above); so it is not strange that we have a $\gammaὰρ$ that corresponds with declarations of this nature, and therefore often repeated; a circumstance, I may add, which seems not to have been duly noticed by the great body of commentators.

Ὁ $\gammaὰρ \dots \piάντων$, *for there is the same Lord of all*; i. e., the Jews and Gentiles have one common Lord and Master; comp. Rom. iii. 29, 30. iv. 16, 17.—Πλουτῶν $\dots \alphaὐτόν$, *abounding [in goodness] toward all who call upon him*. Πλουτῶν means *being rich, having abundance*, viz., of wealth. But here the connection shows, of course, that the apostle means *rich in spiritual blessings, abounding in spiritual favours* towards men.—Ἐπικαλουμένοις ἐπ' αὐτόν, like the Heb. עֲשֶׂה אֲרָפָה, means *making supplication to him, performing acts of devotion to him*. Πάντας here again shows, that the goodness of God is not limited to the Jewish nation, but equally proffered to all.

(13) This is confirmed again by another quotation which exhibits the same $\pi\alpha\tilde{\alpha}\varsigma$. $\Pi\alpha\tilde{\alpha}\varsigma\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ .\ .\ .\ \sigma\omega\theta\eta\sigma\epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\iota$, *for every one who calls on the name of the Lord, shall be saved*. Here we have the full Hebrew form, viz., $\text{יְהוָה בְּשֵׁם יְקֹרָא יְאֹשֵׁר כָּל־אֲשֶׁר}$ *every true worshipper of God*; $\delta\iota\omicron\mu\alpha$ being pleonastic, as in “the name of the God of Jacob defend thee,” “the name of the Lord is a strong tower,” &c.

In regard to the quotations in vers. 11 and 13, from Is. xxviii. 16 and Joel iii. 5 (ii. 32), it has been frequently remarked, that the original Hebrew in neither place exhibits *Christ* as the object of supplication and the author of salvation. In a certain sense this is true; i. e., it is true, that the sacred writers of the Old Testament, in these passages, seem to have had principally in view the confidence which is placed in God in a season of danger and distress, and the promise that such confidence should not be in vain. But here again, as in a multitude of other cases of the like nature, it is the *principle* of action which is the main question, and not the *special relation* of it in ancient times. Is the *principle* the same under the Christian dispensation as it was under the Jewish one, viz., that those who are exposed to danger and distress, and who put their trust in God, shall obtain deliverance? Is this true in a spiritual, as well as in a temporal respect? Or rather, is there not a $\pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\rho\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ to this promise under the gospel? This will not be denied. Paul did not expect his readers to deny it; and consequently he has made appeals in vers. 11, 13, which apply *especially* to Christ; although the passages, in their *original* connection, do not seem to have had such a special reference. But in doing this (verses 13—15 show clearly that he has done it), he has authorized us to apply to Christ the same divine worship and honour, which the saints of ancient days applied to Jehovah. Otherwise how could he make such an application of the words before us? He must have known that his readers would of course see, that he applied the very same things to Christ, which the writers of the Old Testament referred to Jehovah; and consequently, that he considered him as entitled to the same honours and confidence. I see not any way in which we can make less out of the passage than this, viz., that all who believe in Christ shall be saved, and all who pray to him shall be saved. Of course, *sincere* belief and supplication are here intended.

(14) The apostle here anticipates an objection which he expected the Jew would make to his argument, which urges the necessity of calling on Christ in order to be saved: ‘How shall one call on him,

unless he is first a believer in him, *i. e.*, first persuaded that he is the proper object of religious invocation! And how shall he believe this, provided no declaration of it has been made to him! And how can such a declaration be made, unless by a messenger or preacher duly commissioned? For the Scripture itself bestows its encomium on such messengers, and thus impliedly recognises the importance of them.' To all this the apostle gives an answer in the sequel, vers. 16 seq.

It seems to me almost a matter of indifference, whether (with Grotius) we suppose the apostle to introduce an objector as speaking here in the person of an unbelieving Jew, or whether (with Tholuck and most commentators) we suppose the apostle himself to utter the words in question. If we attribute them to the apostle, we must suppose him to be uttering what an objector would naturally say; and this is the substantial part of the whole matter. It can be of no consequence by whom it is uttered.

Nor is it necessary to suppose, that all which comes from an objector is false. The speciousness of an objection consists in the claims of some part of it to be considered as true. We may concede, therefore, that the *reasoning* of the objector here is correct, if you allow him his premises; *i. e.*, it is true that men must first believe on a Saviour, before they will call upon him; and that he must be preached to them, before they can believe on him; and that in order to this, there must be some one to preach. It is true that the Scripture recognizes the importance of such messengers. But then, the main question here after all is, whether the fact assumed as a basis of all this reasoning, *viz.*, that *the Jew had not heard the gospel*, is true. The apostle proceeds in the sequel to show that this is not the case; and therefore that the whole objection falls to the ground.

Πῶς οὖν . . . πιστεύουσιν, *how then shall they call [on him] in whom they have not believed? i. e.*, how shall they pray to him, do religious homage to him, who is not the object of belief or confidence? Οὖν marks here a relation to the foregoing assertions. "It is used," says Passow, 'in interrogative sentences, with reference to preceding assertions which are conceded.' So here, the objector (or Paul in his place) says, 'Conceding now that all who call on him shall be saved, yet how can men call on one of whom they have not heard, &c.?' By saying this he aims to apologize for the unbelief of many Jews who still rejected the Saviour. This delicate shade of οὖν is not noted in the lexicons of Wahl and Bretschneider.

Εἰς ὃν here must mean *the Lord Jesus Christ*; for surely he is the specific object of faith or belief, about which the apostle is here discoursing.

Πῶς δὲ πιστεύουσιν [εἰς αὐτὸν] οἳ οὐκ ἤκουσαν; *and how shall they believe [on him] of whom they have not heard?* That is, before one can believe on a Saviour, he must have some knowledge of him; this Saviour must be proclaimed to him. οἳ here is the Genitive governed by ἤκουσαν; “*verba sensûs gaudent Genitivo.*”—Κηρύσσωντος, *a preacher*, is one who proclaims in public any matter, who publishes aloud; in the Hebrew קִבֵּץ.

(15) Πῶς δὲ . . . ἀποσταλῶσι; *And how shall they preach, except they be sent? i. e., unless they are divinely commissioned; comp. Jer. xxiii 21.*

Καθὼς γέγραπται, *as it is written.* The connection of the sentiment which follows with that which precedes, I have not found exhibited in any commentator so as to satisfy me. Most critics do not appear to have felt any difficulty with the passage, and have said little or nothing to the purpose upon it. But in my own mind there is difficulty in seeing how the sequel here either illustrates or confirms the declaration immediately preceding. The course of the thought seems to be this, viz., ‘the importance of the heralds of salvation is implied in the high commendation which the Scripture bestows upon them.’ This is indeed truly implied in the words quoted; for why should these heralds be spoken of with high and joyful commendation, if they are not important instruments in the salvation of men? So the speaker in this case, in making this quotation, illustrates what he has just suggested respecting the importance of the heralds of salvation.

Ὡς ὤραδι . . . τὰ ἀγαθὰ, *how beautiful are the feet of those who publish salvation, who proclaim good tidings!* The Septuagint translates thus: ὡς ὤρα ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρεων, ὡς πόδες εὐαγγελιζομένου ἀποθὴν εἰρήνης, ὡς εὐαγγελιζομένου ἀγαθὰ! So the Codex Vaticanus; and I suppose that after the latter ὡς the translator must have supplied in his own mind the word πόδες, in order to make out a sense which would be good. The Hebrew runs thus: “How beautiful on the mountains are the feet of him who proclaims glad tidings, who publishes peace, who makes proclamation of good!” Is. lii. 7. Paul has evidently made a new translation, in his quotation; but he has abridged the original Hebrew.—Οἱ πόδες, *feet*, i. e., a part of the person taken for the whole; as often in Hebrew, and so in other languages; comp. Acts v. 9. The

reason why *οἱ πόδες* is here chosen rather than any other part of the body to be the representative of the *person* would seem to be, that the *heralds* who proclaim any thing (*מְבַשְּׂרִים*), *travel* from place to place in order to discharge their duty.

Εἰρήνη, Διέψε, *good, salvation*, good in its most extensive sense. — *Εὐαγγελίζω* means primarily, according to its etymology, *to publish good news*. But secondarily, it conveys only the general idea *to publish*; consequently it takes after it the Acc. of a noun indicating the thing published, as here *εἰρήνη . . . τὰ ἀγαθά*.

(16) 'Αλλ' οὐ πάντες . . . εὐαγγελίσαι, *but all have not obeyed the gospel; i. e.*, notwithstanding what you say (*ἀλλά* concedes), still it is true, that all to whom the gospel has been published have not become obedient to it. So I feel compelled to explain this passage; on the connection of which I have been able to find no commentator who has given me satisfaction. The connection I take to be thus. The objector (in verses 14 and 15) pleads by way of apology for his unbelieving countrymen, that it could not be expected they would believe without the gospel being preached to them, for the Scripture itself acknowledges and proclaims the importance of preachers; thus meaning to intimate that many of them had not heard it proclaimed. To this the apostle answers, (1) That many who had heard it, viz., such as the objector himself must concede had heard it, did not believe it; and he quotes Is. liii. 1, in order to show that the great prophet had predicted this same thing.

To this the Jew replies, that the very quotation which he makes contains an implication of the sentiment, that men must hear the gospel before they can believe it, *who hath believed our REPORT*, *ἡ ψευδος*? meaning thereby to intimate, that a part of his kinsmen after the flesh, at least, are not to be involved in the charge of criminal unbelief. This last intimation the apostle immediately takes up, and replies to it, (2) In verses 11—21, by repeated quotations from the Old Testament, showing that they all had heard the glad tidings of the gospel, or at least showing that what was said in ancient times of the Jews, in respect to the warnings and promises of God, may now be said with equal truth and propriety. It is the *principle* of the apostle's assertion or reasoning, which he designs to support and justify by these quotations. In both ancient and gospel times it could never have been strictly and literally true, that to every individual Jew the message of life and salvation has been actually proclaimed. Nor was it necessary to the apostle's purpose.

It was enough, if the proclamation had been openly, and repeatedly, and perseveringly made among the Jews, so that *all who would*, had opportunities of hearing it. Their ignorance in such a case would of course be *voluntary*, and therefore altogether without excuse.

It is so at the present hour. Thousands in this land have never heard a gospel-sermon, or read a book which disclosed the truths of the gospel, in their whole lives. But why? The sound of the gospel is gone out into all the land, its words even to the end thereof; and ignorance is, certainly for the most part, voluntary and criminal; nor can it be justly alleged as making at all against the general assertion, that the terms of salvation are published to all.

With this explanation of the course of thought, our future way will be comparatively easy and plain.

Ἦσαταις . . . ἡμῶν; for Isaiah saith, Lord, who hath believed our report? Is. liii. 1. That is, the prophet complains that the declarations made respecting the Messiah are not credited by those who hear them. Here then is an example of Jews who hear and believe not; and one to the apostle's purpose, who had just said, that *not all* the Jews who did hear believed the gospel. The same *thing* is asserted by Isaiah, which the apostle now asserts; so that he could not be accused of producing a new or strange charge.

(17) *Ἀρα . . . Θεοῦ, faith then comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of God; i. e.,* the very quotation you make concedes the principle, that the gospel must first be published before men can be taxed with criminality for unbelief; for Isaiah complains of those to whom it had been *published*.—*Ἡ δὲ ἀκοή διὰ ῥήματος τοῦ Θεοῦ, i. e.,* the word of God, the gospel, must first be proclaimed before it can be heard, understood, and believed. The verse I take to be the suggestion of the objector. He means to insist by it, that many of the Jews are not culpable for unbelief, inasmuch as they have not heard the gospel, and hearing it is necessary to the believing of it.

(18) The apostle admits the correctness of the principle, viz., that faith cometh by hearing; but he denies the fact which was implied in the statement of it, viz., that there was a part of the Jewish nation who had not heard, *i. e.,* who had not enjoyed the opportunity to hear. So the sequel: *Ἀλλὰ λέγω . . . ἤκουσαν; but I reply: Have they not heard?* *Μενοῦντος, yes, verily;* compounded of *μέν, οὖν,* and *γέ.* *Μεκοῦν* asserts, and *γέ* increases the intensity of the assertion. In the *μή οὐκ* before *ἤκουσαν*, the *μή* is the sign of interrogation, and *οὐκ* simply qualifies the verb; see New Test. Gramm. § 153. 5.

Εἰς πᾶσαν . . . τὰ ῥήματα αὐτῶν, quoted from Ps. xix. 5, in the words of the Septuagint, which here follows the Hebrew. 'Ο φθόγγος αὐτῶν, in the original Psalm, means the voice or sound of the works of nature, which show or declare in all the earth that he who made them is God, and the God of glory. The apostle seems to use the words in this place simply as the vehicle of his own thoughts, as they were very convenient and appropriate. The expressions πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν and τὰ πέρατα τῆς οἰκουμένης, are common and figurative expressions to designate the idea of far and wide, what is unlimited in extent, &c. As originally employed by the Psalmist, they may be taken in their greatest latitude. As used by the apostle, they may be taken in the like latitude so far as the Jews are concerned; for it is of them, and them only, that he is here particularly speaking.

(19) Ἀλλὰ λέγω, *but I say, i. e.*, I reply again in reference to the opportunity of the Jews to gain some knowledge of the gospel.

Μὴ Ἰσραὴλ οὐκ ἔγνω; *Doth not Israel know? What*—is not said, and has been matter of much controversy. To me, however, it seems plain, that it is to be gathered from the subsequent context; if so, it is clear that the sentiment is: 'Doth not Israel know (as I have before said, verses 11, 12), that the Gentiles are to be received as well as the Jews, and the Jews to be cast off for unbelief?' The apostle now proceeds to quote passages of the Old Testament, which show that the ancient prophets have explicitly declared the same thing. Reiche construes the phrase thus: 'Has not [God] loved or acknowledged Israel?' Comp. Amos iii. 2. Hos. viii. 5. Rom. xi. 2. But I cannot regard this as congruous with the context.

Πρῶτος Μωϋσῆς λέγει, *first, Moses saith.* Πρῶτος I understand here as meaning *first in point or order of time*, like the Hebrew רִשְׁוֹן: comp. the Lex. under πρῶτος.

Ἐγὼ . . . παροργισάμενος, *I will move you to jealousy by that which is no nation, I will excite you to indignation by a foolish people; i. e.*, I will make you jealous, by receiving to favour those whom you regard as unworthy of the name of a people (ἔθνος, ἡ), viz. the Gentiles; I will render you indignant, by receiving to favour a *foolish people*, לְבָבִי. The Hebrew לְבָבִי designates one that is spiritually foolish, *i. e.*, a wicked, unbelieving person, who contemns God. "The fool (לְבָבִי) hath said in his heart: There is no God." "Fools (לְבָבִי) make a mock at sin." Consequently the epithet ἀσύνετος here designates a wicked or idolatrous people. The meaning of the whole is: 'I will receive to my favour the heathen whom you re-

gard as despicable, and who are without God and without hope in the world.' In Deut. xxxii. 21 (from which these words are quoted), God complains of the Jews, that they had apostatized from him and gone after idols, and thus provoked his jealousy and indignation. Because they had so done, he declares that he will, at some future period, provoke them, and excite their jealousy, by receiving a heathen and idolatrous people in their stead.

Whether Moses (in Deut. xxxii. 21) had in view the salvation of the Gentiles in gospel times, cannot well be determined. There is nothing in the context adapted to prove it; and I may add, nothing which forbids this supposition. Be this however as it may, it is enough for the apostle's purpose, that the same *principle* is developed in the words of Moses, which is developed by the reception of the Gentiles into the Christian church in his time. Now as the Jews were jealous and angry because of this reception, so the apostle might appeal to the declarations of Moses, as an exhibition of the very same views and sentiments which he had been teaching.

(20) Ἡσαΐας δὲ . . . λέγει, *but Isaiah comes out boldly and says*, In ἀποτολμῇ, the ἀπό augments the signification; and this is often, (although not always) the case, when prepositions are compounded with verbs.

Εὐρέθην . . . ἐπερωτῶσι, *I was found by those who sought me not, I manifested myself to those who did not inquire after me; i. e., the Gentiles, who had been accustomed to serve dumb idols, and had no knowledge of the true God, and did not seek after him, have, through the gospel, been brought near to him, and he has, in Christ, disclosed himself to those who were before in utter ignorance of him and made no inquiries for him.* The passage is quoted from Is. lxxv. 1, לֹא בִקְשָׁנִי, לֹא שְׁאַלּוּ נִכְמָצָאִי, לֹא בִקְשָׁנִי, which the Seventy have translated agreeably to the words of the apostle, but in citing these words Paul has reversed the order of the clauses. The translation is *ad sensum* only: the more literal and exact shade of meaning in the Hebrew is: *I am sought after* [viz., as an object of religious inquiry and worship] *by those who have not* [hitherto] *asked after me, I am found by those who did not seek for me.* But as the purpose of the apostle is merely to designate the general idea of the prophet, viz., that God would be worshipped, at some future time, by those who had hitherto been "strangers to the covenant of promise," and "without God in the world," so the version of the Seventy is fully adequate to his purpose.

Thus far the apostle quotes in respect to the reception of the Gentiles. There still remains an important part behind, viz., the rejection of the Jews for their unbelief; or at least their unbelief itself, which implies their consequent rejection.

(21) Πρὸς δὲ . . . ἀντιλέγοντα, *but unto Israel he saith: All the day long have I stretched out my hand to a disobedient and gainsaying people.* "Ὁλην τὴν ἡμέραν, *δίημερον*, continually, constantly, without intermission; which implies long and persevering efforts on the part of God's messengers to the Jews, and peculiar hardness of heart and blindness of mind on their part. *To stretch out the hands*, is to address by way of inviting, beckoning, beseeching, warning; comp. Prov. i. 24.—'Ἀπειθοῦντα characterizes *unbelief* in what is said by God's messengers; ἀντιλέγοντα, *contradiction*, or *gainsaying*.

Thus has the apostle shown once more, and in a way different from that which he took in chap. iv., that the Gentiles stand on an equal footing with the Jews, as to gospel privileges, and that God may, in perfect consistency with his ancient promises and declarations, cast off the Jews, when they persist in unbelief, and receive believing Gentiles as his people in their stead. The repulsive nature of this doctrine to the feelings of his proud and self-righteous countrymen, seems to be the reason why the apostle recurs to it so often, and enforces it by such repeated appeals to the Old Testament.

CHAP. XI. 1—36.

THE apostle having thus plainly asserted the rejection of the Jews, and the reception of the Gentiles into their place as the people of God, and this without having yet made particular explanations or limitations, now proceeds to suggest various considerations which might serve to correct the wrong views that his countrymen would probably entertain in regard to the declarations which he had just made. The Jew would very naturally ask (as Paul suggests in ver. 1): 'Is it true, then, that God has actually cast his people away, to whom pertained the *adoption*, and the *glory*, and the *covenant*, and the *promises*? Can this be consistent with his veracity and his faithfulness—with the numerous promises which he made to Abraham, and which he often confirmed and repeated to his posterity?'

It was natural for a Jew to ask such questions; and the apostle, anticipating them, proceeds in chapter xi. to answer them. He shows in verses 1—5, that now, as formerly in times of the greatest declension, God has still a remnant among his people who are true believers, i. e., belong to the spiritual seed of Abraham. But this remnant are, as he has already maintained in chaps. viii. ix., those whom the election of God according to his purposes of grace has made the subjects

of his mercy, and who are not saved by their own merits; while the rest are given up to their own hardness of heart and blindness of mind, even as their own Scriptures have expressly foretold, verses 6—10. Yet it will not always remain thus. The whole of the nation will, at some future day, be brought within the pale of the Christian church. Their present general unbelief is now the occasion of the gospel being preached to the Gentiles, and of the increase of the Christian church among them; so that even their rejection has been the occasion of blessings to others. How much more then is to be hoped, from their general return to God! verses 11—15.

This return must take place. The nation, from its origin, were consecrated to God, and they must yet return to him; for although some of its branches were broken off because of unbelief, and others were grafted in to supply their place, yet in due time they will be again received. The Gentiles, therefore, who have been grafted in, can have no reason to indulge in pride and boasting on account of this. They are cautioned against such a spirit, and exhorted to guard with the greatest watchfulness against unbelief, since this would occasion them also to be rejected. Nor ought they to demean themselves loftily toward the Jews, who were yet to be received back to the divine favour, and fully restored as the people of God, vers. 16—27. Although they are now enemies of the gospel, good comes to the Gentiles through this; and the promises made to their fathers of old are not forgotten, and will yet be fully carried into execution, vers. 28, 29. Although now in a state of unbelief, they will obtain mercy in the like manner as the Gentiles have obtained it who were once in the same state, vers. 30, 31. For God has showed both Gentiles and Jews, that they were included in unbelief and justly subject to the condemning sentence of the law; and he has suffered them to come into such a state, that he might display, in the more signal manner, his mercy toward them, ver. 32. The ways and judgments of God in his proceedings with Jews and Gentiles, are beyond the reach of human wisdom; they are deep and unfathomable mysteries, which can be fully searched out and known only by the Infinite Mind. We can admire and adore, but never fathom the depths thereof, vers. 33—36.

At last, then, the apostle comes fully to the conclusion, that there are mysteries in the divine proceedings relative to the reception of some and the rejection of others, which are entirely beyond the reach of human comprehension. God has reserved the reasons of such proceedings to himself, and not disclosed them to his creatures. If this be truly the case, then is there not something more in these awful mysteries, than what those admit or believe who strenuously reject the doctrine of election? On the ground which they maintain, I do not see why the mind of the apostle should be so deeply affected with the *mysterious* and *unsearchable* nature of the whole transaction. This is, indeed, a very obvious remark; but I must leave it to the reader, whether it has not an important bearing on the exegesis of chaps. viii. ix. xi., and some other parts of this epistle. I cannot help thinking that Paul had something more in his mind, than they have who read him in the manner stated—something different also from that which they admit.

(1) *Δίγω οὖν*, the words of an objector; as much as to say: 'If this be true which you affirm, then must it not follow, that God has rejected his chosen people?' *Οὖν* is very common in questions which have a reference to what had been before said.

Τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ, *his own people*, i. e., his own peculiar people, the Jews. And here the objector means by *λαὸν αὐτοῦ*, the *whole* of the nation, as the sequel, which exhibits the answer, evidently shows.

In reply to the question thus put Paul answers, that an *universal* rejection of the Jews was not meant to be affirmed by what he had said. He adduces himself as an exception to such a rejection, and

a proof that it was not meant to be asserted by him.—*Kal γὰρ ἐγὼ κ. τ. λ.*, for *I myself* or *even I*. The *καί* in this case qualifies *ἐγὼ* as an *intensive* particle, which is best rendered as above. *Ἰσραηλῆτις*, *i. e.*, a descendant of Israel. *Ἐκ πνεύματος Ἀβραάμ* is only a synonyme with the preceding expression for the purpose of amplification, or with particular reference to the same phrase which is often repeated in the Old Testament.—*Φυλῆς Βενιαμίν*, so he describes himself in Phil. iii. 5. It is merely a circumstance of particularity in description, which serves to make it more impressive.

(2) *Οὐκ . . . προέγνω*, *God hath not cast away his people whom he foreknew*, *i. e.*, whom he before determined or decided should be his people. In other words, he has not utterly rejected the Jewish people, whom he from the first ordained to be his people. See on the word *προέγνω* in chap. viii. 29, and compare ver. 29 below. To render *προέγνω* *formerly acknowledged*, does not accord with the design of the passage. The sentiment plainly is such as is developed in chap. viii. 28, by the *οὗς προέγνω κ. τ. λ.*; and the writer in his choice of language here, seems plainly to refer to the words there employed. The sentiment is, that the *οἱ κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοί* among the Jews are by no means cast off.

Ἡ οὐκ . . . ἡ γραφή, *know ye not what the Scripture says in Elijah?* *i. e.*, in that part or portion of it which is cited by the name of Elijah, because it contains his history. The division of the Scripture into chapters and verses, is a modern thing; nothing of this kind occurs in the writings of the ancient fathers. Such a division of the Hebrew Scriptures was made by Hugo de Cardinalis in the twelfth century; and of the New Testament, by the famous printer and editor, Robert Stephens. Of course, reference to the Scriptures in ancient times was in a very different way from that now practised: and was for the most part, such as we see in the verse before us. So the Rabbins cite, in the Mishna; and so the Greek authors were accustomed to cite Homer; *e. g.*, *ἐν τῷ τῶν νεῶν καταλόγῳ*, *in the catalogue of the ships*, *i. e.*, the passage which contains such a catalogue, &c.; comp. Mark xii. 26, *ἐπὶ τοῦ βύτου*, *i. e.*, in the passage which gives an account of the burning bush. The *ἦ* is the mere sign of interrogation.

Ὡς, *when*; so it often signifies. *Ἐντυγχάνει . . . κατὰ*, means *to plead against, to make intercession against*; as *ἐντυγχάνειν . . . ὑπὲρ* means *to intercede for*.

(3) *Κύριε . . . μου*, cited from 1 K. xix. 10, *ad sensum* and with

contractions; also not exactly in the order of the Hebrew text which runs thus: "And he [Elijah] said, I am very jealous for Jehovah, the God of hosts; for the children of Israel have forsaken thy covenant, they have destroyed thine altars, and killed thy prophets; and I only am left, and they seek my life to take it away." The prophet complains, in these words, of what he supposed to be the universal apostasy of Israel. Κατέσκαψαν, lit. *digged down*; for altars were usually made with stones and earth or turf, so that *digging down* characterizes the kind of effort necessary to destroy them—Τὴν ψυχὴν, *natural or animated life*; often so in the Hebrew; comp. Matt. ii. 20. *To seek one's life*, i. e., to seek to take away one's life, is a Hebraism.

(4) Χρηματισμός, *divine response*, from χρηματίζω, *to do public business, to give public responses*, &c. In the New Testament, it is applied only to the response or warning of the true God.—'Εμαυτοῖ, *Dativus commodi*, as grammarians say, viz. the person or thing for which any thing is or is done, is put in the Dative; *for myself* means for my service.—'Επτασχιλίους ἄνδρας, the number *seven* is probably employed here in the way of a *round number*, i. e., a definite instead of an indefinite number. So the Romans were wont to use *sexcenti*; and in like manner 70 and 40 are frequently used in the Scripture. So much, however, is to be understood by it here, viz. a very considerable number.

*Εκαμψαν γόνα, *bowed the knee*, a part of the religious service rendered to idols. Bowing the knee is an attitude of reverence and supplication. Baal (בַּעַל) was the name of the principal god among the Canaanites, Carthaginians, Assyrians, and Babylonians. The Phenicians called him אֲדֹנִי (*Adoni*), and the Greeks Ἀδωνίς. Τῇ Βάαλ, with the fem. article τῇ; and so also in the Sept., in Hos. ii. 8. Jer. ii. 8. xi. 13. xix. 5. Zeph. i. 4, also Tobit i. 5. To solve this singular appearance (for *Baal* generally has the masc. article), Erasmus, Beza, and Grotius, suppose that ἡ εἰκὼν is understood, so that the full expression would be τῇ εἰκόνι Βάαλ. Others (e. g., Brais, Beyer, C. Schmid) suppose that there was a female deity by the name of Baal, i. e., the moon; like יָרֵחַ and חֲמֶלֶךְ (Jer. xxxii. 35. xliv. 17, 18, 19, 25), which were symbols of the sun and moon. But the objection to this is, that in Jer. xxxii. 35, ἡ Βάαλ (fem.) is the same as ὁ Μολόχ (masc.). Others suppose that Baal was ἀνδρογύνης, a *hermaphrodite* divinity, and so might take either ὁ or ἡ; like the Latin *Deus Lunus* and *Dea Luna*; and this seems most probable, at least

the Seventy seem to have been of this opinion. Others solve it by supposing the *fem.* article to be applied in the way of contempt; just as Mohammed (Koran Sur. LIII.) speaks with contempt of the heathen Arabians, who had gods with *fem.* names; and so in Arabic, the name of an idol is *God* (in the *fem.*); and so the Rabbins call idol gods, *הֵי־אֱלֹהִים*, *gods* (*fem.*).

(5) *Οὕτως καὶ . . . γέγονεν*, in like manner, then, even at the present time, there is a remnant according to the election of grace; i. e., as in ancient times, when it appeared to the prophet Elijah as if apostasy was universal among his countrymen, and yet there was not a few sincere worshippers of the true God, although unknown to him; so at the present time, although the unbelief of the Jews appears to be nearly universal, yet God has a people among them, viz., all such as he has of his mercy chosen to everlasting life; comp. viii. 28, seq. ix. 15, 16, 23, 27. The *οὕν* here has reference to what precedes. *Οὕτως οὖν* means as much as to say: 'Such then being the case,' or 'circumstances being as I have now related.'—*καὶ* qualifies *ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ*, according to the version.—*λείμμα*, a remnant, i. e., a small number, a part which though considerable in itself is small compared with another part. So here, the number of Jewish believers, although then considerable and important, was small compared with the whole number of unbelievers. Consequently *λείμμα* may be used to designate it; comp. ix. 27.—*κατ' ἐκλογὴν χάριτος*, according to an election which is not made on the ground of merit, but of mercy. God has not chosen Jewish believers unto salvation, because their obedience first made them the objects of his choice; but he chose them because he had mercy on them; comp. the texts cited above from Rom. ix., and the commentary on them. That the apostle means fully to convey such a sentiment, is plain from the verse that follows; viz.

(6) *Εἰ δὲ . . . ἔργων*, but if it be of grace, then it is not at all of works; i. e., if God's *ἐκλογὴ*, his choosing this *λείμμα* to salvation, be gratuitous on his part, and wholly unmerited on the part of man, it follows that it is not *ἐξ ἔργων*, i. e., that it is not meritorious, it is not on account of any desert on the part of men either seen or foreseen, that he makes them the objects of his mercy.—*ἢ . . . χάρις*, otherwise grace would be no longer grace; i. e., if this were not so, then it would be improper to speak of grace in our salvation; for if men are chosen on account of any merit or desert, then grace is not

the ground of their being chosen, but *merit*; which would contradict the very idea of grace.

This must be true; for men are saved either because they have wholly obeyed the divine law, or on the ground of grace merely; *i. e.*, they are saved either because they are able to advance claims which meet the demands of the law, or else it must be on the ground of pure gratuity. Now, as all men have sinned, it is not the *first*; of course it must be the *second*. If you ask: 'May it not be partly by grace, and partly by merit?' Then our text lies directly in the way of an affirmative answer (as do many others also); and it is, moreover, a conclusive answer in the negative to this, that 'every one is cursed, who continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them;' 'the soul that sinneth shall die.'

Εἰ δὲ . . . ἔργων, *but if of works, then it is not at all of grace, otherwise work is no more work*; the mere converse of the preceding sentiment, and most probably a gloss from the margin. It is omitted in Codices A., B., C., D., E., F., G., 47, and in the Coptic, Armenian, Æthiopic, Vulgate, and Italic versions; also in Chrysostom, Theodoret, Damascenus, Jerome, and generally in the Latin Fathers, Erasmus, Grotius, Wetstein, Griesbach, Tholuck, Flatt, and others, regard it as spurious. At all events, it adds nothing to the sentiment of the passage; but is merely an echo, in another form, of the preceding sentiment.

(7) Τί οὖν; *what then, i. e.*, what is the sum and substance of that which I have been saying?—Ὁ ἐπιζητῶν . . . ἐπίρρυχτ, *that which Israel sought after, he hath not obtained*; *i. e.*, the justification which he sought to obtain by his own merit (comp. x. 3), he has not obtained. Τοῦτο is in many MSS. and copies, instead of τοῦτου; for ἐπιρρυχάτω almost always governs the Genitive in Greek, poetry only being excepted where it sometimes takes the Accusative. Still, the weight of authority in the present case is in favour of τοῦτου; and accordingly Dr. Knapp receives it into the text.

Ἦ δὲ ἐκλογή, *but the election, i. e.*, the elect, the abstract (as grammarians say) being put for the concrete, as is often the case, *e. g.*, Rom. ii. 26, 27, &c. The meaning is: 'Although the Jews, who have sought justification by their own merit, have altogether failed as to obtaining this end in this way; yet those who are called according to the gracious purpose of God (viii. 28), who are justified by his mercy through Christ Jesus, have obtained justification in a

way which others rejected; and therefore they have not failed in the accomplishment of their object.'

Οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ, *i. e.*, the unbelieving part of the Jews, those who did not belong to the *ἰχλογή*—*Ἐπαρώθησαν*, *were blinded*. The word *παρώς*, is equivalent to *τυφλός*; and the verb *παρώω* (in the active voice) means *to make blind*, but in the passive *to be blind*, *to become blind*, &c. It is applied in a secondary sense to the *mind*; and so the apostle here employs it. It indicates *state* or *condition*; but not necessarily the cause or agent by which that state or condition is produced. Thus οἱ λοιποὶ *ἑπαρώθησαν* may mean merely, that the remainder (the unbelieving part of the Jews) were in a state of blindness. In itself, also, it is capable of designating the idea, that *they were made blind* by the agency of another; and in this case, if this be the idea, the implication would be that the agency was God's. If there be difficulty in admitting this sentiment, there is no more than is contained in chap. ix. 17, 18; and I must refer the reader to what is said on those verses, in order to avoid repetition here. To all those who contend vehemently against such an exegesis, and regard it as dishonourable and reproachful to God, and as utterly unfounded, I can only say: "Tell us ingenuously, whether the gloss you put on ix. 17, 18, is not an *explaining away* of the text, rather than an *explanation* of it? Can the conclusion be avoided, by any candid philologist, that the text does there assert, that in some sense or other the agency of God is concerned with the *hardening* of sinners? In what sense? is a very serious and very important question, and one which I have endeavoured there to answer in a Scriptural manner. And in the case now before us, if *ἑπαρώθησαν* merely designates *state* or *condition* (as Bretschneider, Wahl, Tholuck, Flatt, and many others maintain), then to what purpose, I would ask, is the quotation in the next three following verses? Do these also designate no *agent*? If you say: 'These are only examples for illustration, but not predictions,' I grant it. But then, how will these examples illustrate the case before the writer, unless they exhibit a *principle* which is the same as that avowed by the writer? And can verse 8 be construed without the supposition that an *agent* is designated who is in some way or other concerned with the *δραλμοὺς τοῦ μὴ βλείπειν*, *i. e.*, with the *πώρωσις* of Israel? This is impossible, unless we do away by violence the most obvious sense of the apostle's words. The question whether *some* agency on the part of God is asserted to be concerned with all this, seems to be one which cannot receive a

negative answer, *salvo textû et salvâ fide bonâ*. But the question whether such an agency is concerned as makes God the *proper* author of men's moral blindness and sins, or whether men are free agents and altogether accountable for their own actions, is a very different one, and about which the Bible leaves us no room to doubt : see James i. 13, 14.

(8) Καθὼς γίγνεται does not of necessity mean, that what follows is a *prediction* in the appropriate sense of the word. It is a clear case that nothing can be decided from the *formula* of quotation; for very different formulas precede one and the same text, quoted for one and the same purpose. Here I take the force of καθὼς to fall upon *sameness of principle*, in the two cases which are brought into the comparison; i. e., as in ancient times God declares respecting Israel (Is. xxix. 10. Deut. xxix. 4), that he gives them the spirit of slumber, blind eyes, and deaf ears; so now, the same thing is true respecting unbelievers among the Jews; for *they are blinded*, ἐπαρώθησαν.

Ἔδωκεν . . . κατανύξας, *God hath given them a slumbering spirit or the spirit of deep sleep*, תרדמה. The original Hebrew runs thus, כִּי נָסַף עֲלֵיכֶם יְהוָה רוּחַ תְּרִדָּה; which the Seventy have rendered thus: Ὅτι πεποίηκεν ὑμᾶς Κύριος πνεύματι κατανύξας. But the apostle in rendering נָסַף by ἔδωκε, has translated *ad sensum* not *ad verbum*. The Hebrew designates the specific idea of *pouring out* on the hardened Jews the spirit of profound sleep; while Paul dropping the particular image which the Hebrew presents, retains only the generic idea of *communicating* such a spirit to them. It is plain, then, that in this case, as in many others, the apostle makes his own translation *de novo* from the Hebrew.

Ὁφθαλμοὺς . . . ἡμέρας, *eyes that see not and ears that hear not, unto this day*. The original Hebrew in Deut. xxix. 4 runs thus: "For Jehovah hath not given you a heart to understand, nor eyes to see, nor ears to hear, unto this day." If this be the passage which Paul had in his mind, he quotes merely *ad sensum*. The Hebrew declares, that 'God has *not* given Israel seeing eyes and hearing ears; the apostle says, that 'he has given them eyes that see not, and ears that hear not;' the passage in Hebrew is in the negative form as to the verb, and in the affirmative as to the rest of the sentence; while Paul's declaration is in the affirmative form as to the verb, and negative as to the rest of the sentence. It remains, then, in order to make out a quotation *ad sensum*, merely to inquire, whether it is in substance the same thing to say that 'God has not

given seeing eyes and hearing ears,' as it is to say that 'God has given eyes that see not and ears that hear not.' The latter sounds to our ear as if it indicated more *active* interposition on the part of God; but not so to the biblical writers, who, beyond all reasonable doubt, regarded these expressions as equivalent. It would be easy to prove this from a multitude of passages which assert *agency* on the part of God, when at the very same time the wicked (to whom this agency has respect) are represented as the cause of their own ruin, by their own voluntary sins. Comp. what is said in chap. ix. 17, 18, above.

Dr Knapp (in his New Testament), and some other critics, suppose that Paul has quoted ὀφθαλμοὺς κ. τ. λ. from Is. vi. 10, and that ἕως τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας belongs not to the *quotation*, but contains the apostle's own words; and so Dr Knapp has marked it in his Testament, placing the closing member of the parenthesis which includes the quotation, after μὴ ἀκούειν, thus joining ἕως τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας with οἱ λαοὶ ἐπωρώθησαν. But this attributes an idiom to Paul, which he seems to have made a very unfrequent use of. ἕως τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας belongs to the Old Testament, to writers who chronicled earlier events and spoke of earlier times, which they occasionally compared with present events and times. Moses could well make use of the expression, in Deut. xxix. 4; Paul could use it, for he has once employed it (2 Cor. iii. 15 ἕως σήμερον), where it is exactly the expression which he there needed. But it is difficult to make it probable that these words are his in Rom. xi. 8. In this view of the case Reiche concurs.

(9) Καὶ Δαυὶδ λέγει, *David also says; i. e.*, nor are these the only passages of Scripture which speak the same sentiment, or develope the same principle. David, your most renowned king, and the most favourite of all your sacred poets, also utters sentiments still more severe.

Γενθήτω . . . αὐτοῖς, *let their table be a snare to take them, and an occasion of falling, and a recompense to them, i. e.*, let their season of enjoyment and refreshment, when they expect quietude and pleasure, and feel themselves to be safe, prove to be a season of chastisement and of danger and of righteous retribution. The quotation is from Ps. lxi. 23 (22), but not *ad verbum* from either the Hebrew or the Septuagint. The Hebrew, according to its present vowels, runs thus: "Let their table before them be a snare; yea, a gin to those who feel themselves to be secure." The Septuagint (Ps. lxi.

22) has ἡ τράπεζα αὐτῶν ἐνώπιον αὐτῶν εἰς παγίδα, καὶ εἰς ἀνταπόδοσιν καὶ εἰς σκάνδαλον; so that the apostle has somewhat changed the order, and also exchanged some of the words for others (putting ἀνταπόδομα for ἀνταπόδοσιν), and left out ἐνώπιον αὐτῶν. In short, he has plainly made a version of his own, in which he has inserted εἰς θήραν, an addition of his own which seems designed to give the sense of εἰς παγίδα; for εἰς θήραν means *that they may be taken* or *that they may be destroyed*, as this would follow their being taken. As to εἰς ἀνταπόδομα (Sept. εἰς ἀνταπόδοσιν), it is clear that the apostle and the Seventy read the present Hebrew (מִכְלָל) with different vowels from those now employed, i. e., they read it מִכְלָל or מִכְלָל, for a recompense. To this rendering and pointing no good objection can be made, as the Hebrew is clearly capable of it. The present Hebrew conveys a different sense.

Εἰς σκάνδαλον, שְׂרִיטָה, for a net or gin. But the Seventy have frequently rendered this word by σκάνδαλον, which means any thing whereby another stumbles and falls to his harm. The generic idea of שְׂרִיטָה is retained in σκάνδαλον.

(10) Σκοτιθήτωσαν . . . σὺγκραμψον, let their eyes be darkened so that they cannot see, and their back always be bowed down; i. e. let them be in a defenceless and helpless state, bowed down with troubles and infirmities, and groping in the darkness of affliction. Instead of τὸν νῶτον αὐτῶν διαπαντὸς σὺγκραμψον (Paul and the Septuagint), the Hebrew is הִקְמִיד הִקְמִיד הִתְנַחֵם, make thou their loins continually to shake. Here again the apostle has taken the passage *ad sensum*. This expression, in Hebrew, designates the tossing of the body hither and thither on account of distress. In the like sense is *bowing down the back always* to be taken. It presents the image of one bowed down with anguish of spirit or of bodily pain.

These repeated instances show that the apostle was more solicitous about the general sense and object of the Old Testament passages than he was about the costume or diction of them; a principle which he, guided as he was, was not in danger of abusing; one also which may be used to good purpose by us, in sacred criticism, but which needs to be very closely watched in order to guard it against abuse.

As to the general sentiment of this passage from Ps. lxi. 23, 24, it is undoubtedly to be classed with the somewhat numerous passages in the Psalms which contain the like imprecations. Great difficulty is found in such passages by many minds, inasmuch as they seem to be so opposed to the tenor of those passages in the New Testament

which require us "to love our enemies, to bless those who curse us, to pray for those who despitefully use and persecute us." If indeed these passages in the Psalms are to be viewed as the mere utterance of *private* and *personal* wishes and feelings, it would be utterly impossible to reconcile them with the spirit of the gospel. But is this so? Is David, for example, when he utters such things, to be viewed as doing it merely in the way of giving utterance to his own private personal wishes? It seems to me not; but David, as king and magistrate, might wish the punishment of the seditious and rebellious; nay, it would be an imperious duty for him to punish them. Now was it lawful for him to pray that the same thing might be done, which it was his duty to do? Could he not express desires of this nature without the spirit of *revenge*? Cannot we wish the robber and the assassin to be apprehended and punished, yea with capital punishment, and this without being actuated by a spirit of vengeance and a thirst for blood? I trust such wishes are not only consistent with benevolence, but prompted by it. If so, then it may be true that David and other Psalmists had the like views and feelings. And if this *may be* so, is it not probable that it was so? Is not the general character and spirit of their writings a pledge for this?

But I cannot here pursue this subject; which needs more illustration than has yet been given to it. It is enough to say, at present, that the apostle, in making this quotation, need not be supposed to intend any thing more, than to produce an instance from the Psalms where the same *principle* is developed as is contained in the assertions which he had made; *i. e.*, the ancient Scriptures speak of a part of Israel as blind and deaf, as in deep distress and under heavy punishment because of their unbelief and disobedience. What happened in ancient times, may take place again; it has in fact happened at the present time.

(11) Λέγω οὖν . . . πέσωσι; *I say, then, have they stumbled so as to fall down?* Language of the objector, who inquires with solicitude, whether such passages as Paul has quoted can be meant to designate the final casting off of the Jews. Οὖν refers to what had been said in the preceding context. The occasion for the *form* of the question *μὴ ἔπταισαν κ. τ. λ.*, is given by the use of the word *σκόνη* in the quotation above. The design of the objector plainly is, to inquire whether the apostle means to hold forth the doctrine, that Israel is now to be *finally* and *always* cast off on account of their unbelief.—

ἵνα πέσωσι, *so that they may fall down, i. e.,* have the Jews stumbled so that there is no recovery for them, so that they must fall entirely down? The question being asked by μή, implies that he who puts it expects an answer in the negative.

Μὴ γίνωσθε, *not at all; i. e.,* you must not understand me as at all maintaining their *final* and *utter* rejection and ruin. Fearful as their doom is, there are many circumstances respecting it which are worthy of the highest consideration. For in fact this very lapse of theirs, *i. e.,* their unbelief and rejection of the gospel, has been the direct occasion of its being preached to the Gentiles; comp. Matt. xxi. 43. viii. 11, 12. xxii. 1—14.—Παραπτώματι, *lapse, offence, stumbling*, in a moral sense.—Σωτηρία, the blessings of the gospel, the salvation which it proffers.

Εἰς τὸ παραζηλῶσαι αὐτούς, *to provoke them to jealousy, i. e.,* to excite the Jews to be jealous on account of the privileges and favours bestowed on the Gentiles through their belief, and to seek after the same blessings for themselves.

(12) Εἰ δὲ . . . ἔθνον, *now if their lapse has been the riches of the world, and their degradation the riches of the Gentiles.* Δί “orationi continuandæ inservit.”—Πλοῦτος κόσμου, *if their lapse has been the occasion of spiritual riches to the world, i. e., of spiritual blessings in abundance.*—Ἡττημα αὐτῶν, *their diminution, i. e., their degradation, rejection, punishment, has occasioned abundance of spiritual blessings to the Gentiles.*

Πόσῳ μᾶλλον . . . αὐτῶν, *how much more their fulness!* Πλήρωμα, is here the antithesis of ἡττημα; and of course it signifies restoration to favour, a copiousness of blessings and good things, such as would follow a restoration. The sentiment of the whole is: ‘If now the degradation and punishment of the Jews for their unbelief has been the occasion of rich and numerous blessings to the Gentiles, then surely their restoration to favour, their full reception, will redound still more to the spiritual riches of the world.’

Tholuck understands ἡττημα and πλήρωμα in a moral sense, *i. e.,* their depraved and criminal state, and their restored and justified state. I prefer the more simple and obvious construction given above; comp. verse 15, from which it is plain that ἡττημα here is equivalent to ἀποβολή, *casting off*, and πλήρωμα (the antithesis of ἡττημα) is the same as πρόσληψις, *the reception to favour.*

(13) Ἔμῃ γὰρ εἰπεί, *for I say this to you Gentiles.* γὰρ makes some difficulty here; and it is omitted in A., B., several Codices

minusc., Syr., Copt., Damasc., which supply *δέ*, and thus make the sense facile. But *γὰρ* is admissible. The simplest connection of it seems to be an implied sentiment, viz., ‘the *πλήρωμα* of the Jews will yet be accomplished,—for I speak to you Gentiles in such a way that I may stir up the Jews and contribute to their salvation.’ In this case *λίγω* is connected in sense with *εἰπὼς* in verse 14, and the intervening matter is considered as in a parenthesis. This is not the usual mode of exegesis; but it seems to me the more easy and natural one. The apostle is very careful, as is evident from this, while he fully represents the unbelief and *ἀποβολή* of the Jews, not to give occasion to boasting or exultation on the part of the Gentiles.

Ἐφ’ ὅσον μὲν . . . δοξάζω, *inasmuch as I am indeed an apostle of the Gentiles, I do honour to my office.* *Μὲν simplex*, as the lexicons say, *i. e.*, standing alone, and without *δέ* or some equivalent particle following it as usual. But it is omitted in D. E. F. G. 80. al. 5. Clar. Boern., Ambrosiaster; probably because no *δέ* follows. Where *μὲν* is *simplex*, as here, it answers to the Latin *quidem*, *equidem*, *videlicet*; but oftentimes cannot be rendered at all into English, nor conveniently into Latin. It generally stands, in this way, in a clause of *explanation*, and may be called *μὲν explicantis*; but it also appears plainly to have an affirmative and concessive force. The supposition of the writer who thus employs it is, that what he says will of course be conceded. *Διακονίαν* is the *office of the ministry*, *i. e.*, the apostolic office of Paul.—*Δοξάζω*, *magni æstimo*, *honoro*, *honore afficio*.

(14) *Εἰπὼς . . . ἐξ αὐτῶν*, *if by any means I may excite to jealousy some of my kinsmen after the flesh, and save some of them.* *Εἰπὼς*, *si fieri potest*, *si quâ ratione*.—*Τὴν σάρκα*, *my flesh*, *i. e.*, my relatives, *οἱ συγγενεῖς κατὰ σάρκα*, comp. Rom. ix. 3. So the Hebrew *בשר* often means; *e. g.*, Gen. xxix. 14. Judg. ix. 2. 2 Sam. v. 1. Gen. xxxvii. 27. Is. lviii. 7. ‘The meaning of the apostle in the whole passage is: ‘I extol the blessings of you Gentiles, not to lift you up with pride, but in order to excite the attention of the Jews to the distinguished favours which you enjoy, and which they have lost by their unbelief.’

(15) *Εἰ γὰρ . . . ἐκ νεκρῶν*; *for if the casting away of them be the reconciliation of the world, what shall the reception of them be but life from the dead?* *i. e.*, if the rejection of the Jews on account of their unbelief, has been the occasion of reconciling many of the Gentile world to God, what shall the reception of them back to the divine favour be, but as it were a general [spiritual] resurrection? *Γὰρ*

marks the *resuming* of what was dropped at verse 12 for the sake of further explanation. So Reiche.—*Καταλλαγή* is applied to the conciliation of the heathen to God, who by their wicked works had before been *enemies* to him and *strangers* to the covenant of his promise.—*Κόσμου* here, as often, stands for the heathen Gentile world.—*Πρόσληψις* is *reception to favour*, i. e., admission to the family or church of Christ.

Ζωή ἐκ νεκρῶν some (most of the ancient commentators and some recent ones) have understood *literally*, i. e., as indicating the resurrection of the body; meaning thereby, that when the Jews should be brought into the Christian church as a body, the end of time would soon follow. But the time of the reign of Christ on earth, as described in the Apocalypse, and the interval of wickedness that will succeed, seem to forbid this exegesis; it has no *usus loquendi* in its favour, for the proper phrase would be *ἀνάστασις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν*. It is true that we have *ζῶντες ἐκ νεκρῶν* in Rom. vi. 13; but then it is plainly figurative, i. e., it signifies a moral resurrection. I must regard *ζωή ἐκ νεκρῶν*, then, as a tropical expression, used in a kind of proverbial way, or as a figure of speech designating something great, wonderful, surprising, like to what a general resurrection of the dead would be. So Turretin: *Quid erit admissio eorum, nisi quoddam genus resurrectionis*; altogether to the purpose. So the Arabians speak proverbially of great agitations and changes, as of a *resurrection*. Tholuck has produced several examples, in his commentary on this passage. But what is more to the point still is, that in Ezek. xxxvii. 1—14, we have the moral renovation of the Jews designated at full length, by the similitude of a *resurrection*. It seems altogether probable, that the apostle had this passage in his mind; so that *ζωή ἐκ νεκρῶν* here is equivalent to saying: 'What shall such a *πρόσληψις* of the Jews be, but a general resurrection of them, such as Ezekiel has described, i. e., a great, general, and wonderful conversion of them to Christianity!'

(16) *Εἰ δὲ . . . φέραμα, if, moreover, the first fruits were holy, so shall the mass be.*—*Ἀπαρχή*, like the Hebrew ראשית, means the *firstling* or *first-fruits* of any kind, which were offered to God. The Hebrews called the *firstlings* of fruit and grain, in their natural state ראשית בכורים; the *firstlings* of grain, &c., in a *prepared* state, ראשית תרומות. But the particular name given to the firstlings of *dough* or *kneaded meal*, was ראשית עיסת, Num. xv. 20, where the Septuagint renders, ἀπαρχὴ φεράματος; which is the same expression

as occurs in the passage before us, *φεράματος* being implied after *ἀπαρχή*. The comparison here lies between the small part of the mass of dough, which was taken as the *תבואת תשע* and offered up to God, and the greater part or mass of it which was left for the use of him who made the offering. After the *תשע* was offered, the whole mass became *sanctified* to lawful use, *i. e.*, was set apart for this purpose and consecrated to it. In like manner, the apostle would here say, is the whole mass of the Jewish nation yet to be set apart for God and consecrated to him. The *ἀπαρχή* of this nation, *i. e.*, the ancient patriarchs and fathers of it (comp. verse 28), were set apart for God in a peculiar manner; and consequently the *mass* of their descendants are yet to be consecrated to him. The whole is *illustration*, however, rather than argument.

Καὶ ἡ . . . οἱ κλάδοι, and if the root is holy, so are the branches. The same idea is here expressed as in the former clause. A *root* bears some such proportion to the *branches* of a tree, as the *first-fruits* did to the whole *mass* of bread. So here, the root represents the fathers (verse 28), and the *κλάδοι* their descendants.—The word *ἅγιος* in both cases means *consecrated to God, devoted to God, set apart for God, or set apart, consecrated*, viz. for the service of God. But it should be noted, that the apostle does not design to say, that the *φέραμα* and the *κλάδοι* are holy, *i. e.*, that they were so when he was writing. He predicts only that they *will be* so at some future period.

(17) *Εἰ δὲ . . . ἐξεκλάσθησαν*, but if some of the branches were broken off; *i. e.*, if now some of the natural descendants of the ancient fathers have been cast off, because of unbelief (verse 20). *Δὲ* may be construed here as *continuative, jam, German nun*; but the *distinctive* sense seems to be the more facile one.

Σὺ δὲ . . . ἰγύνου, and thou, being a wild olive, wert grafted in their stead, and made partaker of the root and fatness of the olive. The *ἀγρίλαιος*, it is said, was often grafted into the fruitful one when it began to decay, and thus not only brought forth fruit but caused the decaying olive to revive and flourish. This fact is denied by Glöckler and Reiche, but it is substantiated by Columella (*de Re Rust.* V. 9) and Palladius (*de Insit.* XIV. 53), and also by several modern travellers. According to the usual course of nature among us, the fruit will be according to the original nature of the *graft*, and not according to the stock. How far this is actually the case in respect to *olive-trees*, seems not to be yet satisfactorily made out

Be the fact however as it may, it will not change the meaning of the apostle's supposition. The image which he here employs is a very vivid one. The Gentiles had been grafted in upon the Jewish Church, and had caused this decayed tree to revive and flourish. But still the apostle means to hold in check any exultation of the Gentiles on account of this. He reminds them, that after all they are not the *stock* but only *grafts*; that the root and fatness of the good olive had been transferred to them, only because they have been grafted into it. 'Εν αὐτοῖς seems to be used in a *local* way, viz. *in the place of them*.

All this shows, moreover, that in the apostle's view, there has in reality been but one church; the ancient Jewish one being only the foundation, the Christian one the superstructure and completion of the building; a sentiment which accords throughout with the representations in the epistle to the Hebrews, where only a change in rites and forms is argued, not a change of the spiritual and essential nature of the church.

(18) Μὴ κατακαυχῶ τῶν κλάδων, *exult not over the branches; i. e., exult not that the Jewish branches have been broken off, and that thou hast been engrafted in their stead. Κατακαυχάομαι means to exult in one's own advantages or pre-eminence, in such a manner as to look down with contempt on others who do not possess them.*

Εἰ δὲ κατακαυχᾷσαι . . . σί, *but if thou dost exult, thou dost not support the root, but the root thee: i. e., if thou art so inconsiderate and wanting in humility as to exult, there is no ground for such exultation; for after all, the Jewish church is the stock on which the Christian has been engrafted: it is the root from which the tree with its branches have sprung; and as thou art only a branch, thou canst not boast as if thou wert the root.*

(19) Ἐπεὶ οὖν . . . ἵκεν τρισθῶ, *thou wilt say then: The branches were broken off, that I might be grafted in: i. e., perhaps thou wilt reply: 'There is at least some ground for exultation, because the branches were broken off in order to make room for me to be grafted in; which proves that I was considered as of more importance than the branches.—Κλάδοι has the article οἱ in many copies; but A., C., E., 3., 7., 37., 46., 47., 54., Chrysostom, and Damascenus omit it; and so Dr. Knapp. If inserted, it would designate the specific branches before mentioned; if omitted, then κλάδοι will designate branches, some branches, in an indefinite way.*

(20) Καλῶς . . . ἴστηκα, *be it so: they were broken off by reason*

of unbelief, and thou retainest thy standing by faith: *i. e.*, be it as thou hast said, viz., that the branches were broken off so that thou mightest be grafted in, yet the original ground or moving cause of their being broken off was the unbelief of the Jews; and thou retainest thy present condition only on the ground of faith or belief in Christ. Shouldest thou deny him, as the Jews have done, thou wouldest also be broken off in like manner.—*Καλῶς bene*, approves of the sentiment which had just been uttered in some respect or other, but it does not necessarily approve of it in the full extent in which the speaker himself might have done. Here *καλῶς* concedes that the branches were broken off so that the wild olive might be grafted in, *i. e.*, one object in breaking them off was to graft in new ones; but it does not concede that the real ground or reason of their being broken off, was for the sake merely of grafting in new ones; for the sequel shows that *ἀπιστία* was the ground of this. While the apostle concedes thus much, however, to the Gentile, he at the same time reminds him, that he retains his present place and standing on the very same condition as that on which the Jews held theirs, viz., on condition of faith or belief, *ὃ δὲ τῇ πίστει ἱστηκας*. In regard to *ἱστηκας*, the Perfect of *ἵστημι*, it is the only tense which has a *neuter* sense, viz., *to stand*, the other tenses being used actively, viz., *to establish, constitute, set up, &c.*; and consequently the Perfect is used in the sense of all the tenses that are needed to convey the *neuter* sense of the active voice.

Μὴ . . . φοβεῖσθαι, *be not high-minded, but fear; i. e.*, carry yourself not haughtily as it respects the Jews who have been broken off; or rather, do not think too highly of your elevation to favour, indulge in no airs of superiority on account of this, but demean yourself as a humble believer, and one who has need to be continually on his guard, and to fear lest he may fall through unbelief and be broken off.

(21) *Εἰ γὰρ . . . φείσῃται, for if God did not spare the natural branches, then [fear] lest he will not spare thee; i. e.*, if God did not refrain from rejecting the Jews, when they became unbelievers, then surely he will not refrain from rejecting thee, in the like circumstances; or in other words, if the natural branches were not spared, how shall those which are not the natural ones find favour? The *γὰρ* in this case introduces a cause or reason why the Gentile should fear.—*Κατὰ φύσιν* means the branches which naturally belonged to the original stock, *i. e.*, the Jews, the natural descendants of the patriarchs

to whom the promises of God were made. Before *μήπως* the verb *φοβοῦ* is of course to be understood.—Instead of *φείσεται* some copies read *φείσεται* (Subj.); and after verbs of *fearing* (for *φοβοῦ* is here implied) the Subj. is the usual mood. It is also the usual mood after the particle *μή*. But in cases where it is supposed a thing actually exists or will exist, the Indic. mood is employed to indicate this. Here evidently the apostle believes that God would not spare Gentile unbelievers; and so the Indic. is the preferable mood; see N. Test. Gramm. § 152. 4. Note 1.

(22) Ἰδὲ οὖν . . . Θεοῦ, *behold, then, the kindness and the severity of God; i. e., consider, on the one hand, the distinguished kindness which God has manifested toward thee who believest; and on the other, the strict regard to justice and truth which he exhibits, in the punishment of the unbelieving Jews. So the sequel of the verse; ἐπὶ μὲν . . . ἐκκοπήσῃ, severity toward those who have fallen away; but kindness toward thee, provided thou dost maintain a state of integrity; otherwise even thou shalt be cut off.* Ἐὰν ἐπιμείνης τῇ χρηστότητι may be rendered, *if thou dost continue in a state of favour; so Tholuck and others; and so in the translation. But we may attach an intransitive sense to χρηστότητι; for the phrase may be taken as an antithesis to ἐπιμείνωσι τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ in the following verse, so that χρηστότης may here designate the state or qualification of the individual concerned, and not the goodness of God toward him. That χρηστότης may be used to designate probity, uprightness, ΠΡΥΣ, is plain from the Septuagint, Ps. xiii. 1, 3 (xiv. 1, 3). xxxvi. 3. cxviii. 66 (cxix. 66).* The former sense, however, is to be preferred.

(23) The present rejection of the unbelieving Jews is by no means final and exclusive. Καὶ ἐκεῖνοι δὲ . . . αὐτοὺς, *and they also, unless they persevere in unbelief, shall be grafted in; for God is able again to graft them in.* That is: 'Inasmuch as unbelief was the ground of their rejection, so, when they shall abandon this and become believers, they will be again received to favour; for God is able to bring them back to his favour.' The apostle means to say, that God has not so cast away the Jews as to shut them out of all access to the kingdom of heaven, or utterly to reject them; but that he has left a way open in which they may return to his favour, and he may receive them again. He speaks here only of what can be done; but in ver. 24 seq., he speaks of what *will* be done.—Καὶ ἐκεῖνοι δὲ, *and they also; or, if any one prefers, but even they.*

(24) That the Jews *will* be again received to favour, the apostle

now proceeds to show. *Εἰ γὰρ . . . καλλιέλαιον, for if thou wert cut off from the wild olive which was naturally wild, and wert grafted into the good olive which was contrary to thy nature; i. e., if thou wert introduced into a state of favour with God, from a state of enmity which was in all respects foreign to a state of favour.—Πόσῳ μᾶλλον . . . ἰλαίῃ, how much more shall the natural [branches] be grafted into their own olive?* Argumentum a minori ad majus; viz., if God had mercy on Gentiles, who were out-casts from his favour and strangers to the covenant of his promise, shall he not have mercy on the people whom he has always distinguished as being peculiarly his own, by the bestowment of many important privileges and advantages upon them? Comp. Rom. ix. 1—5.—The γάρ in this verse introduces a sentiment co-ordinate with that which follows γάρ in the preceding verse.

(25) The apostle now proceeds more directly to assert the future reception of the Jews. *Οὐ γὰρ . . . τοῦτο, for I would not have you ignorant, brethren, of this mystery. Γάρ confirmantis, i. e., prefixed to a clause which is designed further to illustrate and confirm the assertion in ver. 24, viz., that the Jews would again be grafted in. The form of expression, I would not have you ignorant, is a μείωσις, i. e., a negative form of expression designed to convey a positive idea, viz., I am desirous that you should know. Μυστήριον denotes any thing which is hidden, concealed, unknown. The fact that the Jews would be converted, must have been unknown to human wisdom. It was against all appearances and probabilities at that time.*

** ἵνα μὴ . . . φρόνημοι, lest ye should be wise in your own conceit; i. e., lest you should be puffed up with a view of your own importance I am going to tell you more plainly still, that you are not the exclusive objects of God's favour. * Ὅτι πῶρος . . . εἰσέλθῃ, that blindness has come upon Israel in part, until the fulness of the Gentiles shall come in. As to πῶρος, comp. verses 8, 10 above; comp. also 1 Thess. ii. 15, 16.—' Ἀπὸ μέρους is a qualifying expression to be joined with τῷ Ἰσραὴλ γέγονεν, which saves the proposition from being a universal one; comp. verses 1—5 above. Paul means to say, that 'Israel is indeed in part blinded, and will continue to be so, until, &c.,' without designating what proportion of them continues in unbelief. It is a softened mode of expression, or (as rhetoricians say) *per charientismum*, i. e., κατὰ χάριν.*

** Ἀχρεὶς οὗ, &c. τ. λ. The πληθῆσμα τῶν ἔθνων, I understand as meaning great multitudes or a great multitude, an abundance; comp. John*

i. 16. Rom. xv. 29. Col. ii. 9. It cannot be denied that πληρωμα sometimes means *fulfilling, completion, completing*, i. q., πληρωσις; e. g., Rom. xiii. 10, applied to the *law*; Gal. iv. 4. Eph. i. 10, applied to *time*. But such a meaning would hardly be a congruous one, in the present instance. The *fulfilling* of a *law*, or of a limited *time*, is an easy and obvious expression, because there is an obvious limit to which the *filling up* or *fulfilling* is to extend; but what is this limit in πληρωμα τῶν ἔθνων? As it would be difficult to answer this question, so it seems altogether more facile and congruous, to take πληρωμα in the sense of *copia, an abundance, great numbers, multitudes*. How great this number or abundance must be, the apostle does not say; much less does he say (as some have argued), that *all* the Gentiles must first be converted to Christianity, before the Jews can be brought into the pale of the church. Critics are not wanting, who strenuously contend for the meaning of *totality* in this case, and who aver that πληρωμα can mean nothing less. So Reiche. But the usus loquendi of the word will not support this allegation. The subject must therefore remain as Paul has left it, i. e., indefinite as to the extent of Gentile conversions before the time when the Jews will return. Of course Christians are not debarred, by this view, from hope in labouring and praying for the Jews at the present period, although as yet but comparatively a small part of the Gentiles have been converted to the Christian faith. It is true, even now, that there is a *great multitude* of Gentile converts. May we not hope that the time is near at hand, when there will be a πληρωμα of them?

(26) Καὶ οὕτω . . . σωθῆσονται, and so all Israel shall be saved; i. e., when the πληρωμα of the Gentiles shall have been joined to the Lord, then his ancient covenant people shall also be reclaimed. Καὶ οὕτω means and so, i. e., when it shall be so that the πληρωμα of the Gentiles shall be brought in, then, &c. That καὶ οὕτω, may be used substantially in the same way as καὶ τότε (and then), see Acts vii. 8. xvii. 33. xx. 11. xxviii. 14—Πᾶς here means *all*, in opposition to the ἀπὸ μέρους of the preceding verse. But whether this means strictly *every individual*, it would be difficult indeed to determine.

Ἡξει ἐκ . . . Ἰακώβ, a deliverer shall come from Zion, and turn away ungodliness from Jacob. This is apparently a citation from Is. lix. 20. where the Hebrew runs thus: "A deliverer for Zion shall come, and for those who forsake ungodliness in Jacob." The Septuagint reads ἦκεν Σιών, instead of ἐκ Σιών; but in other respects it conforms to the quotation of the apostle. We can only say of the

apostle's quotation, that it gives the *general* sense of the passage, viz., it conveys the idea that deliverance for Zion is to be accomplished, and that penitents of the house of Jacob are to be saved. It is a very striking instance of free quotation as to the *general* sense of a passage, while the *particular* costume of it is disregarded. Whether Isaiah, in lix. 20, had respect to the salvation of gospel times, has been called in question. But the context seems to me very clearly to indicate this. And even if he had respect to temporal deliverance, there can be no difficulty in the apostle's using his words as the vehicle of conveying his own thoughts, with regard to spiritual deliverance.

(27) *Kai αὕτη . . . διαθήκη, and this is my covenant with them.* This is generally supposed to come from the next succeeding verse in Isaiah, viz., lix. 21, as it agrees verbatim with the Septuagint there. But here the question stops, according to this supposition, and the next succeeding clause, ὅταν ἀφείλωμαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν, is taken from Is. xxvii. 9, where the words stand in the midst of a verse which has relation to the punishment of the Jews, and their consequent moral reformation. I should therefore prefer the supposition, that the apostle here quotes and abridges, Jer. xxxi. 33, 34 (the same passage which is quoted at length in Heb. viii. 8—12). There the words αὕτη ἡ διαθήκη μου occur in verse 33; and in verse 34, Jehovah is represented as saying: Πλεως ἴσομαι ταῖς ἀδικίαις αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν αὐτῶν οὐ μνησθῶ ἔτι; so that nothing is easier than to suppose that the apostle quotes *ad sensum* these last passages, when he says ἀφείλωμαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν. There is this advantage also in this last supposition, viz., that the whole passage in Jeremiah most evidently refers to a new dispensation, to gospel-times; which would be altogether appropriate to the apostle's purpose, for the very point he is labouring to establish, is, that there will be a general conversion of the Jews to the Christian religion.

(28) While the apostle admits that the Jews, the once beloved people of God, have now become alienated and his enemies, he still maintains that this evil, exceedingly great in itself, has been overruled for the accomplishment of very important purposes in respect to the salvation of the Gentiles. Κατὰ μὲν . . . ὑμᾶς, *in respect to the gospel, they have become enemies on your account; i. e.,* they have become ἐχθροὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, have apostatized from him, or have been rejected by him, and are no longer treated as his friends. That Θεοῦ is implied after ἐχθροί, (and not εὐαγγελίου, nor μου as Theodoret,

Luther, Grotius, Cameron, Baumgarten, and others, have supposed), is clear, by comparing with ἐχθροί its antithesis ἀγαπῆται; for in respect to this latter word, it is clear that Θεοῦ is implied after it. It follows, therefore, that the ellipsis to ἐχθροί must be supplied in the same way.

Δι' ὑμᾶς, on your account, i. e., to your advantage. In other words, the rejection of the gospel by the Jews has been the occasion of its being more widely diffused among the Gentiles; so that, in this respect, the loss of the Jews has been the gain of the Gentiles.

Κατὰ δὲ . . . πατέρας, but in respect to the election, they are beloved for their fathers' sake; i. e., in so far as God chooses men to salvation κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν αὐτοῦ (viii. 28) and without being moved thereto by any merit on their part (xi. 5, 6), he will have special regard to the Jews, because of the many and precious promises which he made to their fathers. How Tholuck can find here only an *election to external privileges*, I am unable to see. Is the question, then, which the apostle is here discussing, one which concerns the *external* privileges of Christianity merely; or does it go deep to the very foundation of the whole, viz., to the *spiritual* blessings of the gospel? It does seem to me impossible to doubt here what the answer must be, unless one is led to do so by other considerations than those of simple exegesis.

The apostle appears plainly to aver, that although God has mercy on whom he will have mercy (ix. 18); and although men do not become the heirs of eternal life by any merits of their own, but merely by the good pleasure of his grace (xi. 5, 6); yet in bestowing that grace, he may have regard to his promises made in ancient days to the distinguished patriarchs of the Jewish nation; he may have regard to his original design that the seed of Abraham by faith, and the seed which also were lineally descended from him, should be "as the stars of heaven for multitude." That salvation is *entirely* of free grace and not of merit, of course leaves it open for the sovereign Lord of all to choose the objects of his mercy where and when he pleases. That he always does this with good and adequate reason, yea the best of reasons, his own infinite wisdom and goodness are a sure and perfect pledge. But that men are always acquainted with these reasons, or that he has revealed them, is not asserted, and is not capable of being proved.

(29) God will not disappoint the hopes which he has excited, nor violate the promises which he has made. The blessings which he

promised to bestow, and the calling of Abraham's posterity to be his spiritual seed, will surely not fail. Ἀμεταμέλητα . . . Θεοῦ, *for the gifts and calling of God he will not repent of*; lit. *are not the subjects of repentance*. The meaning is, that God will never repent of the promises which he made to the fathers, and therefore never change his purpose in regard to the bestowment of spiritual blessings upon their offspring. The γάρ here introduces the reason why the Jews are still ἀγαπητοί.

Here again Tholuck construes κλήσις of the *external* calling of the Jews; the fear of *gratia irresistibilis* urging him to the adoption of this sentiment. But the reader is desired merely to turn back and compare viii. 28—30 with this whole passage, and also verses 5—7 above. No other answer need be given to the objection against the sense here maintained. Above all, when one compares the sequel, verses 30—36, with verses 28, 29, can he constrain himself to believe, that *external* privileges only are here the subject of the apostle's discussion? Could these excite in him such wonder, admiration, and gratitude, as he evidently expresses in verses 33—36? And is this the *obtaining of mercy*, of which verse 30 speaks? Let every unprejudiced reader examine and judge!

(30) Ὅτις γάρ . . . ἀπειθεία, *for as you were formerly disobedient to God, but have now obtained mercy through their unbelief*. This refers to the former heathenish and unbelieving state of the Gentiles, and to the fact that the gospel was preached to them, and they became believers in consequence of the Jews having rejected it, in the sense before explained. Γάρ introduces a clause added for the sake of confirming the preceding declaration.

(31) Οὕτω καὶ . . . ἐλεήθῃσι, *so they too have now become disobedient that they also may obtain mercy through the mercy shown to you*. Here are two cases presented, parallel in some respects, but differing in others. (1) The Jews reject the gospel, and occasion its being preached to the Gentiles, who thus become believers. (2) The Gentiles, by the blessing bestowed on them in consequence of their faith, provoke the Jews to jealousy, and occasion their seeking to be restored to their former place as the people of God; comp. verses 13, 14. The parallelism consists in this, viz., that each party occasions the blessings of salvation to come to the other, i. e., each is (ἀφορμητικῶς) the cause of salvation to the other. The difference is, that the Jews give occasion to this by their *unbelief*, but the Gentiles by their *belief*, which provokes the Jews to jealousy, and leads them to seek

after the privileges of the gospel. May the time speedily come, when the example of Christians will have a better tendency to excite such a jealousy among the Jews than it has ever yet done!

The position of *haz* here is somewhat peculiar. We should naturally expect to find it before *τῷ ὑμετέρῳ*; but there are examples of its standing *after* the first words that begin a sentence; comp 1 Cor. ix. 15. 2 Cor. ii. 4. Gal. ii. 10.

(32) *Συνέκλεισε . . . ἰλεήσῃ*, for God hath included all in unbelief, so that he might have mercy on all; i. e., God hath left both Jew and Gentile to fall into unbelief or disobedience, in order that the true nature of sin might fully appear, and that he might thus magnify the riches of his grace, in pardoning multiplied and aggravated transgressions; comp. Rom. v. 20, 21, where the same general sentiment is developed. The fathers in speaking of this subject compare sin to a fever, which before it reaches a certain height, does not so develop itself that the physician applies its appropriate remedy. They also compare it to a tree, which is permitted to grow up to full height, and to spread forth all its branches and leaves, before it is felled. So when sin had reached its acme, the Redeemer appeared and struck the mortal blow. The *γὰρ* introduces an additional reason, to show that God will have mercy on all.

In regard to *συνέκλεισε*, it seems to be the best illustrated by a reference to the Hebrew *הִסְגִּיר אֶל הַקֶּזֶב*, *הִסְגִּיר אֶל הַקֶּזֶב*, *הִסְגִּיר אֶל הַקֶּזֶב* all of which (from *הִסְגִּיר*) mean *to deliver over to, to give up to the power of*.—The whole verse, and also chap. v. 20, 21, seems plainly to teach, that God had a special purpose to answer in giving man over to the power or dominion of sin and unbelief, viz., to expose the “exceeding sinfulness of sin,” and to magnify the riches of his pardoning mercy.

But if any are not satisfied with the sense here given to the word *συνέκλεισε*, and insist that it is to be taken in a more *active* sense, they may compare it with Rom. v. 20, and also with ix. 18. It may be understood here in the same sense as *σκληρύνει* in ix. 18. I see no more objection to the one than to the other. But such a sense of *συνέκλεισε* does not seem to be necessary here.

(33) Here then, to say the least, is some deep and mysterious proceeding on the part of God, which the human mind cannot fathom, and which it should only wonder at and adore. *Ἦ βάθος . . . Θεοῦ*, *O the boundless riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!* *Πλούτου* means *riches* literally, and here it signifies *abundance*.—*Σοφίας*, the *wisdom* of God, viz., the wisdom displayed in thus mak-

ing the unbelief of the Jews subservient to the purpose of bringing salvation to the Gentiles, in thus educing good out of evil ; and also in finally bringing the Jews back to their filial relation, through the mercy granted to the Gentiles ; important ends, which no human foresight or wisdom could have accomplished.—Γνώσεως, boundless knowledge ; for what less than Omniscience could foresee the effects to be thus produced, the good effects that would flow from present and apparent evil ? What human or angelic foresight could divine that such consequences would follow from such means ?

Tholuck refers the whole simply to divine *compassion*, and says that ‘the words are *contra decretum absolutum* of Augustine.’ This may be true, if Augustine meant what Tholuck supposes he did—*fatality*. But did he mean this ? This excellent critic seems to find frequent matter of difficulty in the assertions of Paul here ; so strongly is he exercised with the fear of the *decretum absolutum* of Augustine and Calvin.

Ὡς . . . ἰδοὶ αὐτοῦ, *how unsearchable are his proceedings, and his ways past finding out !* Understanding all this as of course having a reference to the preceding declarations of the apostle, we must interpret it as meaning : ‘How entirely above our comprehension, that God should accomplish such ends by such means,’ viz. the salvation of the Gentiles in such a way, and then that of the Jews !—*κείμενα* seems plainly to mean, like the Hebrew מִצְוָה, ordinance, arrangement, proceeding : or rather decision, counsel, determination. Here it is for substance a synonyme with ἰδοί, which evidently has the like sense. The word ἰδοί, which literally means *way or track* that one makes in going, gives occasion to the adjunctive ἀνεξεχνίαστοι, *whose footsteps cannot be traced, i. e., unsearchable, viæ non vestigandæ*.

What can be plainer, now, than that the declaration in verse 32 gives the immediate occasion to the exclamation in ver. 33 ? But if this be so, then συνέκλεισι contributes its share to excite the apostle’s feelings, as well as ἐλήθη. Tholuck admits only the latter.

(34) Τίς γάρ . . . ἰγνέτω, *for who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor ?* Γάρ is placed here before a clause added in order to confirm the assertion, that the ways of God are unsearchable. The verse is a quotation from Is. xl. 13, *ad sensum*, and nearly in the words of the Seventy. The object is, to challenge the wisdom of created beings ; for the call is made on them to show, if there be any such case, wherein any of them has contributed any

thing to enlighten or to guide the divine counsels. The question implies strong negation.

(35) "Ἡ τίς . . . αὐτῷ, or *who hath first given him any thing, and it will be repaid?* The sentiment of this verse may be found in the Hebrew of Job xli. 3 (11), מִי הַקִּדְמָנִי וְאֶשְׁכֶּנֶה, *who hath done me any service, that I may recompense him.* This the apostle has changed to the *third* person, instead of the first, so as to make it congruous with the preceding quotation. The Septuagint, "abit in omnia alia" here; so that the apostle (if indeed he here quotes at all, which seems somewhat doubtful), has given a new version to the Hebrew.

This latter quotation (if it be one) is designed by the apostle to have a bearing on all *claims* to the divine favour, which can be preferred on the score of desert or of services rendered to God. How prone the Jews were to betake themselves to their own merits, and to rely on self-righteousness, every reader of the New Testament must know. The sentence before us is designed to repress this spirit; for it is as much as strongly to affirm, that no one can make any just claims upon God for his favour, as no one by his services has laid him under any obligation. The Nominative to ἀναπαυομένηςται is αὐτό understood, which would refer to τὸ implied after the preceding προέδωκε.

(36) On the contrary, instead of creatures laying God under any obligation to them, God is all and in all, *i. e.*, he is the source of all being and blessing, by him all things come into existence and are sustained and governed, and for him, for his glory and honour, they "are and were created."—"Ὅτι ἐξ . . . πάντα, *for of him, and by him, and for him, are all things.*—'Εξ αὐτοῦ, *of him, i. e.*, he is the original source, the eternal fountain whence all the streams of existence take their rise.—Δι' αὐτόν, he is not only the original source, but the *intermediate* cause of all things. It is the exertion of his power that brings them into being, and preserves, directs, and controls them.—Εἰς αὐτόν, *for him*, for his honour, praise, glory; he is the sovereign Lord and possessor of all, and all exist because he wills it, and exist for the accomplishment of purposes which the Maker of all has in view. The sentence seems equivalent to saying; "God is the beginning, continuance, and end of all things."

Such is the conclusion of the *doctrinal* part of our epistle; a powerful expression of profound wonder, reverence, and adoration, in regard to the unsearchable ways of God in his dealings with men; and an assertion of the highest intensity, respecting his sovereign right to control all things so as to accomplish his own designs, inasmuch as all spring from him, "live and move and have their being in him," and are for his glory. A doctrine truly humbling to the proud and towering hopes and claims of self-justifying men; a stumbling-block to haughty Jews, and foolishness to unhumbled Greeks. I scarcely know of any thing in the whole Bible which strikes deeper at the root of human pride than vers. 33—36. But what emphasis there can be in these, if the apostle is discoursing merely on the *external* privileges of men, and maintaining that these only were bestowed by pure grace, I am unable to see. Every man on earth has merely to open his eyes on things around him, in order to see that distinctions of a temporal nature are co-extensive with the human race. Does he need the long argument of the apostle, and the strenuous efforts he has made, in order to be satisfied of this? But when we come to the great question: Are distinctions of a *spiritual* nature made, *which are eternal in their consequences*; and made too according to the good pleasure of God, without any merit on the part of men? it is then we find ourselves to need all the argument and reasoning of the apostle, to bring us submissively to bow, and to contemplate the whole subject (as he does) with wonder and adoration. It is then, that God's claims to be considered the GREAT ALL IN ALL, must be advanced in such a way, that "the loftiness of man may be bowed down, and the haughtiness of man laid low, and Jehovah alone be exalted."

I appeal now to all readers and critics, who, like Tholuck, refer all that is said in ver. 33—36 to the mere *goodness* and *compassion* of God as manifested in the gospel, whether there is any congruity in the passage thus considered. Nothing can be more certain, than that vers. 34—36 do assert, in the most high and unequivocal manner, the independence of God on his creatures, and his sovereign power and right over them. This will not be questioned. But why such an assertion here, at the close of the argumentative part of the epistle, the very climax of the whole? Is it necessary to make the deepest possible impression of divine independence and sovereign right, in order to convince us that God can exercise his *goodness* and *compassion*? I repeat it—I cannot see the *congruity* of such reasoning or

rhetoric. Let those who adopt such exegesis look to this; mine is not the task to defend it.

On the other hand; if God has, for reasons not disclosed to us, and therefore in the way of what we call *the exercise of divine sovereignty*, rejected for a time the Jewish nation, and brought in the Gentiles; and if God, in his own due time, shall also again bring the Jewish nation into his church; and all this in such a way as entirely exceeds our comprehension, and which of course we are altogether unable to explain; then we may exclaim with the wondering apostle *O the depth!* Then we may find overwhelming reason to believe, that *God is all in all*, that he is the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and that "for his glory they are and were created." We can sympathize, therefore, while cherishing such views, with all which the apostle has here said, and find abundant reason to cherish sentiments such as he has avowed.

But to prevent all mistake here, I repeat, before I close this subject, what I have once and again expressed in the preceding pages, viz., that *sovereignty* in God, does not imply what is *arbitrary*, nor that he does any thing without the *best of reasons*. It only implies, that *those reasons are unknown to us*. While clouds and darkness are truly about him, in respect to our vision, justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne for ever. It is impossible, even for a moment to doubt that this must be so. Infinite wisdom and goodness can never act at all without reason, nor without the very best reason. God has no possible temptation to act arbitrarily or wrongly; it cannot profit him. His creatures cannot abridge his happiness. Of course, it would be the extreme of folly to suppose, that because God acts in a way which is mysterious, he acts in an arbitrary or oppressive manner. Is he under obligation to disclose all the grounds of his proceedings to us? Enough he has disclosed to satisfy us that he is wise and good. May there not be something left to exercise our filial confidence, and to give us (what does indeed well become us) a deep sense of our humble and imperfect condition? Shall we prescribe to God the terms of our moral discipline? If not, then let us be content, when his mysterious ways press upon our minds and we feel straitened and in darkness, to say with the apostle: Ὁ βᾶθος πλούτου καὶ σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως Θεοῦ! And if our hearts are ever tempted to rise up against the distinctions which God has made, either in a temporal or spiritual respect, in the bestowment of his favours, let us bow them down to the dust, as well as silence and satisfy them, with

the humbling, consoling, animating, glorious truth, that "of God, and through him, and for him, are all things!" To him, then, be the glory for ever and ever! Amen.

CHAP. XII. 1—21.

THE apostle having thus concluded what may be called the *doctrinal* part of his epistle, now proceeds to the *hortatory* and *practical* part; which contains precepts both general and particular that were specially adapted to those whom he was addressing, and the spirit of which is applicable to all times and nations. The very solemn and earnest manner in which he inculcates the practical maxims that follow, shows how deeply he felt the importance of uniting Christian doctrine and duty; yea, how necessarily the reception of the former must lead to the latter. He begins with urging Christians to make an entire consecration of themselves to God, verses 1, 2; he urges upon his readers humility, although they possess the special gifts of the Spirit: inasmuch as all the diversities of such gifts are possessed by those who are only parts of the spiritual body to which all Christians belong, verses 3—5; he enjoins upon each to make a wise and diligent improvement of the special gift or office bestowed on him, verses 6—8; and then gives, in the remainder of the chapter, a most striking and admirable series of Christian precepts; of which no equal, and no tolerable parallel, can be found in all the writings of the heathen world.

(1) Παρακαλῶ οὖν . . . Θεοῦ, *I intreat you, then, by the tender mercies of God, i. e.,* such being the case as I have now stated, such being the love and compassion exhibited towards sinners, and such the provision made for them, I entreat you on account of the tender mercies, &c. Οὖν has reference to all that precedes, and intimates that the writer is making a general deduction from it.—Οἰκτιρισμῶν, in the *plural*, is an imitation of the Hebrew רַחֲמִים which has no singular. It means *kindness, benignity, compassion, &c.* Διὰ, *by, on account of*; comp. Rom. xv. 30. 1 Cor. i. 10. 2 Cor. x. 1.

Παραστήσαι . . . ὑμῶν, *to present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is your rational service.* Παραστήσαι is common in classic Greek, and is employed to designate the action of bringing and presenting to the divinity a sacrifice of any kind.—Σώματα ὑμῶν, *your bodies, i. e., yourselves.* The word σώματα appears to be used because it makes the nature of the representation or comparison more appropriate; for the *bodies* of animals are offered in sacrifice.—Θυσίαν ζῶσαν, *a living sacrifice*, in distinction from that of beasts which were slain. It is put in apposition with the preceding *Θυσίαν*. The meaning appears to be, that the living active powers of their bodies were to be continually offered or devoted to God; or in

other words, they were to offer a *living*, enduring, lasting sacrifice, not a sacrifice once for all by self-immolation. But possibly the reference may be to the custom of the Levitical law, which forbade the offering to God of what was accidentally killed. The animal must be brought *alive* to the altar, and slain there. But I prefer the former exegesis.

Ἁγίαν, *holy*, i. e., ὁμῆ, *integer*, without blemish, or defect; for no other kind of sacrifice could be ἁγία, i. e., consecrated to God.—Εὐαγγέλιον τῷ Θεῷ is an epexegetis of the preceding ἁγία.—Τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν, *your rational service*, viz., your spiritual offering or service, or that which is mental or belongs to reason (λόγος), in distinction from an *external service* or λατρεία σαρκική, such as the Jews offered and relied on for salvation. I have rendered it *rational*, i. e., pertaining to the *reason* or *understanding*, because the word *reasonable* (as we now use it) does not necessarily convey the same idea.

(2) Καὶ μὴ . . . νοῦς ὑμῶν, *and be not conformed to this world*, but *be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind*. The Codices A., D., E., F., G., and many Codd. minusc. read συσχηματίζεσθαι and μεταμορφοῦσθαι, in the Infinitive; which would imply παρακαλῶ before them. The sense would be the same, in such a case, as the Imperative of the text before us makes.—Τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, *the present world*, i. e., τῇ ὥρῃ, according to the later usage of the word ὥρῃ among the Jews. The classic sense of αἰών, never coincides with this. See my *Exegetical Essay* on αἰών, αἰώνιος, &c., § 5. By *not conforming to the world* the apostle means, the not adopting of its sinful customs and practices, whether of an external or internal nature.

Ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθε, i. e., put on another form, person; exchange the μορφή of the world for that of Christianity. Do this ἀνακαινώνει τοῦ νοῦς ὑμῶν, *by the renewing of your mind*, i. e., by renovating the νοῦς παλαιός, by exchanging it for a νοῦς καινός such as the gospel inspires. In other words: 'Cherish no more a spirit devoted to the world and sinfully conforming to it; cultivate a new and different spirit, one devoted to God, one which will love and practise what is good and pleasing to God.

Εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν . . . τίλειον, *that ye may learn what the will of God is, that which is good and acceptable and perfect*. Δοκιμάζω means (among other things) *to explore, to investigate, to search out*, ἵνα; and this for the purpose of learning and knowing. The apostle means to say, that a *renewed mind* is essential to a successful inquiry after practical and experimental Christian truth, in its whole extent.

“If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God.”

Τὸ ἀγαθὸν κ. τ. λ., I regard not as adjectives agreeing with θείλημα, but as nouns, formed in the usual way, viz., by prefixing the article to the neuter gender of the adjective; for τὸ is of course implied before εὐάρεστον and τέλειον. So Flatt and Glückler.—Εὐάρεστον means *acceptable* to God, τῷ Θεῷ being implied.—Τέλειον, that which is wanting in nothing, which has no defect, *integrum*. Reiche construes these adjectives as qualifying θείλημα. The whole verse, therefore, is an exhortation to spiritual-mindedness, in order that Christians may attain to a full knowledge of what their holy religion demands.

(3) Γὰρ here stands before specific reasons given for a general principle urged in the preceding context. Διὰ τῆς χάριτος *by virtue of the [apostolic] office of grace* bestowed on me; comp. Rom. i. 5. xv. 15. Eph. iii. 2, 8.—Ἐν ὑμῖν, *among you*; so ἐν frequently means, in such a connection.

Μὴ . . . φρονεῖν, *lit. not to over-estimate himself beyond what he ought to estimate*. Παρά is often used in such a sense, in *comparative* declarations; e. g., Luke xiii. 2. iii. 13. Rom. xiv. 5. Heb. i. 9. i. 4. iii. 3.—Ἀλλὰ . . . σωφρονεῖν, *lit. but to make such an estimation as to act soberly, i. e., to think modestly, prudently, in a rational way, of himself, not being puffed up with his own attainments and gifts; the same as σωφρόνως φρονεῖν*. The *paronomasia* in ὑπερ-φρονεῖν and σωφρονεῖν can hardly escape the reader's notice.

Ἐκάστῳ ὡς . . . πίστει, *according to the measure of faith which God hath imparted to him; i. e., according to the measure of Christian belief and knowledge which God has imparted*. In other words: ‘Let each one estimate his gifts by the principles which the gospel has revealed.’ But Flatt and Tholuck understand πίστις here as equivalent to χάρισμα, i. e., πίστις = τὸ πισπιστευμένον, *quod creditum est, donum*; for which I can find no adequate and satisfactory proof or example. Nor can I perceive that the meaning which this exegesis would give to the passage, is a probable one. The apostle is not exhorting men to prize their gifts according to the diverse nature of them (which must be his meaning, if Flatt and Tholuck have rightly explained him); but he is exhorting all, whatever may be their gifts, to demean themselves modestly and humbly. All belong to *one body*, and no invidious distinctions are to be made. Consequently it is more congruous to explain μέτρον πίστει as indicating the

measure of Christian belief or faith, *i. e.*, of Christian knowledge which is the object of faith.

(4) To show that no one has any reason to set up himself as superior to others, the apostle now introduces the admirable comparison of the *body of Christ*, *i. e.*, the church, with the human body. There are various members of the latter; and they are designed for different uses. But all belong to one and the same body; and each performs its own proper functions for the good of the whole. So ought it to be in the Christian church.—Πρᾶξιν, *use, opus, negotium, office*.

(5) Οὗτως . . . μέλη, *so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and are each members of others; i. e.*, there is but one church, one spiritual body, of which Christ is the head. To this we all belong. In this respect there is no pre-eminence.—Καθεὶς for καθ' ἑνα, properly a solecism; see also John viii. 9. Mark xiv. 19. 3 Macc. v. 34, and ἀνὰ εἰς Rev. xxi. 21.

(6) Ἐχόντες . . . διάφορα, *and possessing gifts which are diverse, according to the grace bestowed upon us; i. e.*, we, who are many in number, and yet one body in Christ, possess gifts which are diverse, according to the diversity of the operations of the Spirit, who bestows different gifts on different persons. Ἐχόντες agrees with ἡμεῖς understood, and is a continuation of the preceding sentence. It is plain that here is grammatically an *anacoluthon*; for no verb as an apodosis regularly follows the participial ἔχοντες κ. τ. λ. The preceding context may supply an apodosis; and this may either be ἀλλήλων μέλη ἰσμεν, or πρᾶξιν ἔχῃ.

Εἴτε προφητείαν, *whether prophecy, i. e.*, εἴτε [ἔχομεν or ἔχοντες] προφητείαν, the ellipsis of ἔχομεν or ἔχοντες being quite plain. Προφητείαν here evidently means χάριν προφητείας, *i. e.*, the office or gift of prophecy, the prophetic office; which explanation, moreover, is rendered certain by the sequel.—Εἴτε serves to enumerate particular species, which belong to the genus χαρίσματα. But is προφητεία a public or a private office? And if either, what were its appropriate duties?

To answer this question philologically, as well as by the analogy of the Scriptures, it is necessary to resort, in the first place, to the classic use of the word. Προφήτης, among the Greeks, generally signified an *interpreter of the will of the gods, an interpreter of those who were priests of the gods, etc.* The essence of the definition is the idea of *interpreter, one who explains or declares, viz.*, what was before dark, or not understood, or not known. So the Greeks could say, προφήτης θεοῦ—ἱεροῦ—μάντεως—Μουσῶν, κ. τ. λ. Sometimes (but

more rarely) *προφήτης* means, *one who himself foretells, one who predicts*, etc.; and it is then equivalent to the Greek *μάντις*. But in general it differs from *μάντις*, inasmuch as the latter means a person who is himself under the divine *afflatus* in such a manner as to be bereaved of his own consciousness and reason, and merely to utter (as an instrument) what the inspiring divinity causes him to utter. This, which the *μάντις* himself is not supposed to understand and cannot explain, it was the office of the *προφήτης* to interpret. Plato derives *μάντις* from *μαινομαι*, *to rave, to be out of one's senses*; and this shows the peculiar meaning of *μάντις* in distinction from *προφήτης*, which usually designates only such persons as are in possession of their reason.

Προφήτης in the New Testament, corresponds well with the Hebrew *נָבִי*, which means *an interpreter of the divine will generally*, and specially one who by divine inspiration foretells future events. Of this latter sense, which all admit, it is unnecessary to give any examples; but as to the former, the reader may consult for *נָבִי*, Judg. vi. 8. 2 Sam. vii. 2. Ex. vii. 1, where Aaron is said to be a *נָבִי* to Moses, *i. e.*, the interpreter to the people of the plans and designs of Moses (comp. Exod. iv. 16. Jer. xv. 19). Deut. xviii. 18. For the like sense of *προφήτης* in the New Testament, comp. Matt. v. 12. x. 41. xi. 9. xiii. 17. John vii. 52. Acts vii. 48, 52. Rev. x. 7. xi. 10, 18. xviii. 24, 20. Comp. also the verb *προφητεύω* in Rev. x. 11. xi. 3. Luke i. 67. Acts ii. 17, 18. xix. 6. xxi. 9. 1 Cor. xi. 4, 5. xiii. 9. xiv. 1, 3, 4, 5, 24, 31, 39; and with these texts compare Joel ii. 28. Num. xi. 25, 27. 1 Sam. x. 5, 6, 10—13. xix. 20—24.

From all these passages it is put beyond a doubt, that *to prophesy* means not merely *to predict* (which is rather the predominant signification of the word), but also *to preach* (as we say), *to warn, to threaten, to utter devotional sentiment, to utter praise*; in short, to speak any thing by divine inspiration or *afflatus*. *Προφητεῖαν* in our text, therefore, does not of course refer to *those who predicted*; it may have another meaning. More probable is it, indeed it is almost certain, that here it has a more general sense, referring to those who publicly uttered any thing by special divine aid or inspiration, which had respect to the subject of religion.

Such, then, were *προφῆται* in the Christian church, *i. e.*, men endowed with a supernatural gift in regard to addressing the people, either for the purposes of instruction or of devotion. The apostle directs them to perform the duties of their office *κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογία τῆς*

πίστεως, according to the proportion of faith, or according to the analogy of faith. According to the first method of translating it, the sense would be : ' Let the prophets speak only as they have faith to do it : ' i. e., let them not go beyond the faith imparted to them. Faith here may mean *that which is the object of their belief*, i. e., what is given to them in an extraordinary manner as the object of their belief. In such a case, the apostle means to say : ' Let not the prophets exceed what is entrusted to them. Let them keep within the bounds of their reason and consciousness, and not, like the heathen *μάντις*, rave, or speak they know not what.' Comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 32, where the fact is made clear, that Paul considered the prophets as conscious, rational, voluntary, accountable agents, while in the exercise of their gifts. And as to the solemn and conscientious discharge of the duty of a prophet, comp. Jer. xxiii. 25—40. Ezek. ii. 6—8. iii. 17—21. In this manner Chrysostom, Theodoret, Œcumenius, Pelagius, Calvin, Flatt, Tholuck, and many others, have understood the phrase under examination. Reiche, however, and others, construe ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως as meaning the measure of faith, i. e., the degree or measure of actual belief which the prophet exercised, or of which he was the subject.

At the same time, as ἀναλογίαν may signify *analogy, agreement* (for so it means in the classics), the sense may be : ' Prophecy in such a manner, that what you say will accord with the doctrine of faith, viz., with that which the Scripture contains.' The former sense is the most congruous here, and therefore the most probable.

It is obvious, that the elliptical construction reigns through this whole paragraph. Here we may understand προφητεύωμεν before κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν, or we may fill out the construction thus: πρῶτον ἔχῃ πεφοφητία. Reiche, however, insists on κατὰ . . . πίστεως being co-ordinate with κατὰ χάριν κ. τ. λ., and that ἔχοντες is implied before it. But the comparison of the clause εἴτε προφητείαν κ. τ. λ. with the succeeding clauses, εἴτε διακονίαν, ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ κ. τ. λ., makes against this construction. Grammatically it is possible; exegetically, it is quite improbable.

(7) Ἐἴτε διακονίαν, i. e., εἴτε [ἔχομεν] διακονίαν. Διάκονος, in a general sense, means *a servant, a waiter* of any one. But as the office of a servant is elevated by the station of his master and the duties which the servant has to perform, so the word is far from being always employed in a degrading sense; nay, it is sometimes (like the Hebrew עֲבָד) used in a most honourable sense, as *servant of God, servant of*

Christ, servant (minister) of the gospel, etc. In the passage before us, *διακονία* probably refers to the *official duty* of the *διάκονοι* in the Christian church, to whom was committed the care of alms for the poor, of providing for the sick, of preparing conveniences for public worship, etc., and generally, of watching over and taking care of the *external* matters of the church. In the primitive age of the church, this office was very simple, having reference only to the *alms* of the church. So the verb *διακονέω* very often means, *to supply one with food, to make ready or provide food* for any one, *e. g.*, Matt. iv. 11. Mark i. 13. Luke x. 40. xii. 37. xvii. 8. John xii. 2; comp. Acts vi. But in subsequent ages, the office was extended to all the external and merely temporal relations of the church. So in the Jewish synagogue, the *ῥῆ*, *inspector, overseer*, corresponding to *διάκονος*.

Ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ, *i. e.*, ὡμίν or ἴστω; like ἐν τοῦτοις ἰσθί, 1 Tim. iv. 15, *i. e.*, *sit totus in illis*, let him be wholly devoted to his ministration or service, let him be deeply engaged to perform its duties with fidelity and zeal.

Εἴτε ὁ διδάσκων. Here the construction is varied, although there appears to be no special reason for it in the nature of the sentence. We should expect εἴτε διδασκαλίαν here, *i. e.*, the Accusative case of the abstract noun; but in its stead, we have a participial noun in the Nominative. Of course the verb ἦ or ἔστι is understood here after ὁ διδάσκων.—Ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, *i. e.*, ἴστω as before.

That the office of *teacher* is here distinguished from *προφήτης* on the one hand, and from *παρακαλῶν* on the other, is plain. But in what this distinction consisted, it would be a difficult matter for us at the present time to say. In regard to the first distinction, it would seem that *προφήτης* indicated *one who taught by inspiration*, and only so far as inspiration prompted and enabled him to teach. In the strict sense of the word, it was an office created and sustained by miraculous gift. But *διδάσκαλος* appears to have been an ordinary stated teacher, one who was so by official station, and who taught according to the degree of religious knowledge which he possessed.

(8) Εἴτε ὁ παρακαλῶν, *i. e.*, ὁ παρακαλῶν ἦ.—Ἐν τῇ παρακλήσει, *i. e.*, ἴστω as before. But what is *παρακαλῶν*? The verb *παρακαλέω* means *to warn, to console*. *Παρακαλῶν*, then, would seem to indicate an *exhorter*, *i. e.*, one who urged to practical duties, who dwelt upon the threatenings and promises of the gospel, and so aided and completed the work which the *διδάσκαλος* had begun.

How long the distinction which is here intimated, was kept up in

the church, I know not. But in the original settlement of the churches in New England, many of them had two ministers, a διδάσκαλος and a παρακαλῶν, as here explained. It was believed, at that time, that these distinct offices were intended to be perpetual in the church. But why consistency would not of course lead to the maintenance of all the other offices here named, it would be difficult to say.

Ὁ μεταδιδούς, sc. ᾧ, *he who is a distributor, i. e., he who distributes the charities of the church, or of individuals in it.*—Ἐν ἀπλότητι, i. e., with a simple or single regard to the good of those for whom the charity was bestowed, without any selfish or sinister purposes of his own. But in what respect ὁ μεταδιδούς differed from the διάκονος above mentioned, we are now unable to ascertain with precision. That there was a difference, is plain from the manner in which the whole of this paragraph is constructed. May it not have been that the διάκονος was the *general overseer*, the collector and provider of alms; while the ὁ μεταδιδούς was the *actual distributor* of them among the needy? This seems quite probable, from the nature of the case, and from the fact that here are two distinct offices, both of which have a relation to the same class of duties.

The reader should remark, that with ὁ μεταδιδούς the construction is again changed, inasmuch as the εἴς is omitted; so that the strain of the sentiment becomes purely hortatory.

Ὁ προϊστάμενος ἐν σπουδῇ, *let him who presides do it with diligent attention.* A question may indeed be raised here, whether ὁ προϊστάμενος means an *office* in the church, or only a *person* to whom the care of some duty or business is committed. The verb προϊστημι sometimes means *to attend with care and diligence to any thing*, q. d., *to stand over it*, as we say in English. So in Tit. iii. 8, καλῶν ἔργων προϊστασθαι means *to be diligent in performing good works*. But as ὁ προϊστάμενος stands connected with a series of other words which express some *official* duty, most interpreters have been inclined to construe it here as having respect to *office*. It seems plainly to be used in 1 Thess. v. 12, to designate one who holds the office of a *teacher*; and in 1 Tim. v. 17, it also seems to designate one who holds the office of *ruling* or *governing* in the church, as well as teaching. The context of this latter passage has indeed been regarded by most commentators, as showing that there were some προϊστάμενοι who held the double office of teacher and governor or ruler in the church, although, as some of them suppose, these offices would seem more usually to have been

separate. In like manner, Justin Martyr speaks of a *προεστὼς τῶν ἀδελφῶν*, who (it appears) is the presbyter of the church, Apolog. I. c. 67.

In 1 Cor. xii. 28, is another account of Paul concerning the offices in the church existing at Corinth; from which it appears that there were reckoned in that church the following orders of officers and gifts: ἀπόστολοι, προφῆται, διδάσκαλοι, δυνάμεις, χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων, ἀντιλήψεις, κυβερνήσεις, γένη γλωσσῶν, διερμηνεύται; quite a different reckoning from that in our text, and yet the *object* of it is the very same as in Rom. xii. 8, viz., to show Christians that the same Spirit has bestowed gifts and offices of different and various kinds, but that inasmuch as he is the author of all, and they who possess them all belong to one and the same body, so there should be no boasting or pride indulged on account of them, but every one who possesses them should exercise his own gift in the best manner he can, for the edification of the whole.

It must be obvious that the *κυβερνήσεις* mentioned in 1 Cor. xii. 28, would seem to accord with the *προϊστάμενος* in our text; but whether it accords with the same word in 1 Thess. v. 12. 1 Tim. v. 17, seems more doubtful. From a comparison of the whole together, it appears equally clear that the office itself of a *προϊστάμενος*, as designated here (and in 1 Cor. xii. 28 by *κυβερνήσεις*), was one of the lowest in the church. It is ranked the *seventh* in 1 Cor. xii. 28, and the *sixth* in Rom. xii. 8. But in 1 Tim. v. 17 and 1 Thess. v. 12, it is represented as entitled to *special* honour; yet in both these passages it is spoken of as united with the person of a *teacher* or *preacher*.

Ὁ ἐλεῶν ἐν ἰλαρότητι, *he who shows compassion*, [let him do it] *with cheerfulness*; comp. 2 Cor. ix. 7.

For a more extended examination of the passage ὁ μεταδιδούς . . . ἐν ἰλαρότητι, the reader is referred to the EXCURSUS, where an interpretation different from that above exhibited is proposed and defended.

(9) Ἡ ἀγάπη, ἀνυπόκριτος, *let benevolence be sincere*. I render ἀγάπη *benevolence* here, because it seems to indicate *kind feeling* toward men in general. *The love of the brethren* is specified in verse 10. The apostle here enjoins on Christians to cherish a sincere and real, not merely a pretended and apparent, feeling of kindness toward all men.

Ἀποστύγοντες, *i. e., ἴστε*, which would make the Imper.; and this

the nature of the case evidently demands. So κολλώμενοι, sc. ἔσσι. In the connection in which τὸ πονηρὸν and τῷ ἀγαθῷ here stand, the meaning is limited to *malice* and *kindness*. So πονηρός means, even in the classics, *malicious*, *mischievous*; and ἀγαθός is the converse of this, *kind*, *benevolent*. These two phrases, therefore, are merely an epexegetis of ἀγάπη in the preceding clause.

(10) Τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ εἰς ἀλλήλους φιλόστοργοι, *in respect to brotherly love, kindly affectionate one toward another*. Τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ, is the *Dative of relation*; i. e., in connection with adjectives or verbs the Dative is used where the question arises, *whether* or *in respect to what?* which for convenience sake may be called the *Dative of relation*. So often in the New Testament; e. g., νῶθροι ταῖς ἀποαῖς, Heb. v. 11; ἀγνοούμενος τῷ προσώπῳ, Gal. i. 22; so Matt. xi. 29. Heb. xii. 3. Eph. iv. 18, et sæpe alibi. Φιλόστοργοι means *affectionate*, in such a manner as one is toward his own near relative; στοργή means *natural affection*.

Τῇ τιμῇ, ἀλλήλους προηγούμενοι, *in respect to honour, anticipating each other*; i. e., let each one, in paying the proper tribute of respect to others, strive to anticipate his Christian brother. Προηγίμαι means *to take the lead, to go before, to set the example*. The meaning is, that so far from being averse to pay that respect which is due to others, each should strive to excel the other in the performance of this duty. Christianity, therefore, is so far from banishing all civility and good manners from society, that it enjoins the greatest attention to this subject.

(11) Τῇ σπουδῇ, μὴ ὀκνηοί, *as to diligence, not remiss*. Τῇ σπουδῇ is evidently the same *Dative of relation* as before. Σπουδῇ here seems to be taken in the *general* sense; and so the passage accords with Eccle. ix. 10: "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might." So the next phrase explains the whole expression, by presenting the antithesis of it, viz., τῷ πνεύματι ζήοντες, *scrventes animo, warmly engaged* (as we say), *fervid, active in serious earnest*; com. Acts xviii. 25, where the same expression is used to designate the fervid spirit of Apollos.—Some apply τῷ πνεύματι here to the divine Spirit; but I think without any good reason.

Τῷ Κυρίῳ δουλεύοντες (which Griesbach reads τῷ καιρῷ δουλεύοντες), is supported by the more important testimony of external witnesses. Griesbach has rejected it on the ground, that 'the less usual reading is to be preferred;' a ground which, to say the least, has many slippery places. Knapp, Morus, Bengel, and Beza, preserve Κυρίῳ, and

I think with good reason. I take the whole expression to mean, that all our *diligence* is to be consecrated to God, to be made subservient to the cause of Christ. That *Κυρίῳ* here means *the Lord Christ*, the *usus loquendi* of Paul leaves no good room to doubt. Inasmuch as *δουλεύω* governs the Dative, we need not insist here on the *Dative of relation*. But in fact, all of the Datives in this whole paragraph are of this nature; so that exactly rendered it would be, *as to the Lord, obedient or engaged in his service*.

(12) *Τῇ ἐλπίδι, χαίροντες*, *as to hope, joyful*; *i. e.*, rejoicing in the blessed hope of glory which the gospel inspires; and this, amid all the troubles and sorrows of life.—*Τῇ θλίψει, ὑπομένοντες*, *as to affliction, patiently enduring*; *i. e.*, since you are animated with a joyful hope, you may well be called upon to endure the troubles and sorrows of life with patience. Bretschneider, not adverting to the fact that all the Datives here are those of *relation*, has noticed that *ὑπομένω* here governs the Dative, “quod prorsus insolens est.” *Lex. sub. ὑπομένω*. It is indeed *prorsus insolens*; or rather, it is not at all; for *θλίψει* is not governed by *ὑπομένοντες*, and should be separated from it by a comma, like the example above, *τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ . . . φιλόστοργοι*. This example of *τῇ θλίψει, ὑπομένοντες*, I may add, sufficiently confirms what is said above respecting the *Dative of relation* in this whole paragraph.

Τῇ προσευχῇ, προσκατεροῦντες, *as to prayer, be persevering*; *i. e.*, the way to maintain a joyful hope, and to be patient under afflictions, is to cherish the spirit of prayer and to live near to God.

(13) *Ταῖς . . . κοινωνοῦντες*, *in respect to the wants of the saints, be sympathetic*; *i. e.*, feel these wants as if they were your own; cherish that sympathy which will lead you to sympathize with the sufferings of others. With all these particles, *ἔστε* is implied. While Christians were to be kind towards all others, they were to be specially so towards their brethren of the church. *κοινωνέω* in classic Greek has always an *intransitive* sense; and the instances in Gal. vi. 6 and Phil. iv. 5 hardly prove that a *transitive* sense should be given to it in the New Test., viz., *communicate, distribute*. To be a partaker, to share in, is the genuine meaning of the word; and from that we need not here depart.—*Τὴν φιλοξενίαν διώκοντες*, *readily practising hospitality*. Here the construction is changed, and the Accusative after *διώκοντες* is employed. Comp. 1 Tim. v. 10. Heb. xiii. 2. 1 Pet. iv. 9. 3 John verses 5—8. In a particular manner was this virtue necessary in the primitive times, when Christian teachers had no regular

support, and when the missionaries of the cross were labouring to diffuse the knowledge of salvation.

(14) Εὐλογεῖτε . . . καταρᾶσθε, *bless those who persecute you, bless and curse not*; comp. Matt. v. 44. Luke vi. 28. That is, while your persecutors imprecate divine indignation upon you, do you pray that blessings may descend upon them.

(15) Χαίρειν . . . κλαιόντων, *rejoice with those who rejoice, and weep with those who weep*; i. e., sympathize with your fellow Christians both in joy and grief; show that you enter with feeling into the consideration of their joys and sorrows, so as to be glad when they are glad, and sorrowful when they are in heaviness. The Infinitive χαίρειν, κλαίειν, stands (as frequently in the Greek classics) instead of the Imperative. Strictly speaking, δεῖ is understood in such cases, q. d., *you must rejoice—weep, &c.*

(16) Τὸ αὐτὸ εἰς ἀλλήλους φρονοῦντες, sc. ἔσπετε, *mutually think the same thing, i. e., be agreed in your opinions and views*. Whether this relates to matters that concerned spiritual or temporal affairs, the words themselves do not show; but the nature of the case would seem to indicate, that the expression is designed to have a general bearing on all their concerns and articles of belief. Origen, Theodoret, Chrysostom, and Ambrose, have interpreted the passage as meaning: ‘Enter into each other’s circumstances, in order to see how you would yourself feel;’ and so it parallelizes with the preceding expression. But the *usus loquendi* of Paul does not seem to admit of this exposition; comp. 2 Cor. xiii. 11. Phil. ii. 2; comp. Rom. xv. 14. Εἰς ἀλλήλους is not, indeed, the usual mode of expression in the New Testament, but ἐν ἀλλήλοις; comp. Mark ix. 50. John xiii. 35. Rom. xv. 5. But the exchange of εἰς with the Accusative for ἐν with the Dative, in the New Testament (and indeed elsewhere), is very frequent.

Μὴ τὰ . . . συναπαγόμενοι, *mind not high things, but be led away by humble ones*. Such is the *literal* translation of the words. The sentiment is: ‘Shun pride, and cultivate humility. That ἀλλὰ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς, κ. τ. λ., is the antithesis of τὰ ὑψηλά, κ. τ. λ., seems to me very obvious. Of course I must construe ταπεινοῖς as being in the neuter gender; for such is evidently the case in regard to ὑψηλά. But Koppe, Schleusner, and Stolz, construe ταπεινοῖς as being of the masculine gender, and represent the sentiment of the phrase to be: ‘Suffer yourselves to be led away, viz., to the judgment-seat of magistrates, with the *despised* Christian.’ Others, viz., Grotius, Limborch, C.

Schmidt, &c., construe it thus : 'Suffer yourselves to be led away by the humble, *i. e.*, conform to them. This agrees in *sentiment* with the above exposition ; but it has the disadvantage of sacrificing the direct antithesis of the words ὑψηλά and ταπεινοίς.—Συναπάγομαι is commonly used in a *bad* sense, viz., to suffer one's self to be led away by temptation, &c. ; see Gal. ii. 13. 2 Pet. iii. 17. If we translate and explain in conformity with this, we must then render the phrase : 'Be ye led away by low things ;' a meaning which the apostle surely did not intend to convey. We must then resolve συναπαγόμενοι into a *generic* sense, and translate thus : 'Suffer yourselves to be influenced or led away by things that are despised,' viz., by the proud world ; in other words, 'Readily undertake offices or duties that are humble and mean, in the estimation of the proud.' Passow assigns to the word the sense of *mitführen*, which agrees with the above exposition.

Μη . . . ἑαυτοῖς, *be not wise in your own conceit ; i. e.*, do not, trusting in your own superior skill and understanding, refuse to confer with others or to hearken to their suggestions ; a caution intimately connected with the preceding one.

(17) Μηδενί . . . ἀποδιδόντες, *not rendering evil for evil ; comp.* 1 Pet. iii. 9. Matt. v. 43—48. This is, no doubt, one of the most difficult of all the precepts which the gospel enjoins ; I mean, one which most thwarts our natural inclinations and desires. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit."—Προνοοῦμενοι . . . ἀνθρώπων, *seek after that which is good in the sight of all men ; i. e.*, be studiously attentive to those duties, which are commended by all, and which all therefore admit to be of the highest obligation. The expression seems to be taken, with some abridgment, from Prov. iii. 4, καὶ τρεῖς καλὰ ἐνώπιον Κυρίου καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

(18) Εἰ δύνατον . . . εἰρηνεύοντες, *if it be possible, so far as you are able, be at peace with all men.* The limitations εἰ δύνατον and τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν, show that the apostle did not deem this possible in all cases ; and beyond all question it is not. The world hate the truths of the gospel, and will be at enmity with those who boldly and faithfully urge them on their consciences. Apostles and martyrs did thus urge them ; and their sufferings prove the truth of what has now been alleged.—Τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν, *i. e.*, κατὰ τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν. 'Εξ is used here in the sense of *belonging to*. The whole phrase means, 'in proportion to that which belongs to you,' *i. e.*, according to your ability ; like the French *vosre possible*.

(19) *Μη ἑαυτοὺς . . . ὀργῇ*, *avenge not yourselves, beloved, but give place to [divine] indignation.* Such is one method of interpreting this clause. *Διδόναι τόπον* means *to allow, to give place to* (as we say in English). So Eph. iv. 22, *μη δίδοτε τόπον τῷ διαβόλῳ*, *give no place to the devil*; and Luke xiv. 9, *Δός τούτῳ τόπον*, *resign your place to this person, or make room for him.* Josephus (*Antiq.* xvi. ii. § 6) says: *τῷ ἐνδοιασμῷ τόπον δίδοναι*, *to give place to doubt*; Plutarch says: *δεῖ δὲ μήτε παίζοντας αὐτῇ [ὀργῇ] δίδοναι τόπον*, *we must, without jesting, give place to it [anger]*, *De Ira cohibenda*, chap. 14; and Marcus Antoninus says: *χώραν δίδοναι ὀδυρμοῖς*, *to give place to weeping*, *Lib.* iii. 6. The meaning above given to *δός τόπον τῇ ὀργῇ*, thus according with the frequent sense of the phrase *δοῦναι τόπον*, seems to be favoured by the quotation which immediately follows: *Ἐμοί κ. τ. λ.* This quotation would be wholly inapposite, if we suppose that *ὀργῇ* here means *the wrath of our enemy*, and *δός τόπον*, to mean *go out of the way of, get out of the way of, &c.*, as Pelagius, Ambrose, Basil, Schættgen, Ammon, and others have done. In Rabbinic Hebrew, it is true indeed, that *נָתַן מָקוֹם* (give place) means *to go out of the way of*; but we need not resort to Hebrew idiom here.

Another method of interpreting *ὀργῇ* is, to assign to it the meaning of *one's own indignation*, and then to construe *δός τόπον* as meaning *spatium date*, i. e., *put off, defer.* The sense of this would be good; and *Wisd.* xii. 20 would help to justify the *usus loquendi*. So also *Livy* (viii. 32) says: *Iræ suæ spatium . . . daret.* So *Seneca*: *Ira surda est et amens, dabimus illi spatium* (*de Ira*, iii. 39); also *Lactantius*: *Dedisset iræ suæ spatium* (*de Ira*, 18). Construed in this way the passage would mean: 'Put off the execution of that to which your indignation would prompt, or defer the execution of your anger; for God will repay evil to your enemy in case he has done wrong. Retribution belongs rather to him than to you.' This sense, on the whole, seems to be better supported than the other above given. Nor is there any want of congruity with what follows, such as would be an objection against this exegesis here.

Ἐμοί . . . Κύριος, *retribution is mine, I will make it, saith the Lord*; or *vengeance is mine, I will render it, saith the Lord.* The passage is taken from *Deut.* xxxii. 35, *נָתַן מָקוֹם לְיָ*. *Λέγει Κύριος* are the apostle's own words, for they are not in the Hebrew. The meaning is: 'God will render righteous judgment or retribution for acts of wickedness; Christians are not to claim for themselves the doing of that which it is his sovereign prerogative to do.'

(20) 'Εάν οἶν . . . αἰρόν, *if thine enemy hunger, feed him ; if he thirst, give him drink.* Food and drink here stand as a part for the whole, and signify our obligation to treat an enemy with beneficence or kindness. The meaning is : 'Do good to thine enemy, instead of evil ; show him kindness, instead of taking revenge.'

Τούτο γάρ . . . αἰρόν, *for in so doing, thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head.* This is quoted from Prov. xxv. 21, 22. In Ps. xviii. 8, 12, 13, מַלְּחָם, *coals of fire*, are emblematical of *consuming* or *destruction*. The Arabians say, *he roasted my heart*, or *he kindled a fire in my heart*, to designate the idea of *giving* or *inflicting pain*. So in 4 Ezra xvi. 54, "Coals of fire shall burn on the head of him who denies that he has sinned against God." There can be no well-grounded doubt, then, that *pain* is meant to be designated by this expression. But is it the pain of shame or contrition for misconduct, or that of *punishment* ? More probably the former here ; for so ver. 21 would almost necessarily lead us to conclude. It is a noble sentiment when thus understood. 'Take not revenge,' says the apostle : 'overcome your adversary with kindness and beneficence. These will bring him to shame and sorrow for his misconduct.'

(21) Μὴ νικᾷ . . . τὸ κακόν, *be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good ; i. e., be not led to the indulgence of a spirit of revenge on account of injuries ; but subdue the evil temper which leads to the infliction of injury, by beneficence and kindness.*

CHAP. XIII. 1—14.

At the time when Paul wrote this epistle, the civil power was every where in the hands of heathen men, who were idolaters and polytheists. In Palestine there was, indeed, a partial commitment of power to the hands of Jews ; but this was principally of an *ecclesiastical* nature, and the Romans uniformly reserved to themselves the right of confirming or reversing any sentence, which should affect the life or liberty of their subjects. In general the heathen magistracy were hostile to Christianity ; although the Roman civil power, as such, had not begun to persecute Christians when the epistle to the Romans was written, or even to tolerate persecution in others. But the civil magistrates of the Romans, who were polytheists and idolaters, could not but look with indignation or scorn on those who denied the *religio Nolla* of the empire, and who

without hesitation condemned all religion but their own as false and injurious. There were some superstitious men, moreover, among these magistrates; and there were multitudes of superstitious priests, who were peculiarly hostile to Christianity, and who urged the common people, and magistrates also, to testify their displeasure against it. Gradually this feeling ripened towards development; until at last, under Nero, it burst forth like a volcano, and swept before its fiery streams all the disciples of Jesus who were within its reach.

On the other hand, the Jews, before they were converted to Christianity, looked on their masters, the Romans, with such feelings as a sense of oppression and injured dignity and rights trampled on always inspire. As the chosen people of God, they considered themselves entitled to pre-eminence above the nations of the earth. They looked down with scorn and hatred upon the worshippers of stocks and stones, the 𐤓𐤕 whom they had been uniformly instructed to abhor. The idea that the Romans claimed the right to dispose of their persons and property was insufferable. They fortified themselves in this opinion, by an appeal to Deut. xvii. 15: "Thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee whom the Lord thy God shall choose; one from among thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee; thou mayest not set a stranger over thee, who is not thy brother." Willing subjection to the Romans, then, was in their view disobedience to this injunction of Moses. Hence nothing but the fear of immediate and summary punishment restrained them, for many years, from rising up against the Roman power in Palestine; and even in other countries, where they were numerous, they made no small tumult whenever occasion offered.

When individuals passed over from the Jewish community to that of the Christians, they could not, or did not, divest themselves at once of all these feelings and views. Christianity introduced them to a new citizenship, new rights, new privileges, new spiritual rulers, new fellow-citizens. Could they then have any regard for heathen citizenship? It was natural to ask this question; and above all, it was easy to do so, since the heathen magistracy were well known to be hostile in their feelings toward Christians, and since Christians were required to yield up life rather than to obey the civil magistrate as to some things which God had forbidden.

It is easy to see, that while matters stood thus, there was great danger that private Christians, instigated by their own particular views of heathen superstitions and by a sense of duty in some cases where they were called upon to renounce obedience to the magistrate, would be exposed to judge wrongly, and to go too far in justifying a principle of insubordination to the civil power. Paul felt a deep solicitude in regard to this subject, which was evidently encompassed with many difficulties. For on the one hand, it was clear that in some cases life itself was to be sacrificed rather than to obey the civil power: and the apostle himself was a most eminent pattern of high and holy independence, in cases of this nature. On the other, private individuals, with all their prejudices and scorn of heathenism, might greatly abuse the proper liberty of a Christian, and extend it to things to which Christianity did not allow them to extend it.

That there was a disposition to do so among the Christians at Rome, seems evident from the tenor of chap. xiii. The cautions here are salutary for the church in all ages; but they were peculiarly needed in the age of the apostles.

I would add only, that the extension of the principles enjoined by chap. xiii. so as to make them imply implicit subjection to the magistrates in cases of a *moral* nature, where he enjoins that God has plainly forbidden, would be a gross violation of the true principles of Christianity, which demands of us in all such cases, "to obey God rather than man." The apostle himself was a most eminent example of exception to such a sweeping general principle of civil obedience. It is only when magistrates keep within the bounds of *moral* prescription, that obedience is a duty. So long as they do so, it is better for Christians, who live under despotic governments, such as the Roman was, to submit even when they suffer oppression, than to revolt and be accursed. Under an elective government like our own, it is their duty to assist in displacing wicked rulers, and to do this quietly and orderly, in the way which the law has pointed out. But under such a government as the Roman, where the citizen has no elective franchise, there is no remedy (after appeal to the reason of the magistrate, such as Justin, Tertullian and others made), but to suffer, in case of oppression, committing our cause to God, and appealing to him to vindicate the oppressed.

Nothing can be plainer, than that the *subjection* urged in chap. xiii. cannot be extended to cases where the commission of a *moral evil* is demanded. But with the exception of this, the principles here enjoined are altogether of such a nature as our holy religion demands. Certainly these do not demand, that we should neglect any remedy for evils of a civil nature, which is proper. By no means; we are bound to make use of the proper remedy, if in our power, by a regard to the public good. But where the government is despotic, and there is no remedy but rebellion, and this may be a hazardous and bloody measure, it is better to suffer than to excite tumult. So thought Paul, comp. Tit. iii. 1; and so did Peter teach, 1 Pet. ii. 13, 17. But let not the advocates of despotic power urge subjection in cases where the gospel will not allow it, under cover of the general expressions here used. Every precept of this nature is to be interpreted with a proper regard to the time and circumstances in which it was uttered. What these were in the case before us, we have seen. What the example of the apostle and the Saviour himself was, we know. We know, too, that Christianity in its very nature is *love to God and man*; that it makes all men a *brotherhood*; it places them on the same ground as to rights and privileges; it pays real deference to *moral* worth, and to this only. It acknowledges no right in one to oppress another; admits of no "Jew or Greek, Barbarian or Scythian, bond or free;" for it teaches that "all are one in Christ Jesus." It teaches true equality of rights, true spiritual and civil freedom. It does not, indeed, abolish all distinctions among men; nor does it abolish civil governments. Far from this; but then it decides, in its very nature, that all governments, and all civil orders and distinctions, should be only for the public good. It admits no *divine right* of one man to be lord over another; it is at open and eternal war with all the mere claims of birth, and pride, and oppression. The universal good, the equal rights, the peaceful state of man, is the object at which it aims; and whatever is incompatible with these, is incompatible with the fundamental principles of the great "law of liberty and love."

But all this may be allowed (and contradicted it cannot be with reason), and yet it may be true at the same time, that Christians, situated as the Romans were in Paul's time, are required to yield peaceful submission to magistrates, whether Christian or heathen, in all things where the command of God does not directly forbid it. What the world ought to be, what it would be if all men were Christians indeed, is one thing; what the world is, and what is the present duty of Christians in such circumstances, is another and different thing.

In a word, the *spirit* of the precepts in Rom. xiii. is to be regarded as a rule for all ages and nations, so long as circumstances shall be like those which then existed. And even when these circumstances alter, and magistrates become really Christian, it must then be true in a still more eminent degree, that quiet and peaceful obedience in all lawful things will be a duty.

(1) Πᾶσα . . . ὑποτασσέσθω, *let every soul be subject to the supreme magistracies*. Πᾶσα ψυχὴ is *Hebraism*, like כָּל־אֶחָד , *every one, each one*:—ὑπερβολαίς means *pre-eminent, supreme*; i. e., in this case, the civil magistracy or power of civil rulers.

Ὅτι γὰρ . . . οὐκ ἔστιν, *for there is no magistracy unless by divine permission; and the existing [magistrates] are of God's appointment*. γὰρ stands before a reason why they should be subject to the civil magistracy. The apostle intends to reconcile Christians to the idea of civil obedience, on the ground that obeying the magistrate is in accordance with the command of God. All magistrates are by his

permission; and even when they are oppressive, the Christian is bound to regard them (so he should regard other evils), as existing by divine permission, and to bow submissive in all cases where direct disobedience to God is not demanded by them. Such a view of the subject is greatly adapted to satisfy the mind of a Christian, when he feels galled with the yoke of oppression. "The powers that be are ordained of God;" and they should be submitted to, therefore, on the same ground that we take, when we urge acquiescence in other afflictive dispensations of an overruling Power. The only exception is that above-mentioned.

(2) Ὅστις . . . ἀντίστηται, *so that he who resists the magistracy, resists the commandment of God.* The reason of this is, that as God has required obedience to the magistrate (in the sense before stated), so he who refuses to yield this, is disobedient to the divine command.

Οἱ δὲ . . . λήψονται, *and they who resist, shall receive punishment for themselves.* Κεῖμα is often used in the sense of *punishment*; e. g., Rom. iii. 8. 1 Cor. xi. 29. Gal. v. 10. 1 Tim. v. 12, et alibi.—Ἐαυτοῖς, is here the *Dativus incommodi*, as the grammarians say: see N. Test. Grammar, § 104. 2. Note 1. The meaning is, that those who are seditious, i. e., make resistance against the civil government, will be brought to punishment, and that deservedly.

(3) Οἱ γὰρ . . . κακῶν, *for rulers are not a terror to good works, but to evil.* This clause shows what sort of rulers Paul expected Christians to obey, and how far obedience was a duty, viz., such rulers as protect the good, and repress the evil; and while they do this, there can be no question as to the duty of obeying them. But suppose the reverse, i. e., suppose that they protect evil-doing and forbid good works, then Paul's own conduct shows what other Christians ought to do.—Φόβος here is *abstract for concrete*, i. e., φόβος for φοβεροί.

Θέλεις δὲ . . . ἐξουσίαν; *and wilt thou not fear the magistracy?* That is, since the ruler is terrible to evil-doers, wilt thou not be afraid to do evil?—Τὸ ἀγαθόν . . . αὐτῆς, *do good, and thou shalt have praise for it*, i. e., yield obedience to the civil power, and you shall obtain from it the commendation of being a peaceful and obedient citizen.

(4) Θεοῦ γὰρ . . . ἀγαθόν, *for it is an instrument in the hands of God, to promote thy good.* That is, civil government is of divine appointment, and it is designed to be an instrument of good to those

who do well. *Σοὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν, for thy good*, where *σοὶ* is the *Dativus commodi*. The *γάρ* stands before a reason or ground why they might expect *ἵπαινος* for doing well.

Ἐάν δὲ . . . φοβῶ, *but if thou doest evil, fear; i. e., if thou art refractory and disobedient to the civil magistracy, thou hast reason to fear the consequences.*—Οὐ γὰρ . . . πρᾶσσοντι, *for he beareth the sword not in vain; but he is God's minister, punishing the evil-doer.* The sword is here the emblem of punishment. Θεοῦ διάκονος, *a minister or instrument of God's appointment, or one whom his providence has raised up or permitted to exist.* Ἐκδικος εἰς ὀργήν, *exercens judicium ad pœnam, judging, condemning to punishment.*—Τῷ πρᾶσσοντι, the Dative of "the person to or for whom any thing is, or is done."

(5) Διὰ . . . συνίδησιν, *therefore we ought to yield subjection, not because of indignation only, but also for conscience' sake; i. e., we should do our duty not merely in order to shun the evils of a different course, but we ought to do it from a conscientious regard to the obligation under which we are.*

(6) Διὰ τοῦτο . . . τελεῖτε, *on this very account also pay tribute* Διὰ τοῦτο, *i. e., for the sake of conscience, as well as to avoid civil penalties.* Γάρ *illustrantis*, standing in a clause added for the sake of further illustrating and confirming the subject under consideration. It is difficult to make out a proper *causal* meaning for *γάρ* in this case; because *διὰ τοῦτο* itself designates such a meaning. Why may we not consider *διὰ τοῦτο γάρ* as an *intensive* causal formula, not unlike *ἰπειδήπερ*, &c.? I have so rendered it, viz., *on this very account.* Καί, *also*, denoting not only an additional circumstance, but also being *affirmative*, καὶ φόρους τελεῖτε, *ye should also pay tribute*, or ye should pay tribute as well as yield obedience in other things. Τελεῖτε I take as in the Imperative.

Λειτουργοὶ . . . προσκαρτεροῦντες, *for they are ministers of God, who attend to this matter; i. e., they are God's ministers or instruments, in the same sense as the magistracy above mentioned.* God who has ordained that there should be a civil magistracy, has also ordained, as a means of supporting it, that there should be *tribute, custom, taxes.* Let the Christian pay these cheerfully; and even when they are oppressive, let him submit on the same ground as he does to other evils, *i. e., until a proper and lawful remedy for the oppression can be found.* Προσκαρτεροῦντες indicates habitual and persevering attention to any thing; as much as to say, Whose proper official business it is to attend to this matter.

(7) 'Ἀπέδοτε κ. τ. λ., *render to all men what is due*, on the ground and spirit of such precepts.—Φόρον means properly *a tax*, either on persons or on land; or rather, in the present case, both of these together. Τέλος answers to our present term *custom*, i. e., a tax on goods, wares, merchandize, &c. In respect to φόβον, comp. verse 4 above. The meaning of the apostle is, that we should stand in awe of those who wear the sword of civil justice, viz., that we should fear them in such a sense as to deter us from sedition and civil disobedience. Τιμή commonly means *the respect* which one pays to his equals in rank. But here it means the respect to be paid to the magistracy; comp. 1 Pet. ii. 17. τὸν βασιλεία τιμᾶτε. The construction τῷ τὸν φόρον is elliptical. If we may supply it from the sense of the context it would seem to be: τῷ τὸν φόρον [δεῖ ἀπαιτεῖν], or some equivalent expression; and so of τῷ τὸ τέλος.

(8) From these precepts with respect to magistrates, and the rendering to them of what is due on the ground of our civil obligations, the apostle makes an easy transition to our duty in general with respect to the subjects of debts. Μηδενί . . ἀγαπήν, *owe no man any thing, except to love one another*; i. e., scrupulously pay off all debts of whatever nature, and to whomsoever they may be due; except, as I may say, the debt of love, which is such that it can never be paid in the discharge of it. An animated and very expressive description of the extent to which the obligation of *benevolence* reaches! A debt of this nature is not like a pecuniary one, which, by the payment of a certain sum, is fully and finally extinguished. The debt of love is only renewed by payments ever so ample. In its own nature it is inextinguishable; for, as Augustine says: Nec cum redditur amittitur, sed potius reddendo multiplicatur; Ep. 62, ad Cælest. But some commentators take ὀφείλετε in the Indic. and construe the phrase thus: 'Ye have no debt but that of love, etc.;' i. e., true benevolence will lead you to a proper discharge of all your relative duties. I do not think this sense to be so striking as the other.

Ὁ γὰρ ἀγαπῶν . . . πεπλήρωκε, *for he who loves another, fulfils the law*. Γὰρ *illustrantis*, i. e., it stands here in a clause designed to show that *the debt of love* is one which is always due. But how does the apostle intend to illustrate this? The answer is, by showing that the law of God demands love to our neighbour, and this is admitted to be of perpetual obligation; consequently the duty which it demands, must also be perpetual.

(9) He proceeds to show, that the sum of the moral law is contained in the precept *to love our neighbour*.

Τὸ γάρ introduces the proof, from the law, of the position which he had just laid down. γάρ therefore is prefixed here to a clause illustrative of the one which immediately precedes; as it stands in the preceding clause, because it is illustrative of another which goes before it. The τό here is the article prefixed before a quotation or citation, introduced as such; comp. Luke ix. 46, τὰ τίς ἂν εἴη μείζων αὐτῶν; Luke xxii. 2, τὰ, πῶς ἂν ἴλωσιν αὐτόν. See also Acts iv. 21. xxii. 30. xxvii. 4, 9. Luke i. 62. 1 Cor. iv. 6. Rom. viii. 26. 1 Thess. iv. 1. Mark ix. 23. Gal. iv. 25, τὸ γὰρ Ἁγὰρ Σινᾶ ὄρος ἐστίν, *for the or this Hagar means mount Sinai*. See N. Test. Gramm. § 93. 9.

Ὁὐ μοιχεύσεις κ. τ. λ. All these commands proceed from the law of love. By committing any one of the crimes here named, a man sins against the good of his neighbour, and therefore against the precept which requires him to love his neighbour as himself—Ὁὐ ψευδομαρτυρήσεις, in the common text, is of doubtful authority, or rather it is probably *adjectitious*. It is not important to the general meaning of the passage, whether it be inserted or omitted.—Καὶ εἰ τίς is not meant to express a doubt whether there be any other commandment, but only to say; 'Whatever other commandment there may be,' viz., whatever command respecting our *relative* duties.

Ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, *in this saying or declaration*.—Ἐν τῷ, viz., ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, i. e., in the declaration which follows.—Ἀγαπήσεις κ. τ. λ., seems to be quoted from Lev. xix. 18, תְּאַהֲבֶנּוּ כְּעַצְמְכֶם, *thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself*. In this one sentence the apostle affirms the whole essence of the relative *moral* law to be contained; and it is indeed so. Suppose now that every man on earth should really and truly and as highly regard his neighbour's happiness as his own; then all injustice, fraud, oppression, and injury of every kind, would at once cease, and a universal fulfilment of our obligation to others would be the consequence.—Πλῆσιον is itself an *adverb*; but it is here employed as an indeclinable *noun* in the Acc. case, and having the masc. article before it. So the Greeks frequently employed adverbs. The pronoun *ἑαυτὸν* is here referred to the *second* person singular. It may designate either the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd person, by the usage of both classic and N. Test. writers. See Lex. on *ἑαυτοῦ*.

(10) Ἡ ἀγάπη . . . ἡ ἀγάπη, *love worketh no ill to its neighbour; love then is the fulfilling of the law*. That is, he who loves his neigh-

bour as himself, will designedly do him no harm or injury. Πλήρωμα seems here to be of the same meaning as πλήρωσις; and so in Gal. iv. 4. Eph. i. 10. So Philo de Abr. p. 387, πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου; so πλήρωσις τῶν ἡμερῶν, Ezek. v. 2. Dan. x. 3. *The fulfilling of the law* is the completing what the law demands, the filling up the measure of its requisitions. The meaning plainly is, the fulfilling of the law which has respect to our relative duties; comp. Gal. v. 14. James ii. 8. Matt. xxii. 39, 40. 1 Tim. i. 5. What the apostle designs to teach is: 'Love, such as the law demands, will lead us always to seek our neighbour's good, and so to be always paying the debt of benevolence, yet never paying it off.'

(11) Καὶ τοῦτα, i. e., καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖτε, *do this*, viz., all of which he had been exhorting them to do. Καὶ τοῦτο is explained by Theodoret as meaning, καὶ μάλιστα; which gives the sense very well.

Εἰδότες τὸν καιρὸν, *considering the time*, or *taking cognizance of the time*, or (taking the participles as *causal*, which is often the case, New Test. Gramm. § 140. 7) *since*, or *because ye know*, &c. comp. ἦδεν in Acts xxiii. 5. καιρὸν I understand to mean *the gospel-time* which had already come. The apostle considers the commencement of this, which had already taken place, as the beginning of a glorious day, the dawning of the Sun of righteousness with healing in his beams. A state of sin and ignorance is a state of darkness; and out of such a state Christians are brought, that they may see the light; comp. Eph. v. 8, 11. John iii. 19—21. 1 Pet. ii. 9.

"Οτι ἄρα . . . ἐπιστεύσαμεν, *that it is now time to awake out of sleep*, *for now is our salvation nearer than when we believed*. That is, the commencement of the Christian dispensation, and the beginning of light in your own souls, call for corresponding efforts and activity. The image of awaking out of sleep is often used, in order to designate the rousing up from a state of comparative inaction, to one of strenuous effort; comp. Eph. v. 14. 1 Cor. xv. 34. 1 Thess. v. 6.

But what is the σωτηρία, which is nearer than when Christians at Rome first believed? Tholuck, and most of the late commentators in Germany, suppose that the apostle expected the speedy advent of Christ upon earth a second time, when the day of glory to the church would commence. Accordingly, they represent him as here and elsewhere exhorting Christians to be on the alert, constantly expecting the approach of such a day. In support of this view, Tholuck appeals to Phil. iv. 5. 1 Thess. v. 2, 6. Rev. xxii. 12. Such views

and such a mode of representation seems at present to be widely diffused in Germany and to be held even by those who are for the most part strenuous defenders of the *inspiration* of the apostles. But how the words of the apostles, when thus construed, can be made consistent with themselves (not to speak of other difficulties arising from the consideration that they were inspired), is more than I am able to see. The very passage referred to, in the first epistle to the church at Thessalonica, was understood by the Thessalonians in the same manner as Tholuck and others understand it; but this interpretation was formally and strenuously corrected in 2 Thess. ii. Is it not enough that Paul has explained his own words? Who can safely venture to give them a meaning different from what he gives?—Then as to Rev. xxii. 12, how is it possible that the writer who had just made an end of predicting a long series of events that should happen before the *day of glory*, one of which is to occupy a *thousand* years, can be supposed to have believed that all this was to take place during that very generation in which he lived?

I only add here (for this is not the place to enter into a long discussion), that it is incredible that the apostles, if enlightened by supernatural influence, should not have been taught better than to lead the whole Christian church to a vain and false hope about the appearance of Christ; which, when frustrated by time and experience, would lead of course to general distrust in all their declarations and hopes. As the *usus loquendi* does not demand such an exegesis (see in Flattii *Opuscula*, Diss. de *παρουσία Κυρίου*); as the nature of the apostle's knowledge and mission does not allow it; and as Paul has expressly contradicted it in 2 Thess. ii.; so I cannot admit it here, without obtaining different views from those which I am now constrained to entertain.

I must, therefore, refer *σωτηρία* to the *spiritual salvation* which believers were to experience, when transferred to the world of everlasting light and glory. And so construed, the exhortation of Paul amounts to this: 'Christian brethren, we have been brought out of darkness into marvellous light; let us act in a manner that corresponds with our condition. We are hastening to our retribution; every day brings us nearer to it; and in prospect of the reward which now almost appears in sight, as we approach the goal of human life, let us act with renewed effort as duty requires.' So Chrysostom.

(12) Ἡ νύξ . . . ἤγγικε, *the night is advanced, the day is at hand*; a repetition of a part of the idea contained in the preceding verse.

Νύξ is the time of ignorance and darkness in which they had once been. The apostle says : ' This is nearly gone,' i. e., they had now come as it were to the confines of eternal day, or of a more perfect knowledge of divine things. It behoved them, therefore, to rouse up all their energies, and to act in a manner congruous with their condition and obligations.

' Αποθώμεθα . . . φωτός, *let us put away then the works of darkness, and put on the armour of light*; i. e., let us reject such things as we were accustomed to do while in a state of darkness; and let us arise to combat all our spiritual foes, by girding on the armour of light, that is, by living and acting in such a manner as becomes those who are the sons of light.

(13) ' Ὡς . . . περιπατήσωμεν, *let us walk in a becoming manner, as by day*; i. e., let us live as it becomes those who enjoy the light, to whom the path of duty is made plain, and on whom the eyes of men are fixed in order to watch their demeanour. Let us carefully guard against their being able to discern in us any matter of reproach.

' Ἐν ἡμέρα, I take here to be the *Dat. conditionis*, i. e., to designate the circumstance that they have now to act as those who have daylight to guide their actions.

Μὴ κώμοις . . . ζήλῳ, *not in revelling and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and bitter envy*. The apostle here mentions some of those sins which were most usually committed during the night season.

(14) ' Ἀλλ' . . . Χριστόν, *but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ*; i. e., imitate him, which is the usual sense of the Greek *ἐνδύσασθαι τινα*; or perhaps it here means, like the Hebrew *מָלֵא*, *to be filled with*, and so the idea is : Be filled with a Christian spirit, abound in it; "let Christ dwell in you richly."—*Καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς . . . ἐπιθυμίας, and make no provision for the flesh, in respect to its lusts*. *Τῆς σαρκὸς πρόνοιαν* means *provision for the sake of the flesh*, i. e., in order to gratify its lusts, as *εἰς ἐπιθυμίας* explains it. Such a latitude in regard to the use of the Genitive is common; see New Test. Gramm. § 99. So Rom. viii. 32, *πρόβατα σφαγῆς, sheep destined for the slaughter*; comp. Phil. i 22. John v. 29. vii. 35, Matt. iv. 15. x. 5, &c.

CHAP. XIV. 1—23.

THE apostle having given so many precepts for the sake of caution and restraint upon the Jewish part of the church at Rome (on whom he doubtless had his eye when he was writing chap. xiii.), he now turns to the Gentile part, and gives them some salutary cautions with respect to their demeanour towards their Jewish brethren. The Jews, at this time, cherished a deep abhorrence of idolatry; and every thing which pertained to idol worship they avoided with great solicitude. It is no wonder, therefore, that we find among them, even when transplanted into the Christian church, men who abstained from all flesh, lest they should eat that which had been offered to idols. It is to be remembered, that (holocausts excepted) only a part of the flesh of slain beasts was consumed by fire; the rest was reserved for the priests or the offerer, and frequently came to the market for sale. Now a man who ate meats without distinction, that had been obtained at the market, might eat that which had been offered to idols. The Jew shuddered at this, lest he should be defiled; and the Christian Jew could not at once divest himself of such a feeling.

Clement of Alexandria and Augustine, however, interpret the chapter before us as having reference only to scrupulousness about meat that had actually been offered to idols, and not meat in general. But ver. 2 seems to make against this opinion. Accordingly, Chrysostom, Origen, Theodoret, Jerome, and most modern commentators suppose, that the scrupulousness in question extended to all kinds of meat, or at least to all which was sold in the public markets. A comparison of the present chapter with 1 Cor. viii., would seem to afford confirmation of this opinion. It would also seem to establish the idea, that the scruples in question (about the eating of meat) arose from the circumstance, that meats which had been presented at the temples of idols, often came into the markets for sale (1 Cor. x. 25—28), and in consequence of this, it was so difficult to distinguish lawful meats from unlawful ones, that it was duty rather to forego the use of meats, than to incur the danger of eating those which were polluted.

In regard to this last point, however, no less critics than Koppe and Eichhorn have maintained, that the Christians whom Paul has in view here, were a species of Essenes, such as the Greeks called *ἀσκηταί*, *ascetics*, i. e., those who practised peculiar self-denial as to food and drink, and subjected themselves to various penances and mortifications of the flesh, in order that they might attain to a more pure and elevated state of devotion and piety. That a sect of this kind, viz., the Essenes, existed among the Jews at this time, is well known from the testimonies of Philo and Josephus. But besides the Essenes, there were others among the Jews who practised abstinence from meat. Josephus speaks of one Bannus who lived in solitude on fruits and plants, and with whom he spent three years, living in the like manner. So also he mentions priests, who were accused of some slight fault in regard to the Roman government in Judea, and were sent to Rome for trial, who lived on figs and nuts, *Vita Josephi*, §§ 2, 3. There were also, among the Greeks, many Pythagoreans of the newly reviving school of this philosopher, who pursued a like course of life with regard to food. Similar to those classes of men, in respect to their mode of sustenance, are some Christians mentioned by Origen (cont. Celsum, V. 48), who lived in his time. So in *Canones Apostol.* (L.), the like class of men is mentioned.

But although it is plain that there were classes of men at the time when the apostle wrote, who practised the ascetic mode of life which Rom. xiv. contemplates; yet it does not seem probable that such ascetics as have just been mentioned, were the ones whom the apostle here intends to describe. Every one who reads the history of the ascetics of this class, knows, that in every country where they have made their appearance, they have usually obtained for themselves great credit and influence, on the ground of their supposed extraordinary sanctity. As was very

natural, they took to themselves great credit on this account, and looked down with pity or contempt on those, who declined to pursue the course of self-denial which they had adopted. Of course we should expect the apostle, if he were here addressing men of this class, to attack their pride and vain glory, as he does very strenuously in Col. ii. 21—23. But instead of this, we find the ascetic party here to be the one which needs defending. It is the others who look down with contempt or disrespect on them, and who are prone to treat them with some degree of scorn or neglect on account of their weakness or superstition; and therefore the apostle chides the others, and exhorts them to a different demeanour. It is more probable, then, that the whole difficulty in question was one which arose from Jewish scruples about meats and drinks offered to idols, in which the Jewish Christians believed that they could not partake, except at the expense of associating themselves with the worshippers of idols and becoming polluted.

This is satisfactorily confirmed by ver. 5, which speaks of the distinction that those same persons made between days, out of respect to the laws of Moses and the customs of the Jews; comp. Col. ii. 16. We cannot reasonably doubt, therefore, that the apostle is here speaking of such Jewish Christians, as still cherished the feelings and views which they had entertained before their conversion, in regard to the distinction of meats and drinks, and the observance of fast and feast days. The Gentile part of the church would naturally feel no scruple in respect to such matters; and it would not be unnatural for them to look at first with wonder, and afterwards with disdain, on the scrupulousness of their Jewish brethren respecting such external ordinances. It is easy to see, that the peace of the church would thus become endangered. And in order to prevent this, the apostle throws his shield over his brethren in a weaker state of belief, and insists upon it that others shall deal very tenderly and affectionately with scruples of such a nature, and not condemn or despise those who entertained them. This he could insist on with the more urgency, because their scruples were of a conscientious and sober nature, and not mere whims of superstition. Accordingly, the present chapter gives precepts and principles in regard to things of this nature, which must be of great value to the church of Christ, down to the end of time; and on this account, we can aver, in one sense, that we rejoice in the occasion which called forth the expression of such views and feelings on the part of Paul. The whole constitutes a rule of life in regard to weaker Christian brethren, and with regard to food, drink, manner of living, and observance of fasts and feasts of an extraordinary nature, which is a very important guide to scrupulous and tender consciences.

(1) Τὸν . . . κίςτις, *him that is weak in his belief; i. e., him who is not yet fully convinced or enlightened in regard to the true extent of Christian liberty, which pays no superstitious regard to ordinances of a mere external and physical nature.* The article *τῇ* here may be taken as being equivalent to the pronoun *his* which is often the case elsewhere; or *τῇ* may be construed as referring to the Christian belief or persuasion. Πίςτις does not here mean *saving* faith in an appropriate and peculiar sense, but *belief* or *persuasion* in the more general sense of the term; comp. 1 Cor. viii. 11, 12.—Προσλαμβάνεσθε, *receive with kindness, admit to your society or friendship*; so the verb *προσλαμβάνομαι* is used in the New Testament. It means literally *to take to one's self*; and so it is applied to taking a companion, Acts xvii. 5; to receiving into one's house as a guest or a friend, Acts xviii. 26. xxviii. 2. Philem. vs. 12, 18. Hence, in a sense somewhat

more general, *to receive kindly*; comp. Rom. xiv. 3. xv. 7. Calov objects here against his Lutheran brethren, for employing this text to prove that Calvinists should be treated with lenity. He says that 2 John v. 10 is the proper rule to be applied to them!

Μὴ εἰς διακρίσεις διαλογισμῶν, *not so as to make decisions in respect to his opinions.* Διακρίσεις literally signifies *distinctions, decisions, discriminations.* The meaning *doubts, scruples*, needs confirmation, and is unnecessary here. The word διαλογισμῶν, means *thoughts, opinions, sentiments.* The main difficulty is, to make out the verb that is implied after the μή here. We may repeat προσλαμβάνει, and then the sense will be: 'Do not receive him for the sake of making decisions, or so as to make decisions, of opinions or sentiments,' viz., opinions in respect to the subject mentioned in the sequel. Or we may simply supply ἴστω, and then the meaning will be: 'Let not this (viz. the reception spoken of) be such as will lead you to sit in judgment upon the opinions of those who are weak in the faith, in respect to the matter that follows.' The construction of the verse is very obscure. Another exegesis not uncommon is: 'Do not act in such a manner as will have a tendency to promote, rather than allay *scrupulous thoughts* (διακρίσεις διαλογισμῶν) about meats, days, &c.' This sense is a good one it could be fairly made out that διακρίσεις means *scruples* or *doubts*. As the matter stands, the other sense accords best with philology.

(2) *Ος μὲν . . . ὁ δὲ ἀσθενῶν. At first sight, the reader may mistake these formulas for distinctive *antithetic* pronouns. But they are not so. *Ος μὲν would require δς δέ in the antithetic part (see in ver. 5); in the same manner as the pronominal article ὁ μὲν requires the antithetic correspondent to be ὁ δέ. But in the verse before us, the construction is an *anacoluthon*; for it begins with a pronoun and verb in the protasis, viz. ὅς μὲν πιστεύει κ. τ. λ., and then instead of saying ὅς δὲ ἀσθενεῖ, Paul makes use of the article and a participle, viz. ὁ δὲ ἀσθενῶν. Here then is a real *anacoluthon*, i. e., the structure with which the sentence is commenced, is not carried on but exchanged for another. The μὲν with ὅς has simply a *discretive* power in respect to ὅς, which is sufficiently marked in our English *one*. The δέ in the next clause is adversative or antithetic as to the sentiment, and is to be translated *but*.

Πάντα agrees with βρώματα understood, comp. verse 15, but βρώμα is not confined merely to the sense of *meat*; it means *any thing eatable, any food*. Φαγεῖν is the second Aorist here, from the obsolete

φάγω; but it is usually ranged, in the lexicons, under the root *ἐσθίω*. The circumflex accent shows it to be the 2nd Aorist.

Ὁ δὲ . . . ἐσθίει, *but he who is weak eateth herbs*; i. e., ὁ ἀσθενὴς ἐν πίσει, comp. ver. 1, he who is scrupulous about distinction of meats, &c. refrains from meat sold in the markets lest he should eat that which is offered to idols. He prefers to live on *vegetables* (λάχανα), rather than subject himself to this danger. After ἐσθίει the word *μόνον* is implied.

(3) Ὁ ἐσθίων . . . κρινέτω, *let not him who eateth, despise him who eateth not; nor him who eateth not, condemn him who eateth*. Καί *nor*, like the Hebrew *וְ* before a second member of the sentence in which the first member has a negative particle. The English construction demands *not . . . nor*, in order to render the sense of the Greek. Κρίνειν, in the sense of *condemn*, is frequent in the New Testament; as any of the lexicons will show. The sentiment is: 'He who is freed from any scruples about distinction of meats, should not exercise an uncharitable and condemning spirit towards him who still entertains such scruples.' The reason is subjoined:

Ὁ Θεὸς . . . προσελάβετο, *for God has accepted him*, i. e., received him into his redeemed family, and admitted him to its privileges: comp. προσλαμβάνειν in ver. 1.—Αὐτὸν in this case must be *generic*, as it includes both him who eateth, and him who eateth not.

(4). Σὺ τίς . . . οἰκίρην; *Who art thou that condemnest the servant of another?* That is, such a one as is favourably accepted of God, and is his servant and not yours, how can you claim the right of exercising severity towards him, in respect to his scruples of conscience? Σὺ is here properly the Nominative absolute, and applies to any individual of either party. It may be construed as Nominative after *εἰ*, but the other construction seems to be the true one. It is like the Hebrew *וְיָהוָה הָאֵלֹהִים*, [as to] *God, his way is perfect*.

Τῷ ἰδίῳ . . . πίνει, *by his own master he standeth or falleth*. The word *στήκει* here has afforded no small room for discussion among critics. But those who give it the sense of *acting uprightly*, and *πίνει* the sense of *being delinquent*, do not seem to me to consult the context. The apostle says to those who were freed from scruples about food: 'Brethren, do not be severe in condemning those who differ from you in opinion with respect to this point. Yours is not the prerogative to judge in this case; it is God who will acquit or condemn; they are accountable only in such a matter. *στήκει* is not a *classical* word, but is formed, by the later Greek, from

the Perfect ἵστηκα, the *i* being dropped. Its meaning here is, *to stand fast or firm* in a secondary sense, *i. e.*, to hold good one's place at a time of trial, to remain firm and secure. So Psalm i. 5, "The ungodly shall not *stand* in judgment;" *i. e.*, shall not be able to remain firm and safe. So the opposite term (πίπτει) would also lead us to judge. *To fall*, means, in this case, *to be condemned, to be insecure, to be subjected to condemnation or punishment*; exactly as we say in English, of a man on trial for crime and condemned, *he was cast at the trial, he failed*, ἔπεσε. The Dative τῷ ἰδίῳ κυρίῳ, is here the Dative of relation; comp. xii. 10, seq. on this Dative, and New Test. Gramm. 106. 1. The strict rendering *ad sensum* would be: *In relation to his own master he is subject to a sentence of condemnation or acquittal*; *i. e.*, before the tribunal of another he cannot be arraigned in respect to his scrupulous conscience, for it is only his own master who can call him to an account as to this matter.

Ἐσταθήσεται . . . αὐτός, *and he shall be established, for God is able to establish him*; *i. e.*, he shall stand in the judgment of his conduct in reference to this matter, for God is able to acquit him, or God has the power and right of acquitting him, although you should condemn him.

(5) "Ὁς μὲν . . . ἡμέραν, *one esteemeth one day more than another*; *i. e.*, he makes a distinction between days, regarding one as more sacred than another. κρίνει here has a very different sense from that which it conveys in the preceding verse, and is employed in a kind of *paronomasiac* way; it means *estimates, regards, deems*: comp. Acts xiii. 46. xvi. 15. xxvi. 8. Rom. iii. 7. 1 Cor. ii. 2. Joseph. Antiq. Jud. IV. 8, 2, κριθείητε εὐδαιμονίστατοι, *ye shall be deemed most fortunate*. In respect to παρά, in the sense of *more than, above*, see lexicon.

"Ὁς δὲ . . . ἡμέραν, *another esteemeth every day, i. e.*, makes no distinction between days, regards all days alike. The μὲν and δὲ joined with &c in the two clauses, serve merely the purpose of antithetic distinction as to the pronouns.—"Εκαστος . . . πληροφορείσθω, *let every one be fully persuaded in his own mind*; *i. e.*, let each one act conscientiously in respect to this matter, according to the real persuasion or belief of his own mind, so as not to violate his conscience in observing, or neglecting to observe, particular days in a special manner.

Whether the apostle means to include the *Sabbath*, or rather the *Lord's day*, under what he says here of the special observance of particular days, has been called in question by not a few distin-

guished commentators and divines. It is well known, that in the early ages of the church a distinction was made between *Sabbath* and *Lord's day*. The former was the Jewish weekly Sabbath, *i. e.*, the seventh day of the week. It embraced also the occasional fasts and feasts prescribed by the Mosaic law; comp. Col. ii. 16. Gal. iv. 10. Such was the Jewish use of the word $\pi\alpha\psi$, *σάββατον*. But the early Christians, in order to distinguish this from the first day of the week, on which they held their religious assemblies of worship (1 Cor. xvi. 2. Acts xx. 7), called the first day *ἡμέρα Κυρίου* (*Lord's day*), Rev. i. 10. Of this distinction there is clear evidence in the writings of the ecclesiastical fathers. That it was very early made, even in apostolic times, is sufficiently evident from comparing Col. ii. 16 and Rev. i. 10.

The question whether Rom. xiv. 5 has respect to the *ἡμέρα Κυρίου* as well as the *σάββατα* of the Jews, is more difficult of decision than some may at first suppose; because there is nothing in the context which furnishes any certain clue to the meaning of *ἡμέρα* here. But if we may venture to compare Col. ii. 16 and Gal. iv. 10 with the passage here (and it does seem to me that the two passages manifestly have relation to the same usages and prejudices in the church), then we may draw the conclusion pretty clearly, that *ἡμέρα* here relates to days which the scruples of Jewish Christians deemed sacred, and has no relation to the *ἡμέρα Κυρίου* which all agreed to keep holy.

(6) Ὁ φρονῶν . . . οὐ φρονεῖ, *he who regards the day, regards it to [the honouring of] the Lord; and he who regards not the day for [the honouring of] the Lord, he doth not regard it.* That is, he who makes the distinction in question between days, does so because he believes that God has required it, and he keeps such days sacred in order to honour him; but he who does not make these distinctions, refrains from doing it because he thinks that duty to God requires him to refrain, inasmuch as God does not require these days to be kept holy. *Κυρίῳ* is the *Dativus commodi*.

Ὁ μὴ φρονῶν . . . οὐ φρονεῖ is omitted in A., B., C., D., E., F., G.; 23., 57., 67.; Æth., Copt., Vulg., Ital.; Ruf., Ambrosiast., Pel., Aug., Hieron.; and neglected by Erasmus and Mill. Still, the context seems so to require it, that it is now generally admitted.

Καὶ ὁ ἐσθίων . . . ὁ εἶφ, *likewise he who eats, eats [to the honouring of] the Lord, for he gives God thanks; i. e., he who eats food without any scrupulous distinctions, does this with a regard to the commands of God, and is thankful to God for the blessings bestowed upon him, viz., the privilege of enjoying his food without the troublesome*

distinction of clean and unclean. *Γάρ* stands before the reason why he eats in honour of the Lord.

Καὶ ὁ μὴ ἐσθίων, . . . Θεῷ, and he who eats not, for [the honouring] of the Lord he eats not, and gives God thanks. That is, he refrains from certain kinds of food, from a design to obey the commands of God; and for the light which is imparted to him (as he supposes) with respect to making such a distinction in food, he is grateful. Flatt thinks this should be turned thus: 'For the little which he does enjoy, he is thankful to God.' But then this little would be *what he eats*; whereas, he who does *not* eat, is here represented as thankful—for what? *The not eating* must be the answer; and this, in the sense above given.

(7) *Οὐδεὶς γάρ. . . ἑῇ for none of us lives to himself; i. e., none of us, who behaves himself as a Christian, can live only for his own pleasure, or to obey his own inclinations.* The apostle seems here to take it for granted, that those who made distinctions between food, and those who did not, aimed to honour God by this, because they stood pledged to be entirely devoted to his service and glory. —*Ζῆν τινι to live devoted to any person or thing, to accommodate all our actions and desires to his wishes; comp. Luke xx. 38. Rom. vi. 10, 11. Gal. ii. 19.*—The *γάρ* at the beginning of the verse, introduces a general reason for what he had just affirmed.

Καὶ οὐδεὶς ἑαυτῷ ἀποδύσκει, and none of us dieth to himself; i. e., in life and death we are the Lord's, we are bound to glorify him in all that we do. That the phrase *οὐδεὶς ἑαυτῷ ἀποδύσκει* means, we are the Lord's whether in life or in death, *i. e., in the state of the dead, viz., in the present and future world, seems clear from comparing verses 8, 9.*

(8) *Ἐάν τε . . . ἀποδύσχωμεν, for whether we live, we live to the Lord, and whether we die, we die to the Lord; i. e., whether in a state of life or death (comp. v. 9), we belong to the Lord, we are bound to glorify him.* The *γάρ* in this case is introductory to a clause illustrating and confirming the preceding declaration.—The phrases *ἐάν τε . . . ἐάν τε* show the mutual connection of both, and their relation in common to something else; which here is *τῷ κυρίῳ ζῆν* or *ἀποδύσκειν* respectively. The nicer shades of *τέ . . . καί*, or (as here) *τί . . . τί*, it is impossible to imitate in our language.

Ἐάν τί . . . ἵσμεν, whether we live, then, or die, we are the Lord's; i. e., whether we exist in the present world, or in another, viz., the world of the dead, we belong to the Lord, i. e., to Christ. That

Lord does mean Christ here, ver. 9 makes certain. That the apostle means, moreover, by ζῶμεν and ἀποθνήσκωμεν, to describe not the *act* of living and dying, but the *state* of the living and the dead, there can be no reasonable doubt, after consulting verse 9. In other words: 'We, in the state of the living and in the state of the dead, i. e., we of the present or of the future world, are Christ's; he is our Lord, both here and hereafter.—And this being the case, all judgment must be committed to him.

(9) Εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ . . . κυρίως, for Christ both died and revived, for the very purpose that he might be Lord of the dead and the living. There is much discrepancy of readings here. The first καὶ before ἀπέθανε is rejected by many uncial and other MSS. and ancient versions: also by Griesbach, Lachmann, and Reiche. The word ἀνίστηναι, rose, which is in the *textus receptus*, and also in some ancient MSS., versions, and fathers, is rejected on good grounds by Dr. Knapp and all recent critics. It seems to have come from the margin, where it was written as a gloss or explanation of ἵζηται. In regard to ἵζηται, which here has the sense of *reviving, coming to life*, and not simply of living (which has seemed to perplex some commentators), one needs for his satisfaction, only to compare Matt. ix. 18. John v. 25. xi. 25. Acts i. 3. xxv. 15, et alibi. In relation to the sentiment here expressed, viz., that Christ suffered and rose, or in other words, that he "took on him our nature, and became obedient unto death," in order that he might be Lord of all, the reader may compare Phil. ii. 5—11. John xvii. 4, 5. Heb. ii. 9, 10. xii. 2. The apostle means to say, not that *universal dominion* was the principal object of Christ's death, but that this was a fruit or consequence of it, and indeed one of the ends which the Saviour had in view, because it was necessary for the accomplishment of his benevolent purposes.—To be *Lord of the dead and of the living*, is that he should be supreme ruler over the present world and the world of spirits; for the living and the dead make up all the human race.—The supremacy of Christ, and his absolute property in all Christians, living or dead, is fully asserted and implied in vers. 6—9.

(10) Σὺ δὲ . . . σου; and thou, why dost thou condemn thy brother? Σὺ is the Nom. absolute, as in verse 4 above. Δι, but in this case; for the sentiment is adversative. Τί κρίνεις, why dost thou censure thy brother for his weak and scrupulous conscience?

"Ἡ καὶ σὺ . . . σου, lit. or even thou, why dost thou despise thy brother? Καὶ σὺ is emphatic, σὺ being in the Nom. absolute as before. Το

despise here means to regard with feelings of contempt brethren who have scrupulous consciences, to look upon them as inferior.

Πάντες γὰρ . . . Χριστοῦ, for we must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ; i. e., such a brother is not amenable to you in a matter of this nature; Christ is his judge, who is the supreme judge of all. We must leave such matters to him; but we should feel, at the same time, that we are accountable for all that we do or say in respect to our Christian brethren.—Γὰρ is prefixed to a reason given, why we ought not to despise a Christian brother for his weak conscience, viz., the fact that he is accountable to Christ himself and not to us; as we also are accountable for our demeanour toward him.

(11) Ἐγγαγραι γὰρ, where γὰρ is prefixed to a clause introduced in order to confirm what immediately precedes.—ζῶ ἰγὼ . . . Θεῷ, as I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God; i. e., all shall acknowledge subjection to me, and give to me an account of their actions; or, all are accountable to God as their supreme and final judge. The passage is quoted from Is. xlv. 23 (xlv. 23, 24 Sept.), where the Hebrew for ζῶ ἰγὼ is אֲנִי יְהוָה, Sept. κατ' ἑμαυτοῦ ὁμνῶ, by myself do I swear. The ζῶ ἰγὼ of the apostle is equivalent to the אֲנִי יְהוָה of the Hebrew, which is altogether equivalent to אֲנִי יְהוָה. So the apostle has translated *ad sensum*, not *ad verbum*. The ἐν which follows, stands in the Septuagint after κατ' ἑμαυτοῦ ὁμνῶ naturally; in the text of Paul, ζῶ ἰγὼ . . . ἐν, is a *constructio ad sensum*.

(12) That the doctrine of accountability to God is contained or implied in this passage from the Old Testament, Paul now proceeds to assert. Ἀρα οὖν . . . Θεῷ, every one of us, therefore, must give an account respecting himself to God. For λόγος, in the sense here given, comp. Matt. xii. 36. Acts xix. 40. 1 Pet. iv. 5. Heb. xiii. 17. iv. 13.

The apostle here reckons the appearing before the judgment-seat of Christ, as giving an account to God. So God is represented as judging the world by Christ, Acts xvii. 31. Rom. ii. 16. "Deus et Christus arctissime conjuncti sunt, ita ut quod de hoc dicitur, dicitur etiam de illo."

(13) Μήκετι . . . κρίνωμεν, let us then no longer judge one another; i. e., let us no longer do as we have done, in judging and condemning those who make a distinction of meats, days, &c. Since we are all accountable to God for every thing that we do, let us no more

expose ourselves to his displeasure by thus wronging a Christian brother.

Ἄλλὰ τοῦτο . . . σκάνδαλον, *but rather come to this determination, not to put a stumbling-block, or an occasion of falling in the way of a brother.* Κρίναται is here taken in a sense quite different from that which κρίνωμεν conveys in the preceding clause. Κρίναται here means *determine, decide*; κρίναται τοῦτο means, *make or come to this determination*; comp. Acts xvi. 15. xx. 16. 1 Cor. vii. 37. et alibi. The employment of the word again in this case, is occasioned by a kind of παρανομασία which is so frequent in the writings of Paul. It is appropriately what the rhetoricians call *antanaclasis* (ἀντανάκλασις), which means the repetition of the same word in the same sentence, or in one closely connected, in a sense different from that which the word when first mentioned conveyed.

Τῷ ἀδελφῷ is *Dativus incommodi*, as the grammarians say: πρόσκομμα and σκάνδαλον are not materially different; both mean *an occasion or cause of stumbling*. Here they are to be understood, of course, in a *moral* sense; and the use of both words seems designed merely to indicate *every kind of occasion for stumbling*.

(14) Οἶδα . . . Ἰησοῦ, *I know and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus*; i. e., I know, and know for certainty because the Lord Jesus himself has taught me. Ἐν κυρίῳ, *by the Lord*, for so *in* may be construed before the Dative of cause or agent. Or it may be construed as designating Paul's relation to the Lord, i. e., *I, being in the Lord, am persuaded*, &c. The last is the more analogical meaning.

Ὅτι . . . αὐτοῦ, *that nothing is unclean of itself*; i. e., no food or drink in its own nature, or as it is in itself, is unclean to the Christian. Δ' αὐτοῦ, *by itself, through itself, on its own account*. For αὐτοῦ, Lachmann reads αὐτοῦ. The exchange of these words for each other in the New Test., is very frequent; and the confusion is increased much by the negligence of collators as to making the requisite distinction.—Εἰ μὴ . . . κοινόν, *but to him who deemeth any thing to be unclean, it is unclean*; i. e., if a man believes any species of food or drink to be unlawful, and then partakes of it, he defiles himself, because he does that which he believes to be sinful.

(15) Εἰ δὲ . . . λυπεῖται, *now if thy brother is grieved because of meat*. Δέ continuative, *now*; but the sense seems to require γάρ, and there is no doubt that δέ in some cases is employed so that it is equivalent to γάρ; see Passow's Lex. δέ.—Διὰ βρωμα, *because thou eatest meat which he regards as unclean*.—Οὐκ ἐστὶ . . . περιπατεῖς, *thou*

walkest no longer according to what benevolence requires; i. e., thou dost violate the law of love, which would require thee to do unto others that which thou wouldest that others should do unto thee. But this thou dost not, when thou demeanest thyself in this manner.

Μη . . . ἀπίθανε, *destroy not him by thy meat, for whom Christ died.* That ἀπόλλυς means *destroy*, seems plain from comparing 1 Cor. viii. 11 and verse 20 below. The word ἀπόλλυμι was sometimes employed by the Greeks in the sense of *cruciare, to torment, vex*; a sense which is possible here, but not probable. The meaning seems to be: 'Do not furnish an occasion of stumbling to thy brother, lest he fall and come into condemnation.'—'Ὡπὲρ οὗ Χριστοῦ ἀπίθανε seems to be added in order to show how very differently Christ himself acted and felt, with respect to Christians who are weak in faith; and thus to paint, in glowing colours, the criminality of those who refused to imitate his spirit.

(16) Μη . . . ἀγαθόν, *let not your good then be evil spoken of.* Οὐ, *therefore, then, i. e.,* since such is the case, viz., that Christ died for sinners, and that you are under obligation to show the spirit of similar benevolence toward your fellow Christians, you ought to demean yourselves in such a way, as that you will give no occasion for the religious liberty which you enjoy to be evil spoken of. That ἀγαθόν here means freedom from the yoke of bondage which the ceremonial law imposed, I cannot well doubt; and so Origen, Theodoret, Bengel, Clarius, and others understood it. But Chrysostom, Theophylact, Erasmus, and others, understand by ἀγαθόν the Christian religion in general. The sense would be good, if construed in this way; but less appropriate, however, than the meaning above given.

(17) Οὐ γὰρ . . . ἁγίῳ, *for the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost.* The γὰρ here introduces a reason why Christians should not suffer their good to be evil spoken of. Ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ here means, the *spiritual kingdom* of God or Christ; his reign within; his moral dominion over the hearts of men: in a word, true *Christianity*. This does not consist in refraining or not refraining from this or that food or drink; but *spiritual* life consists in holy conformity to God, peaceful and gentle demeanour, and joy such as is imparted by the influences of the Holy Spirit. A truly admirable description of the nature of real Christianity! Εἰρήνη here means *peace*, in opposition to discord and contention among brethren.—'Εν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ may be

applied, as a qualification, to *δικαιοσύνη* and *εἰρήνη* as well as to *χαρά*; but I prefer the construction which I have given.

(18) Ὁ γὰρ . . . ἀνθρώποις, *for he who serveth Christ in respect to these things, is acceptable to God, and approved by men.* The γὰρ here introduces a reason why peace and joy follow the practice of pure Christian principles. Ἐν τούτοις means the things before mentioned, in regard to meats and drinks and feast days, &c. Δόκιμος, *acceptus, gratus*; the apostle means, that men will speak well of such a demeanour as he had commended.

(19) Ἄρα οὖν . . . ἀλλήλους, *therefore let us strive after peace and mutual edification.* τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης . . . τὰ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς, are, according to a very common usage of the Greek, a periphrasis for τὰ εἰρηνικά, &c., or for the simple *εἰρήνη, οἰκοδομή*.—Τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους, i. e., τῆς οἰκοδομῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους.—The article is commonly supplied in this way, before adjectives that follow a noun in order to qualify it, or (which is the same thing) before nouns with prepositions, added merely to qualify the preceding and principal noun; New Test. Gramm. § 92. 1.

The object of this verse is, to charge the church at Rome to demean themselves in such a way, with regard to the matters in dispute which he had touched upon, as would promote the peace of the church and the edification of both parties.

(20) Μὴ . . . Θεοῦ, *destroy not the work of God on account of food.* τὸ ἔργον τοῦ Θεοῦ may be construed as being in substance the same as οἰκοδομή Θεοῦ in 1 Cor. iii. 9, and οἰκοδομή . . . ἐν κυρίῳ in Eph. ii. 21, and οἰκοδομὴν ἑαυτοῦ in Eph. iv. 16; i. e., as meaning Christians, or a Christian. But possibly the writer may refer here to the internal work of *faith*, which is called ἔργον Θεοῦ in John vi. 29. So Reiche, who, after Theodoret and others, construes it of faith and its consequences in renewing and sanctifying the soul; and appeals to 1 Cor. iii. 9. 1 Pet. ii. 5. John vi. 29. That the renewal and sanctification of the heart is the special reason why Christians are called *God's building*, &c. is plain; but I see no reason why the sense here of ἔργον Θεοῦ may not be *concrete*, i. e., no reason why it may not be taken as including the *persons* in whom such a work is carried on.—κατάλυε is a verb accommodated to the figurative expression ἔργον Θεοῦ, and means *to pull down, to destroy*. The meaning is: 'Do not so demean thyself, in respect to this dispute about meats clean and unclean, as to cause thy weak brother to sin and to fall into condemnation.'

Πάντα μὲν καθάρη, *all [meats] are clean; i. e.,* no distinction of food is to be made under the Christian dispensation. All distinctions of this nature made by the Levitical law are abolished. That πάντα agrees with βρώματα implied, is clear from ἵνα ἐκεῖν βρώματος of the preceding verse. Μὲν in the protasis here has ἀλλά in the apodosis for its corresponding particle, which is often the case; see Passow's Lex. μὲν, 2 f.—'Αλλά . . . ἰσθίωντι, *they are hurtful to the man who eats so as to occasion stumbling thereby.* 'Αλλά here concedes what is said in the preceding clause, but stands (as it often does) before a clause which limits or makes exception to this general principle.—Διά, before a noun in the Genitive, often designates the manner in which a thing happens or is done; so (for example) in Luke viii. 4, διὰ παραβολῆς, i. q., παραβολικῶς; Acts xv. 27, διὰ λόγου, *orally*; 2 Cor. x. 11, δι' ἐπιστολῶν, *in the way of writing*; Heb. xiii. 22, διὰ βραχείων, *briefly*, &c.; see Bretschn. in διά, c. a. But here it may seem uncertain at first view, whether διὰ προσκόμματος designates *the giving of offence*, or *the taking of offence*. The context shows, however, that the former is the more probable; inasmuch as the apostle is here plainly addressing those who were not weak in the faith, but believed that all meats were clean. What he says, then, may well be supposed to have reference to their actions and the effects of them.

Κακόν here makes some difficulty. Is it subject or predicate? The most facile construction seems to be, to repeat βρώμα mentally from the preceding part of the verse, and to arrange the sentence thus: ἀλλὰ κακόν [ἴστι βρώμα] τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ κ. τ. λ. Or πᾶν may be understood as the subject of the sentence; or κακόν may be rendered as a noun = *bad* or *evil thing*, for so κακόν appears to be constructed in the next verse. The meaning of κακόν in this case is *spiritual*, not physical. The apostle means to say, that it is a *sin* when any one eats so as to give offence in such cases. The participle τῷ ἰσθίωντι seems to be equivalent to the Inf. mode ἰσθίειν; and it may be rendered here as expressing conditionality, i. e., *if* or *provided that he eat*, &c. See N. Test. Gram. § 140. 8.

(21) Καλὸν . . . ἀσθενεῖ, *it is good not to eat flesh, nor drink wine, nor [to do any thing] whereby thy brother stumbleth, or has ground of offence, or is made weak.* Μηδὲ ἐν ᾧ is elliptical; the full expression would be, *μηδὲ φαγεῖν ἢ πινεῖν τι ἐν ᾧ κ. τ. λ.* The words ἢ σκανδαλίζεται ἢ ἀσθενεῖ, are omitted in Codd. A. C. 67, and in Syr. Arab. Copt. versions; also in Orig., Ruf., and Augustine. Mill and Koppe hold them to be a gloss or repetition of προσκόπτει; but Reiche contends

against this. The sense of ἀσθενεῖν is *to render incompetent, viz., incompetent to walk safely or securely.*

(22) Σὺ Θεοῦ, *hast thou faith? keep it to thyself before God; i. e., hast thou a belief that there is no difference in meats (which is truly the case), yet deem it sufficient, in respect to this point, to regulate by it thy conduct in private as seen only by the eye of God. Do not act this out in public, when you may give needless and injurious offence.* Πίστιν has a limited sense here, as in ver. 1 of the present chapter.

Μακάριος δοκιμάζει, *happy [is he], who does not condemn himself in respect to the thing which he allows; i. e., we may congratulate that man, who does not so use his Christian liberty in respect to food, as to bring on himself condemnation or blame by an abuse of it, or by making use of it in an imprudent and inconsiderate manner.*

Ἐν ᾧ in this case is an example of attraction which is of an elliptical nature. It stands for ἐν τοῦτω ᾧ; which would complete the grammatical construction. See N. Test. Gram. § 113. Note 2.

(23) Ὁ δὲ πιστεῖ, *but he who doubts is condemned if he eat, because it is not of faith; i. e., he who doubts whether it is lawful for him to eat a particular kind of food, and yet eats it, is worthy of condemnation; because he does this against his conscience or belief, or at least without an approving conscience.*

Πάν ᾧ ἵστί, *and every thing that is not of faith is sinful; i. e., not only eating against one's conscience or without an approving conscience, is deserving of condemnation, but any thing else done in like manner is sinful. No man should indulge in any demeanour or conduct, when the lawfulness of it is to him a matter of doubt. A truly excellent maxim in Christian morals, and one which, if duly heeded by Christians, would prevent many a bitter hour of darkness and contrition.*

CHAP. XV. 1—33.

BETWEEN the preceding verse and verse 1 of this chapter, the Cod. Alex., and 106, Codd. minusc., most of the Greek fathers, together with the Syriac and Arabic versions, insert vers. 25—27 of chap. xvi., *i. e., the close of this epistle.* Hence has arisen the controversy, whether the epistle properly closes with chap. xiv. On the side of the *textus receptus*, which places

these verses at the end of the epistle, are the Cod. Vaticanus, 3 uncial Codd., several Codd. minusc., and the Latin fathers. For this arrangement, also the internal evidence arising from the connection may be appealed to; for it seems to be quite plain, that chap. xv. is intimately connected with chap. xiv., in respect to the subject of which it treats. If Paul be the author of the whole epistle (and the evidence appears to be very satisfactory that he is), then it would be somewhat singular that the passage in xvi. 25—27 should be inserted here, where there seems to be no special call for a doxology, and where the connection is so close with the sequel, as it stands in the *textus receptus*. Flatt appeals to Eph. iii. 20, in order to show that Paul is accustomed to introduce doxologies into the body of his epistles. He might have appealed to several other instances of the like nature; e. g., Rom. i. 25. xi. 36. 2 Cor. xi. 31. Gal. i. 5. Phil. iv. 20. 1 Tim. i. 17; but all these examples are in quite a different situation from that of the present one, for with one exception (1 Tim. i. 17), God is the *immediately preceding* subject of the writer; and in 1 Tim. i. 17, this is implied. But such is not the case in the instance under examination. The internal congruity of the passage, then, seems to be strongly against the insertion of xvi. 25—27 in this place. And although Griesbach has inserted it, and Morus, Wetstein, Flatt, Tholuck and many other critics approve of this; yet I agree most cordially with Dr. Knapp, who has decided more conformably, as I apprehend, to the principles of true criticism, that the order of the *textus receptus* is the true one.

In the present chapter, Paul continues to exhort the church at Rome to strive after unity and peace. He sets before them the self-denial of Christ, vers. 3, 4. He beseeches God to give them the spirit of Christian unity and love, vers. 5, 6. He exhorts them to a mutual kind reception of each other, ver. 7. He shows that the reception of Gentiles into the Christian church, had been clearly and often predicted, vers. 8—12; and prays God to fill them all with joy and peace, verse 13. He apologizes, as it were, for writing to the Church at Rome, by describing the nature of his office as an apostle to the Gentiles, the labours which he had performed while holding this office, and the affectionate desire which he had cherished of paying the church at Rome a visit, vers. 14—24. He describes to them the plan of his future journeys and labours, expresses his hope of yet visiting them, and begs an affectionate interest in their prayers to God for him, vers. 25—32. He then concludes with a benediction, ver. 33.

(1) Ὁφείλομεν δὲ . . . βασιλάζειν, *we, however, who are strong, ought to bear with the infirmities of the weak*. Δί must, on the whole, be considered as *adversative* here. The course of thought seems to be thus: 'He who eats in a state of doubt, commits a sin against his own conscience; *but* we, who have more enlightened views, ought to bear with his scruples, and not to demean ourselves so as to increase them.' So Reiche. Δύνατοι, *the strong in faith, i. e., those who had no scruples about meats and drinks, &c.*—Ἀδυνατών, *those who were not δύνατοι, i. e., who had scruples, &c.*—Βασιλάζειν, *to bear with, to endure patiently, to tolerate*; comp. Gal. vi. 2. Rev. ii. 2.

Καὶ μὴ ἑαυτοὺς ἀρέσκειν, *and not to please ourselves; i. e., not to act merely in such a way as would gratify our own views and inclinations*. See the example of Paul, in 1 Cor. ix. 22.

(2) Ἐκαστος . . . οἰκοδομήν *let each one of us please his neighbour in respect to that which is good unto [his] edification; i. e., let us act*

in such a manner as to please our neighbour, so far as we may do so and do what is good; let us act so as to edify him.

(3) Καὶ γὰρ . . . ἥρεσεν, *for Christ did not please himself; i. e.,* Christ did not have respect merely to his own pleasure or pain, convenience or inconvenience; but did that which was grateful and useful to others, although he exposed himself to great suffering in consequence of acting thus. Γὰρ stands prefixed here to a reason why we ought to seek the good of others.

Ἀλλὰ . . . ἐπ' ἐμὲ, *but, as it is written, the reproaches of those who reproached thee have fallen upon me.* The passage is quoted from Ps. lxi. 10 (lxix. 9). The general sentiment is here accommodated to a particular case; i. e., the same thing which this sentiment declares, was in fact exemplified in the treatment which Christ received. In other words, Christ suffered reproaches rather than to desist from his beneficence towards others; which is the sentiment of the passage quoted.

(4) Ὅσα γὰρ . . . προεγράφη, *for whatsoever things were written in ancient times, were written for our instruction.* The connection of this verse with the preceding is somewhat difficult. The γὰρ here seems to follow something implied, viz., 'This Scripture is appropriate, for, &c.' Προεγράφη, lit. *were written before, i. e.,* in former days, in ancient times, as I have rendered it above.

Ἰνα . . . ἰχωμεν, *that through patience, and the admonition of the Scriptures, we might obtain hope.* Ἰπομονῆς refers to a patient endurance of the troubles and sorrows, to which the doing of good may expose us; or to patient tolerance of the ignorance and prejudice of others. Reiche refers it to patient continuance in belief. But this is not so apposite:—παρακλήσεως seems here to mean *admonition* or *exhortation*; for it refers back to διδασκαλίαν, and if rendered *consolation* does not seem to be directly congruous with that word. The writer here refers to the exhortation virtually contained in the Scripture quoted, to persevere meekly and patiently in doing good.

Patience of this nature will produce *hope*; comp. Rom. v. 3—5. He who perseveres in thus doing good, amid the evils which may come upon him, will be rewarded with "a hope that maketh not ashamed."

(5) Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς . . . Ἰησοῦν, *now may the God of patience and admonition give mutual unity of sentiment to you, according to Christ Jesus.* Ὁ Θεὸς τῆς ὑπομονῆς means, God who bestows patience, or God who is the author of patience; just as the God of grace, is the

God who bestows grace. So ὁ Θεὸς τῆς παρακλήσεως means, either God who is the author of exhortation or encouragement [viz. to persevere], or God who is the author of consolation. I understand παρακλήσεως here in the sense of exciting or exhorting to acts of self-denial, *i. e.*, to do those things which make for peace and for mutual Christian edification, although they may cost self-denial and mortification; which accords with the context above.—Δύη is a later form of Opt. 2 Aor. for δοίη; which the older grammarians do not acknowledge.

Κατὰ Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν means, in accordance with the Spirit of Christ, or agreeably to what Christ or the Christian religion requires. The earnest supplication of the apostle, that the Romans may be led τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν ἐν ἀλλήλοις, shows how mistaken those are who think that practical unity of sentiment among Christians is not desirable, even as to matters not essential to salvation; for surely the sentiment about distinction of meats was not essential in this sense. If now such unity in smaller matters was urged by the apostle, then of course he would urge it far more in things essential to salvation. The precepts of the apostle show, also, that Christians may differ about externals, and things of minor importance, without hazarding their salvation; although not without endangering in some degree the peace and welfare of the Church. Such is the imperfection of human nature, that difference of opinion is apt to produce dispute; and dispute of course is apt to lead, more or less, to alienation of feeling.

(6) Ἥνα . . . Χριστοῦ, *that with one accord and with one voice you may glorify God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.*—Ὁμοθυμαδὸν comes from ὁμός *conjunctus*, and δύμος *animus*. This characterizes the union of mind or sentiment, which the apostle desires should pervade the Christian church. Ἐν ἑνὶ στόματι characterizes the harmony of the voices, in the song of praise which was to be sung by the church; *i. e.*, they should not sing *discordant* notes, but *harmonious* ones. The meaning is not literal here, but figurative, viz., that with union in their praise to God they might offer him thanksgiving, that they might all accord in the same feeling and same worship.

In καὶ παρὶς, καὶ is *explicative*, *i. e.*, "et copulat et explicat;" see Bretschn. Lex. καὶ, 2. *b.* Such is a very common idiom in the New Testament with respect to καὶ as *explicative*; comp. 1 Pet. i. 3.

2 Pet. i. 11. 20. Phil. iv. 20. Eph. i. 3. Col. iii. 17. In these cases, viz., such as have καί *explicative* followed by a noun in apposition with the preceding noun and limiting or defining it, the article is usually omitted before the second noun, as here before πατέρα; compare also, in this respect, the examples cited above.

(7) Διὸ . . . Θεοῦ, *therefore show kindness to each other, as Christ also hath showed kindness to you, unto the glory of God*; i. e., in view of all that has been said, I beseech you to treat each other with brotherly kindness and affection; yea, with kindness like to that which Christ has shown to you, in order that God may be glorified.

Διό refers to all which had been before said of Christian kindness and forbearance. As to προσλαμβάνετε, comp. xiv. 3. ῥῆμας in the *textus receptus* is ἡμᾶς. This latter is removed, because the MSS. A. C. D. E. F. G., many Codd. minusc., and several versions and fathers, read ὑμᾶς.—Εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ Tholuck interprets of *eternal happiness*, i. e., the glory which God bestows. The phrase is capable of this meaning, comp. Heb. ii. 10. Rom. v. 2. 1 Pet. v. 4; but vers. 8, 9, require a different sense here, viz., since Christ hath kindly received you, in order that God may be glorified.

(8) Λέγω διὰ κ. τ. λ. Διὶ “*accuratius definit*,” i. e., it is added to a phrase or sentence, inserted for the sake of more full and entire explanation. The design, however, is not directly indicated by δι, but by the nature of the case. The writer having asserted that Christ has kindly received us in order that God may be glorified, goes on now to add some things which serve to show, that Christ entered upon the duties of his mediatorial office in order to propagate the truth, and to bring Jew and Gentile nations to glorify God.

Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν . . . Θεοῦ, *Jesus Christ was a minister of the circumcision, on account of the truth of God*; i. e., that Jesus Christ was a minister of the Jews, that he served the cause of divine truth among the Jews, in order to promote its true interests. ῥῆμα, *on account of, for the sake of*.

Εἰς τὸ . . . πατέρων, *in order to confirm the promises made to the fathers*; i. e., in order to carry into execution the promises made to the ancient fathers, viz., of spiritual blessings to be bestowed on their children.

(9) Τὰ διὰ . . . Θεοῦ, [I say] *also, that the Gentiles are to glorify God for his mercy [in Christ]*: i. e., the Gentiles as well as the Jews, are to be brought into the church, that God may be all and in all, and

thus be glorified by all men. Δέ, i. e., λέγω δέ as above, *I add further*.—Δοξάσαι is constructed with λέγω implied, as the version shows. The present phrase discloses the meaning of εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ in ver. 7.

Διὰ τοῦτο . . . ψαλῶ, *on this account will I praise thee among the Gentiles, yea, to thy name will I sing praise*. The quotation is from Ps. xviii. 49. The design of it is to show, that the Gentiles, as well as the people of Israel, would have the blessings of the gospel proffered to them, and be brought to glorify God.—'Εξαμολογήσομαι, *I will praise thee*, like the Hebrew אֶשְׁבַּח.—Τῷ ὀνόματί σου, *to thy name*, i. e., to thee, like the Hebrew לְפָנֶיךָ.

(10) Καὶ πάλιν λέγει, viz., in Deut. xxxii. 43.—Εὐφρανθήσεσθε . . . αὐτοῦ, *rejoice ye Gentiles with his people*; Hebrew הָיָה נִינִי נְחִימָה עִמּוֹ. The design of the quotation is, to show that the Gentiles are spoken of in the Old Testament Scriptures, as destined to be brought into the church of God, or as being made to praise him.

(11) Καὶ πάλιν, viz., in Ps. cxvii. 1 (Sept. 116. 1). The sentiment is the same as before. The object in accumulating quotations, is additional confirmation of what the writer had advanced.

(12) Καὶ λέγει, viz., in Is. xi. 10. In the quotation, the apostle omits בְּיוֹם הַהוּא, *in that day*. Also instead of the Hebrew עֶמֶד לְנִסְ עַמִּים, *who shall stand as a banner of the nations or Gentiles*, the apostle has (with the Septuagint) καὶ ὁ ἀνιστάμενος ἄρχειν ἔθνων, *one shall arise to be a leader of the Gentiles*; *ad sensum*, but not *ad literam*, as the Hebrew vowels now are. But probably the apostle read עֶמֶד, and then his version is literal. For ἐλπιούσι, the Hebrew has יִדְּלוּ. The whole quotation, therefore, is *ad sensum* only; and it is truly so much. It is added to the others for the same purpose as before, viz., with the design of showing that the Gentiles should belong to the Christian church, so that God may be glorified by them.

Thus far in confirmation of the latter clause of ver. 7. The apostle now quits this subject, and resumes his supplications in behalf of the church at Rome, which were interrupted by ver. 7, seq.

(13) 'Ο δὲ Θεὸς . . . πιστεύουσιν, *now may the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing*; i. e., may that God who is the author of all Christian hope (comp. ἐλπιούσιν in ver. 12), make your joy and peace which result from faith in Christ, greatly to abound.—Εἰς τὸ . . . ἅγιον, *so that ye may abound in hope, through the power of the Holy Spirit*; i. e., so that, having much joy and peace in believing,

you may also have a lively Christian hope of future glory, through the influence of the Holy Spirit who dwells in you, and who gives the earnest of future glory; comp. Eph. i. 13, 14. Rom. viii. 23. with the notes upon it.

(14) Πείσυσμαι δέ, where δέ “orationi continuandæ inservit,” as also in ver. 13 above.—Καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγώ, *even I myself*. Καὶ added to pronouns in this way, serves to make the expression more distinct and intense. Here it is as much as to say, ‘Even I who have thus warned and cautioned you, am persuaded, &c.’—Περὶ ὑμῶν, *in respect to you*.—Ὅτι . . . ἀγαθωσύνης, *that you yourselves (καὶ αὐτοί) are filled with kindness*. Καὶ αὐτοί indicates what I have expressed in the translation, as nearly as our language can express the value of the Greek phrase. “Ἀγαθωσύνης I take here to refer to the kind feelings which the apostle hoped and believed the Roman Christians would cherish towards each other.

Πεπληρωμένοι . . . νοουσιεῖν, *abounding in all knowledge, and able to give mutual admonition*. The meaning is: ‘I am persuaded that ye possess in abundance such Christian knowledge, i. e., such a knowledge of Christian truths and principles, that ye will be able to give such advice and warning as you may mutually need.’

(15) Τολμηρότερον . . . ὑμᾶς, *I have written in part the more boldly to you, brethren, as one repeating admonition, i. e., I have written with more freedom than might have been expected from a stranger, when reminding you of the various things which I have urged upon you*. Ἀπὸ μέρους means *in some parts of his epistle, i. e., as to some things*. It seems to qualify ἔγραψα—Ἐπαναμνηστικῶν, adding to or repeating admonition, or something in the way of reminiscence.

Διὰ τὴν χάριν . . . Θεοῦ, *on account of the favour which was bestowed upon me by God*; namely, the honour of the apostolic office (comp. Rom. i. 5), which the sequel shows to be the meaning of χάριν here.

(16) Εἰς τὸ εἶναι . . . ἱδνῇ, *that I should be a minister of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles*. Because his office led him to preach the gospel to the Gentiles, and to exercise a spiritual watch over them, he had ventured to address the church at Rome with freedom.

Ἱερουργοῦντα . . . Θεοῦ, *performing the office of a priest* [in respect to] *the gospel of God*: i. e., acting a part in respect to the concerns of Christians, not unlike that of a priest among the Jews.—ἵνα γίνηται . . . ἁγίῳ, *that the offering of the Gentiles might be acceptable, being purified by the Holy Spirit*; i. e., that the Gentiles may be offered to God, whom as their λειτουργός I present, inasmuch as they

have been rendered clean, pure, by the sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit on their hearts.

(17) *Ἐχω οὖν . . . Θεοῦ, *I have then cause for glorying, through Jesus Christ as to those things which pertain to God*; i. e., being a minister of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles, I have cause for rejoicing, that he has strengthened me and given me success among them, in things pertaining to religion.—Οὖν, *then*, i. e., since God has bestowed such an office upon me.—'Εν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ may mean *through the aid of Christ*. Paul had just averred that he was λειτουργὸς Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ; and as such, he may be understood as here intimating that Christ had afforded him aid, so as to ensure him success in his employment. That ἐν often has the meaning of *by* or *through*, in the sense of *ope, auxilio alicujus*, there can be no doubt; e. g. "He casts out demons ἐν τῷ ἀρχοντί, *by the aid of the prince of demons*," Matt. ix. 34. In like manner ἐν is used in John xvii. 10. Acts iv. 9. xv. 7. xvii. 28, 31, et sæpe alibi. But ἐν x. Ἰησοῦ may also mean, 'I, being in Christ Jesus, viz. as before described, have cause for glorying, etc.'

(18) Οὐ γὰρ . . . ἑμοῦ *for I will not presume to mention any thing which Christ hath not wrought by me*; i. e., I do not, in saying this, intend to claim any praise by exaggerating my success, or taking to myself credit for what I have not done or for what Christ has not done by me εἰς ὑπακοήν ἔθνων, *in order to bring the Gentiles to obey the gospel*.—Λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ means, *by preaching and by other personal effort*. τὰς explicantis, i. e., preceding what serves to limit the declaration which goes before. The connection seems to be thus: I speak of the glorying in Christ which I may truly have; *for* I will not presume to appropriate to myself any praise for what I have not done, or rather, for what Christ has not done by me.

(19) 'Εν δυνάμει . . . τεράτων, *by the influence of signs and wonders, or wonderful signs*. In Hebrew, אֱמוּנָה וּמוֹפְתִים (usually conjoined) means *wonders, signs, or miracles* adapted to persuade or enforce belief in the power, providence, veracity, etc., of God. The union σήμεια καὶ τέρατα in the New Testament, is an imitation of this idiom. It may be rendered as a Hendiadys, and the latter noun made an adjective to qualify the former, agreeably to an idiom common both in the Old and New Testament. If rendered *signs and wonders*, then σημείων means *miraculous proofs* adapted to impress the mind with conviction, and τέρατα means *wonderful events or occurrences*, adapted to fill the mind with awe. Both together consti-

tute a very strong designation of supernatural interposition and impressive evidence arising from it.

Ἐν δυνάμει . . . ἁγίου, *by the influence of the Holy Spirit*, may refer to the signs and wonders performed by virtue of this influence; and so Chrysostom, Theodoret, Erasmus, and others, have understood it. But it may also mean *the internal influences of the Spirit*, *e. g.*, the gift of prophecy, the power of speaking in foreign languages, etc., and so Beza, Grotius, Tholuck, and others have explained it. In this case it is *co-ordinate* with δυνάμει σημείων καὶ τεράτων, not *subordinate* to it, *i. e.*, not used merely to qualify it. Reiche understands it as expegetical of σημείων καὶ τεράτων, which he refers to the internal influences of the Spirit; but general usage is against such an interpretation. On the whole I regard ἐν δυνάμει πν. ἁγ. as *co-ordinate* with the preceding phrase, and designed to mark the internal spiritual gifts of Christians.

Ὡς τε με . . . Χριστοῦ, *so that from Jerusalem and around, even to Illyricum, I have fully declared the gospel of Christ.* Ὡς τε με . . . πεπληρωκέναι is the usual construction of the Infinitive with ὥς τε. Πεπληρωκέναι many interpret as having here the sense of *diffusing, spreading abroad*; and this they derive from the sense of *filling up*, which the word commonly has, because, in order to *fill up*, a *diffusion* into all parts is necessary. In the like sense the word is said to be employed in Acts v. 28; but this is a mistake as the verb is there followed by a noun which designates *place*, and therefore the verb retains the usual meaning. A real parallel is in Col. i. 25, πληροῦν τὸν λόγον; where the meaning seems to be *fully to declare, i. e.*, to accomplish or complete the declaration of the divine doctrine. The passages quoted by Reiche, from 3 K. i. 14 (Sept.) and 1 Macc. iv. 19, are inapposite; the first having another sense, and the latter depending on a contested reading. The phrase, in the sense which Paul gives it, appears to be peculiar to him alone, elsewhere it means to *fulfil*, in the sense of fulfilling a prophetic declaration, &c. Illyricum was a province bounded south by Macedonia, west by the Adriatic, east by a part of the river Danube, and north by a part of Italy and Germany. It corresponds with the modern Croatia and Dalmatia; and was the extreme boundary of what might be called the Grecian population. The circle of Paul's preaching, then, as here described, reaches from the extreme north-west of the land of the Greeks, to Jerusalem and round about, *i. e.*, it comprehends all Greece in the widest sense of this term, Asia Minor, the Grecian

islands, the country between Asia Minor and Jerusalem, and the region around Jerusalem, i. e., Phenicia, Syria, and part of Arabia. Comp. Acts ix. 20. Gal. i. 16, 17.

(20) Οὐρῶ . . . οἰκοδομῶ, and was strongly desirous to preach the gospel, not where Christ was named lest I should build on another's foundation. Φιλοτιμούμενον is to be constructed with μέ, taken from the preceding verse. The word literally signifies to covet or desire as an honour, to regard as honourable, hence the secondary sense, to desire strongly, earnestly to wish for or to covet. Οὐρῶ must be regarded as qualifying εὐαγγελίζεσθαι. Its present position seems to be for the sake of emphasis. Its correspondent is καθώς in the next verse. I have endeavoured to represent all this in the version and its punctuation; but it is difficult to do it in a satisfactory manner.

As οὐρῶ is designed to refer to the manner of preaching, so the apostle describes this first negatively, by οὐκ εἶπεν, κ. τ. λ., then affirmatively by ἀλλὰ καθώς, κ. τ. λ.

(21) Ἀλλὰ . . . συνήσουσι, but, as it is written: They shall see to whom no declaration was made respecting him, and they who have not heard shall understand. The quotation is from Is. lii. 15; a passage which seems to have respect to the Messiah's being made known to the heathen. The apostle quotes it here in order to illustrate and to justify the principle which he had avowed, viz., that of preaching the gospel where it was entirely unknown before. The quotation says as much as to declare, that the gospel shall be thus proclaimed. Ὁφονται and συνήσουσι are to be understood as designating mental vision and perception; for this is what the writer intends to designate.

(22) Διὸ καὶ . . . ὑμᾶς, wherefore I was greatly hindered from coming to you. Διὸ means, on account of his many and urgent calls to preach elsewhere. Καὶ is here joined with ἐνεκοπτόμην τὰ πολλὰ as an intensive, i. e., "sensum intendit, augmentat." The apostle does not simply say, that he was often hindered or much hindered, ἐκοπτόμην τὰ πολλὰ, but καὶ ἐκοπτόμην τὰ πολλὰ, I was altogether hindered, i. e., I had such frequent and urgent calls elsewhere, that it was impossible for me to visit Rome as I desired to do. Passow is, so far as I know, the first lexicographer who has done any tolerable justice to the Proteus καί of the Greeks.

(23) Νυνὶ δέ . . . ἔτι, but now, having no longer any place in these regions, and being desirous for many years to pay you a visit. Τόπον ἔχω, i. e., having no longer any considerable place, where I have not proclaimed the gospel.

(24) Ὡς ἴαν . . . ὑμᾶς, *whenever I may go into Spain, I hope, as I pass on, to see you*; i. e., intending to visit Spain, he meant to take Rome in his way. Ἐάν appears here (as often in the New Test., Sept. and Apocr.), to stand for ἄν. Its use in such a way seems to belong to the later Greek. See Winer N. T. Gramm. p. 257. ed. 3. Here it qualifies the particle of time, ὡς. The Subj. mood which follows is designed to designate a *possible* or *probable* action. Had the Indic. been used (as D. E. F. G. exhibit it), then the meaning would be, that the apostle certainly expected, or was resolved to go. In the *textus receptus*, ἐλθύσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς follows Σπανίαν; which Griesbach and Knapp have rejected, as they are not found in Codd. A. C. D. E. F. G., nor in the Syriac, Arabic or Coptic versions, &c. Whether the apostle did in fact ever make a journey to Spain, is somewhat uncertain. The tradition of the church affirms this; but not on sure grounds. In case we allow that he was imprisoned a second time at Rome, such a journey is not improbable.

Καὶ . . . ἵκει, *and to be sent on my way thither by you*. The apostle here refers to the usual custom of the churches, when the messengers of the gospel departed from them, of sending their elders, &c., to accompany them for some distance on their journey; comp. Acts xv. 3. xvii. 14, 15. xx. 38. xxi. 5. Ἐάν . . . ἱμπλησθῶ, *when I am in part first satisfied with your company*. Observe the delicacy of the expression. The apostle does not say ἱμπλησθῶ, *satisfied*, but ἀπὸ μέρους ἱμπλησθῶ, *partly satisfied*, as though he never could enjoy their society sufficiently to gratify all his desires.

(25) Νυνὶ δὲ . . . ἀγίοις, *but now I go to Jerusalem to supply the wants of the saints*. Διακονέω is often used in the New Testament, to designate the supplying with food and other comforts of life. 'At present,' says the apostle, 'I cannot visit you, as duty calls me in another direction.'

(26) Εὐδόκησαν γὰρ . . . Ἰερουσαλήμ, *for it has seemed good to Macedonia and Achaia, to make some contribution for indigent Christians at Jerusalem*. Κοινωνία, *contribution, collatio beneficiorum*. Comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 1—4. 2 Cor. viii. ix. Acts xxiv. 17.

(27) Εὐδόκησαν γὰρ . . . εἰσι, [I say] *it has seemed good, for they are truly their debtors*. Γὰρ καὶ ὀφείλεται αὐτῶν εἰσι, assigns a reason why it seemed good. Καὶ is here an *intensive, truly, really*. Dr. Knapp has pointed this verse so as to disturb the sense. The comma should not be after γὰρ, but after εὐδοκησαν.

Εἰ γὰρ assigns a reason why they are debtors. *If the Gentiles have*

shared in their spiritual things, they ought surely to aid them in temporal things. Καί intensive, in καὶ ἐν τοῖς σαρκικοῖς.

(28) Τοῦτο . . . Σπανίαν, *now when this duty shall have been discharged, and this fruit made sure to them, I shall pass through the midst of you into Spain.* Καρπὸν here means the fruit of the contribution in Macedonia and Achaia, the fruit which their benevolence had produced. Σφραγισμένος, applied to an instrument in writing, means *to authenticate it, to make it valid, i. e., sure to answer the purpose for which it was intended.* So here, the apostle would not stop short in the performance of the duty with which he is entrusted as the almoner of the churches, until he had seen the actual distribution of their charity among the indigent saints at Jerusalem; a fidelity and an activity well worthy of all imitation.

(29) Οἶδα δὲ . . . ἰκεύσομαι, *I know, also, that when I come to you I shall come with the full blessing of the gospel of Christ.* Ἐκ πληρώματι εὐλογίας, *with an abundant blessing;* where the first of the two nouns constitutes the adjective; comp. Heb. Gramm. § 440. b.

(30) Παρακαλῶ δὲ . . . Χριστοῦ, *moreover I beseech you, brethren, by the Lord Jesus Christ.* Διὰ continuative.—Διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, *for the sake of the Lord Jesus Christ, i. e., out of love and regard for him.*—Καὶ διὰ . . . πνεύματος, *and by the love of the Spirit; i. e., by the affectionate Christian sympathy for the friends of Christ, which the Spirit has given you.*—Συναγωνίσασθαι . . . Θεόν, *that ye strive together for me, in your prayers to God in my behalf; i. e., that you unite with me in my Christian warfare, helping me by your earnest supplications to God in my behalf.*

(31) Ἴνα . . . Ἰουδαίαι, *that I may be delivered from unbelievers in Judea; i. e., pray that I may be delivered from the enemies of the gospel in Judea, whither I am going: for I have reason to expect persecution and injury from them.*

Καὶ ἵνα . . . ἁγίοις, *and that my service which is for Jerusalem may be acceptable to the saints.* Διακονία means his service in carrying and distributing the contributions of the Greek churches. It seems rather singular, at first, that he should doubt whether such a charity would be agreeable to indigent churches at Jerusalem. But when we call to mind the violent prejudices of the Jewish Christians, who were zealots for the law of Moses, we may well suppose that some of them would hesitate to come under obligations to Paul, the great champion of opposite opinions, and also to the charity of *Gentile*

Christians, who disregarded the laws of Moses with respect to ceremonial observances.

(32) *ἵνα* *iv* . . . , *ὑμῶν* so that *I may come to you with joy, if God will, and may be refreshed among you.* *ἵνα* is here connected in sense with the *ἵνα ἔνσθῶ*, *κ. τ. λ.* of the preceding verse. The sense is, 'that being delivered, &c., he may come with joy to them, &c.'—*Διὰ θελήματος θεοῦ, Deo volente.*

(33) *Ὁ δὲ θεὸς . . . ὑμῶν*, now the *God of peace be with you all; i. e.,* may God, the author of peace, who bestows happiness, true prosperity, *οἷον* be with you, *i. e.,* aid you, and bless you. *Ἀμήν* in the *textus receptus*, is of suspicious authority, and is so noted by Dr Knapp.

CHAP. XVI.

THE apostle concludes his epistle by various affectionate greetings and commendations. 1—19. After which he warns the church against those who make divisions and give offence among them, *i. e.,* such as practise the contrary of that which he had been enjoining in the preceding part of his epistle, vers. 17, 18. He expresses his affectionate desire that they might be kind and simple-hearted, and his wish that the God of peace would give them the victory over the adversary of souls, the fomentor of discord among brethren, vers. 19, 20. He then expresses the salutations of several Christian friends and companions, who were with him, vers. 21—24; and concludes with a devout doxology, vers. 25—27.

(1) *Συνίστημι δὲ . . . Κερχεῖα*, Now *I commend to you Phebe our sister who is a deaconess of the church at Cenchrea.* *Δί* continuative.—*Διακόνον*, *i. e., τὴν διάκονον*, for the Greeks used both *ὁ* *et ἡ* *διάκονος*. It should be remembered, that in the East women were not permitted to mix in the society of men, as in the western world they are at present. They were kept secluded, for the most part, in a retired room or *γυνάκειον*, to which no stranger could have access. Consequently it became highly important for the church to have *αἱ διάκονοι*, as well as *οἱ διάκονοι*, in order that the former might look to females who were indigent or sick. Accordingly we find the female deacons more than once adverted to, in the epistle of Paul; comp. 1 Tim. iii. 11. v. 10. Tit. ii. 3. Pliny in his letter to Trajan (x. 97), no doubt refers to the *αἱ διάκονοι* in the following passage: *Necessarium credidi, ex duabus ancillis quæ ministræ dicebantur, &c.*

Κεγχρεαί, *Cenchrea*, was the *eastern* port of Corinth; for Corinth itself lay not upon the sea, but had two harbours some four or five miles distant from the city, viz., Cenchrea on the east and Lechea on the west. It would seem that Phebe was about to sail from Cenchrea to Rome, when Paul wrote this epistle; and it is quite probable that it was sent by her to the church at Rome. The word Κεγχρεαί is used only in the plural, like Ἀθῆναι.

(2) Ἰνα . . . ἀγίως that ye may receive her in the Lord in a manner worthy of the saints. That the phrase ἐν κυρίῳ may mean *being in the Lord*, i. e., being a member of his spiritual body (comp. 1 Cor. xii. 27. Rom. xii. 5. 1 Cor. x. 17. Eph. i. 22, 23. iv. 12. v. 30. Col. i. 24), the various passages in which it occurs leave no good room for doubt. So the sentiment here may be: ‘Receive Phebe who is a Christian, in such a manner as becomes Christians,’ i. e., with distinguished kindness and benevolence. But some refer ἐν κυρίῳ to the church at Rome, and interpret thus: ‘Do ye, as united to Christ, receive her worthily of the saints.’ I see no way of determining which of these senses is the true one. Both accord with philology and the nature of the case. I rather incline to the latter, because the sense is facile when we suppose the apostle to say: ‘Do ye, who are professed Christians, act worthily of your profession in this matter.’

Καὶ παραστήτε . . . ἑμοῦ, and render her assistance in any thing, where she may need it of you; for she herself has been a helper of many, and especially of me. For the words παραστήτε and προστάτις, see on προϊστάμενος in chap. xii. 8. This hint shows what the office of a deaconess was, i. e., what duties it led her to perform. A comparison of προστάτις here will serve to cast light on ὁ προϊστάμενος in Rom. xii. 8.

(3) Πρίσκαν, *Prisca*, the same as Πρίσκιλλα in Acts xviii. 2, 26. 1 Cor. xvi. 19. The latter is merely a *diminutive*, which was commonly applied to women in the way of courtesy or affection; as John says to Christians: “My *little* children.” Both Priscilla and her husband Aquila are here called συνεργοί of the apostle.—Ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, i. e., in the Christian cause.

(4) Οἰκίτις . . . ἐπίθηκαν, lit. *who exposed their own neck for my life*, i. e., who exposed their own neck to the sword, their own head to be cut off, in order to defend me from harm.—Καὶ τὴν . . . ἐκκλησίαν, and the church which is in their house, i. e., which habitually convenes there. Aquila and Priscilla are spoken of, also, as having

a church in their house while at Ephesus, 1 Cor. xvi. 19; from which some have drawn the conclusion, that only their family, which consisted of Christians, are meant by *ἐκκλησίαν*; a criticism which is destitute of support from the *usus loquendi* of the New Testament. On the contrary, nothing is more natural than the supposition, that these zealous advocates of the Christian cause, wherever they sojourned, were accustomed to hold assemblies at their own house, for the purposes of Christian worship and instruction. All the meetings of the primitive Christians must have been in this way, inasmuch as they had at first no churches or temples where they could convene.

(5) *Epainetus*; this and other names which follow down to ver 15, designate persons otherwise unknown to us, but who, personally or otherwise, must have been known to the apostle.—'Ἀπαρχὴ τῆς Ἀσίας, one of the first who embraced Christianity under my preaching in *proconsular Asia*, i. e., Asia Minor, probably in the Roman sense of that word.—Εἰς Χριστόν, *in respect to Christ*.

(6, 7) It appears probable, that the persons here named had formerly been residents in Asia or Greece, where the apostle was acquainted with them, but that they had now removed to Rome.—'Ἐπίσημοι, *of note, well-known, highly esteemed*; ἐν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις, *among the apostles*.—Οἱ . . . Χριστοῦ, *who became Christians even earlier than myself*; where ἐν Χριστῷ can hardly be mistaken.

(9) Ἀγαπητόν μου ἐν Κυρίῳ, *my beloved fellow Christian*.

(10) Τὸν δοκιμον ἐν Χριστῷ, *a tried and approved Christian*.—Τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ἀρι-τοβούλου, i. e., τοὺς ὄντας ἐν Κυρίῳ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων Ἀριστοβούλου; comp. the close of verse 11.

(13) Μητέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐμοῦ, *his mother and mine*; i. e., his mother in a literal sense, and mine in a figurative one.

(16) Ἀσπάσασθε . . . ἀγίῳ, *salute each other with a holy kiss*; i. e., greet each other after the affectionate manner of Christians; live together in the kind exchange of Christian salutations and tokens of friendship. This custom is extensively maintained, at present, on the continent of Europe, among Christian friends, and others also. In itself, it is like any *external* thing, not essential, but only a *res loci et temporis*, depending on the manners and customs of the time and place, like the wearing or not wearing of long hair at Corinth, &c.

Αἱ ἐκκλησίαι πᾶσαι, i. e., all the churches in the vicinity of the apostle, or those which he had recently visited. This shows the custom of the early Christian churches, as to sending expressions of brotherly

affection for each other, although they were mutual strangers in respect to personal acquaintance.

(17) Σκοπεῖν, *to consider attentively, to beware of*.—Διχοστασίας, *divisions*, viz., in the church, among brethren.—Σκάνδαλα, *offences*, i. e., those who are the occasion of others stumbling and falling, by their uncharitableness or their superstition. Παρά, *contrary to, against*; comp. Rom. i. 26. xi. 24. Gal. i. 8, 9. Heb. xi. 11. Ἐκκλινάσθαι ἀπ' αὐτῶν, *stand off from them, avoid them*; i. e., give them no countenance or approbation.

(18) Τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν Χριστῷ, i. e., the Christian cause, or him who is the author of Christianity.—Κολίγ, *their own appetite*; i. e., they do not labour for the good of the Christian cause, but merely for their own private interests, merely to obtain a maintenance.

The apostle seems, therefore, to refer here to certain teachers at Rome, at this time, who were the authors of division and offence there, and whose views extended no farther than the acquisition of a maintenance for themselves.

Καὶ διὰ . . . ἀπάκων, *and by flattery and fair speeches beguile the minds of the simple*. Theophylact: χηροστολογία, κολακεία, i. e., *flattery*.—Εὐλογίας is *eulogy, praise*.—Καρδίας, *minds*, like the Hebrew כִּלְיֹת.—'Απάκων means those who are *destitute of suspicion, without guile, simple-hearted*.

(19) Ἡ γὰρ . . . ἀφίκετο, *for your obedient temper of mind is known among all* [the churches]; i. e., the fame of your Christian temper, your readiness to obey the gospel, has been spread among all the churches. Γὰρ seems here to be used in connection with something implied, and which the mind of the reader is to furnish; e. g., [I exhort you to do all this] γὰρ, *because I know that you will lend a listening ear*. See Bretschn. Lex. on γὰρ.

Χαίρω οὖν . . . ὑμῖν, *I rejoice, therefore, in respect to you*; i. e., since your obedient disposition has procured you such a good name in the churches, I rejoice. Τὸ ἰφ' ὑμῶν, i. e., κατὰ τὸ ἰφ' ὑμῶν.—Θέλω δέ . . . καλόν, *and I wish you to be wise in respect to that which is good, but simple in regard to that which is evil*. He means to say, that he desires the Roman Christians not to use their dexterity in order to accomplish selfish ends, like the false teachers among them; but to be willingly accounted *simple* or *simpletons*, in regard to doing evil.

(20) Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης, *may God who is the author of peace, or who, loves and approves it*!—Συγγίγναι, Fut. for Optative, like the Heb.

Future.—*Σατανᾶν*, *Satan*, viz., the malignant accuser of the brethren, and who delights in exciting the evil-minded to discord and division. May God disappoint all his malignant purposes, and preserve your harmony and kindly affection. The language of this wish (*συντριψεῖ*) refers to the prediction in Gen. iii. 15.

Χάρις here means favour of every kind, like the *חֶסֶד דִּלֵּשׁ* of the Hebrews.—*Ἀμήν* seems to be spurious.

(21) Luke, and Jason, and Sosipater are classed together here as *relatives* of Paul. If this be Luke the Evangelist, which seems altogether probable, then it would appear that he must have been of Hebrew descent, at least in part; for Paul was “a Hebrew of the Hebrews,” i. e., of pure Hebrew descent. Nevertheless, as *συγγενὴς* does not mark the *degree* of relation, we cannot argue from this expression with much confidence.

(22) *Τίτιος ὁ γραΐψας*, i. e., who was the amanuensis of Paul on the occasion of writing this epistle.

(23) *Ὁ ξένος μου*, *my host*; i. e., who has received me into his house, and showed me hospitality; and who shows an extensive hospitality to all Christians.—*Οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως*, *the treasurer of the city*.—*Κούρτος* shows the manner in which the Greeks represented the Latin *qu*, *Quartus*.

(25) The whole now concludes with a general ascription of praise. *Τῷ δυναμένῳ*, sc. *ἡ ἡ δόξα*, as appears from the close of ver. 27. The sentence is suspended, after the usual manner of Paul, until he resumes it in *μόνῳ σοφῷ θεῷ*.—*Στηρίζαι*, *to establish*; viz., in the Christian faith and practice.—*Κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον μου*, *in accordance with the gospel which I preach*, agreeably to the principles of this.—*Καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα*, *even the gospel of Jesus Christ*, i. e., even the gospel of which Jesus is the author, or which has respect to him. *Κήρυγμα* is in apposition with *εὐαγγέλιον*; and the object of Paul is to show by the whole declaration, that the gospel which he preached was the true one.

Κατὰ ἀποκαλυψιν . . . σεσηγημένου, *according to the revelation of the mystery which was kept in silence during ancient ages*; i. e., agreeably to the gospel which was not fully revealed in ancient times, but is now brought to light; comp. 1 Cor. ii. 7. Eph. iii. 5, 9. Col. i. 23. This phrase is co-ordinate with *κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον* above, and is designed for more ample description.

(26) *Φανερωθέντος δὲ . . . προφητικῶν*, *but is now revealed by the Scriptures of the prophets*. The apostle first refers to the most

ancient times before any revelation was given, as the *χρόνοι αἰώνιοι*, when the gospel remained as it were concealed; next he points us to the Messianic prophecies contained in the Old Testament. But a difficulty lies in the mode of the expression. In other places Paul represents the gospel as hidden from the ancients, but *now* revealed, *i. e.*, under the Christian dispensation; see Col. i. 26. Eph. iii. 5, 10, and comp. 1 Pet. i. 12. But still there is one passage (Rom. iii. 21) where he says of the grace of the gospel, *νυνὶ πεφανέρωται*, and at the same time he adds, *μαρτυρουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν*; by which he means, that God has not only revealed his grace by his messengers in gospel-times, but that this same grace has the concurrent testimony and support of the Old Testament Scriptures. This mode of representation then would concur with the present one. Three things are predicated of the *μυστήριον* which he mentions in ver. 25; (1) That it was kept in a hidden or concealed state down to the time when the Old Testament dispensation commenced. (2) That it was disclosed, *i. e.*, comparatively brought to light (*φανερωθέντος*) by the ancient Scriptures. (3) That it was fully published or made known (*γνωρισθέντος*) under the gospel dispensation. As to the *φανερωθέντος νῦν* here, it means the same in all essential respects as the *μαρτυρουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν* of Rom. iii. 21. There is a concurrent testimony, declaration, or disclosure, by the ancient prophetic writings, which gives force to the new testimony under the gospel dispensation.

Had Reiche adverted to this, and considered the mode of expression in Rom. iii. 21, which is so plainly of the same tenor as the present, he might have spared the censure which he casts on the whole of this last paragraph of the epistle, and the accusation of contradiction in the clause under examination.

As to the other passages to which reference is made above, and which place the revelation of the gospel mysteries in later times in opposition to the silence of former days it is sufficient to remark, that it is only in a *comparative* point of view that this is to be understood; just as when the Saviour says, that 'if he had not come and spoken to the Jews they had not had sin, but now they have no cloak for it;' and just as when Paul says, that 'life and immortality are brought to light by the gospel.' Surely when Abraham and the patriarchs 'sought a better country, even a *heavenly* one, they must have had some notions of immortality. It may be altogether correct, then, that gospel truth as disclosed by the prophets

made only a twilight compared with the noontide glories of the new dispensation, and so there was ample occasion for the comparative views which the apostle has disclosed in Col. i. 26. Eph. iii. 5, 10; at the same time it may be, and is equally true, that the gospel is in some degree disclosed (*φανερωθείς*) in the Old Testament prophets, and is testified to (*μαρτυρουμένην*) by them, in their works, which are every day still read by Christians.

One other difficulty still remains to be disposed of. It is that which is occasioned by the *τε* before *γραφῶν*. Inasmuch as the clause in which *τε* stands has another *connective* (*δέ*), we cannot regard it in the simple light of a conjunction, by which *φανερωθείτος, κ. τ. λ.* is joined to the preceding clause. It must then, as it would seem, have a *relative* meaning, and imply another clause after it to which either a *καί* or a *τε* is appended. Accordingly, the Syr., Arab., (Erp.), and Æth. versions insert the *and* before *κατ' ἐπιταγὴν, κ. τ. λ.* But as there is no room for critical doubt of the genuineness of the *τε* here, and as *καί* is destitute of other support than these versions, we seem still to find our way hedged up.

Beza, Michaelis, Morus, and Flatt, in order to extricate themselves from this difficulty, propose to begin the third predicate of the apostle with *διὰ τε γραφῶν, κ. τ. λ.* and to connect all the sequel of the verse with *γνωρισθέντος*. But then *φανερωθείτος δὲ νῦν* would be left in too nude a state; and there can scarcely be a doubt that *διὰ τε γραφῶν προφητικῶν* must be connected in sense with the participiū *φανερωθείτος*.

We must resolve the difficulty, then, in another way. The whole paragraph is *elliptical* in an uncommon degree; witness *τῷ δυναμένῳ . . .* then *μόνῳ σόφῳ θεῷ . . .* without any predicate or copula. We may well suppose then that *κατ'* is omitted before *κατ' ἐπιταγὴν*, it being necessarily implied by the presence of the *τε* in the preceding phrase. In this way *κατ' ἐπιταγὴν, κ. τ. λ.* belongs to the last clause, and is to be connected (as it should be) with the part. *γνωρισθέντος*; so that the sense of the last clause is, that 'the gospel, by the commandment of the eternal God, has been published to all nations, in order to lead them to the obedience which faith ensures.'

The objection of Reiche to this construction, does not strike me as valid. He alleges that too much is thus connected with the part. *γνωρισθέντος*, and that the gospel was not made known to the heathen by the prophetic Scriptures. As to the first, nothing can be more consonant with the manner of Paul (comp. Rom. i. 1—4); and as to the second, the apostle does not aver that the gospel was made

known to the heathen by the Jewish Scriptures; for the last clause, κατ' ἐπίταγην, κ. τ. λ. merely stands as *co-ordinate* with φανερωθέντος, κ. τ. λ. and not subordinate to it. Reiche, however, who at the outset casts away as spurious vers. 25—27, makes as much difficulty as he can with every part of them. But here I cannot help thinking that he has failed.

(27) The apostle now *resumes* the doxology which he had begun in ver. 25 by τῷ δυναμένῳ, with μόνῳ, κ. τ. λ. The pronoun ϕ here would seem to relate grammatically and most naturally to Jesus Christ. But in such a case, in order to complete the construction, Θεῷ must be joined with ἡ δόξα εἰς τοῦς αἰῶνας implied, or δόξα, or some equivalent word must be understood immediately after it. Following another mode of construction, we must refer ϕ to Θεῷ, and either construe it as equivalent to αὐτῷ (which however wants precedent to confirm it); or we must take ϕ in the *demonstrative* sense, viz., as employed for ὁτος or ἔδε (it often is so employed, Passow, Lex. ὅς, B), and translate it, 'to this one be glory, etc.' This, on the whole, is the more facile way of construing it. The first mode of construction seems at least to be rather hard; yet the elliptical form of the whole paragraph detracts somewhat from the hardness of it, and makes it quite possible.

The *subscription*, like most of the others in the Pauline epistles, is *adscititious*. Chap. xvi. 1 doubtless gave occasion to it; and the matter of it is in all probability correct. But we cannot regard it as coming from the hand of Paul; for surely he did not need to inform the church at Rome, by a subscription, who it was that conveyed the epistle to them, when he had once commended the same individual to their hospitality. Moreover, competent external evidence of genuineness is wanting.

EXCURSUS I.

On υἱὸς Θεοῦ in Rom. i. 4 (p. 46).

THE phrase *υἱὸς Θεοῦ* is, as one may easily believe, difficult of interpretation. In order to be as brief as possible, I begin with the *generic* idea. *Υἱὸς Θεοῦ* any rational being may be called, who is formed in the image of God, *i. e.*, possesses by his gift a moral and intellectual nature like his own. The *original* idea of *υἱός*, is that of *derivation*. The *secondary* one (which is often employed), is that of *resemblance*. The third gradation of meaning is, that of being *regarded or treated as a son, occupying the place of a son*, *viz.*, having distinguished gifts, favours, or blessings bestowed on any one. To one or the other of these classes of meaning, may all the instances be traced in which the phrase *son or sons of God* is applied, in the Old Testament or the New.

It is superfluous here to show that *υἱός*, in its primary and literal sense as applied to the relations of men, means *a masculine descendant* of any one; or that it means generally *offspring posterity*, near or remote. In regard to the phrase *υἱὸς Θεοῦ*, it is applied (1) To *Adam*, as proceeding immediately from the hand of the Creator, Luke iii. 38. (2) To those who are *regenerated*, or born of the Spirit of God, John i. 12, 13; Rom. viii. 15, 17; 1 John iii. 1, 2, et sæpe alibi. Connected with this, is the usage of calling all *true worshippers* of God his *sons*; *e. g.*, Matt. v. 9, 45; Luke vi. 35, xx. 36; Rom. viii. 14, 19; 2 Cor. vi. 18; Gal. iii. 26; Heb. xii. 6; Rev. xxi. 7, et alibi. (3) The same appellation is sometimes given to *such as are treated with special kindness*; *e. g.*, Rom. ix. 26; Hos. i. 10, xi. 1; Deut. xxxii. 5, 19; Isai. i. 2. xliii. 6; Jer. xxxi. 9; 2 Cor. vi. 18. God, as the common father and benefactor of all men, good and bad, in reference to this relation, often calls himself a *father*, and styles them his children; "If I be a *father*, where is mine honour?" "I have nourished and brought up *children*, but they have rebelled against me." Moreover, as all men are made in his image, *i. e.*, have an intellectual, rational, and moral nature like his own, on this account also they may be styled his children; but more especially does this apply to those who are *regenerated*, and in whom the image of God that had been in part defaced, is restored. (4) As bearing some resemblance to the Supreme Ruler of the universe in respect to authority, or as having office by his special favour, *kings* are sometimes named *sons of God*; *e. g.*, Ps. lxxxi. 6 (מְלָכָיו בְּנֵי). 2 Sam. vii. 14. So in Homer *διογενὲς βασιλεῖς*, Il. lib. i. 279, ii. 196. (5) *Angels* are called *sons of God*, for the like reason that men are, *viz.*, because God is their creator and benefactor; and specially, because they bear a high resemblance to God; see Job i. 6, ii. 1, xxxviii. 7; Dan. iii. 25.

It is evident from inspecting these examples, that men and angels may be called *sons of God* for more than one reason; nay, that in some cases all the reasons for giving this appellation are united. *E. g.*, a pious Israelite might

be called a son of God, because God was his creator; because of the special favours and blessings bestowed upon him, i. e., because of his being treated as a son; because he was born again by the power of the Holy Spirit; and because he bore a special resemblance to his heavenly Father. For each or for any one of these reasons, it is obvious we might, agreeably to Scripture usage, call any one *a son* of God, who is truly pious; and for all of them combined, or for any part of them, we might in like manner bestow on him the same appellation. I mention this here, because it is of no small importance in rightly estimating the force of *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*, as applied to Christ. We come now to consider this last phrase, as applied in this manner.

(a) It designates Jesus as produced in the womb of the Virgin Mary, by the miraculous influence of the Holy Spirit, Luke i. 32 (comp. Luke iii. 38). Perhaps the same sense belongs to it in Mark i. 1. The words of the centurion in Matt. xxvii. 54, and Mark xv. 39, seem, in the mouth of a Roman, to have the like sense, although perhaps it is not altogether the same.

(b) It means *Jesus as the constituted king or Messiah*. *F. g.*, Matt. xvi. 16, xxvi. 63; Mark xiv. 61; Luke xxii. 70; John i. 49, xi. 27; and probably in Matt. viii. 29, xiv. 33; Mark iii. 11, v. 7; Luke iv. 41, viii. 28; John i. 34, vi. 69, ix. 35, x. 36; Acts ix. 20, xiii. 33; Heb. v. 5. In the like sense the appellation *son* is given to him, in the way of anticipation, by the ancient prophets who foretold his appearance, Ps. ii. 7, lxxxix. 27. On the like ground, kings, as we have seen in No. 4, are called *sons of God*, Ps. lxxxii. 6; 2 Sam. vii. 14.

(c) The most common use of the phrase *Son of God* as applied to the Messiah, is, to designate the high and mysterious relation which subsisted between him and God the Father, by virtue of which he was, in his complex person as Θεάνθρωπος, the ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ πατρὸς, Heb. i. 3, the εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, Col. i. 15; the εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ, 2 Cor. iv. 4. In this respect, *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* is rather a name of *nature* than of office, for it is predicated of the high and glorious εἰκὼν, *resemblance, similitude*, which the Son exhibits of the Father, he being the *radiance* (ἀπαύγασμα) of his glory; so that what Jesus said to Philip is true, viz., "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father," John xiv. 9. "It hath pleased the Father that in him all fulness should dwell," Col. i. 19; even "all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, Col. ii. 9; and that high, yea, divine honour should be paid to him, Phil. ii. 9—11; Rom. xiv. 11 (comp. v. 9); Rev. v. 13, 14; John v. 23; Heb. i. 6. As *Son*, Christ is lord and heir of all things, Heb. i. 2, 3, 8. In particular, it would seem to be one design of the New Testament writers, in using the appellation *Son of God*, to convey the idea of a most intimate connexion, love, and fellowship (so to speak) between him and the Father. Compare, in order to illustrate this idea, such texts as Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 22; John i. 14, 18; Heb. i. 5, seq.; Matt. iii. 17; Luke iii. 22, ix. 35; Col. i. 13; 2 Pet. i. 17; Matt. xvii. 5; Mark i. 11, ix. 7. Compare, also, with these last texts, the parables in Matt. xxi. 37, seq., xxii. 2, seq., Mark xii. 6; Luke xx. 13; also John viii. 35, 36, and x. 36. That God has given Christ the Spirit without measure, that he dwells in him σωματικῶς, that all counsels and secrets (so to speak) of the divine nature are perfectly known to him (John i. 18; Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 22; John vi. 46, vii. 29, viii. 19, xiv. 9, 10, 11, 20, x. 15); seems to be suggested by the appellation *Son of God* as frequently bestowed; for so the texts referred to,

and other like texts, would imply. In a word, similitude, affection, confidence, and most intimate connexion, seem to be designated by the appellation *son*, as applied to Christ. In this sense it is most frequent in the New Testament; although with Paul, the idea of *Messianic dignity* or *elevation* is more commonly designated by *Κύριος*.

But while I am fully satisfied that the term *Son of God* is oftentimes applied to Christ as a name of *nature*, as well as of office; yet I am as fully satisfied, that it is not applied to him considered simply as *divine*, or simply as *Logos*. It designates the Θεάνθρωπος, the *God-man*, i. e., the complex person of the Messiah, in distinction from his divine nature simply considered, or his *Logos* state or condition. The exceptions to this are only cases of such a nature, as show that the appellation *Son of God* became, by usage, a kind of proper name, which might be applied either to his human nature or to his divine one, as well as to his complex person. In just such a way proper names are commonly used; e. g., *Abraham* usually and properly means, the complex person of this individual consisting of soul and body. But when I say, 'Abraham is dead,' I mean, the physical part only of Abraham is so; and when I say, 'Abraham is alive,' I mean that his immortal part only is so. So in regard to the name *Son of God*; when I say, 'The Son of God was crucified,' I mean that his mortal part was so; when I say, 'God sent his Son, the Son came out from the Father, he had glory with the Father before the world was,' &c., I mean, in such cases, that the divine nature of the Son became incarnate, that *αὐτὸν ἐκίνωσε . . . αὐτὸν ἐταπείνωσε* (Phil. ii. 7, 8), taking upon him the likeness of our nature. But when I say, with John, that "Jesus is the Son of God," and that "Jesus Christ has come in the flesh," I mean to designate his complex person, the Θεάνθρωπος, the *θεὸς ἐν σαρκὶ φανερωθείς*, the *λόγος σὰρξ γενόμενος*, and this is the case with most of the examples of the phrase in the New Testament.

If a different principle of exegesis be assumed here, and we affirm that Christ is called *Son* as being *divine*, and is so called in order to designate his originating from the Father in his *divine* nature; then the objections which may be made are of a very serious cast. They are too numerous, also, to be fully recounted in an excursus. I can only glance at a few of them.

(1) If *Son of God* necessarily implies, *ex vi termini*, that Christ as to his *divine nature* is *derived*; how shall we construe such texts as the following; viz., "What and if ye shall see the *Son of Man* ascend up *where he was before*?" John vi. 62. "No man hath ascended to heaven, but *he that came down from heaven*, even the *Son of Man* who is in heaven," John iii. 13. Does *Son of Man* indicate (*ex vi termini*) the *divine* nature of Christ? This I suppose will not be affirmed; for plainly it indicates the Θεάνθρωπος, the *θεὸς ἐν σαρκὶ φανερωθείς*, i. e., it has of itself a necessary reference to the *incarnate* condition of the Saviour. Yet when employed as a *proper* name, we see by the texts above that it can be used to indicate the original and *divine* nature of the Messiah along with his human nature. If not, then these texts would prove that the *incarnate* nature of Christ existed in heaven before he came down from that place; a fiction which we may well rank with the supposed rapture of Christ into heaven, and his subsequent descent from heaven, as maintained by Socinus.

Now as these texts, when thus employed will not prove that the *human* nature of Christ had a prior existence in heaven; so neither will the other

texts above cited prove that the appellation, *Son of God*, means the *divine* nature of Christ as begotten of God, merely because the Father is said to have loved him and to have sent him into the world. But,

(2) If the Son as *God* be *derived* or *begotten*, then it must follow, that as God he is neither *self-existent* nor *independent*. It is of no avail to say here, that his generation is *eternal*, and that the *method* of it is mysterious, super-human, and unlike to that of any created substance; for one may very readily allow all this, and still ask, whether the word *generation* (let the *manner* of the thing be what it may) does not of necessity, and by the usage of every language, imply *derivation*? And whether *derivation* does not of necessity imply *dependence*, and therefore negative the idea of *self-existence*? This the ancient Fathers acknowledged almost with one voice, asserting that Christ is not αὐτῶς, but derived from the Father, and *begotten of his substance*. The Father only they regarded as self-existent; not deeming it compatible at all with the idea of *generation*, that the Son could vindicate to himself this attribute of divinity. So the Nicene Fathers in their symbol: Θεὸς ἐκ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός. They did truly and really regard the Logos as an *emanation* from the Father; many of the fathers (most of the earlier ones) as an emanation from him which took place in time, or rather perhaps an emanation just before time began. Hence the familiar phrase among them, λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, i. e., the Logos *which was in God as his reason, wisdom, or understanding*, from eternity; and λόγος προφητικός, i. e., *Logos prophetic, uttered, developed*, viz., by words. This development many of them supposed was made, when God said, "Let there be light;" others supposed it to have been still earlier, viz., at the period when God formed the plan of the world, and thus gave development to his internal λόγος, by the operations of his wisdom and understanding.

Prof. Tholuck, in his recent commentary on the epistle to the Romans, appears fully to maintain (with the ancient Fathers) the *dependence*, and to deny the *self-existence*, of the Logos; while, with them, he strenuously maintains that Christ is Θεός. But one who is so earnestly desirous of seeking after truth as he is, will not take it amiss, I trust, if the inquiry be here made: Whether the human mind can now conceive a being to be *truly* God, who is *neither self-existent nor independent*? If the Son have neither of these attributes, then is he indeed what some of the Fathers have called him, a Θεὸς δεύτερος, and nothing more. I will not aver that those are Arians, and deny the divinity of Christ, who believe this; but I must say, that for myself, if I admitted this, I could make no serious objection to the system of Arius. The whole dispute between him and those who maintain this creed, must turn on the difference between *being begotten* and *being made*; both parties virtually acknowledge *derivation* and *dependence*; they differ only as to the time and manner of these. Can such topics as these, which of course must be mere mysteries, be properly made a serious occasion of division or alienation among those who bear the Christian name?

The philosophy of the Fathers permitted them to believe in a divine nature *derived*. Of course they could maintain the generation of the Son as *Logos* without any difficulty. But that we can now admit a being to be *truly* God, and worship him as such, who as to his divine nature is *derived* and *dependent*, does seem to me quite impossible. The very elements of my own views (to say the least) respecting the divine nature must be changed, before I can admit such a proposition.

To say that the Son is *eternally begotten*, and yet is *self-existent* and *independent*, is merely to say that the word *begotten* does not imply *derivation*; it is to deny that the word has any such meaning, as all antiquity and common usage have always ascribed to it. It is, moreover, to give up the very doctrine which the ancient church strenuously maintained. Tholuck, who appears to maintain the views of the Nicene creed, says (on Rom. ix. 5): "The Father is the original source of all being, 1 Cor. viii. 6; John v. 26; the son is only the *εἰκὼν* of his being, Col. i. 15; 2 Cor. iv. 4; Heb. i. 3. But as being the *image* of the divine Being, the Son is in no respect different from the Father, but fully expresses the Being of God. As the church is wont to say: The attribute of *ἀγεμνσία* is possessed *only* by the Father." Much as I respect this excellent man and critic, how can I receive and accredit these declarations? "The Son is in *no respect* (in nichts) different from the Father, but fully (vollkommen, *perfectly*) resembles or expresses (ausdrückt) the being of God;" and yet to the Son belongs not *ἀγεμνσία*, *self-existence*, *independence*, but *ἀγεμνσία* belongs *exclusively* to the Father!" What is this more or less than to say: The Son is perfectly like the Father in all respects; and yet in regard to that very attribute, which beyond all others united makes God to be what he is, viz., true and very God, i. e., in respect to *self-existence* (and of course *independence*), the Son has no participation at all in this, but it belongs *exclusively* to the Father! In other words: "The Son is in *all respects* like the Father, with the simple exception that he is, in regard to the most essential of all his attributes, infinitely *unlike* him." If this does not lie on the very face of Prof. Tholuck's statement, and on that of all who hold that the *Logos* is a *derived* Being, then I acknowledge myself incapable of understanding either their words or their arguments.*

* In a review of the first edition of this work, in the *Literar. Adzeiger* for 1824, p. 171, Prof. Tholuck refers me to John v. 26 as decisive of the question, in favour of his views. The words are: "As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son also to have life in himself." On this he thus comments: "It is declared that *the Father has given life to the Son*, on the one hand: on the other, that *the Son has life from himself* (aus sich). The same power which can constitute a proper person of a human soul, which [soul] has its power of self-determination conferred by another, and yet exercises this power of itself, has so disposed itself also in its own image, i. e., in the Son, that the latter, since his being does not differ from that of the Father, has life from himself?"

But in the way of this I find several difficulties. (1) Nothing can be more evident to my mind, than that the text in John speaks merely of a *life-giving* power, which the Father has in himself, and so can exercise it, where and when he pleases; and Jesus declares that the Father has bestowed this on the Son, who therefore can exercise it in the same way. So verses 21, 22, lead us to explain this, almost by necessity; and so the context leads us to explain it, where the subject is the *resurrection of the dead*, not the metaphysical question of original or derived powers and attributes of Father and Son. (2) Prof. Tholuck, in rendering *ἐν ἑαυτῷ* in ver. 26 by *aus sich*, out of or from himself, has departed from the tenor and sense of the text, which asserts the proper possession of such a power, and the uncontrollable right of exercising it at discretion, but avers nothing in respect to the metaphysical question now under consideration. But (3) The comparison of the self-determining power of a human soul with that of the Son, would only plunge the whole matter into the Arian gulf. Is not a human soul *dependent* and *derived*? And if it exercises a self-determining power, did it *originate* the power itself? The question is not, whether the Son has *life in himself*, but *how he came by it*? I take life here, not in the real sense of the text, viz. a *life-giving* power, but in the physiological or metaphysical sense of Tholuck, viz. as an attribute of the being of the Son. Now if the Father gave the Son (as *Logos*) life in this sense, the inevitable consequence is that the Son is *derived* and *dependent*; in which case the whole matter goes back to the point from which we started.

But Tholuck in the way of further explanation says, that 'the generation of the Son is necessary and eternal. The Son is as necessary to the Father as the Father to the Son; and the dependence (if we must so name it) mutual.' But here again I am lost in the uncertainty of words. The Fathers, as Prof. Tholuck well knows, were divided on the question

A mode of reasoning which involves such difficulties as these, should not be adopted without very imperious reasons. I know of no such reasons, unless they be drawn from the expression *ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* understood in a *literal* sense, i. e., so far literal as can be possible in respect to spiritual beings. Now that one spiritual being can produce another, in some way or other (of course not *more humano*), will not be denied. And if *Son* necessarily imports derivation in the *divine* nature of the Logos, along with this it necessarily imports *dependence*; in other words, it necessarily denies *self-existence* and *independence*. If any one refuses to acknowledge this, then of course he must abandon the meaning of *generation*. No matter what the *modus* of generation may be, however mysterious or super-human; this makes no difference as to real *dependence*, in case the generation is real and actually matter of fact. But in case we insist on preserving the term *generation*, as applied to the divine nature of the Son, and yet aver that he is self-existent and independent, then the *diction* merely of the ancient fathers is preserved, while the *doctrine* which they maintained is clearly abandoned.

All such as cannot admit the *emanation* philosophy into their system of theology (the ancient Fathers did this), will not regard Christ as Θεὸς δεύτερος, but as ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός, εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, ἀμήν. The Logos, "who created all things," "by whom all things were created in heaven and earth," bears at least the *highest* stamp of DIVINITY UNDERIVED. Who is *self-existent* if not the CREATOR? And who is God *supreme*, if not ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός? If there be any higher assertions of Godhead respecting the Father than these, let those who ascribe self-existence only to him, point them out.

The most formidable objection to the Nicenian and Athanasian Creed is, that it makes such a statement respecting the doctrine of the Trinity, as destroys the idea of full and proper equality of the persons of the Godhead. The Son is made dependent on the Father; and the Spirit also dependent on the Father, according to the views and explanations of the Greek church, but according to the Latin one, dependent on, i. e., proceed-

of voluntary or necessary generation. Modern theology understands generation only of *personality*, i. e., the *modus existendi* of the Son, and not of his substance or essential attributes. To all this, however, the declaration of Tholuck seems to exhibit no reference. But supposing the matter is as he states it; then what is *generation*? Is it an *act*, or an *attribute*? If an *act*, how is an *act* eternal? If an *attribute*, then, like Origen, Tholuck must believe that the generation of the Son still continues and always will continue; for *divine attributes* must be eternal. After all, however, does not *generation* necessarily imply *dependence*? This cannot be disproved. The nature of words must first be changed. Then be the generation eternal or not, the Son is still *dependent*, according to this theory, and therefore neither self-existent nor independent. We are still left, then, in the same predicament as before, and can find in the Logos only a Θεὸς δεύτερος.

When Tholuck says, moreover, that the 'Son kein anderes Wesen als der Vater hat, i. e., *has a being that differs not from that of the Father*,' what can this mean on the ground which he takes? I ask whether *self-existence* and *independence* are predicable of the Son, if we concede for once that as divine he is *begotten*? What matters it whether the generation is eternal or in time? The question respects not *modus*, but *res*. *Derivation* is inevitably attached to the idea of *begotten*, present it in what shape you will; and then *self-existence* and *independence* of course cease to be predicable of the Logos. How then is he not a different—yes, immeasurably different—being from the Father?

Nor is the matter helped by averring, as Tholuck does, that 'the Son is as necessary to the Father as the Father to the Son.' This would merely show, if it were true, that neither is self-existent or independent, but that each depended on something not strictly belonging to himself, either for his being or for an essential modification of it. But how can the sun be dependent on its rays? We may say, it would be no sun if it gave no light; and it would be true that it would not be such a sun as we now conceive of. But to say that the radiance of the sun is no more dependent on the sun itself than the sun is on its radiance, would be saying what can be justified only by resorting to metaphysical subtleties in defining and reasoning.

ing from, both the Father and Son. The Son then has not two capacities or faculties which the Father has, viz., that of begetting and causing procession, as the Greek church would have it; and the Spirit is in like manner wanting as to both of these capacities. According to the Latin church, the Spirit is also wanting as to one capacity which the Son has, viz., that of causing procession. Now if God is every where in the Bible recognized as supreme and only God, because he is creator of the world, and all competition of those called gods is treated with scorn, because they cannot compare with him here; then how immeasurably more exalted still must the Father be above the Son and Spirit, if he is the ground or cause of their being, the *fontes et principium* of *Godhead* itself! Arianism itself has placed the Son and Spirit too near the Father, if there be such an immeasurable discrepance between them as there must be between beings derived and dependent, and self-existent and independent.

This, however, is not the place to enlarge on this topic; and it is the less necessary, inasmuch as I have discussed the subject at length in an Essay in the Bib. Repository, Nos. 18, 19, 1835, where I have commented on Schleiermacher's comparison of the Sabellian and Athanasian Creeds

EXCURSUS II.

On Rom. iii. 28, λογίζεσθαι γὰρ δικαιῶσθαι πίστει ἄνθρωπον χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου (pp. 159, 160).

It will be conceded at once, that before we pronounce sentence respecting the agreement or disagreement of Paul and James with respect to the doctrine of justification, it is necessary that we should understand the meaning of the words which they respectively employ, and the nature of the object which they respectively have in view.

First, then, *what does Paul assert?* He says that "a man is justified by *faith*, *χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου*. The inquiry is fundamental, therefore, What does he mean by *ἔργων νόμου*?

I answer: He means *works which the law requires, works which the law makes it duty to perform*. That the Gen. case after *ἔργων* is sometimes employed to express such a relation, there can be no room for doubt; *e. g.*, John vi. 28, 29, *ἔργα Θεοῦ* works which God requires; John ix. 4, *τὰ ἔργα τοῦ πέμψαντός με*, the works required by him who sent me; Acts xxvi. 20, *μετανοίας ἔργα*, works such as repentance demands; 1 Thess. i. 3, *τοῦ ἔργου τῆς πίστεως*, the works which faith requires; and 2 Thess. i. 11, *ἔργων πίστεως*, in the same sense.

In like manner, *ἔργων νόμου* and *ἔργα νόμου* mean *work or works which the law demands*. So the phrase is plainly used in Rom. ii. 15; iii. 20, 28; ix. 32; Gal. ii. 16 (thrice); iii. 2, 5, 10. Sometimes *νόμου* is omitted, and *ἔργων* is used alone in the same sense, *breviloquentiæ causâ*; *e. g.*, Rom. iv. 6; ix. 12; xi. 6 (thrice); Eph. ii. 9.

What works, then, does the law of God require? The answer is: It demands *perfect obedience*. "The soul that sinneth shall die." "Cursed is he who continueth not in *all things written in the book of the law*, to do them."

It is manifestly on this ground that Paul argues the impossibility of

justification by works of law. In Rom. iii. 19, when summing up his argument contained in the preceding part of his epistle, he says: "The whole world is guilty before God," i. e., all men are chargeable with the guilt of sin. What follows? The apostle tells us in ver. 20: *διότι, κ. τ. λ., Therefore by works of law no flesh can be justified before God.*

Must not this be true? If the law of God demands *perfect* obedience, and its penalty is attached to *every* sin, then one sin ruins the hopes of man, and effectually debars him from justification before God, on the ground of merit or obedience.

The apostle Paul disputes with those who denied this, and who expected justification on the ground of their own meritorious obedience; comp. ix. 30, 31; x. 3; also Gal. ii. 16; iii. 8—13; Rom. iv. 4, 5. To say, then, that *a man is not justified by works of law*, is (with him) the same as saying, that *he cannot be justified meritoriously*, i. e., on the ground of merit or obedience, Rom. iv. 5. But as *faith* in Jesus Christ, who died to procure mercy for sinners so that they might be pardoned and accepted, does from its very nature involve the renunciation of claims to merit, and the casting of ourselves on him for *gratuitous* justification; so the apostle opposes the being *justified by faith* to the *being justified by works of law*, the former meaning (with him) *gratuitous* justification, the latter *meritorious*. Let the reader now carefully and diligently compare Rom. iv. 4, 5, 14—16; ix. 6; Gal. v. 4; iii. 11, 12, and he can entertain no doubt of the correctness of this representation.

We have then before us the object of Paul, in declaring that a man is not justified by works of law. It is the same thing as to say, 'No one is accepted with God on the ground of merit or perfect obedience to the law, for no one has ever done all which the law requires.'

But does this involve the idea, that Paul maintains *GOOD WORKS* (*εργα ἀγαθὰ*) to be unnecessary for a Christian? Nothing could be farther from his intention. Are not his epistles filled with the most urgent exhortations to Christians, that they should be fruitful in *good works*? Compare now, for a moment, Rom. ii. 7; 2 Cor. ix. 8; Eph. ii. 10; Col. i. 10; iii. 17; 1 Thess. v. 13; 2 Thess. ii. 17; 1 Tim. ii. 10; v. 10 (twice); v. 25; vi. 18; 2 Tim. ii. 21; iii. 17; Tit. i. 16; ii. 7, 14; iii. 1, 8, 14, etc. Compare the strain of Paul's reasoning in Rom. vi.—viii.; and then say, is it possible to doubt, for a moment, that Paul urged *good works* as strenuously as James, or as any other apostle?

Let the reader mark well, that *εργα νόμου*, and *εργα ἀγαθὰ* or *εργον πίστεως* (1 Thess. i. 3; 2 Thess. i. 11), are two very different things; different not so much in their own nature, strictly considered, as in the use which Paul makes of them in his writings. With him, *εργα νόμου* always designates the idea of *perfect* obedience, viz., doing all which the law requires. But *εργα ἀγαθὰ* or *εργα πίστεως* are the fruits of sanctification by the Spirit of God; the good works which Christians perform, and which are sincere, are therefore acceptable to God under a dispensation of grace, although they do not fulfil all the demands of the law. On the ground of the first, Paul earnestly contends, at length, in his epistles to the Romans and Galatians, that no one can be justified. The latter he every where treats as indispensable to the Christian character.

In a word, when Paul is contending with a *legalist*, i. e., one who expected justification on the ground of his own merit, he avers that justifica-

tion by *works of law* or perfect obedience, is impossible. But when he is addressing Christians, he tells them that *good works* are absolutely essential to the Christian character.

2. Come we then, in the second place, to inquire what is the meaning and object of the apostle James, in chap. ii. 14—26.

He commences by asking: "Of what avail is it, my brethren, if a man say he have faith, and have not works?" It is then with those who make *pretensions* to Christian faith, and mere pretensions, that the apostle has to do. This is clear from the closing verse in the paragraph: "For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is also dead."

The characters, then, which the apostle James has in view, are of a kind directly opposite to those with which St. Paul was concerned. James is disputing with *Antinomians*, viz., such persons as held that mere speculative belief or faith, unaccompanied by works, was all which the gospel demands. He tells them that this is not the case, and cannot be. He appeals to the examples of Abraham and Rahab, in order to confirm the sentiment which he avows; and asks, whether the faith which they possessed did not co-operate with works, when they were justified.

Observe now, that James does not once mention *ἔργα νόμου*. This is not the subject which he has in view. It is *ἔργα πίστεως*, and these only, of which he treats; comp. verses 17, 22, 26.

Mark again, that James does not at all maintain that faith is not essential to justification. He expressly admits that Abraham's faith co-operated with his works, and was perfected by them, ver. 22. Nay, he appeals to the very same passage of Scripture, in confirmation of this, which Paul appeals to in Rom. iv. 3, when establishing the doctrine of *gratuitous* justification. The *work* of Abraham which James mentions, is recorded in Gen. xxii.; and it took place some 30 years after the words were spoken to him, which are quoted in ver. 22. By this work (viz., of offering up his son), Abraham "perfected his faith," and "fulfilled the Scripture which says: Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness," verses 22, 23. In other words: 'The faith of Abraham was inseparable from good works. It shone out in the most conspicuous manner by them. And in like manner did the faith of Rahab exhibit itself.'

James, then, maintains that no man has any good claim to the faith of a Christian, who does not at the same time exhibit good works; in other words, he avers that a mere speculative faith is not a real Christian faith.

When thus understood and considered, how can he be regarded as contradicting what Paul has said? Paul maintains that men are justified gratuitously, in opposition to legal or meritorious justification. James maintains that a man cannot be justified by a speculative and barren faith, but that he must have such a faith as will produce good works. Paul is so far from denying that Christian faith must produce good works, that he every where strenuously maintains the necessity of them. James insists upon it, that a man, in order to be justified, must exhibit good works as well as faith; and that these are essential, in order to complete and perfect his faith. Where, then, is the contradiction?

Luther, however, thought that he found it; and he rejected the epistle of James from the canon of the New Testament on this ground, calling it *epistola straminea*. So did the Magdeburg Centuriators; and not a few recent commentators have alleged, that James contradicts what Paul teaches.

But where has Paul taught that a man is justified by faith *alone*; and that evangelical good works are not an essential condition of his justification before God? I cannot find this doctrine in his epistles or in his discourses. To say that he has maintained the doctrine of justification *without the deeds OF THE LAW* is saying nothing to the purpose; for the meaning of this, as above explained, contains nothing in opposition to what James has taught.

In a word, Paul has taught us, that justification is not on the ground of merit, but of grace: James has taught us, that a faith which will entitle one to hope for justification, must be accompanied with evangelical obedience. Both are true and faithful teachers; the doctrines of both are equally doctrines of the gospel. *Good works*, in the gospel sense of these words, are an essential condition of our acceptance with God; but on the ground of perfect obedience to the divine law, no one ever was or will be accepted.

For a more ample discussion of the subject of this Excursus, the reader may consult the dissertation by Dr. Knapp, Bib. Repos. III., pp. 189 seq.; and also the recent one by C. Fromann, Bib. Repos. IV., pp. 683 seq.; where he will find references to various writings on this subject, and an examination of the arguments of those who hold that James intended to gainsay some of the declarations of Paul.

EXCURSUS III.

On θάνατος in Rom. v. 12 (pp. 209, 210).

AMONG some of the older commentators, and even among some very distinguished recent and living ones, *e.g.*, Flatt, Schott, Reiche, and others, the position has been strongly asserted, that θάνατος can here mean only *the death of the body*. Reiche has summed up the arguments; and we may therefore consider briefly his reasons. (1) 'No explanation added to θάνατος leads us to suppose the literal and usual meaning is not to be here admitted.' But in verses 15—19, an antithesis to θάνατος, or (what is of the same import) to *κρίμα, κάτακριμα, &c.*, shows beyond all reasonable question that the *death* is such an one as is the opposite of *reigning in life* and of *justification unto life*. Can this be mere *temporal* death? (2) 'The connexion leads us to construe θάνατος as meaning *temporal* death only.' And what is this? It is, that in ver. 10 θάνατος is used to designate the physical death of Christ. Can Prof. Reiche show us that θάνατος is capable of any other meaning, as applied to Christ? And because the apostle from necessity uses the term *literally* in one case, can he not employ it in a secondary or tropical sense in another? Especially cannot Paul be supposed to do this, who so often employs the same word in different senses, even in the same sentence? (3) 'Paul elsewhere considers physical death as a great evil or enemy, which Christ came to destroy.' He appeals to Rom. vi. 21 in proof of this; an unfortunate appeal, inasmuch as the antithesis in ver. 22 is ζῶν αἰώνιος; also to 2 Tim. i. 9 (which says nothing concerning the subject); also to 2 Cor. v. 1; 1 Cor. xv. 54, which relate to the resurrection. But what should lead Paul or others to suppose, that because Christ liberates the body from its death, he does not liberate the soul also from the death that has befallen it? Or how can the proof that Christ

does one thing, prove that he does not perform another, provided it be not the opposite of the first? Or how can it be shown, that because *θάνατος* sometimes designates the death of the *body*, that it never designates the death of the *soul*? (4) 'The apostle speaks according to Jewish views merely; and the Jews held that *temporal* death was introduced by Adam.' The answer to this is, that the Jews of his time probably did believe that temporal death was connected with Adam's fall; as Wisd. i. 13, ii. 24; Sirac. xxv. 24, xli. 3, would seem to show. Yet to this hour, so far as the efforts of the learned are concerned, no uniform and consistent views among the Rabbins are made out. Vitringa (Observ. Sac. III. 8, 9), Süsskind (Magaz. St. 13), Bartoloccius (Biblioth. Rabb. V. II. pp. 47 seq.), and others, have maintained that the Rabbins reject the common doctrine of connexion with Adam and derivation of evil from him; while many others (as Tholuck, Reiche, and many quoted by them) endeavour to show that they held, either that our temporal death was occasioned by Adam's fall, or that our moral corruption and physical death both sprung from him; for both of these opinions are avowed among the Rabbins. But what has all this to do with the meaning of Paul? He might assert what was generally believed by the Jews of his day in relation to the point in question, or he might contradict what they believed. In his epistle he has often done both, in respect to many points. He must be left, then, to be explained by himself, and by the general nature of the Scriptural idiom; which does not here decide for *temporal* death only. (5) 'The exegesis which explains *θάνατος* as meaning *all evil* of every kind, mixes the figurative and literal together, and therefore is improbable.' Then *ζωή*, which means (in its secondary sense) *happiness*, and implies *continued life* at the same time, is improperly used; and every word whose *tropical* sense is enlarged beyond its literal one while it is built upon it, is wrongly employed. How far can we proceed in the interpretation of Scripture on such a ground as this?

Such are the arguments by which the usual exegesis is assailed. Let us see what is said by the assailants, in answer to arguments adduced upon the other side of the question. (a) 'Physical death is not removed by Christ; it is still universal.' To this Reiche answers, that 'it is not indeed removed; but it will be at the resurrection; and it will be abolished even here, at Christ's second coming [viz., to reign on earth].' That is, the mischiefs of temporal death will in some way be repaired; but those mischiefs are not prevented. Is this all then that verses 15—19 mean? (b) 'Eternal life in ver. 21 is the antithesis of *θάνατος*, which therefore must mean something besides the death of the body.' To this Reiche replies, that *eternal life* is merely the reunion hereafter of body and soul, and their continued existence. If it be urged that *happiness* is meant by *life*, then, he says, we may reply, that the blessings procured by Christ are much greater than the mischief occasioned by Adam, which was mere temporal death; see verses 15, 16. But on this I would remark, that the excess of the blessings as specified by the apostle, has reference to the evils occasioned by *one* sin, and to the forgiveness extended to *many*; which is a different view of the subject from that which Reiche gives. (c) Finally *θάνατος δεύτερος* in Apoc. ii. 11, al., is disposed of by Reiche, by saying, that 'it may mean (according to the Rabbins) a second actual death of the body after the first resurrection; or if it does not mean this, we cannot conclude from the mode of expression (*θάνατος δεύτερος*) what simple *θάνατος*

ροϛ must mean.' But to me it seems the reverse. The writer of the Apocalypse, in order to remove all doubt respecting his meaning, when he mentions θάνατος as the reward of sin, adds δεύτερος for this very purpose.

I am well aware that the passage in 1 Cor. xv. 22, "For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive," has often been adduced, in order to show that θάνατος in the passage before us means only the death of the body. But with Toellner and Koppe I may venture to say, that because, in discussing the subject of the resurrection (the resurrection of Christians only), the apostle represents Adam as having introduced the death of the body, it does not follow, that in another epistle, when treating of quite a different topic, and intending to show the *full extent* of the benefits procured by the death of Christ, he could not employ θάνατος in its most extensive latitude. Above all, this does not follow, when it is quite certain, that in the context of this last named epistle, and elsewhere, Paul does beyond all doubt employ θάνατος in its most enlarged sense. It lies, moreover, on the face of the whole antithesis which he makes in verses 12—19, that his object is to exalt the δικαίωμα of Christ, by showing the greatness of the παράκριμα from which he delivers us, and which was occasioned by Adam. But how is this object effected in any important measure, in case θάνατος means no more than the dissolution of our mortal bodies? a thing, by the way, from which none are at all delivered.

On the whole, I regard the case as one which scarcely admits of a doubt on the ground of philology, or of the first principles of theology. When Adam sinned, *death* was threatened. Now is the death of *the body* the only penalty of sin? If not, then more was meant than this; and the most rational exegesis seems to be that which we are so often obliged elsewhere to adopt, viz., that *evil of every kind* was threatened. In regard to the θάνατος which came upon the posterity of Adam, it was of the same nature; it was fully inflicted, or rather the penalty fully attached, where they *actually* sinned, as ver. 12 itself shows; and even where they did not *actually* sin, there was subjection still to death in as high a measure as the nature of the case admitted.

Mr. Barnes, in his recent work on the Romans, maintains that the penalty in question was *spiritual* as well as *temporal* death; but he thinks that Adam, from his inexperience and the novelty of his state, could not have known the extent of the penalty, or have supposed it to be more than temporal death. But there are several difficulties in the way of this supposition. How can we conceive of Adam and Eve, just come from the hands of their Creator, who made all things to be "very good," as being inferior in respect to understanding or as to any human perfection which does not depend merely on experience? Spontaneously am I led to regard these as the very *beau idéal* of the human race. Then, moreover, Adam could no more have been fully acquainted with the death of the body, at that time, than of the soul. That he did not know the *full extent* of the evil threatened, we may admit; for who of our race now living knows this, after all the light that has been given? But that he knew what death meant, in a sense like to that in which we now know what eternal death means, I must suppose from the very nature of the case. How would it consist with the integrity and open dealing of the legislator, to conceal from his subjects the *main part* of the evil which they would incur by disobedience? The death of the soul, as meaning the *extinction* of it, we cannot suppose Adam to have

believed, unless he was left to be grossly ignorant of his own nature. Nor can we well suppose him to have been left unacquainted with the very highest motive to obedience, so far as penalty is concerned; I mean the evil to body and soul, consequent upon disobedience. In a word, his own accountability, immortality, and exposure to misery by sinning—exposure to continued misery—we must suppose to have been revealed to him, unless we maintain that the Creator withheld from him who was made in his own image the first elements of moral knowledge, and also kept out of his view powerful motives to continue in a state of obedience. How can we consistently make such a supposition?

Another difficulty in respect to the present subject deserves notice before we leave it. It is suggested by the following statement: 'If the miseries of the present life and the death of the body be a part of the penalty threatened to Adam, then the subject is implicated in difficulties like to those which have been already suggested; for if these be a part of the *penalty* of sin, how can that penalty be contrasted with the deliverance which Christ has effected, inasmuch as he has not effected a deliverance from the evils just named? Must not the miseries of the present life, then, and physical death, be wholly *excluded* from the penalty originally threatened?'

Some have been led to exclude them by this or the like train of reasoning; and especially because, as our context abundantly asserts, the blessings procured by Christ do greatly exceed the evils occasioned by Adam's sin. Such being the case, they conclude that the death of Christ must of course remove the *very same* evils, in all respects, which were threatened in the original penalty; and as temporal evils and the death of the body still remain, and are universal, they cannot admit that they were included in the death threatened to Adam.

But in reply to this I would remark, that it does by no means follow, that even those who become the subjects of redemption are to suffer *none* of the evils threatened against sin. The question, What would be the best means of training up men, who should be always sinless on earth, for the glory of the heavenly world? is something quite different from the question, How are *sinners* to be disciplined, in order that they may become fitted, and best fitted, for the happiness of heaven? A part of the discipline of the latter, (infinite wisdom has so decided it) must now necessarily be *suffering* and *trial*; and as included in this, we may also count the death of the body. Paul himself has told us, in the very chapter under consideration, that the children of God have reason to rejoice in afflictions, inasmuch as they result in patience, approbation, and hope, verses 3, 4; and again he says, that "our momentary [temporal] afflictions work out for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory," 2 Cor. iv. 17; and again, that "all things will work together for good, to those who love God," Rom. viii. 28. So far as bodily suffering is concerned, for the time being, Christians may suffer as severely as others; and oftentimes they may be the subjects of severe mental as well as bodily sorrows; *but all this finally promotes their spiritual benefit*. Here then is the immense difference which Christ has made, between the effect of their sufferings and that of the suffering of the wicked. So far as misery in the present life is concerned, Christians may indeed undergo and do suffer some portion of that which the penalty of the law threatens; they are truly made to taste how bitter a thing it is to have sinned against God, and how dreadful the conse-

quences of sin would be, if they should be subjected to them all. But still, this lesson is by divine mercy made highly salutary, both in weaning them from sin, and in preparing them for glory. To repeat the words of the apostle: "All things work together for their good." In a word, although a portion of the penalty of sin (in the modified way just described), is the necessary result in every case of having sinned; yet as Christ redeems us from immeasurably the greater part of the penalty, and makes that part of it which Christians do suffer, subservient to their own good; above all, since he saves us from every evil which appropriately belongs to the *second* death, no valid objection can be made against the declaration, that the blessings which the Redeemer procures, do not only exceed the evils introduced by the offence of Adam and consequent upon it, but also that the salvation which he has wrought is an effectual antidote against the curse of the law. Even the small part of this which the believer (as having once been a sinner) must necessarily undergo, *i. e.*, the evils which in the present life he must suffer, is, as we have seen, converted into a means of spiritual good to him. This is sufficient then to justify the assertion, that *Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law*. It is not necessary, that all and every particular of this curse should be included in such an assertion; it is enough that the very sufferings which Christians undergo, *i. e.*, so much of the curse as they do suffer, prove at last to be only "blessings in disguise."

But if *temporal* death merely constitutes the *whole* of the threatening to Adam, or the main part of it, then has the death of Christ failed to accomplish the end which Paul asserts it to have accomplished, inasmuch as all men without distinction are still subjected to it. Viewing this death, however, as only a very subordinate and inferior part of the evil threatened to our first parents; and reflecting that even this is made the occasion of discipline, which ends in good; we may without any serious embarrassment maintain with Paul, that the death of Christ has been the cause of blessings which greatly superabound over the miseries occasioned by the fall.

The deeply interesting nature of the subject, the difficulties attending it, and the efforts of numerous commentators, among whom are some highly respected ones, to establish that interpretation of θάνατος which assigns to it the meaning of *temporal death only*, are my apology for dwelling so long on the topics which this word suggests.

EXCURSUS IV.

Ὁν τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος in Rom. v. 14 (pp. 234—236.)

IN making additional remarks upon τύπος, I observe, (1) That the comparison, from its very nature and design, is in the way of CONTRAST. *Adam was the cause of sin and death; Christ of righteousness and life*: these are the simple elements of the contrast. The apostle himself gives notice, immediately after he says that Adam was a τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος, that he does not mean a type of something *the same in kind*, but an *antithetic* type, or one in the way of contrast; for he immediately subjoins: ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ παράπτωμα, κ. τ. λ.

(2) The same *measure* or *degree* of influence in bringing evil upon men,

is not to be attributed to the first Adam, as is to be attributed to the second in respect to bringing *grace* and *salvation*; ἡ χάρις . . . ἐπερίσσει—τὸ κρῖμα ἐξ ἑνὸς [παρὰπτώματος] εἰς κατὰκρῖμα, τὸ δὲ χάρισμα ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων εἰς δικαίωμα; and this last sentiment is virtually repeated again in ver. 17. Nothing can be clearer than this makes it, that the blessings of redemption *predominate* over the mischiefs occasioned by the fall, yea, *greatly* superabound. The measure or degree then of mischief and of benefit, are not what constitutes the *τύπος* in the case under consideration.

(3) Is it then, as I have stated in the commentary (p. 235), the *extent* of the evil on the one side, and of the good on the other, which is a point of resemblance held up by the apostle? That is, does he insist that the mischiefs of the fall on the one side, and the blessings of redemption on the other, pertain in any sense to our *whole* race without exception? A deeply interesting question, and one on which hang some very important deductions. In answer to it, I would observe.

(a) That all Adam's race do suffer more or less evil in consequence of the fall; all have at least lost the original state of inclination to righteousness which belonged to our first parents, and all are subjected more or less to evil of some kind or other, even without their concurrence, and before any voluntary transgression. All come into the world in such a state as makes it certain that their appetites which lead to sin will prevail, and that they will never have any real holiness until they are born again. Others would go still further, and say, that all are born with a positively evil disposition, which is itself sin, and one of the greatest of all sins, inasmuch as it is the parent of all transgression; that men have by the fall lost their freedom to do good, but not to do evil; and that all men, antecedent to any moral choice or action of their own, are condemned to everlasting death, on the ground that they inherit both Adam's crime and punishment. But without entering now into a discussion of these last points (for which the present is not the appropriate place), I would merely observe, that *in some way or other, and in a way which has an important bearing on the character and miseries of the human race, Adam's offence has affected them all.*

(b) As the counterpart of this, it may with equal truth be said, that *the blessings procured by Christ affect all the human race without exception, in some important respects.* The suspension of the execution of the original sentence upon Adam, saved our race from immediate destruction. All the good that comes to sinners, the blessings of providence and of grace, the light of truth, the forbearance of God to punish—in a word, all the means of grace and the offers of mercy, the new dispensation under which "God can be just, and yet the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus"—are all the fruit of Christ's great and glorious work. Many of these blessings are common to all, and the whole of them are proffered to all, without distinction. So far then we may truly say, the mischiefs on the one side and the blessings on the other are co-extensive with the human race; and this, antecedent to or independently of any acts which are properly their own.

(c) But it is important also to note that there are spiritual blessings, *i. e., actual pardon and justification*, which do not come upon all men without distinction, but only on those who believe. These blessings are indeed proffered to all; they are open to all; they are accessible to all. But they are not actually conferred on all; they are not actually possessed and enjoyed, except by *believers*; for *he who believeth shall be saved, and he who*

believeth not shall be damned. It is necessary, then, in order to become an actual partaker of these blessings, to *believe*; i. e., the acts of penitence and faith, acts which are *our own*, are the conditions of enjoying these highest blessings of the gospel, conditions without which they cannot be enjoyed.

And now—the other part of the contrast; which will not, perhaps, be so easily conceded by many of my readers. Does the *ultimate* and highest part of the sentence of death, the *second* death, i. e., future misery, which was threatened to Adam, actually come on all his posterity without any act of their own, without any real and personal concurrence with the sin of their ancestor? So the apostle does not say; for he says that “death passed through upon all men, *because that all have sinned*; i. e., (as we have seen above), in their own persons. But you will say that the apostle affirms, in ver. 19, that “by the *disobedience* of Adam the many, i. e., all, were constituted sinners.” I grant this; I believe fully what this passage affirms. But to say that Adam’s disobedience was an occasion or ground or instrumental cause of all men’s becoming sinners (which I must verily believe is the meaning of this declaration), and that it was thus an evil to them all; and to say that his disobedience was *personally* theirs, or was reckoned or imputed as being personally theirs; is saying two very different things. I see no way in which this last assertion can be made out by philology.

Besides; how utterly unlike, in this last case, would be the points of comparison? It is plain that none can enjoy the *higher* blessings procured by Christ without the personal and voluntary acts of repentance and faith; does it not seem equally true, now, that none will actually suffer the higher penalties of the curse threatened to Adam, without their own voluntary transgression? If this be not the true state of the case, how can the *superabounding* of grace, asserted so repeatedly in verses 15—17, be in any way defended? If we say that sentence of eternal perdition, in its *highest* sense, comes actually upon all men by the offence of Adam; and this without any act on their part, or even any voluntary concurrence in their present state and condition of existence; then, in order to make grace *superabound* over all this, how can we avoid the conclusion, that justification in its highest sense comes upon all men without their concurrence?

I am aware, indeed, that many commentators have considered Adam as being here produced by the apostle as the representative of *all* the human race, and Christ as the representative of only the *elect*. But this latter position at least seems to me to be forbidden by the nature and design of the contrast, as well as by the language in which it is expressed; see the discussion on this point, p. 239 seq. Nor is there any need of resorting to this construction, if we take into view the suggestions above, viz., that on the one hand blessings are proffered to all, blessings much greater than the evils occasioned by the fall, which blessings still can be actually enjoyed only through repentance and faith; while on the other hand, eternal death is before all, i. e., all are exposed to it from their condition and circumstances, but some personal act, i. e., some actual sin, must precede it. I see not well how to escape from this conclusion, unless we give up a part of the *superabounding* of the grace of the gospel, or else take the position that Christ is here presented as merely the head of the elect. But how can the first be given up, when the apostle so often asserts it? And how can the last be received, without doing violence to the laws of interpretation, and to the nature of the contrast presented?

In regard to the *superabounding* of the grace of the gospel, it must be particularly noted, in order to avoid mistake, that I do not construe it as appertaining to the number of its *subjects*, but to the number of offences forgiven by it, *i. e.*, the actual *greatness of evil* removed by it. It is a point perfectly clear, that the superabounding cannot consist in the *number* of subjects to whom grace is extended; for the evils of Adam's fall extend to *all* his race without exception, and how can the grace of Christ extend to *more* than all? This makes it clear, that the superabounding has reference to the forgiveness of the *many* offences which men commit, and which expose them to far greater evils than the *one* offence of Adam does; as it is asserted by the apostle in ver. 16.

There is one other point, also, which should not be omitted in this reference to the superabounding of the grace of the gospel. This is, that the gospel *places all men under a dispensation of grace*, where penitent sinners can be pardoned and accepted; while a dispensation of law (such was that under which Adam was first placed), subjects them to its penalty without reprieve, for the first offence which they commit. It cannot escape notice, then, that we are now, notwithstanding the numerous and dreadful evils occasioned by the fall, under a far more favourable dispensation in respect to an opportunity for *making sure* our final happiness, than we should have been by being placed in the original condition of Adam. Pres. Edwards has taken great pains in his book on Original Sin (p. 324 seq.), to justify God's dealings with Adam's posterity, in charging Adam's sin upon them, by endeavouring to show that mankind had a most favourable trial in Adam, and one which was much more likely in the nature of things to result in their good, than if each had stood upon his own trial. Now if there be any foundation for this, and indeed if we simply admit that each in a state of innocence must have been tried as Adam was, then the fact that he fell, and the conclusion thence to be deduced by analogy that they would fall, seems to render it pretty certain, that the whole of our race would have been involved in final and irretrievable ruin by being placed under a law dispensation, as Adam first was. Grace *superabounds*, then, above the evils of the fall, in that Adam lost for men only an innocent *legal* state—one in which men were on trial, and from which they might fall; while Christ has procured for them a *dispensation of grace*, under which many and aggravated offences are no bar to the salvation of the penitent.

I speak of a *legal* state in which men were to be on trial, because I am not able to find one text of Scripture, nor any good reason, to support the idea, that if Adam had obeyed, all his posterity would have been born in a state not only of perfect, but of *confirmed* holiness. Where is one sentence in all the book of God which declares this? And how is any argument to be obtained from analogy? The angels have had their trial, and some of them "kept not their first estate." The first human pair had their trial, when directly from the hands of their Maker; and they fell. But supposing they had not fallen, is there any ground to expect that their posterity would have been born in a condition *better* than that in which the first pair were created? As far as we know any thing of the history of rational beings, so far it is clear, that it is an indispensable rule of divine moral government, that *all should be subject to a state of trial*. If then the views of Pres. Edwards and others in relation to this subject are unsupported either by the Scriptures or by analogy, how can we admit them? It is not enough to appeal to symbols and to systems of divinity in such a case;

nor to argue *ad verecundiam*, by reciting the names of such as have patronized a view of the subject like that which has now been examined. We must have Scripture, and argument drawn from it, and then we will cheerfully yield our assent.

I return from this partial digression, however, and observe, that in regard to the *extent* of mischief on the one hand, and of blessings on the other, in the case under examination, so much is clear, viz., that a loss of an original state in which a predominant disposition to holiness existed; an imperfect state or condition of our nature, in which it is certain that the sensual passions will get the victory and lead us to sin, and certain that we shall never have any holiness without being born again; and also a subjection to many temporal trials and distresses; are evils brought upon all men by the fall—and on all without any distinction, and without any act or concurrence of their own. The opposite to this is, that men are placed by Christ under a dispensation in which they can be redeemed from the power and penalty of their sins (with the exception that more or less of evil is, and as things now are must be, temporarily experienced in the present world); and that all men enjoy the bounties of Providence, the calls of mercy, and the offers of eternal life; and thus much, without any act or concurrence of their own. This goes far towards satisfying all the demands which the nature of the apostle's comparison requires. Indeed, we might rest satisfied with this. All men have indeed experienced evil, in consequence of Adam's fall; but on the whole all men now are placed, notwithstanding all the evils which they suffer, in a better situation to secure their final happiness, than Adam was in his original state of trial, when the consequence of one offence was *irremediable death*.

If then the *τύπος* of the apostle is to be understood as having reference merely to evils and blessings that come on all Adam's posterity *without* any concurrence or voluntary act of their own, we may find sufficient here to answer the demands of a *τύπος*. But if any insist that the meaning shall be extended still farther, and be regarded as having respect to the *highest* penalty on the one hand, and the *highest* blessings on the other; then, in order to make out a real and true parallel, we must suppose that neither is the one inflicted, nor the other bestowed, without the free and voluntary concurrence of each individual, who sins and suffers for himself or on his own account, or repents and believes for himself so as to receive the highest blessings which Christ bestows. I do not object to extending the *τύπος* in this way, provided it be understood when thus extended, not of penalty in the higher sense as *actually* inflicted, nor of blessings in the higher sense as *actually* bestowed, but of *exposedness* to penalty on the one hand, and *exposedness* (sit venia verbo comparationis causâ) to blessings on the other. How can any thing more than this be made out? That everlasting death will *actually* be inflicted on all of Adam's race, of course will not be assumed; and as little can it be made out, that everlasting life will actually be bestowed on all.

The subject, properly considered, will afford relief to the mind, which is struggling with difficulty arising from the assertions of the apostle, which represent the blessings procured by redemption as being co-extensive with the mischiefs introduced by the fall. The evils and blessings in question are in many important respects co-extensive; and in their *highest sense* they are in this way regarded as being suspended on something *which is to*

be done on the part of man in order either to suffer the one or to enjoy the other. What hinders, then, that Adam in respect to the evils which he has introduced, should be contrasted (as Paul has contrasted him) with Christ in respect to the blessings which he has introduced?

After all, there are many serious and considerate men, accustomed to a different mode of representing this subject, who probably will not concede to this way of considering it. To them I may say, that, with the exception of some whose views are excessive on this point, I have an apprehension that the difference consists more in *words* and *modes of interpretation*, than in opinion as to the *facts* which are really true. They take it for granted, at the outset, that in all respects in which our present condition differs from that of Adam before his fall, in those respects it must be *the consequence of sin*; and to this I do not object; excepting that the latitude of the assertion "*all respects*," may possibly be too wide. What is called high orthodoxy maintains, moreover, that the disposition with which we are born is itself not only sin, but a part of the *punishment* of sin; and, as we could not ourselves sin before we had an existence, that Adam's sin is imputed to us, and we are punished for it, by being born with a disposition which is itself sinful, and which is also a part of the *penalty* of Adam's sin imputed to us. The argument is, that inasmuch as we are born heirs of woe and heirs of a disposition to sin, this must be a punishment for guilt which is either our own in a strict sense, or our own by imputation.

Now that men are born with a disposition that will certainly and always lead them to sin, in all their acts of a moral nature, before they are regenerated, I admit as fully as they do. But the fictitious process of accounting for this on the ground of *imputed* sin, which in this way becomes our own, is not what the Bible asserts or seems to maintain. *There is not, in all the Scriptures, an instance in which one man's sin or righteousness is said to be imputed to another.* If there is, let it be produced, and discussion on this point will then cease.

The *natural* state of man I admit to be one that is destitute of any proper disposition to holiness; and therefore, that man in his natural state is exposed to all the terrors of the curse. This is in itself a tremendous evil; it is also the consequence of Adam's fall. But I can see no advantage to be gained by accounting for this evil in the fictitious way of imputation. The awful turpitude of sin is disclosed by the fact that the consequences fall upon the innocent as well as the guilty. The vicious parent ruins his innocent children; the wicked ruler plunges whole nations into wretchedness. Is this fact illustrated, proved, or accounted for, by saying that his wickedness is *imputed* to these nations? Not in the least. The fact is one which takes place as the natural and regular sequence of wickedness, under the present constitution of things. But it helps the matter in no way to bring in the fiction of imputation.

So in the case of Adam in his posterity. All are sufferers on his account. The original state of man is lost. A new one is come in, in consequence of his sin, which is fraught with danger and sorrow. It is certain now, that all who come to sufficient maturity to sin, will sin. This certainty has been occasioned by the fall. In this way "*all are made sinners by the disobedience of one*," i. e., all are placed in a condition in which they will surely be sinners and nothing else, in case of moral development or of ability to commit sin. More than this cannot be made out. More is

not even contended for by moderate and sober writers, whenever they lose sight of the doctrine of imputation. In proof of this, we may appeal to the fact, that they have made a broad distinction between *original* and *actual* sin. Why this? Plainly because the human mind revolts at confounding our own personal and voluntary acts as free agents, with the disposition that the God of nature has given us, and in which we had no concurrence. But where does the Bible make *two sorts* of sin, we might well ask; two sorts so immeasurably different as these? The one free, voluntary, of our own choice; the other antecedent to all choice or action?

Then, again, the advocates for imputation do most of them concede the salvation of infants, who die before the commission of *actual* sin. Why? Plainly because they cannot bring their minds to place voluntary sins on a level with involuntary ones. Pietet himself, strenuous as he is in orthodoxy, puts the question, whether final damnation would ensue merely on the ground of *original* sin? And this he answers by the declaration, that he does not believe it would.

Of what use then is it to confound things by giving them one and the same name (sin), which we afterwards separate so widely from each other, and which we cannot help separating, without doing a violence to the first laws of our moral consciousness? If I might be permitted to suggest an answer, it would be, that it answers no other purpose but to keep Christians separated from each other, and to perpetuate disputes about *names*, while as to *things* they are essentially agreed. Different modes of explanation they may adopt. In difficult and mysterious matters men will always do this. But why should we refuse to see, that calling certain things by certain names, helps neither to establish nor explain them. A fictitious ground for a resting-place, which is never adopted by the sacred writers, can never add to the peace or harmony, or valuable stores of theologians.

In a word, it does not follow, because men are born heirs of woe and exposed to become *actual* sinners, that this is to be considered as individual and personal *punishment* (in the proper sense of this word); nor that any light is thrown on this mystery by saying, that they are sinners by imputation. *Imputed* sin and *veritable* punishment do not match together. Eternal justice is in no good measure vindicated by coupling them together. The mind remains, after all fictitious efforts of this nature, just where it was before. The facts are seen and confessed; but the mode of accounting for them in this way, the mind is not obligated to receive, while no declarations of such a nature can be pointed out in the Scriptures.

My positions are, that all men are born destitute of a predominant disposition to holiness; that all who come to moral action will sin and always sin before regeneration; that this state of things is brought upon us by Adam's fall; that suffering and personal sin, however, in such a world as this now is, are by no means co-extensive; that the tremendous evil of sin is, that it often affects the innocent (innocent in regard to the particular matter that occasioned the evil) as well as the guilty; and that admitting these facts, we have the substance of the scriptural doctrine respecting the fall and its consequences. The *quo modo*, i. e., the manner of accounting for such facts as these, I cannot regard as important, excepting that it should not be *anti-scriptural*. A mere *law-fiction* cannot help us here; and here, moreover, the sacred writers have not speculated; why then should we?

It is only when men hold fast to the position, than there can be no evil in the world which is not *penalty* in the proper sense—penalty in respect to the particular individual who suffers it—that they need to be embarrassed with the question, why we are heirs of woe, and of a disposition that leads to actual sin. Tell us then, all ye who assume such a position, Was Adam in paradise, before his fall, exposed to no evil? Did he suffer none? Positive pains of body or of mind, I grant he did not suffer; but was it no evil to be exposed to the temptations of Satan? Did it prove to be none? Nay, I might well ask, to what greater evil could he have been subjected, unless it was final perdition, than to be thus exposed to the wiles of Satan? Why then should we be so often and so confidently told, that *all* evil is the penalty of sin, and only the penalty of it? It is not so; it has not been so. In a world of *trial*, there is and must be evil of some kind or other, in some degree or other; else trial is but an empty name.

We need not be over solicitous then to answer the question, How can all the present evils suffered by men, or evils to which they are exposed, be accounted for? That Adam's fall has been concerned with them, or most of them, in their present form, is clearly and abundantly taught by Paul in the chapter before us. But in what way, *i. e.*, how far in all respects, and the *modus operandi*, this chapter does neither assert nor explain. Why need we do what the apostle has left undone? To say that these evils come because of *imputed* sin, is explaining nothing, satisfying in no degree the enquiring mind, helping the case in no respect. It is only changing *res obscura* for *nomen obscurius*. Enough that we believe the *facts*, as simply stated; speculation beyond this has hitherto availed little indeed, and promises but little for the future.

I must make one more remark in this connection. The inquiry has often been made: On the ground that the evils of the present life and physical death stand connected with the fall of Adam, how can it be that the redemption of Christ does not liberate the elect from *all* these evils? In reply to this I would say to the enquirer: Mark well that Paul does not aver, that the blessings procured by Christ do in *all* respects stand *directly opposed* to the evils introduced by Adam, so as to prevent their occurrence in any degree. Not at all. He only avers that blessings *superabound*, and that they are of the like *extent* with the evils. We have seen that this is true; and we have abundant assurance, also, that all the sufferings and sorrows of this life, which the children of God are called on to undergo, will turn to good account at last in respect to their spiritual interests. This does not show indeed that they are not evils in themselves; but only that they may be converted into a blessing, by that infinite power and wisdom and benevolence which have redeemed man. It sets the redemption of Christ in a new and glorious light, that such are the effects of it; and in such a light it was the design of Paul to place it, in the paragraph before us. As I have before said, suffering and sorrow in some degree may be necessary (so infinite wisdom has adjudged) to our discipline in our sinful and fallen state, but they do not substantially detract, and they never can detract, from the actual superabounding of the blessings which the gospel has introduced.

(4) The *τύπος* is not between the *person* of Adam as such, and that of Christ. The apostle does not undertake to compare the *personal* qualities of the one with those of the other; it is the *act* of one and its *consequences* which is compared with the act of the other and its consequences. It is

παράπτωμα and κατάρχημα on the one side, and ἵπακοή and δικαίωμα on the other.

(5) The apostle nowhere declares Adam to be the *federal* head or representative of all his posterity; nor Christ to be the *federal* head of his spiritual children. It would be indispensable, indeed, to the admission of the latter idea, that Christ should be regarded as the federal head of the elect *only*. But as we have seen, the representations of the present passage do not admit of such an exegesis. The usual doctrine of the more recent Protestant symbols, in respect to the *federal* and *representative* capacity of Christ and Adam, appears to have had its rise in the time and in consequence of the disputes of Augustine; it was variously modified and represented by the schoolmen of after ages; it was however more fully developed in its present form at the time of Cocceius, who gave occasion to such a development by his manner of considering the covenants of law and grace. Whatever may be correct or incorrect in the more usual representations about federal head, it does not appear to me to be taught in the chapter before us. It is drawn from it, as all must admit, merely in the way of theological deduction. It is a deduction indeed, which in some respects, and in a modified sense, seems to present nothing inconsistent with scriptural doctrine; inasmuch as all men are affected more or less by what Adam their first progenitor did, and also by what Christ has done in order to introduce a dispensation of grace. But we may safely add, that this particular form of expression casts no new additional light on the difficulties of our subject; and, from the nature of the case, it cannot be justly deemed essential to a full belief in the Christian doctrine of depravity or of redemption, that the idea of federal representation should be urged.

(6) Calvin points out two other points of dissimilitude between Adam and Christ, which he says the apostle did not think unworthy of notice, but which he omitted to notice merely because the turn of his discourse did not allow him to do it. These are (a) "*Quod peccato Adæ non per solam imputationem damnatur, ac si alieni peccati exigeretur a nobis poena; sed ideo ejus poenam sustinemus, quia et culpæ sumus rei, quatenus scilicet natura nostra in ipso vitata, iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud Deum.*"

"At per Christi justitiam alio modo in salutem restituimur; neque enim id nobis accepta fertur qui intra nos sit, sed quod Christum ipsum, cum bonis suis omnibus, Patris largitate nobis donatum possidemus." Calvin then adds (which those should note well who may hold that Christ's righteousness does in any proper sense become our own): "*Itaque donum justitiæ non qualitatem qua nos Deus imbuat, sed gratuitam justitiæ imputationem significat.*"

(b) "*Altera [differentia] est, quod non ad omnes homines pervenit Christi beneficium, quemadmodum universum sud genus damnatione Adam involvit.*" He then goes on to state that the ground of this is, that "our corruption comes in the course of nature (he means that it is transmitted by natural generation), and so pervades the *whole mass*; but we must possess faith in order to participate in the blessings proffered by Christ. To be depraved, it is necessary only to be a man; to participate in the righteousness of Christ, one must be a believer. The infants of believers have by covenant a right of adoption, by which they come into communion with Christ; other infants are not excepted from the common lot. Comm. on Rom. v. 17.

Two more points of difference then, Calvin contends for, which are made

out in the way of implication. The *first* is this, viz., that Adam's sin is not imputed to us merely as the sin of another, *i. e.*, one which is put to our account, but that our nature has become vitiated in consequence of it, and the fault thus becomes inherent, and in a proper sense our own. [On this point he and Turretin are directly at variance, and with Calvin do Edwards and Stapfer take sides.] But the righteousness of Christ does never become *inherently* our own, for the pardon bestowed on account of it is simply gratuitous.

Into a discussion of this topic my limits do not allow me here to go. Calvin may be in the right or in the wrong, just as one understands and defines his assertions. He denies that *punishment* for another's sins is exacted of us; and here I fully believe him to be in the right; for punishment, in the proper sense of this word, and under a system of law which is strictly just, must ever have relation to one's own offences. But *sufferers* because of Adam's sin we truly are; for how else shall we account for it, that we are born destitute of a disposition to holiness, and possessed of one which (in case of moral development) will certainly lead us to sin? To say that Adam's *vitiosity* is *transmitted* to us by natural generation, or in any simply physical way, helps nothing in the way of explanation. What matters it, whether we have Adam's vitiosity, or another one *de novo*, if after all we actually have such a vitiosity as fact shows that we do possess? The *modus in quo* of obtaining it, is a question of no practical moment; and it is wonderful that so much stress should have been laid upon it. How is the fact in question in any way illustrated, established, or vindicated by such a supposition? The transmission of a *moral* character in the way of natural descent is a problem that (to say the least) must always remain dark and difficult; for in a strict and proper sense every man forms his own moral character. But the fact that all men are so born, since the fall, that they are disposed to evil and not to good, at the first opening of moral development, is a fact which universal experience testifies. With this simple fact we may well rest satisfied. Speculation has not yet helped us to any adequate *eclaircissement*, and, so far as I can see, is not likely to do so.

In regard to the *second* point of discrepancy made by Calvin, it would seem to show that he regarded Christ as here represented to be the federal head of only the elect. It is beyond all doubt true that the *highest* blessings of his grace are bestowed only on believers. But the question whether Paul meant to confine his *εὐλογία* within such a limit as this, is surely one which we cannot receive upon simple assertion. Indeed the *εὐλογία* could scarcely be made out, if this view of the subject is the true one. Nor is it in any measure true, that blessings—a multitude of blessings—procured by the Saviour do not come upon all the human race. Here then is the antithesis to the mischiefs that come upon all, through the offence of Adam. But if we advance to the higher blessings and higher evils: on the one side are blessings which cannot be conferred without voluntary acts of penitence and belief on the part of men; on the other, then, why should we suppose that everlasting death will be inflicted unless men *actually* sin? After all that is said in favour of this theory, most men show their radical distrust in it, by holding to the salvation of infants and idiots, who die without moral development in voluntary moral action. If the *εὐλογία* be extended, then, to these higher blessings and penalties, it would seem that it must be extended in this conditional way. In this way we can account for the apostle's declaration, viz., 'that death comes on all, when all have sinned.'

EXCURSUS V.

On Rom. v. 16 (p. 243).

I CANNOT see that the considerations here suggested suffer any abatement of their force, on the supposition that the *οἱ πολλοί* (on whom the blessings procured by Christ are conferred) comprises only *the elect*; as some strenuously maintain. For the elect are never made partakers of *actual* pardon and justification, without repentance and faith; and these are both acts of their own, for it is not the sanctifying Spirit of God who repents and believes for them. And these are not only their own acts, but they are truly acts which constitute a *conditio sine qua non* of real pardon and justification. But how is it, now, on the other side of the antithesis? According to the views of those who advocate the above sentiment, the very *elect* are partakers of Adam's sin and guilt to the full extent of final and eternal damnation, antecedently to any act or choice of their own. So, at all events, Turretin states this matter; and so, others who think with him. But, looked at in this simple light, how are the particulars of the comparison to be made out? Or in what important respect is there any real *εἶδος*, left between the one and the other? The simple thing, that the act of one had influence on others, seems to be all that remains: the manner of that influence, the condition of it, its extent, the degree of causality or efficacy which should be attributed to it, are all thrown out of the question; and yet these are the main points of importance and interest. When the question is put: 'Whether the influence of the Spirit of God in regeneration is *efficient* as *causa principalis*, or whether it is secondary or subordinate, i. e., whether it operates merely as *causa occasionalis*?' it is thought by most theologians to be a fundamental question in evangelical theology; and in my apprehension rightly thought to be so. In this case, then, it is not so much the fact itself, viz., that the Spirit of God does influence the sinner who is converted, which interests us, as it is the *degree* and *kind* and *extent* and *condition* of his influence. How can it be otherwise in the case of the first and second Adam? The mere fact that each had *some kind of influence* upon others, would seem not to cast much light upon theology, or to create much interest in this particular topic, or give much importance to the consideration of it. It is then the degree and kind and condition and extent of influence, which constitute that which is of special interest or importance. But how are these to be at all compared, when things so diverse are brought together, as many bring together in the present case? On the one side, many blessings are *unconditionally* bestowed on all men without exception; yet still higher and eternal happiness is made altogether *conditional*, even after all which Christ has done; for it is suspended on their own voluntary acts of repentance and faith. But on the other, there is not only unconditional and universal temporal evil to a certain extent (for this all candid persons would seem constrained to admit), but there is unconditional and universal sin, guilt, and misery, in their ultimate and eternal measure, before any voluntary act at all of the nascent human being, and before he is in any proper physiological and pneumatological sense capable of any free moral agency whatever. Nor can we, if we keep upon Turretin's ground,

draw back from this statement, as some have lately attempted to do. This is and has been the dominant opinion among those who sometimes claim the exclusive right to be called the highly orthodox party in the reformed churches; as every man may satisfy himself who will read Turretin, Van Maestricht, or other writers of the like character. And assuming this statement for our basis, where, I ask again, is the *τύπος* that remains, in any respect that can be a matter of much interest or importance?

Should it be said, as it has been, that the grand *τύπος* in this case is *imputation* on both sides—imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, and of Christ's righteousness to the elect—the simple answer is, that this is not once asserted, nor even hinted (so far as I am able to discover) in the whole passage. Not one word more or less is here uttered respecting *imputation*. The proof of this lies in the inspection of the passage itself. Those who make out imputation, then, must bring it in upon the text, and not bring it out of the text by any laws of exegesis into their own minds or circle of ideas. Whatever may be elsewhere taught respecting *imputation*, it is not to be found here. And indeed with respect to other parts of the Bible, it is plain matter of fact that the Scriptures (as has once and again been said) never speak of any man's sin being imputed to *others*; it is the imputation of one's *own* sin or fault to *himself*, which they speak of (as we have already seen, p. 167 above), and not the imputation of the sin of one man to others who did not commit that sin.

How can it be consistent now, that we should denounce others in severe terms, who, in order to make out their favourite tenets, do on any occasion superinduce a meaning upon the sacred text which will support their own peculiar views; and yet we ourselves, who thus readily denounce this practice in others, do the very same thing in respect to the passage before us, where no declaration is at all made, that the evils resulting from Adam's sin, or the benefits bestowed by Christ's obedience, are by *imputation*? Is it true, that the train of evils that result from the fall, are no more than suppository, *i. e.*, imputed ones? And are the unspeakable blessings that come to us on account of what Christ has done and suffered, only *imputed*, *i. e.*, supposititious ones, or at least are they only from a supposititious source? Does not the mind spontaneously ask, Can imputed sin be punished otherwise than by imputed damnation, unless the eternal laws of right and wrong—of even-handed justice, are to be overturned and set aside? And must not imputed righteousness correspond with imputed happiness? Else how can we join *par cum pari*? And what is the kind of moral government that we must be led to believe in, by this method of representing the subject? A world, not of *realities*, but of *imputations*; all as it were *factitious*, and nothing real and veritable as to the original ground of punishment or reward! Moreover, according to the scheme in question, while Adam's sin is not only imputed to us, and thus imputed brings upon us the sentence of real and veritable death in its final and eternal power, and while there is besides this an *inherent* original sin (the penalty of imputed sin) which also subjects us to the like condemnation; yet, on the other hand, Christ's righteousness, although said to be *imputed* to us, is acknowledged as never becoming *inherent* (for then we should be absolutely perfect), but is reckoned only as supposititious. Here then is *par cum impari*. The two cases are immeasurably diverse, and the real *τύπος* seems to be much, if not altogether obscured. Must we not force our way, when we oblige ourselves to move in such a direction as this?

After all, however, it is rather the *language* employed, and the costume put upon this whole matter by such modes of representation, than the real ultimate object in view, at least the object in view as conceived of by sober and judicious men, to which one may reasonably object. The extremes of the *imputation doctrine* do certainly lead to very serious difficulties; some of which are stated above, and many others might be added, if this were the proper place. It is enough to say, once more, that *there is not in all the Bible one assertion, that Adam's sin or Christ's righteousness is imputed to us*; nor one declaration that any man's sin is ever imputed by God or man to another man. If this be not a correct statement, those who discredit it have the obvious means before them of correcting it. But if it does not need correction, then why should we be compelled to admit, as essential truth, the *modus* of stating a doctrine which has no parallel in the Scriptures; which we may therefore regard as not expressly warranted by the word of God; which is so obviously adapted to raise difficulties in the mind on the score of God's justice and impartiality; which seems to resolve the grand features of redemption into mere arbitrary sovereignty; which counts things to be what all confess they are not; which seems also to present the moral governor of the universe as doing with the one hand for the sake of undoing with the other, and doing much—very much that is all-important—in a merely fictitious way, and not as veritable reality; why, I would most respectfully ask, should we be compelled to adopt such a statement, unless the Bible absolutely demands it? Every Protestant, at least, is at liberty to ask this question; and he is at liberty to choose a different mode of stating the subject, until it can be shown that the Bible requires this mode, and this only.

But I speak, of course, only of *ultraism* in these views. It is altogether plain that many, I believe I might say of most sober, judicious, and pious men, who have well studied this subject, and are attached to this mode of representation, use the terms *imputation* and *impute* only as a convenient or rather *compendious* method of expressing their belief, that the posterity of Adam have greatly suffered on account of his sin, and that they receive many blessings on account of what Christ has done and suffered. Could this be fully and plainly understood, so that no mistake would flow from the use of the words in question, strenuous dispute about them would belittle more than *logomachy*, and quite unworthy of a sober man; for the *thing itself*, as thus stated, all men of what is called *evangelical* sentiment must agree and do agree. The objection to *imputation* and *impute*, as employed by ultra-theologians, is, that these words (as they apply them) have no warrant in Scripture; that they are adapted to mislead the mass of men as to the real truths inculcated by the doctrines of grace; and that the doctrine *apparently* inculcated by them is liable to many appalling objections, among which one of the most urgent is, that the sin of Adam and the righteousness of Christ are represented as imputed in the like way, when after all the method is so exceedingly diverse, as we have seen above. At least this latter assertion is most palpably true, when the consequences of imputation which are invariably connected with it by those who strenuously maintain the doctrine, are taken into view. For as they represent the matter, the consequence of Adam's *imputed* sin, is to be born an heir of damnation and of *inherent* sin; and the latter is regarded both as the *punishment* of the former and as a new cause for other punishment, and also as the cause of all subsequent actual sin; while, on the other hand, men are not regarded as

born holy on account of Christ; not even the *elect* are so born; nor is there ever any *inherent* holiness in them because Christ's righteousness is imputed to them. They are made really and veritably holy in part (not *putatively* so), by the sanctifying influences of the Spirit of God, on account of what Christ has done and suffered; so that their holiness is not in this case factitious, and the Redeemer's holiness is not veritably theirs. If it were so, then *perfect* holiness would be theirs; and they could then present a *claim* of salvation on the ground of meeting the demands of the law. Mere *imputed* holiness, however, never can answer proper legal demands; and therefore it can never entitle sinners to a legal acquittal. Pardon is given altogether of *grace*; not on the ground of either real or factitious, *i. e.*, imputed obedience. The first of these sinners cannot plead; the second, law (as such) does not in itself admit.

If any one should reply, as doubtless some may do, that Christ is and is called *the Lord our righteousness*; my answer would be, that he is at the same time called *our wisdom and sanctification and redemption*. Now he is by this representation made just as much our imputed wisdom, and our imputed sanctification, and our imputed redemption, as he is our imputed righteousness. But what possible sense could be made from *imputation* as applied to all these? What is our *imputed redemption*? The simple meaning, then, of all is, that Christ is the author of the wisdom which the gospel has revealed; he is the procuring cause of the sanctification which believers experience; he is the author of the eternal redemption of which they are made partakers; and he is *the Lord of their righteousness* (*δικαιοσύνη*) in the same way, *i. e.*, he is the meritorious cause of their justification or pardon.

EXCURSUS VI.

On Rom. v. 19, διὰ τῆς παρὰ κυχῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί (pp. 258, 259).

Thus much for the simple meaning of the word *κατεστάθησαν*. The sum of the meaning conveyed by the whole declaration still remains in some measure to be ascertained. Those who are familiar with the idiom of the original Scriptures must know, that *causation* of every degree and kind was usually expressed by the Hebrews in one and the same way. We are accustomed, when we wish for nice distinctions, to speak of *efficient* or *principal* cause, and of *secondary* or *instrumental* or *occasional* cause, &c. But it is not so generally in the Scriptures. 'God moves David to go and number Israel, and Satan moves David to go and number Israel.' The very same verb is applied to both agents in this case. So 'the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart, and Pharaoh hardened his own heart;' see Exod. vii. 13, ix. 12, x. 1, 20, 27, xi. 10, xiv. 8; Rom. ix. 18; Deut. ii. 30; Isai. lxiii. 17; John xii. 40. So evil is ascribed to God, both moral and natural; 2 Sam. xii. 11, xvi. 10; 1 Kings xxii. 22; Josh. xi. 20; Ps. cv. 25; 1 Kings xi. 23, xxiv. 1. In like manner God is said to give men a new heart, and they are commanded to 'make to themselves a new heart;' the Spirit of God

is said to convince, and convert, and regenerate the sinner; and the same thing is often ascribed, for the most part in the like words, to the gospel and to the power of divine truth. Now he who has not carefully noted and weighed these obvious and highly important facts, is in great danger of making out in some way a very partial system of theology, and of contradicting in his exegesis of one part of the Bible, what the sacred writers have affirmed in another.

To apply this to the case before us. *Were constituted sinners* means, that Adam was, in some sense or other, the cause or occasion of his posterity becoming sinners. But whether this was through a degradation of their nature physically propagated down from father to son; or whether it was (as Chrysostom, Œcumenius, Pelagius, Erasmus, and others have maintained although with high improbability), only by virtue of the example which he set; or whether it was in some other way, is not determined by the language of the text. Such expressions, as we have seen above, do not determine of themselves either the *degree* or the *kind* of causality. Principal or subordinate causation in this case may either of them be expressed by the phrase διὰ τῆς—κατιστάθηναι. The strenuous advocate for *imputation* avers, however, that the posterity of Adam were constituted sinners, *by his offence being imputed to them, and their being treated as though they had committed it.*

But when I look at the nature of this case, and ask what language the apostle would most probably have employed, had he designed to convey such a meaning, I am constrained to say, that the case can hardly be supposed with probability, that he would have employed merely such language as that before us, when other modes of expression more explicit and obvious were within his reach. "Ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἁμαρτωλοὶ ἐλογίσθησαν—ὅτι αὐτοῖς ἐλογίσθη ἡ ἁμαρτία αὐτοῦ—or else ὅτι ἦσαν ὑπόδικοι διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας αὐτοῦ, or something equivalent to these expressions, might, not to say must, have been added after οἱ πολλοί, so as to prevent all mistake. But as the matter now is, with the necessarily *active* sense of ἁμαρτωλοὶ, the language itself cannot lead us philologically to the supposition of an *imputation* scheme of sin. The language does by *usus loquendi* and the necessity of the case import, that Adam's offence is in some way concerned with making men to be sinners, not that it caused them to be so reputed or dealt with when they were not sinners. How can *constituting* a man a sinner, or *making* him such, mean merely *imputing* the sin of another to him, i. e., counting that to be his which actually is not?

The improbability of this mode of interpretation, moreover, is rendered far greater in consequence of the fact, that there is not in all the Bible a single declaration that one man's sin or righteousness is ever *imputed* to another. How can we regard then ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατιστάθηναι as meaning *were made sinners by imputation*, when there is not such a declaration or phrase in all the Scriptures besides? Having followed בְּשֵׁן and λογίζομαι through the concordances, I hesitate not to challenge a single example which is fairly of this nature in all the Bible.

Are we then to decide such a matter of *philology* by *a priori* maxims of theology—and of theology patristic or symbolistic only? That part of human symbols which I regard as the most decisive and authoritative of all, is the one which declares that *the Scriptures are the SUFFICIENT and ONLY*

rule of faith and practice. Imputation here is evidently brought in upon the text; the apostle has not left us a single intimation in the context that he puts this sense on the words ἀμαρτωλοὶ κατιστάθηναι. Nor can the words naturally bear this sense. That men should be *constituted* or *made sinners* by the disobedience of Adam, most naturally means, I had almost said, must necessarily mean, that in some way his offence so affected them as that they become actual sinners *in propria personâ*. Now is any thing more common than this mode of expression? 'A man of vicious character,' we say, 'corrupts his whole family. A profligate of winning exterior corrupts the whole neighbourhood of youth around him. One sceptic makes many doubters in revelation. The example of a bad man has a tendency to render others vicious. Sinners entice others to join with them. Voltaire made half of literary Europe sceptical.' Now in these and a thousand other like expressions, we do mean to assert an active influence, a real causality in some proper sense, of the evil done or spoken. Yet we never once think, for example, of Voltaire's scepticism being *imputed* to half of literary Europe; nor do we once imagine, that any of the classes above named as being corrupted are corrupted without any voluntary agency of their own. The *sin* of corrupt feelings and affections is *entirely their own*: it matters not what the causes were which operated on them, so long as they were after all left to their own choice whether they would yield to the excitement or resist it.

So far then as the force of *language* is concerned, the expression ἀμαρτωλοὶ κατιστάθηναι can never be proved to mean that Adam's posterity were made sinners only by imputation. Indeed it must mean something more than this and different from it. It is *real* and not fictitious and merely putative sin, of which the apostle is here speaking; as we may see by appealing to ver. 12, and to the nature of the case and the meaning of ἀμαρτωλοί.

In what way, then, does Adam's sin operate, in order to produce the effect which the apostle attributes to it? The degree, the extent, and nature of this influence, seem all to be laid open in the text. It amounts to such a degree as to involve us in a ruinous state or condition; it extends to all the posterity of Adam; it is a cause or ground of moral depravation, for it is the cause or occasion of all men's coming into condemnation, and therefore it must be a cause of their becoming sinners. But after all, the *modus operandi* is not declared by the apostle. He does not say, whether the operation of Adam's sin is on our physical or mental constitution; or whether it has influence merely on the condition in which we are placed, as being expelled from paradise and surrounded by peculiar temptations; nor whether it is example merely of Adam which we copy; and therefore a man may believe all that Paul has *here* taught, who refrains from speculations on any of these points, or on any others of the like nature, because he believes that nothing is to be gained by it. Better indeed would it have been for the quiet of the churches, if many had entirely refrained from all the particular modes of explanation which they have urged; for the danger is great that we may not only substitute our own individual belief and speculations for essential doctrines of the Scriptures here, but also for a commentary upon the text, and then elevate what we have thus superadded to an eminence far above the text itself.

It is not then from the text or context here that we can explain the *modus operandi* of Adam's sin. But from facts elsewhere disclosed and well known by observation we may learn, that all men are now born destitute of a holy

disposition, *i. e.*, a disposition that would lead them to obey the divine law. Our nature then is *degenerate and fallen*; and what can have rendered it so but sin? Then, again, Adam's sin occasioned the expulsion of our race from paradise; the ground was cursed on account of this; we are now born in a state in which we are every where surrounded and assailed by temptations: we have no predominant inclination or disposition to resist them, although we have the physiological and psychological power to do so; and for all these reasons (and these are enough to account for the fact without the aid of *imputation*), all men are constituted, or do become sinners. That they are *actual* sinners in the womb, before they are capable of moral knowledge and action, Paul has expressly denied in Rom. ix. 11, "The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil." Even those who make *two sorts* of sin, *viz.*, *original* and *actual*, would seem virtually to admit the truth which the apostle here affirms, if they admit infants to be guilty of only *putative* sin. But still, that men are born with a disposition that will lead them to sin, or occasion them to sin, is altogether certain from Scripture and from fact. Now this is a state the opposite of that in which Adam was created; for his predominant disposition was that which led to holy action. What then can the apostle refer to when he makes the affirmation in our text, unless it be to facts like those that are stated above? And we may safely admit these facts; inasmuch as they are confirmed by Scripture, and by every day's experience. But the *modus operandi* by which they are brought about, must still remain, in many respects, entirely hidden from our view. Why should we waste our time and talents, and spoil our benevolent feelings towards others, in pushing our speculations where the sacred writers have not led the way, and where facts will not warrant us in pushing them?

One more remark of a philological nature should be made on the manner in which *causality* is stated in this verse, *viz.* διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς. Bretschneider (Dogm. II., p. 53) says, that the apostle by using διὰ means to signify that he regards Adam's offence only in the light of an *instrumental* cause. I cannot think this mode of proof, however, to be valid; for that διὰ may stand before a Genitive which denotes *principal* cause, is sufficiently plain from examples in John i. 3. iii. 17; Rom. xi. 36, i. 5; 1 Cor. i. 9; Gal. i. 1; 2 Thess. ii. 2; Heb. i. 3, δι' αὐτοῦ. But that such phrases as διὰ παρακοῆς κατεσθάναι cannot, from the mere form of the language, be made to mean *principal* cause, is not only clear from the fact that διὰ before the Genitive usually designates instrumental or secondary cause, but from the fact also that cases occur where it would be absurd to construe it as designating *causa principalis*. For example: Paul says in Rom. vii. 5, τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν, τὰ δὲ ἰσχυρὰ τοῦ νόμου, *our sinful passions which are by the law*. In ver. 7 he says: "I had not known sin, but διὰ τοῦ νόμου." In ver. 8 he says: "Sin, taking occasion διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence;" and so in ver. 11. Is the law then the efficient cause of sinful passions and actions? Yet the law had something to do with these; and it is therefore (as usual among the sacred writers) reckoned as a cause or ground of them; but by no means the exclusive or principal or only cause. And so in the case before us; if Adam's sin as imputed to us, if original sin indeed either imputed or inherent (as theologians speak), be the sole and exclusive cause of all our sin, then what was the cause of Adam's *first* sin? He surely was not influenced by *original* sin, in either sense that is assigned to this word. The truth seems plainly to be, that there was originally a susceptibility in our

nature of being impressed and excited by allurements to sin; else how happened it that Adam was moved to sin? Even the spotless Saviour was *tempted*; and if there were no sympathies in his nature like to our own, or rather, like to those of Adam in his primitive state, how could he be tempted, and how could the apostle appeal (as he does in Heb. ii. 14—18, iv. 15, 16) to his *sympathy* with us who are tempted, as the peculiar ground of hope and relief for us when we are subjected to temptations?

The point of *degradation* and *fall*, then, would seem to develop itself peculiarly in this particular, viz., that our sympathies towards sinful objects are now much stronger and higher than those of Adam in his primitive state; such indeed as to render it certain that our moral acts will all be sinful, until we become regenerated and sanctified. This renders certain the great fact stated by the apostle, that all men *become sinners* through the disobedience of Adam. But that they are actual sinners *before* moral action, can be made out when it is shown that sin does not consist in *moral* action; and that moral action begins before birth, can be made out when the assertion of Paul, that Jacob and Esau (when old enough to struggle together in the womb) “had not done any good or evil.”

The reason *why* God made such a constitution of human nature, which would suffer in all its branches by reason of an act of sin in our first parents, he has not given. We leave that to his infinite wisdom and goodness, cheerfully confiding in the great and certain truth that he does all things well. We are concerned only with *facts*; and the facts are few, plain, and simple, if we receive them as the Scriptures have left them, and content ourselves without addition to them by our own speculations.

Here I might close my remarks; but the subjects of interesting inquiry and discussion are so many, that the reader will perhaps not be unwilling that some points not yet distinctly brought to view should be touched upon.

The enlightened advocates of imputation do after all disclaim the actual *transfer* of Adam's sin to his posterity. They are well aware, that the human mind cannot be forced up to such a point as this. But they do still urgently contend for the idea, that all Adam's posterity are *punished* for his sin, although they did not in fact commit it; and that in this sense therefore they are all guilty of it. Turretin's view is, that Adam's sin imputed is the ground or cause why men are born with original sin *inherent*, i. e., with native depravity; and this is in his view the *punishment* inflicted because of Adam's sin imputed to them. And with him many others agree. But Calvin, Edwards, Stupfer, and others reject the doctrine of the real imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, while they maintain that native inherent depravity is the consequence of it, which is chargeable to us as sin. This Turretin declares to be no *imputation* at all, i. e., a real rejection of his doctrine. Rejecting these views of Turretin, then, Edwards, in order to account for it how all men come to be born with *inherent* sin, labours to show that there is a *physical and psychological unity* between Adam and all his posterity. According to him, this would account for the *commencement* of native depravity; and when commenced it is imputed to us as sin, and therefore punishable, on legal ground, with temporal and eternal evil. But Turretin makes all to be *punishment* from the outset, and that on the ground of the sin of Adam which is actually imputed to his descendants.

In regard to this favourite view of Edwards's viz., that we are all physiologically one with Adam, we may well ask: how then can we all be *separate* and *distinct* from each other? Are we any more separate from each other,

than we are from our first parents? Pres. Edwards and many others have often and at length represented our connexion with Adam, by the figure of a tree and its branches. Conceding this for the present, we may ask, whether the topmost branch is not more nearly and intimately connected with the one next below it, than it is with the *root*; and whether it receives the laws of its nature any more from the root, than it does from the branch immediately next to it? Then we may ask again, whether any law exists between the branches as they have respect to each other, that is fundamentally different from, and opposite to, that law by which they are all connected with the root? Can the *root* communicate that to the topmost branch, which does not come through the next branch below the topmost, and conform to the laws of its nature? Or has the root some other mode of communication with the topmost branch, independently of that through the next intermediate one, and in conformity with the laws of its nature?

Pres. Edwards says that the declaration of Ezekiel in chap. xviii., viz., that 'the son shall not die for the father,' has respect only to the relation that exists between Adam's posterity, and not to that between them and him. I make the appeal, however, to all who have not a point to carry, and ask, for I feel constrained to ask: Would such an exegesis of the prophet Ezekiel have ever been produced, except for the sake of avoiding the force of a consideration, which at least seems to overturn the doctrine of imputation in its rigid sense? The whole doctrine of moral retribution, as built on the principles of moral justice, appears, at the very first view of it which is taken by our conscience and our sense of right and wrong, to be consentaneous with the principles laid down in Ezek. xviii.; and the representations of moral *retribution* in the Scriptures surely accord with the views of that chapter.

As to Pres. Edwards, notwithstanding that he has in one part of his work (Orig. Sin, Part IV., chapter 2) strongly denied that there is any *positive* infusion of evil inclinations into our nature, yet he has, in another part of the same work, vehemently urged the *universality* of sin, as a proof that our nature has inherited a *positive* infusion of corruption from Adam; and he insists on this at great length, in the first part of his Treatise on Original Sin, as an unanswerable argument. In this he has had a multitude of predecessors and followers. But I find great difficulty in admitting the *force* of this particular argument. Just so far as the human race have had any trial in a pure and holy state, just so far the consequence was a *universal* falling from that state. Pres. Edwards himself has taken great pains, in another part of his book, to show that we had a more favourable trial in the person of Adam, than we should have had in *propria persona*. Of course, then, he must admit that we *all* should have fallen, had we, like Adam, been placed in a state of holiness. The corruption, therefore, by his own arguments, would have been *just as universal* as it now is, if all men had been placed on trial in a state of innocence. How then can the *universality* of present corruption prove that men have now a *positive* infusion of corruption and sin, which has been *inherited* from Adam?

I might even go farther still and aver, that if this argument from the *universality* of corruption be a valid one to prove our native and *positively* sinful state; then the same argument will prove, that men would have been greater sinners if they had been born in a holy state, than they now are. For as *all* of mankind who were placed on trial in a state of holiness did fall; and as by the statement of Pres. Edwards himself, it must be admitted that all their posterity would have fallen in the like condition; and it is clear, that, when

beings in a holy state sin and fall, they are pre-eminently guilty; so, for aught I can see, Pres. Edwards himself being judge, the guilt of men would have been just as *universal* as it now is, if they had been born holy and placed on trial as Adam was; while the *measure* of his guilt would of course have been much greater than at present. For why were the fallen angels passed by, without any redemption provided for them, if their sin was not beyond the reach of mercy because of their previous holy state? And why did Adam's first sin produce such tremendous consequences as no other sin among men ever produced, unless its aggravation was exceedingly great, in consequence of his having fallen from a state of holiness? And even at the present time, is it not true that the sins of Christians are, for obvious reasons, more blame worthy than those of the unregenerate?

But to return from these partial digressions: What is more manifest, than that writers of the highest character, and most eminent talents, are disagreed as to the manner in which they speculate on this subject? And in all these speculations, is there not one radical error, viz. that they every where assume the fact, that no evil can exist in the universe, at least among intelligent rational beings, unless it comes from a sin in some sense their own as the cause; and then every one who suffers evil must of course in some way be made a sinner. Now I grant most fully and readily, that no evil would exist in the universe, had there never been any sin in any quarter; for God made all things very good, and made all his creatures to be happy. But when one part of his rational and moral creatures have sinned, they are not only miserable themselves, but they may inflict evil upon others who are innocent. This, as has before been said, constitutes the most abominable criminality of sin. When Satan had fallen, did he not tempt Adam and Eve in paradise, and in a state of perfect innocence? And was it no *evil* to be subjected to the assailing power of his temptation? Could any mere bodily pain, or even natural death itself, be compared to such an evil? It is true then, that the *innocent* are sufferers because of the sin of others. Yet who would say, that Adam and Eve were *punished* for Satan's transgression? Still more: who would venture to say, that Satan's sin was *imputed* to them?

Can we not suppose, then, that Adam's posterity suffer on account of his sin without being morally guilty of his sin, or without its being properly imputed to them? Do not facts before us every day show, that it is the nature of sin to do mischief to the innocent as well as the guilty?

And how are we helped, as to the real difficulties of the case, by the theory either of Edwards or of Turretin? When a sin is counted to be ours which is not so, then there is *fictitious* guilt and *veritable* damnation. Does this help to allay the doubts of inquiring minds, and to vindicate the justice of God? Or can a mere fictitious unity, which contradicts both consciousness and matter of fact, reconcile us any better to the mystery of our native depravity? I confess myself unable to see how such a forced mode of accounting for *facts*, can help to cast any satisfactory light upon them. Not that I disapprove of or condemn the general *object* of Turretin or Edwards; far from this; but I do not see how any more light is to be obtained with respect to it, by introducing fictitious guilt, or fictitious unity with Adam, in order to account for real and substantial evil. Why not remain content with the simple declaration of the apostle, that Adam's disobedience has been a cause of making his posterity sinners, and leave the *modus in quo* by which this is effected where he has left it, viz., without attempting to assign the specific manner of operation, certainly without attempting to introduce a mere legal fiction, of which the sacred writers have given us no example?

The reader will not be displeased if I here subjoin some leading traits of the usual doctrine of the older Protestant Symbols, and a few remarks on some of the particulars which they embrace.

I shall commence what I have to say (which of course must here be only in the way of mere hints), with a brief review of some of the leading theories which have been proposed and defended, in regard to the influence of Adam's sin upon his posterity.

I. The usual theory of the Symbols or Creeds of the Reformed Churches, and of the leading reformed divines of earlier times, is nearly as follows: viz., Original sin consists, (1) In the want of original righteousness. (2) In the positive and entire corruption of our nature, *i. e.*, in the existence of forbidden lusts and desires *connate* with us, which are not only the punishment of Adam's sin as imputed to us, but which also are positively evil in themselves and deserving of damnation; they are, moreover, the root and ground of all other evil in us. (3) Not only have men lost original righteousness, and become by natural generation the subjects of desires and affections positively bad, but they have lost their freedom to do good, and are now free only to do evil, and *in rebus civilibus*. (4) All these evils, *i. e.*, the whole of this state and condition, is propagated from one man to another by natural generation. (5) Hereditary depravity, still, is not a part of our con-created *substance*; it is not one of the *puranaturalia*;^{*} but it is an invariable *accident* of the same. (6) The prevailing sentiment has been, that the sin of Adam is charged to us; and that on account of this, as well as of hereditary depravity, independently of all *actual* sin, we are justly subjected to the penalty of the second death. Melancthon called this *impia opinio*, at first; but he seems gradually to have given way to it; Bretschn. Dogmatik II., p. 36, 2nd edit. (7) The prevailing sentiment has been, that original sin, as thus defined, is fixed, constant, invariable, unaffected by time or circumstances, and uniform in all ages, in all nations, and among all individuals. Pres. Edwards labours abundantly to establish this idea, for substance, in part I. chap. i. § 2, of his treatise on Original Sin.

The detail of evidence which would establish the correctness of this statement, is of course excluded from such a work as the present. I must content myself with referring to the Protestant Symbols, and to the leading divines, especially the older ones, among Protestants. Some discrepancies have indeed existed, in respect to more or less of the particulars stated; but of the more rigid school, nearly all, among the older writers, have concurred in the substantial part of the statement as given above.

Difficulties not unnaturally arise in the mind, after an attentive examination of some particulars in this theory of doctrine; and they are somewhat appalling. I proceed summarily to state a few of them.

(1) It is common for almost all the writers who advocate the natural propagation of Adam's sin and condemnation, to compare it with the propagation of certain tastes, defects, peculiarities of temperament, inclination to certain vices, &c., which are often and every where developing themselves among our race. But,

(a) It lies in the way of this comparison, that the propagation in question has nothing of the *uniformity* or extent which they assign to original sin. The son of a man who has one eye or one leg, is not born defective.

^{*} So the old school divines call those qualities which are *essential* to human nature, as such. What makes a good man or a bad one, is one of the *accidentia*, and not *essence*: what is necessary to make a man or human being, belongs to the *para naturalia*.

The children of *mutes* have perfect senses The offspring of almost brutalized parents are sometimes remarkable for opposite qualities. Nothing can be more variable, inconstant, and diversified, than every thing of this nature is.

(b) If the descent of original sin is to be explained on such grounds, viz., the common law of parents propagating their own qualities; then why are not the children of pious parents also pious? At least, why is not original sin greatly modified and diminished in the children of such parents? Pelagius urged this question on Augustine; to which the latter replied: 'The children of Jews are born uncircumcised.' Pelagius might have rejoined: 'The children of parents with one eye, are born with two;' and then the balance would have been again poised.

When it is urged in the way of explanation and defence of this, that 'the law of propagation depends not on our immediate ancestor, but on our connexion with Adam,' we may remark, that if the propagation is in the manner stated above, i. e., agreeably to the *physical* laws of our nature, then why must not the qualities propagated depend on our *immediate* ancestor? Take now the favourite representation of Pres. Edwards, viz., the root and branches of a tree; I ask, then, does the topmost branch derive its sap from the one next to it, or immediately from the *root*? Again; if the law of propagation depends solely on our connexion with Adam, the difficulty is still undiminished. Adam became penitent after his fall; at least so the promises made to him, and the mercy shown him, would seem to imply; and so most divines have admitted. Then as this happened before the procreation of his children, why did he not propagate to them his *penitence* as well as his sin, his reward as well as his punishment? These considerations serve to show, that if it be true that Adam's sin is *propagated*, we cannot appeal to the *common* and *usual* laws of our nature as to propagation, in order to support this idea.

(2) 'Original sin,' it is said, 'is uniform and invariable, in all circumstances, ages, and individuals.' It is, then, strictly considered, not capable either of increase, diminution, or modification. The most ardent piety diminishes not the measure on which it is communicated; the highest profligacy does not add to it. The children of the most eminent saint, and of the veriest fiend, would seem to be on the footing of entire equality in this respect.

How can one help asking, now, whether there is indeed any sin among men, in their present state (if perhaps what is called the unpardonable sin be excepted), which is incapable of diminution, increase, or modification, by any actions whatever on the part of the individual who is the subject of it? Does the Bible reveal to us any sin which is incapable of diminution by the sanctifying grace of God, by penitence, self-denial, and a holy life? Or which is incapable of increase by abandoned wickedness? Yet if Pres. Edwards' views are correct, such a sin is that which he calls *original*. The grace and holiness of the most pious parent, does not hinder its being propagated in all its strength and uniformity.

Tholuck (Review in Lit. Anzeig., No. 22 seq. 1834) avers that the advocates for original sin, as stated above, have not directly taught such uniformity as to *quantity*. I admit that in a *direct* way many of them have not; because the bare proposal of such a proposition would be likely to throw a formidable obstacle in the way of their views. But if this be not a fair and necessary deduction from what Edwards has taught on this sub-

ject, then I am not able to make one. Tholuck appeals to Baumgarten (Evang. Glaub. Th. II. p. 575), in confirmation of his averment. But the very passage that he quotes shows that the different degrees (Stufen) of native depravity of which he speaks, refer to the different *kinds* of vicious temperament with which men are born, and not to the simple sum or quantity of *vitiositas*. Why some should have more and some less *vitiositas* (as Tholuck holds), he acknowledges to be a matter quite beyond our reach. And this is the very thing that I am aiming to show, viz., that to account for original sin by the simple law of natural propagation, is an unsatisfactory and inadequate account of it.

(3) 'Original sin,' we are told, 'is not *concreated*; it is not one of the *pura naturalia*; it is mere *accidence*, not *substance*;' and yet it is 'invariable, uniform, always and every where.' Now logicians tell us, that only *substantial* and *essential* qualities have such predicates as these last. Does it not seem like a contradiction, then; to assign to original sin a nature *uniform* and *invariable*, and yet to deny that it is an *essential* part of the human constitution?

(4) We are told that 'original sin is the cause and ground of *all* actual sin.' Yet we are also told that 'original sin is uniform and invariable in all. Of course, then, all must *originally* be equally depraved; and under the like temptations, all must exhibit the very same degrees of wickedness. The same cause in the same degree must produce the same effect, whenever there are no special counteracting causes. But this is contrary to *fact*. Not only do men in a natural state, who belong to the same neighbourhood, but those of the same family, differ widely from each other as to the degree of their wickedness. How then can the cause exist, uniform in *degree* as well as nature, which does not produce uniform effects in the same circumstances?

The real fact seems to be, if we may judge from every day's experience, that all men have more or less a disposition that will lead them to sin, when they come to moral development. Nothing can be more certain than that all have *some* of it; and equally certain is it, that it varies exceedingly in degrees. If *universality* had been put for uniformity, there could be no objection to the proposition. And in general, we may admit the design of those who defend this to be correct, while their language is liable to exception.

(5) If propagation be the ground of transmitting sin, then why are not all the sins of all our ancestors, from Adam down to ourselves, brought down upon us, and propagated to us? In this way, why must not the sins of Adam's posterity for ever go on in the way of an arithmetical progression?

The idea of *propagating* sin, then, in the simple way of natural generation, is liable to some appalling objections; at all events it is so, if we include the *manner* in which it has more usually been stated and defended.

The reader must not be left, however, to misapprehend my design in proffering all these objections. It is not with any intention to set aside the fact that all men in their natural and unregenerate state have, and in all cases have, a disposition that will certainly lead them to sin, under such circumstances as those in which they are placed. Fact and the Scriptures decide this, in my apprehension, beyond all appeal. My design is quite a different one. It is to show, that to maintain the idea of a *physical* propagation of sin, a physically propagated *vitiositas* which belonged to Adam after his fall; and to maintain this on grounds such as belong to the propagation of simple *pura naturalia*; is an undertaking that is replete with difficulties; so replete, that we had better confess our ignorance of the *modus*, than to engage in such an effort in order to explain it.

Nor have I said all that might be said upon this topic. *Original sin* Adam had not. He was created so as to be holy. His only sin was *actual*, not original. How could he *propagate* a quality or temperament which was no part of his proper nature, i. e., how could he impart that which he originally had not?

Nor is this all. From whom does the *soul* of man come? From our earthly parents or our heavenly One? Turretin holds the doctrine to be even heresy, that souls are propagated; and with him agree Edwards, Van Maestricht, and the great body of the reformed divines. Let us take the matter as they represent it; and then we may in our turn be permitted to ask: When the Creator forms human souls, does he infuse originally into them pollution and sin, or not? To this they have all strenuously answered in the *negative*. 'What God makes,' say they, 'must be *good*. He cannot be the author of evil.' Whence, then, the *vitiositas* in question? Has the material body of itself, which is procreated by human parents, a *moral* character? Here again they answer *negatively*. How then comes this *native* and *PROPAGATED* vitiosity. Here Edwards and Turretin undertake to philosophize in different ways, which I cannot now particularize; but the result in both is this, viz., that the body, by its passions and desires, does so entice and win upon the pure soul which it receives, that it at last transforms the whole character of the soul, so that it becomes wholly and entirely vicious. But here again we are in no small perplexity. How can the weaker and more insignificant part so win upon and prevail over the soul, formed at first (as they admit) in the image of God, or at all events free from every stain of pollution? How can mere *matter* thus overcome and so entirely vanquish *spirit*? A problem this, which ages and generations have not solved by philosophizing; and which we see no present grounds to expect will be solved by any speculations of this nature. The *Creationists* are surely put to their wits, when they come to these ultimate questions; and the *Traducians* or *Propagationists* (who have been few hitherto) might be perplexed with many questions, which the proposal of their theory would naturally call forth.

It would seem, then, that Turretin, Edwards, and others who think with them, do not after all admit, in the strict sense, of a *vitiosity* which is *propagated*, or really original and native, but maintain one which is *supervenient*, and which gradually comes in by the intercourse and union of soul and body, and the corrupting influence that the latter exercises over the former.

But where are we now? Is this the result of what such mighty minds have been able to effect, in the solution of this question? This the light that they have scattered over this midnight region? And must we say the sun in his brightness now shines here? Or have we yet to wait and wish even for break of day?

What then is the result? It is this, at least in my own view; viz., that we have made no advance by all the speculations of eighteen centuries, beyond the simple facts as stated by the apostle Paul. 'Adam involved all his race in a state of sin and death. They are born in such a condition that sin will be their first moral act, and sins their only moral acts, unless divine grace prevents it. Adam was the original occasion and cause of this mysterious and degenerate state of his posterity. But all these disadvantages under which they are now born, are more than compensated by the glorious grace and mercy of the gospel.' What do we know beyond this? Just nothing, or nothing to any effectual purpose. Why not stop then with the apostle, and not hazard our speculations in accounting for facts, the manner

of which plainly lies beyond the reach of our investigation? Why not cease to require for such speculations all the deference that we are bound to pay to the high and holy decisions of eternal truth itself? When men come to believe more thoroughly that *the Scriptures are the SUFFICIENT and ONLY rule of faith and practice*, we may hope that more supreme deference will be paid to the Bible.

II. Another theory is, that Adam's sin becomes ours by imputation or putatively, while the consequences of his offence, *i. e.*, punishment or death spiritual and temporal, are really and truly ours.

This theory, in order to be consistent, should of course abandon the ground that Adam's personal sin is propagated to us. In respect to the sentiment which constitutes the basis of it, I have already discussed the subject of *imputation* in so many places in the commentary and in the preceding Excursus, that it would be superfluous here to resume it at length. That it is encompassed with more formidable difficulties, in respect to moral justice, than the first theory above examined, must be apparent, one would think, to every man who will seriously and thoroughly examine it.

The obvious difficulties in the way of it are, (1) The *sin* in this case is merely *putative*, not real and actual. But what is the *punishment*? *Actual* to be sure, according to the statement of those who advocate this theory; and actual, indeed, in a tremendous degree. The punishment begins with our being; it is connate and innate, and contains within itself not only the commencement of a misery which is naturally without end, but is, at the same time, the root and ground of all other sins which we commit, and which serve unspeakably to augment our condemnation and misery. Can the human mind, now, well conceive that perfect justice would *punish* with actual and everlasting and inevitable corruption and misery, beings who are sinners only *putatively*, *i. e.*, in mere supposition, and not in fact? All the elements of our moral nature set themselves spontaneously as it were in array against such a representation. It seems to be one of those cases which make it necessary for us to be made over again, and have new and different faculties, before we can admit its truth. Nor,

(2) Can it be brought, in any tolerable measure, to accord with the views which the Bible gives of divine justice. How can we make it harmonize with the declarations in Ezek. xviii.? Or with many other parts of the Bible of the same tenor? But this is not all; for,

(3) The supposition contains a *ὑπερὸν πρότερον* within itself. According to the tenor of it, punishment begins *before* crime. It is coetaneous with the original elements of our being. It begins before distinct perception, and understanding, and reason, and moral sense, are developed. It begins antecedent to all sense of duty, and antecedent to all knowledge of moral rule. Such punishment, therefore, *precedes* transgression, for "where there is no law, there is no transgression;" and surely there is no law, where there is no moral sense, nor reason, nor understanding, nor perception. But how can justice make punishment *precede* transgression! "The soul that sinneth shall die," is the order in which heaven has placed the matter. Sin comes first; punishment is the fruit or consequence. By the theory before us, the reverse is the case. Punishment precedes all personal demerit; and sin follows on as the result of our punishment!

Nor is this at all relieved, by saying that 'sin does not precede punishment, in this case, inasmuch as it is Adam's sin for which we are punished; for this is only affirming that *putative* or *supposititious* guilt is followed by

real and actual punishment How does this diminish the difficulty of the case?

‘But after all,’ it will doubtless be said, ‘you have repeatedly admitted the idea, that all of Adam’s posterity are affected by his offence, and have sustained great losses thereby, and are subjected to many evils. Why should you now decry the very sentiment which you have so often admitted?’

That I fully admit thus much, in regard to the present world and the sufferings of our present state, and also as to the moral degradation of our nature in consequence of Adam’s fall, I readily concede. But this is in my view something very different from proper *punishment*. The fall of Adam brought our race into a new state of probation, one exceedingly different in several respects from that in which he himself first was. The whole race are now heirs by nature of a frail and dying condition; they are no longer in that state in which they are inclined to holiness. And this comes on all without any concurrence of their own. But this may still be regarded in another light than that of simple punishment. It is trial; it is discipline; it is probation *sui generis*. Adam has brought us into this state, I freely concede. But Christ has more than made good all its apparent or real disadvantages. “Grace superabounds.” If evils come on our race because of Adam’s sin, more, far more, than an equivalent is rendered for them by the grace of the gospel. On the whole, then, our present condition is not to be viewed in the simple light of punishment for Adam’s sin; but that of trial or probation *sui generis* adapted to our fallen nature, and adapted to restore us to the original image of God, in which man was created. Not that in itself alone our condition would be such as I have now described; but viewed in relation to what Christ has done for us, it has become such. What would be proper to preserve beings, perpetually holy, in their pure and happy state, may be quite different, in some respects, from that which is necessary to restore beings to holiness, who now possess a fallen nature. All evil, or suffering and trial, in the present world, is not punishment; and all which we have not brought on ourselves by our own sin and folly, may be well regarded in the light of *discipline*, which is adapted to our present condition.

There is also an inexpressible difference between our temporary evils here, and the endless miseries of a future world. The theory which I am opposing makes all our race the heirs of the latter, antecedent to any voluntary exercise of their own, and merely on the ground of Adam’s offence. Yet even here it does not generally preserve consistency. The salvation of infants, who have not been guilty of *actual* sin, is for the most part admitted. But why this distinction? The theory puts original and actual sin on the same ground as to turpitude, or at any rate as to *penalty*. Why, then, draw such a line of distinction? Here, therefore, the force of moral feeling against such a view of the subject is clearly developed. Say what men may about merely *imputed* sin, the human mind cannot be made readily to believe in our real desert of damnation for what another has done without our knowledge or concurrence.

For these and other reasons before given, I cannot admit the theory above exhibited; nor can I persuade myself that the same or as formidable objections may be justly made against those views on this subject, which I have in various places already advocated.

III. Another explanation of the meaning of Rom. v. 12—19 has been, that

Adam first set the example of sinning, and his posterity have only followed his bad example.

This explanation denies the degenerate condition of Adam's posterity, and places them, in effect, on the same ground with him in his original state of holiness. But this is not only contrary to the numerous declarations of the Scriptures, but irrelevant to the subject which the apostle is labouring to illustrate. For if only the force of Adam's example has led his posterity to sin, how can we account for the sins of such of his posterity who never knew any thing of his example? Or if example be the principle or leading cause of all sin, then whose example did Adam follow when he committed the *first* sin? And why charge the occasion of our sins upon Adam, if example be the principal ground of them, when they should with much more propriety be charged upon those of Adam's posterity who are *immediately* connected with each individual that sins? On the whole, this theory is palpably unsatisfactory, and insufficient to remove the difficulties in question. Especially must it be so considered, when we take into view the *expiatory* death of Christ as the ground of justification. For if, as the theory in question represents, the example of Adam was the occasion of the sin and death of all men, then must it follow, that the example of Christ is the cause of obedience and life to all men. This is, indeed, a doctrine which has been taught by some; but clearly not by the apostle Paul, nor by any of his colleagues in office. We come then,

IV. To the simple facts and declarations of Paul and of the Scriptures relative to the subject before us. These are,

1. That Adam's first sin was connected with the sin and consequent condemnation of all his posterity. It was, in some sense or other a preparatory or occasional cause. Setting aside the implication of this in ver. 12 (εἰσῆλθε . . . διῆλθε), it is expressly asserted in ver. 15 that τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματι: οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον; in ver. 16 we have τὸ μὲν φάρ κρῖμα ἐξ ἐνὸς εἰς κατὰ κρῖμα; in ver. 17, τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματι ὁ θάνατος ἐβασίλευσε διὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς; in ver. 18, δι' ἐνὸς παραπτώματος, εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς κατὰ κρῖμα; and in ver. 19, διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί. It seems to be impossible, without doing violence to the Scriptures, to deny that Adam's first offence is here asserted to have a connexion with, or an influence upon, the sin and consequent condemnation of all his posterity. *But now, is not said.* Let the reader mark this well. Paul neither asserts that Adam's sin is propagated; nor that it is imputed to us without any act of our own; nor that it is ours merely by the force of example. Nor does he say that *hereditary* depravity is the ground and cause of all sin, (how could he say this, when Adam sinned without it?) nor that we are finally condemned to everlasting death without being *actual* sinners. All this, I am aware, has been often said for him, and in his name; but he does not once say this for himself. Why now should we attribute to him our own theories, and then insist on their being a part of Scripture? At all events, if we can make out any theory as to the *modus* of original sin, it must be merely by *deductions* from what the apostle has here said, or from other declarations of the Scriptures which we can find elsewhere. How much can be made out in this latter way, we shall have further occasion to inquire in the sequel.

2. We may justly gather from the declarations in Rom. v. 12—19, that the evil consequences of Adam's act may be placed in antithesis to the good which Christ has procured for the human race. The apostle goes no farther, in

this passage than to declare on the one hand that sin and death were occasioned by Adam; on the other, that righteousness and life are introduced by Christ. But from other parts of his writings we may learn that men in a state of nature, *i. e.*, before regeneration, are all destitute of any holiness; and that all who can sin, have sinned. Of course we necessarily draw the inference, that men are born destitute of such a disposition to holiness as Adam had in his primitive state; and this from the fact, that they never, before regeneration, do any thing which is truly good and holy, but always sin in all their actions of a moral nature. This makes a wide difference, therefore, between their present natural state and the original condition of Adam. And such is the natural state into which they are born, as we have reason to conclude, in consequence of Adam's fall. Although the apostle does not specificate the particular point in which the fall injured all men, yet as he often asserts the *fact* itself that it did injure them, it must of course be allowed that in some way or other the truth of this fact is developed. In what way, then, is this developed, if not in the manner just stated, *viz.*, by our being born into a state destitute of all disposition to holiness, and with passions and appetites which, situated as we are, will *certainly* lead us to sin, and *always* lead us to sin in all our actions of a moral nature? The fact, that we now have such a nature, and that such is the result in respect to our passions and appetites, the Scripture testifies, and the experience of all ages and nations testifies. *How* this came about, Paul seems to me to declare in the passage under consideration.

I must add here, however, in order to guard against all misunderstanding, that our sinning is not to be regarded as *necessary* in the sense of being *compulsive*. The possessing or being endowed with *faculties* to sin, does not make men sinners; otherwise Adam and the fallen angels were sinners before their first transgression; for faculties to sin they surely had. *Temptation* to sin does not make men sinners; even when they feel its power, this feeling of itself does not make them sinners; for our Saviour was tempted "in all points as we are," yet without sin. The possession of desires and appetites which are *pura naturalia* does not make men sinners; for they are essential to men as human beings, and our Saviour possessed them, as did Adam also before his fall. It may be said, moreover, with truth, that moral sense, conscience, reason, judgment, are all attributes of the natural man; that they are *pura naturalia*; and these are designed to contend against and oppose passions and desires that would lead us to evil, to restrain them, to control them, and to keep them within their proper bounds. God has not left men, therefore, even in their fallen and degraded state, in a condition in which they have any proper excuse for their sins; as any one may see and must feel, who will attentively read Rom. i. 19—32. ii. 14, 15. iii. 9—23. It is impossible to overlook the fact here, that the apostle considers the abuse of reason and conscience by the heathen, in virtue of which they ought to have resisted their sinful inclinations as rendering them altogether inexcusable before God.

Whatever, then, may be the degradation in which we are now born (degradation compared with the original state of Adam, we are still born moral agents, free agents, with *faculties* to do good, yea, all the faculties that are needed. If we are born with passions and affections attached to our natures which may lead us to sin, we are also born having a *moral* power, *i. e.*, conscience, within us, to remonstrate against the abuse of our passions.

The fact, that the degradation of our whole race is connected with the

first sin of Adam, is plainly a matter of divine sovereignty, altogether beyond our power to fathom. We can speculate and reason about it, and wonder; but it becomes us to bow in humble submission. More than we have lost, the gospel assures us has been given to us by Christ. We see enough to know, that even in our fallen state our sins cannot be charged upon the author of our nature. They are strictly our own. That Adam was in some real sense a cause or occasion of our degradation, is clearly taught; but that his sin was in fact our own sin—where is this taught? I cannot find it. I can find only (what appears to be the sum of all that Paul has taught relative to this subject) that, such was our connexion with Adam, his fall has occasioned evil to all his race without exception; that all are despoiled of that disposition to holiness which belonged to him in his original state; and that all are in a condition in which ruin will ensue, unless there be some deliverer. On the other hand, it is made equally apparent that such a deliverer has appeared; that he has by his wonderful grace and mercy made such an arrangement, as that the evils which come on all without exception through the act of Adam, may be made the means of *spiritual* good; he has placed all men, destitute of righteousness such as Adam had in his original state, under a *dispensation of mercy and pardon*, where salvation is more accessible and certain to the penitent, than it was in paradise to Adam, while under a mere law dispensation; and for all those who bring on themselves the higher penalty of the divine law by their own personal ill-desert, he has procured eternal redemption, if they will accept it. Is it not true, then, that “*grace superabounds?*” Are we obliged, then, to reject the doctrine of our fall in Adam, as either in itself improbable, or as dishonourable to God? We may answer in the negative.

But I must leave a multitude of interesting questions, because of my limits; remembering that my main design is *commentary* and not didactic theology. A few miscellaneous remarks, however, in relation to topics of importance, I cannot well refrain from making.

1. The common theory, which makes what is called original sin *inherent*, a proper sin, worthy in itself of eternal damnation, and the only cause and ground of all actual sin, is liable to many objections.

(1) Adam and the fallen angels had no original *inherent* sin, in the sense here attributed to Adam’s posterity. How then came they to sin? If original sin is the only ground and cause of *all* actual sin, then was there no ground or cause at all why Adam and the angels sinned. But surely they should not admit this, who carry so high the concatenation of causes and effects, as to make them as regular and as imperious in the intellectual and moral as in the physical world.

All men, therefore, might have been sinners just as well as Adam, if they had all been born without any original inherent sin, such as that contended for. According to Edwards, who strenuously contends that we had a more favourable trial in Adam than we should have had if put upon our own basis, it is more certain that all men would have been sinners without any original sin, than it was originally that Adam would be a sinner. To account, then, for all our actual sin on the ground merely of original inherent sin, is manifestly offending against plain and indubitable facts that lie before us.

Nor is the nature of the case at all changed, if one says that all Adam’s posterity, in case he had remained obedient, would have been exempt from a state of probation, and placed in a state of confirmed holiness. The simple

question is, Could they, in case they were subjected to trial, sin without having any original inherent sin implanted in them? And the answer to this is just as plain as the answer to the question: Could Adam sin without original inherent sin? Besides; there is not a word in all the Bible which asserts that such would have been the consequence of Adam's obedience as to put all his posterity at once into a state of confirmed holiness without trial. All the dealings of God, in heaven and on earth, are against such a supposition. All intelligent, rational, and moral beings, without exception, of whom we know any thing, have had their trial. Analogy as well as the Scriptures would lead us to believe that all must have a probation.

The true state of the case seems to be simply this. Man in his original state had susceptibility of being excited by sinful enticements; so had the fallen angels. On their free will it depended, whether they would yield or resist. They yielded; and this was their sin. Had they resisted at once, as the Saviour resisted the temptations proffered to him, their *susceptibility* of being excited by sinful enticements would not have made them sinners; for he who created them in a state of innocence, did himself give them such a susceptibility; and he surely is not the author of sin. We may add, moreover, that in case of prompt and efficacious resistance against sinful allurements, the possession of excitability even enhances the virtue of the resisting individual. He who resists a thousand degrees of temptation must surely have more virtue than he who can resist but ten; and were a man totally destitute of all susceptibility of being excited by temptation, that man could have no virtue, any more than a statue or an irrational animal can be virtuous.

We may regard it then as an original part of human nature, that man should possess a susceptibility of excitement by sinful and alluring objects. All men, if designed to be placed in a state of *probation*, would have possessed this; and possessing it, they might have sinned; according to Edwards they certainly would have sinned. What then is the difference between men since the fall, and our first parents before their lapse? Certainly it does not consist in the fact, that Adam and Eve could not at all feel the power of sinful enticement, and we can and do feel it. To say this would be to say that our first parents sinned without any enticement to sin; for what cannot be felt is no motive to action. The difference then must lie principally in these two things; the first, that the susceptibility of being enticed is greatly increased, so greatly as to render certain the success of temptation in some respect or other to sin, in regard to all the moral acts of the unregenerate; the second, that we are placed in a world where temptation is immeasurably increased beyond what it was in paradise. Even there, however, Satan found entrance, and obtained the most fatal victory ever yet achieved by him. Who then can say, that no evil could befall the innocent?

(2) To represent original inherent sin, as it is named, as being truly and properly sin in him who is the subject of it, and thus to make it the cause and ground of all his actual sins, is *to make sin the cause of sin*. Now that one sin is often the cause of another, is certainly true; for it is true that the commission of one sin very often leads to another. But if the doctrine is to be carried to the extent here maintained, then an endless progression of sin must be admitted. For what was the cause of our *original* sin? Of course some other sin, viz., that of Adam. And what was the cause of his? Here, if we will not consider ourselves as yet at the end of the race, we

must say, The devil was the cause of Adam's first sin. But even then one obvious question still remains, viz., What was the cause of the devil's first sin? This of course presents the whole train of reasoning in the light of a *reductio ad absurdum*.

(3) Is sin an *act* or a *state*? An *act*, all men would at first spontaneously answer. So the scriptures seem to speak: "Sin is a transgression of the law." But still, this answer without limitations would not do entire justice to the subject. A man by his own sinful actions may bring himself into a *state*, which as the result of his former wickedness is criminal. The debauchee who has urged on in his favourite vice until his whole soul is continually haunted with images of impurity, is surely taxable with sin for that very state or condition. We may and should admit, that whatever vicious state is the result of one's own voluntary actions, for that he is accountable, and it is fairly to be imputed to him as a crime. But what is the case with the infant and the idiot? Was any voluntary act of theirs concerned with what is named their original inherent sin? Certainly not. Turretin and Edwards have taken great pains to show, that a sinful disposition precedes all voluntary thought, affection, and action. What law, then, have infants *transgressed*? None; for they knew and could know no law; and "where there is no law, there is no transgression." What then is their *sin*? Is there any law of the Author of their being, that they should not be born in the state in which they are born; and have they by their birth transgressed this? I know of no such law: and then birth was to them altogether involuntary and unconscious. What law then is *transgressed* by their being born with a susceptibility of feeling the power of temptation? This question those are bound to answer, who make the *state* of infants itself a sin.

The Scriptures do not appear to treat this subject in a way that accords with such representations of the characters of infants. The apostle says in Rom. ix. 11, "The children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil." If it be said, that *done good or evil* here refers only to the *external* actions, Pres. Edwards and others who maintain the above theory have precluded themselves from such a reply, by averring that "nothing is good or bad, except as it proceeds from a *good or bad principle or disposition* of the mind;" which principle, with them, is *antecedent* to all choice and action. Consequently, when the apostle denies that the children had done either good or evil, he must deny that there was any principle of good or evil in them, if this theory be true. Nor is this all. Bad deeds and good ones, evil done or good done, every one should know, means, in the language of the Bible, *every kind of evil and good*, whether internal or external. When it is said that "God will reward every man according to his *works*," the meaning surely is not 'according to merely his external actions.' The account of infants in Isai. vii. 15, 16; in Jonah iv. 11, and in Deut. i. 39, compared with Rom. iv. 15; 1 John iii. 4; James iv. 17; Luke xii. 47, 48; John ix. 41; xv. 22—24; Rom. i. 20, 21, 32, casts strong light on the explicit declaration of St. Paul in Rom. ix. 11. For the substance of these declarations of the Scriptures, is, that "to him who knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, it is sin;" that where there is no such knowledge, i. e., "where there is no law, there is no transgression," for "sin is *ἀνομία*," i. e., want of conformity to the law; of course a *voluntary nonconformity* must be meant, *the voluntary nonconformity of an intelligent, rational, moral, free agent*; for no other is capable of actual sin, unless we would maintain that inanimate substances, and brutes, and idiots, and madmen, are sinners.

Thus one class of texts above cited, teaches. Another class as clearly shows that our sins bear an exact proportion, in respect to their heinousness, to the degree of light which we have, and the motives to holy obedience by which we are urged; all of which of course implies, that if we were in a state in which we had no light, and were incapable of perceiving or feeling the force of any motives, then we should not be sinners. Another class, moreover, developes to us very clearly, that infants are incapable of the knowledge in question. Even of the child *Immanuel* this explicitly is asserted; and the assertion is made, moreover, concerning him *after* his birth, Isai. vii. 15, 16. The very same thing is explicitly affirmed also by Moses, concerning all the very young children of the Israelites: "Your children, which in that day had no knowledge between good and evil," Deut. i. 39. To the same purpose is the text in Jonah iv. 11. It is the like view of little children, which the Saviour presents, when he says to his disciples: "Except ye be converted, and *become as little children*, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," Matt. xviii. 3. Again: "Suffer little children to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven," Matt. xix. 14; Mark x. 13; Luke xviii. 15, 16. So likewise the apostle Paul: "Howbeit, in malice be ye children," 1 Cor. xiv. 20. These comparisons do not imply, indeed, that little children are positively holy. I know of no declaration in the Bible of such import. But they do seem to imply that they are *innocent*, i. e., *innocuous*.

Let the appeal be made now to every candid and ingenuous mind, and the question be fairly urged; What are your first and most natural impressions, on reading these declarations of the Saviour? Would any other answer ever be given, except that the Saviour did mean, that the children here referred to must at least be free from the vices against which he is warning his disciples? And yet these same little children had in them, beyond all reasonable question, susceptibilities of being impressed, by and by, with motives of ambition, precedence, and preference of self; in other words, they had a *disposition* (in the sense in which I willingly admit this term) to be ambitious, and to prefer their own interests or honour. Yet they had not arrived at an age when this embryo disposition could develop itself. It was yet like the quiet germ in the seed of a plant, before moisture and warmth have called it into living action. It was what their Maker had originally given them; at all events, it was what, by his providential management of their rise into being, had actually sprung up within them. Now on the ground of Pres Edwards, all the wickedness that they could ever perpetrate, was already essentially in them, from the very fact that they had in them the susceptibilities of being moved or influenced to commit it. Every thing is referred repeatedly by him to original temperament or disposition, which is the root and ground and essence of all sin; developments being, in his view, nothing more than the indexes of moral turpitude. On this ground, then, I appeal to every man who judges independently of systems and of symbols, and ask, What can be the Saviour's meaning, when he says to his disciples, "Except ye be converted, and *become as little children*, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven?" Matt. xviii. 3. What can be his meaning when he says, "Of *such* is the kingdom of heaven?" Matt. xix. 14. I do not ask for some possible paraphrase that may be made of these passages, in order to avoid difficulties, and save the credit of symbols; but for a plain, honest, straightforward reply, which will be consistent with giving the Saviour's words any intelligible and significant meaning.

On the ground of Edwards I cannot make out such a meaning; for on his ground, an infant from the first moment of its being has already its moral character in full; it is already as really and truly the enemy of God as it ever will or can be. It is then to *such*, that the kingdom of heaven belongs? Are the disciples of Jesus to put on a character like this, in order that they may be saved? Does their being *converted* make them like to such a character as this mode of viewing the subject necessarily presents children as possessing? These are questions which must be met; that cannot be fairly put out of sight, or passed by in silence, or touched so lightly as not really to meddle with them. Jesus understood this matter better than any of his disciples; and how can we correct his views?

There is no way that I can perceive of avoiding the difficulties in question, but by maintaining, as Paul does respecting the children of Rebecca, that to a certain period of life children have not formed a moral character so as to be properly chargeable with sin. It is then the *innocence* of children to which the Saviour makes appeal. Innocence, however, does not mean *holiness* in this case, but mere negative freedom from sin; and in the case presented in the gospels, freedom from the sin of ambitious and selfish claims to precedence and honour. This was the sole point of comparison and admonition. The rebuke of Jesus was as much as to say, 'You must subdue the spirit of ambitious rivalry, the desire after self-precedence, and become as simple and unassuming as little children are, who by reason of their tender age are not yet affected by temptations of this nature.' More than this the nature of the case and the object of the Saviour does not require us to understand; and more than this the real nature of the case does not permit us to assume.

I have said, that on the ground of Pres. Edwards, and others who think and reason as he does, I cannot make out any intelligible, significant, and consistent meaning of such declarations of the Saviour. The reason is obvious; for according to them sin exists antecedent to all volition, choice, or action; it is connate with us, and innate; it is invariable and invincible, for it is propagated uniformly by natural generation, so that the children of the highest saint have just as much of it as the children of the vilest profligate; and what is more than all, it is this very sin, as Edwards most explicitly maintains, which is not only the ground and root of all *actual* sin, but it does itself include all the guilt which a man can have, inasmuch as all virtuous or vicious choice is no further virtuous or vicious, except as it proceeds from a virtuous temper or disposition of mind which *preceded* it; Edwards on *Orig. Sin*, p. 149 seq. In fact this author goes so deep into this matter, as in reality to do away with *actual* sin, and resolve all sin into the *antecedent* disposition, *i. e.*, into original sin or connate depravity, p. 150. Thus, before children have any knowledge at all, yea, while they are in the womb, they are not only sinners, but all the sin which is ever to be committed by them, is then in them in embryo. Gerhard, the *i. táu* of the older Lutheran divines, who has written a system of theology in twenty-two quarto volumes, says, explicitly: *Semen, ex quo formamur, est immundum, et peccato infectum,*" vol. iv. p. 326; an assertion which, extravagant as it may seem, is as capable of defence as that an infant in the womb is a sinner, in the ordinary sense of this word. Nor is Gerhard alone in this extravagance. Augustine said the same things ages ago, in his dispute with Pelagius; and Turretin and others vouch for the like sentiments. In what sense, however, *sin* can attach to lifeless matter remains for them and those who agree with them to explain.

After all, however, a great part of this dispute about the state of infants, seems to me to be little more than *logomachy* among sober and moderate men. What one class of divines call *sin*, i. e., original *inherent* sin, another call merely *a disposition to sin*, or *a susceptibility of being excited to sin*. Most of the older divines regard this latter quality as being itself criminal in some real sense in the sight of God, and as drawing upon itself the full penalty of the law. Yet here they are not all agreed; some of them, like Pictet, declaring that original sin alone will not occasion final perdition (I. p. 429). Dr Doddridge avows, that the doctrine "of a rational creature being made finally and eternally miserable for the action of another [for the sin of Adam], which it was no way in his power to prevent, does so ill agree with our natural notions of justice, and the repeated declarations of the divine word, e. g., Ezek. xviii. 3, 4, 20; Jer. xxxi. 29, 30; Deut. xxiv. 16; 2 Kings xiv. 6), and with what God has been pleased to say concerning his compassion for infants (Jonah iv.), that we must at least wait for the plainest and fullest decision of Scripture *before we can admit it to be true*;" Sect. II. pp. 112. 113. On p. 201 he says, that "if sin signify (as it commonly does) *an action contrary to divine law*, these evil propensities [he is speaking of what is called original and inherent sin in infants] *are not sins*." Dr Watts, who is so strenuous for the doctrine of original sin, in his Psalms and Hymns, says that "infants, not the progeny of believers, fall into a state of *annihilation*." Dr Ridgley, equally strenuous for original inherent sin, held that "they fall into a state of *everlasting insensibility*;" see the quotations and references in Doddridge, ut supra. How plainly now does all this, and much more that might easily be adduced, show, that there is something exceedingly revolting to our ideas of justice, in the eternal perdition of infants merely because of original inherent sin!

Guilt, in the strict, full, and proper sense of this word, as designating not only exposure to penalty but exposure because of transgression or ill desert, guilt in such a sense cannot be predicated of infants. It is in opposition to the immutable principles of our moral nature, to predicate sin in its proper sense of any being that acts without free choice and knowledge of rule. Of course, those who maintain original sin as above stated, must maintain it as a distinct and different thing from actual sin. This they themselves declare by the very terminology which they apply to it. Others who confine the definition of sin to *that which consists in choice and action*, still do not deny for substance what that class of divines just named in reality aim at. At least for myself I do not. I believe most fully that a susceptibility of being excited by sinful enticements, is contemporaneous with our being, and in this sense may be called *native*, *connate*, or *innate*; as much a part of our present being as any taste or faculty which we have. It is universal; it is invariable, i. e., it always exists in some degree or other. I fully believe that it exists in all children to such a degree, that wherever moral development is made by choice or action, it will be sure to lead them to sin. What more than this do any of the sober advocates of original inherent sin believe? Yet they call this native disposition *sin*; but I do not, and cannot, except in a qualified and figurative way. I can easily call this native disposition a *sinful* one, for the reason that it will lead men to sin; just as I speak of a *rational* faculty on the ground that it enables men to be rational or to reason. I have no objection to such terminology, when it is once well understood. But to represent that itself as *sin*, which the God of nature by his own creative power or providence has given me, and which was made

as a part of my very nature antecedent to all choice, volition, action, or affection; to represent the author of my being as having enstamped on my very soul a *prima origine* the seal of eternal perdition, and as having given me by his own sovereign act that which is damnable in itself, and the necessary and inevitable cause of all subsequent additional damnation,—this is what I shrink from. I cannot force my mind up to this appalling point. It will not even stay there if I goad it so as to reach it; no more than did the minds of Pictet, Doddridge, Watts, and Ridgley, as we have seen above. I see no possible advantage to theology or philology, from such a view of the subject. What is *explained*, by introducing a *fictitious* guilt and a *fictitious* cause of condemnation? Nothing; and fictitious all guilt and cause of condemnation must be, when they are not one's *own* in the proper sense of this word.

All the texts that the Scriptures contain, which are appealed to in order to confirm the idea that infants are sinners before thought and choice and action, are appealed to without any good and stable ground for such an argument from them. They all go to show what the natural or unregenerate state of man is; and to this do I most fully accede. They show also, that this state of enmity to God begins with the first moral development of our being. To quote that “we are transgressors from the womb,” and then to omit that “we go astray as soon as we are born, *speaking* lies,” does not seem to display much ingenuousness in argument; for to do so is to omit a clause which would spoil all the argument that could be deduced from the *literal* application of the first phrase, inasmuch as it shows very plainly that the writer did not expect to be, and cannot possibly be *literally* understood. And the same thing is obviously true of all other like cases. But my present limits forbid me to go into a particular examination of them.

In a word, when we admit that all men have within them that temperament, disposition, bias, propensity, vitiosity, or whatever else you may call it, which will certainly lead them to sin when they come to the age of moral development; when we admit that all have it in this degree as a sequel or consequence of Adam's fall, and that all therefore are in a state which of itself would surely prove ruinous were it not that divine mercy interposes; I say, when all this is fully admitted, I suppose that all which need be required, and all that can be scripturally proved, is admitted. That some call this disposition and state itself a *sin*, does not alter the nature of the thing, nor make their creed more orthodox. The question is about *things*, not about *names*. And as to these, I can only express my regret that mere *names* should be so strenuously contested for. I deeply regret also, that adhering to them, even where they may naturally lead to views that are not scriptural, should be deemed a matter of duty and orthodoxy. Paul has decided the case beyond any appeal, that children in the womb do neither good nor evil, in Rom. ix. 11.

The usual objection to such a view of our subject is, that ‘if it be true, then infants need no Saviour.’ But I do not feel in any measure embarrassed by this objection. How, I ask, is that measure of disposition toward sin, or the susceptibility of being excited by sinful enticements, which I have fully admitted to belong to all the race of Adam, to be removed? It is not enough to fit a human being for heaven, that he has not been an actual sinner. He must have such a disposition as will lead him to delight in holiness, in order to be happy there. This the natural man is destitute of. Has the mercy then which a Saviour has procured for our fallen and de-

generate race, nothing to do in fitting an infant for heaven? Is there no work of the Spirit necessary in order to secure such a fitness? Surely there is no good ground for the objection in question.

'But Christ,' it is said, 'came to save *sinners*, and only such.' It is true, I reply, that he came to save sinners. But if an infant is saved, does the *atonement* of a Saviour extend to his *actual* sins? This cannot be asserted because it is agreed on all hands, that there is a time when actual sin has not yet been committed. Was the atonement made for *imputed* sin? If so, then there is real suffering and atoning sacrifice on the one side, and merely supposititious offence or sin on the other. Is this then a doctrine of the Bible, that Christ suffered for supposititious sin; and if so, where is this taught? Yet those who hold to the salvation of infants must hold that Christ died for *imputed* sin, or else they must hold that the disposition with which infants are born is itself an actual sin; and then we are forced upon the same ground of logomachy, which we have already been over. We gain nothing by substituting names for things that do not fit them.

Is there any more real disagreement, in this case, than that which proceeds from dispute about *names*? It seems to me that among moderate and sober men, there is not. I do not see why the views that I advocate do not leave just as much for Christ to accomplish, in order that infants should be fitted for heaven, as those views do which will not dispense with the peculiar terminology that I have been examining. Of course I do not feel the force of the objection under examination.

In a word; as an infant, dying with all its affections and dispositions in embryo, would, should it continue to be just the same, develop itself eventually as a sinner, so renewing grace must actually *sanctify* it; and for our fallen race, renewing grace has been purchased only by a Saviour's blood.

I meddle not with the question, *when* the first actual sin commences; excepting merely to say, that it commences with the first moral action. That is enough. God only can be the competent judge of this. The Scriptures have nowhere, as it appears to me, decided this question. If they have, let the decision be produced; such an one it must be, as will not contradict what Paul has expressly affirmed. To conclude,

(1) Those who strenuously maintain that the native disposition of men is itself sin, cannot well preserve consistency when they are urged with the consequences of this theory. Who gave us being? Who determined the qualities with which we should be born? We did not; our parents did not; at least there was no voluntary action on their part which could determine the attributes of our nature. Has our Maker then given us a disposition which is itself sin? This question must at last be met; and few are stern enough to look it directly in the face. Pres. Edwards could not. His courage failed him here. Although his book is mainly built on the theory, that sin is antecedent to all choice and action, he not only intimates that a different view is reasonable, when urged with the question, Who made us what we are? but he occupies a whole chapter in order to establish it. In page 28 he says: "It is agreeable to the sentiments of the best divines, that all sin originally comes from a *defective* or *privative* cause." In Part IV., chap. ii. p. 307, seq., he has argued at length against the idea of "any evil quality being *infused*, *implanted*, or wrought into our nature by any *positive* cause or influence whatever, *either of God or the creature*; or of supposing that man is conceived and born with a *fountain of evil* in his heart, such is any thing properly *positive*" He goes on to aver, that "the

absence of positive good principles," and "the withholding of special divine influence," and the "leaving of the common natural principles of self-love, natural appetite, &c., *which were in man in INNOCENCE*," is sufficient to account for all the corruption that appears among men. A signal instance, indeed, of the triumph of the spontaneous feelings of our moral nature over the power of *system*! For he is almost every where gone directly counter to this; assuming the common theory of the Protestant creeds, viz., that there is a *positively unholy* principle *connate* with man, which is itself a sin worthy of eternal death, and is the basis of all other sins. But here, supposing man "to have only the common natural principles *which were in him in a state of innocence*," he finds no difficulty in accounting for it that he becomes altogether corrupt. What is this, but to bear spontaneous testimony to the views of Paul, in Rom. ix. 11, and to the first and simple dictates of moral feeling?

II. Is it not a matter of surprise, in case the sacred writers did really estimate the comparative importance of the subject of our connection with Adam as some modern divines have done, that such a deep silence should pervade the Old Testament concerning it, and that in the New Testament only Paul should break this silence in but two instances (Rom. v. 12—19; 1 Cor. xv. 22); and in each of these merely for the sake of presenting a contrast which is designed to magnify the work of Christ?

III. Which, now, of the two principal views taken of the natural state of man, presents the most cogent reasons for penitence and humility? Which inculcates the deepest sense of our need of a Saviour?

Can there be any doubt as to the answer? If man, falling as he is, has still in his fallen state all the faculties necessary to do good, and has a moral sense, conscience, judgment, reason; if, "not being yet born, he has not done any good or evil" (Rom. ix. 11), and he sins altogether of his own free will and choice whenever he does sin; then it is indeed true, that he "is guilty of death;" then is punishment not only threatened, but altogether *deserved*; then is he justly exposed to the condemnation of "those who have known their master's will and done it not;" then has he incurred the awful penalty of those, who "know to do good, but do it not." Can any but an almighty Saviour deliver sinners of such a character as this?

But supposing now, on the other hand, that men are born with a positively evil disposition, which is itself sin, and incurs eternal death antecedent to all choice and action; supposing them to have (as Pres. Edwards asserts, p. 27) "a propensity [to sin] that is *invincible*, or a tendency which really amounts to fixed, constant, unfailing *necessity*;" and supposing this propensity, thus implanted in their natures, and antecedent to all choice and action, is the basis or ground of all subsequent sins; then indeed may men need redemption; they are truly in a ruinous state; they are indeed objects of our pity and of overwhelming misfortune; but where is the aggravated measure of their voluntary guilt, which the Bible charges upon them as agents altogether free? Where is the deep sense of accountability for faculties and moral sense and reason abused? Can there for a moment be any hesitation here, as to the question: Which system presents the greater guilt of men, the more urgent need of redemption, the more awful exposure of sinners, and the unspeakable greatness of their salvation? How little, then, of justice in averring, as has often been done, that such views as I have been giving above of our natural state tend to diminish a sense of our need of a Saviour! Nothing can be further from correctness than this.

The sinner's guilt is rendered beyond description more aggravated by this method of viewing his condition.

IV. What system agrees best with proper views of God's justice and our own accountability?

What is our own act, we feel accountable for; not for that which was done by another, without any concurrence on our part. This is an immutable law of our moral sense. *Justice* keeps pace with desert; retributive and perfect justice *punishes* only for *personal* desert. These are, I had almost said, self evident principles; and can it be that such principles leave any doubt how to answer the above question? But,

V. I still readily concede, that no theory in regard to the original condition of our nature can entirely clear up *all* the difficulties of the case. *The permission of sin* lies at the bottom of all the real difficulty: and this, as it is a matter of *fact*, can never be removed in our present imperfect state. Nor whether I say that men are born sinners, and are thus charged with Adam's sin; or whether I say that they are born destitute of original holiness, and with passions in embryo which they will at the time of development abuse, and certainly abuse; the difficulty is not altogether removed. The latter is, in some sense surely, an arrangement of an overruling providence; for who placed men in their present condition? Even if we say merely that all men imitate Adam's example, and so are ruined in this way; one might still ask, Who then arranged the condition of men, so that this example would come before them? There is no end to such questions, if any one is disposed to ask them; and in the same way we might object to all other theories that have ever been proposed. The ultimate difficulty still is, an arrangement which admits of sin. The main thing which can be said in explanation of this is, that *probation* implies power and opportunity to sin. Without these probation is a mere name, and not a thing. The question being decided, that an intelligent being shall be put on *probation*, it is of course decided that he *can* sin.

I readily admit, that there is no system of explaining our present condition as sinners, which can wholly avoid the difficulties in question. But they do not seem to me to press equally hard on all systems; at least the mode of presenting them in some is less obnoxious than in others.

I do not see any more reason why a susceptibility in us of feeling the power of temptation, or (if one prefers this language) a disposition that will lead us to sin when enticed, can be any more objected to as making God the author of sin, than that external temptations and enticements can be objected to on the same ground. To allow that we are born with such a disposition, is not to allow that God has formed us sinners; I mean that, on the ground which I defend, it is not allowing this. Our own free choice and act must intervene, in order that we should be sinners. But on the ground of Edwards and others, we are sinners when we come from the Creator's hands.

If any one says that it is the same thing, after all, whether we aver that men are so made, or whether we say that they are constituted in such a way as to become sinners, I must demur to this. Was not Adam originally so made and disposed of, as that he would become a sinner? *Fact* answers this question. Was it, then, the same thing to make him a sinner *ab origine*, as to make him a being who could and would sin? This is the very gist of the question; and here we may leave it.

I feel myself compelled, therefore, to reject the predominant theory of

Pres. Edwards in respect to original sin, and to regard his subordinate one (if I may so call it) as being more consonant with the Scriptures and with our moral sense and judgment. It is certain that many appalling difficulties which lie in the way of the former theory, do not stand in the way of the latter. This is enough to determine our choice. But in making this choice, we need not aver that some difficulties, and (if you please) some great ones too, are not common to all theories. But these may be summed up at last in one single thing, viz., the admission of sin into the moral world. This is a problem of no easy solution by any system; but as it is matter of *fact*, it is not to be denied, and it must be consistent with divine wisdom and goodness.

VI. The view which has been given above of Rom. v. 12—19, if correct, serves to show that this passage cannot be justly regarded as asserting the doctrine of *universal salvation*. We have seen, that as there are some evils which come upon all men without any concurrence of their own, so there are blessings and privileges (*i. e.*, the common blessings of providence, the means of grace, and above all a dispensation of grace), which are bestowed on all without their concurrence. But although, on the one hand, evils do indeed come on all without distinction, yet on the other, so far as it respects *these* very evils, they are all capable of being made blessings to the penitent; and they do indeed become so. So much is true, in regard to the present world. In respect to a future world, the higher penalty of sin or the second death comes only on those who do themselves sin; their *own personal* act must consummate their destruction: and so in the opposite case, eternal redemption, though freely proffered to all, and although all are under a dispensation of grace, is actually bestowed only on such as repent and believe. The comparison of Paul between evils on the one hand, and blessings on the other, does not permit us to go farther than this. The “superabounding” of grace has no respect to the *number of persons* (how can this be the case since the evils of Adam’s transgression extend to all without exception?), but to the *number of offences*; see Rom. v. 16. The use which has often been made of the passage in question for the purpose of establishing the doctrine of universal salvation, seems therefore to have no good foundation.

VII. I remark at the close (for to a close I must now come unless I would write a book on this subject), that Christians can have very little apology for bitter disputes with each other about the details of speculation in regard to original sin, and for becoming divided in affection on this account. We have seen that Paul enters into no particulars; he indulges in no speculations. He only asserts the facts, that Adam’s first sin had a connection with and influence upon the sin and death of all men. There he leaves it. We gather his views about the particular nature of the facts to which he alludes only from other parts of his writings; and even here we meet with mere matters of fact, and with nothing of speculation. This is all so clear, that I need not stop to fortify it. Why, then, should Christians dispute and divide, by reason of their own speculations, which are superadded to what Paul has taught? I may view with apprehension the consequence of some speculations on the subject under consideration, because I think they intrench on other very important principles. Yet if my brother, who indulges in these speculations, does not in fact intrench on those principles, but fully admits them, is it not unjust in me to charge him with purposely endeavouring to overturn them? The ruined and helpless state of man by nature,

i. e. of unsanctified man, whether adult or infant, I do most fully and amply believe, although the ground and reason and extent of this in adults and infants is very diverse; the absolute necessity for all of renewing grace, of special sanctification by the Spirit, and of mercy bought by the redeeming blood of Christ, I do most fully and amply admit. I regard the views developed above, moreover, as representing the case of sinners to be far more aggravated and awful than the usual sentiments of the Reformers represent it. In consequence of this, the need of a Saviour becomes more conspicuous, and his help a matter of higher gratitude; for who will be most grateful, he who was so unfortunate as to fall under sentence of everlasting death, antecedently to all choice and action of his own, and is delivered from it; or he who, having of his own choice and free will incurred the penalty, and this by awful aggravations of his guilt, is still delivered from its just sentence by the mercy of a Saviour? All that is *practically* important as to the lost condition of man, the sentiments which I have advocated surely maintain. All that is essential in the doctrines of the Reformation, in respect to original sin, is received and defended; while, in my own view, deeper guilt and danger are attached to the state of the natural man than the Reformers themselves attached; and, of course, higher need of Jesus and his salvation is exhibited. Is this to deny the doctrines of the Reformation? Or is it endeavouring to dissipate mists which have in some respects hovered around some of them, in order that they may shine forth in all their glory? Speak conscience—Christian kindness—God's holy word, and I ask for no more.

I did intend to give a brief sketch of the *history of the doctrine* under consideration; but I must suppress it for want of room. I shall conclude this protracted Excursus, by referring the reader to some select sources of reading on the various topics that have been discussed.

For a view of the doctrines of the Reformed Symbols, he may consult Augusti, *Corpus Lib. Symbol. Reformatorum* 1 vol. 8vo, 1827; containing a very full and ample exhibition of the originals, with literary notices, &c. Also Winer, *Comparative Darstellung des Lehrbegriffs der verschied. Christl. Kirchenparteien*, 4to, 1824; an exceedingly convenient book, which deserves a reprint in this country, with additions and corrections. The author has given short critical notes, which display great acuteness.

On the interpretation of Rom. v. 12—19, besides the commentaries, the reader should peruse J. G. Toellner, *Theolog. Untersuchungen*, I. No. 2, Flatt's *Magazin*, St. 13, p. 68, seq. Schotii *Opuscula*, I., p. 213, seq. Keilii *Opuscula*, p. 16, seq. *Beiträge zur Beford. des vernunft. Denkens*, Th. 12, p. 45, seq. Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, § 124, II. p. 47, seq. Edwards on *Original Sin*, part II., chap. IV., § 2. J. Taylor's *Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin*, and his *Key to the Apostolic Writings*. All the systems of divinity, Calvin, Turretin, Pictet, Gerhard, Quenstedt, Hollaz, Storr, Bretschneider, Knapp, Hahn, Reinhard, Doederlein, Episcopius, Limborch, Markius, Van Maestricht, Ridgley, Doddridge, Hopkins, and all others, of course discuss this passage of Scripture more or less.

The history of the doctrine of original sin may be found in a very compressed, but very instructive, form in Bretschneider's *Dogmatik*, § 128; also in Hahn's *Lehrbuch des Christl. Glaubens*, § 80. See also, Walchii *Historia*

doctrinæ de Peccato Originis, 1738, 4to. Id. *de Pelagianismo ante Pelagium*, 1738, 4to. Augusti, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, p. 301—310. Horn *de Peccato Originali*, Goett. 1801. Muenscher, *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, II., p. 89, seq. IV., p. 143, seq. Wiggers, *Pragm. Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagiannismus*, Berl. 1821. Vossii *Historia Pelagianismi*. J. Geffhen, *Historia Semipelagianismi*, Goett. 1826. The result of extensive and candid reading, in regard to the history of the doctrine in question, will be, as I must think, a full persuasion, that in the form and shape in which this doctrine was maintained by most of the Reformers, it was first introduced by Augustine in his dispute with Pelagius; from whose works, and those of his friends and followers, it came into the creeds of the Reformation, and thence has come down to us. The whole subject needs, in this country, an investigation and review *de novo*, such as it has not yet received.*

EXCURSUS VII.

On Rom. vii. 5—25 (pp. 306—341).

It is not my design here, to repeat at large what has been already sufficiently explained in the body of the commentary. But in order to make out a view in some good measure complete as to its essential parts, I shall simply recapitulate in order the leading considerations already suggested in favour of the exegesis above given, without dilating at all upon them; while other considerations, not yet suggested, will be more fully stated; after which the leading objections to the exegesis adopted will be discussed.

Before proceeding to execute the task here undertaken, I must beg the liberty of making a few remarks on the nature of the case; and also on the nature of the proof which is requisite, in order to establish any particular interpretation of the whole passage.

First, it is a just principle of interpretation, that we should understand every writer, when this can be done in consonance with the laws of language, as speaking to the purpose which he has immediately before him. There are very many truths of the gospel, and many plain and important truths, which are not taught in this or that passage of Scripture. The question concerning chap. vii. 5—25 is not, whether it be true that there is a

* The reader may not be displeased, perhaps, to be furnished with the means of knowing what is thought in the mother country, by a leading divine among the orthodox dissenters there, of the spirit and tenor of my remarks on the subject of *Original Sin* in the former edition of this work. I quote from the preface (page x.) of the English edition, written by Dr. J. P. Smith, the learned and enlightened Principal of the Homerton Seminary in the suburbs of London. After some commendations of the work in general, in terms such as are hardly proper for me to transcribe, he speaks thus of the method in which I have treated the subject in question: "In particular, eminent clearness and judgment, always under the guidance of a humble and pious disposition, appear in educing the cause of condemnation resting upon mankind, the nature and effects of the connection between the first man and his descendants, the formal reason of restoration to the divine favour, and the necessity, progress, and ultimate perfection of a real acquisition of the divine holiness." How different this is from the judgment of a critic in our own country, published about the same time in a periodical, who could find nothing but contradictions and absurdities in this part of my work, it is not difficult to perceive. Yet Dr. Smith's orthodoxy stands unimpeached and unimpeachable. In our own country, however, there appears to be some, "qui cœlum, terram—omniæ innocent."

contest in the breast of Christians, which might, at least for the most part, be well described by the words there found; but, whether such a view of the subject is congruous with the present design and argument of the apostle.

Secondly, no theory of interpretation can, in the present case, be duly and satisfactorily supported, by appealing merely to the form and intensity of particular expressions. If this can be allowed here, then are we certain that two opposite theories may be equally well established, viz., that the individual whose experience is represented is a saint, and is not one. That he is one, may be made out by such expressions as the following: viz., *σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ*, ver. 16; *τὸ γὰρ θέλειν* [sc. *τὸ καλὸν*] *παράκειται μοι*, ver. 18; *τῷ θέλοντι ἔμολ ποιῆν τὸ καλόν*, ver. 21; *συνέδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἀνθρώπον*, ver. 22; and *τῷ μὲν νοτ̄ δουλεύω νόμῳ Θεοῦ*, ver. 25; while with equal certainty and by the same reasoning, we may prove that he is not a saint, from *ἐγὼ δὲ σαρκικός ἔμιμ, πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, ver. 14; *ὁ μισῶ τοῦτο πρᾶσσω*, ver. 15; *οὐκ οἶκετ̄ ἐν ἔμοι τοῦτ̄ ἔστι ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἀγαθόν*, ver. 18; *τὸ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλόν οὐχ εὐρίσκω*, ver. 18; *ὁ οὐ θέλω κακόν, τοῦτο πρᾶσσω*, ver. 19; *ἔμολ τὸ κακόν. παράκειται*, ver. 21; *βλέπω ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι . . . αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, ver. 23; *τῇ δὲ σαρκί* [δουλεύω] *νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας*, ver. 25. Stronger language than this, viz., “*I am σαρκικός, and sold under sin*,” i. e., a bond-slave to sin, and wholly devoted to its service and obedient to its orders, cannot well be found in the New Testament.

Whoever insists, then, that the passage before us must be applied to the Christian, because of some strong expressions in it which seem to indicate true moral good, should also take notice that, by the very same principles of interpretation, he will of course be obliged to concede that a *carнал* state and entire devotedness to the passions and appetites is described. To avoid this conclusion, he considers these last expressions as used in a *qualified* or *moderated* sense, and accounts for them by the fervour of the writer's feelings and the nature of the contrast. But who does not see that the very same rule, when applied to the passages which seem to indicate moral good or holiness, will so modify them as to make the application of them to true Christians altogether unnecessary? The *reason* and *conscience* of the un-sanctified, especially when they are awakened by the terrors of the divine law, present sufficient ground to justify the use of the language here employed, in such a modified sense as that now supposed.

In fact, it appears a very plain case, that neither class of commentators, that is, neither those who apply chap. vii. 7—25 to Christians, nor those who apply it to the unregenerate, can find satisfactory ground for so doing, merely in the *phraseology*, or *modes of expression* employed. Either party who adopts this ground, must deny his opponent the same liberties which he himself takes; or else involve himself in inextricable difficulties, by admitting that the same grounds of explanation may be taken by others, which he takes for himself. But he can do neither of these; not the first, because the common sense of all men would cry out against him; not the last, because this would prove the very contrary of what he holds, or else prove that the apostle has really contradicted himself.

It truth, it is only when men come to the study of the Scriptures, without bringing along with them *a priori* doctrines and conclusions, that they are willing to admit the force of philological considerations, such as have now

been suggested. These once admitted, it follows as a matter of course, that a *modified* sense is to be given to such particular forms of expression as seem to stand in the way of the argument and the object of the writer. This we always give in *fairly* construing the language of men, on all occasions, whether it be written or spoken. The *literal* interpretation of all expressions, in an animated contrast, drawn by a man of such powerful feeling as Paul, would hardly be contended for in any case in which polemic theology was not concerned. Is it proper, then, to insist on such a sense, in passages which involve sentiments that are now controverted by critics and theologians?

Suppose, now, that one should rigorously insist upon it, that all the words of our Saviour must be interpreted without any modification, as meaning what they seem obviously to mean on the first view of them. Take for example the declarations, that "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God;" also, that "if he had not come and spoken to the Jews, they would not have had sin;" will any one insist now that these declarations are to be *literally* interpreted *ad amussim*, and not *ad rationem*? If so, then it is of no use to argue with him in respect to the laws of interpretation; and one had better abandon at once the hope of gaining from him a listening ear. But if any considerate inquirer is disposed to admit, that *hyperbole* occasionally exists in the language of the bible (as also in that of all other books which in any way express the feelings of men), then may it be easy for him to see and feel that the language in Rom. vii. is capable of modification. Nay, most men, however violent their party feelings, do, after all, in fact, admit this principle; for they actually modify that which stands opposed to their own views of this passage. This is a practical confession, therefore, of the necessity of modification. And this being agreed upon, either impliedly or expressly, the inquiry which then presents itself, is: "In what way is any part of the passage in question to be modified? Must it be so modified as to agree with the context, and the scope of reasoning which the writer is aiming at? Or shall it be so modified, as to agree with our *a priori* views of what the writer ought to have said?" As an interpreter and philologist, I can see but one answer to these questions: and this is so plain that it need not be repeated.

If the reader will now look back, he will see that I have not, in any case, laid any particular stress on the form or intensity of expression, in my remarks on vii. 5—25; and the reason of this is evident enough from what has already been said above. At the same time, I have supposed that the expressions *σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ, συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ, τῷ νοῦ δουλεύω νόμῳ* &c., are those which the writer intended should be specially modified by the reader; and this because the *object* of his discourse requires them to be modified. This is the ground on which I rest my interpretation; and not on the form or strength of single words or phrases, on either side of the contrast.

With these remarks in view, I proceed to offer, in a summary way, my reasons for adopting the exegesis which the commentary presents.

1. The object of the apostle in vii. 7 to viii. 17, is to illustrate and confirm what he had said in vii. 5, 6; and which he had before intimated in vi. 14. Chap. vii. 7—25 is as plainly a comment on vii. 5, as chap. viii. 1—17 is on vii. 6; and antithesis between vii. 7—25 and viii. 1—25, seems to be plain and certain. As this is a fundamental point in the interpretation

of the whole, the reader will allow me to be full and explicit in the discussion of it.

At the beginning of chap. viii., we find a distinction made, and a transition of the discourse marked by *ἄρ α νῦ ν*, *now then*, *i. e.*, in our *present* state, in the *present* condition of Christians, *viz.*, as contradistinguished from their *former* state. What was this former state? It was a carnal state, *ἐν σαρκί*, ver. 5; *σαρκινός*, ver. 14; one in which they were subject to the law of sin, ver. 23. What makes this transition the more striking is, that in ver. 6 the antithesis between the two conditions there described, is pointed out by the very same word as here, *viz.*, by *νυνί*.

If now we examine *particulars* in these two discourses (vii. 7—25, and viii. 1—17), we shall find them in direct *antithesis* to each other. *E. g.*, the complaint in vii. 24 of miserable subjection to the influence of carnal desires stands opposed to the thanks in vii. 25, uttered in reference to the deliverance which the writer is about to describe. In vii. 23, the person described is a *captive* to sin, *i. e.*, altogether subject to the influence of sinful passions and desires; in viii. 2, he is represented as delivered from the law of sin and death. In vii. 14, an incessant and irreconcilable opposition is represented as existing between the law of God and the person there described; in viii. 4, he is represented as possessing the ability and the disposition to keep, at least in some good measure, the precepts of the law. In vii. 18, the person described is represented as having no good thing *ἐν τῇ σαρκί* [αὐτοῦ] and as finding no power to effect what is good, even when his mind or conscience approves it or would prefer it; in viii. 3, 4, this disability is represented as removed. In vii. 5, 14, 18, the person described is represented as being *ἐν σαρκί*, *σαρκινός*; in viii. 9 he is declared to be *οὐκ ἐν σαρκί*. In vii. 14 he is represented as the *bond-slave* of sin; (*πεπραμένον ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμαρτίαν*), *i. e.*, as altogether under the power of sin; in viii. 11, 14 he is represented as having the Spirit of God to dwell in him, and as being led, *i. e.*, influenced or guided, by that Spirit.

In a word, the whole tenor of the two discourses is such as is adapted to make the impression, that they are in antithesis to each other, and that they are designed by the writer to be so. This lies on the face of them. It is only the difficulties which can be raised in regard to *subordinate* parts, that can occasion or sustain any doubts in respect to this subject.

Indeed, I may well express my convictions derived from a general view of the antithetic nature of the two passages in question, the connection in which they stand, and the design of the writer, in the words of Tholuck: "Truly if one has respect only to the *connection* of the latter part of Rom. vii., with what goes before, and what follows after, it is impossible to explain this [the latter part of Rom. vii.] of any one, except of him who is still under the law."

2. The object of the writer (which is to show that the law is insufficient for the *sanctification* of sinners) would not be effectually promoted by supposing that he represents the experience of Christians in chap. vii. For if Christians, who are of course under grace, and are dead to the law (vi. 14, vii. 6), are actually still in the state here represented, then would it follow that neither grace nor law hinders them from being the servants of sin. But to aver that *grace* does not effect this, is to contradict viii. 1—17.

3. The *tout ensemble* of the representation in chap. vii. seems to render it certain, that a true Christian cannot be here described. What is the result

of the whole? It is, that notwithstanding all the opposition which the law of God and the law of the mind make to sin, yet the person in question practises it, and habitually practises it, on all occasions, and under all circumstances. In every contest here, the sinful carnal mind comes off victorious. Is this "overcoming the world?" Is this to be 'born of God so as not to sin?' Is this 'loving Christ so as to keep his commandments?' Is this 'doing no iniquity?' Is this "walking not after the flesh, but after the Spirit?" In a word, is it possible to make this accord with chap. viii. 1—17?

4. If chap. vii. represents the *Christian* struggle with sin, then what is the state in which the Christian goes, as represented in chap. viii.? The answer must be: One in which there is no more struggle. But when—where—was ever such a state on earth? It has often been imagined and asserted, but not proved. But if now the transition is from a state in which sin was altogether predominant, into one in which grace on the whole reigns and triumphs, then all is easy and intelligible. On any other ground it is inexplicable; at least, it is so to me.

It were easy to add more reasons; but if these are well-grounded, they are sufficient. It is proper, now, briefly to pass in review some of the exegesis and the allegations of those, who maintain that a degenerate person is described in vii. 7—25.

(1) Their interpretation (*viz.*, that which most of them give) of vii. 9 leads, as may be seen in the commentary on vii. 9, to inextricable difficulty, and contradiction of the context. It is equally opposed to the *usus loquendi*, and to those parts of the discourse which precede and which follow.

(2) It is alleged, that the contest described in Rom. vii. 14—25 is one which accords with the feelings and experience of every Christian; and that he is thus conscious that the interpretation given to it by those who apply it to Christians, must be correct.

This consideration is, in fact, the main dependence of those who support the exegesis just named; I mean, that by such an appeal to feeling, they produce more conviction on the mind of Christians, than is produced by all their other arguments. After all, however, this is far from determining the case. Let us look at the subject in all its bearings.

I concede, in the first place, that Christians have a contest with sin; and that this is as plain and certain as it is that they are not wholly sanctified in the present life. It is developed by almost every page of Scripture, and every day's experience. That this contest is often a vehement one; that the passions rage, yea, that they do sometimes even gain the victory; is equally plain and certain. It follows now, of course, that as the language of Rom. vii. 14—25 is intended to describe a contest between the good principle and the bad one in men, and also a contest in which the evil principle comes off victorious; so this language can hardly fail of being appropriate, to describe all those cases in a Christian's experience, in which sin triumphs. Every Christian at once recognizes and feels, that such cases may be described in language like that which the apostle employs.

Here is the advantage which the patrons of this opinion enjoy, and which they have not failed to push even to its utmost extent. After all, however, the ground is unfairly taken, and unfairly maintained. For, first, it is *only a part* of the case. While Christians have many a contest in which they are overcome by sin, yet they must be victors in far the greater number of cases, if the whole be collectively taken. If this be not true then it cannot be true that 'he who

loveth Christ, keepeth his commandments;’ it cannot be true that ‘they who love the law of God, do no iniquity;’ nor true that “he who is born of God sinneth not;” nor that faith enables him who cherishes it to “overcome the world.” As, however, there is no denying the truth of these and the like declarations, and no receding from them, nor explaining them away as meaning less than *habitual victory* over sin; so it follows, that when verses 15—25 are applied to Christian experience, they are wrongly applied. The person represented in these verses *succumbs to sin* IN EVERY INSTANCE of contest. The Christian must not—cannot—does not, so fight against sin. To assert this would be to contradict the whole tenor of the Scriptures; it would be abrogating, at once, all which is declared in so pointed a manner, in chap. viii. 1—17.

Secondly, as I have already noted, there stands in the way of this interpretation the fact, that a *great transition* is marked by the commencement of chap. viii.; one of which no satisfactory account can be given, if vii. 14—25 is to be interpreted as belonging to those who are under grace.

Thirdly, I repeat the remark, that the question is not, whether what is here said *might* be applied to Christians, but whether, from the tenor of the context, it appears to be the intention of the writer that it *should be* so applied. This principle cannot fail to settle the question concerning such an application.

In a word; how can it be just reasoning to say, that because verses 14—25 may be applied to describe those contests of the Christian with sin in which the latter is victorious, therefore it does describe Christian experience *considered as a whole*, and is intended by the writer so to do? What can be more certain than that *Christian* experience is not here to the writer’s purpose, *when his object is, to represent the truly desperate condition of him who is merely under the law?*

(3) So far as reasoning or argument is concerned, the main allegation of those who apply verses 14—25 to Christian experience, remains yet to be considered. It is this, viz., that ‘the declarations made in these verses respecting the *internal man*, are such as comport only with the state or condition of a regenerate man; and if this be not admitted, then we must concede that the unregenerate are subjects of moral good.’ But,

First, this allegation takes for granted, that the phrases *σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ, συνήδωμαι τῷ νόμῳ, &c.*, are to be taken in their full strength, without any modification. I must ask the reader, now, instead of repeating here what I have before said, to look back upon the commentary on verse 22, and also, what is said near the beginning of the present Excursus, on the subject of deducing arguments in this case merely from the forms of expression, without a special reference to the context, and the object which the writer has in view. When the whole of this is weighed, I would inquire, whether he who interprets chap. vii. 5—25, as having respect to one who is under law, has not just as good a claim to insist that *σαρκικός, πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, &c.*, shall be taken without abatement or modification? And now, what is to be the result? Plainly this, viz., that the writer has described an impossible state, one in which a man is *under law*, and *under grace* at one and the same time; one in which sin has a power predominant in all cases, and grace a power on the whole predominant, at one and the same time. As this cannot be admitted, which set of terms in the description must be modified? for one of

them certainly must be. The answer to this question may be found, in the considerations which have been suggested above.

But secondly, the whole of the allegation which I am discussing, appears to me to rest on ground entirely unsafe and unsatisfactory. It will be admitted by those who are conversant with the dispute about the meaning of the passage before us, and are well read in the history of Christian doctrine, that Augustine was the first who suggested the idea, that it must be applied to Christian experience. This he did, however, in the heat of dispute with Pelagius. At an earlier period of his life, he held to the common exegesis of the church, as is certain from Prop. XLV. in Epist. ad Rom.; *Intelligitur hinc ille homo describi, qui nondum sub gratia*. So in Confess. VII. 21, VIII. 5, Ad Simplic. 1. But Pelagius, who denied the fallen state of man, urged upon him the declaration above referred to, viz., *delighting in the law of God after the inner man, serving the law of God with the mind, &c.* Augustine felt himself pressed by them, and made his escape by protesting against the exegesis of his antagonist. He recanted his former opinion respecting verses 14—25, and became a strenuous advocate for an interpretation which through him has gained an extensive ground among Christians, and maintains its footing among many down to the present hour.

It is difficult to say how far men, and even good men, will sometimes go in matters of interpretation and criticism, in order to relieve themselves from the straits occasioned by warm dispute, in which their antagonists make galling attacks upon them. It was, in all probability, the dispute of the church at Rome with the Montanists, which first occasioned it to doubt and then to deny, the Pauline origin of the epistle to the Hebrews. Luther's dispute with the Roman Catholics, on the subject of *justification by faith alone*, led him to discard the epistle of James, and to call it, by way of contempt, *epistola straminea*. And the like have many others done, for similar reasons. Such seems to have been the ground of Augustine's new exegesis.

But when we come, now, seriously and calmly to inquire whether there is any cause of alarm in respect to the doctrine of the natural man's depravity, because Rom. 7—25 is interpreted as having respect to him, we can see that this is so far from being the case, that the opposite is true; I mean, that this depravity is rendered much more conspicuous and aggravated by this exegesis. Let us see if this be not palpable and certain.

That men are *moral* beings, does not make them sinners or saints. That they have faculties which can distinguish between good and evil, only shows that they are capable of doing good or evil, or of being righteous or wicked. *Conscience and reason* belong to the *pura naturalia* of the human race. Man, in the full and proper sense of this word, cannot exist without them. It is no more an evidence, then, that a man is holy or good in the Scripture sense of the word, because his reason and conscience distinguish good from evil, and testify in behalf of the good, than it is that he is holy because he has a moral nature. Such a distinction and such an approbation are inseparable from the essential nature of reason and conscience.

Consider, moreover, that the guilt of a sinner who continues to yield to the solicitations of his carnal desires, is proportioned entirely to the measure of light which he has, and to the inducements set before him to act in a different manner. "Where there is no law, there is no transgression." "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." Then of course the sinner, with reason, and conscience, and the law of

God all remonstrating against his conduct, is involved in guilt of the deepest dye, while an offender (if I may so call him) without any of these checks, would be no offender at all. "He that knoweth his master's will, and doeth it not, shall be beaten with many stripes." And so it ought to be. What then can render the person's case more aggravated, who is described in verses 14—25, than the fact that he resists so much light and such powerful motives to pursue a different course?

Is it, then, denying the depravity of the unregenerate, when we assign to them faculties to do good, and light as to their duty, and strong excitement to perform it, and represent them as after all refusing to do good, and uniformly hearkening to the voice of sin? I appeal to the reason and conscience of all men, whether such an accusation against the exegesis in question, is not in a high degree unjust and unfounded. Nay, I might go farther; I may say, it is the contrary exegesis which is pressed with the very difficulty it urges against the other. For if the sinner is born without reason and conscience, and is without light; or if he is born with reason and conscience that are incapable of distinguishing good from evil, or of giving the preference to the former; then his depravity and desperate guilt can in no way be made out, consistently with the first principles of a moral sense. Of all the charges then brought against the exegesis which I have defended, that of its diminishing the guilt of unregenerate men is the most unfounded and unjust.

I have discussed the principal arguments, so far as I am acquainted with them, of those who interpret verses 14—25 as having a relation to Christian experience. In regard to the allegation, that Paul here speaks in the first person singular, and must therefore be relating his own experience, I have already remarked upon it, p. 323, seq. There is no objection to allowing it to be Paul's experience; but *when* had he such experience? And why does he speak of himself? These are the questions to be answered; and these I have endeavoured to answer in my remarks at the close of vii. 12.

I cannot conclude this already protracted Excursus, without adverting for a moment, to the history of the exegesis introduced by Augustine.

As has been already stated, the most ancient Fathers of the Church, without a dissenting voice, so far as we have any means of ascertaining their views, were united in the belief, that an *unregenerate, unsanctified* person is described in vii. 5—25. So Origen, Tertullian, Chrysostom, and Theodoret. In this state did the views of the church remain down to the time of Augustine, whose first opinion, and whose change of it, have already been described. How unnecessary such an evasion was, on his part, of the argument of Pelagius, we have already seen. For surely the more light the mind of a natural man has, the more his conscience approves the divine law and sides with it, the deeper and more dreadful is his guilt when he sins against all these. And as the person described by the apostle is one over whom sin in every case of contest presented does actually obtain the victory, he must of course be a person of much deeper and more desperate depravity than any one can be, whose natural faculties are all degraded and depraved in their very origin; as Augustine held the faculties of men to be, after his dispute with Pelagius.

The exegesis of Augustine, however, found favour in the churches where his sentiments respecting original sin were received; and prevailed very extensively and for a long time. In like manner with him, have Anselm,

Thomas Aquinas, Cornelius a Lapide, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Beza, Spener, Buddæus, Koppe, and many others, explained the passage in question; and most commentators among evangelical Christians in Great Britain and in this country, have followed the same opinion.

On the other hand, besides all the ancient Greek, and some of the Latin Fathers, there are many distinguished men who have defended the sentiment which has been above exhibited. Such are Erasmus, Raphel, Episcopius, Limborch, Turretin, Le Clerc, Heumann, Bucer, Schomer, Franke, G. Arnold, Bengel, Reinhard, Storr, Flatt, Knapp, Tholuck, and (so far as I know) all the evangelical commentators of the present time on the continent of Europe. Most of the English episcopal church, also, for many years, and not a few of the Scotch, Dutch, and English presbyterian and congregational divines, have adopted the same interpretation. I cannot but believe that the time is not far distant, when there will be but one opinion among intelligent Christians, about the passage in question; as there was but one before the dispute of Augustine with Pelagius. In this respect there is ground of trust, that the ancient and modern churches will yet fully harmonize.

From the above brief historical sketch it would seem, that in general those who have admitted Augustine's view of the doctrine of original sin, have also admitted his exegesis of Rom. vii. 5—25. To this, however, there are exceptions; and of late, not a few exceptions. More thorough, partial, and unbiassed examination, will probably make an entire change in the views of Christians in general, even of those who have been educated in the belief of the Augustinian exegesis. This was my own lot; and for some time after I began the critical study of the Scriptures, I continued to advocate this method of interpretation. But an often repeated and more attentive study of the epistle to the Romans has brought me to believe, that such an exegesis is forbidden by the nature of the case, the *usus loquendi*, and the object of the writer; and that it is impossible to maintain it on impartial and critical grounds.

I am fully aware of the strength of feeling which exists relative to this subject in the minds of many. I am sorry to add, that the manner in which it is sometimes defended can never contribute to advance the interests of simple truth. When will it be believed, that scorn is not critical acumen, and that calling men heretics is not an argument to convince such as take the liberty to think and examine for themselves? When will such appeals cease? And when shall we have reasons instead of assertions, criticism in the place of denunciation, and a full practical exhibition of the truth, that the simple testimony of the divine word stands immeasurably high above all human authority?

[Dr Smith, in the preface mentioned in a note on page 610, has expressed in a very kind and brotherly manner, his dissent from my exegesis of Rom. vii. 5—25. His opinion is, that it is a copy of Paul's experience, after he was stricken down on the plains of Damascus, and before he obtained a hope by faith in Christ Jesus. In his view, "inceptive but genuine love of holiness and hatred of all sin, were now implanted in his [Paul's] heart by the divine hand." In other words, he had already passed from a law-state to a state of grace, and a new spiritual life was actually begun within him. On this account he applies to him, in their usual meaning, all the expressions which evince an approbation of holiness and obedience to the law; and as to all the strong expressions used in respect to sinning and practical opposition to the law, he construes them in a modified way, and accounts for them on the ground of deep and impassioned feeling in respect to sinfulness. The passage (in pref. pp. xi, xii.) in which he has thus expressed his views, is a vivid and powerful one, and does honour to his head and heart. But I have not been able to find in it matter of conviction that my exegesis is erroneous. The whole controversy turns ultimately on the

simple point, Which method of interpretation best harmonizes with the *main scope* and *design* of the writer in chap. vii., viii.? To settle this by particular phraseology, is certainly a desperate undertaking. If the *literal* sense is to be urged, then both sides can undoubtedly be established, viz., that Paul is speaking of a man who is a Christian, and of one who is not. Scarcely any language in the Bible is stronger on either side. We must give up all hope, then, of coming to any satisfactory issue in this way; as I think I have abundantly shown in the above Excursus. What then is the *main scope* and *object* of the apostle's discourse here? I can find no other than this, viz., to show the utter inefficacy of the law to deliver men from a state of sin and death, and the necessity of betaking themselves to the grace proffered by the gospel. What can be more obvious than that a *law-state* is what is described on the one hand (vii. 7—25), and a *gospel-state* or state of grace on the other (viii. 1—17)? If there be not an antithesis, a marked, and pointed, and powerful one here, between the two states as described in these two portions of Scripture, I confess myself unable to discern what antithesis is. And if there be antithesis, how can a *state of grace* be described in chap. vii. 7—25? I can see no answer to this question, except it be, that the state of distressing apprehension, and contest, and opposition, described in chap. vii. is succeeded by one full of peace and hope as described in chap. viii. But how does such a representation accomplish the apostle's object? The man is *safe*, as described in chap. vii., although in trouble; whereas the deliverance in chap. viii. is "from the law of sin and death." The last could not be said to be effected by the transition in question; it was already effected, if Dr. S. be in the right, when the man was in the conflict described in chap. vii. Does the man go over then, as represented in chap. viii. into a state of entire perfection, so that he is freed from all the struggle with sin? Dr. S. would be one of the last to acknowledge this. It remains then, that the man described in chap. vii. is in a *law-state*. No other method of interpretation will make good the obvious antithesis; no other will fully answer the *main scope* and *design* of the apostle.

Another friend, well known in this country, and also very dear to me, the Rev. Dr. Henderson, of Highbury College, in the precincts of London, who has also written a short prefatory commendation of the English edition of my commentary, in a letter to me dated June 24, 1833, has expressed his views in regard to my exegesis of the passage in question, in the following manner: "Your view of chap. vii. meets with my approbation. I deem it most important. The other view seems greatly calculated to keep up and foster a low state of Christianity." When such enlightened, sober, pious, and judicious divines think so differently about Rom. vii. 7—25, what better can one do, than to investigate for himself and fully satisfy his own mind? This is what I have endeavoured to do, and what both of the much honoured friends mentioned above cheerfully encourage me to do, even in cases where I may differ from them. Would that the same noble and generous spirit might every where take the place of the jealous and morbid Cynicism, in which some seem to move as their most congenial element!]

EXCURSUS VIII.

On *κρίσις* in Rom. viii. 19 (p. 369—371).

THOLUCK argues that *κρίσις* is employed as described in the commentary from two sources; first, from the connexion in which it stands, and the predicates which are assigned to it; and secondly, from both Jewish and Christian belief respecting the renewal of the natural world at a future period.

Under the first head of argument he says, that the more usual meaning of *κρίσις* is the *natural world*. If he means by this to aver, that the word has this signification in a majority of the instances in which it is employed in the New Testament, an inspection of the examples in the commentary will convince the reader that he is mistaken. But still, the fact that the word may very naturally, in itself considered, be employed in such a way, I freely concede; and this I have already more than once intimated.

His next argument is, that *αὐτῇ ἢ κρίσις* in ver. 21, indicates a descent from the noble to the ignoble part of creation. He means that *αὐτῇ ἢ κρίσις*

signifies as much as to say: 'Not only does the nobler part of creation long for a disclosure of the glory which is to be revealed, but even *this inferior creation*, of which I am now speaking, also longs for the period when this disclosure shall be made.'

The answer to this is, that such an exegesis of αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις would necessarily imply, that a higher and nobler κτίσις had been already mentioned in the preceding context, with which this inferior one is now compared. Had such mention been made, there would be some ground for the remark of Tholuck. But as there is no mention of any thing of this nature, I do not see how we can give a *comparative* sense to αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις. In order to do this, must not something have been mentioned with which we may compare it? The expectation of the nobler part of creation is first mentioned in ver. 23, υἱοθεσίαν ἀπεκδεχόμενοι. The force of αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις must therefore be made out in another way. Paul had just said, ἡ κτίσις is *made subject to a frail and perishing state* (ματαιότητι), with the hope, i. e., in a condition or in circumstances in which it is permitted to hope, that καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις, *even this very same creature, may be freed*, &c. Tholuck does not seem to have noted, that the expression is not simply αὐτὴ, but καὶ αὐτὴ; which necessarily refers it to the preceding κτίσις, and means that *even the very same κτίσις*, viz., the frail and perishing κτίσις, which had just been described is still placed in a state in which it may indulge the hope of deliverance, &c. The force of καὶ αὐτὴ, then, seems to consist in designating that very same perishing κτίσις which the writer had just described, as being in a state to indulge a hope of obtaining freedom from this wretched condition. If this be correct, then its force does not consist in any implied comparison with a nobler κτίσις, which indulged the like hopes.

A third reason of Tholuck for the signification which he here assigns for κτίσις is, that in ver. 22, πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις is mentioned.

But why the apostle could not say πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις, if he meant the world of *rational* beings, just as well as he could if he meant the world of *nature*, I am not aware; and more especially so, since in Mark xvi. 15, and Col. i. 23, this very expression is made use of (πάσῃ τῇ κτίσει—ἐν πάσῃ τῇ κτίσει) in order to denote the universality of the rational world.

Finally, Tholuck avers that the predicates ματαιότης and δουλεία τῆς φθορᾶς (verses 20, 21,) more naturally belong to the material creation.

But this I cannot see. Above all, I cannot see it, when the apostle says, that the κτίσις was *made subject ματαιότητι, ὡς ἐκούσα, not voluntarily, not of its own choice*. Does this belong more naturally, then, to the material than the rational creation? Of which is *choice* more naturally predicated? Then again, is not ματαιότης, a *frail and dying state*, as easily and naturally to be predicated of *men*, as it is of the material world? And taken as a whole, is not the latter far less subject to ματαιότης than the race of men? Comp. ματαιότης in Eph. iv. 17—19; Rom. i. 21, seq. Once more, is not δουλεία τῆς φθορᾶς, the *bondage of a mortal or perishing condition*, as naturally predicated of men as it is of the material world? Rather, is it not much more naturally applied to human beings, than it is to the world in which they live? So Paul seems to have thought, and so expressed himself; see φθορά in 1 Cor. xv. 50. Comp. 2 Pet. ii. 18, 19; i. 4.

None of the reasons, then, assigned by Tholuck for the exegesis which

he defends, that are drawn from the exigency of the passage, seem to be well-grounded. So much is true, viz., that the *usus loquendi* in itself considered would admit the sense which he gives to *χριστός*. But that the *exigentia loci* renders probable this meaning, does not seem in any good degree to be made out.

We come, next, to the second class of reasons assigned by Tholuck in defence of his interpretation; viz., those derived from the Jewish and Christian belief, respecting the renovation of the *natural* world at a future period.

The passages of Scriptures mainly relied on are 2 Pet. iii. 7—12; Rev. xxi. 1; Isai. xi. 6, seq., lxv. 17, seq; Heb. xii. 26. seq. Hints of the same doctrine are supposed to be contained in Matt. xiii. 38, seq.; xix. 28, and Acts iii. 21. Brief suggestions respecting passages of such a nature, are all which any reader will here expect.

All the force of argument from these and the like passages must rest on a *literal* interpretation of them. But how can passages of this nature be urged as having a literal meaning, after reading Rev. xxi., and xxii. 1—5? Or if this does not satisfy the mind, then compare passages of a similar nature, viz., those which have respect to the Messiah's kingdom on earth, his spiritual kingdom *before* the end of time, and during the gathering in of his saints. What immeasurable absurdities and contradictions must be involved in a literal exegesis here? For example, from Isai. ii. 1—4, and Micah iv. 1—3, one might prove that in the time of the Messiah, the temple of the Lord is to be built on a mountain, placed upon the top of the highest mountains any where to be found, and that there all the nations of the earth will assemble to offer their devotions. Isai. xi. 6—9 would prove that all the brute creation are to experience an absolute change of their very nature; the lion is to eat straw like the ox; the asp and the cockatrice are no more to retain their venomous power. Isa. ix. 7 would prove that the literal throne of David is to be occupied by the Messiah, and that he is to rule in his capacity as literal king, without intermission and without end. Isai. xxv. 6—8 would prove that a feast of fat things and of rich wines is to be made for all nations, and that all suffering and sorrow and death are to be abolished. Isai. xxxv. 1—10 would prove that the deserts of the earth are to be filled with living streams and exuberant herbage and trees, and that all the ransomed of the Lord are to repair to the literal Mount Zion, where they will have uninterrupted and everlasting pleasure. Isai. xliii. 18—21 would prove the same thing respecting the deserts; and also that the beasts of the field, the dragons, and the owls, shall be among the worshippers of God. Isai. lv. 1—10 would prove, not only that wine and milk are to be had, in the days of the Messiah, without money and without price, but that the mountains and the hills will break forth into singing, and all the trees of the field shall clap their hands. Isai. lx. 15—22 would prove that Israel is to feed on the milk of the Gentiles, and to be nourished by the breasts of *kings*; and also that there will be no sun by day nor moon by night, but God himself by his own splendour is to make their everlasting light so that no more night will ever be known. (The very same things are said respecting the new Jerusalem, in Rev. xxi. 23; are they literal there?) Isai. lxvi. 22—24 would prove that all nations are to come from one new moon to another, and from one Sabbath to another, and worship before the Lord in Jerusalem.

Why now are not such passages just as reasonably construed in a *literal* manner, as those which have respect to the kingdom of God *after* the gene-

ral resurrection? Must it not be true, that in its very nature this kingdom will be still more spiritual than that of the Messiah during its preparatory or disciplinary state? This will not be denied. Is there no reason *a fortiori*, then, why we should understand the language respecting this kingdom as *figurative*, in just the same manner as we are obliged to do with regard to all the descriptions in the Bible of the heavenly world? Nay, I may add, that the idea of Flatt, Tholuck, and many others, about a renewed earth becoming the *literal* abode of the blessed, after the resurrection, is directly at variance with other declarations of the Scriptures. Paul represents Christians at the general resurrection *as caught up to meet the Lord in the air, i. e., as ascending to heaven, and as thenceforth being ever with the Lord*, viz., in heaven, 1 Thess. iv. 17. So all the Bible; believers are to 'dwell with God, to be with him, to see his face, to enjoy his presence, to stand at his right hand.' The apostle Paul says, that at the resurrection 'this mortal will put on immortality, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, that this natural body is to become a spiritual body, and to be made like unto Christ's glorified body,' 1 Cor. xv. 44, 50, 53; and all this, that saints may be glorified with Christ. But where is Christ's body? And where does he dwell? And where do believers go, when they are "absent from the body," in order that they may be "present with the Lord?" Our Saviour represents the saints at the resurrection as becoming incapable of all earthly pleasures, and as being made like to the angels of God in heaven, Matt. xxii. 29, 30. And must we believe, after all this, that the present earth, when it has undergone an emendation, is still to be the abode of spiritual bodies, of saints made like to their Lord and Redeemer? Believe it who may, I must first see all these and the like texts blotted out from the Bible; nay, my whole views respecting the very nature of future happiness must undergo an entire transformation, as great as the earth itself is supposed by the writers in question to undergo, before I can admit such an exegesis as they defend. It contradicts the express declarations of the Saviour and of his apostles.

I have a difficulty, also, as to the *logical* commentary of the passage, provided we adopt the interpretation defended by Tholuck. Let us examine this for a moment. The apostle begins by saying, that present afflictions should not be laid to heart by Christians, because of the future glory which is reserved for them. What now is demanded, in order that this should be believed, and that Christians should regulate their thoughts and conduct by it? Why plainly nothing more is required, than that they should cherish a confirmed belief of it, a steadfast hope that such glory will be bestowed. Such is the conclusion in ver. 25. But how is this hope to be animated and supported? Plainly by considerations which add to the assurance, that *future* glory is in prospect. And what are these? They are, that God has enstamped on our very nature the desire of such a state, and that he has placed us in such a frail and dying condition, as that the whole human race naturally and instinctively look to such a state and hope for it. The present is manifestly a state of trial; even Christians, who have the earnest of future glory within themselves, are not exempt from this. But the very fact that we are in a state of trial and probation, naturally points to an end or result of this. And what is such an end, but a state of *future* happiness? for here happiness in a higher sense is not to be attained.

But suppose now that the *material* world is that which sighs after and hopes for deliverance from its present frail and perishable state; has this a

direct bearing on the subject in question? The answer must be in the negative; so thought Turretin, as his notes most clearly show. But then it may be said, that it has a bearing upon it by way of implication; because the renovation of the material world is necessarily connected with the future happiness of the saints. In this point of view I acknowledge it would not be irrelevant. But is not this less direct, less forcible, less convincing, than the appeal to the wants and desires of which every human breast is conscious? Of two modes of exegesis, either of which is possible, I must prefer that which imparts the most life and energy to the reasoning and argument of the writer.

I have another substantial difficulty with the interpretation under examination. It is this: if *κρίσις* means the material or natural world, on the one hand, and *αὐτοὶ τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες* means Christians on the other (which Tholuck and Flatt both avow), then here is a *lacuna* which cannot well be imagined or accounted for. Christians are subject to a frail and dying state, but are looking for a better one; and the natural world is in the same circumstances; but the world of men in general, the world of rational beings who are not regenerate, have no concern or interest in all this; they are not even mentioned. Can it be supposed now, that the apostle has made such an important, unspeakably important, omission as this, in such a discourse and in such a connection? The *natural, physical world* brought into the account, but the world of perishing *men* left out! I must have confirmation "strong as proof from holy writ," to make me adopt an interpretation that offers such a manifest incongruity.

Such are my reasons for not regarding as weighty the arguments offered by the advocates of the interpretation I am examining; and such are my positive grounds for rejecting it.

I come, at last, to the interpretation which I have supposed above to be the correct and proper one, viz., that *κρίσις* most probably means *men, mankind in general*, as stated above, No. 2, *b*. That such an interpretation is agreeable to the *usus loquendi*, is clear from the statement there made. It only remains, then, to inquire, *whether it accords with the nature of the passage in which the word stands, and whether it can be vindicated from the objections made to it.*

As to its accordance with the nature of the passage, and with the argument which the writer purposes to employ, I must refer the reader (in order to save repetition) to my general statement above (p. 362) of the meaning of the passage, and also to what has been just said respecting the *logic* of the passage. It remains, then, only that I take some notice of the objections urged against this interpretation. Flatt has done the most justice to such objections; and I shall therefore examine the arguments which he produces.

1. '*Κρίσις*, in verses 19—21, is distinguished from *οἱ τοὶ Θεοῦ*. How, then, can it mean *all men*, of which *οἱ τοὶ Θεοῦ* constitute a part?'

The answer to this is, that there is not an *antithesis* here of *κρίσις* to *οἱ τοὶ Θεοῦ* (which the objection assumes), but only a distinction of species from genus. 'Mankind,' says the apostle, *i. e.*, men in general, 'have always been in a frail and dying state, have felt this, and have longed after a higher and better state.' In ver. 23 he goes on to say: 'Even those whom one might expect to be exempt from this, *i. e.*, Christians themselves, who already have an earnest of future glory, have not been exempt from such a condition.'

Here is indeed a distinction, but no antithesis. In fact the nature of the case does not admit of *antithesis*; for both the *κρίσις* and *οὐ τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες* are partakers of the same frail and dying state. The distinction, therefore, is of a different nature from that of antithesis. It is made, as I apprehend, in the manner stated above.

2. 'How could the apostle represent *κρίσις* in this sense, i. e., heathen men and all unconverted men, as seeking and sighing after *the liberty of the children of God*, when he every where avers that they are estranged from God, and at enmity with him, and are ignorant of the things of the Spirit?'

But here the *argumentum ad hominem* may be applied to good purpose. How could the apostle represent the natural or inanimate creation as longing after such a happiness, or any other like to it? You reply, 'It is a *prosopopœia*.' It is so, truly, if you interpret it rightly; and personification of the boldest kind, so bold that I know not how we can admit it, while it has so much of *incongruity* in it.

I quit this part of the subject, however, and proceed. Is there not in the human breast a longing and sighing after immortality? Hear Cicero, who puts these words into the mouth of Cato, when speaking of Elysium: "O præclarum diem, cum ad illud divinorum animorum concilium cœtumque proficiscar, cumque ex hac turba et colluvione discedam! Proficiscar enim, non ad eos solum viros, de quibus ante dixi; verum etiam ad Cætorem meum, quo nemo vir melior natus est, nemo pietate præstantior;" *De Senectute*. Listen also to Seneca: "Juvabat de æternitate animorum querere, imo mehercule credere. Credebam enim facile opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gratissimam promittentium, magis quam probantium. Dabam me spei tantæ." In other passages the same writer descants upon the meanness of affairs pertaining to the present life, unless one rises in his views above human objects. "Sic creatura," adds Turretin, to whom I am indebted for these quotations, "sic creatura abhorrebat a *vanitate* cui subjecta est. Sic sperabat se aliquando a servitute illa liberatum iri;" *Opp.* II. 361.

Who can refuse to see how applicable all this is to our present purpose? Tholuck and Flatt would themselves say, that this sighing after immortality is one of the most convincing of all arguments that men are truly immortal. Does not the fact, that all nations have had their Elysium, establish the allegation that such a longing is innate, i. e., pertaining to our rational nature? Or if this be questioned, is it not certain, that the present unsatisfying, frail, dying condition of the human race does lead them to feel their need of a better state, and to sigh after it?

This does not prove, indeed, that they long for the heaven of the Christian, as a place of purity and freedom from all sin. That they have *specific* and correct views of this and desires after it, is not true; and if they had, we could not suppose them to desire it in respect to its holiness. But it is not necessary to suppose this, in reference to the object of the apostle's argument. It is not a specific view of heaven simply as a place of purity and holiness, which he here represents Christians themselves as entertaining; for in ver. 23 he adverts to them as hoping for *the redemption of their bodies*, i. e., an exemption from the pains and sufferings to which their frail bodies are continually exposed. May not the unconverted long to be delivered from suffering and sorrow? Do they not in *this* respect desire future happiness? I acknowledge that they are unwilling to employ proper

means of obtaining it; and that there are actually, as the Christian revelation holds it up to view, things in it which would not of themselves be at all desirable to the unconverted; but do they not, after all, in some definite and important sense, hope and wish for another and better world? This will not be denied, after reading the above extracts from Cicero and Seneca; and this being admitted, it is all which the apostle's argument here demands.

What he means to say, I take to be in substance this: 'The very nature and condition of the human race point to a future state; they declare that this is an imperfect, frail, dying, unhappy state; that man does not, and cannot, attain the end of his being here; and even Christians, supported as they are by the earnest of a future glory, still find themselves obliged to sympathize with all others in these sufferings, sorrows, and deferred hopes.'

I acknowledge, that if one insists on construing the *revelation of the sons of God*, and the *glorious liberty of the children of God*, as being so specific that they cannot be predicated of the hopes of the world at large, he may make difficulty with the exegesis which I am defending. So Flatt and Tholuck have done. But how should they both have overlooked the fact, that this same rigid interpretation applied to their own mode of construing *κρίσις*, makes a difficulty still greater? For in what possible sense can the natural world be hoping for or expecting the glorious liberty of the children of God? I mean, if these expressions be interpreted (as they, in making their objections, insist that they must be) in their specific and rigid sense.

If there be any difficulty here, then, it is evidently less on the ground which I take, than on the other. It is not enough to make objections to a particular mode of interpretation; but one should show that his own is not liable to objections still greater. And surely it must be deemed a greater difficulty to represent the natural world as expecting the *glorious liberty of the children of God*, than it is to suppose that immortal beings, made in the image of God, and made sensible of the insufficiency of the present world to render them happy, should anxiously look for another and better state. It is not necessary for the apostle's argument, to show that they look for this in the way that Christianity would direct them to do, nor even that they have any good grounds in their present state to expect personally a happier condition in future. If even the wicked, who love this world, are not satisfied with it, and are made to sigh after another and more perfect state, then follows what the apostle has designed to urge, viz., the conclusion that God has strongly impressed on our whole race the conviction that there is a better state, and that it is highly needed.

The ground which Noesselt and others take respecting *κρίσις*, viz., that it means Christians in general, would indeed free the whole passage from any objections of the kind under consideration, inasmuch as they might be said without any limitation, to expect the *revelation of the sons of God*. But this interpretation is pressed with other insuperable difficulties, as has already been stated. It makes no distinction between *κρίσις* and *υἱοὶ θεοῦ* or *τέκνα θεοῦ* in verses 19, 21, when the writer has plainly made one; and then it understands *αὐτοὶ τῇ ἀπαρχῇ τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες* of the apostles only, or such Christians as were endowed with miraculous gifts; which cannot, in any tolerable manner, be defended.

I come, then, by virtue of such considerations as have been suggested, to prefer the interpretation which assigns to *κρίσις* the sense of *mankind, men in general*, to any other of the proposed methods of explanation. But in so

doing, I do not aver that there are no difficulties in the way, or that an ingenious critic can raise none. This is not the question. The more proper question is, whether the difficulties that lie in the way of this interpretation are not less than those which can be thrown in the way of any of the other methods which have been discussed? I can only say, that they seem to me clearly to be less; and therefore I feel compelled to embrace this exegesis until a more probable one is proposed. It has been defended by Augustine, Lightfoot, Locke, J. A. Turretin, Semler, Rosenmuller, Ammon, Usteri, Keil, and many others. This, indeed, is in itself no adequate reason for receiving it; but it shows, at least, that the difficulties attending it have not been regarded as insuperable by men of very different theological views, and of no small attainments.

EXCURSUS IX.

On Rom. viii. 28, *τοὺς κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοὺς οὗσι.* (p. 378.)

THE difficulty arising from this passage, and the temptation to deny or obscure what I must believe to be its plain and inevitable meaning, are both suggested by the following question: "How can God have had an *eternal* purpose as to those who are to be saved, and yet men be free agents, free even in the matter of their own repentance and conversion?" It will not be expected, of course, that I should here discuss at length a metaphysical question, which the disputes and contentions of more than 4000 years have not settled; for in every age and nation, where religious inquiries have been pursued, the difficulty before us has for substance presented itself to the minds of thinking men. One may say that three parties exist, and perhaps have in every age existed, in respect to it; viz., (1) Those who embrace the doctrine of *fatal*ity, and therefore deny the proper free agency of man. (2) Those who deny the divine *decrees* or *eternal purposes* of God, and make in effect a kind of independent agency of man. (3) Those who believe both in the divine foreknowledge, purpose, or decree (for the difference between these is in *name* only, not in reality), and also in the entire free agency of man. Among this latter class, I would choose my lot. The Scriptures seem to me plainly to hold forth both of these doctrines. Yea, so far are the sacred writers from apprehending any inconsistency in them, that they bring them both forward (*i. e.*, divine agency and purpose, and human agency and purpose) at one and the same time, not seeming even to apprehend that any one will speculate on them so as to make out any contradiction. For example: Acts ii. 23, "Him, being delivered by the *determinate counsel* and *foreknowledge* of God, ye have taken, and by *wicked* hands have crucified and slain;" *i. e.*, the determinate counsel (*ῥησιμὴν βουλὴν*) and foreknowledge of God did not render the hands of the Jews less wicked, who crucified the Saviour. Of course they must have acted in a *voluntary* manner, *i. e.*, as agents altogether free; for a sin *involuntary*, *i. e.*, without consent of the will, is a contradiction in terms, so far as moral turpitude is concerned.

Again; Phil. ii. 12, 13, "*Work out your own salvation* with fear and trembling; for *it is God who worketh in you both to will and to do*, of his good pleasure;" *i. e.*, the very ground on which I urge diligence in the matter of your Christian duties is, that God helps you *both to will and to do*.

These are a specimen of the philosophy (if I may so speak) of the sacred writers. And of such philosophy the Bible is full. The attributes of an *omniscient* God, his designs, his very nature, prove that he must have *purposes*; and such as will not be frustrated. *Prediction* or *prophecy* proves this, and puts it beyond all rational contradiction. Is it *uncertain*, whether what the prophets of God have foretold will come to pass? Yet are not the men by whom the things foretold are brought to pass, free agents in all cases of this nature, just as they were in the crucifixion of the Lord of glory?

But you will ask: '*How* is this?' To which I answer at once: I do not know. The *manner* in which God's purposes are consistent with free agency, I do not pretend to know. The *fact* that they are consistent, I do know; because I am conscious of being a free agent; I am as certain of it as I am of my own existence. I am equally certain that God is omniscient, and has always been so; and therefore he must have always perfectly known every thing that will take place. If he knew it with *certainly* (and if he did not, then he did not *know* it at all), then is it *uncertain* whether it will take place? And if it is certain, then how does this differ from what is said to be *decreed*? The name *decree*, indeed, seems to have carried along with it a kind of terror to many minds; but, so far as I can see, it implies neither more nor less than *divine purpose* or *divine will*. And can it be, that sober-minded Christians will, on reflection, maintain that there is no divine purpose or will?

To all the arguments adduced from such a statement of *facts*, which can be alleged in order to prove the doctrine of *fatalism*, I have only to reply, that fact itself *disproves* this; for we are conscious of being *free* agents. The Scriptures disprove this: for they every where treat men as *free* agents. And this is enough; for these are the two highest possible sources of proof, and with these we ought to rest satisfied. To what can we make a convincing appeal, if not to these?

As to the question: *How* is our free agency made to consist with God's eternal purposes? I have said nothing; for I know nothing. And as to the question, *how* ten thousand thousand other things, which I believe, and which all men believe, can be true or take place, no one in the present world knows, or ever will know, any thing; *e.g.*, *How* do heat, moisture, and earth make one plant green and another red, one nutritive and another poisonous, in the very same bed of earth? yet we all believe the fact that they do.

Who can show it to be absurd, now, that God should have had an *eternal* purpose, and yet man be a *free agent*?

Does the certain knowledge we now have of a *past* event, destroy the free agency of those who were concerned in bringing about that event? Did any *previous* knowledge of the same necessarily interfere with their free agency? And as to free agency itself; cannot God make a creature *in his own image*, free like himself, rational like himself, the originator of thoughts and volitions like himself? Can this be disproved? The fact that we are *dependent* beings, will not prove that we may not be *free* agents as to the exercise of the powers with which we are endowed,—free in a sense like to that in which God himself, as a rational being, is free. Nor will this establish any *contingency* or *uncertainty* of events, in the universe. Could not God as well foresee what would be the free and voluntary thought of men, in consequence of the powers which he should give them, as he could foresee thoughts and volitions which would proceed from the operation of ex-

ternal causes upon them? Until this can be denied on the ground of reason and argument, the sentiment in question is not justly liable to the charge of introducing the doctrine of casual *contingency* or *uncertainty* into the plans of the divine mind.

I only add, that when we say, 'God has had an *eternal purpose* in respect to those who are called' (and the apostle does say this, Eph. iii. 11; 2 Tim. i. 9), we speak *ἀνθρωποπάθως*. With God there is no time. 'A thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years.' With him it is an ETERNAL NOW, as it has often and forcibly been expressed. So the expressions, PRE-destination, FORE-ordination, &c., strictly speaking, are *anthropopathic*. 'Non PRÆ-videntia, sed PRO-videntia potius dicitur,' says Roethius, De consol. Philos. i. 5. prop. 6.

If God has any purposes, they are *eternal*. We must, then, either deny that he has any purposes, or else admit their eternal existence; and this being admitted, the *κλητοὶ κατὰ πρόβησιν* are truly such as the apostle describes them to be in the sequel of chap. viii.

EXCURSUS X.

On Rom. viii. 28—30. (p. 382).

On the disputes which have arisen from the paragraph in verses 28—30, I shall not comment at large in this place; but I cannot pass by the subject without making a few remarks.

That man should be entirely *dependent* on God, and yet be a free agent at the same time, presents, it has been often asserted, an impossibility, an absurdity, a contradiction of terms, a scheme of fatalism, &c. After all, however, the mere disciple of Naturalism, who sets *revelation* entirely aside, but allows the natural perfections of the Godhead (among which are omniscience and omnipotence), falls into the very same difficulties inevitably, which he puts solely to the account of Revelation. If there be a God, a Creator, almighty and omniscient, then we are perfectly and entirely dependent on him; from everlasting moreover, he has known all that we are and shall be; he has known this with *absolute certainty*; and if so, then what we are and shall be is not *fortuitous*. This the disciple of nature can no more deny, than the disciple of revelation. And this involves at once all the real difficulties which are charged to the account of those who believe in the plain and simple allegations of the passage before us.

Once admit the idea of an omniscient and omnipotent Creator, and the difficulty of reconciling dependence and free agency comes up of course; and it bears equally, moreover, on every system which admits this truth. It is wonderful that this should not be more extensively seen and felt by writers, who are in the habit of charging all difficulties of this nature to the opinions of those who favour the sentiments of Calvin.

After all, if there be any force in the objections made against the doctrine in question, it arises only from reasoning analogically in respect to the laws and qualities of matter and those of mind. In a piece of physical machinery, every motion will be in accordance with the laws of motion and

mechanical power, and all necessarily according to the contrivance of the mechanist; *i. e.*, the laws of matter and motion remaining the same, the result which is calculated upon is necessary; and it is always the *same*, for there is no volition in the machine, nothing to resist, alter, or modify the influence to which it is subjected.

Not so in the world of immaterial and *spiritual* being. Man is made *in the image of God*; therefore he has a free agency like to that of his Maker. From its very nature, this free agency is incapable of *mechanical* control. Motives, arguments, inducements may move, convince, persuade; but they cannot control by a necessity like that in the world of matter. That they cannot, is owing to the very nature itself of a free agent, who is no longer free, if he have no *ultimate* choice and power of his own. The Bible every where ascribes such a power to man. He resists light, knowledge, persuasion; he remains unmoved (at least undetermined) by all the motives drawn from earth, heaven, and hell; he resists and grieves the Spirit of God himself. Such are the representations of the Scripture. Is this representation truth or fiction? Which is the same as to ask: Are men in *fact* free agents, or only so in *name* and *appearance*?

That they are in fact free, is what I believe. Nor can I be persuaded, that illustrations of free agency drawn from the material world, are in any tolerable measure apposite to our subject. Our souls are *spirit*, not matter. They are like the God who made them; not like the dust on which we tread. All arguments, then, drawn from cause or causation and effect in the *material* world, and applied to the subject of *spiritual* agency and influence, are wrongly applied, and cannot serve to cast any thing but darkness on this deeply interesting subject.

All the deductions in respect to *fatalism* moreover, which are made out and charged upon those who hold the doctrine of God's foreknowledge and eternal purposes, are made out by a process of reasoning which has its basis in material analogies. A regular, necessitous, mechanical concatenation of cause and effect, altogether like that in the world of nature, is predicated of the doctrine of the divine purposes or decrees; and then the charge of fatalism and absurdity of course follows. Let those who would avoid this take good care, then, not to reason about *spirit* in the same way as they do about matter.

Who now can prove, that the Spirit of God may not influence the human mind, in a manner perfectly consistent with its entire free agency—influence it to accept the offers of salvation, and become *σύμμορφος τοῦ νοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ*? No one. He can no more do this, than he can prove that one man cannot influence another, without impairing his freedom of action; an event which takes place every hour, and in all parts of this lower world. Above all, who can show that truth can influence men while they remain free, and yet that the Spirit, who is the author of all truth, cannot operate as effectually and with as little interference with free agency, as the truth which he has revealed? So little foundation is there for the charge of fatalism, against the doctrine of divine influence upon the souls of men!

Those who are saved *freely* repent, *freely* believe, *freely* accept the terms of salvation. Why can they not be as free under the influence of the Spirit, as they are under the influence of the truth which he has revealed? And none but penitents will be saved. There is no room then to say, that a belief in the divine eternal purposes makes it a matter of indifference whether a man lives a virtuous and holy life or not, and that if he is to be

saved, he will be saved, let him do what he may. The plain and certain truth is, that he 'is *not* to be saved' unless he become *conformed to the image of Christ*, and that *without holiness no man shall see the Lord*. This is God's everlasting purpose, his eternal decree; and sooner than this can be violated, heaven and earth shall pass away. All accusations of such a nature, then, against the doctrine in question, properly understood, are ungrounded and unjust.

In regard to the dispute whether God προῶρσει τοὺς κλητοὺς, from his *mere good pleasure*, or from a *foresight of their faith and good works*; it is easy to see, that the paragraph of the epistle which is under consideration does not decide on this. So far the question seems to be fully settled, by other texts of Scripture, viz., that the *merit or obedience* of the κλητοὶ was not the ground or reason of their regeneration and sanctification. This would be assuming that holiness existed before it did exist; that it was the *ground* of that which it followed only as a *consequence*.

On the other hand; as to the *decretum absolutum*, as it has been called, viz., the determination that the κλητοὶ should be saved, irrespectively of their character and actions, one cannot well see how this is to be made out. So much must be true, viz., that they are not regenerated, sanctified, or saved, on account of *merit*; all is of *grace, pure grace*. If this be all that any one means by the *decretum absolutum*, there can be no reasonable objection made to it. But on the other hand; as God is *omniscient*, and therefore must know every part of every man's character, through all stages of his being; as all things, in their fullest extent, must have always been naked and open to his view; so we cannot once imagine, that any decree or purpose in respect to the κλητοὶ can have been made *irrespectively* of their *whole* character. Such an *irrespection* (if I may use the word) is impossible. God has never determined, and from his holy nature never can determine to save any except such as are *conformed to the image of his Son*. All stands or falls together. A *decretum absolutum*, i. e., a decree which should separate these, or have no regard to these, would be a different one from that which the apostle has stated; and I may add, different from what we can ever imagine to be possible. .

To what purpose, then, can disputes on such a question be raised or fostered? Happy would it be for the church, had there been no occasion in times past to mourn over them! It is truly important to distinguish that which is revealed, from that which is not; and to content ourselves with the one, and dismiss the other. "Secret things belong to the Lord our God; but things revealed to us and our children."

I will only add, that the phrase, *God out of his mere good pleasure*, is very liable to be misunderstood and perverted, as it often has been. My own apprehension is, that most of those who employ it, use it merely to signify *without regard to merit, without being induced by considerations of meritorious obedience*. In this sense, as applied to God in respect to his purposes of renewing and sanctifying sinners, it is strictly true. Merit they have not; obedience they exhibit not, while in their unrenewed and unsanctified state. But then the phrase is often understood as conveying the idea, that God, in a way *merely arbitrary*, i. e., without any good reasons whatever, did choose some to everlasting life. This can never be true at all; no, not in any sense whatever. All that can ever be true is, that *God has done this, while the reasons are entirely unknown to us*. He surely never did and never

will determine or do any thing, without the *highest* and *best* reasons; although he may not unfold them to us.

On the whole it is to be regretted that a phrase so easily misunderstood and perverted as that in question, should have been introduced into the technology of religion. It would have been much better to have avoided the disputes it has occasioned, by phraseology more explicit and unambiguous.

One remark more, and I dismiss the whole subject. If I do not greatly err, the principal objections which serious and candid minds feel to the doctrine of *predestination* (as it is called), *i. e.*, of foreknowledge and eternal purpose on the part of God, arises from what I must think to be a mistaken application of the principles of analogical reasoning. 'How,' it is asked, 'can God have determined from eternity who are to be saved,' *i. e.*, whom he will effectually call, and justify, and sanctify, and bring to glory, and yet men be free to choose or refuse salvation? And the difficulty in all this is, that they suppose a regular concatenation of causes and influence must be arranged in the spiritual world, which will just as mechanically and certainly bring about the end, as that gravitation will make a stone fall to the earth. They join, with all this transfer of *physical* causation and effect over to spiritual things, the idea, that regard to the character or efforts of those who are saved is to be left out of the question; and then they make out, in their own minds, the idea of *fatalism*, an undistinguishing fatalism, which acts thus and so, merely because it chooses to do this or that, without any good and sufficient reason whatever. And taking such a view of the doctrine of predestination, of course they think it very reasonable to reject it.

In answer to all this it may be said (1), That it is impossible even to imagine a case in which God can be supposed not to have before him *the whole* of every individual character of those who belong to the *ἐκκλησία*. (2) All that the Scripture teaches in regard to the ground or reason of his purpose of mercy towards these, is, that it is *not* on account of *merit* or *desert* in them; they are regenerated, and sanctified, and saved through *grace*, grace only; "not of work, lest any man should boast." Farther than this *negative* assertion, the Scripture does not go; and who knows any thing more than what is *revealed* concerning it? (3) The Bible, and experience, and reason, all unite in giving testimony of the highest kind which the human mind can receive, that whatever may be the purposes of God, *men in fact are free agents*; free in all their spiritual exercises, as well as any others: and what is thus *in fact* conciliated or harmonized, cannot in its own nature be contradictory or absurd. (4) The *eternal* purpose of God is no more in the way of free agency, than his *present* purpose; for his present purpose is neither more nor less than his eternal one, and his eternal one neither more nor less than his present one. With him there is one *eternal* now; and all ideas of causation, and concatenation of causes and influence, drawn from sensible objects that are *temporary* and *successive*, only serve to mislead the mind in regard to God, when they are applied to him. (5) All the difficulties which ever have been or ever can be raised in regard to the *foreordination* or *decree* of God, centre at last in one single point, *viz.*, How can a creature be perfectly dependent, entirely under the control and within the power of another, and yet be *free*? And all the difficulty here comes at last upon the *how*; it lies not in the *fact*; for the fact that such is the case, is put beyond all doubt by the testimony of Scripture and experience.

Now as this *HOW* lies equally in the way of all who admit the existence

of an *omniscient* and omnipotent Creator—I say *equally* in the way of all such, for this is plainly the case unless they are fatalists—and since, moreover, this question is plainly beyond the boundaries of human knowledge; it does not seem to me reasonable to declaim against those who admit that the doctrine of divine foreknowledge implies of course divine purpose; and that divine purpose must have been *always* the same, inasmuch as God is immutable, “the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.” At any rate, no arguments of an *a priori* nature can serve to set aside the plain, direct, inevitable meaning of the passage in Rom. viii. 28, seq. Nor if it presents a difficulty, can we free ourselves from this, even if we reject revelation. A God almighty and omniscient, and a creature frail and entirely dependent, and yet free, always and every where present the same paradox to the human understanding. The Jew, the Mahommedan, and the Theist, are obliged to encounter it, in common with the Christian of strict creed and principles.

EXCURSUS XI.

On Rom. ix. 17, *εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐξήγειρά σε* (p. 431).

BUT what is the *meaning* of the entire assertion, the words of which we have thus considered? Does it mean that God did *actively* and by his *immediate* influence on the heart or mind of Pharaoh, *excite* him or *rouse* him up to do evil, *i. e.*, to continue obstinate and rebellious against himself? Or that God had excited or roused him up by the various plagues sent on him and his people, so that his opposition to letting the people of Israel go had become more active and bitter? The first of these meanings is the one which it is said some writers have ventured to give. *E. g.*, Augustine, (de Gratia et lib. Arbit. c. 21): His et talibus testimoniis Scripturarum satis manifestatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluptates quocumque voluerit, sive ad bona pro sua misericordia sive AD MALA pro meritis eorum, &c. So Gomar, as represented by Hales: “Not unjustly does God condemn the sinner, for he has ordained the means of condemnation [*i. e.*, sin]; so that he condemns no one, without having first plunged him into sin.”—*Golden Remains*, p. 435, ed. 1688. Augustine says, more expressly and fully than above, on the verse before us: Excitavi te ut contumacius resisteres, non tantum permittendo, *sed multa etiam tam intus quam foris operando*. So Anselm, as quoted by Tholuck: Cum malus esses, prodigiis quasi sopitum excitavi, *ut in malitia persisteres atque deterior fieres*. After quoting this passage, Tholuck exclaims: “Is it God or the devil who speaks thus?” And on the other passages just quoted he says: “Can God speak thus to man [*viz.* can he say what these comments represent him as saying]? then woe to us! for we are mere dwarfs in the hands of an irresistible Cyclops, created and dashed in pieces at his pleasure.” And again: “Then have Satan and God exchanged offices. God goeth about as a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour; and Satan exults that the Almighty, from whose hand none can escape, places at his disposal the victims of his vengeance.” He then goes on to say, that this is just what pantheism

would exult in, viz., that pantheism which abolishes all distinction between good and evil.*

* Dr. J. P. Smith, in the preface to my work as stated above (p. 628), objects to my citations of Augustine and others in this passage, as tending to place the authors unfairly before the eye of the public, because it seems virtually to accuse them of the doctrine of *fatality*. But he has in part mistaken the object of my citations. I had no design to accuse the men in question of really holding the doctrine of fatality, *i. e.*, that God is the proper author of sin; but merely to show that writers of great talent and much celebrity had occasionally expressed themselves in a way that scarcely seems compatible with scriptural views. The passage from Augustine surely cannot be denied. It were easy to add not a few more of the same tenor; but this would be foreign to my purpose at present. All that can be said is, that Augustine, like every other man who is a warm disputant and writes a great deal, in the fervor of his zeal has expressed himself in a manner that comports not all with the general spirit and tenor of his writings. He was, beyond a doubt, the ablest and most consistent of all the ancient Fathers as a *theologian*. As a critic, however, a very high rank surely cannot be assigned him; for he was even unacquainted with the Hebrew language. There is no doubt that Augustine usually expresses himself as a sober man, on the difficult topics connected with the subject of the present Excursus; there is as little doubt that in the heat of controversy "he goes for the whole." How can such a writer, however pious and able, always be consistent?

My friend complains of omissions, in the citation of Augustine, of parts of the passage, and of the sequel. But surely he will call to mind, that the subject of discussion is not the general orthodoxy of Augustine; but merely whether he had expressed himself in a certain way, in relation to the text under consideration. The quotation fairly settles this point; and, I must think, without any injustice to Augustine. He does say, that 'God works in the hearts of men to incline them to *evil* as well as to good;' and this was all he was appealed to as saying. How good, great, or consistent a man he was, the *ratio loci et temporis* did not permit me to discuss.

In regard to the quotation from Anselm, Dr. Smith says he has searched in vain for the original; and he appears to doubt whether it exists. I also have made a search of some considerable extent, and have not been so successful as to find it. Yet in a *folio*, who will venture to say that it does not somewhere lie concealed? Tholuck is one of the last men to quote falsely and erroneously. I can hardly feel that he is mistaken as to the fact that Anselm has such a passage. Yet I confess it seems strange to me, that Tholuck, who names it a *horrible* (*schreckliches*) passage, should not tell his readers where they might find it, so as to judge of the tenor of it for themselves. In my estimate of Anselm's character, I heartily unite with my friend, and with the late ecclesiastical historian, Milner.

Dr. Smith also complains of the injustice done to Gomar. He says that he has searched the works of Gomar in vain, to find any thing like the passage quoted. The declaration of my friend I do not distrust. But he will call to mind, that the quotation from Gomar is expressly stated in my Excursus to be taken from Hales's account of him at the Synod of Dort. Dr. S. seems to aim at palliating a little the injustice that some might think I had done to these writers by saying, that "I have avowedly borrowed them from Tholuck." As to Gomar, he says that I took the passage from Tholuck, he from Mosheim, and Mosheim from John Hales of Eton, "who embraced the side of Gomar's opponents at the Synod of Dort. Thus," adds he, "Mr. Stuart has the passage at *third* hand."

My answer is short. I verified the quotation from Mosheim's translation of Hales's letters, having the original work of Mosheim before me. I had before read the whole of that work, and remembered the passage. The original English work of Hales, *i. e.*, his letters to the ambassador at the Hague, Sir D. Carleton, was not then in my possession. It now lies before me. On p. 435 (as I have already stated in the text), stands the passage in question. It is not misrepresented by Mosheim and Tholuck, as to substance. Yet as to the last clause of the quotation, it is doubtful whether it comes from Gomar, or is a conclusion drawn by Mosheim, and by Tholuck after him, from what is said in the first part of the quotation. From the mode of printing and pointing in the *Golden Remains*, it is impossible to tell whether the phrase, *that is, as he predestinated man to death, so he predestinated him to sin, the only way to death*, belongs to Gomar or to the comment of Hales on what Gomar had just said, viz., that, as God had decreed the end [death], so he did decree the means [sin.] Mosheim takes the doubtful words as belonging to Gomar; the inspection of them in the *Golden Remains* rather inclines me to attribute them to Hales. Be, this, however, as it may, they are undoubtedly a correct exposition of the sentiment conveyed by the declaration of Gomar.

Every thing turns then on the credit due to John Hales. As to this, no less a personage than J. Pearson, the well-known, learned, and excellent bishop of that name, edited John Hales's book, inasmuch as his name stands attached to the preface. His testimony concerning Hales, whom he intimately knew, is as follows: "John Hales (some time Greek Professor of the University of Oxford, long a Fellow of Eton College, and at last also a prebendary at Windsor) was

These expressions, it must be admitted, bear very hardly on such men as Augustine, Anselm, Calvin, Beza, P. Martyr, Paræus, Gomar, and many others. Yet so much must we concede, viz., that the Scriptures not only teach us God's entire abhorrence of sin, and the freedom of man in sinning, but they do also, in so many words, assert that "God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed," James i. 13, 14. With this unequivocal assertion of an apostle before our eyes, an assertion bearing directly on the specific point of *internal excitement* to do evil, we ought not to take any position which maintains, that *God operated DIRECTLY on the heart and mind of Pharaoh*, in order to harden him and make him more desperate.

God does not permit wicked men to say truly that such is the case, in respect to his dealings with them. Thus he says to the Jews: "Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear falsely, and burn incense to Baal, and walk after other gods whom ye know not; and, come and stand before me in this house...and say: *We are delivered [נַצִּלְנוּ, we are reserved]* to do all these abominations?" Jer. vii. 9, 10. Nay, the Scripture directly decides, that there may be a "determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God" respecting a thing which is exceedingly sinful, and yet that

a man, I think, of as great a sharpness, quickness, and subtlety of wit, as ever this, or perhaps any nation bred... He became as great a master of polite, various, and universal learning, as ever yet conversed with books... He really was a most prodigious example of acute and piercing wit, of a vast and illimited knowledge, of a severe and profound judgment... I cannot esteem him less in any thing which belongs to a good man, than in those intellectual perfections... As a Christian, none was ever more acquainted with the nature of the gospel, none more studious of the knowledge of it, or more curious in search... If ever any man might be allowed to judge, it was he who so long, so much, so advantageously considered; and what is more, who never could be said to have the least worldly design in his determinations... He was most exemplary, meek, and humble, notwithstanding his perfections... This testimony... comes far short of him."—Pref. to *Golden Remains*.

So much for the capacity of Hales to understand Gomar, and for his fidelity in reporting what he said. As to the fact alleged by my friend, viz., that "Hales was on the side of Gomar's opponents at the Synod of Dort," it is the greatest mistake of all. He who has studied well the history of the Synod of Dort, cannot be ignorant of the fact that it was convoked by the influence of King James, and with a design to support Calvinism. Sir Dudley Carleton was accordingly sent by the King to stay at the Hague, and watch over all the movements of the Synod, in order to see that matters were conducted so as to please his majesty. It was indecorous for Carleton to go directly to Dort; and so he stopped a short distance from it, and sent Hales to watch the motions of the Synod, and communicate them to him from day to day. For this very purpose had Hales been nominated by King James, as the most shrewd, learned, and able of all the English Calvinists. Had he been in any degree suspected of leaning to Arminianism, he could not possibly have received the appointment that he did. It was by attendance on the Synod, and witnessing the manner in which the Arminians were treated, that Hales became first cool towards Gomar and his party, and afterwards opposed to them on the ground of their violence and persecution unto blood. In subsequent life he seems to have declined still farther from the high Calvinistic party. But be this as it may, there is not the least ground of doubt that he was a high Calvinist when he went to the Synod of Dort. That his letters are a faithful picture of what took place there, no one who reads them with candour and attention can doubt. The internal evidence is perfectly convincing. Nor have I ever seen their authenticity called in question. That Gomar, with all his abilities, whatever they were, was a high party-man, a heated disputant, and a bold uncompromising defender of ultra-doctrines on the subject of the divine decrees, no one, I think, will call in question, who reads the letters of Hales.

After all, I hardly need to have said any thing in the way of my own vindication; for I have expressly said, that the remarks of Tholuck "*bear very hardly*" on the authors quoted. Yet in deference to the feelings of my friend, whose opinion I so highly value, and in justice to the general tenor and strain of the works of the authors quoted, I have modified my own remarks upon their declarations. I do this, not because I suppose them not to have made such declarations; but because I suppose them to have said, in the heat of dispute, that which they did not abide by in their sober and considerate moments.

those who are agents in bringing it about may be altogether voluntary and guilty, Acts ii. 23. *Guilty* or *wicked* they could not be, unless they were *voluntary* agents.

But having advanced thus far, we must go still farther in order to obtain satisfaction as to the point in question. This can be obtained only by a considerate and extensive survey of the *usus loquendi* in the Scriptures, with reference to God *as the author of all things*. There is a sense, in which he is the author of all things, yea, of all actions. He has created all things. Under his control, and by his direction and power, they come into existence. None but atheists will deny this. He continues to hold them all under his control, *i. e.*, he governs the universe: and in him "we live, and move, and have our being." He directs all things after the counsel of his own will; *i. e.*, he so guides and controls all things, all events, all creatures and their actions, as finally to accomplish his own blessed and glorious purposes, both of mercy and justice.

The moment we admit him to be an *omniscient* and *omnipotent* God, that moment we admit that he must have *foreseen* from eternity *all* the actions of his creatures, all their thoughts and affections and wishes and desires. We cannot deny that, foreseeing all these with all their consequences, he brought them into being, and placed them (for surely it was *he* who ordered their lot) in circumstances, where he knew they would act as he had foreseen they would. It is impossible to deny this, without denying the *omniscience* of God, and his *immutability*.

Now the Scripture most evidently admits and inculcates all these truths. Such being the fact, there is plainly a sense in which all things and events may be ascribed to God. He *foreknew* them; and his creating and governing and controlling power renders it *certain* that they will come to pass; for how could he *foreknow* what is *uncertain*? Accordingly, the Bible declares that 'we live and move and have our being in God.' Nay it goes farther than this; however we may stumble at the expressions, or revolt at the sentiment. It ascribes *evil*, yea, *moral* evil, to God in some sense or other; an assertion which must not be hazarded without proof, and which shall be supported by an overwhelming mass of examples. Let the reader now turn to the following passages and attentively consider them; viz., 2 Sam. xii. 11, xvi. 10; 1 Kings xxii. 22; Josh. xi. 20; Ps. cv. 25; 1 Kings xi. 23; 2 Sam. xxiv. 1. Let him next examine the texts which declare that God hardened the heart of one and another; *e. g.*, of Pharaoh, Exod. vii. 13, ix. 12, x. 1. 20, 27, xi. 10, xiv. 8; Rom. ix. 18; of Sihon king of the Amorites, Deut. ii. 30; of the Israelites, Isai. lxiii. 17; John xii. 40. Who can read such texts as these, and so many, and yet aver that the Scripture teaches us, that there is *no* sense in which it is true that God hardens the hearts of men?

But the great question yet remains, Does God do this in such a way, *i. e.*, is he so concerned in it, and only so concerned, that man's free agency is still left entire, and so that all the moral blame of his sins is to be attributed *solely* to him? This question we may answer in the *affirmative*. The Bible does indeed speak of God as hardening the hearts of men, in some sense or other. In what sense, is not specifically said, although it is very plainly implied. That he does this in the way of *direct* influence on the heart or mind, seems to be unequivocally denied in James i. 13. 14. That what we are allowed to attribute to him, in respect to the hardening of the heart, cannot be any thing which takes away the criminality and guilt of

men, nor any thing which in any measure abridges the entire freedom of their own actions, is clear from the fact, that *the sacred writers often and every where ascribe the hardening of the heart to the wicked themselves*. So, expressly, in respect to Pharaoh, Exod. viii. 15, 32, ix. 34; 1 Sam. vi. 6; in respect to others, 2 Chron. xxxvi. 13; Ps. xcv. 8; Prov. xxviii. 14; Job ix. 4; and so of *hardening the neck*, which for substance has the same meaning, 2 Kings xvii. 14; Jer. vii. 26, xix. 15; Prov. xxix. 1; Neh. ix. 16, 17, 29. In other expressions the *passive* voice only is made use of, without designating any agent; *e. g.*, Exod. vii. 22, viii. 19, ix. 7, 35, et alibi.

With these texts may be compared Isai. vi. 10, where the prophet is bid to go and *make the heart of the people stupid*, their ears heavy, and to close up their eyes. Read now the comments on this, in Matt. xiii. 15; Mark iv. 12; John xii. 40; Acts xxviii. 26, 27. A comparison of these is replet with instruction; for in Isai. vi. 10, the *prophet* is represented as hardening the Jews, because he declares to them the divine word, and they, hearing and rejecting it, become more hardened. In John xii. 40, *God* is represented as *hardening their heart* (which seems also to be implied in Mark iv. 12); while in Matt. xiii. 15 and Acts xxviii. 26, 27, the plain and necessary implication is, that the Jews hardened their own hearts. Here then is one and the same case, which is represented in three different ways. (1) The prophet hardens the Jews. (2) God does the same thing. (3) The Jewish people do it themselves. Is all this true; or is one part contradictory to another? We may safely answer: It is *all* true. The prophet is said to *harden the hearts* of the Jews, merely because he is the instrument of delivering messages to them; while they, in consequence of abusing these, become more hardened and guilty. God hardens their hearts, in that by his providence he sustains them in life, upholds the use of all their powers, causes the prophets to warn and reprove them, and places them in circumstances where they must receive these warnings and reproofs. Under this arrangement of his providence they become more hardened and wicked. In this sense, and in this only, do the Scriptures seem to affirm that he is concerned with the hardening of men's hearts.

The Jews hardened their own hearts, inasmuch as they freely and voluntarily abused all the blessings and privileges which the providence and mercy of God had bestowed upon them, and thus became more stupid and corrupt.

Surely no one will say that the prophet (Isai. vi. 10) hardens the hearts of the Jews, by *direct* and *positive* influence upon them. It is *not* necessary, then, when it is declared that *God hardened the heart of Pharaoh*, to draw the conclusion that this was done by *direct* and *positive* influence. That it is not necessary, can be made clear from the following illustration of Scripture usage. In 2 Sam. xxiv. 1, it is said, *The Lord moved* (נָחַם) *David to go and number Israel*, &c., which, under the circumstances then existing, and with the views that David had, was a great sin in the sight of heaven, and was punished by a signal judgment of God. Here observe, that נָחַם is applied directly to Jehovah, without any intimation of a *secondary* agent or instrument; and so one might argue (as some do in regard to other expressions of the like nature in the Scriptures), that God is here asserted to be the *direct* exciting cause, which occasioned David to number Israel, &c. Yet in 1 Chron. xxi. 1 the very same thing is ascribed to Satan: *And Satan moved* (נָחַם) *David to go and number Israel*, &c. Observe

that the *very same verb* is employed in the second case, as in the first. Now as Satan is the *tempter* of men to sin, and as "God *tempted no man*," we must say, Here is a clear case, in which that is ascribed to God, which he permits or suffers to be brought about under his superintendence or government of the universe, by agents of an inferior character. This seems, at least, to be a clear case; and it is one which has a very important bearing on the subject before us.

It is true that God *roused up* Pharaoh, so that he was the occasion of the divine power and glory being displayed in all the land of Egypt. But was this done by *direct* and *immediate* operation in hardening his heart, or was it through the signs and wonders, which the power and providence of God performed before the eyes and in the country of this contumacious monarch? In the latter way, we may safely answer, inasmuch as Pharaoh and others are said, in the Scriptures, *to harden their own hearts*. There was *another agency* here, then, besides that of Jehovah; just as in the case stated above. God in his providence did send Moses and Aaron with a commission to make demands on the king of Egypt in behalf of the oppressed Hebrews; he sent plagues upon Egypt by his miraculous power; and all these things under arrangements of his providence being brought to act upon Pharaoh, he became worse and worse. The Lord hardened his heart, because the Lord was the author of commands and messages and miracles, which were the occasion of Pharaoh's hardening his own heart. In just such a way, Paul says that *our sinful passions are by the law*, τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου, Rom. vii. 5, which he afterwards explains by saying, ἡ γὰρ ἁμαρτία ἀφορμὴν λαβοῦσα, κ. τ. λ., Rom. vii. 11.

That God was the author of the commands and messages delivered by Moses and Aaron to Pharaoh, is clear; that he was the author of the judgments inflicted on the land of Egypt is clear; that he knew what effect these would produce on the heart of Pharaoh, is equally certain; and that he designed to turn all this into ultimate good, and to glorify himself, the Bible often asserts or implies. There is no difficulty then in saying, with reference to all this, and in the sense stated above, that God hardened Pharaoh's heart, or that he *roused him up*, viz. by his messages and the miracles which he wrought. It is a clear case, that the active and bitter indignation and contumacy of Pharaoh was greatly increased or excited by these doings of Divine Providence; and therefore the sentiment of our text remains true; while, at the same time, God is not the author of Pharaoh's sin (in the common sense of this expression), any more than he is the author of our sin, because he has given us powers and faculties by which we may sin, and, with full knowledge that we should sin, has placed us in a world where we are of course surrounded by temptations and enticements to sin. After all this, we are *free agents*, we sin *voluntarily*, and we are therefore accountable for it; all which was equally true of Pharaoh.

To all that has now been said to illustrate and vindicate the true sense of *ἐξήγισα*, it may be added, that the conclusion drawn by the apostle in ver. 18, clearly implies that he gave such a sense to verses 16, 17, as has been given above: "Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will, and *whom he will, he hardeneth*," Now if *ἐξήγισα* does not imply some kind of agency, something done on the part of God which has a connection with the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, how can the apostle deduce the conclusion in ver. 18 from the assertion in verses 16, 17? This consideration alone seems

fully and finally to decide the point, in regard to the exegesis put upon *ἡξήγεια* by Tholuck, who follows the *διετηρέθη* of the Seventy, and construes it of *preserving* Pharaoh, i. e., upholding him in life during the continuance of the plagues in Egypt. Six of these had already been inflicted, when the words in ver. 17 were spoken. Tholuck says that Pharaoh might have easily been taken off by these plagues, and therefore *ἡξήγεια* relates, as he maintains, to Pharaoh's having been preserved in life. And in the same way many others have construed the word *ἡξήγεια*. But this will hardly satisfy the demands of critical exegesis. The six plagues already inflicted were, the turning of the waters of the Nile into blood, Exod. vii. 14, seq.; the sending of the frogs, Exod. viii. 1, seq.; of the lice, Exod. viii. 16, seq.; of the flies, Exod. viii. 20, seq.; the murrain of beasts, Exod. ix. 1, seq.; and the plague of biles and blains, Exod. ix. 8, seq. Now as all these plagues were merely *temporary*, and as we have no intimation in the sacred records that they occasioned the loss of human life among the Egyptians, so there seems to be no special reason for putting this sense on *ἡξήγεια*, viz. *I have preserved thee, or kept thee alive*.

And then, if this be adopted, how does the conclusion of the apostle in ver. 18 follow, viz. *ὃν δὲ θέλει σκληρύνει*? Does *preserving in life, or making one to keep his standing*, necessarily import a *τὸ σκληρύνειν* or *σκληρώμα*? I am altogether unable to see how Paul could deduce such a conclusion from such premises.

I must therefore accede to what seems to be the plain and evident meaning of *ἡξήγεια*, viz., that God in his providence did so direct things, viz., the warnings to Pharaoh, the commands addressed to him, and the signs and wonders in his land, that he was excited to more vehement resistance and contumely, which ended in his signal overthrow and destruction. In all this Pharaoh was entirely voluntary and free. The case differs not, in principle, from what happens every day. As has been before remarked, God creates men: he endows them with powers and faculties which enable them to sin; and places them in a world surrounded by temptation; and all this, knowing certainly that they will sin. Every one must agree to this. But are not men free agents still? Do they not sin *voluntarily*? Does not the blame of this attach entirely to themselves? Can any part of it be justly charged upon God? Surely not; and if not, then there is a sense in which he may say, that *he roused up Pharaoh, in order that he might show forth his power and glory in all the earth*; and this without making himself the proper author of sin. In one sense, God does all that takes place under his providence and government of the world; for he preserves all creatures and all worlds, and gives them all their powers, faculties, and opportunities of action. In another sense, God is *not* the author of sin; "God tempteth no man." Man is the proper author of his own sin; "every man is tempted when he is drawn away by his own lust, and enticed to sin." In one sense God hath made all things for himself, yea, "*the wicked for the day of evil*," Prov. xvi. 4, and in the like sense he *roused up* Pharaoh. So far as he is concerned with all this, it is in a way that is perfectly consistent with the freedom of men in action; and all his designs are to bring good out of evil, and thus to promote the glory of his own name; as is intimated in the verse before us.

All the difficulty which is involved in these declarations in their full extent, is involved in the principle (which even Theism admits), that God is

omniscient, omnipotent, and immutable. The Deist has, in reality, the very same difficulties to cope with here, so far as the free agency and the sinfulness of men are concerned, as the evangelical Christian. The *modus* of the whole is our ignorance of the *manner* in which free agency and entire dependence, foreknowledge and voluntary action, consist together and are harmonized. But as *fact* only is known to us, viz., the fact that they do coexist; and as the *manner* of their coexistence or consistency is beyond the boundaries of human knowledge; so I do not see how those, who are stumbled at the subject under consideration, can ever satisfy themselves, so long as they insist on first knowing the *manner* of the consistency, before they admit the *fact*.

In the apostle's time, the very same objection was made to his doctrine, which has been made ever since, and is still every day repeated. So the verses in the sequel plainly show us. They show, moreover, that the apostle was understood in the same way by objectors, as his words at first view would seem to mean; for if this were not so, what ground was there for the objection which is raised?

The difficulty of this subject, the manner in which it has so often been misunderstood and abused, and a wish to contribute (if possible) something to remove some of its perplexities from the minds of readers who may peruse these pages, are my apology for dwelling so long upon it. That there are difficulties still which remain unexplained, and which ever must remain so while 'we know in part,' i. e., while we continue in the present world, I do not feel disposed at all to deny. But this is confessedly the case in regard to a multitude of other things, which all admit without hesitation; and admit them, too, even while the *modus* of them remains utterly inexplicable.

EXCURSUS XII.

On the various designations in Rom. xii. 8 (p. 505).

I HAVE, in the commentary, given the reader the *usual* exegesis of the passage in question, viz., *ὁ μεταδίδους, ἐν ἀπλότητι ὁ προϊστάμενος, ἐν σπουδῇ· ὁ ἐλεῶν, ἐν ἰλαρότητι.* But an attentive and repeated examination of it has raised many doubts in my mind whether there is not a radical mistake at the foundation of this whole interpretation. I refer not now to the *verbal* criticisms merely; which, it is obvious, are in general well founded and correct. But I refer to the assumption, in this case, that *ὁ μεταδίδους, ὁ προϊστάμενος*, and *ὁ ἐλεῶν* designate *officers* or *offices* in the church; I mean *officers* in the usual and proper sense of the word, viz., men set apart by the special designation and appointment of the church, for the performance of some peculiar and appropriate duties. I have a predominant persuasion, that these words here designate duties which individuals *merely as such* were to perform, and to whom the church looked for such performance because they had ability or opportunity to perform them, or (if it shall be thought more probable) who were specially desired by the church to perform

them. In the last case it might be true, for example, that to an individual in the church who was wealthy, the church looked in a peculiar manner with expectation that he would aid the poor; or (to adduce another example) it might happen that some individual had leisure, and also particular qualifications for visiting the sick, consoling mourners, counselling the perplexed, relieving the distressed by various personal attentions, &c., and the church looked to him as a *ὁ ἐλεῶν*, or they made a special request of him that he would attend to such duties. All this might be, nay, it is all very natural and probable; while, at the same time, this would not prove that there were regularly instituted *offices* in the church, designated by *ὁ μεταδιδούς*, *ὁ προϊστάμενος*, and *ὁ ἐλεῶν*.

These hints give the general views which I feel compelled to entertain of the words under examination. But as the whole subject has an important bearing on the polity of the Christian church, I feel obliged to assign reasons for such an opinion.

(1) It is obvious that the apostle does not here confine himself to *extraordinary* and *miraculous* gifts only, although he includes them. The *προφήτης* was one who spoke under the influence of inspiration; but *ὁ διδάσκων* and *ὁ παρακαλῶν* might or might not be inspired; for the office itself was of a permanent or general nature, and not limited to special circumstances. So the *διακονος* might or might not be an inspired man; for Stephen (Acts vi. vii.) was "full of the Holy Ghost," while we have no particular reason to believe that all of his brethren in office were endowed with the same gift. The same is true of *ὁ μεταδιδούς*, *ὁ προϊστάμενος*, and *ὁ ἐλεῶν*: for the respective individuals who performed the duties designated by these words, might, at times, enjoy special divine assistance and direction. But this belongs not essentially to the nature of the duties themselves, which may in general be performed without miraculous interposition.

(2) It is equally obvious that the apostle, in the whole extent of his exhortation here, includes both public and private, official and unofficial duties. A bare inspection of verses, 6—21 sets this question at rest. He means to say, that inasmuch as all Christians are members of one and the same body, all their gifts and talents, of whatever kind or nature, whether adapted to the performance of public or private duties, whether they are aided by the special influence of the Spirit or otherwise—all were to be employed in the most efficient and profitable manner. Such is the evident tenor of his whole discourse. Who, for example, would seek in verses 9, 10 seq., for directions only to men in official stations? There is no reasonable question, therefore, respecting the *general principle* which I have here laid down, in regard to the whole paragraph which contains the apostle's exhortation. But *where* does he dismiss the address to the *officers* of the church as such, and begin with individuals or laymen? This is the very gist of the question; and in order to throw some light on this, I observe,

(3) That the very construction and natural order of verses 6—8 favour the supposition, that the last three classes of men named are *private*, not *official* persons.

In respect to the *natural order* of the passage, it would seem to be an obvious dictate of propriety, that the apostle should begin first with the officers of the church; and this he has plainly done; for we have *προφήτης*, *διάκονος*, *διδάσκαλος*, *ὁ παρακαλῶν*, before he proceeds to the rest. Now if,

after παρακαλῶν, he proceeds to *unofficial* men (as I suppose), then it would be perfectly natural to select from among these, those who are particularly distinguished in the church for their usefulness; and so he seems to have done. The reader will not fail to notice, moreover, that here (before ὁ μεταδιδούς) the construction is changed by the apostle, εἰς being omitted as if purposely to designate a change in classification.

(4) It is difficult, if not impossible to make out *official* distinctions through the whole of verses 6—8. How does ὁ μεταδιδούς, as an *officer* of the church, differ from ὁ διάκονος? And again; how does ὁ ἱλεῶν differ from both, or from either? A question which none of the commentators have answered with any good degree of satisfaction. Indeed most of them pass the difficulty over with entire silence; which is at least the most easy, if not the most instructive, method of commentary. Here then according to them, are two supplementary offices to that of διάκονος; the main and originally the only duty of which was, *to take care of the poor*.

But further, who is ὁ προϊστάμενος? He who *presides* over the church? If so, how can he be placed the *sixth* in rank here, and the *seventh* in 1 Cor. xii. 28? (See κυβερνήσεις there.) Then again, why should ὁ προϊστάμενος not have a place among the *teachers*, instead of being placed where it has, on the right and left hand, an office of mere *charity*? Does the *presiding* officer of the whole church ever rank in this way, in times either ancient or modern? I know of no such example.

I am aware, indeed, that the apostle has not strictly followed the order of office here, as to dignity or rank, inasmuch as he has mentioned the *deacon* before the *teacher* or *exhorter*. But there is an apparent reason for this. In speaking of the *official* classes of the Romish church, the highest and lowest office, viz. that of *prophet* and *deacon*, i. e., the *two extremes* of office, occurred first: which is a very natural method of thought. These the apostle wrote down as they occurred. He then supplied the intermediate offices, viz., that of *teacher* and *exhorter*, i. e., the proper *doctrinal* instructor, whether in public or private, and *exhorter*, or practical and persuasive preacher. This will account very naturally for the order of officers *here*. But in 1 Cor. xii. 28, the apostle *ex professo* recounts the natural order *seriatim*; which he makes to be, 1. Apostles; 2. Prophets; 3. Teachers; 4. Such as possessed miraculous powers in general (δυνάμεις); 5. Such as possessed the gift of healing the sick; 6. Ἀντίληψεις; 7. Κυβερνήσεις; 8. Those who spoke various languages; 9. Interpreters (comp. ver. 30).

Here, then the ὁ μεταδιδούς, ὁ προϊστάμενος, and ὁ ἱλεῶν of our text, are omitted (unless indeed the ὁ προϊστάμενος is found in the κυβερνήσεις, of which more hereafter), and ἀντίληψεις comes in for ὁ διάκονος. So Bretschneider on ἀντίληψις: “haud dubie ad munus diaconorum et diaconissarum respicitur, ut etiam patres eccles. putarunt.” That this last declaration is correct, one may see by consulting Suicer’s *Thesaurus*, sub. voc. ἀντίληψις. Vitringa thinks that ἀντίληψις means, *the interpreters of foreign languages* (comp. 1 Cor. xii. 30, διεγμνεύουσι); *de Vet. Synag.* II. 31, p. 509. But the other exegesis is most natural; for ἀντίληψις means, *help, assistance, care*; and here the *abstract* (as grammarians say) being used for the *concrete*, the sense is *curatores*, i. e., δίδονοι.

It is obvious, now, that in this noted passage in 1 Cor. xii. 28, ὁ μεταδι-

δοῦς and ὁ ἡλεῶν are omitted; and this gives very strong reason to suspect that these were not properly *offices* in the church.

But how is it with ὁ προϊστάμενος? Is he not found in the κυβερνήσεις of 1 Cor. xii. 28? This looks probable at first view; but let us examine a little more thoroughly.

First, I remark, that the word προϊστημι and its derivatives are by no means confined to designate the idea of presiding over *persons*. It sometimes conveys the idea of being placed over any *thing*, or any kind of *business*, in order to take care of it, see that it is done, &c.; i. e., the *undertaker* in any thing, the *protector* or *curator* of any person or thing, the Greeks call ὁ προϊστάμενος, ὁ προϊστώς, ὁ προϊστάτης, i. q., *patron*, *helper*. Accordingly the word occurs in the sense of *aiding*, *assisting*, &c., in Rom. xvi. 2, where the brethren of the Roman church are charged by the apostle to *aid*, in any manner she may need, Phebe, who had been a *προστάτις* of many Christians, i. e., a *helper*, a *curator*, one who had aided them by her personal attention and by her charity. The grammarian Varinus explains προστασία by βοηθία. In the letter of Athanasius *ad Solitarios*, when speaking of the disposition of Zenobia to Paul of Samosata, he says: προϊότη τοῦ Σαμοσατέως, *she aided him of Samosata*.^{*} So Theophylact, commenting on Rom. xii. 8, says: Προιστασθαι ἴστω το βοηθῆν, καὶ διὰ ῥήματων καὶ διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ τῷ βοηθείας δοκῶν, i. e., προιστασθαι means TO AID, both by words and by personal services, him who is needy.

That such a meaning then may be given to ὁ προϊστάμενος in Rom. xii. 8, seems clear. The *usus loquendi* allows it. What then does the context demand? Let us see what precedes, and what follows.

What precedes is, ὁ μεταδίδους, ἐν ἀπλότητι; which I now render, *let him who imparts* [charity], *do it with liberality*. So, beyond all doubt, the words may be rendered. That ἀπλότης may mean *liberality*, one may see in 2 Cor. viii. 2, ix. 11, 13; James i. 5. So Xenophon: ἀπλούστατον ὁ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, κ. τ. λ., *it seems to me to be the part of a most liberal man*, &c., *Cyrop.* VIII. p. 155. So Josephus, speaking of Araunah's liberal offer to David (2 Sam. xxiv. 19—24), says: David highly esteemed his ἀπλοτητα, *liberality*, &c. *Antiq.* VII. 10. So in Test. XII. Patriarch, p. 624: ὁ Θεὸς συνεργεῖ τῇ ἀπλότητι μου, *God helped my liberal disposition*. See other examples in Kypke in loc. As to ὁ μεταδίδους, which is commonly applied to one who *distributes* charity, and so made for substance synonymous with διάκονος, it is very doubtful, to say the least, whether the word will bear this construction. Bretschneider has indeed given it such a meaning (as others before him have often done); but as Vitringa long ago observed (*De Vet. Synag.* II. 3, p. 501), "the proper Greek word for *distribute* is διαδίδωμι;" as one may see in John vi. 11; Luke xviii. 22 (also in xi. 22, it has the like sense), Acts iv. 35. The like sense this verb has in the classics. But μεταδίδωμι properly means *to impart among others what belongs to one's self, to give of one's own to others*; which is, or at any rate may be, a very different thing from *distributing* the alms of the church.

If these words be rightly explained, we have in them a command of the apostle, that those who are able μεταδίδειν, *to give in charity*, should do this

^{*} Reiche has quoted this in the sense of 'he presided over Samosata'

in a liberal manner. That all this is congruous and appropriate, I presume no one will venture to deny.

We have seen what *precedes* ὁ προϊστάμενος. Let us now see what *follows* it. This is ὁ ἐλεῶν, ἐν ἰλαρίῳ, *let him who performs deeds of mercy, do it cheerfully*, i. e., let him go about his task with a willing mind voluntarily, not grudgingly and with a forbidding demeanour. The duty of ὁ ἐλεῶν may differ from that of ὁ μεταδιδούς, in this respect, viz., that the former consisted in personal cares and services bestowed upon the sick and unfortunate; while the latter consisted in donations of money, food, &c. These latter duties devolved especially on the *rich*; the former could be performed by all classes of Christians.

Between these two classes of *benefactors*, then, the apostle places ὁ προϊστάμενος. If these classes, now, are not *officers* of the church, it would seem probable that ὁ προϊστάμενος does not stand here for one. That ὁ ἐλεῶν cannot be made to mean an *officer* of the church, the silence of most commentators concerning it would seem pretty strongly to indicate. Accordingly Vitranga does not hesitate to say: Quicquid enim adversæ opinionis auctores statuunt, fieri non potest, ut per τὸν ἐλεοῦντα describantur aliqui ecclesiæ officarii [officers.]

It does seem most probable, therefore, that ὁ προϊστάμενος is of the like tenor with ἡ προστάτις in Rom. xvi. 2, which there means, *one who receives and entertains strangers*, i. e., a helper of Christian brethren coming from abroad; for such a helper (προστάτις) was Phebe. And this seems the more probable, inasmuch as the duty of *hospitality*, so often and so urgently insisted on by the apostles, has no specific mention among the special charities here unless it be included in this word; although it is touched on as it respects the church in general, in ver. 13. But a comparison with Rom. xvi. 2, as I must think, renders the sense now given to ὁ προϊστάμενος quite probable.

But Tholuck and others appeal to κυβερνήσεις in 1 Cor. xii. 28, and say, that as κυβερνήσεις means there a special gift or office bestowed by the influence of the Spirit, so ὁ προϊστάμενος must be considered as corresponding with it. But what is κυβερνήσεις? A question difficult to be answered, inasmuch as this word in 1 Cor. xii. 28 is a ἀπαξλεγόμενον. In classic Greek it means *guidance, direction, steering*; and is especially (as also the verb κυβερνάω) applied to designate the *steering or guiding* of a ship by the pilot. Hence many critics understand it here (1 Cor. xii. 28) as designating the *office* of a ruler in the church. But how can such an office be placed the *seventh* in rank (for the apostle here seems to make an enumeration according to the order of precedence), and have but one or two offices reckoned below it? This seems to be exceedingly incongruous. The *governor and guide* of a Christian church would seem, in the order of nature, to stand at its *head*.

I ask, in the next place, how it should happen that κυβερνήσεις stands here in such a position, having in order before it ἀντιλήψεις, opulatores, curatores (i. q. διάκονοι), and after it γένη γλωσσῶν? Why does it not stand next before or after προφήτας or διδασκάλους, where we should almost of necessity expect to find it, if it mean *presidents or governors* of the church?

Moved by such difficulties, I feel constrained to seek another than a *classical* meaning for κυβερνήσεις. But as in the New Testament the word is not

elsewhere to be found, we must resort to the Septuagint : and here the word is *uniformly* employed as the rendering of the Hebrew מְלִאכְּתָא, *skilful dexterity, wise foresight, power of prudent or skilful management*. In this very sense κυβερνήσις is plainly employed in Prov. i. 5, xi. 14, xxiv. 6. μετὰ κυβερνήσεως γίνεται πόλεμος; and these are all the instances in which the word occurs in the Septuagint. In accordance with this meaning is the Lex. Cyrilli; κυβερνήσις, φρόνησις. So the Glossæ ineditæ in Prov. Salom. : κυβερνήσις, ἐπιστήμη τῶν πραττομένων. So also Hesychius : κυβερνήσις, προνοετική ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρονήσις, *considerate knowledge and understanding*.

In view of all this, we may now venture to translate κυβερνήσις, *skilful discernment or insight*. But in what respect? To answer this, we must let the apostle explain himself. Let us go back, then, to 1 Cor. xii. 8—10, and there we shall find nearly if not quite the same reckoning of spiritual gifts as in verses 28—30. But there, before γένη γλωσσῶν, stands διακρίσεις τῶν πνευμάτων; which does not at all appear in verses 28—30, unless it be designated by κυβερνήσις. That it should not in fact be included in this latter passage, distinguished as such a gift must be, and important as it was in the then state of the church, would be singular. Now as in 1 Cor. xii. 28, γένη γλωσσῶν comes immediately after κυβερνήσις, and in ver. 10 immediately after διακρίσεις πνευμάτων, so it is natural to conclude, that the apostle means to designate the same thing by κυβερνήσις as he does by διακρίσεις πνευμάτων. For as *peculiar skill* and *insight* would be appropriate and necessary to the *discerning of spirits*, so the qualifications for such a duty may be used to designate the persons who are to perform it. Philology allows this; but above all, the order, concinnity, and consistency of the apostle's discourse here, seem to render it necessary, or at least quite probable. This being conceded, it would follow that no argument from κυβερνήσις can be adduced in order to show that ὁ προϊστάμενος in Rom. xii. 8 means a *ruler* in the Christian church.

I am the more satisfied with this view of the subject, as I find it was fully embraced by Lightfoot and Vitringa, "quos [in re critica] facile principes nominarem." See Vitringa, De Vet. Synag. II. 8. p. 507 seq.

It remains only that I notice one objection more to the meaning which I have assigned to ὁ προϊστάμενος. This is, that in 1 Thess. v. 12 and 1 Tim. iii. 4, 12, it means *governors, overseers* of the church; and consequently that is the most probable meaning in Rom. xii. 8.

On this allegation I must be very brief, as I have already put the patience of the reader to a trial. In 1 Thess. v. 12 the apostle says to the church: 'Affectionately regard τοὺς κοπιῶντας ἐν ὑμῶν, καὶ προϊσταμένους ὑμῶν ἐν κυρίῳ καὶ νομιζοῦντας ὑμᾶς. The question is, whether he means here *different* classes of officers, or *one* and the *same* class, in the exercise of divers gifts. I know of no way in which this question can be definitely and certainly decided. The insertion of the article before κοπιῶντας (the *first* participial noun in the series), and the omission of it before the other like nouns προϊσταμένους and νομιζοῦντας will not prove, as has sometimes been assumed, that all belong to one class; nor will it prove the contrary; for (1) the article is usually *omitted*, even when the meaning of the nouns employed is plainly diverse, provided they are of the same gender and case; e. g., Mark. xv. 1,

μετὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων καὶ γραμματίων (the latter without τῶν); and so Col. ii. 8, 19; 2 Thess. iii. 2; Rom. i. 20; Phil. ii. 17, et sæpe alibi; see N. Test. Gramm. § 89. 9. (2) The article is often *inserted*, where each noun indicates a separate subject; e. g., Mark ii. 16, οἱ γραμματεῖς καὶ οἱ φαρισαῖοι; so Luke viii. 24, xi. 39; 1 Thess. iii. 11; Phil. iii. 10, et alibi sæpe; comp. ut sup. Of course, as usage is both ways, the *omission* of the article here can prove nothing. Nor,

(2) Will the context enable us to decide the point under consideration; as there seems to be nothing in it which has a direct bearing on this point. We are left, therefore, to the simple nature of the case. What can be gathered from this? I answer, (a) That τοὺς κοπιῶντας is evidently a *generic*, not a *specific* term, and may indicate any kind of labour performed in behalf of the church. (b) The words προΐσταμένους and δουλοῦντας appear to be *specific* here, i. e., to designate particular (and probably different) classes of persons. The most probable interpretation, then, is, that προΐσταμένους and δουλοῦντας designate the *specific* classes, comprehended under the genus κοπιῶντας. This being admitted (and certainly no one will say this is an improbable exegesis), it would seem altogether probable, that προΐσταμένους here has the like sense as in Rom. xii. 8, viz., those who applied themselves to the *external* temporal business or concerns of the church, while δουλοῦντας designates all the various kinds of teachers. The exhortation of the apostle, then, is to regard with kindly feelings those who laboured in any respect, whether temporal or spiritual, for the good of the church. This determines nothing, therefore, against our interpretation of ὁ προΐστάμενος in Rom. xii. 8.

From what has now been said, it is easy to explain 1 Tim. v. 17, "Let the elders καλῶς προσεστώτες, *managing well* [the concerns of the church], be accounted worthy of double honour [i. e., of ample maintenance], specially those who labour in word and doctrine." There were then two kinds of elders, or (to speak more accurately) there were two departments in which the πρεσβύτεροι might labour; they might be προσεστώτες, i. e., *standing over, taking care of, serving* the temporal concerns and business, &c., of the church; or they might be specially devoted to preaching and teaching, λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ; or perhaps this latter means, that they might perform the duties of a προσεστώς, and also teach and preach in addition to this. That the government of the church, in the ordinary sense of *presiding over* and *making rules for* the church, is not here meant, at least that it is not necessarily meant, seems to me quite plain, from comparing προϊστημι and its derivatives in other places. E. g., in this same epistle, iii. 13, deacons are spoken of who τέκνων καλῶς προϊστάμενοι καὶ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκῶν, *manage their own children and households well*, i. e., take good care of them; for so ver. 13 explains it οἱ γὰρ καλῶς διακονήσαντες=καλῶς προϊστάμενοι. I cannot refrain from adding, that this last passage throws great light on what has been before said about ὁ προΐστάμενος, and serves very much to confirm it.

So, then, προϊστάμενοι and προσεστώτες may mean the performers of any service or services which pertain to the *external* welfare and management of the church. That the πρεσβύτεροι sometimes did such services, is clear from 1 Tim. v. 17. But that others might perform them, is equally clear from Rom. xii. 8; 1 Cor. xii. 28; Rom. xvi. 2, &c.

We can now account for it that the apostle says, in Rom. xii. '8, 'Let ὁ προϊστάμενος do his duty ἐν σπουδῇ, *with diligence, i. e., with active watchful attention and effort.*' But how ἐν σπουδῇ can be applicable to *ruling*, in the common sense of this word, has been a difficulty which has perplexed not a few, who have undertaken to expound this passage. We might exhort a *ruler* to perform the duties of his office with *impartiality*, with a due regard to *justice and equity*, &c.; but to exhort him to *govern ἐν σπουδῇ*, seems hardly congruous.

On the whole, I am brought by a kind of philological necessity to the conclusion, that church *officers*, in the appropriate sense of this word, are not designated by ὁ μεταδιδούς, ὁ προϊστάμενος, and ὁ ἐλεῶν in Rom. xii. 8, but that the apostle refers to individuals in the church, conspicuous for their attention to the duties respectively indicated by these words; which duties were, the giving of money or sustenance, the management of the external temporal affairs and business and interests of the church, and the succouring of the sick and unfortunate by personal attention and effort.

EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

Introduction and Salutation.

1. PAUL, a servant of Jesus Christ, a chosen apostle, set apart for
 2 the gospel of God, | which he formerly declared by his prophets
 3 in the holy Scriptures, | concerning his Son (born of the seed of
 4 David in respect to the flesh, | the decreed Son of God with
 power in respect to the spirit of holiness after his resurrection
 5 from the dead), Jesus Christ our Lord, | (by whom we have re-
 ceived grace and apostleship, in order to promote the obedience
 6 of faith among all nations, for his name's sake, | among whom are
 7 ye also called of Jesus Christ,) | to all who are at Rome, beloved
 of God, chosen saints; grace be unto you, and peace from God
 our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.
- 8 First, I thank my God, through Jesus Christ, on account of
 9 you all, that your faith is spoken of in all the world. For God
 is my witness, whom I serve with my spirit in the gospel of his
 10 Son, how unceasingly I make remembrance of you, | always
 asking in my prayers, that if possible, at some time before long,
 I may (God willing) make a prosperous journey and come to
 11 you. For I am desirous to see you, in order to bestow on you
 12 some spiritual favour, so that you may be confirmed. This also
 [I desire], to be comforted among you by the mutual faith both
 of you and me.
- 13 Moreover, I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that I
 have often purposed to come unto you (but have been hindered
 until now), that I might have some fruit among you, as also
 14 among other Gentiles. I am a debtor both to Greeks and Bar-
 15 barians, both to the learned and the unlearned: such being the
 case, I am ready, according to my ability, to preach the gospel
 even to you who are at Rome.

Subjects of consideration proposed.

- 16 For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ, since it is the power of God for salvation to every one that believeth; to the
 17 Jew first, and then to the Greek. For by it the justification which is of God is revealed, [justification] by faith for the faith-
 18 ful; as it is written: "The just shall live by faith." For the wrath of God from heaven is revealed against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men,

Universal depravity and guilt of the Gentiles.

- 19 Who wickedly hinder the truth; | because that which might be known of God, is manifest in them, inasmuch as God hath manifested it to them; | (for the invisible things of him, since the creation of the world, are clearly seen by the things which are made, even his eternal power and Godhead); so that they are
 20 without excuse; because, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became foolish in their imaginations, and their inconsiderate mind was darkened.
 21 Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, | and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for an image like to mortal man, and fowls, and four-footed beasts, and reptiles.
 22 Wherefore God even gave them up, in the lusts of their hearts, to uncleanness, to dishonour their own bodies among themselves;
 23 who exchanged the true God for a false one, and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed
 24 for ever, Amen! On account of this, God gave them up to base passions; for their women changed their natural use into that
 25 which is against nature. And in like manner also the males, leaving the natural use of the female, burned in their lust toward each other, males with males doing that which is shameful, and receiving in themselves the reward of their error which is due.
 26 And inasmuch as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them up to a reprobate mind, to do those things
 27 which are base; being filled with all iniquity, uncleanness, malice, covetousness, mischief; full of envy, murder, strife, deceit, malevolence; | backbiters, open slanderers, haters of God, railers, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to
 28 parents, | inconsiderate, covenant-breakers, destitute of natural
 29 affection, implacable, unmerciful: who, knowing the ordinance of God that they who do such things are worthy of death, not
 30 only do the same things, but even bestow commendation on those who do them.

The Jews equally guilty with the Gentiles.

- II. **THEREFORE** thou art without excuse, O man, whoever thou art that judgest; for while thou art passing sentence upon another, thou condemnest thyself, since thou who judgest doest
 2 the same things. For we know that the judgment of God is
 3 according to truth, against those who do such things. Dost thou think, then, O man, who condemnest those that do such things, and doest the same, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God?
 4 Or dost thou despise his abounding goodness and forbearance and long-suffering, not acknowledging that the goodness of God
 5 leadeth thee to repentance? According to thy hard and impenitent heart, however, thou art treasuring up for thyself wrath in the day of wrath, when the righteous judgment of God shall be
 6 revealed; who will render to every man according to his works;
 7 to those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life; but to those who are contentious, and disobey the truth and obey unrighteousness,
 9 indignation and wrath. Affliction and distress [shall be] upon every soul of man that doeth evil, first of the Jew and then of
 10 the Greek; but glory and honour and peace [shall be] to every
 11 one who doeth good, first to the Jew and then to the Greek; (for
 12 with God there is no respect of persons; since so many as have sinned without law shall perish without law, and so many as
 13 have sinned under the law shall be condemned by the law; for not hearers of the law are just with God, but the doers of the
 14 law will be justified; for when the Gentiles who have no law, do in a natural state such things as the law requireth, these, being
 15 destitute of the law, are a law to themselves; who shew that the work which the law requireth, is written upon their hearts, their consciences bearing witness, and their thoughts alternately ac-
 16 cusing or excusing); in the day when God shall judge the secret things of men by Jesus Christ, according to my gospel.
 17 If now thou art surnamed *Jew*, and dost lean upon the law,
 18 and make thy boast of God; | and art acquainted with [his] will, and canst distinguish things which differ, being instructed by the
 19 law; thou art confident also of being thyself a guide to the blind,
 20 a light to those who are in darkness, | an instructor of the ignorant, a teacher of little children, one having the representation of true knowledge in the law; dost thou then who teachest another,
 21 not instruct thyself? Dost thou who preacheest against stealing,
 22 thyself steal? Dost thou who forbiddest to commit adultery,

22 thyself commit adultery? Dost thou who abhorrest idols, thyself
 23 commit robbery in holy things? Dost thou who gloriest in the
 24 law, thyself dishonour God by transgressing the law? For as it
 25 is written, "the name of God is on your account blasphemed
 among the Gentiles."

Circumcision indeed is profitable, if thou dost obey the law;
 but if thou art a transgressor of the law, thy circumcision be-
 26 cometh uncircumcision. If, moreover, he who is uncircumcised
 keep the precepts of the law, shall not his uncircumcision be
 27 counted for circumcision? Yea, he who keepeth the law in his
 natural uncircumcised state, will condemn thee, who, in possession
 of the Scriptures and a partaker of circumcision, art a trans-
 gressor of the law. For he is not a Jew, who is one outwardly;
 nor is that which is outward, [merely] in the flesh, circumcision.
 29 But he is a Jew, who is one inwardly; and circumcision is of
 the heart, spiritual not literal; whose praise is not of men, but
 of God.

Answer to some objections. Further confirmation of the depravity and guilt of the Jews.
 General conclusion from the facts stated.

III. 'WHAT then is the advantage of the Jew? Or what the
 profit of circumcision?'

2 Much in diverse respects; the most important however is, that
 they were entrusted with the oracles of God.

3 'What then if some did not believe? Will their unbelief
 make void the faithfulness of God?'

4 By no means; but let God be [counted] true, and every man
 false; as it is written: "That thou mightest be justified when
 thou speakest, and overcome when thou art judged."

5 'But if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of
 God, what shall we say? Is God unjust, who inflicteth punish-
 ment?'

6 (I speak after the manner of men). By no means; otherwise,
 how shall God judge the world?

7 'Still, if God's faithfulness to his word has on account of my
 deceitfulness abounded more unto his glory, why am I any
 longer condemned as a sinner?'

8 Shall we then [say] (as it is slanderously reported and as
 some affirm that we do say): Let us do evil that good may
 come? whose condemnation is just.

9 'What then? Have we any pre-eminence?' None at all;
 for we have already made good the charge against both Jews and

- 10 Gentiles, that they are all under sin. As it is written : “ There
 11 is none righteous, not even one ; there is none who understand-
 12 eth, there is none who seeketh after God ; all have gone out of
 the way, together have they become corrupt ; there is none who
 13 doeth good, not even one. Their throat is an open sepulchre ;
 with their tongues do they deceive. The poison of asps is under
 14 their lips. | Whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness.
 15 } Their feet are swift to shed blood ; destruction and misery attend
 16 } their steps ; | the way of peace they know not. There is no fear
 of God before their eyes.
 19 Now we know whatsoever things the law saith, it speaketh to
 those who are under the law ; so that every mouth must be
 20 stopped, and the whole world become guilty before God, | be-
 cause that by works of law shall no flesh be justified before him,
 for by the law is the knowledge of sin.

Gratuitous justification by Christ is the only way of salvation.

- 21 But now, the justification without law which is of God is re-
 vealed, to which testimony is given by the law and the prophets ;
 22 a justification then which is of God by faith in Jesus Christ ;
 [offered] to all, and [bestowed] on all who believe, for there is
 23 no distinction. For all have sinned and come short of divine
 24 approbation, | being justified freely by his grace through the
 25 redemption which is by Christ Jesus ; whom God hath set forth
 as a propitiatory [sacrifice] by faith in his blood, in order to
 declare his justification through remission, by the forbearance of
 26 God, of sins formerly committed ; in order to declare his justifi-
 cation at the present time ; so that he might be just and yet
 the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus.
 27 Where then is boasting ? It is excluded. By what law ? Of
 28 works ? Nay, but by the law of faith ; for we have come to the
 conclusion, that a man is justified by faith without works of law.
 29 Is he the God of the Jews only ? Is he not also of the Gentiles ?
 30 Yea, of the Gentiles also ; since it is one and the same God,
 who will justify the circumcised by faith and the uncircumcised
 31 by faith. Do we then make void the law through faith ? By
 no means ; we confirm the law.

The Scriptures of the Old Testament teach the doctrine of justification by grace only.

- IV. ‘ WHAT then shall we say that Abraham our father obtained,
 in respect to the flesh ?’

- 2 No ground of glorying; for if Abraham was justified by works, he hath ground of glorying; but [this he hath] not before God.
- 3 For what saith the Scripture? "And Abraham believed God,
- 4 and it was counted to him for righteousness." Now to him that worketh, reward is not counted as a matter of grace, but as a
- 5 debt; but to him who worketh not, but believeth on him who justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness.
- 6 In like manner, also, David pronounceth happy the man, to
- 7 whom God imputeth righteousness without works: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered ;
- 8 blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity."
- 9 [Is] this a declaration of blessedness, then, concerning those who are circumcised [only], or concerning the uncircumcised ? [Concerning the uncircumcised also], for we say that faith was
- 10 counted to Abraham for righteousness. How then was it counted? While he was in a state of circumcision, or of uncircumcision ?
- 11 Not in a state of circumcision, but of uncircumcision. And he received the sign of circumcision, as a seal of the righteousness by faith which [he obtained] in a state of uncircumcision; in order that he might be the father of all the uncircumcised who believe, so that righteousness might also be counted to them ;
- 12 and the father of the circumcised, who are not only of the circumcision, but walk in the steps of that faith which our father Abraham had while in a state of circumcision.
- 13 For the promise was not made by law to Abraham or to his seed, that he should be heir of the word ; but by the righteousness of faith. If now they who are of the law, are heirs, faith is rendered of no effect, and the promise is made void ; for the law worketh wrath, because where there is no law there is no
- 16 transgression. On this account it was of faith, so that it must be of grace, in order that the promise might be sure to all the seed, not only to him who is under the law, but to him who is of
- 17 the faith of Abraham ;—who is the father of us all | (as it is written : "A father of many nations have I made thee"), in the sight of God in whom he believed, who giveth life to the dead,
- 18 and calleth the things which were not, as if they were ; | who, against hope, believed in hope that he should become the father of many nations (according to what had been said : "So shall
- 19 thy seed be") ; | and being not weak in faith, he considered not his own body already dead (as he was about one hundred years
- 20 of age), nor yet the deadness of Sarah's womb ; neither did he

through unbelief doubt the promise of God, but he was strong
 21 in faith, giving glory to God, | and being fully persuaded that
 22 what he had promised he was also able to perform. Wherefore
 23 it was verily counted to him for righteousness. Yet it was not
 recorded merely for his own sake, that it was counted to him; but
 also for our sake to whom it will be counted, to us who believe
 24 on him who raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead, | who was
 delivered up on account of our offences, and was raised for the
 sake of our justification.

The fruits of justification, as to their certainty and extent.

- V. THEREFORE being justified by faith, we have peace with God,
 2 through our Lord Jesus Christ; by whom also we have obtained
 access [to God], through belief in that grace in which we stand,
 and rejoice in hope of the glory of God.
- 3 And not only so, but we rejoice also in our afflictions; knowing
 4 that affliction produceth patience, | and patience approbation, and
 5 approbation hope, | and hope maketh not ashamed; for the love
 of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which is
 6 given to us. For while we were yet without strength, Christ
 7 died in due time for the ungodly. Now scarcely for a just man
 will any one die; although for his benefactor some one, perhaps,
 8 might venture even to die. But God commended his love to us,
 9 in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Much
 more, then, being now justified by his blood, shall we be saved
 10 from wrath by him. For, if, when we were enemies, we were
 reconciled to God by the death of his Son; much more, being
 reconciled, shall we be saved by his life.
- 11 And not only so, but we also rejoice in God through our Lord
 Jesus Christ, by whom we have now obtained reconciliation.
- 12 Therefore, as by one man, sin entered into the world, and death
 by sin; and so death came upon all men, because that all have
 13 sinned; (for until the law sin was in the world, although sin is
 14 not accounted of where there is no law; yet death reigned from
 Adam unto Moses, even over those who had not sinned in like
 15 manner as Adam; who is a type of him that was to come. But
 not as the offence, so the free gift also; for if by the offence of
 one the many died, much more has the grace of God and the
 gift which is by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, abounded
 16 unto the many. Moreover, not as the [condemnation] by one
 who sinned, is the free gift; for sentence was by one [offence]

unto condemnation, but the free gift is unto justification from
 17 many offences. For if by the offence of one death reigned be-
 cause of that one, much more shall they who receive abundance
 of grace and of the gift of justification, reign in life by one, Jesus
 18 Christ); therefore, as by one offence [sentence came] upon all
 men unto condemnation, so by one righteousness [sentence came]
 19 upon all men unto justification of life; for as by the disobedience
 of one man the many were made sinners, so by the obedience of
 one the many will be made righteous.

20 The law moreover was introduced, so that offence should
 21 abound; but where sin abounded, grace superabounded; so that,
 as sin reigned by death, in like manner grace also might reign by
 justification unto eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord.

Gratuitous justification does not encourage men to sin, but restrains them from it.

VI. WHAT shall we say then? May we continue in sin, that
 grace may abound?

2 By no means. How shall we, who are dead to sin, any longer
 3 live in it? Know ye not, that so many of us as have been bap-
 4 tized into Christ Jesus, have been baptized into his death? We
 have then been buried with him by baptism into his death; so
 that, as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the
 Father, in like manner we also should walk in newness of life.
 5 For if we have become kindred with him by a death like unto
 6 his, then we shall also be [kindred] by a resurrection: for we
 know this, that our old man is crucified, as he was, that the body
 of sin might be destroyed, in order that we should no longer
 7 serve sin; for he who is dead, is freed from sin. If now we are
 dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him;
 9 knowing that Christ, being raised from the dead, dieth no more,
 10 death hath no longer any dominion over him. For in that he
 died, he died once for all unto sin; but in that he liveth, he
 11 liveth unto God. In like manner you also must account your-
 selves dead unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ.
 12 Let not sin reign, then, in your mortal body, that ye should
 13 obey the lusts thereof; neither proffer your members to sin as
 instruments of iniquity; but proffer yourselves to God as alive
 from the dead, and your members to God as instruments of
 14 righteousness. For sin shall not have dominion over you; since
 ye are not under the law, but under grace.

- 15 What then? Shall we sin, because we are not under law, but under grace?
- 16 By no means. Know ye not, that to whomsoever ye proffer yourselves as servants ready to obey, ye are servants to him whom ye obey, whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto
- 17 justification? But thanks be to God, that ye were the servants of sin, but have become obedient from the heart to that model
- 18 of doctrine in which ye have been instructed. Moreover being
- 19 freed from sin, ye have become the servants of righteousness (I speak in language common to men, because of the weakness occasioned by your flesh); for as ye have proffered your members as servants to impurity and iniquity in order to commit iniquity, so now proffer your members to righteousness in order to be holy.
- 20 For when ye were the servants of sin, ye were free in respect to
- 21 righteousness. What fruit had ye then, in those things of which
- 22 ye are now ashamed? for the end of those things is death. But now, being freed from sin and having become servants to God, ye have your fruit in respect to holiness, and in the end [ye will
- 23 have] eternal life. For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God, eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord.

Those who are under law cannot be freed from the power and penalty of sin.

- VII. Know ye not, brethren, (for I speak to those acquainted with the law,) that the law hath dominion over a man so long as he
- 2 liveth? For the married woman is bound to her husband so long as he liveth; but if her husband die, she is freed from the
- 3 law of her husband. Therefore, if she marry another while her husband is living, she must be called an adulteress; but if her husband die, she is freed from the law, so that she will not become an adulteress by marrying another husband.
- 4 Thus, my brethren, ye also have become dead to the law by the body of Christ, in order that ye should be joined to another who is risen from the dead; so that we may bring forth fruit
- 5 unto God. For when we were in the flesh, our sinful passions which were by the law, wrought powerfully in our members to
- 6 bring forth fruit unto death; but now we are freed from the law by which we were held in bondage, inasmuch as we have become dead to it; so that we must serve [God] with a new spirit, and not according to the ancient letter.
- 7 'What shall we say then? Is the law sin?'
By no means. Still, I had not known sin except by the law;

for I had not known inordinate desire unless the law had said,
 8 "Thou shalt not desire inordinately." But sin, taking occasion
 by the commandment, wrought out in me all manner of inordi-
 9 nate desire; for without the law sin is dead. Once, moreover, I
 10 was alive without the law; but when the commandment came, sin
 revived, and I died; yea, the commandment which was unto life,
 11 the very same was found to be death to me. For sin taking
 occasion by the commandment deceived me, and by it slew me;
 12 so that the law is holy, and the commandment holy and just and
 good.

13 'Has then that which is good become death unto me?'

By no means; but sin [has become death], in order that it might
 manifest itself as causing death to me by that which is good, so
 that through the commandment sin might be exceedingly sinful.
 14 For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold
 15 under sin. For that which I practise, I approve not; for not
 16 what I approve do I perform, but that which I hate, I do. If
 then I do that which I approve not, I give consent to the law as
 17 good. But now it is no longer I who do this, but sin which
 18 dwelleth in me. For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh,
 there dwelleth no good thing; for to approve is easy for me,
 19 but to do what is good I find no [readiness]. For the good
 which I approve, that I do not; but the evil which I condemn,
 20 that I do. Now if I do that which I approve not, it is no longer
 21 I who do it, but sin which dwelleth in me. I find, then, that it
 is a law to me, when desirous to do good, that evil is near to me.
 22 For I take pleasure in the law of God, as to the inner man;
 23 but I perceive another law in my members, warring against the
 law of my mind, and making me a captive to the law of sin which
 24 is in my members. Wretched man that I am! Who shall de-
 25 liver me from the body which causeth this death? I thank God,
 through Jesus Christ our Lord! Wherefore I, the same person,
 serve with my mind the law of God, but with my flesh the law
 of sin.

A state of grace delivers from the bondage and penalty of sin.

VIII. But now, there is no condemnation to those who are in
 2 Christ Jesus.* For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,
 3 hath freed me from the law of sin and death. For what the law

* *Who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit, is probably spurious here, and is therefore omitted.*

could not accomplish, in that it was weak through the flesh, God [accomplished], who, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and on account of sin, condemned sin in the flesh ;
 4 so that the precepts of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk
 5 not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit. For they
 who are according to the flesh, do mind the things of the flesh ;
 but they who are according to the Spirit, the things of the Spirit.
 6 For the mind of the flesh is death ; but the mind of the Spirit is
 7 life and peace. Because the mind of the flesh is enmity against
 God ; for it is not subject to his law, nor indeed can be. Those
 8 then who are in the flesh cannot please God. · Ye, however, are
 9 not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God
 dwelleth in you. If now any one hath not the Spirit of Christ,
 10 he is none of his ; but if Christ be in you, the body indeed is
 mortified on account of sin, but the Spirit liveth on account of
 11 righteousness. But if the Spirit of him who raised up Jesus
 from the dead, dwelleth in you, he who raised up Christ from
 the dead will also quicken your mortal bodies, because of his
 Spirit which dwelleth in you.
 12 Therefore brethren, we are not debtors to the flesh, to live
 13 according to the flesh ; | for if ye live according to the flesh, ye
 shall die ; but if through the Spirit ye mortify the deeds of the
 14 body, ye shall live. For as many as are led by the Spirit of
 15 God, the same are the sons of God. For ye have not received
 a servile spirit, that ye should again be in fear : but ye have re-
 16 ceived a filial Spirit, by which we cry Abba, Father ! The same
 Spirit beareth witness in our spirit, that we are children of
 17 God. But if children, then heirs ; heirs truly of God, and joint
 heirs with Christ, if so be that we suffer with him in order that
 we may be also glorified with him.

Fruits of the grace and sanctification proffered in the gospel.

18 Moreover I reckon the sufferings of the present time as not
 worthy of regard, when compared with the glory which is to be
 19 revealed to us. For the earnest expectation of the creature is
 20 waiting for the revelation of the children of God. For the
 21 creature was made subject to frailty (not of its own choice, but
 through him who put it in subjection), in hope that this same
 creature may be freed from the bondage of a perishing state, and
 22 [brought] into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For
 we know that every creature sighs and groans together even to

- 23 the present time. Yet not only so, but those who have the first
 24 fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves,
 25 waiting for adoption, the redemption of our body. For we are
 26 saved in hope. Now hope which is seen, is not hope: for what
 27 a man seeth, how doth he still hope for it? But if we hope for
 28 that which we do not see, we patiently wait for it.
- 29 In like manner, also, the Spirit helpeth much our infirmities;
 30 for we know not what we should pray for as we ought; the same
 31 Spirit, however, maketh earnest intercession for us, in sighs
 32 which cannot be uttered; but he who searcheth hearts knoweth
 33 the mind of the Spirit, that he maketh intercession in behalf of
 34 the saints according to the will of God.
- 35 We know, moreover, that all things work together for good to
 36 those who love God, to those who are called according to his
 37 purpose. For those whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to
 38 be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he should
 39 be the first-born among many brethren. Those also whom he
 40 predestinated, the same he likewise called; and those whom he
 41 called, the same he also justified; and those whom he justified,
 42 the same he also glorified.
- 43 What shall we say, then, concerning these things? If God be
 44 for us, who is against us? Even he who spared not his own Son,
 45 but gave him up for us all—how shall he not also with him freely
 46 give us all things? | Who shall accuse the elect of God? It is
 47 God that justifieth; | who is he that condemneth? It is Christ
 48 who died [for us]; yea rather, who has also risen, who moreover
 49 is at the right hand of God, and also intercedeth for us. Who
 50 shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall affliction, or
 51 anguish, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword?
 52 (As it is written: "For thy sake are we continually exposed to
 53 death, we are counted as sheep for the slaughter.") Nay, in all
 54 these things we are more than conquerors through him who loved
 55 us. For I am persuaded that neither death nor life, neither angels
 56 nor principalities, neither things present nor future, nor powers,
 57 | neither height nor depth, nor any other created thing, shall be
 58 able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus
 59 our Lord.

God has a right to make those whom he chooses to be partakers of his favour; and this right he has always exercised.

IX. I SAY the truth in Christ, I do not speak falsely (as my conscience testifieth for me in the Holy Spirit), | that I have great

3 sorrow and continual anguish in my heart. For I could wish
even myself to be devoted to destruction by Christ, instead of
4 my brethren, my kinsmen after the flesh ; | who are Israelites ;
to whom pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the cove-
nants, and the giving of the law, and the rites of service, and the
5 promises ; | whose are the fathers ; and from whom Christ
[descended] in respect to the flesh, who is God over all, blessed
for ever, Amen !

6 However, it is not so that the word of God has been rendered
7 void ; for they are not all Israel who are of Israel ; | neither are
8 all the seed of Abraham children, | but, “in Isaac shall thy seed
be called ;” that is, not the children of the flesh are the children
of God, but the children of promise, are counted for the seed.
9 For the word of promise was thus : According to this time will
I come, and Sarah shall have a son.”

10 And not only so, but Rebecca also, having conceived by one,
11 Isaac our father, | for [the children] being not yet born, neither
having done any thing good or evil, that the purpose of God
according to election might stand, not of works but of him that
12 calleth), | it was said to her ; “The elder shall serve the younger ;”
13 | as it is written : “Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.”
14 “What shall we say then ? Is there unrighteousness with
God ?”

15 By no means ; for he saith to Moses : “I will have mercy on
whomsoever I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on
16 whomsoever I will have compassion.” Therefore it is not of him
that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God who showeth
17 mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh : “For this very
purpose have I roused thee up, that I might show forth my power
18 in thee, and declare my name in all the land.” Therefore on
whom he will he hath mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.

19 Thou wilt say then to me ; Why doth he yet find fault, for
20 who hath resisted his will ? But rather [I may say], Who art
thou, O man, that repliest against God ? Shall the thing formed
21 say to him who formed it : Why hast thou made me thus ? Hath
not the potter power over the clay, to make out of the same
22 lump one vessel to honour and another to dishonour ? What
now if God, purposing to manifest his indignation and make
known his power, endured with much long-suffering the vessels
23 of wrath fitted for destruction ; and that he might make known
the riches of his glory towards the vessels of mercy which he

- 24 had before prepared for glory, | [shewed mercy] even to us whom he hath called, not only of the Jews but also of the Gentiles?
- 25 To the like purpose he saith also in Hosea: "I will call him who was not my people, my people; and her who was not my beloved, beloved. And it shall come to pass, that in the place where it was said to them: 'Ye are not my people,' there shall they be called the sons of the living God."
- 27 Isaiah moreover saith concerning Israel: "Although the number of the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, [only] 28 a remnant shall be saved. For he will execute his word which he hath decreed in righteousness; for the Lord will execute 29 his word decreed concerning the land." Yea, as Isaiah had before said, "Except the Lord of Sabaoth had left us a remnant, we should have been like Sodom, we should have been made like to Gomorrah."
- 30 'What shall we say then?' That the Gentiles, who did not seek after justification, have obtained justification, and that justification, which is by faith; but Israel, who sought after a law of 31 justification, have not attained to a law of justification. Why? Because [they sought] not by faith, but by works of law; for 33 they stumbled at the stone of stumbling; | as it is written: "Behold! I lay in Zion a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence; but every one who believeth on him shall not be ashamed."

The unbelief and rejection of the Jews, and the reception of the Gentiles through faith, are truly consistent with the declarations of the ancient Scriptures.

- X. BRETHREN,** the kind desire of my heart and my prayer to 2 God for them is, that they may be saved. For I bear them witness, that they have a zeal for God, but not according to 3 knowledge. For being ignorant of the justification which is of God, and seeking to establish their own justification, they have 4 not submitted themselves to the justification which is of God. For Christ is the end of the law unto justification, for one who believeth.
- 5 For Moses describeth the justification which is of the law; namely, "The man who doeth these things shall live by them."
- 6 But justification by faith speaketh in this manner: "Say not in thine heart, Who shall ascend into heaven?" that is, to bring 7 down Christ; or, "Who shall descend into the abyss?" that is, 8 to bring up Christ from the dead. But what saith it? "The word is near to thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart; that is, the

- 9 word of faith which we preach. For if thou shalt openly confess the Lord Jesus with thy mouth, and believe in thy heart that God
 10 raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved; because with the heart there is belief unto justification, and with the mouth there
 11 is confession unto salvation. For the Scripture saith: "No one who believeth on him, shall be ashamed."
 12 There is therefore no difference between the Jew and Greek; because there is the same Lord of all, who is rich [in mercy]
 13 unto all them that call upon him; for "every one who calleth on the name of the Lord, shall be saved."
 14 'How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? And how shall they believe in him of whom they
 15 have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? | And how shall they preach, except they be sent?' As it is written: "How beautiful are the feet of those who publish salvation, who proclaim good tidings!"
 16 Yet all have not obeyed the gospel; for Isaiah saith: "Lord, who hath believed our report?"
 17 'Faith, then, cometh by hearing; and hearing by the word of God.'
 18 But I say, Have they not heard? Yea, truly, "their sound hath gone forth into all the earth; their words to the ends of the
 19 world." But I say: Doth not Israel know? First Moses saith; "I will move you to jealousy by that which is no nation; I will
 20 excite you to indignation by a foolish people." But Isaiah is very bold, and saith: "I was found by those who sought me not; I made myself manifest to those who did not inquire for
 21 me." But unto Israel he saith: "All the day long have I stretched out my hand to a disobedient and gainsaying people."

God hath not cast away the Jews entirely and utterly. Some are now saved; and all will finally be converted, with the fulness of the Gentiles. God's dealings with them are unsearchable, but wise.

XI. 'I SAY then, hath God cast away his people?'

- 2 By no means; for I myself am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin. God hath not cast away his people whom he foreknew. Know ye not what the Scripture saith in [the history of] Elijah, when he maketh intercession to God against Israel? 'Lord, they have killed thy prophets, and digged down thine altars; and I only am left, and they are
 3 seeking my life.' But what saith the answer of God to him?

"I have reserved for myself seven thousand men, who have not
 5 bowed the knee to Baal." In like manner, then, there is even at
 the present time a remnant according to the election of grace.
 6 But if it be of grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise
 grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, it is no more
 of grace; otherwise work is no more work.

7 'What then? that which Israel sought after, he hath not
 obtained.'

8 But the elect have obtained it; and the rest were blinded; | as
 it is written: "God hath given them the spirit of slumber, eyes
 9 that see not and ears that hear not, even unto this day." David
 also saith: "Let their table become a snare to catch them, and
 10 an occasion of falling and a recompence to them. Let their eyes
 be darkened so that they cannot see, and their back be always
 bowed down."

11 'I say then, have they stumbled so as utterly to fall?'

By no means; but by their fall salvation [is come] to the Gen-
 12 tiles to provoke their emulation. If now their fall hath been the
 riches of the world, and their degradation the riches of the Gen-
 13 tiles, how much more their fulness? For I say this to you
 Gentiles (inasmuch as I am indeed an apostle of the Gentiles I
 14 do honour to my office), | if by any means I may excite to emula-
 tion some of my kinsmen after the flesh, and save some of them.
 15 For if the casting away of them be the reconciliation of the
 world, what shall the reception of them be but life from the dead.
 16 If, moreover, the first-fruits were holy, so shall the mass be; and
 17 if the root be holy, so will be the branches. But if some of the
 branches were broken off, and thou, being a wild olive, wert
 engrafted in their stead and made partaker of the root and fatness
 18 of the olive, | glory not over the branches; but if thou dost
 19 glory, thou dost not support the root but the root thee. Thou
 wilt say, then: 'The branches were broken off, that I might be
 20 grafted in.' Be it so: they were broken off by unbelief, and
 21 thou standest by faith; be not high-minded but fear; for if God
 spared not the natural branches, then [fear] lest he should not
 spare thee.

22 Behold, then, the kindness and severity of God! Severity
 toward those who have fallen away; but kindness toward thee,
 provided thou dost abide in his kindness, otherwise even thou
 23 shalt be cut off. But even they, unless they continue in unbelief,
 24 shall be grafted in; for God is able again to graft them in. For

if thou wert cut out from the olive which was wild by nature and contrary to thy nature, how much more shall the natural branches be grafted into their own olive !

- 25 Moreover I would not have you ignorant, brethren, of this mystery (lest ye should be wise in your own conceit), that blindness has come upon Israel in part, until the fulness of the Gen-
 26 tiles shall come in. And thus all Israel shall be saved: even as it is written: "A deliverer shall come out of Zion, and shall turn
 27 away ungodliness from Jacob;" | also: "This is my covenant
 28 with them, when I shall take away their sins." In respect to the gospel [they have become] enemies on your account; but in respect to the election [they are] beloved for their fathers' sake.
 29 For the gifts and callings of God, he will not repent of. For as ye were formerly disobedient to God, but have now obtained
 31 mercy through their unbelief; so they too have now become disobedient, that they may obtain mercy through the mercy shown
 32 to you. For God concluded all in unbelief, so that he might have mercy on all.
 33 O the boundless riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his counsels, and his ways past
 34 finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who
 35 hath been his counsellor? Or who hath first given him any
 36 thing, and it will be repaid? For of him, and by him, and for him, are all things; to him be glory for ever, Amen !

Exhortation to piety, humility, diligent improvement of gifts, kind sympathy and benevolent feeling.

XII. I ENTREAT you, therefore, by the tender mercies of God, to present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God which
 2 is your rational service. And be not conformed to this world; but be transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may learn what the will of God is, even that which is good and acceptable and perfect.

- 3 I say, moreover, by the grace given to me, to every one among you, that he think not of himself more highly than he ought to think, but that he think modestly, according to the measure of
 4 faith which God hath imparted to him. For as in one body we have many members, but all the members have not the same
 5 office, so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and are members one of another.

- 6 Having then gifts which differ according to the grace that is

- given us, whether prophecy, [let it be] according to the proportion of faith ; | whether ministry, [let there be diligence] in ministration ; whether teaching, in instruction ; | or exhorting, in exhortation. Let the distributor [do his duty] with simplicity ; the superintendant, with diligence ; he who performs offices of compassion, with cheerfulness. Let benevolence be sincere ; abhor that which is evil ; cleave to that which is good.
- 10 As to brotherly love, [be] kindly affectionate one toward another ; as to honour, give to each other the preference ; | as to diligence, be not slothful ; be fervent in spirit ; engaged in the Lord's service ; | rejoice in hope ; be patient in affliction ; persevere in prayer ; make the wants of the saints your own ; practise hospitality. Bless those who curse you ; bless, and curse not. Rejoice with those who rejoice ; and weep with those who weep. Think mutually the same thing ; do not regard high things, but suffer yourselves to be influenced by humble ones. Be not wise in your own conceit.
- 17 Render to no man evil for evil ; seek after that which is good in the sight of all. If it be possible, so far as in you lieth, be at peace with all men. Avenge not yourselves, beloved, but defer anger ; for it is written : "Retribution is mine, I will render it, saith the Lord." Therefore, "if thine enemy hunger, feed him ; if he thirst, give him drink ; for in so doing, thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head." Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good.

Exhortation to obey civil rulers, and to exhibit a kind and peaceable demeanour towards all men.

- XIII.** LET every soul be subject to the supreme magistracies ; for there is no magistracy except of God ; and those which be, are ordained of God. So he that resisteth the magistracy, resisteth the ordinance of God ; and they who resist, shall receive for themselves condemnation. For rulers are not a terror to good works but to evil ones ; and wilt thou not stand in awe of the magistracy ? Do good, and thou shalt have praise for it ; for [the magistrate] is a servant of God for thy benefit. But if thou doest evil, fear ; for he beareth the sword not in vain, since he is the minister of God, avenging unto indignation the evil-doer.
- 5 Therefore we ought to yield subjection, not only because of indignation, but for conscience' sake.
- 6 On this very account also pay tribute ; for they are God's ministers who attend to this matter. Therefore render to all that which

is due; tribute, to whom tribute; custom, to whom custom; fear,
 8 to whom fear; honour, to whom honour. Owe no man any
 thing, except to love one another; for he who loveth another
 9 fulfilleth the law. For this [is the law]: "Thou shalt not com-
 mit adultery; thou shalt not kill; thou shalt not steal; thou
 shalt not covet;" and if there be any other command, it is sum-
 marily comprehended in this precept, namely: "Thou shalt love
 10 thy neighbour as thyself." Love worketh no ill to its neighbour;
 love, then, is the fulfilling of the law.
 11 And this [do], since ye know the time, that the hour has already
 come when we should awake out of sleep; for now is our salva-
 12 tion nearer than when we believed. The night is far spent, the
 day is at hand; let us put away then the works of darkness, and
 13 put on the armour of light. Let us walk in a becoming manner,
 as in the day; not in revelling and drunkenness, not in chamber-
 14 ing and wantonness, not in strife and bitter envy; | but put ye
 on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh, in
 respect to its lusts.

Caution against making external rites and observances matters of division and contention among
 Christians.

XIV. HIM that is weak in faith receive with kindness, not in order
 2 to judge of his opinions. One believeth that he may eat every
 3 thing; but he who is weak eateth herbs. Let not him who
 eateth, despise him who eateth not; nor him who eateth not,
 4 condemn him who eateth; for God hath accepted him. Who art
 thou, that condemnest the servant of another? By his own
 master he standeth or falleth; and he shall stand, for God is
 able to make him stand.
 5 One man esteemeth one day above another; another esteemeth
 every day [alike]; let each one be fully persuaded in his own
 6 mind. He who regardeth the day, regardeth it for [the honour-
 ing of] the Lord; and he who regardeth not the day, for [the
 honouring of] the Lord he doth not regard it. Likewise he
 who eateth, eateth for [the honouring of] the Lord, for he giveth
 God thanks; and he who eateth not for [the honouring of] the
 7 Lord he eateth not, and giveth God thanks. For no one of us
 8 liveth to himself; and no one of us dieth to himself; for whether
 we live, we live to the Lord, and whether we die we die to the
 9 Lord; whether we live, then, or die, we are the Lord's. For

Christ both died and revived for this very purpose, that he might be Lord of the dead and of the living.

- 10 But thou, why dost thou condemn thy brother? Even thou, why dost thou despise thy brother? For we must all stand
- 11 before the judgment seat of Christ. For it is written, "As I live saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every
- 12 tongue shall confess to God." Every one of us, therefore, must give an account of himself to God.
- 13 Let us, then, no longer judge one another; but rather let us decide not to put a stumbling-block or a cause of falling in the
- 14 way of a brother. I know, and am persuaded of the Lord Jesus, that nothing is unclean of itself; but to him who deemeth
- 15 any thing to be unclean, it is unclean. Now if thy brother is grieved because of meat, thou dost not walk as love requireth;
- 16 destroy not him by thy meat, for whom Christ died. Let not
- 17 your good, then, be evil spoken of; for the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.
- 18 Now he who serveth Christ, as to these things, is acceptable to
- 19 God and approved by men. Therefore let us strive after peace
- 20 and mutual edification. Destroy not the work of God on account of meat. All [meats] are clean; yet they are hurtful to him,
- 21 who eateth so as to give offence thereby. It is good not to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor [to do any thing] whereby thy brother stumbleth, or hath cause of offence, or is made weak.
- 22 Hast thou faith, keep it to thyself before God. Happy the man,
- 23 who doth not condemn himself in that which he alloweth! But he who doubteth, is condemned if he eat, because it is not of faith; and every thing which is not of faith, is sin.

Various exhortations to charity and kindness. Expression of the apostle's regard for the church at Rome, of his intention to visit them, and of his desire for an interest in their prayers.

- XV. WE however, who are strong, ought to bear with the in-
- 2 firmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves. Let each one of us please his neighbour, in respect to that which is good,
- 3 unto edification. For Christ did not seek his own pleasure; but [with him it was] according to that which was written: "The reproaches of those who reproached thee, have fallen upon me."
- 4 For whatsoever things were written in ancient times, were written for our instruction; that through patience and the admonition of the Scriptures, we might obtain hope.

- 5 Now may the God from whom is patience and admonition, give to you mutual unity of sentiment, according to Christ Jesus
6 that with one mind and with one voice ye may glorify God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ !
- 7 Wherefore deal kindly with each other, even as Christ hath dealt kindly with you, unto the glory of God.
- 8 I say, moreover, that Jesus Christ became the minister of the circumcision, on account of the truth of God, in order to confirm
9 the promises made to the fathers ; also, that the Gentiles shall glorify God for his mercy ; even as it is written : " Therefore will I celebrate thy praise among the Gentiles, and to thy name
10 will I sing." And again he saith : " Rejoice ye Gentiles, with
11 his people." And again : " Praise the Lord, all ye Gentiles ; and
12 laud him, all ye people." And again Isaiah saith ; " There shall be a root of Jesse, and one shall rise to be a leader of the Gentiles : upon him shall the Gentiles place their hopes."
- 13 Now may the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that you may abound in hope, through the influence of the Holy Spirit !
- 14 Moreover I am myself well persuaded concerning you, my brethren, that ye are full of kindness, abounding in all knowledge, and able to admonish one another. But I have written to you in part the more boldly, brethren, as one repeating admonitions, because of the grace which is bestowed by God upon me,
16 | that I should be a minister of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles, performing the office of a priest in respect to the gospel of God, that the offering of the Gentiles might be acceptable, being
17 purified by the Holy Spirit. I have then cause of glorying in
18 Christ Jesus, as to those things which pertain to God : for I will not venture to mention any thing which Christ hath not wrought by me, in order to bring the Gentiles to obedience, by word and
19 by deed, | by the power of signs and wonders, by the power of the Holy Spirit ; so that from Jerusalem and round about, even
20 to Illyricum, I have fully proclaimed the gospel of Christ, | and I was strongly desirous so to preach the gospel (not where Christ was named, lest I should build on another man's foundation, | but) as it is written : " They shall see to whom no declaration was made respecting him, and they who have not heard shall understand."
- 22 On this account I have been greatly hindered from coming to
23 you. But now, having no longer any place in these regions

24 and being desirous for many years of making you a visit ; when-
 ever I may go into Spain, I hope, as I pass on, to see you, and
 to be sent on my way thither, when I am in part first satisfied
 25 with your company. But at present I am going to Jerusalem,
 26 to supply the wants of the saints.—For it hath seemed good to
 Macedonia and Achaia, to make some contribution for the saints
 27 in poverty at Jerusalem. [I say] it hath seemed good, for verily
 they are debtors ; because if the Gentiles have shared in their
 spiritual things, they ought surely to assist them in temporal
 28 things. Now when this duty shall have been performed, and
 this fruit secured to them, I shall pass through the midst of you
 29 into Spain. I know, also, that when I come to you, I shall
 come with abundant blessings of the gospel of Christ.
 30 Moreover I beseech you, brethren, by our Lord Jesus Christ
 and by the love of the Spirit, that ye strive together for me, in
 31 your prayers to God in my behalf, | that I may be delivered
 from the unbelieving in Judea, and that my service for Jeru-
 32 salem may be acceptable to the saints ; [also] that I may come
 to you with joy (if God will), and may be refreshed among you
 33 The God of peace be with you all, Amen !

Various salutations. Caution against divisions. Conclusion.

XVI. Now I commend to you Phebe our sister, who is a deacon-
 2 ess of the church of Cenchrea, | that ye may receive her in the
 Lord in a manner worthy of the saints, and give her assistance
 in any thing wherein she may need it of you ; for she herself
 hath been a helper of many, and especially of me.
 3 Salute Priscilla and Aquila, my fellow-labourers in Christ Je-
 4 sus | (who exposed themselves to great danger in my behalf ; to
 whom not only I myself am grateful, but even all the churches
 of the Gentiles) ; | and the church which is at their house.
 5 Salute Epenetus, my beloved, who is the first fruit of Asia in
 6 Christ. Salute Mary, who laboured much for us. Salute An-
 7 dronicus and Junias, my kinsmen and fellow-prisoners, who are of
 8 note among the apostles, and who were before me in Christ. Sa-
 9 lute Amplias my beloved in the Lord. Salute Urbanus, our
 10 fellow-labourer in Christ. Salute them of the household of
 11 Aristobulus. Salute Herodian, my kinsman. Salute them of
 12 the household of Narcissus, who are in the Lord. Salute Try-
 phene and Tryphosa, who labour in the Lord. Salute Persis-

13 the beloved, who laboured much in the Lord. Salute Rufus,
14 elect in the Lord, and his mother, and mine. Salute Asyn-
critus, Phlegon, Hermas, Patrobas, Hermes, and the brethren
15 with them.—Salute Philologus and Julias, Nereus and his sister,
16 and Olympas, and all the saints with them. Salute each other
with a holy kiss. All the churches of Christ salute you.

17 Moreover I beseech you, brethren, to beware of those who
occasion divisions and offences, contrary to the doctrines
18 which ye have learned. For such serve not the Lord Jesus
Christ, but their own appetite; and by flattery and fair speeches
19 they beguile the minds of the simple. For your obedience is
known to all; I rejoice therefore concerning you, and desire
you to be wise in respect to that which is good, but simple in
20 respect to that which is evil. May the God of all peace shortly
bruise Satan under your feet! The grace of our Lord Jesus
Christ be with you!

21 Timothy my fellow-labourer, and Luke and Jason, and Sosi-
22 pater, my kinsmen, salute you. (I Tertius, who wrote this
23 epistle, salute you in the Lord.) Gaius saluteth you, who is my
host and that of the whole church. Erastus saluteth you, the
24 chamberlain of the city, and Quartus, a brother. The grace of
our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all, Amen!

25 Now unto him who is able to establish you, according to my
gospel, even the gospel of Jesus Christ; according to the reve-
lation of the mystery which was kept silent in ancient times,
26 | but is now manifested by the prophetic Scriptures, [and] ac-
cording to the command of the eternal God made known to all
27 nations for the obedience of faith;—to the only wise God,
through Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever, Amen!

APPENDIX.

The object of this Appendix, is to present a brief view of the most distinguished commentators, ancient and modern, upon the Epistle to the Romans.

Origen (†253), Comm. in Ep. ad Rom., in Vol. IV. ed. de la Rue; extant only in the Latin translation of Rufinus, by whom it was abridged in some places, and enlarged in others. Like all of Origen's expositions, it contains not a little that is fanciful or arbitrary; but it also contains some good hints.

Chrysostom (†407). Homil. XXXII. in Ep. ad Rom., Vol. IX. ed. Montf.; distinguished by much sound interpretation, simplicity of representation, elegance of language, and a glowing ardour of piety. The master-piece of ancient commentary.

Augustine (†430), *Inchoata Expos. Ep. ad Rom.*, also *Expos. quarundam Proposit. ex Ep. ad Rom.*, in Vol. II. Opp., ed. Benedict; dogmatic rather than philological, yet not without acuteness.

Theodoret († circa 450), whose commentary is contained in Vol. III., ed. Halle. His interpretations are, for the most part, brief, plain, grammatical, and direct. But they are not always well studied, nor very weighty. He is inferior to Chrysostom in his remarks on this epistle.

Oecumenius (cent. 10), Comm. in Ep. Pauli, Paris, 1631; contains excerpts from Chrysostom, Photius, Basil, &c., with remarks of his own. They are highly valued by critics.

Theophylact (cent. 11), Comm. in Ep. Pauli, Lond. 1630; contains an abridgment of Chrysostom, which is very acceptable to the beginner in the reading of Greek commentary; even more so than the original, as it is exceedingly easy and plain.

Besides these, there is a Comm. of Pelagius, printed in Hieron. Opp. Tom. V. ed. Mart., abridged and augmented by Cassiodorus, so that what is genuine can no longer be certainly ascertained. Also Hilary (commonly named *Ambrosiaster*) published a Comm. on the 13 Epistles of Paul. It is of little value. Who this Hilary was is unknown.

Thomas Aquinas (†1274), Comm. in Ep. Pauli. Ant. 1591; contains some very acute *theological* commentary; *philological* is not to be expected from him.

Erasmus (†1536), Paraphrasis in Ep. ad Rom., in Crit. Sac. Tom. VII.; fine Latin, and many good remarks. The main object of the epistle he does not seem to have rightly apprehended.

Calvin, Comm. &c., in Opp., Tom. VII.; fundamental investigation of the logic and course of thought contained in the epistle; very little verbal criticism. Many a difficulty is solved without any appearance of effort, or any show of learning. Calvin is by far the most distinguished of all the commentators of his times.

Melancthon and Zuingle wrote *Scholia* merely, on the Ep. to the Romans. Both exhibit good hints, but not much philology. Their *Notes* are contained in their respective *Works*.

Beza (†1605), Nov. Test. 1598. His Notes on Romans are valuable in a grammatical and philological point of view. He was an excellent Greek scholar; and his Notes are almost always worth consulting.

Bucer (†1551), Metaphrases et Enarrationes Ep. Pauli, 1586; distinguished for natural and artless interpretation, and a good talent for this department of labour.

Grotius (†1645), Comm. in Opp.; also separately, Par. 1644, 2 Vols. Remarks philological, grammatical, historical, antiquarian, &c., distinguished all the exegetical works of Grotius, beyond those of any writer before him, or in his day. "The *shell* he takes off with wonderful dexterity; but the *nut* he seldom tastes, and more seldom relishes."

Hunnius, Justinian, Cornelius a Lapide, Baldwin, Cocceius, Seb. Schmidt, Limborch, S. J. Baumgarten, J. B. Carpzov, Wolf, Heumann, C. Schmid, have all written commentaries, more or less, on the Ep. to the Romans. Some good things may be found in most of them; but hardly enough to repay the trouble of reading at the present day.

In the *Critici Sacri*, (Amstelod.), are contained the Comm. of Valla, Revius, Erasmus, Vatablus, Castalio, Clarius, Zegerus, Drusius, Casaubonus, Gualterius, Cameronius, Jac. and Ludov. Capellus, and Grotius. Of these, Drusius, Erasmus, Clarius, Grotius, Cameronius, and J. Capellus, are especially worth consulting.

J. A. Turretin (†1737), Prælectiones in Ep. ad Romanos (in Opp.) of distinguished exegetical talent; for the most part his interpreta-

tion is simple and natural, and adorned with some admirable references to the classics. A truly *multum in parvo* book.

Koppe (1791), in *Novo Test. Koppiano*. The *manner* of the interpretation is good, being simple and philological. But Koppe had not deeply studied this epistle, nor does he seem to have imbibed the true spirit of it.

Besides the commentators in form, already named, there are several important *subsidiary* works; *e. g.*, Schöttgen, *Horae Talmudicae*, Tom. II. Elsner, *Observatt. Sacrae*, Tom. II. Kypke, *Observatt. Sac.* Tom. II. Bauer, *Philol. Thucyd. Paulina*. Raphel, *Annot. Philol.* in *N. Test. ex Xenophonte*, &c., Vol. II. Palairer, *Observ. Philol. Crit.* in *N. Test.* Krebs, *Observatt. e Josepho*. Lösner, *Observatt. e Philone*. Münthe, *Observ. e Diodoro*. Rambach, *Introduct. histor. theol.* in *Ep. Pauli ad Romanos*.


Recent works on the epistle to the Romans are those of Platt and Tholuck; both of them excellent, but especially the latter. Tholuck has greatly the advantage as a philologist. Of him I have sufficiently spoken in my preface to the first edition. I regret much that his new edition corrected, with *Excursus*, &c., has not yet come to hand in this country.

Of the very recent works on this epistle, I have spoken sufficiently in my preface to the present edition; and therefore need not here recount them.

The English works on the Epistle to the Romans, are too well known to need mentioning or recommending here. Henry, Whitby, Doddridge, Guise, John Taylor, Macknight, Scott, A. Clarke, Bloomfield, and many others, are known to all who study commentary.







**UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY
BERKELEY**

**Return to desk from which borrowed.
This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.**

2 FEB 51 HE

9 Mar 54 DJ

FEB 23 1968 LU

FEB 23 1968 08

58202

BS2665

S8

1854

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

